Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No.

93833. September 28, 1995]

15AUG
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.. Private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit
and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the
trial courts order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent
court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of
absurdity.

CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
CONFLICT OF LAWS - CASE DIGEST

CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 186571 August
11, 2010
Gerbert R. Corpuz, Petitioner
Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General, Respondents
Ponente: BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but
subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned
to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another
man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was
eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce
decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to
marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree
of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of
National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent
judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the
RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action
for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action
under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to
remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz
the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal

interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.

San Luis vs. San Luis

Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him,
then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried
again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st
marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage
was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't
apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively,
Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd
marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the
Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the
case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on
this.
Facts
FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:
1.
VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963
1.
MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before
Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973
1.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian
Church in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in
their Alabang residence
-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a
letter of administration before RTC Makati
-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:
1.
Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile)
and not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his
death)
1.
No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to
Merry Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied
retroactively as it would impair their vested rights in accordance
with Article 256, FC)
---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing
evidence of the ff:

Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to

prove proper venue

Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of

Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue
RTC Makati: Dismissed petition
CA: reversed and set aside

Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or

physical habitation so petition was properly filed

Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under

Philippine law
WON Venue properly laid? YES
-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.
-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES
As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo
(1985) sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce
obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse.
-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van
Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again
---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to
marry Felicidad. However, as the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was
not sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC
Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter
of administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC
both stating that she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by
persons living as husband and wife but whose marriage is void.

Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals

No. 1
Case Digests: Statutory Construction
Director
276
G.
July 28 1997

of
R.

Lands
SCRA

vs.
No.

CA
276
102858

Facts:
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title
under P. D. No. 1529. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence
his heirs represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad
litem, were substituted as applicants.
The Land Registration Court in its decision dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. The trial
court dismissed the petition for the reason that the applicants failed to publish the notice of
Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Private Respondents appealed to CA, which set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General, brought the case to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
W/N newspaper publication of the notice of Initial Hearing in an original land registration
case mandatory or directory.
Held:
It is mandatory. The word shall denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory
character of a statute. The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by
the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting
the time for Initial Hearing. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire
provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning.

Pascual vs. pascual-Bautista

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.

ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUALBAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T.
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER,
NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 84240
March 25, 1992
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual,
the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate without
any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual
the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceeding
case no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are
illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend that the term illegitimate children as
described in art 992 should be construed as spurious children).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners
herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate
estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

People vs. Mario Mapulong [G.R. No. L-22301.

August 30, 1967]
15AUG
Ponente: FERNANDO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was found to be in violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act
No. 4. Petitioner willfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one
home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without
first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. The
lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime of illegal possession of firearms The
only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to [the Supreme] Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor
would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.
HELD:
NO. The judgment appealed from was affirmed.
RATIO:
The law (Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code) is explicit that
except as thereafter specifically allowed:
it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition.
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision was made for a secret agent. The first and fundamental duty
of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them. (Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24
Phil. 504, 513). The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

People v. Patricio
46 PHIL 875
FACTS: On December 17, 1922, Jose Malgana and Domingo Bestro went to the house of
spouses Bonifactio Malgana and Antonia Patricio. Her mother, Antonina Manangan was
also there with the spouses. When night came, Bonifacio went to sleep but the other four
remained awake. At about midnight, his wife began the deadly work by slipping a muffle
around his neck. Jose violently pulled and mashed the testicles of Bonifacio. While
Antonina and Domingo held his feet and head respectively. The body was buried in a
sitting position.
ISSUE: Whether or not all who participated in killing Bonifacio be sentenced to death.
RULING: The crime committed by Antonia Patricio is parricide, with aggravating
circumstance of premeditation, treachery, nocturnity and the abuse of superior strength
and to undergo reclusion perpetua. Jose Malgana and Antonina Manangan to be merely
accomplices in the crime of simple homicide and are declared guilty of murder. Jose
Malgana, Antonias paramour, will be sentenced to cadena perpetua and Antonina
Manangan to undergo the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Domingo Bestro, who was used
as a witness for the prosecution, and against whom the information was dimissed upon
the motion of the fiscal in order that he might be thus used, naturally minimizes the
extent of his own participation in the crime. But the court is not concerned with his case.
GLOBE- MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION VS. NLRCG.R. NO. 82511. MARCH
3, 1992.ROMERO, J.
FACTS1.Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company
equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar
were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities.2.The report
prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that
Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial
Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering
Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended bySaldivar.3.The
report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders
airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also
connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The air conditioner was
recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against
Saldivar.4.Moreover, it appeared in the investigation that Imelda Salazar violated
company regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the
companys interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles
of partnershipbetween Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full
knowledge of theloss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to

inform her employer.5.Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, GMCR

placed private respondentSalazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month,
effective October 9, 1984,thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to explain
her side. But instead ofsubmitting an explanation, three (3) days later or on October
12, 1984, Salazar fileda complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which
she subsequentlyamended to include illegal dismissal, after petitioner notified her in
writing thateffective November 8,1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of
(her) inabilityto refute and disprove these findings."6.After due hearing, the Labor
Arbiter ordered GMCR to reinstate private respondent toher former or equivalent
position and to pay her full backwages and other benefitsshe would have received
were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was alsoordered to pay private
respondent moral damages of P50,000.00.7.On appeal, the NLRC in its resolution
affirmed the said decision with respect to thereinstatement of Salazar but limited
the backwages to a period of two (2) years anddeleted the award for moral
damages.
ISSUES1.Whether or not the suspension of Salazar was illegal.2.Whether or not
Salazar was entitled to reinstatement and two (2) years' backwageswith respect to
her subsequent dismissal.
HELD1.YES. The investigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin
Saldivar'sacts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager,
necessitatedimmediate and decisive action on any employee closely associated
with Saldivar.The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by the discovery of the
missingairconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with
Saldivar.Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial
recourseavailable to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself,
preventivesuspension does not signify that the company has adjudged the
employee guilty ofthe charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such
disciplinary measure isresorted to for the protection of the company's property
pending investigation of anyalleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the
employee. Thus, it is notcorrect to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated
Salazar's right to due processwhen she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault
lay with private respondentwhen she ignored petitioner's memorandum "giving her
ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went
directly to the Labor Departmentand filed her complaint for illegal suspension
without giving her employer a chance toevaluate her side of the controversy.2.YES.
Under Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended: Security of Tenure.-In casesof
regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employeeexcept for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who
is unjustlydismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rightsand other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to hisother benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time his compensationwas withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement."In the case at bar, there was no evidence which clearly showed an
authorized, muchless a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had
every right, notonly to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages.
The intendmentof the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and

payment ofbackwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her
status beforeshe lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate is "to
restore to astate, condition, position, etc. from which one had been removed" and in
the latter, togive her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both
remedies,looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."The Labor Code is
clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissedfrom work shall be
entitled to reinstatement ... and to his full backwages . . ." Neitherdoes the provision
admit of any qualification. An exception to the rule is when thereinstatement may
be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between theemployer and the
employee. In such cases, it should be proved that the employeeconcerned occupies
a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of hisemployer; and that it is
likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy andantagonism may be
generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivityof the employee
concerned.The principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately.
Otherwise,reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is
invariablyengendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human
nature.Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of
assertingone's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be
easilyseparated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the
pretext thathis relationship with his employer had already become strained.Here, it
has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systemsanalyst is
one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence suchthat if
reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer andemployee.
Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rulemandating
reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed. As asystem
analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving theprocurement of
supplies.In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss
ofconfidence. As has been held before, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is
avalid ground for termination, it must rest on some basis which must be
convincinglyestablished. An employee may not be dismissed on mere presumptions
andsuppositions. While the Court should not condone the acts of disloyalty of
anemployee, neither should it dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived
fromspeculative inferences. To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for
Salazar'sdismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of the findings
centeredprincipally Saldivars alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as
technicaloperations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of
Salazar'sspecial relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge
ofSaldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent
iswanting from the records. Thus, she was illegally dismissed.

CASE DIGEST:Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of JusticeCase No.G.R. No.

109445 (November 7, 1994)
FACTS: RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustly
accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were

charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife
and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the CA,
Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-inlaw was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime
with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law.
Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309.
HELD:No, he is not. For one to be unjustly accused one must be wrongly accused
from the very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and
deliberately rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any
basis for judgment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted
because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309

You are here: Home CASE DIGEST: Cynthia S. Bolos vs Danilo T. Bolos

CASE DIGEST: Cynthia S. Bolos vs Danilo T.

Bolos
Published by Paul Nikko Degollado on January 3, 2014 | Leave a response

Mendoza, J.
Facts : Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage invoking
Article 36 of the Family Code on July 10, 2003. The RTC granted her petition on August
2, 2006. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration after respondent
received the decision of the lower court. The decision as declared final after a motion to
reconsider denial of appeal was denied.
Respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals and hereby granted.
The appellate court ruled that AM no 02-11-10-SC did not apply to the case at bar as
their marriage was solemnized Feb 14 1980 before the family code took effect. The said
court procedure required a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal cases
on declaration of absolute nullity on void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages. Petitioner filed her manifestation and a motion for partial reconsideration

but was denied by the appellate court as the 15-day reglementary period to file is not
extendable.
Petitioner filed this said petition to the Supreme Court contending that the appellate
court erred in ruling that their case is not covered by the Family Code; that AM no 0211-10-SC covers/pertains to the word petitions instead of marriages; if the Family
code covers the case then a motion of reconsideration is a precondition for an appeal;
and, since the respondent refused to comply with the precondition of filing a motion for
reconsideration, a relaxation on the rules of appeal is not proper.
Issue: Whether or not AM no 02-11-10 SC Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
void marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is applicable to the case.
Held: No. the court ruled that AM 02-11-10-SC is strict in its scope wherein section 1 of
the rule reads:
Section 1. Scope This rule shall govern petitions for declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines. Applying the rule verba legis, the said section leaves no room for
interpretation and is very clear that it would only cover marriages under the Family
Code. Also it would only be applied to marriages not to petitions.

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. (PLDT) vs. CITY OF DAVAO and
ADELAIDA B. BARCELONA, in her capacity as City Treasurer of Davao
GR. No. 143867, March 25, 2003
Facts: PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to three percent (3%) of its gross receipts. The franchise tax was
paid in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof pursuant to RA 7082. The exemption from
all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof was subsequently withdrawn by RA 7160 (LGC), which at
the same time gave local government units the power to tax businesses enjoying a franchise on the basis of
income received or earned by them within their territorial jurisdiction. The LGC took effect on January 1,
1992.
The City of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 519, Series of 1992, which in pertinent part provides:
Notwithstanding any exemption granted by law or other special laws, there is hereby imposed a tax on
businesses enjoying a franchise, a rate of seventy-five percent (75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross
annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the income receipts realized within the territorial
jurisdiction of Davao City.
Subsequently, Congress granted in favor of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (Globe) and

Smart Information Technologies, Inc. (Smart) franchises which contained in leiu of all taxes provisos.
In 1995, it enacted RA 7925, or the Public Telecommunication Policy of the Philippines, Sec. 23 of which
provides that any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises,
or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications
franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises. The
law took effect on March 16, 1995.
In January 1999, when PLDT applied for a mayors permit to operate its Davao Metro exchange, it was
required to pay the local franchise tax which then had amounted to P3,681,985.72. PLDT challenged the
power of the city government to collect the local franchise tax and demanded a refund of what had been
paid as a local franchise tax for the year 1997 and for the first to the third quarters of 1998.
Issue: Whether or not by virtue of RA 7925, Sec. 23, PLDT is again entitled to the exemption from
payment of the local franchise tax in view of the grant of tax exemption to Globe and Smart.
Held: Petitioner contends that because their existing franchises contain in lieu of all taxes clauses, the
same grant of tax exemption must be deemed to have become ipso facto part of its previously granted
telecommunications franchise. But the rule is that tax exemptions should be granted only by a clear and
unequivocal provision of law expressed in a language too plain to be mistaken and assuming for the
nonce that the charters of Globe and of Smart grant tax exemptions, then this runabout way of granting
tax exemption to PLDT is not a direct, clear and unequivocal way of communicating the legislative
intent.
Nor does the term exemption in Sec. 23 of RA 7925 mean tax exemption. The term refers to exemption
from regulations and requirements imposed by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
For instance, RA 7925, Sec. 17 provides: The Commission shall exempt any specific telecommunications
service from its rate or tariff regulations if the service has sufficient competition to ensure fair and
reasonable rates of tariffs. Another exemption granted by the law in line with its policy of deregulation is
the exemption from the requirement of securing permits from the NTC every time a telecommunications
company imports equipment.
Tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and unequivocal provision of law on the basis of language
too plain to be mistaken.

JMM v NLRC (1993)

JMM Promotions & Management, Inc., petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and Ulpiano L. De Los Santos, respondents.

1.
a.
b.
c.

Ponente: Cruz, J.
Facts:
Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a recruiting agency,
made the following:
Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)
Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)
Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec. 17)

2.

The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal because of failure of the
petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules. The
decision being appealed involved a monetary award.
3.
The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond and surety bond,
and placement of money in escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond is unnecessary. According
to Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the
conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of
employment. On the other hand, according to Sec. 17, the escrow shall answer for valid and legal
claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.
4.
Sec. 6 reads:
In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
The bonds required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. 4.

Issue: Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it has posted
bonds of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before?
Held:
Yes. It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of
350,000 because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The reason for such is that
overseas employees are subjected to greater risks and hence, the money will be used to insure
more care on the part of the local recruiter in its choice of foreign principal to whom the worker will
be sent.
Doctrine: Construction:
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case),
care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated
and harmonious whole. With regard to the present case, the doctrine can be applied when the Court
found that Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.
In the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, Book 2 and the escrow required in
Sec. 17 Rule 2, Book 2 have different purposes from the appeal bond required in Sec. 6, Rule
5 Book 7.
The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer, which is not limited to
monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated.
The escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the employer.
On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award. Indeed, this appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary
award. Also, it is possible that the monetary award may exceed the bonds posted previously and
the money placed in escrow. If such a case happens, where will the excess be sourced? To solve

such a dilemma, an appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award is required by Sec.
6.

Radiola Toshiba Philippines Inc. vs. The Intermediate Apellate

Court
G.R. No. 75222, July 18, 1991
Facts:
The petitioner obtained a levy on the attachment against the properties of Carlos Gatmaytan and
Teresita Gatmaytan un Civil case o. 35946 for collection of sum of money before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila. A few months later three creditors filed another petition
against Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan for involuntary insolvency, docketed as special proceedings
No. 1548 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles city.
A favorable judgment was obtained of by the petitioner in Civil case No. 35946. The court ordered
for the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said property but respondent sheriff of Angeles City
refused to issue a final ceritificate of sale because of the pending insolvency proceedings.
Court of First Instance of Angeles City and Intermediate Appellate Court rules against petitioner
Issue:
Whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of petitioner in dissolved by the insolvency
proceedings against respondents commenced for months after the said attachment.
Held:
Section 32 (of the Insolvency Law). As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified,
the clerk of court shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the
assignee all the real and personal property, estate and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books and
papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings
in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded, and by operation of
law shall vest the title to all such property, estate and effects in the assignee, although the same is then
attached in mesne process, as the property of debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the
assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolved any
attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings
and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately
prior to
commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by
default or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency
proceedings.
Section 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement
of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon

which attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove
the legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and in keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall
be a preferred debt.
There is no conflicts between the two provisions.

Statutory Construction; where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation,

court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the
provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other. but even
granting that such conflicts exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts
should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of the statute, if at all
possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut magis valeat quam pereat or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every
word, hence when a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court
should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision
thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.
Read the Statute as a WholeAlpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (AISA) vs.
NLRCFacts:AISA is a private corporation engaged in providing security
services and the Don MarianoMarcos State University is their client. The private
respondents were as security guards by ASIAfor DMMSU. Five months after, private
respondents filed a complaint against AISA and thenincluded DMMSU for non
compliance with the current minimum wage order. The agreementwas that they will
be paid 1,200php every month but was only paid 900php as their monthlysalary.
AISA made representations for an increase in the contract rates to make up for
themandated minimum wage rates. DMMSU replied that it cannot grant
said request due tobudgetary constraints. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
finding AISA and DMMSU solidaryliable and ordering them to pay each of the
complainant Php41,459.51 representing salarydifferential from Feb 16, 1990-Sept
30, 1991. NLRC affirmed this decision. Only AISA filed amotion for reconsideration
but was denied by the NLRC. The judgment against DMMSU is finaland executor
since no motion for certiorari was filed while AISA filed a motion to the SC.AISAs
arguments:- They argue that the payment of wage increases under the current
minimum wage ordershould be borne exclusively by DMMSU citing Section 6 of RA
6727 which states that Incase of contracts for construction projects and
security...the prescribed increases in thewage rates of the workers shall be borne by
the principals or clients... (see p.656and p.657 for full text)- Articles 106, 107 and
109 generally refer to the failure of the contract or sub-contractorto pay wages in
accordance with the labor code with a mandate that failure to pay suchwages would
make the employer and contractor jointly and severally liable.- AISA insists that the
matter involved in this case hinges on WAGE DIFFERENTIALS orWAGE INCREASES
NOT WAGES IN GENERAL as provided by the Labor Code.NLRC:- Cited Articles 106,
107 and 109 of the Labor Code.- 106: ...In the event the contractor or sub
contractor fails to pay the pages of hisemployees in accordance with this
Code, the employer shall be jointly and severallyliable with his contractor or subcontractor...(see p. 657 and p.658)- 107: the provisions shall apply to any person,
partnership, corporation, which not beingan employer, contracts with an
independent contractor for the performance of any work,task , job or project.- 108:

every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor
orsub-contractor for any violation of any provision of this Code.SC Held:Wage orders
cannot be waived since it is mandatory and statutory. AISA cannot escape
liabilitysince the law provides for a joint and solidary liability of the
principal (DMMSU) and thecontractor (AISA).Section 6 of RA 6727 merely
provides that in the case of wage increase resulting in a salarydifferential, the
liability of the principal and contractor shall be joint and several. Same goes withthe
liability attached in Articles 106, 107 and 109 which refer to the standard minimum
wage.
The NLRC decision is AFFIRMED. No grave abuse of discretion on their part.The
Petition is DISMISSED.Statutory Construction:Cardinal Rule: In interpreting the
meaning and scope of term used in the law, a careful review of the whole
lawinvolved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made.
Legislative intent must beascertained from a consideration of the statute as
whole, and not of an isolated part or aparticular provision alone. AISA only
referred to Sec 6 of RA6727 and some parts of Articles 106, 107 and 109failing to
see the bigger picture re: Wage Differentials, Wage increases and WAGES
INGENERAL. Considering bits and pieces instead of the statute as a whole

De Guia v Comelec
GR no. 104712, May 6, 1992
Facts:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and
enforcement of Comelecs
Resolution No. 2313, adopting the rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by
district, of the
number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the provinces with
only 1
legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area for the
preparation of the project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election
Supervisors and
Election Registrars. Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of District
Apportionment
submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution Und. 92-010,
holding that

paragraphs in Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections.
A petitioner is an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of
Paranaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local elections.
He prays,
for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of
Paranaque and
all other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi to raise the question.
Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner has no locus standi since the petitioner lacked personal or substantial
interest
and did not allege any legal right that has been violated by the respondent. In his
petition, he did
not state that he is running for re-election, much less, that he is prejudiced by the
election, by
district, in Paranaque. As such, the Court ruled that petitioner does not appear to
have a locus
standi, a personal or substantial interest.
However, the Court resolved that they would brush aside the question
of procedural
technicalities due to the importance of the issue. The issue being brought upon the
Court is
important since it concerns the general public, specifically the political
exercise of qualified
voters affected by the apportionment. Despite the lack of legal standing of the
petitioner, the
Court decided to tackle the issues presented because issues presented concerns
matters of
public interest.
Finding no abuse of discretion much less grave, on the part of respondent, and for
lack of merit,
the instant petition is dismissed was dismissed by the Supreme Court. No cost.

Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07,
1992]
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail
of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is
qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits
equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost
fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil
Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project
which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to
the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:
Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant,
like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are
extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act
No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of
the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the
applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioners
application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive,
as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled
to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all
she served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum requirement under the law but for
almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

Peope v. Manantan
Full Text: http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1962/jul1962/gr_l-14129_1962.php
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However,
Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said

section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview
of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee
of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified
civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election
or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code
wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was
omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.
Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?
Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First
Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include
justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and
broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in
that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee.
Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the
peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA
180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said
officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee.
Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the
case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just
called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been
omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of
terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered
as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges
of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are

now within its encompass.

The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts
because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of
peace".

JM Tuason and Co. Inc. et. al. vs. Mariano et. al.
[G.R. No. L-33140. October 23, 1978]
15AUG
Ponente: AQUINO, J.
FACTS:

The case began when Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel
of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 8943. They alleged that sometime
in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had
been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. They further
alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc., et.al. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper
venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied
it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of Tuason
and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. The
Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition
praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in
the said case, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by
respondents Aquial and Cordova.
HELD:
NO. The trial court was directed to dismiss Civil Case 8943 with prejudice and without costs.
RATIO:
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and
do not disturb what has been settled), respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in
Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and
no longer open to attack.It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated
again and again, consuming the courts time and energies at the expense of other litigants.

Nancy ty vs banco Filipino

(Authors Note: A convoluted case in remedial law on the aspect of res judicata. It
may be wise for the reader to read all the G.R. Nos indicated in the case digest for a
better understanding of the substantive aspect of the case. This digest was done to
explain the court ruling on the use of stare decisis.)
In 1979, the Board of Directors of Banco Filipino warehoused some of its existing
properties to allow more flexibility in the opening of branches, to enable it to acquire

more branches, and to circumvent the General Banking Act which limits a banks real
estate holdings to not more than 50% of its capital assets.
To go about the warehousing scheme, Nancy, a major stockholder and director of the
bank, persuaded two other stockholders, brothers Tomas and Pedro to organise and
incorporate Tala Realty to hold and purchase real properties in trust for respondent.
Thus it came to be that Remedios, another sibling of Tomas, Pedro and Nancy
controlled Tala Realty through their respective nominees.
To execute their trust agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala Realty some of the
properties; Tala Realty simultaneously leased to the bank the properties for 20 years,
renewable for another 20 years and with a right of repurchase should Tala Realty
decides to sell them. However, in 1992, Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the
titles for itself, and demanded that the bank pay rentals, deposits and goodwill, with a
threat to eject the bank.
From 1995 to 1998, Banco Filipino filed 17 complaints against Tala Realty, Nancy and
the other nominees and stockholders of Tala Realty, including this case which was
filed before the Malabon City RTC. Nancy and her co-defendants moved to dismiss
this case, citing forum shopping and lis pendencia citing the 16 other cases filed in
other courts involving the same issues, same parties and same causes of action.
The Regional Trial Court of Malabon denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the
motions for reconsideration and suspension of proceedings. After they filed their
answers, Nancy and her co-defendants moved to suspend proceedings, citing the
pendency of G.R. No. 127611, which was a petition for certiori questioning the denial
of their motion to dismiss in the RTC of Batangas City, and praying for a writ of
prohibition to stop the RTC judges hearing the other cases and the CA. The Malabon
RTC granted the suspension of the proceedings which the bank appealed to the CA.
The certiorari was eventually granted by the CA after the Supreme Court dismissed
Gr. No. 127611 for late filing.
The bank then moved for pre-trial, which Tala Realty again opposed due to pendency
of G.R. No. 132703 which assailed the CAs affirmance of the denial of the motion to
dismiss, this time in Iloilo City (Civil Case No. 22493). Nancy also filed her own
opposition, citing two cases, G.R. No. 132703, and G.R. No. 130184, this time the CAs
reversal of the dismissal of the Quezon City case.
The RTC suspended the proceedings. After six years, the RTC issued an order
directing the counsels to inform it of the status of the pending cases.
Nancy filed her manifestation, informing the RTC of the Supreme Courts rulings in
the consolidated cases of G.R. Nos. 130184 and 139166, and in G.R. No. 132703, and
reported on the other cases involving the same parties decided by this Court, such
as G.R. Nos. 129887, 137980, 132051, 137533, 143263, and 142672, as well as the

other related cases decided by the Supreme Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 144700, 147997,
167255, and 144705.
The bank also filed its own manifestation with motion to revive proceedings, citing
the rulings in consolidated decision in G.R. Nos. 130184 and 139166, and the
decisions in G.R. Nos. 144700, 167255, and 144705, commonly holding that there
existed no forum shopping, litis pendentia and res judicata among the respondents
reconveyance cases pending in the other courts of justice.
In her comment/opposition to the motion to revive, Nancy held that the case should
not be revived, as it involves the same issue of implied trust which the Court in G. R
No. 137533 ruled that was void for being in contravention of the limitation imposed
by the General Banking Act on the bank (the 50% rule)
The RTC ordered the revival of the proceedings, citing that there is no res judicata in
this case because there are other independent causes for each of the parties to
sought be recovered.
The Court of Appeals denied her petition for certiorari, holding that res judicata does
not apply in this case since the Supreme Court ruled in G.R. No. 144705 that G.R. No.
137533 does not put to rest all pending litigations involving the issues of ownership
between the parties since it involved only an issue of de facto possession. In this
case, the trust agreement was only raised in an ejectment case, not an issue
involving ownership.
Nancy elevated her case to the Supreme Court. According to her, G.R. No. 137533 is
controlling in this case and therefore, this case should not be revived in accordance
with the doctrine of res judicata.
G.R. No. 137533, as reiterated in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and
166608, is binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine
of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to precedents, and
not to unsettle things which are established. Under the doctrine, when this Court
has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially
the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the
judgment, which results therefrom. In this particular sense, stare decisis differs from
res judicata, which is based upon the judgment.
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which

the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the
decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the
sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court,
the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same [issue]. (italics
supplied)
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 188302, June 27, 2012, NANCY L. TY, PETITIONER, VS.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N

Tala Realty Services Corporation, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals and Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank
G. R. No. 130088, 7 April 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
No right is created where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in
evasion of its express provision.
FACTS: Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) filed before 17 Regional Trial
Courts (RTC) 17 complaints for reconveyance of different properties against Tala Realty Services

Corporation (Tala Realty) et al. Banco Filipinos complaints commonly alleged that in 1979,
expansion of its operations required the purchase of real properties for the purpose of acquiring sites
for more branches; that as Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act limit a banks allowable
investments in real estate to 50% of its capital assets, its board of directors decided to warehouse
some of its existing properties and branch sites. Thus, Nancy L. Ty, a major stockholder and director,
persuaded Pedro Aguirre and his brother Tomas Aguirre, both major stockholders of Banco Filipino,
to organize and incorporate Tala Realty to hold and purchase real properties in trust for Banco
Filipino; that after the transfer of Banco Filipino properties to Tala Realty, the Aguirres sister
Remedios prodded her brother Tomas to, as he did, endorse to her his shares in Tala Realty and
registered them in the name of her controlled corporation, Add International.
Thus, Nancy, Remedios, and Pedro Aguirre controlled Tala Realty, with Nancy exercising control
through her nominees Pilar, Cynthia, and Dolly, while Remedios exercised control through Add
International and her nominee Elizabeth. Pedro Aguirre exercised control through his own nominees,
the latest being Tala Realtys president, Rubencito del Mundo.
In the course of the implementation of their trust agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala Realty some
of its properties. Tala Realty simultaneously leased to Banco Filipino the properties for 20 years,
renewable for another 20 years at the option of Banco Filipino with a right of first refusal in the event
Tala Realty decided to sell them.
Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself, and demanded payment of rentals,
deposits, and goodwill, with a threat to eject Banco Filipino.
Thus arose Banco Filipinos 17 complaints for reconveyance against Tala Realty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trust agreement is void
HELD: In Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, the Court,
by Decision dated November 22, 2002, ruling on one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty
against Banco Filipino arising from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance cases subject of
the present petitions, held that the trust agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced.
An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as the Court has held that
"where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud."
The bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since
its purpose was contrary to law. As admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its branch site holdings to
Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion program and purchase new branch sites including its main
branch in Makati, and at the same time avoid the real property holdings limit under Sections 25(a)
and 34 of the General Banking Act which it had already reached.

Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General
Banking Act and that its "warehousing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the
limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade, but
instead phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a "first preference to
buy" at the "same transfer price." This agreement which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is
contrary to law. Thus, while the Court finds the sale and lease of the subject property genuine and
binding upon the parties, the Court cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the parties
intended to create it. In the words of the Court in the Ramos case, "the courts will not assist the
payor in achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the
clean hands doctrine." The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its
alleged implied trust relationship with Tala.