9/9/2015

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Carnap: Modal LogicInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Print

RudolfCarnap:ModalLogic
In two works, a paper in The Journal of Symbolic Logic in 1946 and the
book Meaning and Necessity in 1947, Rudolf Carnap developed a modal predicate
logiccontaininganecessityoperatorN,whosesemanticsdependsontheclaimthat,
where is a formula of the language, N represents the proposition that is
logicallynecessary.CarnapsviewwasthatNshouldbetrueifandonlyifitself
islogicallyvalid,or,asheputit,isLtrue.Inthelightofthecriticismsofmodal
logicdevelopedbyW.V.Quinefrom1943on,thechallengeforCarnapwashowto
produce a theory of validity for modal predicate logic in a way which enables an
answer to be given to these criticisms. This article discusses Carnaps motivation
fordevelopingamodallogicinthefirstplaceanditthenlooksathowthemodal
predicate logic developed in his 1946 paper might be adapted to answer Quines
objections.TheadaptationisthencomparedwiththewayinwhichCarnaphimself
triedtoanswerQuinescomplaintsinthe1947book.Particularattentionispaidto
theproblemofhowtotreatthemeaningofformulaswhichcontainafreeindividualvariableinthescopeofamodal
operator,thatis,totheproblemofhowtohandlewhatQuinecalledthethirdgradeofmodalinvolvement.

TableofContents
1. Introduction
2. CarnapsPropositionalModalLogic
3. Carnaps(NonModal)PredicateLogic
4. Carnaps1946ModalPredicateLogic
5. DeReModality
6. IndividualConcepts
7. ReferencesandFurtherReading

1.Introduction
Inanimportantarticle(Carnap1946)andinabookayearlater,(Carnap1947),RudolfCarnaparticulatedasystemof
modallogic.Carnaptookhimselftobedoingtwothingsthefirstwastodevelopanaccountofthemeaningofmodal
expressionsthesecondwastoextendittoapplytowhathecalledmodalfunctionallogicthatis,whatwewould
callmodalpredicatelogicormodalfirstorderlogic.Carnapdistinguishesbetweenalogicorasemanticalsystem,
andacalculus,whichisanaxiomaticsystem,andstatesonp.33of1946thatSofar,noformsofMFC[modal
functional calculus] have been constructed, and the construction of such a system is our chief aim. In fact, in the
precedingissueofTheJournalofSymbolicLogic,thefirstpresentationofRuthBarcansaxiomaticsystemsofmodal
predicate logic had already appeared, although they contained only an axiomatic presentation. (Barcan 1946.) The
principalimportanceofCarnapsworkisthushisattempttoproduceasemanticsformodalpredicatelogic,anditis
thatconcernthatthisarticlewillfocuson.
Nevertheless, firstorder logic is founded on propositional logic, and Carnap first looks at nonmodal propositional
logic and modal propositional logic. I shall follow Carnap in using ~ and for negation and disjunction, though I
shalluseinplaceofCarnaps.forconjunction.Carnaptakestheseasprimitivetogetherwithtwhichstandsfor
anarbitrarytautologoussentence.Herecognisesthatandtcanbedefinedintermsof~and,butpreferstotake
them as primitive because of the importance to his presentation of conjunctive normal form. Carnap adopts the
standarddefinitionsofand.Iwill,however,deviatefromCarnapsnotationbyusingGreekinplaceofGerman
lettersformetalinguisticsymbols.InplaceofvalidCarnapspeaksofLtrue,andinplaceofunsatisfiable,Lfalse.
Limpliesiff(ifandonlyif)isvalid.andareLequivalentiffisvalid.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/cmlogic/print

1/9

9/9/2015

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Carnap: Modal LogicInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Print

OnemightatthisstageaskwhatledCarnaptodevelopamodallogicatall.Thecluehereseemstobetheinfluenceof
Wittgenstein.InhisphilosophicalautobiographyCarnapwrites:
For me personally, Wittgenstein was perhaps the philosopher who, besides Russell and Frege, had the greatest
influenceonmythinking.ThemostimportantinsightIgainedfromhisworkwastheconceptionthatthetruthof
logicalstatementsisbasedonlyontheirlogicalstructureandonthemeaningoftheterms.Logicalstatementsare
trueunderallconceivablecircumstancesthustheirtruthisindependentofthecontingentfactsoftheworld.On
the other hand, it follows that these statements do not say anything about the world and thus have no factual
content.(Carnap1963,p.25)
Wittgensteinsaccountoflogicaltruthdependedontheviewthatevery(cognitivelymeaningful)sentencehastruth
conditions.(Wittgenstein1921,4.024.)CarnapcertainlyappearstohavetakenWittgensteinsremarkasendorsingthe
truthconditionaltheoryofmeaning.(SeeforinstanceCarnap1947p.9.)Ifalllogicaltruthsaretautologies,andall
tautologiesarecontentless,thenyoudontneedmetaphysicstoexplain(logical)necessity.
One of the features of Wittgensteins view was that any way the world could be is determined by a collection of
particularfacts,whereeachsuchfactoccupiesadefinitepositioninlogicalspace,andwherethewaythatpositionis
occupiedisindependentofthewayanyotherpositionoflogicalspaceisoccupied.Suchaworldmaybedescribedin
alogicallyperfectlanguage,inwhicheachatomicformuladescribeshowapositionoflogicalspaceisoccupied.So
supposethatwebeginwiththislanguage,andinsteadofaskingwhetheritreflectsthestructureoftheworld,weask
whether it is a useful language for describing the world. From Carnaps perspective, (Carnap 1950) one might
describeitinsuchawayasthis.Givenalanguagewemayaskwhetherisadequate,orperhapsmerelyuseful,for
describing the world as we experience it. It is incoherent to speak about what the world in itself is like without
presupposingthatoneisdescribingit.WhatmakesaCarnapianequivalentofalogicallyperfectlanguagewouldbe
thateachofitsatomicsentencesislogicallyindependentofanyotheratomicsentence,andthateverypossibleworld
canbedescribedbyastatedescription.

2.CarnapsPropositionalModalLogic
In(nonmodal)propositionallogicthetruthvalueofanywellformedformula(wff)isdeterminedbyanassignment
of truth values to the atomic sentences. For Carnap an assignment of truth values to the atomic sentences is
represented by what he calls a statedescription. This term, like much in what follows, is only introduced at the
predicate level (1946, p. 50) but it is less confusing to present it first for the propositional case, where a state
description,whichIwillrefertoass,isaclassconsistingofatomicwffortheirnegations,suchthatforeachatomic
wff p, exactly one of p or ~p is in s. (Here we may think of p as a propositional variable, or as a metalinguistic
variablestandingforanatomicwff.)Armedwithastatedescriptionswemaydeterminethetruthofawffats in
theusualway,wheresmeansthatistrueaccordingtos,andsmeansthatnots:
Ifisatomic,thensifs,andsif~s
s~iffs
siffsors
siffsands
st
ThisisnotthewayCarnapdescribesit.Carnapspeaksoftherangeofawff(p.50).InCarnapstermsthetruthrules
wouldbewritten:
Ifisatomicthentherangeofisthosestatedescriptionsssuchthats.
WhereVisthesetofallstatedescriptions,therangeof~isVminustherangeof,thatis,itistheclassof
thosestatedescriptionswhicharenotintherangeof.
Therangeofistherangeoftherangeof,thatis,theclassofstatedescriptionswhichareeitherinthe
rangeofortherangeof.
Therangeofistherangeoftherangeof,thatis,theclassofstatedescriptionswhichareinboththe
rangeofandtherangeof.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/cmlogic/print

2/9

9/9/2015

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Carnap: Modal LogicInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Print

TherangeoftisV.
ItshouldIhopebeeasytosee,firstthatCarnapswayofputtingthingsisequivalenttomyuseofs,andsecond
thattheseareinturnequivalenttothestandarddefinitionsofvalidityintermsofassignmentsoftruthvalues.
ByacalculusCarnapmeansanaxiomaticsystem,andheusesPCtoindicateanyaxiomaticsystemwhichisclosed
undermodusponens(theruleofimplication,p.38)andcontainstandallsentencesformedbysubstitutionfrom
Bernayss four axioms [See Hilbert and Ackermann, 1950, p. 28f] of the propositional calculus. (loc cit.) Carnap
notesthatthesoundnessofthisaxiomsystemmaybeestablishedintheusualway,andthenshowshowthepossibility
of reduction to conjunctive normal form (a method which Carnap, p. 38, calls Preduction) may be used to prove
completeness.
ModallogicisobtainedbytheadditionofthesententialoperatorN.CarnapnotesthatNisequivalenttoLewiss~~.
(NotethatthesymbolwasnotusedbyLewis,butwasinventedbyF.B.Fitchin1945,andfirstappearedinprintin
Barcan 1946. It was not then known to Carnap.) Carnap tells us early in his article that the guiding idea in our
construction of systems of modal logic is this: a proposition p is logically necessary if and only if a sentence
expressingpislogicallytrue.Whenthisisturnedintoadefinitionintermsoftruthinastatedescriptionwegetthe
following:
sNiffsforeverystatedescriptions.
This is because Ltruth, or validity, means truth in every statedescription. I shall refer to validity when N is
interpreted in this way, as Carnapvalidity, or Cvalidity. This account enables Carnap to address what was an
important question at the time what is the correct system of modal logic? While Carnap is clear that different
systemsofmodallogiccanreflectdifferentviewsofthemeaningofthenecessityoperatorsheisequallyclearthat,as
heunderstandsit,principleslikeNpNNpand~NpN~Nparevalid.Itiseasytoseethatthevalidityofboththese
formulaefollowseasilyfromCarnapssemanticsforN.FromthisitisashortsteptoestablishingthatCarnapsmodal
logicincludestheprinciplesofLewisssystemS5,providedonetakestheatomicwfftobepropositionalvariables.
However,weimmediatelyrunintoaproblem.Supposethatpisanatomicwff.Thentherewillbeastatedescription
ssuchthat~ps.Andthismeansthatforeverystatedescriptions,sNp,andsos~Np.Butthismeansthat
~Np will be Ltrue. One can certainly have a system of modal logic in which this is so. An axiomatic basis and a
completenessproofforthelogicofCvalidityoccursinThomason1973.(ForcommentsonthisfeatureofCvalidity
seealsoMakinson1966andSchurz2001.)However,CarnapisclearthathissystemisequivalenttoS5(footnote8,p.
41, and on p. 46.) and ~Np is not a theorem of S5. Further, the completeness theorem that Carnap proves, using
normalforms,isacompletenessproofforS5,basedonWajsberg1933.
How then should this problem be addressed? Part of the answer is to look at Carnaps attitude to propositional
variables:
Weheremakeuseofp,q,andsoforth,asauxiliaryvariablesthatistosaytheyaremerelyused(following
Quine)forthedescriptionofcertainformsofsentences.(1946,p.41)
Quine 1934 suggests that the theorems of logic are always schemata. If so then we can define a wff as what we
mightcallQCvalid(Quine/Carnapvalid)iffeverysubstitutioninstanceofisCvalid.WffswhichareQCvalidare
preciselythetheoremsofS5.

3.Carnaps(NonModal)PredicateLogic
In presenting Carnaps 1946 predicate logic (or as he prefers to call it functional logic, FL or FC depending on
whetherweareconsideringitsemanticallyoraxiomatically)Ishallusexinplaceof(x),andxinplaceof(x).FL
containsadenumerableinfinityofindividualconstants,whichIwilloftenrefertosimplyasconstants.Carnapuses
thetermmatrixforwff,andthetermsentenceforclosedwff,thatiswffwithnofreevariables.Astatedescription
isasforpropositionallogicincontainingonlyatomicsentencesortheirnegations.Eachofthesewillbeawffofthe
formPa1...an or ~Pa1...an, where P is an nplace predicate and a1,..., an are n individual constants, not necessarily
distinct.
TodefinetruthinsuchastatedescriptionCarnapproceedsalittledifferentlyfromwhatisnowcommon.Inplaceof
relativising the truth of an open formula to an assignment to the variables of individuals from a domain, Carnap
assumes that every individual is denoted by one and only one individual constant, and he only defines truth for
sentences.Ifsisanystatedescription,andandareanysentences,therulesforpropositionalmodallogiccanbe
http://www.iep.utm.edu/cmlogic/print

3/9

9/9/2015

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Carnap: Modal LogicInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Print

extendedbyaddingthefollowing:
sPa1...anifPa1...ansandsPa1...anif~Pa1...ans
sa=biffaandbarethesameconstant
sxiffs[a/x]foreveryconstanta,where[/x]iswithareplacingeveryfreex.
Carnap produces the following axiomatic basis for firstorder predicate logic, which he calls FC. In place of
Carnaps ( ) to indicate the universal closure of a wff, I shall use , so that Carnaps D81a (1946, p. 52) can be
writtenas:
PCwhereisaPCtautology
andsoon.CarnapreferstoaxiomsasprimitivesentencesandinadditiontoPC,usingmorecurrentnames,wehave:
(x()(xx))
VQ(x),wherexisnotfreein.
1a(x[y/x]),where[y/x]isjustlikeexceptinhavingyinplaceoffreex,whereyisanyvariablefor
whichxisfree
1b(x[b/x]),where[b/x]isjustlikeexceptinhavingbinplaceoffreex,wherebisanyconstant
I1xx=x
I2(x=y()),whereandarealikeexceptthathasfreexin0ormoreplaceswherehasfreey.
I3abwhereaandbaredifferentconstants.
Theonlytransformationruleismodusponens:
MP,therefore
Theonlythingnonstandardhere,exceptperhapsfortherestrictionoftheoremstoclosedwffs,isI3,whichensures
thatallstatedescriptionsareinfinite,and,asCarnappointsoutonp.53,validatesxyxy.Itispossibletoprove
thecompletenessofthisaxiomaticsystemwithrespecttoCarnapssemantics.

4.Carnaps1946ModalPredicateLogic
PerhapsthemostimportantissueinCarnapsmodallogicisitsconnectionwiththecriticismsofW.V.Quine.These
criticismswerewellknowntoCarnapwhocitesQuine1943.Someyearslater,inQuine1953b,Quinedistinguishes
three grades of what he calls modal involvement. The first grade he regards as innocuous. It is no more than the
metalinguisticattributionofvaliditytoaformulaofnonmodallogic.Inthesecondgradewesaythatwhereisany
sentence then N is true iff itself is valid or logically true. On pp. 166169 Quine argues that while such a
procedureispossibleitisunilluminatingandmisleading.Thethirdgradeappliestomodalpredicatelogic,andallows
freeindividualvariablestooccurinthescopeofmodaloperators.ItisthisgradethatQuinefindsobjectionable.One
ofthepointsatissuebetweenQuineandCarnapariseswhenweintroducewhatarecalled definitedescriptionsintothe
language.MuchofCarnapsdiscussioninhisotherworksseeespeciallyCarnap1947elevatesdescriptionstoa
centralrole,butinthe1946paperthesearenotinvolved.
TheextensionofCarnapssemanticstomodallogicisexactlyasinthepropositionalcase:
sNiffsforeverystatedescriptions.
Asbefore,awffcanbecalledCvalidiffitistrueineverystatedescription,whensatisfiestheprinciplejuststated.
AsinthepropositionalcaseifisS5validthenisCvalid.However,alsoasinthepropositionalcase,(quantified)
S5isnotcompleteforCvalidity.Thisisbecause,wherePaisanatomicwff,~NPaisCvalideventhoughitisnota
theoremofS5andsimilarlywithanyatomicwff.Unlikethepropositionalcaseitseemsthatthisisafeaturewhich
Carnapwelcomedinthepredicatecase,sinceheintroducessomenonstandardaxioms.
ThefirstsetofaxiomsallformpartofastandardbasisforS5.Theyareasfollows(p.54,butwithcurrentnamesand
http://www.iep.utm.edu/cmlogic/print

4/9

9/9/2015

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Carnap: Modal LogicInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Print

notation):
LPCNWhereisoneoftheLPCaxiomsPCI3thenbothandNareaxiomsofMFC.
KN(N()(NN))
T(N)
5N(NN~N)
BFCN(NxxN)
BFN(xNNx)
The nonstandard axioms, which show that he is attempting to axiomatise Cvalidity, are what Carnap calls
Assimilation,VariationandGeneralizationandSubstitutionforPredicates.(Carnap1946,p.54f.)Inournotation
thesecanbeexpressedasfollows:
AssNxyz1...zn((xz1...xzn)(NN[y/x])),wherecontainsnofreevariablesotherthanx,y,
z1,...,zn,andnoconstantsandnooccurrencesof=.
VGNxyz1...zn((xz1...xznyz1...yzn)(NN[y/x]),wherecontainsnofree
variablesotherthanx,y,z1,...,zn,andnoconstants.
SPN(NN),whereisobtainedfrombyuniformsubstitutionofacomplexexpressionforapredicate.
Noneoftheseaxiomschemataiseasytoprocess,butitisnotdifficulttoseewhatthesimplestinstanceswouldlook
like.Averysimpleinstance,whichisofbothAssandVGis
AssPNxyz(xz(NPxyzNPyyz))
ToestablishthevalidityofAssPitissufficienttoshowthatifaandcaredistinctconstantsthenNPabcNPbbcis
valid.Thisistriviallyso,sincethereissomessuchthatsPabc,andthereforeforeverys,sNPabc,andso,for
everys,sNPabcPbbc.MoretellingisthecaseofSP.LetPbeaoneplacepredicateandconsider
SPPNx(NPxN(Px~Px))
InthiscaseisPx,whileisPx~Px,sothat,inCarnapswords,isformedfrombyreplacingeveryatomic
matrixcontainingPbythecurrentsubstitutionformof.Thatis,whereisPx~Px,itreplacessPx.Ifhad
beenmorecomplexandcontainedPyaswellasPx,thenthereplacementwouldhavegivenPy~Py,andsoon,
wherecareneedstobetakentopreventanyfreevariablebeingboundasaresultofthereplacement.Inthiscasewe
have~N(Pa~Pa),andso~NPa.
Infact,althoughCarnapappearstohaveitinmindtoaxiomatiseCvalidity,itiseasytoseethatthepredicateversion
isnotrecursivelyaxiomatisable.For,whereisanyLPCwff,isnotLPCvalidiff~N is Cvalid, and so, if C
validitywereaxiomatisablethenLPCwouldbedecidable.Thereisahintonp.57thatCarnapmayhaverecognised
this. He is certainly aware that the kind of reduction to normal form, with which he achieves the completeness of
propositionalS5,isunavailableinthepredicatecase,sinceitwouldleadtothedecidabilityofLPC.

5.DeReModality
WhatthencanbesaidonthebasisofCarnap1946toanswerQuinescomplaintsaboutmodalpredicatelogic?Quine
illustratestheprobleminQuine1943,pp.119121,andrepeatsversionsofhisargumentmanytimes,mostfamously
perhapsinQuine1953a,1953band1960.Theexamplegoeslikethis:
(1)9isnecessarilygreaterthan7
(2)Thenumberofplanets=9
therefore
(3)Thenumberofplanetsisnecessarilygreaterthan7.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/cmlogic/print

5/9

9/9/2015

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Carnap: Modal LogicInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Print

Carnap 1946 does not introduce definite descriptions into the language, so I shall present the argument in a
formalisationwhichonlyusestheresourcesfoundthere.IshallalsosimplifythediscussionbyusingthepredicateO,
where Ox means x is odd, rather than the complex predicate is greater than 7. This will avoid reference to 7,
whichisofnorelevancetoQuinesargument.Pmeansisthenumberoftheplanets,sothatPxmeanstherearex
manyplanets.WiththisinmindItake9tobeanindividualconstant,anduseOandPtoexpress(1)and(2)by
(4)NO9
(5)x(Pxx=9)
Onecouldaccountfor(4)byaddingO9asameaningpostulateinthesenseofCarnap1952,whichwouldrestrictthe
allowablestatedescriptionstothosewhichcontainO9,thoughfromsomeremarksonp.201ofCarnap1947itseems
thatCarnapmighthaveregardedbothOand9ascomplexexpressionsdefinedbytheresourcesoftheFrege/Russell
accountofthenaturalnumbersandtheirarithmeticalproperties.Italsoseemsthathemighthavetreatedthenumbers
ashigherorderentitiesreferredtobyhigherorderexpressions.Ifsothenthenecessityofarithmeticaltruthslike(4)
wouldderivefromtheiranalysisintologicaltruths.InmyexpositionIshalltakethenumeralsasindividualconstants,
andassumesomehowthatO9isalogicaltruth,trueineverystatedescription,andthattherefore(4)istrue.
InthisformalisationIamignoringtheclaimthatthedescriptionthenumberoftheplanetsisintendedtoclaimthat
thereisonlyonesuchnumber.Somuchforthepremises.Butwhatabouttheconclusion?Theproblemiswheretoput
theN.Thereareatleastthreepossibilities:
(6)Nx(PxOx)
(7)xN(PxOx)
(8)x(PxNOx)
Itisnotdifficulttoshowthat(6)and(7)donotfollowfrom(4)and(5).Incontrastto(6)and(7),(8)doesfollow
from(4)and(5),butthereisnoproblemhere,since(8)saysthatthereisanecessarilyoddnumberwhichissuchthat
therehappentobethatmanyplanets.Andthisistrue,because9isnecessarilyodd,andthereare9planets.Allofthis
should make clear how the phenomenon which upset Quine can be presented in the formal language of the 1946
article.Quineofcourseclaimsnottomakesenseofquantifyingin.(SeeforinstancethecommentsonSmullyan1948
inQuine1969,p.338.)

6.IndividualConcepts
EvenifsomethinglikewhathasjustbeensaidmightbethoughttoenableCarnaptoanswerQuinescomplaintsabout
deremodality,itseemsclearthatCarnaphadnotavailedhimselfofitinthe1947book,andIshallnowlookatthe
modallogicpresentedinCarnap1947.Onp.193fCarnapcitestheargument(1)(2)(3)fromQuine1943discussed
above. He does not appear to recognise any potential ambiguity in the conclusion, and characterises (3) as false.
Carnapdoesntconsider(8),andonp.194simplysays:
weobtainthefalsestatement[(3)]
InCarnapsviewtheproblemwithQuinesargumentisthatitassumesanunrestrictedversionofwhatissometimes
calledLeibnizLaw:
I2xy(x=y()),whereanddifferonlyinthathasfreexin0ormoreplaceswherehasfreey.
In the 1946 paper this law holds in full generality, as does a consequence of it which asserts the necessity of true
identities.
LIxy(x=yNx=y)
ForsupposeLIfails.Thentherewouldhavetobeastatedescriptionssinwhichforsomeconstantsaandb,sa=b
butsNa=b.Sothereisastatedescriptionssuchthatsa=b,butthen,aandbaredifferentconstants,andso,s
a=b,whichgivesacontradiction.
Inthe1947bookCarnapholdsthatI2mustberestrictedsothatneitherxnoryoccurfreeinthescopeofamodal
operator.InparticularthefollowingwouldberuledoutasanallowableinstanceofI2:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/cmlogic/print

6/9

9/9/2015

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Carnap: Modal LogicInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Print

(1)x=y(NOxNOy)
Inordertoexplainhowthisfailurecomesabout,andsolvetheproblemsposedbycoreferringsingularterms,Carnap
modifiesthesemanticsofthe1946paper.Theprincipaldifferencefromthemodallogicofthe1946paper,asCarnap
tellsusonp.183,isthatthedomainofquantificationforindividualvariablesnowconsistsofindividualconcepts,
where an individual concept i is a function from statedescriptions to individual constants. Where s is a state
description,letisdenotetheconstantwhichisthevalueofthefunctioniforthestatedescriptions.Carnapisclear
thatthequantifiersrangeoverallindividualconcepts,notjustthoseexpressibleinthelanguage.
Usingthissemanticsitiseasytoseehow(9)canfail.Forletxhaveasitsvaluetheindividualconcepti,whichisthe
functionsuchthatisis9foreverystatedescriptions,while the valueof yisthefunctionj such that, in any state
descriptions,jsistheindividualwhichisthenumberoftheplanetsins,thatis,jsisthe(unique)constantasuchthat
Paisins.(Assumethatineachstatedescriptionthereisauniquenumber,possibly0,whichsatisfiesP.)Assumethat
x = y is true in any statedescription s iff, where i is the individual concept which is the value of x, and j is the
individual concept which is the value of y, then is is the same individual constant as js. In the present example it
happensthatwhensisthestatedescriptionwhichrepresentstheactualworld,isandjsareindeedthesame,forins
therearenineplanets,makingx=ytrueats.NowNOxwillbetrueifOxistrueineverystatedescriptions,whichis
tosayifissatisfiesOineverys.Sinceisis9ineverystatedescriptionthenisdoessatisfyOineverys,andsoNOx
istrueats.Butsupposesrepresentsasituationinwhichtherearesixplanets.Thenjswillbe6andsoOywillbe
falseins,andforthatreasonNOywillbefalseins,thusfalsifying(9).(ItisalsoeasytoseethatLIisnotvalid,since
itiseasytohaveis=jseventhoughij.)
The difference between the modal semantics of Carnap 1946 and Carnap 1947 is that in the former the only
individualsarethegenuineindividuals,representedbytheconstantsofthelanguage.Intheproofoftheinvalidity
of (9) it is essential that the semantics of identity require that when x is assigned an individual concept i and y is
assignedanindividualconceptjthatx=ybetrueatastatedescriptionsiffisandjsarethesameindividual.Andnow
wecometoQuinescomplaint(Quine1953a,p.152f).ItisthatCarnapreplacesthedomainofthingsastherangeof
thequantifierswithadomainofindividualconcepts.Quinethenpointsoutthattheverysameparadoxesariseagainat
thelevelofindividualconcepts.Thusforinstanceitmightbethattheindividualconceptwhichrepresentsthenumber
ofplanetsineachstatedescriptionisidenticalwiththefirstindividualconceptintroducedonp.193ofMeaningand
Necessity. Carnap is alive to Quines criticism that ordinary individuals have been replaced in his ontology by
individualconcepts.InessenceCarnapsreplytoQuineonpp.198200ofCarnap1947isthatifwerestrictourselves
topurelyextensionalcontextsthentheentitieswhichenterintothesemanticsarepreciselythesameentitiesasarethe
extensionsoftheintensionsinvolved.Whatthisamountstoisthatalthoughthedomainofquantificationconsistsof
individualconcepts,theargumentsofthepredicatesareonlythegenuineindividuals.Forsuppose,asQuineappears
to have in mind, we permit predicates which apply to individual concepts. Then suppose that i and j are distinct
individualconcepts.LetPbeapredicatewhichcanapplytoindividualconcepts,andletsbeastatedescriptionin
whichPappliestoibutnottojbutinwhichisandjsarethesameindividual.Wenowhavetwooptionsdependingon
how=istobeunderstood.Ifwetakex=ytobetrueinswhenisandjsarethesameindividualthenifxisassignedi
andyisassignedjwewouldhavethatx=yandPxarebothtrueins,butPyisnot.Sothateventhesimplestinstance
ofI2
I2Px=y(PxPy)
fails,andheretherearenomodaloperatorsinvolved.Thesecondoptionistotreat=asexpressingagenuineidentity.
Thatistosayx=yistrueonlywhentheindividualconceptassignedtoxisthesameindividualconceptastheone
assignedtoy.IntheexampleIhavebeendiscussing,sinceiandjaredistinctindividualconceptsifiisassignedtox
andjtoy,thenx=ywillbefalse.ButonthisoptionthefullversionofI2becomesvalidevenwhenandcontain
modaloperators.ThisisjustanotherversionofQuinescomplaintthatifanoperatorexpressesidentitythentheterms
of a true identity formula must be interchangeable in all contexts. Presumably Carnap thought that the use of
individualconceptscouldaddresstheseworries.Thepresentarticlemakesnoclaimsonwhetherornotanacceptable
treatmentofindividualconceptsisdesirable,andifitiswhetheronecanbedeveloped.

7.ReferencesandFurtherReading
Thislistcontainsallitemsreferredtointhetext,togetherwithsomeotherarticlesrelevanttoCarnapsmodallogic.
Barcan,(Marcus)R.C.,1946,Afunctionalcalculusoffirstorderbasedonstrictimplication.TheJournalofSymbolicLogic,11,1
16.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/cmlogic/print

7/9

9/9/2015

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Carnap: Modal LogicInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Print

Burgess,J.P.,1999,Whichmodallogicistherightone?NotreDameJournalofFormalLogic,40,8193.
Carnap,R.,1937,TheLogicalSyntaxofLanguage,London,KeganPaul,TrenchTruber.
Carnap,R.,1946,Modalitiesandquantification.TheJournalofSymbolicLogic,11,3364.
Carnap,R.,1947,MeaningandNecessity,Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress(Secondedition1956,referencesaretothesecond
edition.).
Carnap,R.,1950,Empiricism,semanticsandontology.RevueInterndePhil.4,pp.2040(Reprintedinthesecondeditionof
Carnap1947,pp.20522221.Pagereferencesaretothisreprint.).
Carnap,R.,1952,Meaningpostulates.PhilosophicalStudies,3,pp.6573.(ReprintedinthesecondeditionofCarnap1947,pp.
222229.Pagereferencesaretothisreprint.)
Carnap,R.,1963,ThePhilosophyofRudolfCarnap,edP.A.Schilpp,LaSalle,Ill.,OpenCourt,pp.384.
Church,A.,1973,Arevisedformulationofthelogicofsenseanddenotation(partI).Nos,7,pp.2433.
Cocchiarella,N.B.,1975a,Ontheprimaryandsecondarysemanticsoflogicalnecessity.JournalofPhilosophicalLogic,4,pp.13
27..
Cocchiarella,N.B.,1975b,Logicalatomism,nominalism,andmodallogic.Synthese,31,pp.2367.
Cresswell,M.J.,2013,CarnapandMcKinsey:Topicsintheprehistoryofpossibleworldssemantics.Proceedingsofthe12th
AsianLogicConference,J.Brendle,R.Downey,R.GoldblattandB.Kim(eds),WorldScientific,pp.5375.
Garson,J.W.,1980,Quantificationinmodallogic.HandbookofPhilosophicalLogic,ed.D.M.GabbayandF.Guenthner,
Dordrecht,Reidel,Vol.II,Ch.5,249307
Gottlob,G.,1999,RemarksonaCarnapianextensionofS5.InJ.Wolenski,E.Khler(eds.),AlfredTarskiandtheViennaCircle,
Kluwer,Dordrecht,243259.
Hilbert,D.,andW.Ackermann,1950,MathematicalLogic,NewYork,ChelseaPublishingCo.,(TranslationofGrundzgeder
TheoretischenLogik.).
Hughes,G.E.,andM.J.Cresswell,1996,ANewIntroductiontoModalLogic,London,Routledge.
Lewis,C.I.,andC.H.Langford,1932,SymbolicLogic,NewYork,Doverpublications.
Makinson,D.,1966,Howmeaningfularemodaloperators?AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy,44,331337.
Quine,W.V.O.,1934,Ontologicalremarksonthepropositionalcalculus.Mind,433,pp.473476.
Quine,W.V.O.,1943,Notesonexistenceandnecessity,TheJournalofPhilosophy,Vol40,pp.113127.
Quine,W.V.O.,1953a,Referenceandmodality.FromaLogicalPointofView,Cambridge,Mass.,HarvardUniversityPress,
secondedition1961,pp.13959.
Quine,W.V.O.,1953b,Threegradesofmodalinvolvement,TheWaysofParadox,CambridgeMass.,HarvardUniversityPress,
1976,pp.158176.
Quine,W.V.O.,1960,WordandObject,Cambridge,Mass,MITPress.
Quine,W.V.O.,1969,ReplytoSellars.WordsandObjections,(edD.DavidsonandK.J.J.Hintikka),Dordrecht,Reidel,1969,pp.
337340.
Schurz,G.,2001,Carnapsmodallogic.InW.StelznerandM.Stockler(eds.),ZwischentraditionellerundmodernerLogik.
Paderborn,Mentis,pp.365380.
Smullyan,A.F.,1948,Modalityanddescription.TheJournalofSymbolicLogic,13,317.
Thomason,S.K.,1973,NewRepresentationofS5.NotreDameJournalofFormalLogic,14,281284.
Wajsberg,M.,1933,EinerweiteterKlassenkalkl.MonatsheftefrMathematikundPhysik,Vol.40,11326.
Wittgenstein,L.,1921,TractatusLogicPhilosophicus.(TranslatedbyD.F.PearsandB.F.McGinness),2ndprinting1963.London,
RoutledgeandKeganPaul.

AuthorInformation
M.J.Cresswell
Email:max.cresswell@msor.vuw.ac.nz
VictoriaUniversityofWellington
NewZealand

ArticleprintedfromInternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy:http://www.iep.utm.edu/cmlogic/

http://www.iep.utm.edu/cmlogic/print

8/9

9/9/2015

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Carnap: Modal LogicInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Print

CopyrightTheInternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.Allrightsreserved.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/cmlogic/print

9/9