Villavicencio vs Lukban - A case digest

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce
around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus
the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his
capacity as Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody
of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter
were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are
inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that
those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao
instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could
have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have
shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought
before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present.
Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100
pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold
his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and
has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he
should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the
custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the
mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of
Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to

Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of
her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while
the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may
not thus be easily evaded.
People Vs Lagman
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so
because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed.
Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an
army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the
National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The defense of the State
is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal military or civil service
AGLIPAY Vs RUIZ
G.R. No. L-45459

March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what
he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce
the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the
respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for
printing
ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
constitutional
HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were
money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the
latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that
the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more

tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director
of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animaldrawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public
Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonw

ealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations
made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public
Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all
animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject
to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is
a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring
its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its

rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the
greatest good to the greatest number.

JOSE ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, digested

GR # 121013 July 16 1998
(Remedial Law, Appeal)
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Almeda filed a notice of appeal which was disapproved by the trial court due to it
being filed five (5) days late beyond the reglementary period and subsequently denied of motion for
reconsideration. Respondent court dismissed the petition contending that the requirement regarding
perfection of an appeal was not only mandatory but jurisdictional such that the petitioners failure to
comply therewith had the effect of rendering the judgment final. Subsequently, petitioner motions for
reconsideration and is denied. Also, it was found that there was lack of merit in the petitioners reason for
the late filing of the notice of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal within
reglementary period would render a judgment final and executory.
HELD: Yes, the period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by statute,
particularly Sec 39 of BP 129, which provides:

Sec.39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from
The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of it must strictly comply with the
statutes or rules as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an
orderly discharge of judicial business. Due to petitioners negligence of failing to perfect his appeal, there
is no recourse but to deny the petition thus making the judgment of the trial court final and executory.

Meyer vs Nebraska
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that
outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating legislation that
restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable state objective.

Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the
teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.
Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment?

Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff
and

fails

to

reasonably

relate

to

any

end

within

the

competency

of

the

state.

The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state
argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all
children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak
other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge
of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.

Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is arbitrary
and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate

People vs Ritter

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary restraining
order prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send
their

children

to

public

school.

Appellants

appealed

the

order.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parents or guardians
right to decide the mode in which their children are educated. States may not usurp this right when the
questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest.

Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies
or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college
preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants
from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send
children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.
Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control?

Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has
no

reasonable

relationship

to

any

purpose

within

the

competency

of

the

state.

The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the

appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the
right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th
Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which
their children are educated.

Rissa M. Mira - Case Digest

DECS vs. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Facts:
Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) three times. When he
applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application based on the three-flunk-rule. He then filed a
petition before the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challenging the
constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and constitutional.

Ruling:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the
challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right
to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has the right to choose
a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition
was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed.

Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge Case Digest

Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191, March 21, 1978
Facts:
On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas
corpus, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the preliminary examination which led to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of
Mariveles, Bataan, (1) failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether
there was a probable cause. (2) He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that
tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. (3)
It was in the amount of P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner.
As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday, March 15, 1978.
Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest,

alleging that there was no impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the
excessive character of the bail, he asserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail
Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge in Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to
P8,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause was
constitutionally deficient?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court declared that the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of
this Court of March 15, 1978.
The Court issued the following Resolution:
Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant
to section 191of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old minor, to order the release of
the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his
Counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice
to further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law. This
Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code.
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive.