April 2012 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure

Posted on May 21, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo
Here are select April 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and
procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Composite crime; defined. The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite
crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law
treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal
impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law and differs from a
compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that
[w]hen a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. People v. Villaflores,G.R. No.
184926, April 11, 2012.
Composite crime and compound crime differentiated. There are distinctions between a composite
crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in
a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized,
that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other.
For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a
complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be
imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed;
a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be the
subject of a separate information. People v. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012.
Criminal liability; effect of death pending appeal. On 29 July 2009, a Notice of Appeal was filed
by Brillantes through counsel before the Supreme Court. While this case is pending appeal, the
Prisons and Security Division Officer-in-Charge informed the Court that accused-appellant
Brillantes died while committed at the Bureau of Corrections on 3 January 2012 as evidenced by
a copy of death report signed by New Bilibid Prison Hospitals Medical. Hence, the issue here is
the effect of death pending appeal of the conviction of accused-appellant Brillantes with regard
to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities. People of the Philippines v. Saturnino Dela Cruz, et al.,
G.R. No. 190610, April 25, 2012.
Criminal liability; effect of death pending appeal. The Revised Penal Code is instructive on the
matter. It provides in Article 89(1) that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of
the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. It is plain that
both the personal penalty of imprisonment and pecuniary penalty of fine of Brillantes were

extinguished upon his death pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts. There is no
civil liability involved in violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. No
private offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to civil liability in the decision
of the trial court. The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of his criminal
liability, however, does not have any effect on his co- accused De la Cruz who did not file a
notice of appeal. People of the Philippines v. Saturnino Dela Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 190610,
April 25, 2012.
Criminal liability; extinguishment by death. In a Decision dated May 9, 2006, the Court of
Appeals affirmed appellants conviction with modification, increasing the award of indemnity
from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral damages in favor of AAA in the
amount of P50,000.00. However, appellant died on December 4, 2004. Nonetheless, the Public
Attorneys Office still appealed the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to the Supreme Court.
Appellants death during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals extinguished
not only his criminal liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil
liability solely arising from or based on said crime. People of the Philippines v. Nelson Bayot y
Satina, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012.
Criminal liability; extinguishment by death. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, specifically provides the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil,
liability. It reads thus: Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1) By death of the convict, as
to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. . . It is clear that the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
case. People of the Philippines v. Nelson Bayot y Satina, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012.
Murder; treachery. The stabbing of Alfredo by Samson was qualified by treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In
order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to himself. Here, while it is true that the attack on Alfredo was frontal, the same was
so sudden and unexpected. Alfredo was completely unaware of the imminent peril to his life.
Alfredo was walking to meet Samson, expecting that they would only talk. Alfredo was
unarmed while Samson had a knife. Alfredo was deprived of the opportunity to defend himself
and repel Samsons attack. Clearly, treachery attended Samsons stabbing to death of Alfredo,
hence, qualifying the crime to murder. People of the Philippines v. Samson Escleto, G.R. No.
183706, April 25, 2012.

Qualified theft; elements. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal
property of another without the latters consent. If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the
crime of theft becomes qualified. In prcis, qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in
relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is committed when the
following elements are present: (1) taking of personal property; (2) that the said property belongs
to another; (3) that the said taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that it be done without the
owners consent; (5) that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (6) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence. Here,
the first and second elements are unquestionably present. The money involved is the personal
property of Trias employer, PNB. Trias argument that the amount does not belong to PNB even
if it is the depositary bank is erroneous since it is well established that a bank acquires ownership
of the money deposited by its clients. The third element, intent to gain or animus lucrandi, is an
internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of
asportation. This element is immediately discernable from the circumstances narrated in the
affidavits submitted by PNBs employees. The fourth element of the crime clearly also exists.
PNB did not consent to the issuance of the check and its eventual encashmentwhich both
constitute the taking of personal propertyas respondents had made sure that the bank was
rendered inutile and incapable to give its consent. The fifth element is also undisputed here;
while the last element, that the taking be done with grave abuse of confidence, is sufficiently
shown by the affidavits of PNB and Trias own admission of the position he held at the Bank. A
banks employees are entrusted with the possession of money of the bank due to the confidence
reposed in them and as such they occupy positions of confidence. The Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City is ordered to file an Information charging Amelio C. Tria and Atty.
Reyes/John Doe for Qualified Theft. Philippine National Bank v. Amelio Tria and John Doe,
G.R. No. 193250, April 25, 2012.
Qualifying circumstance; treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. Treachery is present
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without
risk arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In the case at bar, the attack
on Magdalino Olos was treacherous, because he was caught off guard and was therefore unable
to defend himself, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses and as indicated by the wounds
inflicted on him. The prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the attendance of treachery in
this case. People v. Asilan, G.R. No. 188322, April 11, 2012.
Rape; elements. The crime of rape is defined in the Revised Penal Code as amended by the AntiRape Law of 1997. The essential elements that the prosecution must prove are, first, that a man
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of a woman; and, second, that the act was accomplished
through force, threat or intimidation. In this case, AAA positively testified to the presence of both
elements. In her testimony, she recounted in detail her harrowing experience at the hands of
Ganzan how she and her friend, while on their way home from a disco, were intercepted by the
appellant; how they were made to undress at gunpoint; how her friend was sent away so that the
appellant would be left alone with her to fulfill his lewd designs; and how he actually succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of her against her will while poking a knife against her neck. These

accusations were further buttressed by the findings of Dr. Carlos Ray Sanchez, who concluded
that there was a possibility of sexual abuse after he found fresh lacerations in her hymen and
confirmed the presence of sperm in her vagina. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the
prosecution has fulfilled its burden of establishing appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
People v. Ganzan, G.R. No. 193509, April 11, 2012.
Syndicated estafa; elements. Gilbert Guy, et al. should be charged for syndicated estafa in
relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689, which has the following elements: (a) estafa or other forms
of swindling as defined in Artilce 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code is committed; (b) the
estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation
results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, samahang nayons, or farmers associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v.
Asia United Bank/Asia United Bank v. Gilbert Guy, et al./Gilbert Guy, et al. v. Asia United Bank,
G.R. No. 187919/G.R. No. 187979 & G.R. No. 188030, April 25, 2012.
Syndicated estafa; elements. Here, five (5) accused, namely, Gilbert G. Guy, et al, were, (a) all
involved in the formation of the entities used to defraud AUB; and (b) they were the officers and
directors, both of RMSI and SPI, whose conformities paved the way for AUB to grant the letter
of credit subject of this case, in AUBs honest belief that SPI, as Gilbert Guy, et al. represented,
was a mere division of RMSI. Furthermore, while these corporations were established
presumably in accordance with law, it cannot be denied that Gilbert G. Guy, et al, used these
corporations to carry out the illegal and unlawful act of misrepresenting SPI as a mere division of
RMSI, and, despite knowing SPIs separate juridical personality, applied for a letter of credit
secured by SPIs promissory note, knowing fully that SPI has no credit line with AUB. The
circumstances of the creation of these entities and their dealings with the bank reveal this
criminal intent to defraud and to deceive AUB. Lastly, the fact that the defraudation of AUB
resulted to misappropriation of the money which it solicited from the general public in the form
of deposits was substantially established. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding
probable cause against private respondents for the crime of estafa under Article 315, par 2 (a) of
the Revised Penal Code is affirmed with modification such that Gilbert G. Guy, et al, be charged
for syndicated estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1
of Presidential Decree No. 1689. Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v. Asia United
Bank/Asia United Bank v. Gilbert Guy, et al./Gilbert Guy, et al. v. Asia United Bank, G.R. No.
187919/G.R. No. 187979 & G.R. No. 188030, April 25, 2012.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Dangerous Drugs; buy bust operation; coordination with PDEA. On appeal, accused-appellant
assailed his conviction by insisting that the buy bust operation conducted by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) which was instrumental to his arrest was invalid because of alleged
violation of Section 86 of R.A. 9165, requiring that the PNP maintain close coordination with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on all drug related matters. The Supreme Court
ruled that accused-appellants contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that Section 86 of R.A.
9165 does not invalidate operations on account of the law enforcers failure to maintain close
coordination with the PDEA. Section 86, as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations

implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law
enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation. This
silence [cannot] be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation
of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. People v.
Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April 11, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; buy bust; required procedures. Given the nature of buy-bust operations and
the resulting preventive procedural safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165, courts must tread carefully
before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who conducted the operations. Although it
has been ruled in the past that mere procedural lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are
not ipso facto fatal to the prosecutions cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items have been preserved, courts must still thoroughly evaluate and differentiate
those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from those that amount to a gross,
systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law. Accordingly, despite the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of law enforcers, we stress that
the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot
be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. Here, the conduct of the buy-bust
operations was peppered with defects, which raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items from accused-appellant. First, there were material
inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items. Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show
genuine and sufficient effort to seek the third-party representatives enumerated under Section
21(1) of R.A. 9165. Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory
and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Accusedappellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul is therefore acquitted of the charges in Criminal Cases No.
14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG on the ground of reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines
v. Sammy Umipag y Abdul, G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody and prescribed procedures. Non-compliance with the
prescribed procedural requirements does not necessarily render the seizure and custody of the
items void and invalid; the seizure may still be held valid, provided that (a) there is a justifiable
ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
shown to have been properly preserved. These conditions, however, were not met in the present
case as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of SPO4
Mendoza to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized items. As held in
People v. De Guzman, the failure to follow the procedure mandated under RA 9165 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations must be adequately explained. The justifiable ground for
the non-compliance must be proven as a fact. The Court cannot presume what these grounds are
or that they even exist. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the
balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right. Petitioners Valentin
Zafra y Dechosa and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes are acquitted for the failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and Eroll Marcelino y
Reyes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190749, April 25, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs; elements. Illegal
possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements concur:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;

(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. All these elements were established beyond reasonable doubt in the
cases against accused-appellant. The prosecution witnesses consistently and categorically
testified that pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by a judge, they found and seized from
accused-appellants house and actual possession a brick of marijuana leaves and heat-sealed
sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. People v. Velazquez, G.R. No.
177244, April 11, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal sale of dangerous drugs. This appeal involves two distinct drug-related
offenses, namely: illegal sale of dangerous drugs, and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires: (a) proof that the transaction
or sale took place, and (b) the presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti, or the
dangerous drugs themselves. It is crucial that the Prosecution establishes the identity of the
seized dangerous drugs in a way that the integrity thereof has been well preserved from the time
of seizure or confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court.
Nothing less than a faithful compliance with this duty is demanded of all law enforcers arresting
drug pushers and drug possessors and confiscating and seizing the dangerous drugs and
substances from them. Here, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful compliance by the
arresting lawmen of the rule on chain of custody. Further, the State did not establish the identity
of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from petitioner with the same exacting certitude required
for a finding of guilt. Although PO2 Payumo declared that he was the one who had received the
sachet of shabu (RRS-1) from petitioner and who had confiscated the two sachets of shabu
(RRS-2) from petitioner, all of which he had then sealed, nothing more to support the fact that
the evidence thus seized had remained intact was adduced. Also, the Prosecution did not show to
whom the seized articles had been turned over following the conduct of the laboratory
examination, and how the seized articles had been kept in a manner that preserved their integrity
until their final presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Such lapses of the
Prosecution were fatal to its proof of guilt because they demonstrated that the chain of custody
did not stay unbroken, thereby raising doubt on the integrity and identity of the dangerous drugs
as evidence of the corpus delicti of the crimes charged. Petitioner is acquitted of the crimes
charged in Criminal Case No. 05-234564 and Criminal Case No. 05-234565. Rogelio S. Reyes v.
The Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 180177, April 18, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal sale of dangerous drugs. For the successful prosecution of offenses
involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the following
elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. After a careful
examination of the records of this case, the Supreme Court was convinced that that the
prosecutions evidence established Abedins guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution was
able to prove the existence of all the essential elements of the illegal sale of shabu. Abedin was
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the person who sold and possessed the
shabu. People v. Abedin, G.R. No. 179936, April 11, 2012.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Evidence; circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence may prove the guilt of appellant and
justify a conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, for
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. Here, the circumstances accused-appellant (i) was the legal
secretary and liaison officer of private complainant, (ii) was tasked to process land titles of
private complainants clients, (iii) was confidently given considerable amounts of cash without
need of receipts by private complainant, (iv) submitted handwritten padded liquidation
statements because her reported expenses turned out to be higher than what she actually spent
and the official receipts she submitted to private complainant were fake, and (v) did not
specifically deny her submitting altered or fake receipts, and (vi) suddenly disappeared leaving
some of her tasks, unfinished lead to the reasonable conclusion that appellant took amounts of
money from Rebecca. People of the Philippines v. Remedios Tanchanco y Pineda, G.R. No.
177761, April 18, 2012.
Evidence in Rape; credibility of witness. There can be no question that the testimony of a child
who has been a victim in rape is normally given full weight and credence. Judicial experience
has enabled the courts to accept the verity that when a minor says that she was raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed against her. The credibility of such a
rape victim is surely augmented where there is absolutely no evidence that suggests the
possibility of her being actuated by ill-motive to falsely testify against the accused. Truly, a rape
victims testimony that is unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies
or contradictions in its material points is entitled to full faith and credit. AAAs failure to shout
for help although she knew that her father was tending to the family store just downstairs was not
a factor to discredit her or to diminish the credibility of her evidence on the rape. She explained
her failure by stating that Taguilid had threatened to harm her should she shout. She thereby
commanded credence, considering that she was not expected to easily overcome her fear of him
due to her being then a minor just under 13 years of age at the time of the rape. People v.
Taguilid, G.R. No. 181544, April 11, 2012.
Preliminary investigation; no vested right to file a reply. According to petitioner, he was denied
his right to due process when he was not given a copy of the: (i) Counter-affidavit, (ii) Asst.
Prosecutors 10 September 2008 Resolution, and (iii) 17 February 2009 Resolution of the Office
of the Ombudsman. He also claims he was deprived of due process because he was not able to
file his Reply to the Counter-affidavit. However, a complainant in a preliminary investigation
does not have a vested right to file a Replythis right should be granted to him by law. P/Insp.
Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012.
Preliminary investigation; no vested right to file a reply. There is no provision in Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file a
Reply to the accuseds counter-affidavit. To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a Reply
in preliminary investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule 112 gives the prosecutor, in certain instances,
the right to resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz: (d) If the respondent

cannot be subpoenaed, of if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10)
day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented
by the complainant. On the other hand, petitioner was entitled to receive a copy of the Counteraffidavit filed by Aguillon. P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No.
190569, April 25, 2012.
Preliminary investigation; non-receipt of counter-affidavit. The procedural defect of not having
received a copy of the Counter-affidavit, however, was cured when petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban had the duty to send petitioner a copy of
Aguillons Counter-affidavit. Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
grants a complainant this right, and the Provincial Prosecutor has the duty to observe the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in the cases presented before it. That the
requirements of due process are deemed complied with in the present case because of the filing
of an MR by Complainant was simply a fortunate turn of events for the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April
25, 2012.
Probable cause. A finding probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds
over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. The term does not mean
actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. Cruz v. Hon. Gonzales, et al, G.R. No. 173844, April 11, 2012.
Probable cause. In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in
line with the principle of non-interference with the prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to
review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in the determination of the existence of probable
cause. The Secretary of Justice found sufficient evidence to indict petitioner. It was adequately
established by DBP and found by the Secretary of Justice that the funds would not have been
released pursuant to the subsidiary loan agreement if HSLBI had no sub-borrowers/Investment
Enterprises to speak of. As it turned out, not only were the collaterals submitted inexistent, all
the purported sub-borrowers/Investment Enterprises were also fictitious and inexistent. In fact,
the signatures of the sub-borrowers and the supporting documents submitted to DBP by
petitioner and her co-respondents were all forged. The findings of probable cause against
petitioner was based on the document showing that petitioners opinion was instrumental in the
deceit committed against DBP. Cruz v. Hon. Gonzales, et al, G.R. No. 173844, April 11, 2012.