PEOPLE vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The accused, Rolando Plaza was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, with a salary grade 25. He was
charged in the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 89 of P.D. No.
1445 or The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Allegedly, he failed to
liquidate the cash advances he received by reason of his office on
December 19, 1995 in the amount of P30,000. On April 7, 2005,
Plaza filed a motion to dismiss with the Sandiganbayan which was
found to be with merit.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over
the case. So, the petitioner filed this case to the Supreme Court
contending that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal
cases involving public officials and employees enumerated under
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, whether or not occupying a position
classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not
only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies
included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to their office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsodwhose salary grade is
below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines.
HELD: Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively
enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads ( Sec.
4 (1) (a) of P.D. 1606); city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads (Sec. 4 (1) (b) of P.D. 1606); officials of
the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher;

Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of
higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of P.D. 1606 provides that
other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office
also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
So, those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or
felonies in relation to their office. The Supreme Court ruled in
earlier cases that: as long as the offense charged in the information
is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been
perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no
personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is
held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to
his office. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed
that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses
themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section
4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were
committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office.

MATTHEWS vs. TAYLOR

FACTS: On June 20, 1988. Respondent Benjamin Taylor, a British,
married a Filipina named Joselyn Taylor. Eventually, they bought a
lot. The transaction was said to be financed by Benjamin. Joselyn
and Benjamin constructed improvements and made an inn to the
said lot. Permits and licenses were secured for the establishment.
Three years passed and their relationship turned sour and Joselyn
ran away with Philip Matthews. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor
and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an
Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for
a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The
agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary
Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and
renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the
Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn
without his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against
Joselyn and the petitioner.
ISSUE: Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into
by his Filipina wife over a land bought during their marriage?
HELD: The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not
allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save
only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule
more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more
aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands
through another. Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of
Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is
absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the
Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated
vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim
that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into
such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was
created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property
was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any
event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory

that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a

husband in respect of conjugal property.

DENR vs. YAP

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued
Proc. No. 1801declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,
caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondentsclaimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that
Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership.
Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to
have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the
mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available
for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry
Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondentsclaimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was
misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed
by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since

Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,

whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The
Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought
reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial
court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other
landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior
vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in
continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the
two petitions
ISSUE: Whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay.
HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified
lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No.

705 defines apublic forest as a mass of lands of the public

domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the
1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural
lands
may
be
alienated.Prior
to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had neverbeen expressly and administratively classified under any
of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable. The
burden
of
proof
in
overcoming
such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented
to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that,
prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land
is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to

classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064.
This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is
misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when
the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of
the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that
time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land
Act, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusiveprerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no
longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine
the classification of lands of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value
for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a
majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands
that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land
must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for
one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled
by the proof in each particular case
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitutionclassifying lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The

discussion in Heirs of
particularly instructive:

Amunategui

v.

Director

of

Forestryis

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does

not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary
and forest or timber land as a classification of lands of the public
domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification
for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine
the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach

resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has

not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may
not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not
denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and
other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will
this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their
occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean
lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as
builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or
protect their possession. For another, they may look into other
modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by
law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private
claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them
from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is
one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives.