Wagging the Doves?

Peace-Promoting Actions as a Source of Presidential Support

David T Burbach

MIT Security Studies Program*

Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association
August 28, 2003
Philadelphia, PA

ABSTRACT
Dramatic uses of force are widely thought to increase public support for national leaders, but less
attention has been given to the possibility of uses of peace as sources of rallies. Media and
public opinion theories suggest that, as visible and popular events, diplomatic activities should
also be status-enhancing. This study tests that proposition by measuring the impact of peacepromoting actions on the approval ratings of U.S. Presidents from 1953-2000. A dataset of 85
dramatic peace events is constructed, and statistical tests used to measure the magnitude and
duration of approval changes following them. Peace events cause an average 2% increase, and
just over 5% for the 25 largest events, decaying with a half life of 3 months. Media quantity and
elite opinion strongly influence the response, with gains >10% or losses of nearly 5% being
possible. Despite these political gains, there is no evidence of diversionary peace: peace
events are not more frequent in response to low approval ratings, recessions, scandals, or
impending elections.

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Introduction
One of the most deeply ingrained views in the conventional wisdom on U.S. politics is
that uses of force have a powerful and unique ability to increase the publics support of the
president. Although some academic studies challenge that view, there is still a widespread belief,
even among many scholars, that the use of force makes for good polls and good politics. As a
result, there is much concern about the attractiveness of diversionary war to U.S. presidents,
though fortunately, most studies suggest it is uncommon if not absent altogether.
The appeal of diversionary war would be much lower if presidential actions other than
war can produce the same sorts of increases in presidential support. Not much is known about
the effect of other dramatic presidential activities, yet in theory, force is not the only potential
way to boost presidential ratings. In particular, peace promoting activities, such as diplomatic
initiatives, summits, or the de-escalation or termination of wars are headline grabbing,
presidentially-focused events that are likely to be popular with the public. There is every reason
to think that peace activity could help presidents, though few tests of the possibility have been
conducted.
This study argues that dramatic peace-promoting activity is a source support for U.S.
presidents. Major peace events from 1953 to 2000 have caused temporary increases rallies in
presidential approval much like those following uses of force. The potential gains are modest,
approximately a 5% initial increase on average decaying over a few months, but that is of the
same scale as reactions to uses of force. Gains can be greater or lower depending on media
coverage and elite opinion.
Presidents do not appear to make use of the peace tool, however. The rate of
peace activity was unaffected by presidential approval, the state of the economy, scandals, or

elections parallel to the common finding that such domestic variables have little effect on use
of force rates.
The argument proceeds through five sections. First, a media priming model of rallies is
introduced, and reasons are given why this model predicts that peace events will be causes of
rallies. Next, the methods that were used to construct a dataset of peace events and code them on
relevant variables are described, as are the statistical techniques that are used to measure the
impact of these events on presidential approval. Results from regressions measuring the impact
of peace events on presidential standing are then presented; this is followed by a section that
analyzes how the frequency of peace events is affected by political variables. Finally, the
implications of these findings are discussed.

A New Model of Rally Events

Most authors agree that U.S. uses of force are usually followed by increases in
presidential approval (Mueller 1973;Kernell 1978;Marra; Ostrom, and Simon 1990;Lee
1977;Baum 2002;DeRouen 1995), although some point out that these increases are smaller and
less consistent than traditionally thought (Lian and Oneal 1993). The conflict-induced
cohesion effect is commonly invoked to explain this effect. Drawing on research in group
psychology, this theory predicts that when facing foreign threats, citizens rally around their
leader (Coser 1956;Simmel 1955); see also (Levy 1989;Stein 1976). This unifying ability is
seen as unique to external conflict, and so most studies of rally effects have either looked only
at the response to uses of force ((Baum 2002;Oneal; Lian, and Joyner 1996;Lian and Oneal
1993;DeRouen 1995;Edwards and Swenson 1997)) or to crises/militarized disputes ((Baker and
Oneal 2001;Oneal and Bryan 1995;James and Rioux 1998;James and Hristoulas 1994)). Others
(

have claimed to look at foreign policy events generally, but in practice have heavily weighted
their events towards conflict ((Mueller 1973;Kernell 1978;MacKuen 1983;Ostrom and Simon
1985)).
There is also a vast literature on the diversionary use of force (Levy 1989;Fordham
2001;Fordham 1998b;Prins 2001;Goemans 2000;DeRouen 2000;Gowa 1998;Meernik
2001;Davies 2002;Enterline and Gleditsch 2000;Dassel and Reinhardt 1999;Gelpi 1997).
Relatively little attention has been given, however, to political timing of other dramatic foreign
policy actions, with some exceptions (Brace and Hinckley 1993;Marra and others 1990)).
The narrow focus on force as a source of short-term political gain may not be
theoretically justified. The conflict-cohesion model privileges force, but there is mounting
evidence that public reactions are not adequately explained by that theory. For example,
rallies do not automatically follow uses of force ((Lian and Oneal 1993;Hugick and Gallup
1991;Edwards 1990)), and the strength of public support depends on variables such as media
coverage and reaction of opinion leaders ((Brody 1991;Brody 1984;Baker and Oneal 2001)), on
the goals of the presidents action ((Oneal and others 1996)). These variations are not consistent
with the predictions of the conflict-cohesion model, but are consistent with a media priming
model of presidential support and presidential rallies.

The Media-Priming Model of Rallies

The media priming model explains rallies as the result of sudden changes in media
attention shifting the basis of presidential evaluation to issues more favorable to the president.
The basic framework was suggested by Iyengar and Kinder (1987), who argue that presidential
approval can explained as a weighted average of a presidents rating on individual issue areas,
with the weights determined by recent media coverage. In this view, individuals do have stable

preferences ((Page and Shapiro 1992) and assess presidential performance with respect to them,
but at any given moment the salience of issues generally follows the media agenda if crime has
been in the news lately, then individuals are primed to think of the crime issue if asked
whether they approve of the presidents performance. This priming effect is well established
((Gilliam and Iyengar 2000;Iyengar 1991;Iyengar and Kinder 1987;Zaller 1992;McCombs and
Shaw 1972;Rogers; Hart, and Dearing 1997)), and Iyengar and Kinders findings on priming and
presidential support has been borne out by later studies ((Pan and Kosicki 1997;Krosnick and
Kinder 1990;Miller and Krosnick 2000;Edwards; Mitchell, and Welch 1995)).
Rally events can be explained in the terms of the media priming model though the
following process: 1) a dramatic event takes place which causes of rapid change in news media
attention; 2) the change in focus causes the salience of that issue area to increase; 3)
individuals ratings of the president will give more weight to the issue at hand than before the
dramatic event; 4) if the presidents support on that issue is higher than the average of their
support on other issues, then their ratings will increase (conversely, drawing attention to an
unfavorable issue will lower presidential ratings). Presidential ratings would then shift back to
their previous levels as coverage of the event declined.
This analysis suggests that there are two requirements for an event to cause a rally: it
must significantly capture media attention, and, the presidential action must be popular, or at
least more popular than the presidents current performance on other issues. Whether a given
action will be popular or not depends on a number of factors. First, events will receive more
support when they are congruent with existing public preferences. Second, events will be more
popular when they receive the support of opinion leaders ((Popkin 1994;Zaller 1992;Brody
1991;Miller and Krosnick 2000)).

Uses of force generally meet the prerequisites for producing rallies. Whether due to a
patriotism effect or due to rational evaluations of presidential actions, foreign conflict often
receives both strong public support and heavy media coverage. The use of force is not the only
presidential activity which could have such an effect, however. Presidential health crises
(Eisenhowers heart attack, Reagan shooting) have usually been followed by approval spikes, for
example.
Beyond personal tragedies, another category of events that could be expected to produce
rallies are dramatic peace-promoting foreign policy activities, such as superpower summits,
arms control breakthroughs, or the ends of wars. These events involve presidents, are highly
publicized, and are likely to be popular. The next section explains in detail why peacepromoting foreign policy activity is a likely source of rally events.

Peace-Promoting Events as Candidates for Rallies

The idea that major cooperative international events could be sources of presidential
support is not new. Mueller, examined dramatic international events, not only wars; the events
in his study included U.S.-Soviet summits and the end of the Korean War ((Mueller 1973): 211).
Lowi is even more explicit in arguing that foreign policy activity generally, not only the use of
the military, has rallying power for presidents; he suggests that major economic summits could
boost presidential poll numbers, for example ((Lowi 1979). Neither Lowi nor Mueller offered
theoretical justification for their views, but the following section argues that peace events
diplomatic activity and actions to end or de-escalate conflicts -- meet the criteria for rallies: they
receive extensive media coverage, they directly involve the president, and they are likely to be
popular.

Media Attention
It is easy to see that peace events meet the rally requirement of capturing media focus.
Historically they have received extremely high levels of coverage, as great as most uses of force.
For example, Eisenhowers 1955 summit meeting in Geneva generated 35 front-page stories in
the New York Times in 14 days.1 More recently, Reagans meetings with Gorbachev all
generated 20 to 30 front page stories, and even with the end of the Cold War the Clinton-Yeltsin
summits still attracted front page attention for several days. Peacemaking efforts in third-party
conflicts also receive attention, whether 20 front-page stories about Kissingers shuttle
diplomacy with Egypt and Israel in January 1974, or more recently, 15 stories on Clintons
unsuccessful Mideast peace summit in Wye, Maryland in the fall of 1998. Even with a
presidential scandal competing for attention, presidential diplomacy is big news: television
news stories devoted to the Lewinsky scandal declined dramatically during Clintons Africa trip
in March of 1998, and his July 1998 trip to China was by far the number one topic for network
news that month ((Center for Media and Public Affairs 1998)). Arms control advances such as
the 1963 nuclear test ban receive significant attention, and peace treaties to end the Vietnam and
Korean wars dominated the headlines for weeks.
Popularity
The popularity of peace is not a new suggestion. One foundation of Kants democratic
peace was that given the cost of war in lives and money, war would be highly unpopular to
voters ((Kant 1949)).2 Public opinion data confirms that Americans support peace, at least in the
abstract. Arms control has almost always enjoyed strong support ((Page and Shapiro
1992;Hinckley 1992;Graham 1989)). Even during the late 1970s chill in U.S. Soviet relations

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support for the SALT II treaty remained above 50%, and in wake of Sputnik citizens by 3 to 1
still wanted Eisenhower to propose a nuclear test ban (Roper Center, question USGALLUP.57-585,
R003A).

Actions to end, avoid, or de-escalate conflicts also receive support, particular if wars are

not going well. By late 1969 majorities were in favor of withdrawing from Vietnam, and
throughout Nixons first term those who thought troops were coming home too slowly
outnumbered those who thought the pullout was too fast by 4 to 1 ((Mueller 1973)). Support
remained stronger for the Korean War, but polls also made it clear that by 1951 Americans were
eager to see the war end. Prior to the first Gulf War, large majorities wanted President Bush to
make every possible effort to get Iraq out of Kuwait through negotiations rather than war
((Mueller 1994), pp 237-241). Similarly, even as Americans supported the younger president
Bushs preparations to invade Iraq in 2003, they hoped Saddam Hussein could be removed
without war, and wanted to see the U.N. involved in the dispute.
Historical evidence reveals that presidents and their advisors often thought of peace as a
winning political formula. For example, the acclaim for Eisenhowers April 1953 speech calling
for better U.S.-Soviet relations convinced the White House that it was advantageous to be seen
on the side of peace, and there was an explicit strategy in 1960 to portray Eisenhower as the
Man of Peace (via foreign travel, speeches, a summit with Khrushchev, etc) in order to
improve the GOP position in the elections that year ((Hughes 1962), pp 106-117; (Adams
1961)). Kennedy too saw an opportunity in the public enthusiasm for the nuclear test ban in
1963, and before his assassination there had been talk of seeking additional arms agreements in
1964 an election year ((Halberstam 1972a), pp 361-363).

Lyndon Johnson never saw war in Vietnam as a political plus; he kept the issue generally
quiet during the 1964 election ((Beschloss 1997)). Bombing pauses, international conferences,3
and peace proposals were driven largely by concerns for domestic public opinion ((Karnow
1983b;Halberstam 1972b;Small 1988)). Every major address by Johnson on Vietnam concerned
peace proposals, not escalation. Many observers suspect that Johnsons cessation of bombing
North Vietnam on the eve of the 1968 election was calculated to help Hubert Humphrey.4 Most
audaciously, Johnson may have hoped to reenter the presidential race after a surprise U.S.-Soviet
summit he had arranged for the week before the 1968 Democratic National Convention
((Beschloss and Talbott 1993), p. 113)5
Nixon may have believed that a silent majority supported the Vietnam war, but he
nonetheless felt that escalation would be rejected by the public. Fear of backlash led him to drop
his plans for a massive bombing campaign in the fall of 1969 ((Sagan and Suri 2003)) The pace
and timing of his administrations troop withdrawals were calculated to maintain public support
for Nixon ((Karnow 1983b), pp 594-596; (Bundy 1998), pp 63-67). Beyond Vietnam, the
Administrations interest in arms control came partly because it was perceived to be a popular
political issue ((Garthoff 1985), p. 115; (Kissinger 1979), pp 399-402; (Knopf 1998)). Nixon
was also very conscious of the boosts he received from high-profile summits with foreign
leaders; as the Watergate scandal approached its conclusion in the summer of 19754, Nixon

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hoped his trips to Moscow and the Middle East would improve his poll numbers ((Nixon 1978),
p. 1017)
The Reagan Administration expected political gains from peace activities. From late
1981 to early 1983, for example, Reagans advisors believed public fear of nuclear war was
harming Reagans approval rating, and the opening of START talks and the Strategic Defense
Initiative came in part to counter that political problem (Talbott 1984;Knopf 1998;Fitzgerald
2000).6 Reagans 1984 campaign strategists identified the peace and arms control issue as
Reagans key vulnerability, and they recommend the withdrawal of troops from Lebanon,
dropping the confrontational stance in Central America, and making progress on arms control
and improving U.S.-Soviet relations generally (Oberdorfer 1991;Cannon 1991). Reagan heeded
this advice: he proclaimed 1984 a year of peace and dramatically softened his tone towards
the Soviets (Garthoff 1994); by September, Reagan had taken the peace issue away from
Mondale.
Hypotheses To Be Tested
Dramatic peace events have generated strong media interest and appear to be popular at
the least, presidents themselves have expected political gains from them. Since peace events
meet the criteria for rally events as predicted by the media priming model, we make the
following three predictions about the public reaction to peace events and presidential timing of
them:

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Table 1: Hypotheses To Be Tested

H1

Peace-Promoting activity by presidents leads to increases in presidential

approval ratings (i.e., they create rallies as uses of force often do)
Peace activities will cause greater increases in presidential approval when
A) media coverage is more intense

H2

B) the presidential action is successful

C) the presidents actions receive support from Congress and
opinion leaders in the media
Peace activities should be more frequent during periods of presidential
political need, such as:
a) low approval ratings,

H3

b) recessions,
c) scandals
d) impending elections.

Hypothesis 1: Peace-Promoting activity by presidents leads to increases in

presidential approval ratings (i.e., they create rallies as uses of force
often do)
Hypothesis 1 simply summarizes the argument of the previous section: since they meet
the criteria for producing rallies, we should observe increases in presidential approval
following dramatic peace-promoting activities by presidents.
Hypothesis 2a:
Peace activities will cause greater increases in presidential
approval when media coverage is more intense
Hypothesis 2b:
Peace activities will cause greater increases in presidential
approval when successful
Hypothesis 2c: Peace activities will cause greater increases in presidential approval
when supported by opinion leaders
Hypothesis 2 derives from the media-priming model, identifying conditions that will
produce larger or smaller approval increases for presidents. More media coverage should lead to

higher salience for the peace activity or foreign policy generally, and so should lead to larger
increases in approval. On the other hand, drawing attention to a disaster will not be helpful:
successful initiatives should produce more favorable results for presidents. Citizens can also be
expected to follow the lead of experts, such as members of Congress or media commentators, in
evaluating presidential actions.
Hypothesis 3: Peace activities should be more frequent during periods of presidential
political need, such as low approval ratings, recessions, scandals, or
impending elections
If peace activity can boost presidential ratings, then we would expect presidents to avail
themselves of the opportunity to improve their poll numbers during times of political misfortune.
This prediction does not come directly from the media priming model, but instead applies the
logic of the diversionary war theory to peacemaking: politically-motivated presidents will use
the tools available to them to improve their standing and reelection prospects, and thus we should
see an increase in the frequency of peace events when presidents face domestic difficulties.
Diversionary war studies have come to mixed conclusions about the existence of diversionary
motivations behind U.S. uses of force, so it would be worth extending the analysis to see if the
timing of other foreign policy actions by presidents appears to be politically inspired.

Methods and Sources of Data

The effect of peace events on presidential approval was measured using the same general
strategy that has been employed by studies of the rally effect that supposedly follows uses of

force: a set of relevant events was identified, then statistical tests were used to measure the
changes in presidential approval ratings following those events.
Identifying Peace Events
Although there are a number of existing datasets of uses of force or conflicts more
generally, that is not the case for peace initiatives. Earlier presidential approval studies that
included cooperative actions did so on an ad hoc basis (Mueller 1973;Kernell 1978;MacKuen
1983), or did not provide a list of their events at all (Marra and others 1990;Brace and Hinckley
1993). More general datasets of conflict and cooperation such as COPDAB (Azar ) and WEIS
(McClelland 1999)are also inadequate, due to their limited years of coverage (neither extends
past 1978), their inclusion of many small, low-visibility events, and the fact that they focus on
actual international actions, rather than political initiatives (which would include proposals that
do not ultimately bear fruit). For similar reasons, using treaties and agreements would not be
satisfactory, since in may cases initiation or changes of position in talks are the more relevant
political event than the actual signing of an agreement.
Therefore, a new dataset was constructed of presidential events that were visible, dramatic,
and peace promoting. These criteria were operationalized as follows:

Visibility: events had to receive five or more New York Times front-page stories in a 14
day period.

Dramatic: events had to be:7

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A specific, significant accomplishment or action, such as completing a treaty,

cessation of bombing, etc
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A Presidential initiative that represented a new or changed policy, rather than

promotion of existing policy.

Peace: events had to involve one of the following:8

-

Arms control or other steps to make nuclear war less likely (i.e., de-targeting of
missiles).

De-escalation or termination of a conflict in which the U.S. is engaged, or about

to be engaged.

Improvement of relationships with adversaries (in particular, the U.S.S.R. and

China)

U.S. high-level involvement (president or cabinet member) to end a prominent

conflict between third parties.

A set of candidate events was compiled from a variety of standard sources on U.S.
diplomatic and presidential history. 9 After assembling this candidate list, the New York Times
Index was consulted to measure the number of front page stories related to each event that
occurred in a 14 day period surrounding the event, and only those meeting the five-day
requirement were kept. Using these criteria a total of 85 events were selected between 1953 and
2000; they are listed in Appendix A. Figure 1, below, shows the distribution of the events over
time.

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1960

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1970

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2000

Figure 1 -- Peace Events by Year

To illustrate the sort of events that were chosen and the approval changes that followed
them, Table 2 lists representative events and their associated change in presidential approval
ratings (measured from the last poll prior to first poll after). Some significant gains have been
seen; Richard Nixons numbers went up 16 points when the Vietnam War finally ended. On the
other hand, presidents have not always benefited from diplomatic activity: George Bushs
diplomatic forays in 1991 and 1992 did nothing to help the steady erosion of his poll numbers,
and Eisenhower actually lost more than 10% when the Korean War ended.

TABLE 2: Approval Changes Following Selected Events

1/73

Approval
Change
+16%

Initiatives to improve relations with Soviet Union

5/89

+14%

Atoms for Peace proposal

12/53

+10

Johnson attends Manila Conference, offers Vietnam peace plan

10/66

+5

Reagan reopens arms talks with USSR

11/81

+5

Nixons visit to China

2/72

+4%

Ford attends Helsinki CSCE Summit

7/75

-8%

Bush attends Middle East peace conference in Madrid

11/91

-10%

End of Vietnam War

EVENT

Date

To show the full spectrum of immediate changes, figure 2 presents a histogram showing
the distribution of approval changes over the whole set of peace events. These measures are
from the last poll prior to first poll after, and so are not strictly comparable sometimes days
have elapsed since an event, sometimes weeks to months. The statistical analysis to follow will
take those timing issues and other factors into account, but figure 2 does suggest that peace
events have helped presidents more often than not, but on the average have been followed by
only minor immediate increases in approval.

Number of Events

10

0
-1 0

-5

10

15

20

25

P o s t-E v e n t C h a n g e in A p p ro v a l (% )

Figure 2 Distribution of Approval Changes Following Peace Events

Variables and Coding
Each event was coded on the following variables:
PEACE_EVENT
1 for each event
DATE
The date that the principal U.S. activity was reported in the New York Times.
COVERAGE
An ordinal variable representing coverage in the New York Times:
1

5 to 15 front-page stories in 14 days

15 to 25 front-page stories in 14 days

More than 25 front-page stories in 14 days

PEACE_MAJOR
1 for each event that met the following criteria: a medium or high level of media
coverage (COVERAGE = 2 or 3), and either a major presidential statement (e.g.,
prime-time speech) or foreign trip associated with the event.

.
SUCCESS

coded +1, 0, or 1 depending on whether the event (in its initial stages, at least),
appeared to be successful for the U.S. The judgment was based on actual
outcomes, not assessment of Presidential activity (i.e., if the dominant media
message was that the President had done well but something bad still happened,
that would be coded 1). For example, the 1960 Paris and the 1986 Reykjavik
summits were coded as failures, while the 1972 Moscow and 1987 Washington
summits were successes.
OPINION
Variable indicating the balance of reaction in editorials and columns to each
event, as reported in the New York Times. If the majority of editorials and
columns were favorable, +1. If the majority are negative, -1; if there is no clear
majority or if no opinion is expressed, 0.
CONGRESS_OWN, CONGRESS_OPP (H2c)
Congressional reaction by the presidents own party, and by the opposition.
Coded +1 if the majority of reactions expressed by members of the party were
supportive, -1 if the majority were negative, and 0 if mixed or none were
recorded. The source for Congressional opinion is also the New York Times
Index,10 but opinions were counted even if they were not reported on the front
page.

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CONGRESS_EXPECTED, CONGRESS_REVERSE (H2c)

Opinions expressed in Congress should carry more weight when they are not in
the expected direction. To capture this effect, these two variables were coded as
follows
CONGRESS_EXPECTED is the sum of:

+1 if CONGRESS_OWN=+1
-1 if CONGRESS_OPP=-1

CONGRESS_REVERSE is the sum of:

-1 if CONGRESS_OWN=-1
+1 if CONGRESS_OPP=+1

OPINION_INDEX
Sum of OPINION, CONGRESS_EXPECTED, CONGRESS_REVERSE (i.e., a
3 to +3 scale).
WAR_TERMINATION, DE-ESCALATION, ARMS_CONTROL, RELATIONS, MEDIATE
Each event was assigned into one of these five categories. Events are coded 1 for
their assigned category, 0 for the other two.
WAR_TERMINATION events were the termination of major wars, which meant
Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, and Kosovo.
DE-ESCALATION included events that reduced the level of American
involvement in an ongoing conflict, or constituted steps towards a negotiated end
to the conflict, such as the initiation of peace talks. Most events in this category
related to Vietnam, such as bombing pauses, troop withdrawal announcements,
and progress in peace talks.
ARMS_CONTROL events were summits where major arms control treaties or
agreements took place, initiation of new talks, completion of treaties when a
dramatic event in and of themselves (not taking place at a summit), or
announcement of major proposals for arms control or other actions to make
nuclear war less likely (de-targeting, hotline, etc).
RELATIONS events signified improvements in relations with adversaries
meaning principally China and the USSR. Included summits with no specific
arms control agreements, or policy changes by the U.S. that mark improved
relations (e.g., recognition of China).
MEDIATION events were cases of the U.S. engaging at the White House level to
serve as intermediary in conflicts not involving the U.S. (principally, the Middle
East)

Statistical Approach
The effects of dramatic peace events on presidential approval were modeled as
exponentially decaying shocks superimposed on an underlying level of approval set by economic
conditions and other control variables. This approach was chosen for several reasons. First, the
duration of any gains from peace activities are important to a presidents political calculations: a
gain of 5% that lasts for months may be more significant than a gain of 10% that lasts for days.
Relatively few studies have estimated both the magnitude and duration of approval changes from
events,11 and so this is a useful methodological contribution. This approach also controls for
background trends in approval ratings, such as when peace event happens as the economy is
rapidly worsening or improving. Finally, the approach is less sensitive to sampling error or
errors in the dating of events than the commonly used method of using the change from the last
approval poll prior to first poll after an event (i.e., using only two polls per event).
The control model was similar to specifications used by previous studies of presidential
approval (Kernell 1978;Marra and others 1990;MacKuen; Erickson, and Stimson 1992;MacKuen
1983). The form chosen was a linear, autoregressive (i.e., AR1) specification (Erickson;
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002;Beck 1992). The principal control variables were economic
conditions, along with early term honeymoons, and the impact of war deaths and major
scandals. One slight difference is that individual polls, rather than monthly averages, were the
unit of analysis.12 This has little effect on the control model but is important to allow more
accurate modeling of rally dynamics. The specific variables and functional form were:

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APPROVAL
The share of the public indicating that they approve of the way the president is handling
his job according to each Gallup survey. Expressed in percentage points that is, 0 to
100, rather than fractions for ease of interpretation.13
UNEMPLOYMENT
The national unemployment rate for the month in which a given poll took place.
QUARTERLY_INFLATION
Three-month moving average of the annualized monthly change in the Consumer Price
Index. A moving average is used because of the volatility of the series.14
CONSUMER_EXPECT
Index of the Business Conditions Expected in the Next 12 Months item from the
University of Michigan Survey of Consumers. 15
INAUGURATION
Takes on 1 for the first poll after a new President takes office, zero otherwise
VIETNAM_SQRT
The square root of the cumulative casualties (in thousands) during the Vietnam War,
from January 1965, to the end of Johnsons term. From Mueller (1973).16
WATERGATE
Dummy variable for the Watergate scandal: 1 starting March of 1973, and 2 from the
Saturday Night Massacre in October of 1973 until Nixons resignation in August 1974.
5
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IRANCONTRA
Dummy variable for the Iran-Contra scandal; 1 from November of 1986 until the end of
August 1987 (when Congressional hearings concluded).
The model without any effect from events is specified in equation 1:
1a :

Controlt = 0 + 1 *Unemploymentt + 2 * QuarterlyInflationt

+ 4 * ConsumerExpectt + 5 * Inaugurationt + 6 *VietnamSqrtt + 7 *Watergatet
+ 8 * IranContrat

1b :

Approval t = Controlt + 1 * Controlt-1

Where t represents each poll in the 1953-2000 sequence, and 1 is the coefficient on the
autoregressive term. Also, the control coefficients are shown as rather than

to distinguish

them from coefficients on event effects. For brevity, Controlt will be used in place of the
individual control variables and their coefficients in subsequent equations.
Event effects are added as exponentially decaying shocks, with an initial magnitude that
is a function of the independent variables. To allow for the possibility that rally effects decay
more rapidly than do approval changes from changes in economic conditions, a separate decay
constant 2 is estimated. The model does not treat polling periods as equal for event effects.
Instead, event effects decay according to the actual time between polls the model will predict
that virtually all of a shock should still be present if the first poll is just a day later, while much
of the effect will have diminished by the time of the first poll if weeks or months have elapsed.
The time between polls is termed Intervalt, measured in months of 30.5 days. The magnitude of
the disturbance at time t is thus equal to 2Intervalt times the disturbance at time (t-1). Moreover,
the magnitude of the disturbance at the first poll after an event will not be equal to the
instantaneous effect, since polls sometimes come weeks after an event. The first observed

//

magnitude is thus a function of Delayt, where Delay is the time (in months) between an event
and the first poll following the event.

2:

EventEffect t = 2

Interval t

* EventEffect t -1 + X t B * 2

Delayi

Where Xt and B are vectors of independent variables and coefficients, and EventEffectt-1
is the residual effect of previous events. A final complication is the possibility that multiple
events will happen within one polling period each with a different delay until the next poll. To
allow for this, the equation is re-specified, with the independent variables using events as the unit
of analysis and i representing a given event, and during a polling period t the new disturbance is
the sum of the disturbance from all events i that take place between poll (t-1) and poll t:

3:

EventEffect t = 2

Interval t

* EventEffect t-1 +

LastEventt

X i B * 2

Delayi

i = FirstEventt

Finally, this disturbance is added into the approval model. Since it seems unlikely that
one president s rally would carry over to the next, the term (1-Inaugurationt) is added, and
used to null out prior event effects at any polling period when a new president takes office.

4:

Approval t =

1 * Controlt-1 + 0 + 1 *Unemploymentt + 2 * QuarterlyInflationt

+ 4 * ConsumerExpectt + 5 * Inaugurationt + 6 *VietnamSqrtt + 7 *Watergatet
+ 8 * IranContrat + 2
+

LastEventt

Interval t

* EventEffect t-1 * (1 Inaugurationt )

( 0 + 1 *Variable1i + ... n *VariableN i ) * 2

Delayi

i = FirstEvent t

/(

Or, using Controlt to signify the control variables, and setting EventMagnitude equal to
the sum of the independent variables and coefficients:

5:

Approval t =

1 * Controlt-1 + Controlt + 2 Interval * EventEffect t-1 * (1 Inaugurationt )

t

LastEventt

(EventMagnitudei )*2 Delay

i = FirstEvent t

where
EventMagnitudei = 0 + 1 *Variable1i + ... n *VariableN

In the form of eq 5, the only terms that change with different independent variables are
the components of EventMagnitude. Therefore, for brevity when describing specific regressions
only the form of EventMagnitude will be given, but in each case that term is a component of
equation 5, which is the actual equation being regressed. This form can not be estimated using
the standard AR(1) extensions to OLS, but it behaves much like a standard linear auto-regressive
model and can be readily estimated with maximum likelihood methods .17

Analysis (I): Presidential Gains from Peace Events

General Effects of Peace Events
To test Hypothesis 1, that peace events are generally followed by increases in
presidential approval, three regressions were run. In each case, the full model was as specified in
equation 5; only the EventMagnitude term changed from one regression to another. For the
initial attempts to measure the average effect of peace events, event magnitudes were specified
as:

$ ;$ E
#

5
1.

-MF!I
6
@ 1

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6a : EventMagnitudei = 1 * PEACE _ EVENTi

6b : EventMagnitudei = 1 * PEACE _ EVENTi + 2 * FORCE _ EVENTi
6c : EventMagnitudei = 1 * PEACE _ MAJORi + 2 * FORCE _ MAJORi

The first specification simply measures the mean initial effect of peace events. An
important consideration, though, is that peace events often take place not long before or after
uses of force, which also can affect presidential approval (for example, the end of the Vietnam
war a few weeks after the 1972 Christmas bombing , or Clinton s 1998 China summit a month
before the cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan). It is important, then, to control for
effects of uses of force. This is done by adding a set of use of force events to the model; these
are listed in Appendix B.18 Finally, another regression was run using only the major events
those receiving especially heavy press coverage and a connection to the president.

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Table 3: Effects of Peace Events on Presidential Approval

Variable

Control
Variables

Peace Events
(eq 6a)

Estimate(
)

Std. Err

Peace Events + Force

Events (eq 6b)

Estimate(
)

Std. Err

Major Peace/Force
(eq 6c)

Constant

2.342

0.380

1.731

0.482

1.835

0.263

Unemployment

-4.930

2.081

-2.684

2.090

-2.751

1.743

QuarterlyInflation

-1.894

1.138

0.225

2.717

0.079

10.736

ConsumerExpect

0.016

0.002

0.019

0.003

0.018

0.002

VietnamSqrt

-0.458

0.038

-0.479

0.044

-0.449

0.042

Watergate

-1.013

0.113

-0.995

0.129

-1.168

0.167

IranContra

-1.004

0.385

-1.151

0.390

-1.017

0.901

Inauguration

21.876

1.132

23.363

1.309

24.231

1.704

Time constant 1

0.926

0.925

0.928

Event
Variables
PeaceEvent

3.918

ForceEvent

1.347

1.873

0.556

1.933

0.655

PeaceMajor

5.408

1.671

ForceMajor

6.248

1.569

Time Constant 2

0.297

.805

(half life)

17 days

96 days

0.794
90 days

Std. Error
N
Log-likelihood

6.708
7.088
6.974
838
838
838
-2060.1
-2053.2
-2014.4
95% confidence intervals for effect predictions. Variables in bold significant at a .05 level or above.

Coefficients on the control variables show the expected signs, are mostly significant, and
are generally consistent with the findings of earlier presidential approval studies.
The results show that peace events are followed, on average, by increases in presidential
approval ratings. A positive and statistically significant effect is found in all three regressions.
Without controlling for uses of force, an average 4% increase is seen but that effect decays

/*

rapidly; only a 1% increase would remain after a month. With a control for uses of force, only a
2% increase is expected, though with a half life of three months (about the same half life as has
been found for uses of force alone). Though that 2% result is statistically significant, it is not of
much political significance.
More dramatic effects are seen when only the 25 largest events are included in the
regression. As results for equation 6b show, major peace events can be expected to provide
presidents a 5.4% boost (+/- 3.4%) nearly as large as the 6.2 (+/- 3.2%) gain from major uses
of force. In either case, the rally is expected to decay with a half life of three months. Figure 2
illustrates the expected decay patterns.

Figure 2: Predicted Peace Event Effects

10

10

10

-5

-5

-5

-10

-10

-10
0

Figure 3 Predicted Effects of Peace Events

Dramatic uses of peace apparently affect presidential ratings in a manner similar to that
of uses of force. The size of these rallies is modest: the 2% gain from an average peace event
would hardly be noticeable given the other influences on presidential ratings. A sudden 5% gain,
however, is politically meaningful, but even so the effect is small and short-lived compared to
major negative factors such as a recession or major scandal. From the coefficients in table 3, for

/,

example, the Iran-Contra scandal had a long term impact of about 13% on Reagan s approval
ratings.

Media/Opinion Variables and Peace Events

As stated in Hypothesis 2, the media priming model predicts that the public reaction to
events will be conditioned by the coverage, success, and elite reaction of those events. To test
this, regressions were run with the media and opinion variables as shown in equations 7a and 7b:
7a : EventMagnitudei = 1 * PeaceEvent i + 2 * Coveragei + 3 * Success i
+ 4 * Commenti + 5 * CongressOwni + 6 * CongressOpposei + 7 * ForceMajor
7b : EventMagnitudei = 1 * PeaceEvent i + 2 * Coveragei + 3 * Success i
+ 4 * OpinionIndexi + 5 * ForceMajori

Unfortunately, the opinion variables showed classic signs of multicolinearity:

coefficients showing unexpected sign, high instability under specification changes, and
substantial correlation between each other. Therefore, regressions were also done with the
OpinionIndex variable, which is the sum of the editorial and Congressional variables, producing
an index that ranged from 3 to +3. This variable was much better behaved, as demonstrated in
the results in Table 4.

/)

Table 4: Event Effects by Media/Opinion, Event Type

Variable

Opinion Variables
(eq 7b)

Estimate(
)

Std. Err

Event Type
Estimate(
)

Std. Err

Event Type
MAJOR ONLY

Estimate(
)

Std. Err

Constant

2.120

0.3739

2.1088

0.4126

2.2391

0.3441

Unemployment

-2.2267

2.2363

-1.972

2.456

-4.0442

1.9828

QuarterlyInflation

-1.1379

1.1202

-1.1499

1.1958

-1.2943

1.0369

ConsumerExpect

0.0195

0.0017

0.0197

0.0018

0.0177

0.0015

VietnamSqrt

-0.4778

0.0407

-0.4717

0.0408

-0.4701

0.0379

Watergate

-1.0162

0.1194

-0.9608

0.1174

-1.014

0.1208

IranContra

-1.3693

0.3948

-1.2062

0.3872

-1.1245

0.3744

Inauguration

23.5561

1.1517

23.0409

1.1328

22.5353

1.0982

Time constant 1

.9193

0.9188

0.9248

Event Variables
PeaceEvent

-1.9398

1.1011

CoveragePE

2.6199

0.8349

SuccessPE

0.4861

1.1359

OpinonIndexPE

1.7388

0.5085

1.1102

0.4385

1.8041

1.2362

Deescalation

0.2924

0.7768

8.9544

4.3456

ArmsControl

2.0308

1.4119

2.9783

6.9229

Relations

1.2334

1.0014

5.5444

2.4015

Mediation

-4.6462

2.513

-8.072

8.4339

WarTermination

23.2568

4.3921

33.1624

6.2376

5.5664

0.9239

ForceMajor

6.5019

Time Constant 2

.6489

(half life)

Std. Error
N
Log-likelihood

47 days

6.743

0.9617

0.6564
49 days

6.597

.5066
31 days

6.717

838
838
838
-1999.1
-2015.1
-2018.37
95% confidence intervals for effect predictions. Variables in bold significant at a .05 level or above.

As predicted, the peace activity produces larger approval gains for presidents when
coverage is more intensive, and when supported by opinion leaders. Success, on the other hand,
did not matter much, though studies of the use of force have also found that.

/0

The effect of coverage is particularly strong: if elite opinion is neutral, then an event just
meeting the 5-day threshold for New York Times coverage would have an expected effect of just
0.7% on the president s ratings, which a high coverage event (more than 25 stories) would have
an expected 6.0% immediate increase. Elite opinion can also make a substantial difference in the
public s reaction, adding or subtracting 5.1% with 100% support or 100% criticism. In practice,
unanimous support or opposition is rare; the average value for OpinionIndex is 0.5. There were
eight cases of full support (OpinionIndex = +3), and three of total criticism (OpinionIndex = -3).
The net result is that in the best possible case high coverage, success, complete support
a president s ratings would be expected to increase 11.5% initially, decaying by half every
seven weeks. In a worst-case scenario, unsuccessful, criticized peace activity could lower a
president s ratings by 5%. Figure 4 shows these predicted effects over time.

Figure 2: Peace Effects by Media/Opinion Variables

15

15

15
10

10

10

-5

-5

-5

-10

-10

-10

-15

-15

-15

Figure 4 Predicted Effects by Media/Opinion Variables

Effect of Different Types of Peace Activity

Further regressions were run with peace events disaggregated by type. The media
priming model predicts that presidential approval will show greater increases when presidential

(+

actions are more in line with public preferences. Studies suggest this is true for uses of force:
intervention for internal change is less popular than other missions ((Jentleson and Britton
1998;Jentleson 1992)), and internal change events due lead to smaller increases (or even losses)
in approval ((Oneal and others 1996;Burbach 2003)).
Columns 2 and 3 of table 4 show results from regressions run by type of event, with all
peace events and major events only. The most striking result is the huge coefficient on War
Termination, with an instantaneous approval increase of 20 to 30% predicted. The end of wars
are important events, but such a large coefficient seems unreasonable, and there are reasons to
doubt the result. Most importantly, there are only four cases of war termination, and so the result
is based on very few data points. The four cases and their immediate approval changes were:
Korea 15, Vietnam +16, Gulf War +9, Kosovo 0%. Note that fairly rapid half-lives were found,
so that a 23% immediate prediction would typically mean a 15-20% by the time of the first
subsequent poll. The large WarTermination effect is probably driven by the extraordinary rally
of the Gulf War in 1991; Bushs ratings went up more than 25%, far more than the 6% predicted
by the MajorForce variable. With the Gulf War making up 1/4th of the WarTermination variable,
and the end-of-war event happening so quickly after the start of the war, WarTermination picks
up much of the excess war-related rally. Looking at the individual data, with only four examples
about all we can say is that the ends of wars do not have a consistent effect, though they can
cause significant changes in presidential ratings for better or for worse.
Looking to other types of peace activity, there are some differences, though not as clearly
as with uses of force. Most activities provide modest gains on average. ARMS CONTROL
gives a consistent 2 or 3% immediate increase. DEESCALATION and IMPROVED
RELATIONS activities have little effect when events of all magnitudes are considered, but

highly prominent reductions in conflicts or improvements in relations are followed by gains of

5% or more.
MEDIATION actually hurts presidents; the coefficient was consistently negative in all
specifications that were tried. The negative effect of serving as a mediator for third parties is
surprising, given that presidents seem eager to play the role of peace maker. Looking at the data,
though, only in the case of Carters 1978 Camp David summit was mediation followed by
approval gains for a president. This would be consistent with a public focus on direct U.S.
interests in foreign policy solving other nations conflicts may not be seen as relevant by many
Americans.
Summary: Rallies From Peace Events
The results generally confirm hypotheses 1 and 2: peace events do have positive effects
on presidential approval, and are affected as predicted by media coverage and elite opinion. The
gains from diplomacy are generally modest; even for events receiving heavy media coverage, the
expectation is for only a 5% initial gain lasting for a few months. Such approval gains would not
rescue a failing president, but on the other hand, they are not much less than the gains available
from the use of force. If the relatively small approval increases resulting from most uses of force
generate fears that presidents use military force to boost their poll numbers, then it does seem
plausible that the gains from diplomacy found here would also inspire manipulation. The next
section tests that proposition.

(/

Analysis (II): Political Timing of Peace Events

Hypothesis 3 predicted that presidents would engage in diversionary peace Since
peace activity yields political benefits, there would appear to be opportunities for presidents to
exploit statesmanship for their own personal gain.
Methods and Variables
To test for political motivations in the timing of peace activities, the frequency of peace
activity was modeled as a function of politically relevant variables, and control variables, using a
Poisson event-count model for the number of peace events observed in any given polling
interval, an approach that has often been used in the diversionary war literature (Gowa
1998;Waterman and Meernik 1996;Fordham 1998a;Brace and Hinckley 1993).19 In addition to
the variables described earlier, these regressions required the following additional variables were
used:
USSR_TENSION
Coded 1 for periods of heightened tension, -1 for periods of unusual cooperation,
zero otherwise, per the following table:

0:

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Table 5: US-Soviet Tension

START
1/1953
4/1955
3/1959
7/1963
11/1969
7/1975
12/1980
1/1984
11/1987

END
3/1955
2/1959
6/1963
10/1969
6/1975
11/1980
12/1984
10/1987
12/1991

Description (signal event)

Immediate Post-Stalin period
Spirit of Geneva (Austrian treaty)
Crises in Berlin, Cuba, U2 (Berlin deadline )
Quiet 1960s (nuclear test ban agreement)
Dtente (SALT negotiations begin)
Post-Dtente (Helsinki summit)
Cold War Revival (invasion of Afghanistan)
Regan Thaw ( Year of peace speech)
Gorbachev reforms/rapprochement (Washington
summit)
1/1/1992 1/29/2001 End of cold war (USSR disbanded)

VALUE
0
-1
+1
0
-1
0
+1
0
-1
0

WARTIME
1 during periods when the U.S. was at war. Specifically, 1953 up to the Korean
armistice, February 1965 to January 1973 (Vietnam), August 1990 to March 1991 (Gulf War),
March to June 1999 (Kosovo).
ELECTION YEAR
1 for the 12 months prior to a Presidential election
ELECTION PRESIDENT
1 for the final three months prior to a presidential election
ELECTION MIDTERM
1 for the three months prior to a midterm election
POST COLDWAR
1 for the period after December, 1991 (the breakup of the Soviet Union).
EISENHOWER . CLINTON
Dummy variables for each president
SCANDALS

(8

1 during periods of major scandals, as identified from (Schultz 1999).20

3MONTH APPROVAL
3 month moving average of presidential approval, up to the poll prior to the polling
period in questions (approval immediately before each event is not used to avoid the possibility
that approval ratings are affected by the run-up to the events).
The following equations were regressed, with and without individual presidential effects
included:
0 + 1 *Unemployment + 2 * ConsumerExpect +
3 * 3MoApproval + 4 *USSR _ Tension + 5 *Wartime +
8 : PeaceEventCount t = Intervalt * exp
6 * Scandals + 7 * ElectionYear + 8 * Elect Pr esident +
9 * ElectMidterm + 10 * PostColdWar
0 + 1 *Unemployment + 2 * ConsumerExpect +
3 * 3MoApproval + 4 *USSR _ Tension + 5 *Wartime +
9 : PeaceEventCount t = Intervalt * exp
6 * Scandals + 7 * ElectionYear + 8 * Elect Pr esident +
9 * ElectMidterm + 10 * JFK ... + 18 * Clinton

Note that Intervalt is used as a weighting factor due to the unequal polling periods.
EISENHOWER is not included in the presidential effects since a constant term is included (i.e.,
each presidential dummy represents their difference from Eisenhower), and POST COLDWAR is
dropped when presidential effects are included since it is almost identical to CLINTON (POST
COLDWAR would effectively be a dummy variable for the 1992).
Analysis of Results
Regression results from equations 8 and 9 are shown below in table 6.

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(9

Table 6: Rates of Peace Events

Peace Event Rate
(eq 8)
Estimate(
)

Variable

Std. Err

Peace Event Rate

Presidential Effects
(eq 9)

Estimate(
)

Std. Err

(Intercept)

-2.2524

1.3150

-0.9498

1.5925

Unemployment

-3.3669

11.9898

-9.6978

13.3053

ConsumerExpect

-0.0068

0.0049

-0.0055

0.0062

3MoApproval

0.0143

0.0123

-0.0046

0.0158

USSR_Tension

-0.5579

0.2218

-0.3727

0.2769

Wartime

0.6296

0.3101

0.5982

0.4287

PostColdWar

1.0582

0.2926

JFK

0.4316

0.7520

LBJ

-0.2255

0.6426

Nixon

-0.0079

0.5566

Ford

-0.5044

0.8753

Carter

-1.0466

0.8951

Reagan

0.2997

0.4057

Bush41

0.7258

0.4673

Clinton

0.8913

0.4333

Scandals

0.1511

0.2690

0.0937

0.2993

ElectionYear

0.0103

0.3009

0.0926

0.3089

ElectionPresident

-0.9526

0.7148

-0.9611

0.7164

ElectionMidterm

-0.1128
704
-139.6

0.3927

-0.0880
704
-137.3

0.4011

N
Log-likelihood
Likelihood ratio
test
(Pr(Y| =0))

0.0009

0.0076

Variables in bold significant at a .05 level or above; Variables underlined at a 0.30 level. Dummy variable for
Eisenhower omitted since constant included; read as if Eisenhower effect is zero.

The control variables for the current U.S. international situation have the expected
effects: peace events are more common during wars (when peace proposals and de-escalation
are possible), less common when U.S./Soviet tensions are high, and become significantly more

(*

common after the end of the Cold War (though this could be a Clinton effect as much as a postCold War effect).
Political variables generally have insignificant effects, and often in the direction opposite
that would be predicted for diversionary peace . This can be seen more clearly in Figure 4,
below, which shows peace event frequency predicted for the unit changes (unless otherwise
specified) in variables, with all other variables held constant. The reference line shows the
predicted rate for Eisenhower, during a non-wartime, non-election period, with USSR TENSION
at 0, and approval and economic variables at their means.

0 .5

Peace Events / Month

0 .4

0 .3

0 .2

0 .1

0 .0

E is e n h o w e r
M id te rm 3 m o
Scandal
E le c tY e a r
P r e s id e n t 3 m o
W a rtim e

USSR

C lin to n

C a rte r

A p rv -1 5 %
R e c e s s io n

Figure 5 First Differences On Peace Event Rates

Presidential elections campaigns appear to depress diplomatic activity; the frequency
drops dramatically in the last months before an election, as does the rate of uses of force.
Presidents may fear charges of October surprises , the White House may be too focused on the

(,

campaign to conduct major policy initiatives, and potential diplomatic partners may prefer to
wait until after elections when it is clear who their future negotiating partner will be.
Scandals, recessions, and low approval ratings have little effect on the frequency of peace
activity. Presidents are no more likely to conduct dramatic diplomacy when their poll numbers
are down than they are at other times. Presidents are also no more likely to do so during
recessions, which is an interesting finding: most authors report that the use of force does become
more common during recessions. It is not clear why no evidence of political timing is seen.
Presidents might simply refuse to let domestic political calculations affect their foreign policy
decisions. The White House may have a wide range of other political tools at its disposal that are
more effective than overtly diversionary uses of peace or force. It also seems likely that there is
strategic interaction involved: Presidents are well aware that potentially self-serving actions
during times of political need are widely criticized by the press and opposition politicians.
A variety of alternative specifications were tried using higher order terms for approval,
and interactions between approval and economic conditions.21 These specifications did not
significantly outperform the simple model shown in table 6, but in no case did the diversionary
peace pattern appear. Instead, a majority of the models showed peace activity being more
frequent when presidential approval was already high, and for peace activity to become
particularly uncommon during the combination of low presidential approval and poor economic
conditions. In no case was there anything like the strong relationship that has been observed
between economic slowdowns and an increased use of force.
If the greater propensity to use force during recessions is due to diversionary motivations,
it seems odd that peace events do not also become more common, since they too can enhance

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presidential support. Why shouldn t presidents make use of all the tools at their disposal,
especially since peace events would probably be less risky, less costly, and possibly less
damaging if the illegitimate motives became known. One explanation, of course, is that uses of
force during recessions may not be diversionary: the observed correlation could be a
coincidence. Alternatively, there could be a missing factor that is a common cause of both, such
as shared connections to the electoral calendar. The relative effectiveness of peace and war may
also vary under different economic conditions uses of force might be relatively more popular
when economic conditions are poor, for example. Future research is planned that will investigate
these possibilities.22

Conclusion
Dramatic presidential peace activity has resulted in increases in presidential approval.
On average, major peace events those receiving a story per day or more in the New York Times
for two week give presidents about a 5% increase. This compares to 6% for similarly
publicized uses of force. This confirms Hypothesis 1. In addition, there is a systematic variation
between the effects of difference peace events: more coverage means larger gains, and elite
opinion can have a profound influence on the response. Presidential actions which are heavily
criticized might actually cause the president to lose support. This generally confirms Hypothesis
2, although success did not matter as expected.
Taken together, these results suggest that the media priming model has greater
explanatory power than the conflict-cohesion theory. Similar changes in approval result from
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similar levels of attention and elite support for either uses of force or peace events. There have
been a relatively small number of conflicts that have been followed by extreme changes in
presidential approval, such as the 1991 Gulf War, the 1979 Iranian Hostage Crisis, or the Sept.
11th attacks in 2001, all of which caused increases of 20% or more. In these cases there might be
a patriotism effect at work, or perhaps using New York Times story counts doesn t truly capture
the effect of the saturation TV coverage seen with those events. In general, though, the same
processes seem at work in shaping the public response to peace events as uses of force.
Given that uses of peace often help presidents, it is surprising that there was so little
evidence of political timing. Hypothesis 3, that the rate of peace activity will increase with
political negatives such as low approval ratings or scandals, was not confirmed. Presidents do
not appear to use the diplomatic tool to try to rebuild lagging support. What this means is that
there is little evidence for political timing of either uses of force (according to previous studies)
or peace events. The one exception is the correlation of force with recessions, but the fact that
peace events do not show a similar correlation calls into question a simple diversionary
explanation for that relationship.
One question, though, is how to explain the presidential talk of using peace for political
purposes, given that there does not appear to be politically-motivated timing. One possibility is
that presidential talk is just that talk. Also, a careful reading shows that the periods when there
is the most evidence of potential gains from peace activities being discussed in the White House
are periods when presidents were in political trouble precisely because of an unpopular war
(Johnson, Nixon, and the Vietnam War) or because of heightened U.S.-Soviet tensions (e.g.,
Reagans first term). Presidents have considered the potential to use dramatic peace gimmicks to
head off anti-war sentiments or to reassure anxious voters, but there is not much evidence of
them suggesting the use of diversionary peace to counter losses from recessions, scandals, or

8+

other unrelated causes. This suggests that peace activity might not follow macro-political
indicators, but it could be that presidents strike peaceful poses when public war fears or
dissatisfaction with an ongoing war are high; this will be explored in a future project.
When Henry Kissinger was in secret negotiations with the Chinese for Nixons historic
visit, the Chinese leadership reportedly took it for granted that Nixon would want to schedule the
trip in the spring or summer of 1972, in order to enhance his image and steal press attention
away from his challengers in the run-up to the presidential election that year (Hersh 1983). The
Chinese Communists had American politics partly right: summits, treaties, and de-escalation of
conflicts do generate media attention and do improve presidential standing. The gains from
peace are modest, but so generally are the political returns from using force. Dramatic peacepromoting activities are a potential source of presidential support. Whatever Nixons thinking in
the China case, in general the timing peace events does not appear to be motivated by broad
political conditions. Paired with the lack of diversionary war findings, U.S. presidents may be
less cynical in their foreign policy actions than is often suspected.

APPENDIX A: Peace Event Data

Date

Event

Type

NYT page1

Opinion
Index

Success

04/16/53 "Chance for Peace" Speech

summit

15

07/27/53 End of Korean War

WarTerm

35

12/08/53 Atoms for Peace initiative

ArmCtl

11

05/15/55 Austrian State Treaty (US troop withdrawal)

ArmCtl

07/22/55 Geneva Summit, Open Skies proposal

summit

35

06/20/57 Nuclear test moratorium / fissile cutoff proposal

ArmCtl

19

-1

08/22/58 Nuclear test moratorium / test ban negotiations

ArmCtl

09/15/59 Washington Summit

summit

54

-2

05/16/60 Paris Summit

summit

41

-2

-1

06/03/61 Vienna Summit

summit

11

06/10/63 American U speech: testing moratorium

ArmCtl
Nuclear test ban agreement reached (signed one week
07/25/63 later)
ArmCtl

27

04/07/65 Peace plan for Vietnam (Johns Hopkins speech)

DeEsc

12/25/65 Vietnam bombing pause / "Peace Offensive"

DeEsc

16

-1

10/25/66 Peace plan for Vietnam at Manila Conference

DeEsc

10

02/08/67 Vietnam bombing pause (Tet)

DeEsc

-1

06/24/67 Glasboro Summit

summit

10

09/29/67 Proposal for bombing halt if N. Vietnam negotiates

DeEsc

-2

-1

12/20/67 Xmas bombing pause, LBJ ready to open peace talks

DeEsc

-1

04/01/68 Vietnam bombing cut to DMZ area only

DeEsc

25

10/31/68 Vietnam bombing of N. Vietnam stopped

DeEsc

05/14/69 Nixon peace offer -- mutual troop withdrawals

DeEsc

10

06/10/69 Nixon announces troop withdrawals (Midway)

DeEsc

-1

09/16/69 Troop withdrawal (35,000)

DeEsc
Nixon "silent majority" speech: more withdrawals,
11/03/69 eventually end US ground role
DeEsc
Strategic arms talks open in Helsinki (+NPT signed days
11/17/69 later)
ArmCtl

16

12/15/69 Troop withdrawal (50,000)

DeEsc

04/20/70 Troop withdrawal (150,000)

DeEsc

06/04/70 Cambodia incursion to end; troop withdrawals resume

DeEsc

12

-1

08/07/70 Withdrawal acceleration / draft calls reduced (Laird)

DeEsc

8/

APPENDIX A: Peace Event Data

Date

Event

Type

NYT page1

Opinion
Index

Success

10/07/70 Nixon speech: "standstill ceasefire" proposal

DeEsc

15

04/08/71 Troop withdrawal (100,000)

DeEsc

-1

04/15/71 Relaxation of embargo, travel, etc on China

relations

14

07/15/71 China trip announced

relations

16

01/25/72 Kissinger negotiations with N. Vietnam made public

DeEsc

10

-1

02/21/72 China visit

relations

29

05/22/72 Moscow Summit, SALT I and ABM treaties

relations

31

10/27/72 Pre-Election Push for Vietnam Peace ("peace at hand") DeEsc

29

-1

-1

01/24/73 End of Vietnam War

WarTerm

35

06/18/73 Washington Summit

relations

22

01/19/74 Kissinger brokers Israel/Egypt ceasefire

mediate

20

06/27/74 Moscow Summit

relations

23

-2

11/23/74 Vladivostok Summit, SALT II framework

relations

08/01/75 Helsinki Summit -- CSCE Treaty

relations

13

-3

03/24/77 SALT II negotiations begin

ArmCtl

-1

-1

09/17/78 Camp David accords, Egypt and Israel

mediate

20

01/29/79 Deng Xiaoping visit to US, normalization of relations

relations

15

06/15/79 Vienna summit / SALT II Signed

ArmCtl

11

-1

11/18/81 INF -- Zero option

ArmCtl
Reagan offers initial START proposal; announces 5/31
05/10/82 that START talks to being
ArmCtl

12

03/23/83 SDI Proposal

ArmCtl

10

-3

01/16/84 Reagan Admin seeks better relations w/USSR

relations

01/07/85 Resumption of arms talks in Geneva

ArmCtl

13

11/19/85 Geneva summit

ArmCtl

20

10/10/86 Reykjavik Summit

relations

21

-1

-1

09/19/87 INF Agreement reached

ArmCtl

10

12/10/87 Washington Summit / INF Treaty signed

relations

29

05/29/88 Moscow Summit

relations

25

12/08/88 Governor's Island mini-summit

Bush endoreses Gorbachev reforms, wants better
05/12/89 relations

relations

10

12/02/89 Malta Summit

relations

13

05/30/90 Washington Summit

relations

21

-1

ArmCtl

8(

APPENDIX A: Peace Event Data

Date

Event

Type

NYT page1

Opinion
Index

Success

07/07/90 NATO summit declares USSR no longer enemy

relations

09/09/90 Helsinki Summit

relations

02/28/91 Gulf War Ends

WarTerm

35

07/31/91 Moscow Summit / START I Treaty

relations

15

09/28/91 Unilateral nuclear cuts

ArmCtl

12

10/30/91 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference

mediate

17

01/04/93 Moscow Summit / START II Treaty signed

ArmCtl

04/04/93 Vancouver Summit

relations

09/14/93 Oslo Accords signed at White House

mediate

20

10/08/93 US announces withdrawal from Somolia

DeEsc

19

-3

-1

01/13/94 Moscow Summit / Detargeting Agreement

ArmCtl

10

05/10/95 Moscow Summit

relations

11/21/95 Dayton Accords end Bosnian War

mediate

11

04/19/96 Moscow Summit

relations

03/22/97 Helsinki Summit

relations

10/29/97 Jiang Zemin visit to US

relations

11

06/25/98 Bejing Summit (China)

relations

15

10/15/98 Mid-East Peace Summit at Wye

mediate

15

06/10/99 End of Kosovo War

WarTerm

40

-1

88

Appendix B: Use of Force Events

Date

Event

03/20/54

Assistance to French at Dienbienphu

08/05/54

Coverage

Opinion

DEFENSE

-1

US/Chinese clashes after BOAC shootdown

PROTECT

09/01/54

First Taiwan Straits crisis (US soldiers killed)

DEFENSE

07/16/58

US Marines deployed to Lebanon

INTERNAL

08/25/58

Second Taiwan Straits Crisis

DEFENSE

-2

05/12/60

U2 shot down over Soviet Union

PROTECT

04/21/61

Bay of Pigs Invasion

DEFENSE

08/23/61

Berlin Wall Crisis

DEFENSE

11/20/61

Dominican Republic show of force against Trujillo

INTERNAL

05/10/62

Laos civil war; US deployment to Thailand

INTERNAL

10/25/62

Cuban Missile Crisis

PROTECT

01/20/64

Panama: US troops defend bases from rioters

PROTECT

08/08/64

Vietnam: Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Strikes on N. Vietnam

DEFENSE

02/09/65

Vietnam: US begins bombing campaign ("Rolling Thunder")

DEFENSE

03/08/65

Vietnam: U.S. ground troops deployed

DEFENSE

04/29/65

Dominican Republic invasion

INTERNAL

07/25/65

Vietnam: Major expansion of ground commitment

DEFENSE

06/30/66

Vietnam: bombing expanded to Hanoi, POL facilities

DEFENSE

01/24/68

North Korea captures USS Pueblo

PROTECT

02/01/68

Vietnam: Tet Offensive

DEFENSE

-3

04/17/69

North Korea Shoots Down EC-121

PROTECT

05/01/70

Vietnam: Invasion of Cambodia

DEFENSE

-3

11/23/70

Vietnam: Son Tay POW Rescue Attempt

PROTECT

02/08/71

Vietnam: Invasion of Laos

DEFENSE

05/08/72

Vietnam: Bombing of Hanoi ("Linebacker I")

DEFENSE

-1

12/18/72

Vietnam: Bombing of N. Vietnam Resumes ("Linebacker II")

DEFENSE

-2

10/26/73

Nuclear Alert during Yom Kippur War

DEFENSE

05/16/75

PROTECT

08/20/76

Mayaguez crew rescued from Cambodia

US Soldiers killed by North Korea in DMZ ("tree cutting
incident")

PROTECT

05/20/78

Airlift Belgian troops into Zaire combat, evacuate Westerners

PROTECT

11/20/79

Iran Hostage Crisis, Show of Force in Persian Gulf

PROTECT

04/25/80

Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt

PROTECT

08/20/81

Libyan planes shot down

DEFENSE

08/21/82

Lebanon: US Marines deployed to Beirut

INTERNAL

09/21/82

Lebanon: US Marines deployed again to Beirut

INTERNAL

10/28/83

Grenada invasion

PROTECT

Type

89

Appendix B: Use of Force Events

Date

Event

12/15/83

Lebanon: U.S. strikes Syrian forces

10/12/85

Coverage

Opinion

INTERNAL

-1

Achile Lauro hijackers intercepted by U.S. forces

PROTECT

03/26/86

Libya: Skirmishes in Gulf of Sidra

DEFENSE

04/15/86

Libya: Bombing of Tripoli

PROTECT

06/16/87

Reflagging / Escorting Tankers in Persian Gulf

DEFENSE

10/15/87

Iranian boats/bases struck by U.S.

DEFENSE

04/19/88

More raids against Iran

DEFENSE

12/01/89

Show of force / possible air strikes against Philippine coup

INTERNAL

12/20/89

Panama Invasion

PROTECT

08/09/90

Iraq: Deployment to Protect Saudi Arabia ("Desert Shield")

DEFENSE

11/09/90

Iraq: Major expansion of force in Saudi Arabia

DEFENSE

-1

01/15/91

Iraq: Gulf War begins

DEFENSE

02/26/91

Iraq: Ground campaign begins

PROTECT

04/15/91

Iraq: Humanitarian Assistance to Kurds ("Provide Comfort")

INTERNAL

08/26/92

Iraq: Imposition of No-Fly Zone

DEFENSE

0.5

12/06/92

Somalia: Humanitarian Assistance Mission Begins

INTERNAL

01/16/93

Iraq: Air Strikes Following Threats to Coalition Aircraft

DEFENSE

06/17/93

Somalia: Expansion of Mission to Pursue Aideed

INTERNAL

-1

06/27/93

Iraq: Missile Strikes Following Bush Assassination Plot

PROTECT

10/04/93

Somalia: Major Mogadishu Battle

INTERNAL

-3

04/22/94

Bosnia: NATO Air Strikes (Gorazde)

INTERNAL

0.5

07/22/94

Rwanda humanitarian assistance

INTERNAL

09/20/94

INTERNAL

-2

10/14/94

Haiti Occupation
Iraq: U.S. Forces Deployed to Reinforce Kuwait ("Vigilant
Warrior")

DEFENSE

11/21/94

Bosnia: NATO Air Strikes (Bihac)

INTERNAL

1.5

08/31/95

Bosnia: NATO Air Campaign ("Deliberate Force")

INTERNAL

12/15/95

Bosnia: Deployment of IFOR Peacekeepers

INTERNAL

0.5

09/03/96

Iraq: Missile Strikes after Kurdistan Incursion

INTERNAL

-0.5

08/20/98

Sudan/Afghanistan Missile Strikes after Embassy Bombings

PROTECT

-0.5

12/16/98

Iraq: Air Strikes After Inspectors Expelled ("Desert Fox")

DEFENSE

-1

03/24/99

Kosovo War

INTERNAL

06/12/99

Kosovo Peacekeeping (KFOR)

INTERNAL

Type

8*

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