Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Crim Pro Case Digest
Crim Pro Case Digest
06/25/2015
2. People v. Regalario
Facts: Regalario and 6 others were found guilty of murder of Menardo Garcia.
RTC Judgment conviction was promulgated on January 17 and a copy of which
was received by the appellants counsel the next day, January 18.
January 31, appellants filed MR but the court denied on Feb 22.
RTC March 14, appellants filed notice of appeal but the trial court denied for
having been filed out of time.
Neither the State nor private prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the appeal
made by the appellants nor objected to the order of the trial court to forward the
records to the SC for appellate review
August 2, 1991, said court directed that the records of this case and the
transcripts of the proceedings had therein be forwarded to this Court
ISSUE:
1. On the matter of filing within the reglamentary period:
Whether the lower court erred in denying notice of appeal on the ground of being
filed out of time.
Appelants claim: computation of 15 days within which to file notice of appeal
should have been counted from Feb 23 (day after MR was denied) and not from
Jan 31 (day the verdict pre-MR was given)
o In Shourt, the appellants claim that the 15 day reglamentary period
should have restarted on the day of the denial of the MR.
2. On the matter concerning the syllabus topic, Estoppel by laches to bar attacks on
jurisdiction
(Counsel for the state questions authority of the Supreme Court to review the
case)
Ruling of the lower court:
(Issue of procedure is being questioned for the first time in the SC)
Ruling of the SC
(TRIAL COURT DENIAL OF NOTICEO APPEAL AFFIRMED):
1. The notice of appeal was filed beyond the reglamentary period set by law
Sec 6 of Rule 122 states thatappeal must be taken 15 days from promulgation
or notice of judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of order overruling the motion shall have been
served upon the accused or his attorney
o The rule states period shall only be interrupted thus appellants only had 1
day which to file notice of appeal with the trial court
2. Estoppel by laches to bar attacks jurisdiction of the court had already attached Neither
the public or private prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the appeal or objected to the
order of the trial court to forward records to the SC for appellate review. It was only after
appellants had already filed their briefs with the SC that the counsels for the state raised the
issue of belated appellate jurisdiction of the SC in the case.
RULING:
Accused-appellants Regalario, Pabillar and De Chavez are entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority under paragraph 2, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed, in the proper period. As reduced by one degree, the maximum imposable
penalty for these three appellants shall be within the range of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellants Alex Regalario y Villagracia, Carlos Pabillar y Villon and Rolando de
Chavez y Montalbo are hereby each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The death indemnity to be paid by all the accused-appellants to the heirs of Menardo Garcia is increased
to P50,000.00. As thus MODIFIED, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
November 8, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the same
was filed by one Atty. Rodolfo A. Lat, who failed to show his authority to sue and
sign the corresponding certification against forum shopping. It argued that Atty.
Lat's act of signing the certification against forum shopping was a clear violation
of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court
RTC -March 22, 2002, granted petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the
case without prejudice, ruling that it is mandatory that the certification must be
executed by the petitioner himself, and not by counsel.
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an Order
July 9, 2002.
appeal by respondent, the CA, in its Decision dated March 23, 2007, reversed and
set aside the trial court's order.
o The CA ruled that the required certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory and that the same must be signed by the plaintiff or principal
party concerned and not by counsel; and in case of corporations, the
physical act of signing may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity
by specifically authorized individuals. However, the CA pointed out that the
factual circumstances of the case warranted the liberal application of the
rules and, as such, ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was later denied by the CA in the
Resolution September 3, 2007
Hence, the petition for Review on Certiorari
ISSUE:
1. The main issue in this case is whether Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to
sign the certification against forum shopping on its behalf and
2. w/o petitioner is esptopped by laches from raising the defect in respondents certificate of
non-forum shopping.
HELD:
1. We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be
signed by the principal parties.If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition,
the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. With respect to a corporation,
the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a
specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be
disclosed in such document.
The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere
amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice. Same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on
behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized
to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.
There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat,
through a board resolution, to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping
on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum shopping appended to the
complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of respondent's complaint for
Insurance Loss and Damages against petitioner.
The Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not necessitate the relaxation
of the rules. There was no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly, to show subsequent
compliance with the requirement of the law.
2. Respondent's allegation that petitioner is estopped by laches from raising the
defect in respondent's certificate of non-forum shopping does not hold water.
In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, we held that if a complaint is filed for and in
behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An
unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss
the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
Accordingly, since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by respondent to file the complaint and
sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, the complaint is considered
not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary consequence, is dismissable due to lack of
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice;
that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of
the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be
bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. [if !
supportFootnotes][28][endif]
Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the RTC, Branch 8,
Manila, the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.
Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is
not estopped from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the
proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Regalado v. Go,[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] the Court held that laches should be clearly
present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the
exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack
of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case.
In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction
must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to
assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question
of jurisdiction.
The factual setting attendant in Sibonghanoy is not similar to that of the present
case so as to make it fall under the doctrine of estoppel by laches. Here, the trial court's
jurisdiction was questioned by the petitioner during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings,
and it cannot be said that considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to attach.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated March 23, 2007 and September 3, 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75895 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, dated
March 22, 2002 and July 9, 2002, respectively, in Civil Case No. 99-95561, are
REINSTATED.
3. People v. Magallanes
Facts:
Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder (of Gargar and
Lumangyao) were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against 14 persons, 5 whom
are members of the PNP.
Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment
Prosecution rested its case and started to receive the evidence for the accused
Private prosecutor, 24 June 1994, moved for the transmittal of the records of
the case to the SB on the ground that, pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994
in RP vs Asuncion, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases because the
offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers.
RTC issued an order denying the motion
The prosecution, represented by the OSG, prayed for a TRO challenging the
refusal of the respondent Judge Magallanes to transfer the cases to the SB
15 August 1994, the trial court, thru respondent Judge, ruled that the
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject cases because the
informations do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers
o People vs. Montilla, it held that the allegation in the informations that the
accused PNP officers took advantage of their office in the commission of
the offense charged is merely an allegation of an aggravating
circumstance. It further stated that a public office is not a constituent
element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense
intimately connected with the office. It then denied the motion for transfer
of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the case
should continue
On 7 September 1994, 10 the trial court issued an order denying the motion
On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed with us a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order challenging the refusal of the
respondent Judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan
Issue:
w/n RTC of Bacolod City has jurisdiction over the case instead of the SB- YES
Ruling :
At the time the information in the said cases were filed, the law governing the
jurisdiction of the SB was Sec 4 of PD NO. 1606
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and
not by the result of evidence after trial
Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies
committed by public officers or employees under Section 4(a) (2) above, it is not
enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the
offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their office
For lack of an allegation in the informations that the offense were committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected
with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within
the jurisdiction of the RTC and not of the SB
o Montilla vs. Hilario 18 that an offense may be considered as committed in
relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office, or if the office is a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such
3.1
Adaza vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 154886
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against
the spouses Mayor Adaza and wife Aristela Adaza.
Two Informations filed before the Sandiganbayan: falsification of voucher by
counterfeiting the signature of PTA President Mejoranda and falsification of DBP
check by counterfeiting the signature of Mejoranda, relating to the construction of
a school bldg consisting of 2 classrooms.
Sandiganbayan found Mayor Adaza guilty in the first case, counterfeiting the
signature of PTA President Mejoranda, but acquitted him and his wife in the
second case.
ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction if there was no allegation showing
that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately connected to
the duties of his office as mayor?
RULING: No. For an offense to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
(2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph A of Section 4;
and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
It is undisputed that at the time the alleged crime was committed, he was the
municipal mayor of Jose Dalman, a position corresponding to salary grade 27 under the
Local Government Code of 1991,[44] which fact was properly alleged in the information. It is
thus imperative to determine whether the offense, as charged, may be considered as having
been committed in relation to office as this phrase is employed in the above-quoted
provision of R.A. 8249. For, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction, it is
essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and
the discharge of official duties be alleged in the information.[45]
In Montilla v. Hilario,[46] this Court held that for an offense to be committed in
relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and
not accidental, such that the offense cannot exist without the office.
People v. Montejo,[47] by way of exception, enunciated the principle that although
public office is not an element of the offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, the accused is
held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.
It bears noting that in Montejo,[58] where this Court held that the allegations in the
information for murder were sufficient to bring the case squarely within the meaning of an
offense committed in relation to the accuseds public office, the phrase committed in relation
to public office does not even appear in the information, which only underscores the fact
that said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus
The offender under Article 172 must be a private individual or maybe a public officer,
employee or notary public who does not take advantage of his official position.[62] Under
Article 171, an essential element of the crime is that the act of falsification must be
committed by a public officer, employee or notary who takes advantage of his official
position.
Although petitioner was described in the information as a public officer there was
no allegation showing that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was
intimately connected to the duties of his office as mayor to bring the case within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Neither was there any allegation to show how he made
use of his position as mayor to facilitate the commission of the crimes charged. For the
purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is this allegation that is controlling, not the evidence
presented by the prosecution during the trial.
However, the prosecution is not precluded from filing the appropriate charge against
him before the proper court.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 19, 2002 and Resolution dated
July 3, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.
7. People v. Cawaling (1) the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction over informations for murder committed by public officers, including a town
mayor
FACTS:
, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alexander Mortel filed, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, 10 an Information for murder 11 against
the appellants and Andres Fontamillas.
o Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas, with the
assistance of their lawyers Atty. Abelardo V. Calsado and Juanito Dimaano,
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 15, 1988; 12 while
Accused Cawaling, assisted by Counsel Jovencio Q. Mayor, entered a plea
of not guilty on March 16, 1988. 13
After due trial, 14 the court a quo 15 rendered its Decision dated October 21,
1994, 16 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) ULYSSES M. CAWALING, (2) ERNESTO
TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO DELOS SANTOS, (4) HILARIO CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES
FONTAMILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER under the
Information, dated June 4, 1987, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law.
Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed
jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular
courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public
officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation
to their office.
HELD:
We do not agree.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it
may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new
legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal.
The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case
at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the
statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively
taken cognizance of by the latter. 33
In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861,
quoted earlier, lists two requisites that must concur before the Sandiganbayan
may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years, or higher than a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000). 34 Sanchez
vs. Demetriou 35 clarified that murder or homicide may be committed both by
public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive
element of said crime, viz.:
Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it
is thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to
have been committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their
offices."
Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation
that appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their
office. The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., 36 "[I]n
the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not
involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present case.
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 37
In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the
office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their
functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. 38
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the award of P6,000 as actual damages is DELETED, and (2) the award for loss of earning
capacity is INCREASED to P928,000. Costs against appellant.
8. Subido v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
On June 25, 1992, Bayani Subido Jr., Commissioner of BID and Rene Parina, a BID
special agent, while in the performance of their official functions, issued and implemented a
warrant of arrest against James J. Maksimukm knowing fully well that the BID decision
requiring Maksimuk for a period of 43 days, causing him undue injury.
Subido and Parina were charged with Arbitrary Detention defined and punished by
Art 124 of RPC. For their part, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, contending that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case since when it was filed, Subido was no
longer part of the service and Parina was not occupying a position corresponding to salary
grade 27
Issue: w/o Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case
Ruling:
Yes. The SB had jurisdiction over the case by virtue of SECTION 2 of RA 7975,
which amended SECTION 4 of PD No 1606
Sec 2: Sec 4 of PD NO 1606 is hereby further amended to read as follows:
o Sec 4: Jurisdiction- the SB shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of RA no 3019, where or one more of the principal accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether
in permanent, actiong or interim capacity, AT THE TIME OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE:
Officials of the executive branch grade 27
All other national and local officials classified as grade 27
o b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials
o c. civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with the executive
oder nos 1,2,14 and 14-A
In case where non of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to the salary grade 27 or higher, PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper RTC
Finally, the petitioners' invocation of the prohibition against the retroactivity of
penal laws is misplaced. Simply put, R.A. No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal laws
or statutes are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violation; 28 or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide for their punishment. 29 R.A. No. 7975, in further
amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, mode of
appeal, and other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e., one which
prescribes rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress
for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.
Contrary to the claims of the petitioners, RA 7975 applies since what is considered is
the time of the commission of the crime, during which Subido was still Commissioner of
BID. Similarly, although Parina was holding a position with a classification lower than salary
grade 27, it still applies to him since he is prosecuted as a co-conspirator of Subido, the
principal accused. Jurisdiction is only vested in other courts if none of the principal accused
where occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27.
All told, as a procedural and curative statute, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be given retroactive effect, there
being no impairment of contractual or vested rights. 33
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned resolution and orders of the
respondent Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
ISSUE: is whether or not at the time of the filing of the informations on November 2,
1995 the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the cases against petitioner for violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
HELD: NO. The SB did not have jurisdiction.
RATIO:
The SB has jurisdiction over offenses and felonies, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, where
the position accused holds a position with salary grade 27 or higher.
At the time of the commission of the offense, in 1992, he was occupying the position
of Director II, salary grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the RTC.
The SB has no jurisdiction over violations of Sec 3 a and e as amended, unless
committed by public officials and employees with salary grade 27 or higher, in relation to
their office.
the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan, issued on August 5, 1998, September 21, 1998, and December 16, 1998, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 23016 and 23017, and makes the temporary restraining order permanent.
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said
cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate
informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code, 6 and two for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987
during petitioner's incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash
The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the
suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, 9 to set aside the resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan
dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit
petitioner to file said reply.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16,
1995.
June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the "proper
court" for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995,
were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases
The Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of the offense or
thereafter, is determined by his classification under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Thus
since the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of the offenses and
the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade "27", it is a conclusion
beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused herein.
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007.
He prayed, among others, that the Court annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the order
suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995
denying the motion to refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary
restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7, 1995,
resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for.
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining
the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen
days after its complete publication on February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of general
circulation.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the
regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan
shall be referred to the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines in determining
jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong: 34
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction
over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute
changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior
to the enactment of the statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule. The provision is
transitory in nature and expresses the legislature's intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to "criminal
cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan." To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.
Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are found in other laws
reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts. 35 There is no reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any
different.
The term "proper courts," as used in Section 7, means "courts of competent jurisdiction," and such
jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read
in isolation but construed in conjunction with the latter.
The term "proper courts" as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to "regular courts," but includes
as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have
not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed the term "proper regular courts" or "regular courts"
instead of "proper courts." Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term "regular courts," not "proper courts":
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27,"
or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
1.
If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval of R.A.
No. 8249, said law does not apply.
2.
If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249,
then said law applies.
(a)
If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction.
(b)
If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case shall be referred
to the regular courts.
(c)
If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court, the latter loses
jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d)
jurisdiction.
If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court retains
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said cases.
ISSUE:
1. w/o SB is a regular court and is included in the term regular courts of
Sec 46. RA 6975
2. w/o the SB has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Orders of the public
respondent RTC Judges dated 23 May, 14 July and 18 August 1994 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Facts:
FACTS:
Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu who was also appointed by
Pres. Estrada as student regent of UP to serve a one-year term from Jan.1,
2000 to Dec. 31, 2000. On Sept. 2000, petitioner together with her siblings
and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc (OSFRI). On of the projects of the OSFRI was the renovation
of Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman, and Pres. Estrada gave P15M as financial
assistance for the said project. The source of funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.
However, the renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student
regent and system-wide alliances of students conseguently filed a complaint
for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Ombudsman. After
due investigation, the Ombudsman instituted a criminal case against Serana
and her brother, charging them of Estafa.
Facts:
ISSUE:
the main issue is whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action.
HELD: YES
The petition is impressed with merit. There is no dispute that the PJI is
now under sequestration by the PCGG and that Civil Case No. 0035 was filed
in the Sandiganbayan wherein the PJI is listed as among the corporations
involved in the unexplained wealth case against former President Marcos,
Romualdez and many others. The records likewise show that petitioner
Olaguer, among others, is a fiscal agent of the PCGG and that as Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the PJI he was acting for and in behalf of the
PCGG. Under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding "the funds,
moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by Former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees," 3 civil or
criminal, including incidents arising from such cases. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme
Court. 4
Facts:
Philippine National Construction Corporation (CDCP/PNCC), is a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It was under sequestration by the PCGG
July 24, 1987, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan complaint
against Rodolfo M. Cuenca for the sequestration of PNCC for
acquiring in an illegal manner assets in the Cuenca-owned
corporations, to wit: Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines, now known as Philippine National Construction
Corporation (CDCP/PNCC),
Asia Hardwood Limited (AHL), a Hongkong-based company owned
by Rodolfo M. Cuenca, WUTIC, through its attorney-in-fact, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134, Makati, a complaint
against CDCP/PNCC to enforce a foreign judgment
the trial court rendered judgment in favor of WUTIC/AHL
CDCP/PNCC filed with the trial court an appeal from said decision to
the Court of Appeals
October 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming
the decision of the trial court.
July 7, 1997, the Supreme Court denied CDCP/PNCCs motion for
reconsideration of the minute resolution.
ISSUE:
W/O SB has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES
The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in summarily
dismissing the petition without a motion to dismiss filed by any of the
parties. We rule that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court in a sequestration-related case.
Facts:
August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an
affidavit-complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ) which
contains the following in part:
o August 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by
military personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator
Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II
August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the
DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction
over the case since the imputed acts were committed in relation to
his public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31
which should be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan
ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation because the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31
(Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan
Bayan.
The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order
no. 8 of the office of the Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and
under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, All recognize and uphold the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct
preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and
employees.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the
Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed
with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the
government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised
Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been
held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus,
there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary
investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first
place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any
stage of the investigatio
FACTS:
On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the
impugned resolution11 recommending that both Mayor Esquivel and
Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel be indicted for the crime of
less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats
Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayans exercise of
jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78.
HELD: