Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, *CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. JUDGE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Promulgated:
Br. 158, RTC-Pasig City, ATTY.
LIGAYA P. SALAYON and ATTY.
ANTONIO M. LLORENTE,
Respondents. August 28, 2006
x------------------------------------------------- -x
DECISION
with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 133509, which sought the
reversal of the resolutions of the COMELEC dismissing his complaint
PUNO, J.:
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Joint Decision [1] of the
the COMELEC "to file forthwith with the proper [RTC] the necessary
affirmed
the
Order[2] issued
by
respondent
Judge
Jose
R.
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 11882331, 118848-91, 118902-9063 and 119099-204 for violation of private
for violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646; and 4) to allow him to
for the convenience of the parties that these cases (Criminal Case
questions of fact and law and the parties may have to introduce
Motions before Branches 158, 153 and 69 of the RTC of Pasig City,
asking them: 1) to consolidate all the cases filed against him for
treat the 321 informations filed against him as only one information
filed his Notice of Appearance with Branch 158 of the RTC of Pasig
The trial court noted that during the hearing on private respondent
the matter of consolidation of the cases and in fact gave its consent
Pimentel, Jr., an Atty. Luis Gana, did not register any objection
thereto. In ruling that only one information for violation of Section
27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 should have been filed, the trial court held:
[I]n this case[,] the unity of criminal intent is
manifested by the fact that the several acts of
tampering[,] while allegedly done separately over a
2001 of the trial court, asking the trial court to nullify the arraignment
telephoned the trial court that he was indisposed. The hearing was
reset to July 26, 2001.[21] However, the hearing on July 26, 2001 was
Order was likewise denied for being in the nature of a second motion
for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of
Court. Despite the denial of the prosecution's motions, the pre-trial
and trial were cancelled and reset to September 4, 2001 in view of
the prosecution's manifestation that it was appealing the trial court's
xxx
order to a higher court. The court warned that "[i]n the event that the
prosecution shall not be able to get any restraining order to stop the
proceedings in this case, the hearing on said date shall proceed as
scheduled."[24]
SO ORDERED.[22]
Accordingly, petitioner, through Senior State Prosecutor
After considering the respective positions of the prosecution and the
private respondents, the trial court issued its Order dated August 2,
Motion
the
said petition was dismissed outright for having been filed without the
on June 15, 2001, the records revealed that the Order of the trial
court dated May 11, 2001 which set the date of the arraignment and
for
Reconsideration. It
found
that
contrary
to
denial of their right to speedy trial. The trial court denied their motion
instant cases, setting the next hearings on October 3 and 15, 2001,
Court. We
granted
petitioner's
motion
in
our
Resolution
dated December 12, 2001. Petitioner filed its Petition for Review
accordingly.[30]
time and for Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo's failure to sign the
with pre-trial and trial, giving as reason its pending petition before
the case on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. The
trial court granted private respondents a period of three (3) days
prosecution was also given three (3) days from receipt of private
Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo that the latter had his tooth
extracted, hence, could not appear in court. The trial court found this
filed its Motion to Inhibit [33] dated October 5, 2001, asking Judge
excuse quite odd since Atty. Galimpin informed the court that he saw
cases and remand the same to the Clerk of Court of Pasig City for
in the first floor of the same building where the court sits. Private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the instant cases due to the
this
Court
Petition
for
Certiorari,
Prohibition
and
referred said petition to the CA for appropriate action. [38] In the CA,
that:
1. Upon the filing hereof, this case be consolidated
with [the] Petition for Review, filed last January 10,
2002 [with the Supreme Court], and docketed as
G.R. No. 150317;
2. The Order dismissing the instant cases be
recalled, set aside and the 321 criminal cases filed
against both accused Salayon and Llorente be
reinstated; after which they be arraigned for the 321
counts for the violation of Section 27(b) of R.A.
6646;
3. The Order, dated June 15, 2001, be declared as
null and void and set aside;
4. All the cases that used to be pending before the
respondent, Honorable RTC-158 be ordered
remanded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for reraffle to the other branches, except those where
these cases were originally assigned to; or in the
alternative,
Subsequently,
CA-G.R.
SP
Nos.
69703
and
68922
were
consolidated.[42]
states:
rendered his assailed Order dated November 23, 2001. The ruling of
the trial court was found to be supported by Sections 6 and 9 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sections 9 and 13 of R.A. No.
8493 and Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. It
restated the principle that "[t]he right to speedy trial means one free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary
objective being to assure that an innocent person may be freed from
was
"certainly
vexatious,
capricious
and
"delay
resulting
from
extraordinary
remedies
against
interlocutory orders," as an exclusion to the computation of the 80day period within which to commence trial under Section 3(3), Rule
119 of the Rules of Court, should be read in harmony with Section 7
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere
expedient of petitioner's filing before the CA of a petition for certiorari,
the cases before the trial court on the ground of the denial of private
also misplaced as the trial court did not state in its orders granting
outweigh the best interest of the public and the right of the accused
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the CA was the proper remedy since respondent Judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he consolidated the 321 criminal cases into one information
and dismissed the "criminal case" on the ground of the denial of
private respondents' right to speedy trial, without giving the
prosecution the chance to present evidence. Citing People v.
Velasco,[47] petitioner contends that the dismissal of the "criminal
case" against private respondents is tantamount to their acquittal
which, as a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal from in the
absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. In any case, the
10
of the accused's right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal
that would
In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against private
respondents for the denial of their right to speedy trial. In a long line
11
bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. [51] Thus,
we have held that where after such dismissal the prosecution moved
for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the court re-set
the case for trial, the accused can successfully claim double
jeopardy as the said order was actually an acquittal, was final and
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging that "respondent judge
an appeal was not available to it. Where the dismissal of the case
and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not
the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal and such
passion or hostility.[55]
was the proper remedy from the dismissal of the instant cases by the
trial court, the crucial issue is: was the CA correct in ruling that a writ
Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. [56] In 1998,
12
Trial Act of 1998." The law provided for time limits in order "to ensure
1987
Trial Court." On August 11, 1998, the Supreme Court issued Circular
No. 38-98, the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 8493. The provisions of
R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate certain reasonable delays as
exclusions in the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also
provide that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule
implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of
Constitution."[57] Thus,
in
spite
of the
prescribed
time
13
14
xxx
3) Delay resulting
from extraordinary
remedies against
interlocutory
orders;
xxx
f) Any period of delay resulting
from a continuance granted by any
court motu proprio, or on motion of
either the accused or his counsel, or
the prosecution, if the court granted
the continuance on the basis of its
findings set forth in the order that
the ends of justice served by taking
15
Section 6 of Rule 119 has not yet lapsed. Deducting the time it took
Judge Hernandez to resolve petitioner's Omnibus Motion to
Postpone and Motion for Reconsideration dated June 27, 2001, only
15, 2001. Section 3 of Rule 119 provides that "delay resulting from
computing the time within which trial must commence. This provision
is not in conflict with Section 3(f) of Rule 119 as they speak of two
before the filing of the CA petition. On August 24, 2001, Senior State
definitely is.
provides that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the
with this Court.Prior to his filing of this motion for extension, 76 days
have lapsed from the date of arraignment. This Court granted him 30
the trial court with a higher court, the trial court, in its August 2, 2001
16
Order, gave a warning that "[i]n the event that the prosecution shall
proceed with the pre-trial and trial. The orders of the court contained
repeated warnings that "[i]n the event that there will again be no
hearing, the Legal Department of the COMELEC shall then make its
2001 hearing set by the trial court and the court only received a call
from the secretary of said Senior State Prosecutor that the latter had
the cases by resetting the hearings to October 3 and 15, 2001, the
Atty. Galimpin, the private prosecutor, informed the trial court that he
Court, which is located at the first floor of the same building where
proceed with the pre-trial and trial of the cases on the ground of the
pendency of its petition with the CA. This, despite the fact that as
early as August 16, 2001, the CA has dismissed CA-G.R. No. SP.
No. 65966 which raised the issue of the validity of the private
respondents' arraignment. As the trial court held:
The Court notes the petition for certiorari
that Prosecutor Bagabuyo filed before the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-GR SP No. 65966
questioning the propriety of [the] June 15, 2001
Order of this Court and the Honorable Court of
Appeals dated August 16, 2001 dismissed the
petition outright. It also notes the resolution of the
said Court dated October 9, 2001 denying the
Prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration.Given
these resolution, the Prosecution had no option
17
What
this
argument
reflects
is
petitioner's
stubborn
filed a petition with this Court raising the same issue and was
reading of the June 15, 2001 Order of the trial court during
likewise denied on January 30, 2002 for having been filed out of
2002. Hence petitioner can no longer raise the same issue in this
petition. In Zarate v. Director of Lands,[66] we held that:
A well-known legal principle is that when
an appellate court has once declared the law in a
case, such declaration continues to be the law of
that case even on a subsequent appeal. The rule
18
trial, as clearly shown by the events that transpired in the trial court,
was due to its own fault.
free
from
will
represent
them
in
19
No cost.
20
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CORONA,*
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG,
GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE Promulgated:
SY and DEXIE DURAN,
Respondents. January 29, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before
us
is
petition
for
review [1] on
certiorari
of
the
21
Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an
respondents
abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: The driver of the 10wheeler cargo truck abandoned the victims, at a time when said
[Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only
extracted from the car by the by-standers.[7]
leave
to
file
demurrer
to
evidence
which
was
failed
to
establish
the
allegations
in
the
22
xxxx
The defense furthermore argued that on
the contrary, the prosecutions [evidence]
conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1
[the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo
truck] is the proximate cause of the accident. The
court again is inclined to agree with this argument
of the defense. It has looked carefully into the
sketch of the accident as indicated in the police
blotter and can only conclude that the logical
explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1
swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the
latters inner fender and tires. Exhibit 7 which is a
picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage
23
civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65,[14] alleging that the MTCs dismissal of the case was done
without
considering
the
evidence
adduced
by
aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand
the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
the
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the
Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accuseds
acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED
to the court of origin or its successor for further
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.[16]
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br.
32.
RTC order, but these were denied for lack of merit in the
order[17] dated 12 September 2005.
for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled
that the MTCs recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions
disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that
the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by
Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no
longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the
accuseds demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under
Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate
court
subsequently
rendered
the
assailed
decision
and
24
Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)[18] which ruled that
the allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on
Act of 1980 can be the basis of the RTCs jurisdiction over the
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had
where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As there was
to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, [22] which confers
case falls within the RTCs jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the
withdrawn
amended
information
alleging
SO ORDERED.[19]
The petition has merit. It should be granted.
25
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the
should have been charged with the same offense but aggravated by
provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by
maximum
period
to prision
correccional in
its
medium
the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force
provides for a retroactive application thereof. [26] When this case was
26
129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691
liability. It
the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the
explicitly states
Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial
court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal
basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer
maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and
not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same
pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction
correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
cases, such as the one at bar, is filed after the prosecution had
rested its case, and when the same is granted, it calls for an
diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed
27
also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist [32] or where the accused did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.[33]
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. [34] This is
remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil
yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the
MTC.
a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction
of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
the acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission from
the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused is acquitted. [31] However, the civil action based on delict
noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any
28
evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and
that accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the
prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed
the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner
as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the
incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of
the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by
the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo
truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly
establishing
that
petitioner
is
not
guilty
of
reckless
SO ORDERED.
29
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover
the amount called for therein and without informing the payee of
such circumstance; that when said check was presented to the
drawee bank for payment, the same was consequently dishonored
and refused payment for the reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED; that
despite demands, accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse
to pay and/or make arrangement for the payment of the said check,
to the damage and prejudice of said J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution
On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased
300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through
Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner
gave the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the
Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by
one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao
accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it was a
good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the
petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it
was drawn under a closed account (Account Closed). The petitioner
was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank
check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi
Branch, which, however, was returned with the word DAUD (Drawn
Against Uncollected Deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a
Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court [5] alleging that she could
not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a)
30
held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D.
Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing
Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.[6]
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a
plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order
denying the motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial
court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the
trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given the
opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly
liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the
applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case,
contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended
party, she should have been first accorded the procedural relief
granted in Rule 33.
The Petition Is Meritorious
According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall
be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and
31
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has
not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the
civil and criminal actions.
The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.[7]
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment
of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant
and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of
the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent
to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal
actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the
sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the
vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the
offender. On the other hand, the action between the private
complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the
former.[8]
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The
first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The
parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the
accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a
witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second
is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is
32
33
waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall
specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a nonextendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its
case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a nonextendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to
evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within
a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the
nature of a motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the
accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he
thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case
for decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the
other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to
evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the
criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer
is denied by the court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court,
the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of
the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues
an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to
evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil
34
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of
trial may be modified.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of
the case on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution and the
accused.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action
arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no
waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability nor a
reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before
the institution of the criminal action.
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to
evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its
finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only
civil.However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the
case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the
private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce
evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her
right to due process.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Orders dated November 19, 2001 and January 14,
2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to set Criminal Case
No. 7474 for the continuation of trial for the reception of the
evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on the civil aspect of the case and
for the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant and the surrebuttal evidence of the parties if they opt to adduce any.
SO ORDERED.
35
MARKETING CORPORATION
The DAUD means that the account to which the check was drawn
had sufficient funds.
evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil
liability, the judgment on
process.
36
amount to estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code.
Timario remained at large.
thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case
for decision on the basis of the
Because of the denial of the motion, she filed petition for review on
certiorari before the
on the civil aspect of the case of the demurrer is denied by the court.
Supreme Court alleging she was denied due process as the trial
court did not give her the
opportunity to adduce evidence to controvert her civil liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Salazar was denied due process.
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE REMEDIAL LAW
U.S.T. Law Review, Volume XLVIII, January December 2004
HELD:
Salazar should have been given by the trial court the chance to
present her evidence as regards
the civil aspect of the case.
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court explained
the demurrer to evidence
partakes of a motion to dismiss the case for the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
37
Citing Aante vs Savelana, Jr., the Court stressed that Section 14 (1)
and (2) of Article III of the
1987 Constitution which are elementary and deeply imbedded in our
own criminal justice system are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot
possibly be met without a "law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial".
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 28, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
38
DECISION
as
NACHURA, J.:
the
Gorordo
property,
affixed
her
signature
to
the
of
Court,
assailing
the
Court
of
Appeals
(CA)
4,
1999,
respondents
were
charged
Cebu
City,
Branch
the
aforesaid
motion. Concepcions
motion
for
19,
through
criminal
information
39
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the
have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is
pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court
of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC
15,
2001,
In its Resolution dated March 12, 2002 denying petitioners motion for
the
CA
rendered
which reads:
40
II.
WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL
CASE
A QUO CONSTITUTES
A WAIVABLE
DEFECT IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.[20]
thereto. Because
of
this,
the
petition
was
for certiorari. Thus, the People was given the opportunity to refute
the respondents arguments.
obviously
41
witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and
appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of
the case in the presence of the judge. [25] This is especially true in
criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. [26] It also
gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to support their
position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. [27] Lastly, this rule
enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.[28]
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of
the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that
condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of
The
very
reason
offered
by
the
petitioners
to
42
pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with
appear
at
the
trial;
no
or
2)
if
definite
the
witness
date
of
has
to
leave
returning. Thus,
when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not
been too sick at that time, her motion would have been
denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court,
she would have been compelled to appear before the court for
examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case
at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination be
made before the court where the case is pending. It is also
Rule
119
categorically
states
that
the
conditional
43
cases.
rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the
Decision and Resolution dated August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002,
SO ORDERED.
PUNO, C.J.:
44
On appeal are the Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the two
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 22, 1999 and
May 11, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945. The Court of Appeals
discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from
the Information in Criminal Case No. TM-1730 for Murder, pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, to become
state witnesses. The appellate court likewise cancelled the bail bond
of petitioner Rimberto Salvanera.
First, the facts:
In an Information1 dated November 30, 1996, petitioner Rimberto
Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and
Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane,
committed as follows:
That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with treachery and
evident premeditation, then armed with a firearm, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot
one RUBEN PARANE Y MAGSAMBOL, inflicting gunshot wound on
his body, resulting to his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged
mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the
motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the commission of
the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. All
the accused have been arrested and detained, except Edgardo
Lungcay who remained at-large.
45
46
47
Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the
conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably
elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power
should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the
timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound
judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the
right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to
decide whom not to prosecute.
We further ruled:
In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas,
the jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For the business of
a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved
with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every
now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its
strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any
more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For
fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise
between and among all litigants. Due process demands that courts
should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and
perpetually level.
Lastly, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail
bond of petitioner. The grant of petitioners application for bail is
premature. It has to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin
and Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in
determining whether the petitioner is entitled to bail.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated
April 30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, respectively,
are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
48
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
- versus -
49
one
Hildo
Sumipo
(Sumipo)[3] who
was,
however,
[4]
50
for a short while, the group boarded his car, Maritess taking the seat
beside the victim who was driving, as Estacio and Sumipo took the
nakuha niya.
backseat.
On Estacios and Maritess directive, Sumipo stopped by a
Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim
to pull the car over. As the victim complied, Estacio, with a gun
pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess transferred to
the backseat, sat beside the victim, tied the victims hands behind his
back, and placed tape on his mouth. Estacio then directed Sumipo to
take over the wheels as he did.[7]
drug store where Maritess bought alcohol to clean their hands. Along
the way, Maritess and Estacio threw out the victims attach
case. Maritess later told Estacio Honey, sana hindi muna natin
pinatay si Charlie para makahingi pa tayo ng pera sa mga magulang
[niya].
The three later abandoned the car in Malinta.
plan, they replied that they would kill the victim so that he would not
Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio then brought
about future calls, as they might get caught, but Estacio and Maritess
resurfaced.
Bulacan. On the way, Estacio and Maritess talked about how they
51
without her knowledge, while Estacio was jealous of the victim with
her to place the money in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills
at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza
Hut, and as they were seated there, a patrol car passed by, drawing
claimed that a quarrel broke out in the car between the victim and
Maritess about a debt to the victim; that he tried to pacify the two, but
the victim got angry at him, prompting him to point a fan knife at his
neck; and that he then asked Sumipo to drive the car up to Barangay
Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan where he dragged the
given P7,000.
police. The police then informed the victims mother that Estacio had
leave the victim in Bulacan, but since there was talk of the victim
Estacio. She claimed that while on board the car, the victim took issue
went to the crime scene and recovered the remains of the victim who
was identified by his mother by the clothes attached to his bones. The
grabbed the victim by the collar, prompting the victim to pull out a gun
court,[10] that Maritess got angry with the victim after he lent money to
quarreling men; that the car stopped at San Jose del Monte and the
her husband, one Robert Ong, [11] enabling him to leave the country
three men alighted; that Sumipo returned to the car and was later
52
CHARGED
WAS
PROVEN
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
x x x CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSEDAPPELLANT
OF
THE
CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE
FAILURE
OF
THE
PROSECUTION
TO
PROVE
THE
INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF DETENTION
AND LOCK UP.[20] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Branch 219 of the Quezon City RTC found both Estacio and
Maritess guilty of kidnapping on the occasion of which the victim was
killed, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Pablo
Estacio, Jr. and Maritess Ang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping on
the occasion of which the victim was killed, the
court hereby sentences each of them to suffer
the maximum penalty of Death; to jointly and
severally pay the heirs of Charlie Chua the
amount of P200,000.00, as actual damages,
and P1,000,000.00, as moral damages; and to
pay the costs.
SO
ORDERED.[17] (Emphasis
underscoring supplied)
B.
and
C.
The case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review.
[18]
BEYOND
follows:
53
[24]
(Emphasis
and
fact of the trial court, especially if they have been affirmed on appeal
by the appellate court, as in the present case. [27] Nevertheless, the
Court combed through the records of the case and found no ground
to merit a reversal of appellants conviction.
The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants
were convicted was erroneously designated.
Appellants were eventually charged with and convicted of the
special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, defined in the last
paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.In a special
complex crime, the prosecution must prove each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were
made the subject of separate complaints.[28]
Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not
because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they
him. That appellants intention from the beginning was to kill the victim
which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so that it
would not create noise.[29] The subsequent demand for ransom was
as they testify.[26] This Court need not thus pass upon the findings of
kidnapping.
54
55
(c)
(d)
(e)
Estacio, and Maritess at the bar-restaurant on the day and at the time
in question.[34] Henry Hong, the victims cousin who arrived at Pizza
Hut, Greenhills ahead of the victims brother during the scheduled
delivery of the ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with
companions.[35] And the victims skeletal remains were found at the
scene of the crime upon Estacios information and direction.
And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a
These
conditions
were
established
by
the
prosecution. Sumipo was the only person other than appellants who
state witness was erroneous, such error would not affect the
competency and quality of his testimony.[36]
had personal knowledge of the acts for which they were being
prosecuted. Only he could positively identify appellants as the
Finally,
the
Court
brushes
aside
Maritess
disclaimer
of participation in killing the victim. It was she who bound the hands
crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was joking when she
the victim to the scene of the crime and thereafter returned to the car,
her and Estacios hands were bloodied.
56
Parenthetically,
prosecution
witness
Arlene
Francisco,
24,
2006,
the
penalty
is
reduced
to reclusion
57
This petition for review[1] assails the June 18, 1999 decision [2] of the
Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 affirming [3] the omnibus
decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City,
58
59
capacity as group supervisor. Estillore paid the taxes in the bank and
Cesar received another call from petitioner who told her that she
Estillore. She was told that petitioner wanted to see her for some
demand was met. RDO Balagon assured Cesar that he would look
replied that she needed to confer with her two brothers who were her
petitioner informing her that she could get the CAR but reminded her
business associates.
60
As petitioner left his office, he held the door open for Cesar
bill on each side of each of the two bundles to make it appear that
After the serial numbers of the four one-hundred peso bills were
marked money to petitioner who, upon receiving it, asked Why is this
the
CAR
to
her
and,
as
she
was
signing
the
61
basically
raises
two
points:
(1)
the
62
money from private complainant Cesar for the release of the CAR)
decision and disregarding his evidence. He claims that, had the RTC
direct bribery.
The calibration of evidence and the relative weight thereof belongs to
Petitioner is wrong.
TRIAL
COURTS
EVALUATION
OF
EVIDENCE WI
LL NOT BE DI
STURBED
Both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the
prosecutions witnesses (that petitioner demanded and received
63
We agree.
judge himself.[20] Between the trial judge and this Court, the former
such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony for
ruled that the inconsistencies referred only to minor details that did
64
65
66
common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 18,
included among or form part of those enumerated in the other.
1999 decision of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005
Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share,
is AFFIRMED.
percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section
3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift
67
PEDRO C. CONSULTA,
Appellant,
-versus-
68
papatayin kita.
perception of the parents of Nelia that his family was partial towards
her, her parents disliked his family. Nelias father even filed a case for
of 18k gold, and which was worth P3,500, kicked the tricycle and left
saying Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang, anong
the maltreatment charge, Nelia ordered him and his family to move
out of their house and filed a case against him for grave threats and
Makati City and reported the incident. They then proceeded to Camp
cause scandal.
Crame where they were advised to return in a few days when any
injuries they suffered were expected to manifest.
robbery, Nelia,
together
with
her
two
companions,
police investigator.
he knew a bald man who is big/stout with a big tummy and with a
sister named Maria. As he replied in the affirmative, Nelia at once
69
in
the
original,
The first two issues, which appellant raised before the appellate
court only when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration of said courts
decision, were resolved in the negative in this wise:
On the matter of accused-appellants claim of having
been denied due process, an examination of the
records shows that while accused-appellant was
represented by Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes, who seems
not a lawyer, during the early stages of trial, the
latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity
of the former as early as July 28, 2000 and
subsequently, approved by the RTC in its Order
70
during
the
presentation
of
his
evidence. People
v.
[4]
Elesterio enlightens:
As for the circumstance that the defense counsel
turned out later to be a non-lawyer, it is observed
that he was chosen by the accused himself and
that his representation does not change the fact that
Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed
firearm when he was arrested. At any rate, he has
since been represented by a member of the
Philippine bar, who prepared the petition for habeas
corpus and the appellants brief.(Underscoring
supplied)
On the third and fourth issues. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code
under which appellant was charged provides:
71
The
Court
finds
that
under
the
above-mentioned
72
The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the
commission of the act. The motives of the accused are the prime
Law, the minimum that may be imposed is anywhere from one (1)
criterion:
month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, and from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
reasonable
doubt
and
violence
consisting
of, inter
alia, uttering
of
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
73
74
Date
Private
Complainant
Reason for
the
Dishonor
0025242
Oct.
P 20,000,000 6,
1997
Samson T.Y.
Ching
DAIF*
0088563
Oct.
150,000 6,
1997
"
"
0121424
Oct.
100,000 6,
1997
"
"
0045315
Oct.
50,000 6,
1997
"
0022546
Oct.
100,000 6,
1997
"
"
0088757
Oct.
100,000 6,
1997
"
"
0089368
Oct.
50,000 6,
1997
"
"
0022739
Oct.
50,000 6,
1997
"
"
00894810
Oct.
150,000 6,
1997
"
"
"
00893511
Oct.
100,000 6,
1997
"
"
01037712
Oct.
100,000 6,
1997
"
"
At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also
for violation of BP 22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by
Emma Nuguid, said to be the common law spouse of petitioner
Ching. Allegedly fourteen (14) checks, amounting to P1,150,000.00,
were issued by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid but were dishonored
for lack of sufficient funds. The Informations were filed with the same
MCTC and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9458 up to 9471.
At her arraignment, respondent Nicdao entered the plea of "not
guilty" to all the charges. A joint trial was then conducted for Criminal
Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and 9458-9471.
For the prosecution in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443, petitioner
Ching and Imelda Yandoc, an employee of the Hermosa Savings &
Loan Bank, Inc., were presented to prove the charges against
respondent Nicdao. On direct-examination,13 petitioner Ching
preliminarily identified each of the eleven (11) Hermosa Savings &
Loan Bank (HSLB) checks that were allegedly issued to him by
respondent Nicdao amounting to P20,950,000.00. He identified the
signatures appearing on the checks as those of respondent Nicdao.
He recognized her signatures because respondent Nicdao allegedly
signed the checks in his presence. When petitioner Ching presented
these checks for payment, they were dishonored by the bank, HSLB,
for being "DAIF" or "drawn against insufficient funds."
Petitioner Ching averred that the checks were issued to him by
respondent Nicdao as security for the loans that she obtained from
him. Their transaction began sometime in October 1995 when
respondent Nicdao, proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore,
together with her husband, approached him to borrow money in
order for them to settle their financial obligations. They agreed that
75
respondent Nicdao would leave the checks undated and that she
would pay the loans within one year. However, when petitioner Ching
went to see her after the lapse of one year to ask for payment,
respondent Nicdao allegedly said that she had no cash.
Petitioner Ching claimed that he went back to respondent Nicdao
several times more but every time, she would tell him that she had
no money. Then in September 1997, respondent Nicdao allegedly
got mad at him for being insistent and challenged him about seeing
each other in court. Because of respondent Nicdao's alleged refusal
to pay her obligations, on October 6, 1997, petitioner Ching
deposited the checks that she issued to him. As he earlier stated, the
checks were dishonored by the bank for being "DAIF." Shortly
thereafter, petitioner Ching, together with Emma Nuguid, wrote a
demand letter to respondent Nicdao which, however, went
unheeded. Accordingly, they separately filed the criminal complaints
against the latter.
On cross-examination,14 petitioner Ching claimed that he had been a
salesman of the La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing for
almost ten (10) years already. As such, he delivered the goods and
had a warehouse. He received salary and commissions. He could
not, however, state his exact gross income. According to him, it
increased every year because of his business. He asserted that
aside from being a salesman, he was also in the business of
extending loans to other people at an interest, which varied
depending on the person he was dealing with.
Petitioner Ching confirmed the truthfulness of the allegations
contained in the eleven (11) Informations that he filed against
respondent Nicdao. He reiterated that, upon their agreement, the
checks were all signed by respondent Nicdao but she left them
undated. Petitioner Ching admitted that he was the one who wrote
the date, October 6, 1997, on those checks when respondent Nicdao
refused to pay him.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check (Check No. 002524),
petitioner Ching explained that he wrote the date and amount
thereon when, upon his estimation, the money that he regularly lent
76
Petitioner Ching reiterated that after the lapse of one (1) year from
the time respondent Nicdao issued the checks to him, he went to her
several times to collect payment. In all these instances, she said that
she had no cash. Finally, in September 1997, respondent Nicdao
allegedly went to his house and told him that Janette was only willing
to pay him between P3,000,000.00 and P5,000,000.00 because, as
far as her daughter was concerned, that was the only amount
borrowed from petitioner Ching. On hearing this, petitioner Ching
angrily told respondent Nicdao that she should not have allowed her
debt to reach P20,000,000.00 knowing that she would not be able to
pay the full amount.
Petitioner Ching identified the demand letter that he and Nuguid sent
to respondent Nicdao. He explained that he no longer informed her
about depositing her checks on his account because she already
made that statement about seeing him in court. Again, he admitted
writing the date, October 6, 1997, on all these checks.
Another witness presented by the prosecution was Imelda Yandoc,
an employee of HSLB. On direct-examination,15 she testified that she
worked as a checking account bookkeeper/teller of the bank. As
such, she received the checks that were drawn against the bank and
verified if they were funded. On October 6, 1997, she received
several checks issued by respondent Nicdao. She knew respondent
Nicdao because the latter maintained a savings and checking
account with them. Yandoc identified the checks subject of Criminal
Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and affirmed that stamped at the back of
each was the annotation "DAIF". Further, per the banks records, as
of October 8, 1997, only a balance of P300.00 was left in respondent
Nicdaos checking account andP645.83 in her savings account. On
even date, her account with the bank was considered inactive.
On cross-examination,16 Yandoc stated anew that respondent
Nicdaos checks bounced on October 7, 1997 for being "DAIF" and
her account was closed the following day, on October 8, 1997. She
informed the trial court that there were actually twenty-five (25)
checks of respondent Nicdao that were dishonored at about the
same time. The eleven (11) checks were purportedly issued in favor
of petitioner Ching while the other fourteen (14) were purportedly
issued in favor of Nuguid. Yandoc explained that respondent Nicdao
or her employee would usually call the bank to inquire if there was an
incoming check to be funded.
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of respondent
Nicdao, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. On directexamination,17 respondent Nicdao stated that she only dealt with
Nuguid. She vehemently denied the allegation that she had
borrowed money from both petitioner Ching and Nuguid in the total
amount ofP22,950,000.00. Respondent Nicdao admitted, however,
that she had obtained a loan from Nuguid but only forP2,100,000.00
and the same was already fully paid. As proof of such payment, she
presented a Planters Bank demand draft dated August 13, 1996 in
the amount of P1,200,000.00. The annotation at the back of the said
demand draft showed that it was endorsed and negotiated to the
account of petitioner Ching.
In addition, respondent Nicdao also presented and identified several
cigarette wrappers18 at the back of which appeared computations.
She explained that Nuguid went to the grocery store everyday to
collect interest payments. The principal loan was P2,100,000.00 with
12% interest per day. Nuguid allegedly wrote the payments for the
daily interests at the back of the cigarette wrappers that she gave to
respondent Nicdao.
The principal loan amount of P2,100,000.00 was allegedly delivered
by Nuguid to respondent Nicdao in varying amounts of P100,000.00
and P150,000.00. Respondent Nicdao refuted the averment of
petitioner Ching that prior to 1995, they had another transaction.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, respondent Nicdao
admitted that the signature thereon was hers but denied that she
issued the same to petitioner Ching. Anent the other ten (10) checks,
she likewise admitted that the signatures thereon were hers while the
amounts and payee thereon were written by either Jocelyn Nicdao or
Melanie Tolentino, who were employees of Vignette Superstore and
authorized by her to do so.
Respondent Nicdao clarified that, except for the P20,000,000.00
check, the other ten (10) checks were handed to Nuguid on different
77
78
79
The MCTC further ruled that there was no evidence to show that
petitioner Ching was not a holder in due course as to cause it (the
MCTC) to believe that the said check was not issued to him.
Respondent Nicdaos admission of indebtedness was sufficient to
prove that there was consideration for the issuance of the checks.
According to the MCTC, all the foregoing elements are present in the
case of respondent Nicdaos issuance of the checks subject of
Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443. On the first element, respondent
Nicdao was found by the MCTC to have made, drawn and issued the
checks. The fact that she did not personally write the payee and date
on the checks was not material considering that under Section 14 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, "where the instrument is wanting in
any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima
facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a
signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the
signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable
instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for
any amount x x x." Respondent Nicdao admitted that she authorized
her employees to provide the details on the checks after she had
signed them.
The MCTC disbelieved respondent Nicdaos claim that
the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that she lost in 1995. It
observed that ordinary prudence would dictate that a lost check
would at least be immediately reported to the bank to prevent its
unauthorized endorsement or negotiation. Respondent Nicdao made
no such report to the bank. Even if the said check was indeed lost,
the MCTC faulted respondent Nicdao for being negligent in keeping
the checks that she had already signed in an unsecured box.
As to the third element, the MCTC established that the checks were
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for being "DAIF" or
drawn against insufficient funds. Stamped at the back of each check
was the annotation "DAIF." The bank representative likewise testified
to the fact of dishonor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the MCTC declared that the
conviction of respondent Nicdao was warranted. It stressed that the
mere act of issuing a worthless check was malum prohibitum; hence,
even if the checks were issued in the form of deposit or guarantee,
once dishonored, the same gave rise to the prosecution for and
conviction of BP 22.26 The decretal portion of the MCTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused is found guilty
of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in 11 counts, and is hereby
ordered to pay the private complainant the amount
of P20,950,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from date of filing of
the complaint until the total amount had been paid. The prayer for
moral damages is denied for lack of evidence to prove the same.
She is likewise ordered to suffer imprisonment equivalent to 1 year
for every check issued and which penalty shall be served
successively.
SO ORDERED.27
80
81
82
83
84
Petitioner Ching also takes exception to the CAs ruling that the
payments made by respondent Nicdao as reflected on the
computations at the back of the cigarette wrappers were for both the
principal loan and interests. He insists that they were for the interests
alone. Even respondent Nicdaos testimony allegedly showed that
they were daily interest payments. Petitioner Ching further avers that
the interest payments totaling P5,780,000.00 can only mean that,
contrary to respondent Nicdaos claim, her loan obligations
amounted to much more thanP2,100,000.00. Further, she is
allegedly estopped from questioning the interests because she
willingly paid the same.
Petitioner Ching also harps on respondent Nicdaos silence when
she received his and Nuguids demand letter to her. Through the said
letter, they notified her that the twenty-five (25) checks valued
at P22,100,000.00 were dishonored by the HSLB, and that she had
three days to settle her ndebtedness with them, otherwise, face
prosecution. Respondent Nicdaos silence, i.e., her failure to deny or
protest the same by way of reply, vis--vis the demand letter,
allegedly constitutes an admission of the statements contained
therein.
On the other hand, the MCTCs decision, as affirmed by the RTC, is
allegedly based on the evidence on record; it has been established
that the checks were respondent Nicdaos personal checks, that the
signatures thereon were hers and that she had issued them to
petitioner Ching. With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check,
petitioner Ching assails the CAs ruling that it was stolen and was
never delivered or issued by respondent Nicdao to him. The issue of
the said check being stolen was allegedly not raised during trial.
Further, her failure to report the alleged theft to the bank to stop
payment of the said lost or missing check is allegedly contrary to
human experience. Petitioner Ching describes respondent Nicdaos
defense of stolen or lost check as incredible and, therefore, false.
Aside from the foregoing substantive issues that he raised, petitioner
Ching also faults the CA for not acting and ordering the consolidation
of CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. He informs
the Court that latter case is still pending with the CA.
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(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required
to state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist."37
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court enunciated that the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares
that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature;
and (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the
criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. Thus, under Article 29
of the Civil Code
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
The Court likewise expounded in Salazar v. People39 the
consequences of an acquittal on the civil aspect in this wise:
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the criminal case where: (a) the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declared that the liability of the accused is only
civil; (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. Moreover,
the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding
in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution
cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the
offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment
on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the
offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case
notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal by the CA. The civil
action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did
not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
Following the long recognized rule that "the appeal period accorded
to the accused should also be available to the offended party who
seeks redress of the civil aspect of the decision," the period to
appeal granted to petitioner Ching is the same as that granted to the
accused.40 With petitioner Chings timely filing of the instant petition
for review of the civil aspect of the CAs decision, the Court thus has
the jurisdiction and authority to determine the civil liability of
respondent Nicdao notwithstanding her acquittal.
In order for the petition to prosper, however, it must establish that the
judgment of the CA acquitting respondent Nicdao falls under any of
the three categories enumerated in Salazar and Sapiera, to wit:
(a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and
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(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from
or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted.
Salazar also enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or
omission imputed to him.
For reasons that will be discussed shortly, the Court holds that
respondent Nicdao cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
The acquittal of respondent Nicdao likewise effectively extinguished
her civil liability
A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that
respondent Nicdaos acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of
the action to enforce her civil liability. There is simply no basis to hold
respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
First, the CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on
reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not
commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found
that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never
issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As
such, according to the CA, petitioner Ching "did not acquire any right
or interest over Check No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of
action founded on said check,"41 and that respondent Nicdao "has no
obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be
held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22."42
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the
loans secured by these checks had already been extinguished after
full payment had been made by respondent Nicdao. In this
connection, the second element for the crime under BP 22, i.e., "that
the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for
value," is not present.
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Evidence sufficiently shows that the loans secured by the ten (10)
checks involved in the cases subject of this petition had already been
paid. It is not controverted that petitioner gave Emma Nuguid a
demand draft valued atP1,200,000 to pay for the loans guaranteed
by said checks and other checks issued to her. Samson Ching
admitted having received the demand draft which he deposited in his
bank account. However, complainant Samson Ching claimed that the
said demand draft represents payment for a previous obligation
incurred by petitioner. However, complainant Ching failed to adduce
any evidence to prove the existence of the alleged obligation of the
petitioner prior to those secured by the subject checks.
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Apart from the payment to Emma Nuguid through said demand draft,
it is also not disputed that petitioner made cash payments to Emma
Nuguid who collected the payments almost daily at the Vignette
Superstore. As of July 21, 1997, Emma Nuguid collected cash
payments amounting to approximately P5,780,000.00. All of these
cash payments were recorded at the back of cigarette cartons by
Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting, the authenticity and accuracy
of which were never denied by either complainant Ching or Emma
Nuguid.
It goes without saying that since complainant Ching did not acquire
any right or interest over check no. 002524 and cannot assert any
cause of action founded on said check, petitioner has no obligation
to make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.44
Anent the other ten (10) checks, the CA made the following findings:
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The use of the word "may" denotes the permissive, not mandatory,
nature of the above provision, Thus, no grave error could be imputed
to the CA when it proceeded to render its decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23055, without consolidating it with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054.
SO ORDERED.
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