Professional Documents
Culture Documents
KASO
KASO
COURT OF APPEALS
(101 SCRA 661, 1998)
Facts: Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under R.A. No. 387, as
amended, a contract, install and operate oil pipelines. The original pipeline
concession was granted in 1967 and renewed by the Energy Regulatory Board in
1992.
Sometime in January 1995, petitioner applied for a mayors permit with the
Office of the Mayor of Batangas City. However, before the mayors permit could
be issued, the respondent City Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax
based on its gross receipts for the fiscal year 1993 pursuant to the Local
Government Code. The respondent City Treasure assessed a business tax on
the petitioner amounting to P956,076.04 payable in four installments based on
the gross receipts for products pumped at GPS-1 for the fiscal year 1993 which
amounted to P181,681,151.00. in order not to hamper its operations, petitioner
paid the tax under protest in the amount of P239, 019.01 for the first quarter of
1993.
On June 15, 1994, petitioner filed with the RTC of Batangas City a
complaint for tax refund with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents City of Batangas and Adoracion Arellano in her capacity as City
Treasurer. In its complaint, petitioner alleged, inter alia, that: (1) the imposition
and collection of the business tax on its gross receipts violates Sec. 133 of the
Local Government Code; (2) the authority of cities to impose and collect a tax on
the gross receipts of contractors and independent contractors under Sec.
141(e) and 151 does not include the authority to collect such taxes on
transportation contractors for, as defined under Sec. 131(h), the term
contractors excludes transportation contactors; and (3) the City Treasurer
illegally and erroneously imposed and collected the said tax, thus meriting the
immediate refund of the tax paid.
Traversing the complaint, the respondents argued that petitioner cannot
be exempt from taxes under Sec. 133 (J) of the Local Government Code as said
exemption applied only to transportation contractors and persons engaged in the
transportation by hire and common carriers by air land and water. Respondents
assert that pipelines are not included in the term common carrier which refers
solely to ordinary carriers as trucks, trains, ships and the like. Respondents
further posit that the term common carrier under the said Code pertains to the
mode or manner by which a product is delivered to its destination.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is a common carrier so that in the
affirmative, he is not liable to pay the carriers tax under the Local Government
Code of 1991?
Held: Petitioner is a common carrier.
A common carrier may be defined, broadly, as one who holds himself out
to the public as engaged in the business of transporting persons or property from
place to place, for compensation, offering his services to the public generally.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as any person,
corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
D. Cases:
1. DE GUZMAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS (168 SCRA 612)
Facts: Cendena was a junk dealer and was engaged in buying used bottles and
scrap materials in Pangasinan and brought these to Manila for resale. He used
two 6-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to Pangasinan, he would load his
vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to Pangasinan.
For that service, he charged freight lower than regular rates. General Milk Co.
contacted with him for the hauling of 750 cartons of milk. On the way to
Pangasinan, one of the trucks was hijacked by armed men who took with them
the truck and its cargo and kidnapped the driver and his helper. Only 150 cartons
of milk were delivered. The Milk Co. sued to claim the value of the lost
merchandise based on an alleged contract of carriage. Cendena denied that he
was a common carrier and contended that he could not be liable for the loss it
was due to force majeure. The trial court ruled that he was a common carrier.
The CA reversed.
Issue: Whether or not Cendena is a common carrier?
Held: Yes, Cendena is properly characterized as a common carrier even though
he merely backhauled goods for other merchants, and even if it was done on a
periodic basis rather than on a regular basis, and even if his principal occupation
was not the carriage of goods.
Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity. It also avoids making a distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation services on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does it make a distinction between a carrier offering its services to the
general public and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of population.
Because the others denied liability, Home Insurance paid San Miguel the
insurance value loss. This cost was brought by the former to recover indemnity
from Luzon Stevedoring and the ship owner. Luzon Stevedoring raised the
defense that it deliver with due diligence in the same from the carrier. Mexican
Steamship Agencies denied liability on the ground that the charter party referred
to in the bills of lading, the charter, not the ship owner, was responsible for any
loss or damage of the cargo. Furthermore, it claimed to have exercised due
diligence in stowing the goods and as a mere forwarding agent, it was not
responsible for losses or damages to the cargo.
Issue: Whether or not the stipulation in the charter party to owners non-liability
was valid as to absolve the American Steamship from liability loss?
Held: The Civil Code provision on common carriers should not be applied where
the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation in the
charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of
its agent is void only if the strict public policy governing common carriers is
applied. Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved, as in
the case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party.
10. SAN PABLO VS. PANTRANCO (153 SCRA 199)
Facts: The Pantranco South Express, Inc., hereinafter referred to as
PANTRANCO is a domestic corporation engaged in the land transportation
business with PUB service for passengers and freight and various certificates for
public conveniences (CPC) to operate passenger buses from Metro Manila to
Bicol Region and Eastern Samar. On March 27,1980 PANTRANCO through its
counsel wrote to Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) requesting authority to
lease/purchase a vessel named MN "Black Double" "to be used for its project to
operate a ferryboat service from Matnog, Sorsogon and Allen, Samar that will
provide service to company buses and freight trucks that have to cross San
Bernardo Strait. In a reply of April 29,1981 PANTRANCO was informed by
MARINA that it cannot give due course to the request.
PANTRANCO nevertheless acquired the vessel MN "Black Double" on
May 27, 1981 for P3 Million pesos. It wrote the Chairman of the Board of
Transportation (BOT) through its counsel, that it proposes to operate a ferry
service to carry its passenger buses and freight trucks between Allen and Matnog
in connection with its trips to Tacloban City. PANTRANCO claims that it can
operate a ferry service in connection with its franchise for bus operation in the
highway from Pasay City to Tacloban City "for the purpose of continuing the
highway, which is interrupted by a small body of water, the said proposed ferry
operation is merely a necessary and incidental service to its main service and
obligation of transporting its passengers from Pasay City to Tacloban City. Such
being the case there is no need to obtain a separate certificate for public
convenience to operate a ferry service between Allen and Matnog to cater
exclusively to its passenger buses and freight trucks.
bus trips and issues separate tickets whenever they board the MN "Black
Double" that crosses Matnog to Allen. Nevertheless, considering that the
authority granted to PANTRANCO is to operate a private ferry, it can still assert
that it cannot be held to account as a common carrier towards its passengers
and cargo. Such an anomalous situation that will jeopardize the safety and
interests of its passengers and the cargo owners cannot be allowed.
Thus the Court holds that the water transport service between Matnog and
Allen is not a ferryboat service but a coastwise or interisland shipping service.
Before private respondent may be issued a franchise or CPC for the operation of
the said service as a common carrier, it must comply with the usual requirements
of filing an application, payment of the fees, publication, adducing evidence at a
hearing and affording the oppositors the opportunity to be heard, among others,
as provided by law.
Held: The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration.
The liability of petitioner is governed primarily by the Civil Code however, in all
matters not regulated by the Civil Code, the Code of Commerce and Special
Laws will govern with respect to the rights and obligations of the carrier.
Therefore COGSA is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.
SWEET LINES INC, VS. CA (121 SCRA 769)
Facts: Herein private respondents purchased first-class tickets from petitioner at
the latters office in Cebu City. They were to board M/V Sweet Grace bound for
Catbalogan, Western Samar. Instead of departing at the scheduled hour of about
midnight on July 8, 1972, the vessel set sail at 3:00 am of July 9, 1972 only to be
towed back to Cebu due to engine trouble, arriving there on the same day at
about 4:00 pm. The vessel lifted anchor again on July 10, 1972 at around 8:00
am. Instead of docking at Catbalogan (the first port of call), the vessel proceeded
direct to Tacloban. Private respondents had no recourse but to disembark and
board a ferry boat to Catbalogan. Hence, the suit for breach of contract of
carriage.
Issue: Whether or not the mechanical defect constitutes a fortuitous event which
would exempt the carrier from liability.
Held: No. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, there was no
fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented the vessel from fulfilling its
undertaking of taking the private respondents to Catbalogan. In the first place,
mechanical defects in the carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that exempts
the carrier from responsibility. In the second place, even granting arguendo that
the engine failure was a fortuitous event, it accounted on for the delay of
departure. When the vessel finally left the port, there was no longer any force
majeure that justified by-passing a port of call.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. CA 234 SCRA 7
Facts: On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from
Yokohama, Japan for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by
defendant Eastern Shipping Lines under a bill of lading. The shipment was
insured under plaintiff's Marine Insurance Policy. Upon arrival of the shipment in
Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged unto the custody of defendant
Metro Port Service, Inc. The latter excepted to one drum, said to be in bad order,
which damage was unknown to plaintiff.
On January 7, 1982 defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the
shipment from defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum opened and without
seal. On January 8 and 14, 1982, defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation made
deliveries of the shipment to the consignee's warehouse. The latter excepted to
one drum which contained spillages, while the rest of the contents was
adulterated/fake.
Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum,
the consignee suffered losses totaling P19, 032.95, due to the fault and
negligence of defendants. Claims were presented against defendants who failed
and refused to pay the same. As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff
was compelled to pay the consignee P19, 032.95 under the aforestated marine
insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of said
consignee against defendants.
Issue: Whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods can
be a solidary or joint and several, liability of the common carrier, the arrastre
operator and the customs broker?
Held: The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the
shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for
transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their
acceptance by, the person entitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-1738, Civil Code).
When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition, a
presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and
there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable (Art. 1735,
Civil Code). There are, of course, exceptional cases when such presumption of
fault is not observed but these cases, enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil
Code, are exclusive, not one of which can be applied to this case.
As to The question of charging both the carrier and the arrastre operator
with the obligation of properly delivering the goods to the consignee, the legal
relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to that of a
depositor and warehouseman while the relationship between the consignee and
the common carrier is similar to that of the consignee and the arrastre operator.
Since it is the duty of the arrastre to take good care of the goods that are in its
custody and to deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such
responsibility also devolves upon the carrier. Both the arrastre and the carrier are
therefore charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in good condition to the
consignee. A factual finding of both the Supreme Court and the appellate court
was that there was sufficient evidence that the shipment sustained damage while
in the successive possession of appellants. Accordingly, the liability imposed on
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the sole petitioner in this case, is inevitable
regardless of whether there are others solidarily liable with it.
YEPES VS SAMAR
Appellees boarded appellant's Bus No. 56, with its driver, While on its way the
bus turned turtle and caught fire, causing injuries to some of its passengers,
amongst them the appellees who suffered serious burns. Appellant paid all the
expenses for their hospitalization and medical treatment. appellees were asked
to sign a document which stated that operator has incurred in properly giving
them the proper medical treatment, that they manifest their desire to waive any
and all claims against the operator of the Samar Express Transit.
This document notwithstanding, appellees filed with the lower court separate
complaints for damages for breach of contract of carriage against appellant.
In its answers to the complaints the latter invoked the following defenses:
(a) that the accident was due to a fortuitous event beyond its control and/or due
to the negligence of one of its passengers, and (
b) that the plaintiffs (appellees here) had waived their right to claim for damages
against it.
After a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment ruling the above-mentioned
waiver null and void as being contrary to public policy
Appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for
the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said document
proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously is
not the same as making an actual waiver of their right. it unnecessary to
consider the question of whether or not such waiver if actually made upon the
consideration stated in the document already referred to, is against public policy
and morals.