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Arc Flash Science and Regulation
Arc Flash Science and Regulation
Arc Flash Science and Regulation
Outline
Electrical Safety principles
Where are the arc flash regulations and standards going?
OSHA
NFPA
70E-2009
70 (NEC)-2008
IEEE
1584-2002
C2 (NESC) - 2007
Section 1
Electrical Safety Principles
OSHA Standard
Code of Federal Regulation
Title 29
Part 1910
Occupational Safety and Health
Standards
Subpart R
1910.269
Subpart S
Electrical
Citation Settlement
http://search.access.gpo.gov/oshrc/SearchRight.asp?
ct=oshrc&q1=Electrical
OSHA is citing
NFPA70E
during injury
investigation
and fine
assessment.
Enforcement
OSHA fine assessment based on:
4000 electricians
X $7,000 per electrician
$2.8 M Fine
10
Requirement Documents
OSHA 29 CFR
Part 1910
OSHA Standards
(Iowa Shown)
NFPA70E-2009
NESC
NFPA70 (NEC)
IEEE C2-2007
Governs Employee
Workplace Safety
Applies to Utility
Governs Electrical
Installations
Industry
11
Supporting Documents
Recommended Practice of
Electrical Equipment
Maintenance
ANSI Z535-2
Standard for
Environmental and
Facility Safety Signs
12
13
14
1.2
Untreated cotton
25
40
15
16
Better too much than too little (dont sacrifice safety for comfort), but
best to select the right level for a given task in a given location.
Provide breaks, drink a lot of water when working in a high category
suit.
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20
Section 2
Where are the Arc Flash Regulations
and Standards Going?
Note: This is not a complete list of the changes in standards. Only
some key changes are listed.
22
23
Equipment Labeling
Equipment shall be field marked with a label containing the available
incident energy or required level of PPE.
24
25
Whats next?
26
IEEE 1584
Opportunities to fine tune present method
Alternate box sizes
Boxes of variable depths
Exploration at 208 V
Conditions for arc to ignite, sustain
27
28
IEEE C2-2007
National Electrical Safety Code
Article 410
Effective January 1, 2009 the employer shall ensure that an
assessment is performed to determine potential exposure to an electric
arc
Introduced a new method of calculating arc flash energies for open
switchyards and open conductor lines over 1000V using tables 410-1
and 410-2
Article 410.A.3, Note 2: It is recognized that arc energy levels can be
excessive with secondary systems. Applicable work rules required by
this part and engineering controls should be utilized.
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33
34
35
36
Arc Flash
Reliability
37
Section 3
The Arc Flash Calculation Process
Arcing
39
40
Case History #1
Infinite Bus versus Actual Available Fault Current
UTIL- INFIN
LV 463.2 kA
LV X/R 15.0
C/L (mom) 704.8 kA
C/L X/R 15.0
Interrupt 463.1 kA
Interrupt X/R 15.0
BUS-UTI
BUS-UTR
2500 kVA -1
2500 kVA - 2
4000A -1
4000A - 2
MAIN 1
MAIN 2
LV 59.0 kA
LV X/R 9.1
LV 43.4 kA
LV X/R 8.9
MAIN 1 -1250HP
UTIL-REAL
LV 4.9 kA
LV X/R 8.1
C/L (mom) 6.7 kA
C/L X/R 8.1
Interrupt 4.8 kA
Interrupt X/R 8.1
MAIN2 - 1250HP
41
Case History #1
Infinite Bus versus Actual Available Fault Current
CURRENT IN AMPERES
1000
CURRENT IN AMPERES
2500 kVA -1
1000
2500 kVA -1
100
2500 kVA -1
2500 kVA -1
4000A -1
100
10
TIME IN SECONDS
TIME IN SECONDS
10
4000A -1
7 SEC
0.10
0.01
Ia=19kA
TX Inrush
0.5 1
10
TX Inrush
0.10
Ia=26kA
.32SEC
100
1K
Infinite Bus
Schneider Electric - Engineering Services Nov 2009
10K
0.01
0.5 1
10
100
1K
10K
Real Values
42
Case History #1
Infinite Bus versus Actual Available Fault Current
UTIL- INFIN
LV 463.2 kA
LV X/R 15.0
C/L (mom) 704.8 kA
C/L X/R 15.0
Interrupt 463.1 kA
Interrupt X/R 15.0
IE = 33 cal/cm2
UTIL-REAL
BUS-UTI
BUS-UTR
2500 kVA -1
2500 kVA - 2
4000A -1
4000A - 2
MAIN 1
MAIN 2
LV 59.0 kA
LV X/R 9.1
LV 43.4 kA
LV X/R 8.9
PPE = 4
MAIN 1 -1250HP
MAIN2 - 1250HP
LV 4.9 kA
LV X/R 8.1
C/L (mom) 6.7 kA
C/L X/R 8.1
Interrupt 4.8 kA
Interrupt X/R 8.1
IE = 551 cal/cm2
PPE =
DANGEROUS
551/33 = 16.6
43
Practical Application
Utility systems are dynamic
Utility may change the parameters of power supply source at the
distribution substation
Customer may change the system arrangement in the plant
Arc flash analysis is essentially a snap-shot of the system at the time of
the study
It will have to be repeated if the utility supply parameters change
44
Section 4
The Arc Flash Mitigation Problem
New Problem
Arc flash exposure levels may be unacceptable to the end user
The Compromises
Compromise between protection and reliability
But the best protected system may have unacceptable Arc Flash
Exposure
46
Case History #2
46 kA, 3ph. Bolted Fault on Unit Substation Bus
Main Breaker does not have Instantaneous
Primary Transformer Fuse is Available
2000kVA Transformer, 5.75% Z
2000 KVA
3000 A
Questions:
1. How long does it take for Main
breaker or Primary fuse to clear ?
2. What is Incident Energy ?
1600 A
46 KA
Bolted
Fault
47
Case History #1
CURRENT IN AMPERES
1000
600A
2000 KVA
200E
200E
100
2000 KVA
2000 KVA
3000A MAIN
3000A MAIN
LV 46.0 kA
LV X/R 8.2
TIME IN SECONDS
10
1600A1
TX Inrush
.5 sec
0.01
10
100
1200A1
1200A2
800A
MTRI-SUB1
20 kA Arcing Fault
0.10
1600A1
SUB 1B
1K
10K
Case 1.tcc Ref. Voltage: 480 Current Scale x10^2 Ford Sharonville.drw
Schneider Electric - Engineering Services Nov 2009
48
Case History #1
Incident Energy Calculation
Using IEEE 1584
Spreadsheets @ 24:
E = 25.2 cal/cm2
15-10
49
Case History #1
CURRENT IN AMPERES
1000
2000 KVA
175E
100
2000 KVA
3000A MAIN
10
1600A1
TIME IN SECONDS
TX Inrush
0.10
.07 sec
20 kA Arcing Fault
0.01
1
10
100
1K
10K
Case 1.tcc Ref. Voltage: 480 Current Scale x10^2 Ford Sharonville.d
50
Arc Flash
Reliability
51
Section 5
Principles of Arc Flash Mitigation
Engineering
53
Perception
Before
Schneider Electric - Engineering Services Nov 2009
After
Reality?
Before
After
54
REVIEW: PPE
Category 0
Category
Class
Description
Min. Arc
Minimum
Rating
Rating
(cal/cm2)
N/A
2
1.2
FR shirt + FR pants
(2) + FR Coverall
25
40
Category 2
NFPA 70E-2004
Category 4
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Axiom #1
ARC-FLASH INCIDENT ENERGY (AND FLASH PROTECTION
BOUNDARY) MAY BE REDUCED BY LOWERING ARCING TIME
LOWERING DEVICE SETTINGS there is a limit to how much reduction
can be made and still achieve adequate selective coordination.
CHANGING THE DEVICE THAT CONTROLS ARCING TIME for
example, using remote main.
SPECIALIZED PROTECTIVE RELAYING such as zone-selective
interlocking or differential relaying these operate independently of
selective coordination, so selectivity is not reduced.
ACTIVE PROTECTION detects an arc and acts upon it to minimize arcing
time or nature of the arc.
61
3000 KVA
4000A
2000A
Fault
62
1M
10K
1K
100
CURRENT IN AMPERES
100K
1000
System is selectively
coordinated
PRIMARY FUSE
TRANSFORMER
100
100
Calculated AFIE at
switchgear main bus: 291
cal/cm2 not suitable for
live work
MAIN CB
10
10
CB F1
22.07kA
1M
100K
0.01
10K
0.01
1K
0.10
100
0.10
TIME IN SECONDS
3.8s
63
1M
10K
1K
100
CURRENT IN AMPERES
100K
1000
PRIMARY FUSE
TRANSFORMER
100
100
MAIN CB
10
10
CB F1
0.32s
22.07kA
1M
100K
0.01
10K
0.01
1K
0.10
100
0.10
TIME IN SECONDS
64
65
Regular Transformer
IE = 1591 cal/cm2
PPE = DANGEROUS
Schneider Electric - Engineering Services Nov 2009
IE = 2.87 cal/cm2
PPE = 1
66
Axiom #1
ARC-FLASH INCIDENT ENERGY (AND FLASH PROTECTION
BOUNDARY) MAY BE REDUCED BY LOWERING ARCING TIME
LOWERING DEVICE SETTINGS there is a limit to how much reduction
can be made and still achieve adequate selective coordination.
CHANGING THE DEVICE THAT CONTROLS ARCING TIME for
example, using remote main.
SPECIALIZED PROTECTIVE RELAYING such as zone-selective
interlocking or differential relaying these operate independently of
selective coordination, so selectivity is not reduced.
ACTIVE PROTECTION detects an arc and acts upon it to minimize arcing
time or nature of the arc.
68
4000A
2000A
MCC BUS
Fault
Schneider Electric - Engineering Services Nov 2009
69
Timing
70
50/
51
MV RELAY
ESTABLISHES
THE ARC
FLASH
ENERGY ON
LV BUS
71
72
Place the CT in
the XFMR
compartment
50/
51
Digital Relay
(Virtual Mail)
LV Switchboard
Setting Group
Control Switch
73
Axiom #1
ARC-FLASH INCIDENT ENERGY (AND FLASH PROTECTION
BOUNDARY) MAY BE REDUCED BY LOWERING ARCING TIME
LOWERING DEVICE SETTINGS there is a limit to how much reduction
can be made and still achieve adequate selective coordination.
CHANGING THE DEVICE THAT CONTROLS ARCING TIME for
example, using remote main.
SPECIALIZED PROTECTIVE RELAYING such as zone-selective
interlocking or differential relaying these operate independently of
selective coordination, so selectivity is not reduced.
ACTIVE PROTECTION detects an arc and acts upon it to minimize arcing
time or nature of the arc.
74
75
2000A
MCC BUS
Fault
Schneider Electric - Engineering Services Nov 2009
4000A
2000A
MCC BUS
77
1M
10K
1K
100
CURRENT IN AMPERES
100K
1000
PRIMARY FUSE
TRANSFORMER
100
100
MAIN CB
10
TIME IN SECONDS
10
0.10
0.10
0.01
0.01
22.07kA
1M
100K
10K
1K
100
0.08s
50
51
TRIP
TRIP
MV BREAKER
50
51
ZSI
LV BUS
LV BREAKERS
79
ZSI Considerations
Must interlock all devices at same level in system
Otherwise, nuisance trip of feeder or main is possible
For example, not interlocking one feeder on switchboard where main
and other feeders have ZSI
80
81
Sample Schematic
82
83
Axiom #1
ARC-FLASH INCIDENT ENERGY (AND FLASH PROTECTION
BOUNDARY) MAY BE REDUCED BY LOWERING ARCING TIME
LOWERING DEVICE SETTINGS there is a limit to how much reduction
can be made and still achieve adequate selective coordination.
CHANGING THE DEVICE THAT CONTROLS ARCING TIME for
example, using remote main.
SPECIALIZED PROTECTIVE RELAYING such as zone-selective
interlocking or differential relaying these operate independently of selective
coordination, so selectivity is not reduced.
ACTIVE PROTECTION detects an arc and acts upon it to minimize arcing
time or nature of the arc.
84
85
Active Protection
How it Works
86
Axiom #2
PROTECTION OF WORKERS CAN ALSO BE ACHIEVED BY
SEPARATING THEM FROM THE SOURCE OF ARC THE
SEPARATION CAN BE BY INTERPOSING DISTANCE OR A
PHYSICAL BARRIER
IR window
Remote control of breakers
Arc-resistant equipment
87
Axiom #2 - IR Window
88
89
Axiom #2 Arc-Resistant
90