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La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest

G.R. No 127882
Facts :
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.
2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern
the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A.
No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the
procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes
their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and
Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly
before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President
entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s.
1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary
demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 9640, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has
yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
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They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or
Technical Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as
unconstitutional and null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act
contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative
issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western
Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
Issue :
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.
Ruling :
The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a
qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical
assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.
(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee,
insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement,
(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical
assistance agreement;
(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or
technical assistance agreement;
(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance
agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement;
(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a
contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the
foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own:
(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial
or technical assistance agreement.
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Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical
assistance agreements;
Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or
technical assistance agreement proposals;
Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance
agreements;
Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;
The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's
share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and
Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to
said contractors;
When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into
effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected,
must fall with them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
TIGOY vs. CA Case Digest
RODOLFO TIGOY vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 144640. June 26, 2006FACTS:
Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986,
was allegedlyintroduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified
his intent to rent the trucks of Ong totransport construction materials from Larapan,
Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport wassupposedly entered into
between Ong and Bertodazo.In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered
Nestor Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy tobring the two trucks to Lolong
Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte. He instructed the two drivers to leave thetrucks
in Larapan for the loading of the construction materials by Lolong Bertodazo. Thus, after
meeting withBertodazo, Sumagang and petitioner Tigoy allegedly went home to return
to Larapan at four o'clock in themorning the next day. When they arrived, the trucks had
been laden with bags of cement and were half-covered with canvas.That same morning
of October 4, 1993, the Ozamis City police received a report that two trucks, a blue
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andgreen loaded with cement, did not stop at the checkpoint. Thus, some police officers
boarded their patrolvehicle to intercept the two trucks. Upon inspection, the police
officers discovered piles of sawn lumber beneaththe cement bags in both trucks. The
police officers inquired if the drivers had a permit for the lumber but thelatter could not
produce any. After an investigation was held by the police and the DENR office in
the city, an Information was filed againstNestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and
petitioner Tigoy for possession of forest products without legalpermit in violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series
of 1987, in relation to Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.Ong and petitioner
Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during the arraignment. After trial, the Regional Trial
Courtfound both Ong and Tigoy guilty. On appeal, Ong was acquitted while Tigoys
conviction was upheld.
ISSUE:
Is Tigoy guilty of possession of forest products without permit?
HELD:
Yes. There are two ways of violating the said Section 68: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or
collectingtimber or other forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber
or other forest products withoutthe required legal documents.Petitioner was charged
with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable
under Section 68 of the Code. The appellant, Sumagang and the rest of their
companions were apprehended by thepolice officers in flagrante delicto as they were
transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City.Tigoy contends that he did
not know that the truck was loaded with timber without the necessary permit.However,
the circumstances shows otherwise. Why would the drivers refuse to stop when
required? Did theyfear inspection of their cargo? Why would "S.O.P." (which in street
parlance is grease money) be offered tofacilitate the passage of the trucks? The only
logical answer to all these questions is that the drivers knew thatthey were carrying
contraband lumber.In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act
is prohibited by a special law such as inthe present case, the commission of the
prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has theintent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and
consciously. Directproof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to
prove conspiracy. Conspiracy may beproven by circumstantial evidence. It may be
deduced from the mode, method and manner by which theoffense is perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose anddesign,
concerted action and community of interest. It is not even required that the participants
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Facts:
Petitioner Mustang lumber, Inc is a duly registered lumber dealer with the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD). Its lumberyard is located at Fortune Street,
Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, their office is located at Nos.
1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and their permit will expire on September
25, 1990.
The Special Action and Investigation Division (SAID) of thee DENR
received information that the petitioner is hiding stockpile of prohibited lumbers, some
though not prohibited but without proper documents. On April 1, 1990 SAID organized a
team of Policemen and Foresters to conduct surveillance at the lumberyard, in the
course thereof the team saw coming out from the lumberyard of the petitioner truck with
plate no. CCK-322 loaded with Lauan and Almaciga of assorted sizes and dimensions.
Since the driver was unable to produce the required documents the team seized the
truck together with its cargo and impounded at the DENR compound.
Due to the refusal of the owner, the team was unable to gain entry
thereof. On April 3, 1990 the team was able to secure search warrant from Executive
Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Armed with the
search warrant the team proceeded to the lumberyard of the petitioner and seized
truckloads of Narra shorts, trimmings and slabs, a number of Narra lumber and
approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including
Almaciga and Supa. On April 4, 1990, the team returned to the lumberyard and seized
stockpile of Almaciga, Supa and Lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet
for the petitioner were unable to produce the required documents for the said items and
place it under administrative seizure. Wherein the lumberyard seized will remain in the
custody of the petitioner but he is not allowed to dispose it.
On April 23, 1990, acting on the memorandum submitted by the Chief of
the SAID Atty. Vincent A. Robles, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending
immediately the petitioners lumber-dealers permit.
On May 3, 1990 Secretary Factoran issued another order to confiscate in
favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with the law the approximately
311,000 board feet of Lauan, Supa and Almaciga lumber.
On July 11, 1990 petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with regards to April 1, 1990 incidents.
On September 17, 1990 the DENR received reports that petitioner was
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violating P.D. 705. A team of DENR agents went to the office of the petitioner at Tondo,
Manila, since the gate were open they proceeded and caught petitioner operating as a
lumber dealer although its permit has already been suspended on April 23, 1990,
furthermore the team were informed that an owner-type with a trailer loaded with lumber
is about to be delivered with sales invoice with it. As a consequence of which petitioner
filed the second Civil Case with the RTC of Manila s petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
While Atty. Robles filed with the DOJ a complaint against the petitioners
President and General Manager Ri Chuy Po, for violation of section 68 of P.D. 705 as
amended, the investigating prosecutor recommended for the filing of appropriate cases
to Ri Chuy Po. On this basis, information was filed by the DOJ at the RTC of Valenzuela
Charging Ri Chuy Po with violation of section 68 of P.D. 705 on June 5, 1991.
Both civil cases filed by the petitioner were dismissed by the court a quo
for lack of merit and was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence they bought it to
the Supreme Court.
The criminal case filed against Ri chuy Po was dismissed, for according
to Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong possession of lumber without the legal documents
required by the forest laws and regulations is not a crime. Hence the people filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, alleging that Judge Dizon-Capulong acted
with grave abuse of discretion, after their motion for reconsideration has been denied.
Issue:
Whether or not, possession of lumber without legal permit is a crime.
Held:
All three cases were consolidated by the Supreme Court. The court held
that the incident on April 1, 1990 is a legal seizure without warrant since the object to be
searched is a moving vehicle so the dismissal of the Court of Appeals to the first civil
case is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
With regards to the second civil case the court held that Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the dismissal of the case hence the petitioner never disputed the fact
that their permit was suspended by Secretary Factoran and it was never lifted.
On the criminal case brought against Ri Chuy Po the court held that
Judge Dizon-Capulong committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the said case.
The Judges disposition and conclusion is incorrect since possession of lumber is
punishable under PD 705 since lumber is a processed log or timber cut into desired
sizes. Hence lumber is also a timber.
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Wherefore the resolution is hereby set aside and annul and directing the
Judge on her successor to hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch since she
committed grave abuse of discretion.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION), VS. LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,[G.R. NO. 191427, MAY 30, 2011]Doctrines:
The thrust of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must all
owadministrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilitie
s within thespecialized areas of their respective competence.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense for it isenough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case
against him is decided.
Facts:
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal Robina
Corp. failed to
complywith government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natu
ral Resources (DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of
1990. After conducting hearings, the LLDA resolvedthat respondent is found to be
discharging pollutive wastewater. Petitioner moved to reconsider however theLLDA
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to pay the
penalties.
Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders before the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court went on to chidepetitioners petition for certiorari as premature since the law
provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or
the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first beenexhausted before
invoking judicial intervention.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy as groundswhich exempted it from complying with the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Held:
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our
judicial system. The thrust of the
rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
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discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective

competence. The rationale for this doctrine isobvious. It entails lesser expenses and
provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity andconvenience also impel
courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redresshas been completed.Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy
of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Itscontrary arguments to show that an appeal to the
DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs
findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous.The essence of due process is
simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunityto explain
ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense for it is enoughthat the party is given the chance to be
heard before the case against him is decided.
Shell Philippines Exploration B. V. vs. Efren Jalos, et al.,
G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner here claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state
immunity without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, on the basisthat under
Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent of the Philippinegovernment in the
development of the Malampaya gas reserves.Petitioners main undertaking under
Service Contract 38 is to Perform allpetroleum operations and provide all necessary
technology and finance as well
asother connected services to the Philippine government. As defined under thecontract,
petroleum operation means the searching for and obtaining Petroleumwithin the
Philippines, including the transportation, storage, handling and
sale of petroleum whether for export or domestic consumption.
Petitioners primaryobligation under the contract is not to represent the Philippine
government for
thepurpose of transacting business with third persons. Rather, its contractualcommitme
nt is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State.Consequently,
it is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services, technology
and financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. Notably,the Philippine
government itself recognized that petitioner could be sued in relationto the project. This
is evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties underService Contract 38.
ISSUES:
-Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction
of the PAB; -Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a
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causeof action against Shell; and -Whether or not the suit is actuallyagainst the State
and is barred under the doctrine of state immunity.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner cannot claim immunity from suit because it isnot an
agent of the Republic of the Philippines, but the latters service contractor
forthe exploration and development of one of the countrys natural gasreserves.
While the Republic of the Philippines appointed petitioner as theexclusive party to
conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo areaunder the States full
control and supervision, it does not follow that petitioner hasbecome the States agent
within the meaning of the law. An agent is a personwho binds himself to render some
service or to do something in representation oron behalf of another, with the consent or
authority of the latter. The essence of anagency is the agents ability to represent his
principal and bring about businessrelations between the latter and third persons. An
agents ultimate undertaking isto execute juridical acts that would create, modify or
extinguish relations betweenhis principal and third persons. It is this power to affect the
principals contractualrelations with third persons that differentiates the agent from a
service contracto
Universal Robina Corp Held Liable for P1.25 M in penalties for Pollution of Pasig River
The Supreme Court has sustained the rulings of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) and the Court of Appeals (CA) that Universal Robina Corporation's
manufacturing plant in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City was guilty of discharging pollutive
wastewater for a total of 1,247 days or equivalent to accumulated daily penalties of
PhP1,247,000.00.
The Court's Third Division, through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, dismissed the
petition for review on certiorari filed by Universal Robina Corporation (URC) contesting
the period of violation which served as LLDA's basis for the amount of the penalty. The
Court ruled that LLDA correctly reckoned the two periods--from March 14, 2000 to
November 3, 2003 and from March 15, 2006 to April 17, 2007within which URC was
found to have continued discharging pollutive wastewater. The Court held that LLDA
thus correctly applied the penalty under Sec. 32, Article VI of LLDA Resolution No. 33,
Series of 1996 which sets a penalty for prohibited acts of not more than PhP1,000.00
for each day of violation or by imprisonment of from two to six years or both fine and
imprisonment.
The Court noted that URC was given by the LLDA the opportunity to submit valid
documents to show proof of its non-operating dates that would be necessary for the
possible reduction of the accumulated daily penalties, but the corporation failed to do
so. While URC did submit Daily Operation Reports and Certifications, as these
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documents were not verified as required under RA 4850, orthe Laguna Lake
Development Authority Act, the Court held that LLDA may not be faulted for treating
such evidence to be purely self-serving especially since the submitted documents were
contrary to LLDA's own Investigation Report and Report of Inspection.
The Court added that URC failed to comply with the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies when it appealed LLDA's orders before the CA as the corporation still had the
available remedy of appeal to the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. The Court stressed that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system...The rationale for this doctrine is
obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. The Court also
declared, While belaboring petitioner's assertions, it must be underscored that the
protection of the environment, including bodies of water, is no less urgent or vital than
the pressing concerns of private enterprises, big or small. Everyone must do their share
to conserve the national patrimony's meager resources for the benefit of not only this
generation, but of those to follow. The length of time alone it took petitioner to upgrade
its WTF (from 2003 to 2007), a move arrived at only under threat of continuing
sanctions, militates against any genuine concern for the well-being of the country's
waterways.
After conducting a laboratory analysis on March 14, 2000, LLDA's Pollution Control
Division Monitoring and Enforcement Section found that URC's corn refinery plant's
wastewater failed to comply with government standards under DENR Administrative
Orders Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. LLDA, which also found that URC was operating
without a LLDA clearance/permit, ordered URC to explain why its operations should not
be shut down. Meanwhile, a phone-in complaint on August 31, 2000 led to another
analysis by LLDA of URC's wastewater which showed continued failure to conform to
government standards. Hearings were thus conducted on URC's pollution case. In
2003, URC notified LLDA of its plan to upgrade its wastewater treatment facility, but this
was completed only in 2007. After a sampling of URC's wastewater on May 9, 2007
revealed that it has finally complied with government standards, URC requested for a
reduction of penalties to 560 days or equivalent to PhP560,000.00 on the ground that
LLDA erred in its adoption of straight computation of the periods of violation. LLDA's
order, which dismissed URC's petition, was sustained when URC filed a petition in the
CA. (GR No. 191427,URC v. LLDA, May 30, 2011)

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