WHO HELPED

HITLER?

By

the

IVAN MAISKY

same author

BEFORE THE STORM

JOURNEY INTO THE PAST

Soviet Ambassador to the United

Member

of the

Academy of

Kingdom, i?3 2-43>

Sciences of the U.S.S.R-

WHO HELPED
HITLER?
Translated from the Russian by

ANDREW ROTHSTEIN

HUTCHINSON OF LONDON

HUTCHINSON & CO.

(Publishers)

LTD

17S-2Q2 Great Portland Street, London^ W*\

London Melbourne Sydney

Auckland Bombay Toronto
Johannesburg

New York

*
First published in Russia as

CONTENTS

KTO POMOGAL CITLERU

(Izdatdstvo Institute Mezhdunarodnykh
Otnoshenii;

Moscow

1962)

Foreword

This edition: First published 1964

PART ONE

Before 1939

The

What

Soviet Government's instructions

I

found in England

13

21

Trade Agreement

27

causes

36

The

A brief thaw and

Steps to a rapprochement

43

Churchill and Beaverbrook

53

It

grows colder
Below freezing point
Munich

67

10

Chamberlain's sharp practice

91

11

On the eve

94

struggle for the

its

59

77

of 1939

PART TWO

1939
1

Hutchinson

&

Co. {Publishers) Ltd.

in

19*14

Fournier type face. It has

f UNIVERSITY

Wove paper*

The

Two

99

U,S.Sit. proposes a pact of mutual

assistance

been printed in Great Britain by The Anchor Presst

Ltd., in Tiptree, Estex^ on Antique

rape of Czechoslovakia and Chamberlain's

manoeuvres
2

This book has been set

The

draft pacts

116

132

MO

name

To name

Pact and military convention

Preparing for the military negotiations

Military negotiations in

The Soviet Government's dilemma

The collapse of the tripartite negotiations and

or not to

Moscow

the forced agreement with

54
162

Germany

169
178

196

Conclusion

20^

Index

213

FOREWORD
The enemies of the U.S.S.R.

abroad have brought into being

and spread far and wide a spurious legend about the behaviour
world
of the Soviet Government on the very eve of the second
war.

The

essence of this legend

is

the following.

and summer of 1939 (from

Union
was playing a double game:
March to August) the Soviet
on the one hand it was carrying on open negotiations with
It is asserted that in the spring

Britain

and France for the conclusion of a

triple pact

of mutual

on
assistance for the struggle against Hiderite Germany, while
carried
it
France,
and
Britain
of
backs
the other hand, behind the
on parallel but

secret negotiations

with Hiderite Germany for the

conclusion of an agreement aimed at the 'western democracies'.

on various
It is alleged, further, that the Soviet Union by seizing

dragged out negotiations with

Britain and France, awaiting the end of its talks with Germany,

unessential

details

artificially

when, nevertheless, the moment came for signing the

triple pact, it suddenly changed its attitude altogether, broke with
Britain and France and concluded an agreement with Germany
an agreement which (usually this is mentioned in deliberately

and

that

vague terms) was practically a military alliance directed against

Britain and France. Our enemies, finally, allege that the signature
of this agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany opened
the

way

for Hitler's attack

on Poland, and

responsibility for launching the second

U.S.S.R.

that thereby the

world war

falls

on the

FOREWORD
s

FOREWORD
a

originated in
This malicious legend,
lands ox
war and filled out with all
the
irallv worked up after
and
versions
alternative
reproduced in numerous

Ss

wi

publicity

ou^tts

SSSfc

2S

and Lorians. It
the
diplomatic documents of

capitalist

Eisenhower, former
the notes of Mr.

Yrt

hands of western potans

the most
found its way even mto

at the

this

legend

is

government

Present of the

the bourgeois
a classic example of

falsifica-

much

earlier date.

one. In

and

the spnng
the events themselves-hs
.hey went
Secondly,
distorted.

j^^X

dace

1.

That date naturally

is

determined by the

two wars: the

point which was a watershed in the era between the
Germany.
coming to power of HMerism in
Such a date for the beginning of the story is also very convenof
for myself. I decided to present my account in the form
ient

reminiscences because such a form

would convey

to the reader

more easily the atmosphere and the events of those already

comparatively far-off years. Also I arrived in London as
Ambassador of the tLS.S.R. in the autumn of 1932: that is, only
three months before the Nazi coup in Berlin.
Thus both political and personal considerations make it
particularly

convenient to begin

my

account with the

first

impressions I gained immediately upon my arrival in Britain.

Although the events to be discussed in the following pages
a
took place more than a quarter of a century ago, they have
lively echo in the events of the present day.
For then, just as today, the international political horizon was

wrapped in heavy thunder-clouds. Then, as now, the fundamental

problem facing humanity was the problem of whether there was
camp of
or was not to be a new world war. Then, as now, the
Socialism, represented in those days only by the Soviet Union,

that

foHow

- * *fR^

teU dte

U.S.S.K. and

between the
in the lelarions
actuallv did take place
and aununer of 1959Geratany in the spring

SSta

France and

Ke'pIZlar advantages^ perfontdng

hand

as

SS.

of and a patdcipan. in

be^een

*e

and
the U.S.S.R, Bttann

in those days, 1

was

^*2^'

London
Soviet Ambassador in

" *

was defending the cause of peace with all its strength, while the
camp of capitalism, which at that time included all the other
countries and States, was blindly and criminally hurtling to war,
and in the end led humanity into a terrible catastrophe- When one
of the present leaders of capitalism one
often thinks: Chamberlain and Daladier used to say the same
things in the thirties. Evidently the sons have learned nothing

now to the speeches

listens

from the experience of their

But does

this

mean

fathers.

that things must end once

more

in a

new

frightful world war?

does not. During the twenty-odd years which have
passed since then, the balance of power in the international arena

and

still

No,

more

it

has completely changed.

At

beS4,Imb^myaMntno,w da IW bn,ft.
i

that time the U.S.S.R-

planet

Today

there

is

an

was

the only Socialist State

on our

of such

States,

entire constellation

FOREWORD
10

include
stand

the

mighty

Chi^e

So^^^tiSS
^
^^^J^^ J

our day-

by *e

mer

also champ-
States, which are
militant capittd
In the camp of

neutral

war.
fneace and opponents of
about
only
e

more

ofpea*."")
than a few friends
dg for considering
arena
international
the
Stable, and that
is not by
war
world
0f
that a third
displayed Py tn forces
activity and energy
with the necessary
peace it can be averted.
kce on

JL

InsuchasimationitisuseMtorecallw^

blindness

State.

0 f the then
and did

manldnd

^.J^g^Sde-
^S^Loi

feol.q^
forces of war.

they were dragging

hatre d of Communism
followed from
d of

see

and the Soviet

not see

T\~tI^o
abyjmw wmch
V_ ^
^
which
^
_a

not want to

fc

world
eve of the second
the
demonstrate

*OVe

,t

of the recent

jvan maisky

PART ONE

Before 1939

The

Soviet Government's instructions

In the autumn

of 1932

was appointed Ambassador of the

U.S.S.R. to Great Britain, and at the end of October that year,

after the British

Government had given

its

agrement^ I

left

for

London,

What
what

Government put before me? With

tasks did the Soviet

intentions, plans

and

feelings did I leave for the place

of

my new work?
I

can say safely that the Soviet Government was sending

me as

and friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Great

Britain, and I myself gladly and willingly set about the fulfilment
of such a mission. By no means over-estimating my own forces, I
decided beforehand to do everything possible to improve relations
between Moscow and London. The reasons underlying the aims
of the Soviet Government were both general and particular in
a herald of peace

their character.

The

reasons of a

more general

character sprang from the

inherently peaceful nature of the Soviet State,

where there are

no classes or groups which might gain anything from war.
Workers, peasants and intellectuals the social elements of which

the Soviet

community

consists

course, does not in the least

The

price.

can only

mean

lose

Bolsheviks are not Tolstoyans.

Soviet song runs our 'armoured train*

sidings, maintained at the level

by war.

is

As

the

any
well-known

always ready on the

of the most up-to-date military

technique: and, should the Soviet State be in peril,

iately

This, of

that they are for peace at

it is

immed-

brought, and will be brought, into operation. But in our

essence

we do

not want war,

we
13

hate war and to the extent of

WHO HELPED

14

human

possibility

we

try to avoid war.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS

HITLER?

up regular payments for the industrial equipfrom

abroad, I can remember really critical
ment imported
moments in the winter of 1932-3 when I was already working in
London. However, the Soviet Government always paid on the

We are wholly engaged

difficult

and Communism; it is here that our

in the building of Socialism
and we wish for nothing which
minds and hearts are committed,
desire or which, all
us from this work we ardently

could distract
was and
interfere with it Such ahvays
the more, could seriously
State. If, nevertheless,
general line of the Soviet
is today, the
had to do a
forty-five years of history has
the U.S.S.R. during its
imposed
was
was due to the fact teAwar
great deal of fighting, this

In us by

hostile

striving to wipe from

external forces, which were
That
Socialist country in the world.

the face of the earth the first

and foreign
the years of the Civil War
it was during
the great
of
it was in the days
intervention. That is how

Thow

Patriotic

War

of 1941-5-

more particular
The
Government to
Soviet
impelled the
reasons of a

...

which still further

and friendship
peace
five in
appointment as Ambassador

character

time of my
features
the one hand, in some special
in London, consisted, on
the
country, and on the other in
of the internal situation in our

Jh Great Britain
rapidly growing

at the

menace of Fascism in Germany.

U.S.S.K.
internal situation in the
I will deal first with the
Plan was drawing to a
When I left for Britain the first Five Year
been laid, but
for our new industry had
close. The foundations
a matter for
were
which they cost
the fruits of the heroic efforts
and tiie
born,
had only just been
the future. Collective farming
countey
The
it was not yet over.
struggle of the kulaks against
were insufr
There
foodstuff,
^experiencing difficulties with
S^S.R
the
of
Beyond the boundaries
cient

consumer goods.

there

was raging

a cruel

economic

crisis

prices for foodstuffs

(the notorious

and raw

crisis

materials,

by

of

the

I029_> World
were paying in those years for
export of which in the main we
seriously. Income
^machines imported from abroad, had fallen
industry was still
small. The Soviet gold
in foreign currency was
the destrucits regeneration after
going through the first stages of

and was in no
by the Civil War and intervention
by foreign
goldfields
the Lena
helped by the management of
a result, it was extremely
cZessionairls in the twenties. As

tion caused

IJ

to keep

day and hour appointed. We valued highly the reputation

established on the world market by the U.S-S.R. for meeting its
obligations without
this, naturally,

and spared no

fail,

efforts to preserve

it.

All

impelled the Soviet Government to avoid any

which might

external political complications

create difficulties for

our trade and arouse the necessity for unforeseen expenditure.

This was not only a noble policy but also an extremely wise
one, but

how difficult it was to

maintain

it

in those years!

end of 1932 the Weimar Republic

collapse. The Nazis were rapidly
of
complete
state
in
a
was visibly

Turning

to

Germany,

at the

gaining, conquering one position after another.

The

split in

the

ranks of the proletariat was profound, and the Social-Democrats

were stubbornly refusing any co-operation with the Communists
against Fascism. In such a situation it was extremely probable
and if that should happen,
that Hitler would come to power
what would be its effect on the whole European situation? How
in particular would it be reflected in German-Soviet relations?
Nothing good, of course, could be expected of such an outcome.

Before leaving for

London

Litvinov, then People's

he gave

me

had a long

Commissar

with M. M,

talk

for Foreign Affairs, in

the general directions for the

work

was

to

which
do in

Britain.

'You understand, of course/ explained Maxim Maximovich,

not my personal views, but the directives of our

'that these are

higher authorities,'

That conversation I remember very well, and think it

to reproduce its most important points here,
'Soviet foreign policy,' said
peace. This follows

M, M,

from our

Litvinov,

principles

'is

The

never changes, but in putting

into practical effect

it

a policy of

and from the very

foundations of the Soviet State.

basis

desirable

of our foreign policy

we have

reckon with the particular international situation prevailing.

to

Up

WHO HELPED

HITLER?

with Germany, andinour

our best relations have been
uni*d fron
as possible to maintam a
actions we have tried as for
her nterests
to take her position and
with Germany, or at any rate
deahng
were
with which we
account .But the Germany

now

to

So

Weimar Germany. Today that Germany

is v.s,b

y onus last eg*

then
that respect. If not today,
cannot cherish any illusions in
power, and the station wiU
tomorrow Hitler will come to
be transformed from our friend

We

cZge

at once.

Germany

will

we

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS

replied.

'What must you

every possible

strive for first of all?

way of our

ties

17

The

extension in

with the Conservatives,

Two

the
forces are dominant in the political life of Great Britain
the
and
Labour
Conservatives and the Opposition, consisting of

Once

Liberals*

the Liberals played

first fiddle

in the Opposition,

but those times are gone. In our days the Liberals are declining,
splittings weakening. The main role in the Opposition is passing

more and more

to the

Labour Party. You should note

that

up

to

the positive steps in the sphere of Anglo-Soviet relations

.must
the prospect, what conclusion
of peace^we
the interests of our policy
draw? Obviously now, in
Franc*and
Britain
relations with
try to improve our
cap^ist
in
leading Power
ticukrly wuh Britain as the
to
hosule
up to now have been
Europe. True, both these States

now

US

diplomatic relations between the two countries, broken off in

into our enemy. If that

is

TZ

To

illustrate this

point

Maxim Maximovich

recalled

some of

1 930-1.

'But

He continued:
now the objective world

When they come to power

I war of revenge: they

******

...changing u.N.w
The Na^s
=

situation is

frightful noise for

will of course ra.se a
to demand the
will begin to arm,

make
and so forth. This is bound to
res^ration of their colonies
only
if
reason,
Britain and France see
tne mHng circles of
against
think of allies
nTrdX and must compel them to
Entente o
remember*e
they will be obliged to

Kany. ^en

^1^^"^

and consequently our

war
London But you
situation for your work in
a more favourable
task
developing on their own. Your
cannot rely much on things
coming into bang
greatest use of the situation

the

will

be to make the

of Anglo-Soviet
in Britain, in the interests

rapprochement.

your

of the situation and

agree with your assessment
to be the immed'but what do you conceive

conclusions,' I said,

*Vwm speak now

from Labour, Thus, for example,

agreement between Britain and
trade
important
the first and very
Soviet Russia in 192 1 was signed by a Government led by Lloyd
have come from

the Liberals or

George. Diplomatic recognition of the U.S.S.R. in 1924 was

effected by the first Labour Government. The restoration of

by Britain^and
the leading part played
the most important facts:
I9 i8-zo, the Curzon
France in the intervention of
the rupture of Anglo-Soviet
the raid on Arcos and
f
d
, **
dhplomSic relations in

all

England,' he
only about your mission in

1927,

was brought about by the second Labour Government

in

1929, On the contrary, so far we have seen only hostile actions by

the Conservatives. This is a pity, because, after all, the Conservatives have been and remain the bosses in Britain. And so long as

do not change their attitude, our relations with

remain unstable and subject to all kinds of chance

the Conservatives
Britain will

unpleasantness/

Maxim Maximovich
front of
'In

adjusted a pile of papers

on the desk

in

him and concluded:

London we have

had, and

still

have,

good

relations

with

Labour: you should cultivate these relations in every possible

way, they are very important, particularly having future prospects

We

have not bad relations with some groups of the

Liberals: take every step to strengthen and widen them. But
among the Conservatives we have scarcely any contacts at all.
Yet I repeat that they are the real bosses in Britain! Therefore
in mind.

and most important task is to break through the

icy wall which separates our London Embassy from the
Conservatives, and establish the widest and most reliable contacts
possible with them. If you succeed in this, it will be a useful step
in the struggle against German aggression. Think out your most
your very

first

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS

WHO HELPED HITLER?

i8

immediate steps after

your

arrival in

London and

let

growth in the productive forces of the U.S.S.R., and the forthcoming realization of the second Five Year Plan, the result of
which will be a substantial rise in the prosperity of the working

me know

another talk/
them: then we shall have
Commissar and
Two days later I again visited the Peoples
of initial activities in Britain which
told him of the programme
^

masses of our country, represent a good foundation for the

development and strengthening of Soviet-British economic

the following three main poults:

had drawn up. It amounted to
credentials I give an
after presenting my
i. Immediately

the senes of visits which

extend as widely as possible
a newly appointed Ambassador,
diplomatic etiquette imposes on
the narrow circle of persons
'and in doing so cover not only
but also a number of members
connected with the Foreign Office
politicians, people of the City and
of the Government, prominent
world.
representatives of the cultural
the problem of expanding Anglo^
on
stress
particular
a. I

3.

I lay

and asked whether

M^Lil^inov approved my
I handed him my
text of my press interview,
plans,

on the fulfilment
first of all to
your country I think it necessary
the U.S.SJL
Union
Soviet
the
and peoples of
underline that the Government
and
peace
intentions, wish to live in
strangers to any aggressive
in

as well as with al parts

good understanding with Great Britain,
of the U.S-SJL is a policy of
of the British Empire, The policy

and

it

finds

countries, and also the position

between the U.S.S.R. and other
Disarmament Conference which
of the Soviet delegation at the
oontuiued:
had opened at Geneva in February, 1932, 1
^

'With

U-S.S*.Rthe greater readiness does the

which cannot be avoided),

the fulfilment of
countries, the

two

will greatly facilitate

this task. Being of the greatest benefit to the

improvement of relations between them would

same time represent an exceptionally powerful factor for

international peace, which would be particularly important in our
at the

disturbing and difficult times.'

concluded the statement with some words of a personal

my appointment

Ambassador of the
During the last
U.S.S.R. in Great Britain with
twenty years I more than once have had to live and work in
your country, and had the occasion to become better acquainted
'Personally, I received

as

great satisfaction.

with the British people and British culture. I also have a feeling
of gratitude to Britain which, in the years before the revolution,
1
granted me the right of asylum as a political exile. I should
therefore feel particularly

happy

if

I succeeded in promoting the

cause of a rapprochement between the U-S.S.R.

and Great

Britain.'

present time/
extremely vivid expression at the
the latter assertion, the list of
of
After quoting, as evidence
on the way to conclusion,
non-aggression treaties concluded, or

all

indisputable fact

character:

dralt

'In entering

illustrated in the past,

had

prepared the
textual corrections and
He read it through, made a few minor
The statement read:
then approved it in its final form.
of my duties as Ambassador of

peace. This has been frequently

and consequendy political relations.

of the British
I hope that the common sense so characteristic
people, and their unsurpassed ability to reckon with facts (and the
ILS.S.R. are an
fifteen years existence and development of the
fi

interview to the British press.

19

smye

The
is

spirit

with which the statement I had prepared was imbued

sufficiently clear

Both

not to require any comment.

Litvinov took place in the

my conversations with M. M,

But on October 17 a telegram arrived

from our Embassy in London, informing us that Sir John Simon,
the British Foreign Secretary, had in a special Note, the day
first

half of October, 1932-

to

Great Britain, with which it has

develop friendly relations with
economic sphere. The successful
such a variety of contacts in the
immense
Plan, which has led to an
fulfilment of the first Five Year

1*

The

five years

described in

my book

(1912-17) spent by me as an emigrant in London are

of reminiscences. Journey into the Past (Hutchinson,

WHO HELPED

20

HITLER?

of 1930
Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement
before denounced the
Labour
we had concluded with the second
act, on which
anti-Soviet
obviously
This was an unexpected and
Two days later Litvinov
to dwell in greater detail.

IS

Govern,

I^Le
called

me

in and said:

.die

your work ir England with

'You were intending to begin
Of course dus would
the text.
interview of which I approved
relations existed between
Sve been a proper statement if normal
after the unilateral
and Great Britain. But now,
l

What

*e t

deviation of the Anglo-Soviet Trade

Agreement, the situauon

of
has given an open demonstrator
better
it is
us. In such circumstances
hostile disposition towards
aS yours
nature
friendly
refrain from an interview of such a
being
without
quoted above died
a result, the interview
practica
a
however, in order to give
born. I have included its text,
I wa
prevailed in Moscow when
muTtrauon of the feelings which
Soviet
on the way to my work as
taking my place in the train
,
Ambassador in Great Britain.
Government and
conviction that the Soviet

has changed.

London

Trepeat

with

full

found in England

have vivid recollections of the way the rulers of Britain met

me in that distant autumn of 1932, It was a question, of course,

the Soviet
not of myself as a person but of the Ambassador of
Union and consequently of the Soviet Union as a people and a
better than any long
State, These recollections will show

disquisitions the reply

entirely

which

sincere

the

desire

Soviet

of the ruling

animated.

The

first

recollection
that,

is

in the sphere

when

the expansion in every possible

bilateral
:

wT

side too.

Let

Did

it

exist?

facts reply to this question.

intended in

of Anglo-Soviet

was preparing

have already said

rekuons
desire the best^ossmle
enough for the Soviet side to
was needed on the British
Great Britain: the same desire

and

friendship

for

of Britain to that
co-operation with

Government and the Soviet people were

Great
between the Soviet Union and
of the best possible relations

tit^s everyone knows, friendship is a

classes

my ambassadorial activity to

for

my

trade-

journey, I

lay special emphasis

on

way of commercial operations

Chance gave me an object-lesson of

between the two countries.

the difficulties I should have to meet on that very path.
On die eve of my arrival the Sunday Chronicle suddenly
'discovered' a terrifying event: Moscow, it appeared, had

smuggled into Britain, in coffins of foreign origin', boxes of

Russian matches on which the label depicted 'the Sacred Heart,
The newspaper raged in fury, and
transfixed by a dagger
demanded that the Government should take most resolute steps
c

of 'blasphemy'. The sensational story was

immediately taken up by a number of other newspapers. An antiSoviet wave rapidly rose in political and parliamentary circles.
A furious campaign began against trade with the U.S.S.R. The
against this kind

atmosphere grew more hostile day by day. In vain did the

21

22
director of

no
ches-

WHO HELPED
charges,
protest against these sdrpid

anti-religious

ZIZi

not

listen to

dtaU*

along which each freshly arriving guest solemnly marches. A

herald in Tudor costume pronounces his name for all to hear. The

ever earned

guest

Mian,

23

is

advancing there

is

a thunder of applause in his honour

The amount of applause

present.

varies

according to the position and popularity of the guest. The result

is a peculiar kind of plebiscite, and from the volume of applause

any blasphemy,
dagger a lofty and
a heart pierced by a

etoter.

IN

from the guests already

nlufactLs were least of all intending

it

guest slowly walks to the end of the carpet, steps up on to the

dais and shakes hands with the Lord Mayor and his wife. While the

not happily been soon

would have ended had i.
detaenri
roach-boxes had been
^covered dta. the nowrioua
Union but from India: and
no. fem the Soviet
lnrtian
wooden cases: and that the
hut in the most prosaic
smce*
understand

ENGLAND

WHAT

on Soviet
.where aU
him- 1 do not tan,

anUems were

FOUND

HITLEB?

given to each guest one can judge

of ruling quarters in Britain towards him.

which

On

is

infallibly the attitude

had to proceed along the red

Ambassador, Matsudaira.
carpet immediately
It was a real ovation: he was applauded noisily, long and with
enthusiasm. It was clear that his country and he himself were
'By chance

different
'ToIeT^lotion, of a aomeraha.
to S^-d
Notmt ,a,a, I presented ^credendah

it

happened that

after the Japanese

8,

very popular among top people in Britain and this in spite of

1
Then the herald proclaimed:
the 'Manchurian incident'
"His Excellency the Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Maisky!"
I

'It

was

as

though an icy

Everything at once

Not
all

a sound, not a handclap!

round me. The

brilliant

the carpet, accompanied

M Ws banquet

2S

is

makea big
Cabinet Minister should
was
political question. It
some important and topical
i
on November 9, 9
that I found myself

at.sue*

3^nd thu

banquet

whThappened

(I

quoted record I made the same

my memory):
guests
of presentation of
ceremony
'The

was

fresh in

F^m the entrance to the dais

is

British commercial

company,

vigilantly hostile silence

assembly, crowded on either side of

me

with curious and prickly glances.

and his wife/

Beautifully attired

day while

it

they arrive

carpet,
spread a broad dark-red

was a vivid and perfect demonstration of the sentiments of

those who ruled Britain towards the Soviet Union.
It

And

here

is

another episode. About a fortnight after the

Lord Mayor's banquet there took place the opening of the new
session of Parliament. This is also a very magnificent and
colourful ceremony, in which the voice of the centuries can be
heard.

Society-was

A deadly,

at

*at time the

Arco^the All-Russian Co-operative

a
legally estabhshed as
mding organization in Britain,

cenil^eT

hall.

off along the red carpet.

as

had swept through the

moved

dames pointed at me with their lorgnettes,

whispering maliciously and even laughing. In this atmosphere of
deafening hush I slowly, with head raised high, walked up the
carpet and, as ritual dictated, shook hands with the Lord Mayor

political event. Tradition

also an important
Minister or some other

the Prune

blast

fell silent, I

1.

That

is

what

British ruling circles called Japan's seizure

eastern China, carried out in 1931,

of north-

HITLER?

WHAT

Hou$e of Lords.

The

WHO HELPED

24

the

The opening of Parliament takes place in

mantles trimmed with ermine,
The peers are present in their red
notables ot

their jewels, the

wives in brilliant toilettes with
sit on
Corps. The King and Queen
the State and the Diplomatic
of the House of Commons, by
a dais at the far end. Members
smaU group ot
in the hall.
ancient tradition, are not allowed
behind a
(yes, stand and do not sit!)
their representatives stand
Lords Jta
the exit from the House of
special barrier which closes
the text of
King
the
hands
Lord Chamberlain with a deep bow
Then he
it.
reads
The King rises and
the Speech from the Throne.
the
retire-and
to all present,
King and Queen, after bowing

their

session of Parliament

My

is

considered open.

of the
wife and I were at the opening
session

Parliament for

new

session ot

to

*****

which was fated

Anglo-Soviet relations (which I

dramatic in the history of
other
required, I sat with^ the
deal with later). As etiquette
and my wife with die
Ambassadors to the right of the throne,

also requires

the left. Etiquette

wives of other Ambassadors to
of the
place be given to the wives
that the most honourable
come the Court ladies of the
Ambassadors, and only after them

most junior ot the

wife at that time was the
it turned oui tto by
Ambassadors' wives,* and therefore
anstocracy.
representative of the British
side sat a senior female
Methuselah and as ugly as a deadly
She was a Duchess, as old as
Before the ceremony
glittering in silks and diamonds.

highest rank.

sin,

but

My

all

conversation with my wifeand

opened, the Duchess began a
country do
foreigner, asked: 'And what
realizing that she was a
e

y0

MywTfe c2mly

answered:

represent the Soviet Union.*

Corps is
Seniority in the Diplomatic
country where he
the
in
Ambassador
aresence of the
the rank of Ambassador
I was the last but one in
Ambassador^
last was the German
The
ooly'ust arrived in London.
o,
King i the sameday
presented his credentials to the
i.

SSSrfiS*

Bmam

taZ

von Hoesch who had

Hoesch was
of an hour after me. However,
Is myself, but a quarter
Ambassadress.
junior
most
and therefore my wife was the

UcSr

FOUND

IN

ENGLAND

of these words was shattering.

effect

The Duchess

suddenly changed countenance as though she had stepped on a

poisonous snake. She coloured
scraggy neck, angry

'Do you know,

frightfully, veins swelled

my

on her

eyes-

She

wife and cried out angrily:

I hate the Soviets

What had happened

in her

glittered

lights

litde

brusquely drew away from

to British self-control, the

most ordinary

social politeness!

My wife did not

*In that event I

and in her turn sharply replied:

am very sorry that you have proved to be my
lose her head,

neighbour/ 1

This

but so characteristic incident was an excellent

litde

supplement to what had happened

Lord Mayor's banquet.

And finally one other recollection of the first weeks of my
work in London as Soviet Ambassador,
Among the official visits which I paid after presenting my
credentials was one to the then Chancellor of the Exchequer and
at the

de facto leader of the Conservative Party, Neville Chamberlain,

During our talk Chamberlain began to complain that the

U.S.S.R. was selling a great deal in Britain but buying little, and
was spending what it realized in London on big orders placed
in Germany. It was obvious that the Chancellor's heart was
aching and crying to heaven at such 'injustice'. I answered
tranquilly:

'Why are you surprised, Mr. Minister? The Soviet Government

behaves as any good merchant would behave:

more
c

profitable

But

and buys where

why do you

it sells

consider that

Britain?'

it is

to place

asked Chamberlain.

This incident had the following diplomatic sequel.

incident I visited

where

more profitable/
it is more profitable

it is

your orders in Germany and not in

i.

determined by the period of

the
is accredtted. In

Two days after the

Mr. Monck, the head of the Protocol Department of the

Foreign Office, told him what had happened at the opening of Parliament
and asked him to take steps to see that in future my wife never had to sit by
the side of the Duchess.
self-control,

and to do him
dinners

Monck

expressed his regret at the Duchess's lack of

saying that she was the

justice

my wife

real enfant terrible at the British

Court;

he made sure that at various diplomatic lunches and

and the Duchess were never again neighbours.

i6

a very simple
to five years' credit

For
us p

S%
'Whv

WHO HELPED HITLER?

Gemam ate giving
I replied. The

wbifeyooJ

a kind of siniaK*
do you expect that

o^,^

we should give long term

,o

uses for our money,

wc have better
^
ino, we
our enemtesr No
without
fln J witn
genuine and
in these words,
was
Chamberlain
real
The

The

struggle for the

Trade Agreement

any make-up.

The
class

pXt^te
P
y ou, and

What

fis

ois'in G *

firat is all.

The,

conclusion could 1

^-irom
draw

of Britain
contacts with the rulers
not only
could only be that they

fire

at that

W V*

u.c

fo,

Xd
^
^J^**!

fleedrrg

ronclusion

politeness

and diplomatic

tact.

first

large-scale

contacts with the British ruling

me

still

more.

diplomatic operation in

London was

Agreement of
GovernConservative
the
by
denounced
1930, which had been

negotiating a

new

trade agreement to replace the

ment- I do not hesitate to call the Government in power in 1932

Conservative, in spite of the fact that officially it was called

and included, in addition to the Conservatives, the

National Liberals headed by Simon and National Labour headed
by MacDonald. I do this without hesitation, because of 520
M-P.s constituting the ruling coalition, 471 were Conservatives.
Formally, the Prime Minister was Ramsay MacDonald, but the
'National'

of
the Soviets
and
it,
e hos tility to
were openly display nS
but on the contrary
of
elementary
forgetting the most
occasionally even
friendly relations

more profound

deepened such feelings in

My

next and

Prime Minister was his deputy, Stanley Baldwin.

The negotiations for a new trade agreement which our then
Trade Representative in Britain, A. V- Ozersky, a wise and skilful

real

man, and I had to carry on in London proved to be extremely

it because
difficult, and lasted a full fifteen months. Why? Was
Was it
complex?
the subject of negotiation was itself too
because the contradictions in the commercial sphere between the
U.S.S.R. and Great Britain were extremely acute? No, those were
negotiations proved difficult and protracted
because the British Government constantly sought to apply to
the Soviet Union a policy of hostile discrimination. This was

not the reasons-

The

main arguments
a dramatic
even
assuming
and disputes sprang, sometimes

the essence; and

it

was from

this that all the

character.

For what was the course of events?

27

do not intend to

set this

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE TRADE AGREEMENT

HITLER?

WHO HELPED

28

U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, which

book1), but I should

forth in detail (I have done so in another
the negotiations.
recall here, briefly, the main points in
after the
The Soviet Government understood perfectly that
of
1932, and the
Imperial Conference at Ottawa, in the autumn
protection^ a
abandonment by Britain of free trade in favour of
between Great Britain
revision of the previous trade agreements
a revision was in fact
Such
and other countries was inevitablethis usually done? Usually
carried out step by step- But how was
denouncing the old agreement,
the British Government, without
enter upon negotiations
invited the Government concerned to
which had become
changes
order to make in the agreement those
policy.
since

it

commercial

owing to the radical alteration in British

and legitimate,
Such a method was entirely reasonable
which were
reduced to a minimum the difficulties

new

But

how

did the British

Government

act in relation to the

October

16, 1932, Sir

John Simon, the Foreign Secretary,

not very

by

was denouncing the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreeclear sky. The

ment of 1930, For us this was a thunder-clap from a
and one
accompli,
Soviet Government was confronted with zfait
still
emphasized
was
very unfriendly character. This character
unilateral act

of a

more by

the fact that in his

open negotiations

Note Simon did not even

for the completion

but only expressed his readiness

situation created

by

'to

invite us to

of a new trade agreement,

enter into discussion of the

^ent

re
the denunciation' of the previous a g
discrimination in respect of the tLS.S.R.,

Here was patent

No. i*
which the
Furthermore, what were the demands

discrimination

BritisH

trade negotiations did at last

Government put forward when

begin? They amounted in substance
1,

in

with the

her trade

U.S,A,,

The

to

two

of a Soviet Ambassador

in Britain

owing

that time,

was

Plan, there

to the difficulties of the

first

Five Year

a widespread conviction in the capitalist world

had failed, that the

of the Soviet Government and

that the attempt to industrialize the U.S,S,R.

ground was shaky under the

that in the

feet

very near future the

system could be expected.

final collapse

The

of the whole Soviet

strengthening of such views in

was assisted to no little degree by Sir Esmond Ovey, then

Ambassador in Moscow, who in the winter of 1932-3 sent
dispatch upon dispatch to London on the internal situation of the
U.S.S.R., each one gloomier than the last. The British Government,
Britain
British

in particular

Foreign Secretary Simon, willingly swallowed the

information sent

was

true!)

by Ovey

(after

all,

they hoped so

a favourable situation to settle their accounts with

As

a result, the

'selling'

much

and decided to take advantage of what seemed

the

new

London

that

to

it

them

Moscow.

politicians set themselves the task

of

trade agreement to the U.S.S.R. as dearly as

of the two demands

mentioned above, they put forward as a condition for signing a

possible. Therefore, in addition to satisfaction

points:

levelling-out of the balance of trade

Recollections

in quite extraneous questions.

At

Embassy in London a
quite unexpectedly sent the Soviet
British Government
polite Note in which he stated that the

1.

balance

conditions.

U.S.S,R.? Quite differently.

On

then had had an adverse

Germany,
Argentine, Denmark and a number of other countries, yet had
never required of them that this situation should be changed. The
exception was now being made only for the U.S.S.R. This was
discrimination No. 2.
2. The right of the British Government at any moment, by
unilateral act, to restrict or even to prohibit the import of any
Soviet goods into Britain if in its opinion such imports constituted a threat to Canada in the British market. The British
Government had never put forward such claims to any other
country. Only in respect of the U.S.S.R., once again, was there
an exception, This was discrimination No, 3.
Not content with the two demands just mentioned, the British
Government complicated the negotiations extremely by dragging
adverse

country concerned to
involved in adapting British trade with the
the

29

balance of trade with us. But Britain also had an extremely

necessary

till

between the

(Moscow, i960).

new agreement

that the U.S.S.R. should

concede the following

WHO HELPED

30

HITLER?

had
for the British capitalists who
three points: compensation
or
losses
revolution, compensation for the
lost by the October
1

Goldfields' company, and

the Anglo-American 'Lena
it was a diplomat
seem fantasy, but unfortunately
(this

finally

may

should
goods sold in the Torgsm shops
reality) that prices for
2
market.
correspond to prices on the world
gold
a concession for working A.
'Lena Goldfields' had received
October
.The
Tsarist Government in 1908
;

on the Lena from

deposits

Solution put an end

the

to this concession;

but

^^^^
^"J^

Government of 1930, the company

Concessions Decree of the Soviet
(of course, on
agreement
new concession
production on a
gold
developed
ftom those of the past) and
however
in its employment. As,
about 15,000 people were working
into an
Bnnsh
a
from
transformed
been
Lena Goldfields, which had now
t busmto
'trying
systematically
Anglo Americn concern, was
there were
constandy infringing Soviet law,
en capitalist lines, and was
the
and
company
time becween the

53"

tap>^

Wt
:

and disputes

friction

all

the

Sment. fcim -

^ping

widi

by arbitrate,
even agreed becween the two
was
arbitration
of
composition of the court
hearing the case Lena
week before me date appointed for
decided to

To

disputed questions

settle all the

But one

Goldfields carried out a lock-out,

by

actions

andeven closed its office

m Moscow. These

agre ernent
infringed me concessions
the company patendy
the Soviet
and
exist,
to
effect, the agreement ceased

TuridicalW aTwell as in

mke
o-raliy, found it impossible to

lost
had
winch
agreement
provided under a concession
members
insisted on the two remaining
die less, Lena Goldfields
company)
the
of
representative
Ohe Resident and the
part

0 *

*
[^J

pseudo

absent. Thi
Soviet representative was
dispute, even though
should pay the
Government
frEtion produced the verdict that the Soviet
and anoAer
company
the
by
invested
company 3,500,000 for ihe capital
had
company
the
compensation for the profits which
die
before
remammg
years
receive during the twenty-five

me

SSSw

dT

mlt

dSe

expire Naturaly,

the Soviet

And now,

entirely groundless claims.

Government (and particularly Sir

Bri sh

Co*^.*^"^

X comU *

beginning of i 9 3J, the

Simon) made an attempt to

at the

John

the negouauons for

P<>-d of flesh as part of
for
agreement.
trade
conclusion of a new Anglo-Soviet
were set up in the U.S.S.R.
a . At the end of .93* there
trade with
for Torgavlya s mostrcntsanufthis was an abbreviation
and
foodstuffs
with
particularly well suppUed

faS^fl.

which were

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE TRADE AGREEMENT

31

Such was the degree of unceremoniousness reached by the

British Government at the time! This was discrimination No< 4,
Quite obviously the attitude adopted by the British side in the
trade negotiations itself

made an agreement extremely

But the situation grew

difficult to

worse when, in March> 1933, a

explosive
factor
came into play.
exceptionally
new and
During the first Five Year Plan the Soviet Government had
technical aid agreements with a number of large firms in the
reach.

capitalist countries.

Among

still

these firms

British concern, Metropolitan- Vickers,

office in

Moscow, and

Soviet building

sites.

its

On

It

was the well-known

maintained a special

engineers were engaged

March

12,

on various

1933, about twenty-five

employees of Metropolitan- Vickers in the U.S,S,R,, including

six British engineers, were arrested on charges of espionage and
wrecking,

This event aroused a violent reaction in

Britain,

and the

Government itself supported and magnified it in every possible

way. Once again an extremely sinister role in this was played by
consumer goods* and in which goods were sold in exchange for gold,
valuables and foreign currency. The purpose of Torgsin was to concentrate in the hands of the Government the gold and other valuables in the
possession of the population, and thereby enlarge the resources of the
State required to pay for imported machinery and equipment* At the same
time there were closed down the Insnab shopsj where foreign diplomats in
Moscow bought foodstuffs and other commodities in unlimited quantity for
Soviet currency (in those years there was rationing for foodstufls and other
goods sold to the people). In practice the system of supplying the foreign
diplomats through Insnab led to numerous abuses on their part* and served
as a means of illicit enrichment of many of them. With the opening of the
Torgsin shops, foreign diplomats were invited henceforth to satisfy their

requirements of foodstuffs and other goods there,

commodities they required

in

i.e.

to

pay for the

gold or in foreign currency. This deprived the

many of them made

Government. At the
Esmond Ovey, British

diplomatic speculators of a considerable income, and

noisy protest against the measures taken

by

the Soviet

head of the discontented diplomats stood Sir

Ambassador in Moscow. This was why the British side in the trade
negotiations presented such a stupid and offensive demand to the Soviet
Government-

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE TRADE AGREEMENT

HITLER?

WHO HELPED

32

the trade negotiations on March 20.

the British Ambassador

Moscow.

in

arrest of the British engineers,

immediately after the

had confined himself to

If,

Ovey

i^?-

tion

have objected to his

assured of a proper defence, no one could
is to show
Ambassador
any
actions. The direct obligation of

fellow citizens who have been

interest in and concern for his
country where he is accredsubjected to repressive action in the
up in British Great
Brought
further.
ited

that

he could dictate his conditions

This was discrimination No. 5.

few hours after the
In fact, on the afternoon of March 12, a
had even begun, Ovey assured
arrest and before the investigation
innocent, and
Simon that the British engineers were absolutely

to the Soviet State.

recommended the
iate

liberation

British

Government

to

demand

their

without investigation and without

immed-

trial,

he

AmbassGovernment accepted the recommendation of its

Government,
Soviet
ador and began furious pressure on the

British

insisting that the prosecution

of the

six British subjects

should be

threatened that there would be

M. M. Litvinov in Moscow
a rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations.
repel these claims as an
and I in London had vigorously to
affairs. The British
intolerable interference in our internal
come before a Soviet
were firmly told that the engineers would

stopped. Should

we

refuse,

Ovey

British
court, whatever the reaction of the

Government might

be

Then

the politicians in

London

decided to take

more

drastic

the internal

about
measures. Lulled by Ovey's misinformation
subjectively
reports,
his
situation in the U.S.S.R*, and also by
about the
Litvinov
retouched, on his conversations with
would
they
that
Metropolitan-Vickers case, they calculated
secure, at the least,

engineers, and at the

Government

the British
the immediate liberation of
Soviet
most they might even assist the

grave a little more rapidlybreaking

politicians began by demonstratively

to descend into

The London

this step

with

complete calm, they went on to other measures of a repressive

character, on the details of which I do not need to dwell. It will

to making sure that

enquiring the reasons for the arrest, and also
conditions, that the
the arrested men were held in good
that the accused should be
and
delay
without
should proceed

But Ovey went much

Power traditions, he imagined

As we met

33

its

be sufficient to say that, in spite of all the efforts of the British

Government, the trial did take place in Moscow, and that one of
the British engineers was acquitted, three were expelled from the
U.S.S.R. and two were sentenced to three and two years'
imprisonment respectively. However, the

politicians in

London,

once having entered on the path of blackmail, could not stop

it at accelerating speed, brought

themselves and, moving along

matters to the point of a three months' trade war between Britain

Government imposed a ban on

Soviet imports into Great Britain, in reply to which the Soviet
Government imposed a ban on British imports into the U.S.S.R*
This trade war ended only on July 1, 1933, by a mutual lifting
of the bans on each other's goods, and also by the pardoning and

and the U.S.S.R, The

expulsion from the

British

U.S.S.R.

sentenced to imprisonment.

On

of the two British engineers

July 3 trade negotiations also

were resumed.
There were very many difficulties in these negotiations
difficulties arising from the policy of discrimination towards the
U.S.S.R, pursued by the British Governmentand these
difficulties did not disappear after the trade war had been ended.
Nevertheless, combining firmness and flexibility in

Soviet

Government brought the negotiations

conclusion.

On

February

16, 1934, the

its tactics,

the

to a successful

new Trade Agreement

was signed. True, it bore the title of 'Temporary': but more than
a quarter of a century has passed since that date and the
Temporary' Agreement is still in force, still regulating the
development of Anglo-Soviet trade.
What impression was left in my mind by the tactics of multistage discrimination used by the British Government in the
course of the struggle for a trade agreement? What conclusion was
I

bound to make from the experience of my first serious

London?
It did not diverge in any way from the impressions I had

diplomatic operation in

oil

WHO HELPED

34

formed immediately on
it

my

arrival in Britain.

only confirmed that they were correct.

On

Now

HITLER?

the contrary,

could see

still

group ruling the country was full of

hostility to the U,S.S,R,, and made concessions to it only when
circumstances beyond their control obliged them to do so. As

more

clearly that the

result,

my

feeling of distrust

towards the rulers of Britain not

only did not lessen bur rather increased. I felt this most acutely in
regard to a particular group of politicians of whom I shall yet

have to speak
was Simon,

whose outstanding

a group

later

Officially the negotiations

representative

the British side were conducted

on

Foreign Secretary and Runciman as President of the

Board of Trade, But Runciman did not take any effective part in
the negotiations. During all these fifteen months he appeared only

by Simon

twice

as

at the first meeting,

when the

talks began,

being signed. In

when the Trade Agreement was

Runciman s presence was not felt
5

at all,

and

all

while the

at the last,

other respects
officials

of his

had for the most

wanted Anglo-Soviet
trade to develop and, so far as the general directives of the
British Government permitted, sought not to complicate but on

Ministry,

who really carried on the negotiations,

part a reasonable attitude-

They

sincerely

the contrary to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement.

was otherwise with Simon and his officials. In spite of his

Liberal past, Simon in the thirties was one of the most implacable
It

enemies of the Soviet Union. In the course of the negotiations he

constantly strove not to shorten but to prolong the road to
agreement. It was he

who

sought out every possible pretext for

complicating the negotiations

like the ludicrous

by

various extraneous questions

one of the prices in the Torgsin shops, Simon's

heart beat in unison with the interests of the most hardened

representatives of the capitalist world like the Lena Goldfields

company, and for

interests of British

who was

their sake

he was ready to

trade. In addition to all this

sacrifice

even the

Simon was a man

not fastidious in his choice of means to achieve his ends,

and made wide use of sheer invention in the struggle against

the U,S,S.R. Apart from a few pleasant exceptions, the machinery

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE TRADE AGREEMENT

3?

of the British Foreign Office in those years was saturated with the

Simon spirit,
I remember one example. The

trade

negotiations

were

approaching their very end. Everything had been agreed except

the question of Torgsin. But Simon on this account was delaying
the signature of the agreement, I then invited the well-known
Cummings, with whom at that time I had
Liberal journalist A.
J,

good

relations, to

business

was

still

come to see me, and I frankly told him why the

not concluded- Next day, February a, 1934, the
its front page, under a big heading

News

Chronicle published on

The

British

Cummings
This

article

Ambassador's Potatoes', a virulent

article

by

explaining the true reason for the delay in signature.

caused the utmost confusion in political quarters in

London, and a Labour M,P,, Grenfell, put down a question

asking what was the connection between signature of the Trade
Agreement and the food supplies of the British Ambassador in
Moscow, Simon himself gave the official reply and this is what

he

said:

no truth in the suggestion that the Anglo-Soviet

Trade Agreement is being held up because of this matter/
So limitless was the extent to which Simon's falsehoods carried
him. Can one be surprised that this only reinforced Soviet distrust

There

is

of the ruling

class

of Great Britain?

THAW AND

A BRIEF

CAUSES

ITS

have to be reckoned with seriously, at least for a number of years.

This aroused anxiety and alarm among them. It brought back
memories of the events and circumstances of the first world war,
when Great Britain had the greatest difficulty in protecting her

position in the world against the dangerous attacks of

and

brief thaw

its

The

imperialism.

causes

aspirations, the

German

watchwords, the demands of

Hitler obviously foreshadowed the rebirth of the old plans of

German hegemony which had played such

Ab out the middle of 1934 a temporary or more

brief

thaw began in Anglo-Soviet

relations.

loose the
correctly a

There were two

main reasons for this.

The first was that in January, 1933, Hitler came to power in
Germany. At first the rulers of Britain did not take the Fuehrer
too seriously. I well remember how throughout 1933 British
Conservatives, Liberals, Labour
politicians of various hues
Party men were still arguing about whether Hitler would
succeed in holding on to power. Even such an experienced statesman as Vansittart, who then held the key post of Permanent

me in the course of a

Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said to

summer of

conversation in the
'Hitler has

the Poles are extremely suspicious of him.

Things are not too

There are men who aspire to

the first place in its ranks, and it will not be easy for Hitler to cope
peaceful within the Nazi Party,

with them,

You

cannot exclude the possibility that the

internal struggle will break

and

up

world war

form than in those days.

faced

more and more

a great part in letting

even, perhaps, in a

The

still

more menacing

ruling circles of Great Britain

insistently

were

with the question of what was

to be done.

Their

first

reaction centred round the idea that the Entente

world war period should be restored: that is, a military

of Britain, France and Russia against Germany, True, in
place of Tsarist Russia there was now the Union of Soviet
of the

first

alliance

Socialist Republics: this

was unpleasant, very unpleasant, but

the long run international politics are guided not

by

practical interests. If interests so require

even a

bitter medicine. It so

happened

in

by emotions but

one must swallow

that at the time I

am

describing not only Labour and Liberal politicians began seriously

1933:

many difficulties and enemies, external and internal,

The French, the Belgians, the Czechs and

to contend with,

first

the Nazi Party,

. . .

We must wait

see,'

to think of improving relations with the Soviet Union, but also

many Conservatives.
The second reason
after the dispute

for the beginning of the

thaw was

that,

over the Metropolitan-Vickers case, British

became finally convinced of the strength and

of the U,S,S.R,, and drew the conclusion that henceforth

ruling quarters
solidity

the 'Soviet factor'

had become a permanent element

in the

world

Independently of one's sympathies or antipathies, it

would have to be taken into account in all political calculations
situation.

As

for the Labour Party leaders, most of them were convinced

Nazi domination in Germany would not be for long.
However, from 1934 onwards, and particularly from the

that

after Hider had destroyed the Roehm group

had crushed the internal opposition in his party,
the mood in British ruling circles began to change. They began
to understand that Hitlerism was consolidating itself and would

and

projects.

guished

by

And

middle of the year

ones), they

and

1934 to consider

in general

36

as British politicians

their ability to

began

after the signature

how

have always been

reckon with

facts

distin-

(even unpleasant

of the Trade Agreement in

best to utilize in their

own

interests the

power of the U.S,S.R,, which had been displayed so unexpectedly. And their thoughts, as I have just said, began to turn more

WHO HELPED

38

and more to the

traditional road of the Entente

A BRIEF

HITLER?

THAW AND

It's stupendous 1

of the first world

ITS

CAUSES

No other Government would have made such

efforts to save Arctic explorers.

war*

39

. .

It's

very noble

and very

chance circumstance greatly promoted such a change in

Between
the state of mind of the ruling circles of Great Britain,
'epic
memorable
the
place
took
there
February and April, 1934,

wiseT
There was a sly gleam in the eyes of the Liberal leader as he
suddenly and unexpectedly added: 'I congratulate you! You have

including
of the Chelyuskin. About one hundred Soviet people,
head,
their
women and children, with Otto Yulievich Schmidt at
on a Polar
after the sinking of the Chelyuskin found themselves
press, its
its
world,
western
The
landicefloe far from the

won a

One

that the
politicians, its scientists, its Arctic explorers, considered
But
'Chelyuskinites* were lost, and intoned their funeral dirge.
5

'Chelyuskinites
the Soviet world thought and felt otherwise. The
created on the
but
heart,
lose
or
panic
not only did not fall into
high the
held
which
amazing organized collective,
icefloe

an

banner of the Soviet Union, carried on its scientific work, looked

of its members.
after the health and maintained the high spirits
gave his comeven
camp,
icefloe
the
O. Y. Schmidt, as head of
same
rades a course oflectures on historical materialism. At the
all
time the Soviet Government and the Soviet people mobilized
disaster.
that was possible to save their fellow countrymen from
was
everything
aircraft
the
radio,
Men, resources, technique,

the

concentrated to serve this noble purpose, and

'Chelyuskinites' were saved, including the eight dogs in the
finally all

out on planes with the rest.

Polar dramas have always engaged the sympathetic attention

camp,

who were brought

of the great mass of mankind. The Chelyuskin drama won that

concern with particular force both because its victims included
existence of
a hundred men, women and children and because the
the tiniest,
even
event,
wireless made it possible to follow every
of
behaviour
in the life of the camp on the ice- The courageous
1

the 'Chelyuskinites

aroused universal admiration in

all circles,

views and inclinations. At the same

irrespective of
Soviet
time the colossal energy and the vast expenditure of the
political

employed in saving the 'Chelyuskinites' amazed the

bourgeois world. I remember Lloyd George saying to me in
State

those days:

great diplomatic victory.'

Lloyd George was right. This epic of the Chelyuskin* had not
only once more confirmed the strength and vitality of the Soviet
and displayed to the whole
State but had also vividly displayed
wide world its nobility, its humanity, its profound wisdom- At
fi

one stroke the popularity of the U.S.S.R, rose higher, particularly among the working people in all quarters of the globe,
than years and years of stubborn propaganda work could have
raised

it.

An external expression of this was the fact that for many

months the

portrait

of O. Y. Schmidt was constantly appearing

in the capitalist press.

The

'epic of the Chelyuskin

played no small part, therefore,

thaw in Anglo-Soviet relations which

began in die middle of 1934. Pyschologically it helped many
who were unfriendly to the U,S.S.R, to change to new political
in

developing

the

attitudes.

As a result of all these circumstances, those elements who

favoured a rebirth of the Entente temporarily gained the upper
hand among British ruling circles.
Here it will be timely to say that in the period between the two
world wars the British ruling class split into two main groups on
the question of relations with the U.S.S.R.
In one the principle of State interest prevailed. This group saw
that Britain and the U.S.S.R, as Powers have no serious
contradictions, while in the economic sphere they may even be
very useful to each other. This group supported the policy of a
most prominent representatives were people like Lloyd George, Beaverbrook, Eden,
Vansittart and others. After Hitler had come to power Churchill
rapprochement with the U.S.S.R.

Its

group.
In the other group, on the contrary, the predominant feeling

also joined this

WHO HELPED

40

HITLER?

country of Socialism.

a
was blind class hatred of the U.S.S.R. as
to attack
circumstances
all
in
This group considered it essential

detriment of the national interests

the Soviet Union, even to the
prominent representatives were
of Britain as a State. Its most
(Austen and Neville),
Lord Curzon, the brothers Chamberlain
others. Up
Joynson-Hicks, Simon, Halifax and

Lord Birkenhead,

to 1934 Churchill also

What was
not of course

was with

this

British

THAW AND

working

class

Yet as a whole the class

with various events and circumstances.
convenience the Chamberhatred group' (which I shall call for
than the 'State interest group
lainites') was much more influential
the middle and the second
(which I shall call 'Churchillites'). In
of forces within the ruling
half of the thirties the distribution
Conservatives and the Liberals
class of Great Britain, taking the
three-quarters of the Conservtogether, was roughly as follows:
only about one-quarter adopted
atives followed Chamberlain and
were divided rough y
attitude, while the Liberals
Churchill's

vividly in 1920

two groups, but were already

dramatically

with the Labour

Of course, the Chamberlainites had to reckon
the
thirties had already become
Party, which by the middle

Polish war. But in

its

some

will
November, i
,
of the Parliamentary elections in
parties at
various
the
between
of forces

idea of the relationship

No. of vow

No- of

{thousands)

seats

National Liberals (Simon Group)

B 7
.

Labour Party

of the masses. Worst of

far

all

from

in this

was the top leadership. Up to 193 1 Ramsay MacDonald,

Philip Snowden, J. H, Thomas and several others almost openly
strove to turn the policy of their party in an anti-Soviet direction.
After they had been expelled in 193 1 and, on forming the
ephemeral National Labour Party, had deserted to the Conservative camp, there could always be felt among the orthodox
members remaining in the Labour Party a definite current of
opinion which secretly sympathized with the expelled leaders, but

avoided speaking of this openly.

Labour Opposition to the

Chamberlainites turned out to be much weaker than could have
been the case. This in turn opened to the Chamberlainites a
sufficiently broad field of activity for sabotaging any Anglo-

As

a result, the resistance of the

National Labour (Macdonald Group)

340

Others

97

Government Coalition

8
3^

"j793

43 1

Labour

8,465

158

Opposition Liberals

I ?382

21

(total)

Communists

27

275

10,149

l8 4

Others

Opposition

These

figures

(total)

show beyond doubt

that

by

the middle thirties the Conserv-

and Labour parties were the two main parties in the country, that the
Liberals now had fallen back to third place, and that MacDonald's 'National
Labour* Party was almost a figure of speech* This meant that three-quarters
of the Conservatives plus half the Liberals, given a certain passivity of the
ative

Labour

'1/

Conservatives

practical activity the

fully reflected these feelings

The

1
displacing the Liberals.
second main party in Britain,

****

the attempt to engage Britain in

military intervention against Soviet Russia during the Soviet-

their supporters.

give

41

undoubtedly wanted to maintain the most

shown this most

by thwarting

Soviet rapprochement.

The outcome

CAUSES

friendly relations with the Soviet State, and had

part of their formerpolitical

declining and had lost the greater
in
that in the period I have
influence. It is clear, consequently,
decisive part in die ranis
mind the Chamberlainites played the
in mind that in the period
of the ruling class, particularly bearing
too long in power, and
between the two world wars they were
of the State machine with
had been able to 611 the greater part

ITS

respect

group.

two groups? It was

the comparative strength of the
to year in keeping
constant, but changed from year

equally between the

A BRIEF

leadership,

rapprochement*

were able

effectively to sabotage

an Anglo-Soviet

WHO HELPED

42

HITLER?

groups in
might be, the existence of these two
between
struggle
and the constant
the ranks of the ruling class
Angloof
whole history
them were a standing feature of the
world wars. Now this now that
Soviet relations between the two
as a make-weight, left its
grouping, with the Labour Opposition

However

that

the British Government

impression on the practical steps taken by
From the middle of 1934, for reasons
in relation to the U.S.S.R.
gained the
the Churchillites temporarily
I have explained earlier,
expression in a number oi hard
upper hand, and this found its
facts.

Steps to a rapprochement

Chronologically,

the

first

of such

was

facts

a series of

lengthy conversations between Vansittart and myself, as Soviet

Ambassador, in July-August, 1934- The conversations began on
this
the initiative of Vansittart, and the form which he gave to
initiative was a very curious one.

June 21, 1934, my wife and I were invited to lunch with

Sir
the Vansittarts. There were ten people present, among them
of
honour
in
arranged
John Simon, However, the lunch was

On

myself and

my wife,

not of Simon. This was clear from the fact

was seated to the right of the

that, as British etiquette required, I

wife to the right of the host, while Simon was

seated to the left of the hostess, and consequently was No* 2.
During the luncheon, when there was a crossfire of conversations

my

hostess and

over the table, Lady Vansittart leaned slightly in

London?

my direction and

how do you
Something in her tone and in the expression on her face gave
me to understand that her question was not simply customary
society small-talk. However, I cautiously replied: 'London is a
like life in

asked: 'Well,

fine city,

Lady
suppose

but

meet with great

Vansittart bent
it's

my

still

difficulties

here/

closer and asked in a half-whisper:

neighbour on the

left

who

is

making these

difficulties?*

She had Simon in mind, of course, I nodded.

'Then why should you not have a frank talk about this with
Van?* Lady Vansittart gave this familiar title to her husband.
I

knew

that

since they

Simon and

Vansittart did not get

were representatives of two

43

on

politically,

different diplomatic lines

WHO HELPED

44

HITLER?

give
had not expected that Lady Vansittart would
between
me so frankly to understand that there were differences
Under-Secretary,
Permanent
the Foreign Secretary and his
the Soviet Embassy in
'In the atmosphere created around
seemed to me inconvenient to display any

of policy:

London/

still,

I replied,

that so?

exclaimed

Lady

Vansittartis

easily

If

it's

only a

overcome,

were the
was clear to me that on the lips of Lady Vansittart
However, I
words of the Permanent Under-Secretary himself.
Women are
scepticism.
could not rid myself of a certain dose of
this
conversation
emotional beings, and I was afraid that in her
than the 'instrucelegant little woman might have gone further
It

which she had received from her husband.

had a practical
But I was mistaken. Lady Vansittart's mediation
me up and invited me to
result. Two days later Vansittart rang
Anglo-Soviet relations.
to the Foreign Office to talk about
and on July 12
Vansittart,
with
first long talk
I had

my

frank nature, and

and 18 two more. All of them were of a very
We examined
were characterized by a highly constructive spirit.
between the US.S.R. and
all the questions then outstanding
although there were
Great Britain and came to the conclusion that,
between the two governin some cases differences of opinion
of
be an obstacle to a serious improvement

ments, they could not

relations between them.

subject

on July

On

London and had talks on the same

with the British Government,

conversation,

12, Vansittart told

During our second

that Britain would

me

The

Union and France accepted this condition, and

thereupon the London Government announced its support for an
Eastern Locarno, However, Germany, followed by Poland,
refused to enter the proposed group. This dealt a mortal blow to
the whole scheme. But in my conversations with Vansittart the
to

it.

affair

Soviet

of the Eastern Locarno played a very positive

Soviet Government's agreement that

Eastern Locarno. At

that time,

the question of the so-called

the French
with a view to strengthening European security,
was carrying on
Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Barthou,
assistance
mutual
of
pact
energetic propaganda for a draft
Lithuania, Finland
between the U.S.S JL, Poland, Latvia, Estonia,
France was to be a guarantor for the Eastern

and Czechoslovakia.
guarantor for the
Locarno, while the U.S.SJL was to become a
with
sympathized
U.S.S.R.
existing Western Locarno. The
Barthou's plan. Britain's position was unclear.

part,

and the

Germany should be included

convinced him of the sincerity of the Soviet Union's striving for

peace.

Litvinov was very

with

satisfied

my

conversations

with

Vansittart, seeing in them the first steps in the reduction of tension

in Anglo-Soviet relations. In fact, as later events showed, this

frank exchange of opinions in

London opened

the

way

for the

Government's support for entry of the U.S,S,R, into the

League of Nations, which I will speak of later.
Here I want to say a few words about Vansittart. A clever and
cultivated man, a skilful diplomat and politician, a talented poet
and writer, he was, of course, flesh of the flesh of the riding class
British

of Great

Britain,

maintenance of

A particularly important part in our conversations was played

by

conversation with Vansittart I strove to convince

July 8 Barthou himself came to

tions'

On July 3

first

the necessity for Britain to support Barthou*s draft.

declare in favour of an Eastern Locarno if Germany were admitted

question of who speaks first, that difficulty

I will undertake it myself/

come

my

him of

45

'it

is

In

initiative in this respect/

'Oh,

STEPS TO A RAPPROCHEMENT

its

His divinity was the British Empire. The

integrity

and

inviolability, the defence

of the

world position of British imperialism, were Vansittart's symbol

of

faith.

now

Taking

this as his

to the right and

now

point of departure, he manoeuvred

to the

left,

in particular changing his

attitude to the U.S-S,R,

well known that after the second world war Vansittart,

many other British statesmen, became an antagonist of our
country. The reason was that the war did not end as the leaders of
the ruling class of Great Britain had wished. They had anticipated
that the U.S.S.R. would emerge from the war much enfeebled,
It is

like

that for a

long time

it

would not be

able to carry

on any

active

WHO HELPED

HITLER?

whole generation, if not

foreign policy, and that for at least a
sleep of the London politimore, it would cease to disturb the
it
turned out quite otherwise, when
cians. When in reality things
much stronger after the war
transpired that the U.S.S.R. was
there had come into bong
than before it, and that in addition
camp, it was not only the
around

it

a powerful Socialist

with
but the Churchillites too, beginning
against the U.S.S.R. It was
Churchill himself, who bristled up
of Vansittart's post-war pronounceChamberlainites,

strange for

me

to read

some

and hackneyed were they.

ments against our country, so shallow
education, his subtle
What had happened to his intelligence, his
means to go
his literary art? That is what it
play of thought,
against the

forces

tomorrow!
However, then,

of

historical

progress,

against

mankinds

immediately after
a
in Germany, Vansittart was
the consolidation of Hitlerism
advantage
took
and
warm supporter of the rebirth of the Entente,
of government really to
of his position in the British machinery
the Entente nevertheless did
do a great deal in this direction. If
beginning of the second world
not come into being before the
not fall upon Vansittart.
war the blame for this in any case does
witness to the
The second factor in point of time which bore
relations was the affair ot
beginning of a thaw in Anglo-Soviet
League of Nations. When the
the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the
was
as is well known, Soviet Russia
.

in the

League was formed

middle of the

thirties,

in 1919,

for the next

that time, and

not invited to become a member. At
a hot-bed of hostility,
was
Nations
fifteen years, the League of
Soviet State. By 1934
the
against
plots and intrigues of every kind
changed considerably compared with

the world situation had

League
reflection in the destinies of the

1919, and this found its

Senate had rejected ratification
of Nations. In 1920 the American
of which the U.SA. had not
of the Versailles Treaty, as a result
Germany, having taken the
joined the League. In 1933 Japan and
League. 1 here
aggression, had withdrawn from the

path of active

and France,
remained as the League's bosses Britain

had not the power

who

visibly

conditions, which
to steer the ship in the

STEPS TO A RAPPROCHEMENT
became increasingly

clear,

47

of an international thunderstorm. This

forced the leaders of the Anglo-French bloc to turn their minds

to the question of bringing the U.S.S.R. into the League. In

its

turn the Soviet Government, by the end of 1933, had come to the
conclusion that in these conditions it would be useful for the
U.S.S.R. to join the League of Nations. This would place at its
disposal an international platform, most important at that time,
from which to defend peace and counteract the peril of a second

world war.

It also

opened up a

obstacles in the path of those

though the Soviet

of

possibility

Government never over-estimated

its

significance

who would

launch a

raising

new world

As a result, the U.S.S.R., in September, 1934, became a

member of the League, with a permanent seat on its Council.
Of course, the way had to be well prepared. A great part in this
was played by the then French Minister for Foreign Affairs. In
the first years after the October Revolution M. Barthou had been
massacre.

one of the most determined enemies of Soviet Russia, and for all
practical purposes it was he who had sabotaged the Genoa
Conference of 1922. However, being a sincere (though Conservative) patriot, he later understood that with the coming of

power in Germany French security depended greatly

on co-operation with the U.S.S.R. With much vigour he set
about achieving this end. He was particularly active in campaigning for the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations.
Hitferism to

He

encountered

many

overcoming them.

obstacles,

but ultimately succeeded in

In Britain his

helper at

this

time was

They worked

together and in September, 1935, thirty

States-members of the League of Nations approached the Soviet
Vansittart.

Government with the invitation to become a member. On behalf

of the Soviet Government M. M. Litvinov most skilfully carried
through all the preliminary conversations and arrangements for
the entry of the U.S.S.R.
said to

'Well,
club, I

When

this

had happened Vansittart

me:

now we have become members of one and the same

that from now on our relations will be such as ought

hope

to prevail between

members of the same club/

WHO HELPED

48

HITLER?

confirmed to some extent

These words of Vansittart were
banquet on November 9, 1934,
at the next Lord Mayor's
filled
time the library was not
had a very different reception. This
had greeted me two years beiore.
with the deafening silence which

They applauded in moderauo^

Instead the notables applauded.
loudly
at any rate sufficiently
without enthusiasm or fervour, but
considerable
that there had been a
to enable one to conclude
to the
relation
people
top
in the state of mind of the
;

change

USSR
The

third

factor,

speaking

chronologically,

which bore

STEPS TO A RAPPROCHEMENT

49

and ultimately bring about its downfall. The trouble only has
been that, once the crisis was over, England and Russia hitherto
it

have gone off in different directions and even begun to quarrel.

This opened the way for the appearance of some new pretender to
dominate Europe, or even the whole world- The greatest problem
of modem diplomacy, both British and Soviet, is to avert the
repetition of this process after the end of the present war/
Unfortunately, Eden proved unable to maintain this attitude
after the war, and gradually joined the ranks of the knights
of the 'cold war* proclaimed by the leaders of America, and

was the visit of Eden to Moscow

evidence that a thaw had begun
a very
Vansittart again who played
in March, i 93i . It was
diplomatic
this
through
part in preparing and carrying

supported by the leaders of British imperialism.

great

purposes

it

Coming from
^Eden had then only begun to gain promotion.
man,
rank, a cultivated and educated
the landed gentry of middle
reliable
and
sense
amount of common

London

at the

he possessed a considerable

began to consider
After Hitler came to power he
of the
be saved only by the rebirth
that the British Empire could
grouping in *e Conservative
Entente, and therefore joined that
between Britain and the
which advocated a rapprochement
political instinct.

Party

USSR. He even justified his attitude by quite

serious historical

war was
remember how in i 9 43, while the
as Deputy
post
my
up
when I was leaving London- to take
Eden in a
Moscow,
Affairs in
People's Commissar for Foreign
arguments.

raging,

at a farewell luncheon said:

SDeech
P
have
half England and Russia
'During the last century and a

always been in the same camp

when any

serious crisis arose in

the
the time of Napoleon, it was
Europe. That is what happened in
now
happened
war and it has
same in the years of the first world
What is the explanation? It is
war.
world
in the days of the second
powerfu States at
and Russia are two great and
that Britain

to the
cannot reconci e themselves
opposite ends of Europe who
third
any
of
unquestioned domination
creation in Europe of the

por.Siidi

m ^^powe^tUdSt^l^*^
they unite against

both to Britain and to Russia-and

as a result

But

at that time, in the thirties,

Eden

energetically supported

the policy of rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., and for practical

was by this that he made his career. When I arrived in

end of 1932 Eden was Parliamentary UnderSecretary for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons, and as
Simon was also a member of that House and spoke there on all
the more important questions of foreign policy, Eden had to play
a secondary role. But later Eden's elevation proceeded at a rapid
pace. This was partly due to his connections in the upper ranks
of the Conservative Party; but of still greater significance was

that struggle

between the two groupings within the ruling

of Great Britain which

mentioned

saw in Eden a
purpose, and began to promote him.
In 1934 Eden was appointed Lord Privy
'rebirth

of the Entente

circles

The supporters of a
man suitable for their

earlier.

Seal (a purely dec-

orative post), in fact a Minister without Portfolio, in Baldwin's

Cabinet.

Nations
Britain

He was given the special task of dealing with League

affairs. As a result there were for a certain time

two Foreign

Secretaries

Eden, They represented two

a 'senior

different,

Simon, and a

between them were

in

'junior',

and on a number of

questions even opposite, lines of British foreign policy.

relations

of

strained. Vansittart,

not get on well with Simon, supported Eden.

As

who

The

also did

a result there

went on within the British Foreign Office a constant internal

struggle, which only reflected the struggle going on over

WHO HELPED
among *e

policy
^estions of foreign

country as a whole.

of

the.

STEPS TO A RAPPROCHEMENT

HITLER?

Eden on

the
ruling circles of

the

tQ Bfirlin

was*

Sim n

>

puyi

Hitler
suddenly, in February,

forth

journey from Berlin to Moscow.

the conversations between

Eden

was present

at all

and the leaders of the U,S,S.R,,

sometimes serving as an interpreter. In particular, I attended the

meeting between J. V. Stalin and Eden, and accompanied the
I
latter on his visit to the sights of the Soviet capital. Eden,
the
of
collections
our
in
remember, was particularly interested

by

bel^g
when
^nilrs were preparing to leave,
Brids *
the
Se
^nd
and
articles
arranged,
^ ^ military
At

his

French painters (Gauguin, Cezanne, Renoir and others), a visit

to which he had included in his Moscow programme while still
in London. Eden also took a trip along the first line of the Moscow

Germany

Metro,

The

three days' negotiations revealed a large identity of views

two sides on international questions, Litvmov instructed

me to draw up a draft communique, to be published at the very
end of the visit, I did this, Eden on his side appointed William

of the

*.< Th= PP*iS

of

^t^^St^tr
the greatest

numiu

would be
whet the appetite
ot
real the danger
that, the more
most
the
use of even
it to make

fg^^S^

peace.
of preserving
P

to
and Eden would go
tinue

on

the

way

to

t0 Berlin

Strang, an official of the British Foreign Office dealing with

and wou!d only

peasement rephed

more necessary

"^^^
^ ^'^^LwW
'

and means

Simon
d conGovern-

Be**

Moscow,

tor talks

wim

to he
how Eden's
become a cenm<f
Today Moscow has

^*

is

*
^
^
for

o(

ofStatesandMinisteesofvanomnanomtiom
Heads
accom^ to
Se earth. We have become
n
q
of couta. At
Moscow had
on
ol
rv
after the uctooer
s/ n -cow was under
For eighteen years

^
^X
*Jff^&3L
I

Lnloo foe leaders ffonrfybutme^

polidcal

boycotts

Lge western

States thought

si Andnow

possMe tos

approved by both sides, and appeared in the press on April i,

1935. Its most important passage read as follows:
The representatives of the two governments were happy to

and frank exchange of views, that there is

at present no conflict of interest between the two governments on
any of the main issues of international policy, and that this fact
note, as a result of a full

provides a firm foundation for the development of fruitful

collaboration between

They

them

in the cause of peace.

both countries, recognizing that the

integrity and prosperity of each is to the advantage of the other,
will govern their mutual relations in that spirit of collaboration

Great Britain,

and loyalty to obligations assumed by them which is inherent in

their common membership of the League of Nations,'

of*'

y>^3^2,

dden1

it

League of Nations affairs, who had earlier served as Counsellor

of the British Embassy in Moscow, to join in working out the
communique. We met at the British Embassy on Sofiiskaya
Embankment, and very rapidly arrived at an agreement: Strang
made only minor alterations of a textual character in the draft we
submitted. Then the communique prepared in this way was finally

are confident that

The Soviet side was satisfied with the visit and with the
communique, and Eden was too. In conversation with me he said

WHO HELPED
visit

he was pleased with his

to

HITLER?

Moscow, and thought the

Eden's

visit.

On May 2,193s,

followed
events which immediately
France
was signed in Paris between
Assistance
I Pa* If Mutual
French
the
which Pierre Laval
and AeVs.S.R, following
capital

Churchill and Beaverbrook

paid a visit to the Soviet

Minister for Foreign Affairs,
was signed in
a Pact of Mutual Assistance

On May

16, 1935,

P^guebet^

Eduard
for Foreign Affairs,
the Czechoslovak Minister
Union.
Benes, also visited the Soviet
was extremely pleased with
hardly say that personally I

this

^i^.u

need

of
Anglo-Soviet relations, a page
page had been opened in
very
I
improvement. At all events
prolonged and systematic
worried only by die diougM
wanted this'to happen. I was

the

Moscow v/ere conducted, and

supporter of raPP?^
communiqulwas signed by Eden-a
this without

that the

Zth

negotiations in

the US.S.R.

SU

Of course, he could not have done

the same

but
*e agreement of the British Government,
Chamberlain and
all

people as Simon, Neville

the
begin to pour icy water on
react? Would they not
risingSprigs of an Anglo-Soviet

how

od
still

weak

'V^T^

and barely

become a
the Moscow communique
such conditions would not

W^I

groundmyself that my doubts were

a
of my heart there remained
ll. But somewhere in the depths
worry which gave me no rest.
gnawing
S
than justified, and subsequent
These doubts proved more
tried to convince

u^^t

most
events demonstrated this

clearly.

H owever,

before going on to these events, I think

to deal with one substantial

it

essential

success which the brief thaw in Anglo-

Soviet relations brought us.

have already said that, when he was sending me to London,

Litvinov had put before me, on the instructions of the Soviet
Government and as my most important task, the establishment
of connections and contacts with Conservative circles, I began to
I

act in this sense

from the very

first

days of

But up to the beginning of the thaw

my

my work

efforts

in Britain.

enjoyed a very

managed to 'win* Liberals, including such

important men as Lloyd George, Herbert Samuel, Archibald
Sinclair and others. The Liberals, of course, were part of the
ruling class, but in the thirties, as I have already mentioned, had

meagre

very

success. I

little

influence

on the Government, As

for Conservatives, I

had been able to establish acquaintance with some persons of the

second or third rank, but the first-class figures, as before, kept
away from the Soviet Embassy.
The only exception was the house of the Astors, but there
were special reasons for this. Lady (Nancy) Astor had in 1931
paid a visit to Moscow together with Bernard Shaw and Lord
Lothian, and had been received

by

the Soviet leaders, and at this

on
Nancy
same

period was playing the part of a 'friend* of the U.S.S.R. Later

how, a few years afterwards, the

Astor was transformed into one of the Soviet Union's worst
I shall describe

enemies.

However,

in Conservative circles

Lady Astor's

status

was not very high: she was considered a wealthy and unbalanced
American, capable of any extravagance, something
53

like a political

WHO HELPED

CHURCHILL AND BEAVERBROOK

HITLER?

Ambassador

Consequently the fact that the Soviet

Astor was not enough to open
kept up an acquaintance with Lady
Conservative citadels.
to him the doors of other
Leading politicians
The coming of the thaw changed all this.
with us.
acquaintance
began to seek
in the Conservative camp
enfant

terrible*

'

maximum the situation thus

Naturally I tried to utilize to the
a
in establishing firm contacts with
created, and really did succeed
representatives of British
number of the most prominent
preserved even
contacts so stable that they were
Conservatism

in Anglo-Soviet relations gave way

later when the brief thaw
then to a real frost. The most important
first to a cooling-offand
acquaintances were undoubtedly
and interesting of these new
Winston Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook.
month after the luncheon
At the end of July, i 9 34> about a
the Vansittarts invited my
with Simon which I have described,
others present were Churchill and
wife and myself to dinner. The
peculiar.
The position of Churchill at this time was very
his wife.

Ministerial post,

he had held any

an ordinary M,P, The ruling
only
and formally he remained
wish to admit him to the
Conservative Party clearly did not

It

was already

five years since

What was the reason?

from
to the following. The ten years
amounts
My hypothesis
of comparatively tranquil devel1929 to 1939 were a period
arena of public affairs was
opment of British political life, and the

heights of authority-

filled

by average and even

petty personalities like Neville

Simon and others.

Chamberlain, Samuel Hoare, Halifax,

There

political qualities, as is

is

often

no need to exaggerate Churchill's

not frequently was misdone in western literature, Churchill
and events (I shall have to
taken in his assessment of people
a wrong line, wrong
later): during the war he took

mention this
interests in their long-term
even from the point of view of British
1
far wiser than all the personages
sense: but nevertheless he was
very
a
by
distinguished
was
have just mentioned, and in addition
the Ministers of that
Consequently
character.
authoritarian
strong

that thanks to his qualities

day were simply afraid of him, fearing

Party and in the country he
and his authority in the Conservative

5J

would crush them, tie them hand and foot, transform them into
his pawns. It would be better for such a grizzled political bulldog
to stand aside from the road along which the chariot of power was
gliding comparatively smoothly! Only the dread crisis of the
second world war could bring Churchill back into the Government to begin with as First Lord of the Admiralty, and then
as Prime Minister, But here there came into play factors over

which the Chamberlains and the Simons no longer had any

control.

However, even without any portfolio as Minister, Churchill

in those years was one of the outstanding political figures in
Britain, and undoubtedly enjoyed considerable influence in wide
parliamentary circles. This influence developed still further when,
in the middle thirties, Churchill became leader of the internal
opposition in the Conservative Party which saw the key to the
safety of the British Empire in the re-creation of the Entente of
world war,
do not know who was responsible for the meeting between
Churchill and myself, Churchill or Vansittart: but it is a fact that

the

first

on

that

warm

table talking
ladies,

July evening in 1934 the six of us were seated at

about various current topics. When after coffee the

according to British custom, withdrew to the drawing-

room, and only the three

men

remained

at table, a

more

serious

conversation began. During this conversation Churchill frankly

explained his position to me,

'The British Empire/ said Churchill,

What is good

my be-all and end-all.

'is

Empire is good for me too; what is

In 1919 I considered
had for me,
that the greatest danger to the British Empire was your country,
and therefore I was an enemy of your country. Now I consider
that the greatest danger for the British Empire is Germany, and
therefore now I am an enemy of Germany, At the same rime I
consider that Hitler is making ready to expand not only against
for the British

bad for the British Empire

us but also to the

is

east, against

you.

Why

should

we

not join

combat our common enemy? I have been an adversary

of Communism, and remain its adversary, but for the sake of the

forces to

CHURCHILL AND BEAVERBROOK

WHO HELPED HITLER?

56

57

have come to you on a delicate matter/ Bevan began. 'I have

a friend, Lord Beaverbrook. You know of him, of course?'
I nodded.
'Well, Lord Beaverbrook would like to know you,' continued
(

Empire I
integrity of the British
S

thad
that

am ready to co-operate with

sincerely

the

and

Churchill was speaking

to register that
change of directs
which he was giving for his

Se motives

Bevan. 'He has already written his invitation to you to come to

lunch, but asked me to find out in advance what your attitude
would be. It would be unpleasant for Beaverbrook if you turned

and worthy of confidence.

were
frankness I replied to Churchdt
th! same spirit of
ism ft*
die adversaries of capital
Soviet people are inprinciple
are
peace
for
struggle
peace, and in the
they very much want
is
it
if
system
on any
2dy to co-operate with a State founded
e
concre
And I cited a number of
eemnnely striving to avert war.'
quite
was
illustrate this. Churchdl
fac7and h storical events to
began an
there
evening
Jh my words, and from that
of my
end
the very
which was' maintained until
logical

it

whVfn

the

full

fi

pos^n of Great Britain.

Ltd. Nevertheless, the
t value. It played its

Therefore I

Oh, they

and Russia must go the same

A
I

^ W**^
*

was

we

sitting at table

able to study

him

with Beaverbrook,

closely.

He was

We were alone, and I was

a short, extremely lively and

man, with a round mobile face and acute, piercing eyes.

There poured from his Hps a firework torrent of wisecracks,
opinions, assessments, characterizations of people and events- He
did not restrain himself in his expressions. The conversation with
restless

Beaverbrook was exceptionally interesting and instructive, and

I spent more than two hours with him. Several times I sought to

and take

my leave, but my host would not let me go-

thought it necessary to explain to

mT We

3
are the very best, said Bevan, 'Beaverbrook thinks

In the course of the conversation Beaverbrook,

point.

can march together against Hitlerite Germany.'

few days later (if my memory does not fail me it was June 4)

present

rise

see

meet you on

really is interested to

'Very well, then/ I replied. T will accept Beaverbrook's

invitation. There is no point in resurrecting the past if in the

was
acquaintance with ChurchiH
in the
especially
part in later events,

war.
neriod of the second world

he

Welt, what do you say?'

road/

encouragement from Moscow

Kkffthe

that in the present situation Britain

ui

cite

Bevan.

if

threat,
Britain against the Hider
fnr the ioint struggle with
casting about
time that Churchdl was

And now
and against me personally.
that same Beaverbrook was inviting me to lunch*
'And what are Beaverbrook's ideas and intentions now?' I asked

nStaS

aid with

Besides,

against the U.S.S.R.,

^tent paradoxical.
the
that Churchill was
2avs remembered it. I also remembered x r 8-20 Ideologically
^ader of intervention in 9
of foreign pokey
between us. Bu1 in the sphere
*e
with the enemies of yes*.
ot mu't sometimes march togetherinterests require it. This was
thirties,

Metropolitan- Vickers case had carried on a frenzied campaign

even to a certain
camps and

enemy of today,

In recent years Beaverbrook had taken up an anti-Soviet

position, and in the days of the Anglo-Soviet crisis over the

unusual, and
"The"te^ot between us were
We were people of mo oppose

against the

political grounds.

tStt

down.

he came straight to the

were well acquainted, and

me

like Churchill,

the reasons for his change of

heart towards the U.S.S.R,

'Yes, yes/

he said rapidly, 'we must go together.

. , .

I will tell

WHO HELPED HITLER?

58

love the

very much but I

frankly I don't love your country
I am
health of the British Empire
British Empire. ... For the
Problem
mam
the
Germany today is
ready to do anything. . - .
let s be
the British Empire too. So
for
not only for Europe but

you

friends

^'

was particularly important,

"This, too, was frank and, what
jolted by
pleased. I had always been
quite smcere. I was very
Russ*n
the
sympathy with 'Russia and
sickly sweet talk about
people' with which

some

emptiness of their feelings

up the
British poUticians covered
intrigues
or even their anti-Soviet

was refreshing. He
Beaverbrook's rather brutal realism
appealing
of his State and was
guided by the egotistical interest
it of the Sonet
Tthe 'egotistical interest', as he understood
build up a serious
it was possible to
State; but on such a basis

was

the
policy of joint action against
a

common peril from the German

It

The

grows colder

thaw in Anglo-Soviet

about a year.

Its

only

relations did not last long

highest point

was Eden's

Immediately afterwards there was a

Anglo-Soviet
disturbed

relations,

by the

because

possibility

fall in

the

visit

Chamberlainites

between London and Moscow, They became active again, and

took advantage of their political influence to begin wholesale
sabotage of such a possibility.

country in matters of supply.

to be inclined to the rebirth of the Entente of the

ning

the
was not by chance
asecond front in France.
highest
our
Beaverbrook with one of
It

that

moment chosen by the Chamberlainites

new plan for parrying the German menace, which

This was the precise

>

He was also, from the ve^eginwarm supporter of the opening

of the great Patriotic War, a

were

of a stable improvement in relations

to put forward a

my

Moscow.

the temperature of

became much
acquaintance with Beaverbrook
Soviet^Urnon
little value to the
stronger later on, and was of no
member
world war Beaverbrook, as a
In the years of the second
to our
services
rendered no small
of Churchill's War Cabinet,
fact

to

at that

time was called the conception of 'western security'. If in

1934 the ruling circles in Britain of all trends and opinions began
first world war,

and saw in

it

the real guarantee for the preservation of the British

Government decorated

Empire, now, in 1935, a division of opinion became apparent.

There was a differentiation between the supporters of 'State

Orders-

interest'

and the supporters of 'class hatred'. The first continued as

before to strive for the rebirth of the Entente, and consequently

for closer relations

between Britain and the U.S.S.R. The others

became more and more fascinated by a gamble on another horse.

They argued approximately as follows: 'For the British Empire
both Hitlerite Germany and Soviet Russia are dangerous. They
should be incited to attack each other
Fascists

(all

the

more because

the

and the Communists hate each other), and we should

When Germany and the U.S.S,R, have bled each

stand aside.

other white, and, as a result of war, have been

the time will

come

for the west to appear

59

much

on the

enfeebled,
scene,

and

HITLER?

WHO HELPED

fo
Britain in the

first

place.

Then

IT

its

somewhere, she must extend her dominions in some direction

so let her better carve out an empire for herself at the expense of

world hegemony,

amuse
herself with the Balkans or the Ukraine, but leave Britain and
France alone. Such ideas are, of course, complete idiocy, but
the States in eastern and south-eastern Europe. Let her

this conception, naturaUy,

ever. From
for a long time, if not for
rapprochement between London
against
there followed a struggle
Hitler to
kind of encouragement to

It

was

also every

unfortunately they are

'

east.

he took

just because

this

in applying the policy

indivisible',

E^pe must i^vLly become a world war.

this sense

on

number of occasions

of th<league

of

at sessions

Germany

conferences and meetings.

minor

details,

this in

*e

interests of Soviet

Moscow,

at

he
and private meetings. Sometimes
serve
could
too, if he thought that the,

to raise his

'

Eden

in
pudding had inscribed on at
it
notice
Eden did not foil to
English: 'Peace is indivisible.'
well understood by the
The indivisibility of peace was also
pohticians In the spring of i 9 35
more far-sighted among British
much of
with Churchill. He talked
I was at luncheon one day
spoke quite freely.
.
the Hitlerite danger, and
exclaimed. It is a terrible and
he
Germany?'
Hitlerite
is
'What
^entffically
Hitlerite Germany is a vast,
dangerous force!
a dozen American
organized war machine with half
one knows exactly
expect anything of them. No
.

will

only encourage Hitler

demands/

them

wanted to believe that such a man could

the
perspicacity and capacity of the British
judge
of
good
a
be
subsequent
events showed it, Churchill
ruling class, Alas, and
displayed excessive optimism in his forecast. The Chamberlainites proved much stronger and more thick-witted than he
imagined. In particular, immediately after Eden's return from
in every possible

s visit to

pohcy. I recall how durmg

Maxim Maximovich
the official luncheon which

and

Churchill's views greatly pleased me, and I supported

for him, the iced

orgTZd

wholesome state of apprehension. No concessions

made to Hitler. Any concession on our part will be

interpreted as a sign of weakness,

official

dd

popular in certain quarters of

in a

should be

Nations and at various international

European
He insistently argued on these lines with
diplomats, both at

fairly

But I am firmly convinced that in the

long run the victory will be not with the supporters of western
security, but with those who, like Vansittart or myself, consider
that peace is indivisible, and that Britain, France and the U.S.S.R.
must be the backbone of the defensive alliance which will keep

<*

Litvinov spoke

still

the Conservative Party.

conception into account that

of the Soviet
watchword that peaces
the
put forward in the winter of i 93 4-S
senous war in Hastern
arguing that in our times any

M. M. Litvinov,

6l

'These people argue that just the same Germany has to fight

Germany
rf west will dictate tc
the
peace which wiU ensure

and the U.S.S.R. the kind of

and possibly
security of the British Empire,

and Moscow, and

launch war in the

GROWS COLDER

way.

Moscow they began to make

vast

and

far

from

fruitless efforts to

restore their influence.

The

first

was the conference at Stresa in

was held to discuss Germany's

step in this direction

the middle of April, 1935. It

Pgft

violation of the military articles of the Versailles Treaty. Present

will be doing ^morrow.

.
what they want, and what they
be
is? ... I shaU **
policy
foreign
their
^ho knows what
UASJL,
the
at
his first blow not
all if Hitler launches

Laval (Minister of Foreign Affairs) from France, Mussolini and

its

head.

You can

surprised at

bSuse

that

would be

fairly

different
dangerous, but at very

Goffig

on then to the supporters of western

continued:

were MacDonald and Simon from

Suvich

(Deputy Minister for Foreign

Premier Flandin and

Affairs)

from

Italy.

Naturally Mussolini sabotaged any sharp action directed against

Hider, but the British and French likewise betrayed no desire to
quarrel with the Nazi dictator.

security, Churchill

Britain,

As a

result, the Stresa

conference

confined itself to academic condemnation of Hitler's action, but

avoided taking any effective measures against his aggressive step.

WHO HELPED

62

HITLER?

in his further rapid

only encouraged the Fuehrer
than that, the Stresa conference
progress on the same lines. More
undergave Mussolini
(particularly Simon and MacDonald)
of
seizure
her
obstruct Italy in
stand that Britain would not
preparing.
Ethiopia, for which she was then
of the Chamberlainites
position
the

Thereby

it

next step in restoring

Government. In May, i 9}h
was the reconstruction of the British
s accession
King George
came the twenty-fifth anniversary of
many ceremonies in connection with
to the throne. There were
appointments. The Uiamalso a number of

The

and

this jubilee,

berlainites

The

their position.
occasion to try to strengthen
chaNational
Government preserved its previous

used

British

this

real Prime
head there was now placed the
the Conservative Baldwin
Minister in the previous Government,
while the former
who had previously been Deputy Premier,
racter,

but

at its

MacDonald, became his deputy. Even

decorative Prime Minister,
which took place in the
more important were the changes
it had been
By this time even in the ruling circles

Foreign Office.
affairs
years' management of foreign
realized that Simon's four
this
in
part
small
State (no
had brought no benefit to the British
Simon's behaviour durmg
realization was played by
he was shifted to the more
trade negotiations), and now

^agio-

Soviet

neutral post of

Home

Secretary.

Who

would

replace

Simon

as

struggle took pbce around

Foreign Secretary? A considerable
Eden wou d
Vansittart very much hoped that
this

appointment.

behind the scenes to

it, and in the

energetically
get the post, and even worked
strongly opposed
this end, but the Chamberlainites

at

agent

military
world war Hoare was the British
ot the
admirer
an enthusiastic
the Tsar's headquarters and
he
which
Church,
the Russian Orthodox

During the

first

Easter services of

GROWS COLDER

63

somewhat mystical book The Fourth

There
was
altogether
something of the mystic in
Seal (193)Thus,
for
example,
in his drawing-room there
character.
Hoare's
stood a strange decorative object which had the appearance of a
silvered coffin, which not infrequently aroused a slight shudder
in guests who first saw it. In the middle thirties Hoare was one of
the closest supporters of Chamberlain and a warm champion of
depicted very vividly in his

western security.

However, the Chamberlainites had to reckon with the very

pacifist feelings in Britain at that time, which found
vivid expression in the desire of the great mass
particularly
their
of the people to ensure universal peace through the League of
Nations. At the end of 1934 the British League of Nations Union,
led by Lord Robert Cecil, organized a voluntary 'Peace Ballot'
throughout the country, in which 11,500,000 people took part.
Among them about 10,500,000 declared themselves in favour of
widespread

using force against aggressors. This obliged the Chamberlainites

to display a certain caution and to manoeuvre. Therefore, while

making Samuel Hoare Foreign

Secretary, they maintained

as Minister without Portfolio,

Eden

but with the special duty of

dealing with League of Nations affairs.

The

third step in the

same direction was the Anglo-German

Naval Agreement signed in June, 1935, The Versailles Treaty had,

of course, laid down very severe restrictions on German naval
armament. In February, 1935,
aside all the military articles of

when

Hitler unilaterally swept

this Treaty,

he began intensive

rearmament of Germany on the sea as well as on land. The

conference at Stresa had condemned, albeit in a mild form, these

,
end were victorious.
Samuel Hoare a typical
The new Foreign Secretary was
group. He had been to
representative of the British ruling
Personal Private Secretary to
Oxford, at twenty-five had become
Minister at forty-two Secretary
Colonial Secretary Lyttelton, Air
Secretary.
and now, at fifty-five, Foreign

for India at fifty-one

IT

actions

of the Fuehrer.

And now,

Britain officially recognized

only two months after Stresa,

Germany's right to naval armament

going far beyond the Versailles limitations! This was such a

provocative act of appeasement of the aggressor that

on the eve

of its signature even France made a protest to Britain, However,

the

Baldwin Government took no account of its ally's dissatisfacand next day, June 18, signed the agreement. This provided

tion,

that the general

ratio

of tonnage of the navies of the two

64

WHO HELPED

HITLER?

GROWS COLDER

IT

<Jj

Germany to
countries should be 100 to 35, but with the right of
Empire.
British
entire
the
have a submarine fleet equal to that of

reward to the aggressor for having committed his act of

aggression, and an encouragement for other potential aggressors

commentaries left no doubt that the most important

British
motive for concluding such an agreement was the
Baltic
the
in
supremacy
Germany
assure
Government's desire to
race
armaments
Hitlerite
against the U.S.S.R. The road for the

to

Semi-official

was not only opened but now legally authorizedBut as in the autumn of 1935 there was to be

a General

League
sensational vote-catching speech
Assembly in Geneva, creating the impression that Britain was
Ethiopia,
ready to apply sanctions if Italy began her war against
against aggression at the

Mussoliiu on

This was only a swindler's trick.

British
October 3 did begin military operations in Africa the
November 14 the
ruling class did not turn a hair. And when on

and the Conservatives

was not so overwhelming as in 1931, but
election took place,

Britain

which

won

a victory

still

ensured them a

counteract Hoare's
stable majority, the Chamberlainites tried to
question
September speech. The war in Africa sharply raised the
displayed
of League of Nations sanctions against Italy. Eden
sancestablishing
of
considerable activity in Geneva in favour
openly
was
while at the same time Chamberlain in London
tions,

them 'madness*. Laval, who was now Premier in France,

U.S.S.R. was
sabotaged the introduction of sanctions- As the
policy was
that
as
and
defending the policy of sanctions,

calling

firmly

Laval
supported by a number of smaller States, Chamberlain and
sanctions, Howdid not succeed in completely freeing Italy from
adopted by the
finally
compromise
they did ensure that the
ever,

for
League bore a sufficiently toothless character. Sanctions,
product
example, were not applied to such an important strategic
as oil.
step

In December, 1935, the Chamberlainites took a further

Laval, a plan
forward, Samuel Hoare worked out, jointly with
transferring half of
for ending the Italo-Ethiopian war by
was a frank
Ethiopia's territory to Mussolini to control This

example.

barely ipanaged to retain his majority, while Samuel

forced to resign immediately. 1

Only now,

to condemn
Election, and the great mass of the people continued
September,
in
1935, made a
the Fascist aggressors, Samuel Hoare

For when

The immediate reaction in

and France to the Hoare-Laval plan was such that Laval

follow Mussolini's

at last,

was Eden appointed Foreign

Hoare was
Secretary.

This could be considered a success for the supporters of an

Entente, but the Chamberlainites immediately surrounded the

new Foreign Secretary with

made him a prisoner of the

number of hidden

barriers

knights of class hatred.

The

which
result

could be foreseen.

When, on March 7, 1936, Hitler tore up the Locarno Treaty

and reoccupied the Rhineland, and when the U.S.S.R. was
this new act of aggression the
and French Governments, supported by the United

proposing resolute steps against

British
States,

the

confined themselves to merely verbal protests, which had

effect on Hitler as the reproaches of Krylov's cook in

same

on his cat Vaska (who 'listened, but went on eating').

Yet, as became known later, the Nazi generals who led their
forces into the Rhineland had in their pockets instructions to
the fable

withdraw immediately should

the

French

offer

them any

resistance.

Later,

when on July

18, 1936, Franco, with the active support

of Hitler and Mussolini, raised a rebellion against the legitimate
Government of the Spanish Republic, Britain and France^-again
with the support of the United States initiated the comedy of

non-intervention*

which became in

effect indirect

support of

Franco and his foreign protectors. 2

1.

However, Hoare was not long without a Ministerial post: after all,
group considered him as one of themselves! He had made a slip

the ruling

on the question of Ethiopia, of course, but one could not long be

angry with
such a reliable colleague. In 1936, when public feeling
had somewhat abated,
Hoare was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, and later Home
Secretary.
a. I have described the details of this in my
reminiscences of the NonIntervention Committee, entided Spanish Notebooks.

WHO HELPED

66

Government were
Moscow communique of
obvious contradiction to the

Naturally,
in

HITLER?

all

these activities of the British

anti-Soviet character.
and in the long run bore an
^en Baldwin was
Nevertheless, in the winter of 1*3*7,
the British
Secretary,
Foreign
Prime Minister and Eden was

April

i,

Government

tried to maintain

on the Spanish question

at least

succeeded
neutrality and impartiality. I
the external appearance of
our
the hurtful consequences of
also in reducing to a minimum
a
as
relations
for Anglo-Soviet
difference on Spanish affairs
the
at
question
with Eden on this
whole. I recall my conversation
war.
very beginning of the Spanish
Soviet and British governIt is clear to me,' I said, 'that the
the Spanish events. ... 1 here
ments have a different approach to
in the
here which may even grow
are differences between us
foreign
one of the problems of the
future: yet Spain is only
There are many other problems, even
policy of the two countries.
and Great Bntam are not

Below

On

May

freezing point

19375 Premier Baldwin retired, and Neville

became
head of the Government in his place.
Chamberlain
Learning this news, I could not help but think: 'Churchill was
28,

mistaken in his forecast. Not he but Chamberlain has taken the

helm. Now there is the prospect of an agreement between

Chamberlain and Hitler and what next?'

Neville Chamberlain was undoubtedly the most
.

sinister figure

LrTimportant, on which the U.S.S.R

on the

Moscow

profound and innate reactionary character of his views, sinister

for the influence which he enjoyed in the Conservative Party. The
fact that Neville Chamberlain was a man of narrow views and
small capabilities, that his political horizon, to use Lloyd George's

the Spanish
localize our differences on
in opposition. ... Let us
Auglo-Soviet
prevent them injuring
question and do our best to
the
would be extremely undesirable for
relations as a whole. ... It
paper.
communique" to become a scrap of

moment, and then replied:

everything
agree with you, and will do

Eden thought
'I

quite

for a

possible

on my

should follow the principles set

part to ensure that our policy

very important not

in the
it is also important
only for Britain and the U.S.S.R.,
was silent again for a moment, and
interests of general peace.' He
that
quietly: 'But you understand
then added, somewhat more
me alone.'
_
this does not depend upon
on
but nevertheless I must put
well:
I understood this very
Anglothe temperature of
i
record that up to the middle of 9 37

forth in the

Moscow communique. ...

It is

above zero.
Soviet relations was considerably

political

horizon of Britain

expression, did not rise

at that time- Sinister for the

above that of

'a

provincial manufacturer

of iron bedsteads*, only increased the danger of his remaining in

power. Neville's father, the famous Joseph Chamberlain, considered

this

son, unlike his other son Austen, unsuited to

his youth trained him for commerce. However,

on the commercial field likewise, Neville won no particular
laurels. Then he was launched on a 'municipal career'. Here, after
a series of intermediate stages, he ultimately became Lord Mayor

politics,

and from

of Birmingham. In 1917, as a Conservative of distinguished

origin, Neville Chamberlain was given the post of Director of
National Service in Lloyd George's Coalition Cabinet, but was

an utter failure and was expelled from the Government.

And now

same Neville Chamberlain had become head of the British

Cabinet, in the midst, moreover, of a complicated and difficult

this

67

WHO HELPED

HITLER?

world situation. Involuntarily the thought came to mind: 'What a

profound demoralization of the British ruling class!'
For me, as Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Neville
Chamberlain's appointment was of quite particular significance.
I had not forgotten my conversation with him in November,
five years had
1932, which I have mentioned earlier. The next
and examples, that Neville
completely confirmed,
Chamberlain was a consistent enemy of our country. Such a
Prime Minister could make Anglo-Soviet relations only more

by many

facts

tense and just because of his hostility to the Soviet State could
could
only reinforce the policy of appeasing the aggressors.

We

good of him.
However gloomy my feelings, I decided all the same to visit
the new Premier and probe his state of mind. He received me in
time
his room in the House of Commons on July 29. This
first
our
during
Chamberlain was more calm and restrained than
encounter five years before. I asked him about the general
expect nothing

outlines of policy which the British Government intended to

follow in the sphere of international relations. Chamberlain

explained to

me

long and patiently that the main problem

at the

BELOW FREEZING POINT

beyond doubt

69

that his aspirations

were centred on a Four-Power

(Western) Pact, and that the road to it would be the appeasement

of Hitler and Mussolini in every possible way.

This pessimistic forecast became even more probable thanks to

the fact that it was just at this time there was finally formed in

which played such a sinister

Lady (Nancy)
Astor, the same Lady Astor who in 1932-3 had coquetted with
'friendship' towards the Soviet Union, during the subsequent
years revealed her real face, and became in the end the 'hostess' of
a political salon in which the most reactionary representatives of
the Conservative Party regularly gathered. Usually at week-ends
in her luxurious mansion at Cliveden, near London, which she
tried to make into an imitation of Versailles, such people as
Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Samuel Hoare, Kingsley
Wood and others met together. Here they ate and drank, amused

London

the so-called Cliveden set,

role in the years before the second world war.

themselves, exchanged opinions and projected their plans for

immediate action.

Not

infrequently most important afiairs of

were decided between wo rounds of golf. The closer war

came, the more active did Cliveden become. Lady Astor's salon
State

was Germany, If this question were

would present no particular
settled first
problem to be settled? This
German
difficulty. But how was die
seemed quite possible to the Prime Minister if the proper method

became the main citadel of the enemies of the Soviet Union and
the fiiends of an Anglo-German rapprochement. From here came
the most energetic propaganda for the conception of western

of settlement were applied.

'and'
'If we could sit down with the Germans at a table,' he said,
claims,
their
and
complaints
pencil in hand go through all their

the prospect of mutual destruction

moment,

in his opinion,
all

other questions

would greatly clear up relations.'

So the whole problem was one of sitting down

this

at a table pencil

simple! I could not help recalling Lloyd George's

in hand!
words about 'a provincial manufacturer of iron bedsteads'. He did

How

evidently really see Hitler and himself as two merchants who

would, in the event of a dispute, argue, chaff and then in the end
strike a bargain.

So primitive were the Prime

Minister's political

all

that

Chamberlain said to

me on

July 29

it

followed

they pictured to themselves with particular delight

by the Soviet Union and

Germany, on the fulfilment of which the frequenters of Cliveden
had put their money. Lady Astor's salon had very great influence
on the appointment of Ministers, the formation of governments
and the determination of the policy of those governments. The
coming to power of Neville Chamberlain heralded such power
most anxious
among the leaders of the Soviet Union. In any case

for the Cliveden set as might give rise to the

apprehension
there

was not long to wait.

Chamberlain's main aim was the appeasement of the Fascist

dictators

conceptions.

From

security; here

course,

with a view to establishing western security. This, of

was

idiocy, as Churchill

had put

it:

but in Chamberlain

WHO HELPED

70

BELOW FREEZING POINT

HITLER?

friendly feelings for the Spanish Republic* But they realized the

hatred towards the country

(and not only in Chamberlain) class
completely clouded the normal
of Socialism was so great that it
war memoirs, when speaking
process of reason. Churchill in his
Hitler, ironically remarks:
of Chamberlain and his attitude to
appeasing and reforming
'Chamberlain had cherished the hope of
grace/ 1 In this passage Churchill observes

perfidy of the Fascist dictators, had

and therefore

and that

is

why he became

carry through such a policy

appeasing the aggressors. In order to
constituted in harmony with
in practice he needed a government
this

not

Secretary- Eden was

ideaand above all a 'suitable' Foreign
more so bemuse he was
suitable for this purpose, all the

in Berlin. Chamberlain s
extremely unpopular in Rome and
Lord Halifax; but taking into
selection for this key post was
the Premier did not
account public opinion then prevailing,
immediately. The ground had to be
venture to get rid of Eden
best of all if Eden could be
prepared beforehand, and it would be
Chamberlain, for the time being,
compelled to resign. Therefore
but purely decorative
appointed Lord Halifax to the honourable
a Minister without Portfolio
post of Lord Privy Seal^nce again

as we
be given particular work to do. And,
was
special work which Halifax received
later, the most important
shall see

who would

of an external political character.

the sphere of appeasement
Chamberlain's first striking action
of a friendly letter to Mussolini,
of the dictators was the dispatch
replied without delay with just as
to which Mussolini, of course,
Chamberlain began energetic negotiations
friendly a letter. Then
of a preaching treaty of
with him aiming at the conclusion
between Britain and Italy- Eden and
friendship and co-operation
opposed these negotiationssome other prominent politicians
the Spanish Republic Not at
not because they sympathized with
most of his sympathizers cherished any
all! Neither Eden nor

i.

The Second World War, Vol.

i5

page 281 (1948)-

demanded

that, in

little

belief in their promises

order to prove that his intentions

withdraw from Spain his

troops fighting on Franco's side. But Chamberlain would listen
to nothing, and stubbornly pursued his policy of signing an
Anglo-Italian agreement as rapidly as possible. This was the
were

him and leading him to

private conversations he expressed

the literary decencies. In
how once he said to me:
himself much more strongly. I remember
5
He thinks he can ride the tiger.
'Neville is a fool
Chamberlain thought,
Unfortunately, that was precisely what
of
the consistent apostle of the policy

71

serious, Mussolini should first

between Chamberlain and Eden (possibly

blown up by the Prime Minister) as a result of which,

basis for the clash

artificially

on February

20, 1938,

Eden

resigned.

With him

resigned his

Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Lord Cranborne, who in those

years was also a supporter of rapprochement with the U.S.S.R*

on January

Shortly before this,

removed from

1938, Vansittart

1,

had been
and

active participation in the Foreign Office

appointed to the honourable but not very operational post of

Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government, Telling me of his

new title, Vansittart remarked with a wry smile: Chief Diplomatic

'

But you are not obliged to take his advice.

wants/
the
Prime
Minister
Everything depends on what
Vansittart anticipated his future very well. Chamberlain really

Adviser.

did not turn to

him

for advice.

Now the genuine and ever more powerful adviser of the Prime
come

Minister on foreign affairs began rapidly to

inence: Sir

Horace Wilson.

into

prom-

knew him well, from the days of the

At that time Horace

trade negotiations with Great Britain.

of Chief Industrial Adviser of the

Government, was the main figure on the British side in working
out the Temporary Trade Agreement of 1934. Wilson was well
acquainted with everything pertaining to trade and industry, but

Wilson, bearing the

his

title

horizon in foreign

man

in the street.

And

most trusted expert

problems.

It

seemed

affairs

did not extend

in settling the
like

berlain's foreign policy

beyond

that

Chamberlain was making such a

madness,

of the

man

his

most important international

But was not all Cham,

one unbroken madness, fermented in the

yeast of class hatred, stupidity

and illiteracy?
Having cleansed fhe Foreign Office of people

whom he found

WHO HELPED

7*
embarrassing,

Chamberlain

now

HITLER?

appointed Lord Halifax as

aristocrat of ancient hneage

Foreign Secretary- He was a British
administrative career,
who had gone through a long political and
India. Tall, gaunt slowculminating in the post of Viceroy of
a
hand, he spoke
moving, a black glove on his injured left
Externally
smile.
a pleasant
calm, low voice, always preserving

the impression ot a
he attracted one's sympathy, and gave
great
man interested
profound thinker, or at any rate of a
but the philosophy
problems, His turn of mindwas philosophical:
to
mystical religious one. He belonged

was

a
talking
in Anglican thought, and liked
current
the 'High Church'
that when Halifax was
on moral and religious themes. It was said
behind his study. Belore
Viceroy of India there was a small chapel
would withdraw for a few
any serious meetings or discissions he
Halifax undoubtedly
minutes to ask God to enlighten his reason.

dose to

his heart

shall
wasawidelycultivatedmanbutthisdidnotpreventhim(we
a complete misunderstanding
see examples later) from displaying
of our epoch. But this was
of the present day and the motive forces
class outlook.
a clear sign of the limitations of his
Halifax supported
Government,
As a member of Chamberlain's
one of the pillars
was
and
appeasement
in every way the policy of
easy to get on
was
HaUfex
of the Cliveden set. Temperamentally
the
difficulty with the fact that
with, and he put up without
control
together with Horace Wilson, usurped

Prime Minister,

the Foreign Office to the

of British foreign policy, and reduced
attached to his own
condition of a mere diplomatic chancery
the important post ot
person. To avoid any complications,
Affairs, taken from
Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign
who could be relied
Cadogan,
Vansittart, was given to Alexander

upon not to provide any unexpected surprises.

retiring and submissive
Having in this way assured himself of a
^

machinery, Chamberlain

now set about the systematic realization

of his own foreign policy.

At the end of November, 1937,
It began with Germany*
Chamberlain instructions to
Halifax had already received from
and to enter upon negotiations with

make

a pilgrimage to Berlin

BELOW FREEZING POINT

73

Hitler for a general regulation of Anglo-German relations. At

that time we did not yet know all the details of these negotiations,

but their general sense was clear to us; and, moreover, a little of
what had taken place in Berlin leaked out into British political
on the
circles and became known to us. As a result, distrust

Government very much increased.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs
German
Today the materials of the
captured by the Soviet Army in Berlin show that there were more
Soviet side to Chamberlain's

than sufficient grounds for our distrust.

In fact, the record of the conversation between Hitler and
Halifax on November 17, 1937, published by the U.S.S.R.

Foreign Ministry in 1948, makes

it

quite clear that Halifax,

on

behalf of the British Government, offered Hitler a kind of alliance

on the basis of the Tact of Four' and a free hand in Central and

Eastern Europe. In particular, Halifax stated that 'no possibility of

changing the existing situation must be precluded', and

later

on

more precise by saying that 'to these questions belong

and Czechoslovakia'. Of course, in pointing out
Austria
Danzig,
least
to Hitler a direction in which his aggressions would meet
made

this

resistance

from the Chamberlain Government, Halifax thought

essential to

make

the pious reservation:

'England was only

effected

by

it

interested that

any

be
methods which

alterations should

peaceful evolution, so as to avoid

might cause far-reaching disturbances which were not desired

1
either by the Fuehrer or by other countries.'
However, Hitler understood the value of this reservation very
well, and therefore could consider his conversation with Halifax
as

London's blessing for the violent seizure of

the regions indicated*

became

And when Eden

Foreign Secretary, Hitler

that the time

had come to put

'living space' in

resigned,

had good grounds

into effect

the

and Halifax
for deciding

programme of

aggression which had been sketched out in the conversation

between them in November, 1937- He lost no time. On March 12,

Foreign
1938, twelve days after the appointment of Halifax as
1.

War

Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World

1 (Moscow, 1948), pp. 20, 25, 34 (English edition)*

Vol.

WHO HELPED

74

HITLER?

made his first big leap, occupying Austria with a

lightning blow. As though jeering at the London appeasers, the
Fuehrer timed his aggression for the very day when Chamberlain
was ceremoniously receiving Ribbentrop, the German Minister
for Foreign Affairs, who had come to Britain, And what hapSecretary, he

pened? Britain and France reacted to this outrageous act of

aggression by purely verbal protests which neither they themselves, and still less Hitler, took seriously.
However great and legitimate, after all that had happened, was
the Soviet Government's mistrust of the Chamberlain Government, nevertheless at this critical moment the leaders of the

U.S.S.R. made an attempt

leaders of Great Britain,
seizure of Austria,

common

to appeal to the

On March

17, 1938, five

sense of the

days after the

M, M. Litvinov, on behalf of the Soviet

Government, gave an interview in Moscow to representatives of

the press in the course of which he said:
'While previous cases of aggression took place in continents
more or less remote from Europe or on the outskirts of Europe

on this occasion has been committed in the centre

created an undoubted danger, not only to the
has
and
of Europe
. , ,

the outrage

eleven countries

now

bordering the aggressor but

for

European States, and not only European.

'First and foremost arises the threat to Czechoslovakia,
.

'The
States,

present international situation puts before

and big

States

in

particular,

all

the

all

BELOW FREEZING POINT

circumstances with other Powers in the League of Nations or

outside

At

it.'

the same time I received from

Moscow

the instruction to

transmit the text of the interview to the British Government,

with an accompanying Note to the effect that this interview was

the official expression of the point of view of the Soviet GovernI did this.

ment.

Moscow, by
In

this

The same was

the Soviet

way the

done, also by instructions from

Ambassadors

in Paris

U.S.S.R. publicly proclaimed

and Washington.

its

readiness to take

energetic measures against aggression, and called

France and the U-S.A. to do the same.

The

Soviet

upon Britain,
Union did its

what about its partners?

On March 24 the British Foreign Office sent the Soviet
Embassy a long Note signed by Halifax. It stated that the British
Government would warmly welcome the assembly of an international conference, at which it might be expected that all
duty. But

European States would consent to be represented (i.e. both

aggressors and non-aggressors
I.M), but that it objected to
the calling of 'a conference only attended by some of the

European Powers, and designed ... to organize concerted action

against aggression*. For, hi the opinion of the British Government, such a conference would not have a favourable effect upon
the prospects of European peace. 1

peaceable

question of their

75

to

And so, instead of a struggle against the aggressors, there were

be aimless conversations with the aggressors. One more Non-

responsibility for the subsequent destinies of the peoples of

Intervention Committee, but this time on European

Europe, and not only of Europe. The Soviet Government is aware

of its share in this responsibility; it is aware of the obligations

merely Spain! In other words, tranquillizing

incumbent upon it under the League Covenant, the BriandKellogg Pact and the treaties of mutual assistance it has concluded
with France and Czechoslovakia; and I can say on behalf of the

'leaps'.

Government

that, for its part,

it

is

ready

as

before to join in

collective action which, decided jointly, would have the purpose

of arresting the further development of aggression and removing

the accentuated danger of a

new world

shambles.

It

agrees to

proceed immediately to discuss practical measures dictated

by

the

pills

affairs,

not

for the mass of

the people in order to give the aggressors time to prepare for

new

Government wanted. This is how

in practice it deciphered Halifax's words about the desirability of
changes in the European situation by 'peaceful evolution'.
The response to the Soviet approach in Paris and Washington
was no better than it had been in London.
It might have seemed that the seizure of Austria should have
1.

p. 101.

This

is

what the

British

Documents on British Foreign Polky, 1919-1939, Third

Series, Vol.

ia

WHO HELPED

76

HITLER?

some extent brought Chamberlain to his senses, and

made him more careful in his relations with the Fascist dictators.
ChamFar from it. Blinded with hatred of the Soviet Union,
fatal
his
continued
stubbornly
berlain would see nothing else. He
the
signed
policy (fatal for Britain herself), and on April 16
he
agreement for friendship and collaboration with Italy which
at least to

recognition
had so passionately sought. This agreement included
Ethiopia.
of
annexation
Italy's
by the British Government of
in
elements
Wishing, however, to calm somewhat the democratic
an Anglo-Italian
Britain, who considered the conclusion of

such a time to be betrayal of the Spanish Republic,

to
Chamberlain made one important reservation. He undertook
from
troops
evacuated her
ratify the treaty only after Italy had
keeping with the plan which was then being worked out

agreement

at

Spain, in

describe
the Non-intervention Committee. Later I shall

by

Chamberlain

how

fulfilled this obligation.

diplomatic
In the spring of 1938 I met Lady Vansittart at a
elimination
reception. She was very depressed- Her husband's
appointment
the
policy,
foreign
British
from any active part in
Clivedenites
of Halifax as Foreign Secretary, the domination of
pessimistic,
very
in the Government and much else made her
is very close, just round
war
'that
said,
she
convinced/
'Van is
What a misfortune that we have such a bad Prime
the

comer

Minister at such a

Then

difficult

she began to ask

timer
me about the

relations. I quite frankly told

her hands and

*

And

don't

how

of Anglo-Soviet

matters stood. She

wrung

said:

you remember how

in improving relations
that's

her

state

four years ago

Van

succeeded

between our two countries? ... But

all

been spoiled now/

husband, there
I replied: 'Yes, in 1934-5 , with the help of your

was a thaw in Anglo-Soviet relationsbut now their

is below zero/
Lady Vansittartagainwrungher hands, and saidwith deep feeling:
temperature

'At

all

events.

Van has done

all

he could/

9
Munich

But

if

Chamberlain was not able to draw any lesson from the

overthrow of Austria, Hitler proved a much more capable pupil.

The 'leap* at Vienna was an important probe for him. The Nazi
dictator wanted to test how the democratic Powers would react
to his aggression. The test demonstrated that Britain and France

was not surprising that Hitler interpreted this

as meaning that the way was open. Accordingly, two months
after the annexation of Austria, he began a new and still more
did not move. It

serious operation.

What Litvinov had foretold

in his interview of March 17

came

to pass: the storm-cloud appeared over Czechoslovakia, In May,

1938, Hitler launched a furious campaign against that country,
and not only in the press and on the radio: German troops began
to mass on its borders, and the Sudeten Nazis within, on orders
from Berlin, began the most impudent provocations against the
Czechoslovak Government. The political atmosphere in Czechoslovakia, Central Europe, Britain and France became more and
more tense. There was a smell of gunpowder. After all, France

had a pact of mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia, and if the

latter were attacked by Germany, France would be bound to
come to her aid. Britain had no such formal pact with Czechoof France, she too could not have
stood aside. By August the situation had become so menacing,
and the alarm and anxiety of the masses in France and Britain so
slovakia, but as the close ally

great, that the British

Government was obliged

to relieve the tension created.

What did

in Chamberlain's style.

77

it

to

do something

do? Something entirely

WHO HELPED

78

HITLER?

would not
still had
which
step
a
Czechoslovakia
allow Hitler to swallow
the
aggressor
the
of
some chance of arresting the hand
Czechoslovakia
Chamberlain Government decided to send to
was an
mission headed by Lord Runciman. Lord Runciman
Instead of firmly stating that Britain and France

magnate who had never taken part in international affairsof where Czechodeaf, ponderous and even somewhat ignorant
with him in the
slovakia was (I discovered this in a conversation

elderly

the Runciman mission was to

spot and make proposals for
the
on
'investigate' the situation
German-Czechoslovak
mediation with the purpose of settling the

summer of

1938),

Officially

work
In reality, however, as events proved, the mission's
dismemberment of
reduced itself to opening the way for the
conflict.

London and

Paris to the

Although the reception given in

occupation of
Soviet demarche of March 17, 1938, after the
attempts of the same
Austria, was far from encouraging further
the terrible peril to
of
view
in
nature, the Soviet Government,
to the common
appeal
Czechoslovakia, decided once again to
sense of the French and British leaders.

of the French Government in the situation thus created. For

was inviting the French
its part, the Government of the U.S.Sit.
consultation between
a
arrange
immediately
to
Government
tions

French and Czechoslovak General

thought
Staffs to work out the necessary measures. Litvinov
Rumania would allow Soviet troops and aircraft transit through

representatives of the Soviet,

its territory,

of the months since then has taught them somePerhaps even now they may be ready for more ener-

getic action against the aggressors

were even a majority

If there

League Council

in favour of

was approximately at the same time, as Gottwald (who

became President of Czechoslovakia after the war) subsequently
revealed, that J. V. Stalin through him informed the then
President Benes that the Soviet Union was ready to afford
armed assistance to Czechoslovakia even if France did not do
50.

Not

a single possibility,

On

the

considerations, Litvinov

Payart,

the

French charge

on September
d'affaires

in

2,

1938,

Moscow

to
(Ambassador Naggiar was away), and asked him urgently
the
Government of
transmit to the French Government that the
on Czechoslovakia
attack
German
U.S.S.R. in the event of a

obligations under the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact

assistance to

of Mutual Assistance of 1935, and would give armed

to give aid
Czechoslovakia- But as, under this Pact, the obligation
France, bound to
entered into force only if at the same time
against Germany,
arms
up
Czechoslovakia by a similar Pact, took

Government of the U.S.S.R, would

like to

know

the inten-

morning of September

3 I received

telegram containing the statement

In the circumstances of that day

it

from Moscow a

made by Litvinov

was

to Payart.

document of the

greatest

The important thing was that it should

widely known as possible, because the Cliveden set

political significance.

disaster/

the

in the

according to the Covenant, unanimity was

such
required) Rumania would undoubtedly support it, and would not
object to Soviet forces passing through its territory.

had

fulfil its

desirable, in order to influence

very

aid (strictly

become

would

it

in this sense, to put the question of eventual aid to

Czechoslovakia before the League of Nations as soon as possible.

for averting
even the smallest, must be allowed to go by

informed

but considered

Rumania

We thought: 'Perhaps the

bitter experience

Out of such

79

It

Czechoslovakia.

thing

MUNICH

as

through August carried on a whispering campaign in

political circles to the following effect: 'We should be glad to
save Czechoslovakia, but it is hard to do this without Russia, and
all

keeping quiet and obviously evading the fulfilment of

obligations under the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact of Mutual

Russia
its

is

Assistance.'

The same

day, September

house, Chartwell, and told

to Payart. Churchill at

3, 1 visited

him

Churchill at his country

in detail of Litvinov's statement

once realized

its

importance and said that

he would immediately inform Halifax of my communication. He

fulfilled his promise; that same day, September 3, he sent Halifax
a letter conveying in detail Litvinov's demarche.

He

confirms

WHO HELPED

8o
this in his

own war

HITLER?

memoirs. 1 Not confining myself to the

conversation with Churchill, I also met Lloyd George and

Arthur Greenwood, Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, and
repeated to

My

I had told Churchill.

doing so was that the three Opposition
undoubtedly tell their party colleagues of

them what

calculation in

leaders

would

more so because when informing

them of it I did not ask them to keep it a secret) and consequently
political circles in London would know the real attitude of the
U.S.S.R. in such a burning issue. If any member of the Govern-

Litvinov's demarche

(all

the

ment were to begin slanderous talk in Parliament about the

'passivity' of the U.S.S.R. on the Czechoslovak question there
could be a reply from the Opposition restoring the true facts.
Subsequently my calculation was justified completely.
I did not doubt then, and do not doubt today, that if the
French Government had grasped the Soviet hand stretched out
to it on September 2, if Britain and France even at that late hour
had sincerely accepted joint action with the U.S.S.R., Czechoi.

Churchill writes; *ln the afternoon of September 2 I received a

message from the Soviet Ambassador that he wouM like to come down to
Chartwell and see me at once upon a matter of urgency- ... I thereupon
received the Ambassador, and after a few preliminaries he told me in precise
and formal detail the story set out below. Before he had got very far I

was making a declaration to me, a private person because

preferred this channel to a direct offer to the
Government
the Soviet
Foreign Office, which might have encountered a rebuff. It was clearly
intended that I should report what I was told to His Majesty's Government.
This was not actually stated by the Ambassador, but it was implied by the
fact that no request for secrecy was made. As the matter struck me at once as
being of the first importance, I was careful not to prejudice its consideration
by Halifax and Chamberlain by proceeding to commit myself in any way, or
use language which would excite controversy between us/ Churchill then
goes on to give the text of his letter to Halifax in which he sets out very
precisely what I told him then of Litvinov's talk with Payart (The Stcond
World War, Vol. i, pp. 229-30).
As can be seen from the text, the circumstances and motives which
impelled me to approach Churchill in this case were somewhat different
from those by which he explains my action, but the fact of my communicarealized that he

tion itself

is

set forth correcdy.

MUNICH

8l

would have been saved, and the whole

European and world events would have taken a
tion. But to act in this way would have meant
Slovakia

Hitler,

later

course of

different direc-

a quarrel with

burying the plans for western security, renouncing the

hope of a clash between Germany and the U.S.S.R* , * Neither

Chamberlain nor Daladier would accept this. They preferred to
cherish their stupid and fantastic chimeras, dictated by class
hatred of the country of Socialism. They were ready thereby to
sacrifice Czechoslovakia, and not only Czechoslovakia
Churchill in his memoirs tells how he received a reply on
September 5, in which the Foreign Secretary stated that putting
the question of Czechoslovakia before the League of Nations at
present would not be helpful, but that he would keep it in his

mind\

Two

days after Halifax's reply to Churchill there appeared a

The Times (September 7) which patently

out of the situation would be the
transfer of the Sudeten districts by Czechoslovakia to Germany.
The British Foreign Office hastened to state that it had nothing
but nobody believed this,
to do with this leading article
I remember how the following day, September 8, Halifax
invited me to see him, and in the course of conversation on
^various subjects stated that the British Government had no
sinister leading article In

indicated that the best

way

connection with the newspaper's statement

believe

him

either-

Of

but

did not

course, I allowed for the possibility that

neither the Foreign Office

nor the Government

as a

whole had

given The Times any direct and formal instructions to print

this

But had the highest authorities any

lack of indirect and unofficial ways of ensuring an expression of
the opinions and views they desired in the press? And that is how
matters stood in this particular case, since the whole content and
unfortunate leading

article.

tone of The Times leading article perfectly reflected in spirit the

and actions of the Cliveden set. What justification, then,

would I have had for believing Halifax's denial?
Then followed the shameful days of Munich. The head of
the British Government, the 'man with the umbrella', as the
ideas

WHO HELPED

82

HITLER?

newspaper wits christened him in those days, with the energetic

support of Daladier sank to the role of a kind of second-rate
Hitler
political commercial traveller, convulsively flitting between
Chamberlain
and the Czechoslovak Government. More than this:
1

humiliated himself to the point of becoming the 'big stick of the

Nazi leader, demanding that Czechoslovakia should capitulate to
the

German

aggressor.

However, before these

success, the U.S-S.R.

efforts

were crowned

made one more attempt

finally

with

to save the situation.

In September, 1938, the League of Nations Assembly was held as

London
usual. Litvinov came to Geneva, He called me over from
atmosphere
to take part in the work of the Soviet delegation. The

Geneva was extremely tense. There were the most alarming

rumours and reports in the League corridors. An attack by
Germany on Czechoslovakia was expected any day- Even the
peaceful Swiss were carrying out anti-aircraft exercises and

in

arranging

trial

In Geneva

83

A, Butler and Lord de la Warr, asked Litvinov

and myself to have a talk on the situation. The British wanted to
know how the Soviet side conceived of the practical steps needed
to follow up Litvinov's statement of two days before at the
League. In reply Litvinov suggested that a conference should be

in Geneva, Mr, R,

called immediately

learned that the French Foreign Minister,

of representatives of

Britain,

France and the

U.S.S.R* in Paris or in some other suitable place (not Geneva) to

work out measures for defending Czechoslovakia. He added that
the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact of Mutual Assistance would be put

what attitude the League of Nations

took up (such a statement had been made to the Czechoslovak
Government three days before, in reply to an enquiry by the latter
as to the attitude of the Soviet Government). Furthermore

into effect irrespective of

Litvinov informed them that the Soviet Government had given

a serious warning to the Government of Poland: if Warsaw were
to attack Czechoslovakia in order to seize the Tesin region (about

which there was a

black-outs.

we

MUNICH

lot

of talk

at the time) the

U.S.S.R. would

consider the Soviet-Polish Pact of Non-Aggression automatically

Bonnet, one of the most malignant enemies of the U.S.S.R., had

concealed Litvinov's statement to Payart from the majority of

annulled.

the members of the French Government. Bonnet was constantly

explaining the treacherous policy of the French Government in

statements, and even displayed something like semi-sympathy

relation to Czechoslovakia

by

'the passivity

of Russia' on

this

subject, and the statement of the Soviet People's Commissar of

September 2 did not suit him at all. Now it turned out that no one

come to
of her
members
the aid of Czechoslovakiaand that included the
whole
Government, It was essential to show France and the
world what the true attitude of the U.S.Sit. was. It was just for
in France

knew of the Soviet Government's

readiness to

September 21, 1938,

from the rostrum of the League of Nations, openly repeated
what he had communicated to the French Government nineteen
days before by diplomatic channels through Payart. Bonnet's
helped
intrigue had failed, and its exposure to the whole world

this reason that Litvinov, in his speech of

to strengthen the international authority of the U.S.S.R.

Two days later, on September 23, the British representatives

Butler and de la

Warr seemed very

interested in Litvinov's

with the actions of the U,S,S.R. They promised that they would
immediately report our conversation to London, and on receipt
Alas, this further meeting
of instructions would meet us again
never took place (naturally, through no fault of ours). And how
could it be otherwise? It was just in these last days of September,
1938, that Chamberlain

and Daladier were rounding off

their

'Operation Treachery* against Czechoslovakia.

September 27 Litvinov asked me to go back to London

immediately. 'Your presence there just now is much more
important than in Switzerland, he said.

On

The same day

I left

Geneva.

It

was pitch-dark

at the station,

because the local authorities that evening had arranged a

trial

blackout. Early in the morning of the 28th I was in Paris- It was

raining, and the familiar streets of the French capital were
deserted and melancholy. I arrived the same day in London at

WHO HELPED

84

HITLER?

about 4 p,m., and went straight from the station to Parliament, I

had arrived at the most dramatic moment.
Hitler
It will be known that Chamberlain's first pilgrimage to

was on September

ij- Hitler received the British

Prime Minister

out his demands on Czechoslovakia,

threatening to use force if the latter refused. Chamberlain returned
and
to London. There was a special conference of the British

at Berchtesgaden,

and

set

French Ministers, which accepted Hitler's demands. On

September 19, under pressure from London and Paris, the
1
Czechoslovak Government "also accepted these demands.
Thereupon Chamberlain flew for a second time to see Hitler,
The meeting took place at Godesberg on September 22 and 23.
Chamberlain had reckoned that when he laid Czechoslovakia's
agreement on the table he would earn the approval of the Fuehrer

but he was cruelly undeceived.

Realizing at Berchtesgaden that

he was faced not with a steel-clad knight but with a rag-stuffed

'man with an umbrella , Hitler decided that there was no call for
Godesberg
restraint. At the second meeting with Chamberlain in
he put forward new demands, much more harsh than at
Berchtesgaden. The British Prime Minister was very much discouraged, but nevertheless undertook to 'persuade' Czecho5

slovakia to yield once again.

He

returned to London, and

together with Daladier attempted for the second time to exercise

pressure on Prague. But here his attempt misfired: the Czecho-

slovak Government rejected Hitler's Godesberg programme. In

making up their minds the Czechoslovaks were influenced a good
deal

by

the assurance received from the Soviet

before that

it

was ready to

Union a few days

afford Czechoslovakia assistance in any

conditions, even should France betray her.

and declared on September 26 that if

Czechoslovakia had not capitulated by 2 p.m. on the 28th he
would open hostilities. Chamberlain and Daladier were panicHitler

stricken,

was

85

MUNICH

appeal to Hitler and Mussolini to arrange a Four-Power meeting

in order finally to settle the

population, the French

and
top group of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, including Benes
capitulation,
to
inclined
were
a number of members of the Government,
which considerably assisted Chamberlain and Daladier in their task.

The

up
Government

issued orders calling

mobilized the Fleet and adopted some measures of anti-aircraft

would
defence. All were waiting in a terrible state of tension:

new meeting?
sat down in my place in the
House of Commons, Chamberlain,

Hitler agree or not agree to a

When on

September 28

Diplomatic Gallery of the

was standing before the Government bench and

of
nervously waving his right hand, showing everyone a sheet
just
white paper he was holding. It was a letter from Hitler,

visibly excited,

tearful
received during the meeting, in reply to Chamberlain's
agreed.
had
Hitler
Four.
the
of
petition for a meeting

Chamberlain did not conceal his delight. The vast majority of

Labour and
the Conservatives gave him a real ovation. The
conceal
Liberal M.P,s were more restrained, but also did not
the
left
Chamberlain
that
scenes
their joy. It was amid these

Chamber

Munich
impression on me.

in order at once to begin his journey to

scene produced the most painful

you could see a heavy coach, packed with
though
It was as
could
people, rolling down an inclined plane into an abyss, and
into
Gallery
the
do nothing to stop it. When I came down from
had
I
the Lobby I met one of my Labour acquaintances whom

The whole

seen applauding Chamberlain.

'Why were you

'Well,

why

applauding?' I asked him.

ever not?' he replied, 'After

all,

Czechoslovakia

has been saved, and there won't be any war/

I replied:

don't want to be a Cassandra, but remember

words: Czechoslovakia

The M.P, looked

seriously?'

is lost,

me

at

my

and war has become inevitable/

with amazement. 'Do you mean that

he asked in surprise.

'Quite seriously,
r.

Government

several contingents of reservists, while the British

infuriated,

and the British Prime Minister made a most obsequious

Czechoslovak question. At the same

among the mass of the

time, in order to arouse suitable feelings

What happened

You

after that

will see/

is

well

known.

On September 29 and

30 the Munich conference was held. Hitler behaved with extreme

WHO HELPED

86

HITLER?

Chamberlain and
the back of
behind
end,
In
the
eels.
like
Daladier wriggled
signed.
was
Czechoslovakia, the Munich Agreement
The essence of this was that the Sudeten districts were transinsolence,

ferred to

and Mussolini

Germany with

all

supported

him.

the property they contained, and in

addition Czechoslovakia had to satisfy the territorial demands

made on her by Poland and Hungary. The rest of Czechoslovakia,
defenceless and humiliated,

was

to receive a guarantee

Big Four a guarantee the value of which,

happened, was little more than zero.

after all

from the
that had

In order to some extent to weaken the painful impression

which the Munich betrayal was bound to make on British public

opinion, Chamberlain persuaded Hitler to sign with him a paper
to the effect that henceforth there should be no wars between
and Germany, It was a valueless promise destined, as the
future proved, only for the wastepaper basket. It was this scrap
of paper which Chamberlain demonstratively waved at London
Airport on his return from Munich, proclaiming loudly that now
Britain

was assured.
Lord Halifax kept abreast of his Prime Minister- The German
Ambassador in Britain, von Dirksen, recording his conversation
with the Foreign Secretary on August 9, 1939, states among other
'peace in our time'

things:

In the further course of the conversation Lord Halifax said

that he would now like to give me an exact picturfe of his ideas and
views as they had stood after Munich, , , , After Munich he had
fi

been persuaded that fifty years of world peace were now assured,
roughly on the following basis: Germany the dominating power
on the Continent, with predominant rights in South-Eastern
Europe, particularly in the field of commercial policy; Britain
would engage only in moderate trade in that area; in Western
Europe, Britain and France protected from conflicts with
the lines of fortification on both sides and endeavouring to retain and develop their possessions by defensive means;
friendship with America; friendship with Portugal; Spain for the

Germany by

time being an indefinite factor which for the next few years at

MUNICH

87

from all combinations

of Powers; Russia an out-of-the-way, vast and scarcely survey-

least

would

necessarily have to hold aloof

on safeguarding her Mediterranean

Dominions and the Far East, via Aden,

able territory; Britain bent

communications with the

Colombo and Singapore/ 2

When

one reads these

lines it is difficult to

say whether they

spoke more of imperialist malice or phenomenal

One

ness*

thing

is

historical blind-

clear: Halifax did not in the least understand

what was going on in the world. How characteristic, in particular,

his remark about Russia! He could find nothing more intelligent
to say about a people inhabiting one-sixth of the world, and
which had become the herald of the future of mankind.
The reaction to the Munich Agreement in Britain was a very
stormy one. Wide masses of the people, who better understood
what was what than Halifax did, were indignant at the betrayal
of Czechoslovakia and alarmed at the ever-nearing and growing
of war. More far-sighted circles in the ruling class understood
the abyss into which the country was being dragged by its Prime
Minister, and experienced a feeling of profound humiliation at the
pitiful role he had played in all this tragic affair. One member of
peril

Government itself was found First Lord of the Admiralty

Duff Cooper who could not swallow what had happened, and
on October 1, 1938, demonstratively resigned. However, the
Cliveden set only closed its ranks more firmly, and made an
attempt to shift responsibility for its historic crime on to the
the

shoulders of the
earlier this

was

Union In

Soviet

may seem

the light of

all

narrated

fantastic imbecility, yet nevertheless it

so.

Munich betrayal, Lord

Winterton, a member of the Government, made a public speech
in which he explained that concessions by the British and French

On October 11,

to Hitler

were

1938, ten days after the

inevitable.

of the Soviet Union and

1.

2,

Why?
its

Because of the military weakness

inability

and therefore unwillingness

the time of Munich the war was still going on in Spain.

Documents and Materials Relating to the Eye of the Second World

At

(English edition,

Moscow,

1948),

VoL

II,

pp, 128-9.

ir

HITLER?

MUNICH

obligations under the Pact of Mutual Assistance with

repudiate

WHO HELPED

88
to

fulfil its

When I read Winterton's speech in the newspapers I was very

indignant and asked at once to be received by Halifax, to whom
the
a protest against Winterton's slanderous invention. At
Soviet
of
the
time I made a statement to the press on behalf

made

same
Embassy,

This

in

which

I said:

statement of Lord Winterton's

is

a complete perversion

of the actual position of the U.S.S.R., which was explicitly, and

without leaving any room for misunderstanding, stated by the
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M, Litvinov, in his
speech at Geneva on September 21. In this speech M. Litvinov
recapitulated his conversation with the French charge d'affaires
Soviet
in Moscow on September 2, in which, on behalf of the

Government, he declared that the U.S.S.R. intended to fulfil all

Pact and, together
its obligations under the Soviet-Czechoslovak
the
with France, would afford assistance to Czechoslovakia by
War
Soviet
ways open to the U.S.S.R- He added that the
Department was ready to start immediate staff talks with the
representatives of the French and Czechoslovak War Depart-

ments in order to discuss measures appropriate to the moment/

the following
I thought that matters would end there. But no,
morning, Qctober 12, 1 read in the newspapers the report of a new
lying
public speech by Winterton, in which he repeated his
assertion.

This

finally

enraged me, and

gave the press a second

and sharper statement by the Embassy, in which I said that it was

the
useless to argue with a man who deliberately shut his eyes to
Lord
of
part
on
the
effort
of
amount
no
real facts, but that

Winterton could turn an original falsehood into a truthof

This polemic between the Soviet Embassy and a member
heated
the British Government aroused universal attention in the
question
a
down
put
Party
Labour
The
atmosphere of the day.
in Parliament.

Winterton's statement.

We

could

feel

some small

satisfaction.

Czechoslovakia,

89

The Prime

Minister himself had to reply-

One

and
can easily understand how unattractive this was for him,
how strenuously he tried to remove the blame from his Governto
mental colleague- Nevertheless, Chamberlain was obliged

was small indeed. The great and truly important

to the
consideration which presented itself in all its magnitude
position in
Soviet State and the Soviet Government was Britain's
of course
did
and
arouse,
only
could
the international arena. This
Four
notorious
The
arouse, profound concern and indignation.
Pact had come into existence at Munich, its sharp edge
But

it

Power

repulsive
turned against the U.S.S.R. And in the most base and
masters
unchallenged
the
which
in
form a Four-Power Pact

of Britain and
were the Fascist dictators, while the representatives
behind them.
France were hurrying along in cowardly servility
How characteristic, in fact, had been the behaviour of the British
Government in the critical days of September. It had not once
ILS.S.R.
made an attempt even to consult the Government of the
peace.
on the question of Czechoslovakia and of European
Mussolini,
All the negotiations between Chamberlain and
dictators,
Fascist
the
with
meetings
Chamberlain's travels for

all
all

of Munich, were carried

his agreements with them, including that
without
on behind the back of the Soviet Government, even
made
informing it of what was going on. The only time Halifax
in
developed
had
which
events
contact with me about the
a
is,
at
that
September was in a conversation on September 29,
moment when Chamberlain was already in Munich and the fate
the
of Czechoslovakia had already been settled. But what was

of this conversation? Britain's attitude on the question of

Czechoslovakia? The prospects and lines of an agreement with

subject

Germany and Italy? Nothing of the kind. InhisconversationHalifax

wanted to explain to me why Britain and France had agreed to
enter a conference with the Fascist dictators without the U.S.S.R.
But Halifax's justification was worse than the most severe act of
accusation against Chamberlain's policy. Here are the authentic

words of Halifax, from his own record of our conversation:

'We all had to face facts, and one of these facts was, as he [i.e.
II.M.] very well knew, that the heads of the German Government and of the Italian Government would not be willing in

WHO HELPED

(JO

present circumstances to

seemed

tatives. It

sit

HITLERf

with Soviet represenbelieved it would to him, that if

in conference

to us vital, as I

war was to be avoided, we must somehow or other get matters on to

a basis of negotiation. It was this conclusion that had led the Prime
Minister to

make

ro

his appeal yesterday to Herr Hitler for a confer-

Herr Hitler so desired, others could be invited/ 1

This was a real certificate of poverty, issued to the British
Government by its own Foreign Secretary* For how in fact did

ence, to which,

if

Halifax see the situation which had arisen?

things stands Hitler,

To him

is

At

the centre of

all

addressed the petition of the

Prime Minister of Great Britain to hold

a conference,

on him

depends likewise the composition of the conference. Chamberlain

himself can do nothing. He puts no conditions, he does not even

He simply and gratefully receives from the

hands of the Nazi dictator what the latter is pleased to throw him
from his table. It is difficult to imagine a picture of greater
humiliation for the head of the Government of one of the
greatest world Powers, whose possessions then could still be
express any wishes.

found in
I did

all

corners of the earth.

not hide from Halifax

my

Chamberlain's sharp practice

and quite
words and of

sincere feelings,

In November,

1938,

when

the excitement aroused

by Munich

had somewhat subsided, another serious event took place.

I have already said that on April 16, 1938, Chamberlain and
Mussolini had signed an agreement for friendship and collaboration, but that, in an effort to calm British public opinion even to
some extent, Chamberlain had promised that the treaty would
not be ratified until the Italian troops had been withdrawn from
Spain, in accordance with the plan of the Non-intervention

Committee-

Such a plan,

after

prolonged

and

discussions

arguments, was finally adopted on July 5, 1938. On the question of

the evacuation of foreign combatants from Spain it provided that

unately, however, Halifax 'forgot* to reproduce these objections

number of evacuated combatants on the side which had

fewest of them should be 10,000, while the side which had more
was to evacuate a similar percentage of the total number of
foreigners fighting on its side. Concretely this meant the following. In the summer of 1938 there were on the side of the
Republican Government about 12,000 men, fighters in the famous

a not

International Brigades. Consequently 10,000 foreign combatants

him what
Chamberlain's policy on

frankly

told

thought

of his

international questions, I particularly

emphasized that the weakness displayed by the British Government in the events of 1938 not only did not put off but, on the
contrary, brought closer the peril of a second world war. Unfort-

of mine in

his record of that conversation.

But that

is

infrequent occurrence in British diplomatic documents.

and could not help drawing

What conclusions did I draw

from the painful experience of the Czechoslovak tragedy?
They were simplebutnotatallencouraging-Isaidtomyselfr'This
is how Daladier's France carries out its obligations under treaties
which it has concluded Thisishow Chamberlain's Britain observes
the requirements of the Covenant of the League of Nations!
!

iJ

II,

Documents on British Foreign Policy^ 1919-1939, Third Series, Vol.

pp. 623-4.

the

on the Republican
the Franco side at

side represented 80 per cent

that time,

130,000 foreign combatants,

not

less

on

of their

total.

On

the contrary, there were about

among whom the Italians represented

than 100,000. Consequently, in order to

fulfil

conditions of the Committee's plan, Franco had to send

the

home

not less than 80,000 Italians. Naturally this did not suit Franco,

and therefore in the autumn of 1938 he began a game of postponement. In this he was energetically supported
Italians,

9i

by

the

Germans and

WHO HELPED

92

HITLER?

without
In September, 1938, the Republican Government,
Non-intervenawaiting the conclusion of the negotiations by the
of foreign
evacuation
tion Committee for the proportional

combatants from both

sides,

by

unilateral action

renounced the

a
help of the International Brigades altogether; and
visited
request
its
at
Nations
of
League
commission of the

special

Republican Spain and

certified that the

Republicans had carried

in a
out their decision precisely. Franco found himself

difficult

announced
position, and decided to make a handsome gesture. He
combatants. If even
that he was ready to evacuate 10,000 foreign
they would have
Italians
all these 10,000 consisted only of
Italians fighting
represented only 10 percent of the total number of
on Franco's side. Yet the plan of the Non-intervention
or
Committee required the evacuation of at least 80 per rant,
and
swindling,
of
piece
real
80,000 Italians. Franco's offer was a
fulfilment
obvious to everyone that it was not in any case
it

was

not been
of the plan of the Committee. And, since this plan had
own promise of April,
fulfilled, Chamberlain, in keeping with his
Agreement.
Anglo-Italian
1938, had no right to ratify the
the
But that was still before Munich. Now, after Munich,

Prime Minister had become 'wiser'. I recall how in my

the direct
conversation with Halifax on October 11 I put to him
the
considered
Government
question: whether the British
justify
to
evacuation of 10,000 Italians from Spain sufficient
Halifax's reply was
ratifying the Anglo-Italian Agreement?
that
ambiguous and vague. He dwelt at great length on the theme
the
from
approached
question of evacuation should be
British

the

with the
standpoint of more general problems, and particularly
1
as possible,
object of liquidating the 'Spanish problem as quickly
since

it

was a source of 'acute

international anxiety'.

Halifax said that 'this consideration

of the 'Spanish

[i.e.

problem'I.M.] was

And

good

deal

more important

Italy or
that the precise measures of withdrawal that

Power might have

1.

Vol.

in contemplation.'

p. 331.

any other

Documents of British Foreign Policy,

m,

finally

the speediest liquidation

1919-W9, Third

Series,

chamberlain's sharp practice

It

was

all

clear.

93

The Chamberlain Government wanted

and
throttle the Spanish Republic as rapidly as possible,
therefore ready to close
that is

what

it

did.

its

eyes to Franco's trickery.

The withdrawal of

to

was

And in fact

10,000 Italians was

recognized by Chamberlain to be the fulfilment of the Committee's

on November
plan by Franco, and after this piece of trickery,
16,

1938,

the British

Government

ratified

the Anglo-Italian

Agreement.

had to repeat to myself:

Chamberlain's Britain keeps its word!'

Once again

'This

is

how

ON THE EVE OF 1939

95

Foreign Secretary, and it was the Cliveden set that defined the
main lines of the Government's official policy- That official
policy was directed sharply against the U.S.S.R. and the

II

principles of collective security;

conflict

On

it

between Germany and

was aimed
the

Soviet

at

bringing about

Union and was

and peoples to achieve its ends. The

examples of Austria, of Czechoslovakia, of Spain were particsacrificing various countries

the eve of 1939

ularly instructive.

And what

As the New Year,

of my

over the results

1939, opened I looked back
of the U,S,S,R*
Ambassador
as
six years' work in London

The review was not

cheerful,

ment, had made very great efforts to improve relations between

Britain and the tIS,S,R, This aim was likewise in keeping with
personal feelings and aspirations: from

my boyhood

had

for the British people, its high

cherished sympathy and respect

wanted so much to
help in creating firm co-operation between the two countries, I
was well aware that what the Soviet Government desired was
Yet
also the desire of millions upon millions of Soviet people.
level of culture, its

remarkable

now, in the seventh year of

than modest

literature. I

my

to admit with bitterness that

London, I was obliged

these efforts were bearing less

work

all

in

fruits.

Temporary Trade Agreement had been concluded (after a

cruel struggle!) between the Soviet Union and Britain. For a

year after that Anglo-Soviet relations were of a character that

could be reckoned 'friendly'- I had succeeded in finding in
Britain quite a

among

number of wise,

the ruling class, and

The European horizon was obscured by

sinister clouds.

To

war would be possible only by the friendly

U,S*S,R,, Great Britain, France and the
of
the
and
U,SA, In practice it was collaboration between London and
Moscow that was particularly important. At one public meeting
avert a second world
joint efforts

I had travelled here in 1932 with the very best intentions, and
for six years, carrying out the instructions of the Soviet Govern-

my

did the future hold?

and influential people

good relations with
the U,S,S JL, for Britain,

far-sighted

in establishing

them. All this was good and useful for

for the cause of universal peace.
Nevertheless, power in this country remained firmly in the
hands of the most reactionary elements of the Conservative
Party, Chamberlain was Prime Minister and

94

Lord

Halifax was

during the winter of 1938-9 1 said openly that the question of war
or peace depended in the long run on the character of relations
between Britain and the U,S,S.R, But what I had seen and

observed during

my

work in London, what had

made close co-operation unlikely

six years*

happened in Europe in 1938,

between the Powers who were not interested in launching war.
Least of all could one calculate that Chamberlain would accept
such co-operation.

Of

course, even in such unfavourable circumstances I

would

do all that was humanly possible for a rapprochement between

London and Moscow, for this wa^ my duty as a Soviet
Ambassador, and in this lay the'hope if not of averting at least of
somewhat postponing a second world war.
But all the same we entered 1939 with gloomy anticipations
and with a heavy burden of profound distrust of the then
Government of Great Britain, and above all of its head Neville

Such was the psychological background on

which the events of that year of accursed memory wrote their
Chamberlain,

traces,

have dwelt in such

detail

on

my moods, thoughts and feelings

at all because I attribute some particular personal

importance to them but only because they truthfully reflected

of that time, not

^6

WHO HELPED

HITLER?

what the Soviet people, the Soviet State, the Soviet Government
were thinking and feeling. My psychology was a miniature
photographic reproduction of the psychology of the Soviet
whole, and only in that sense does it merit the attention of the
reader.

PART TWO
1939
All that

has been set forth in the preceding pages represents

only the prehistory of the. tripartite negotiations for a pact of
mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R,, Great Britain and
France, For this reason I have spoken of the events of 1932-8
briefly,

drawing

omitting

many

details (often

my picture in months

very

characteristic),

or even years at a time- 1

and

now go

on to my recollections of the tripartite negotiations themselves,

the main theme of this book, and here I must alter the scale on
which facts and events are depicted. Henceforth it is a question
not of years or months but of weeks, days and in some cases
even hours. That will make the picture more accurate, tangible
and convincing.

The

rape of Czechoslovakia

and Chamberlain's manoeuvres

On

march io, 1939, Sir Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary

and one of the most hardened Clivedenites, made a big speech in
London, In it he depicted the European situation since Munich
in the most optimistic colours. He declared that Britain and France
did not want to attack anyone, underlined that Germany and
Italy had repeatedly given assurances of their devotion to the
cause of peace, and continued:
'Suppose that political confidence could be restored to Europe;
suppose that there was a five-year plan immensely greater than
any five-year plan that

this or that particular

country has

at-

tempted in recent times, and that for a space of five years there

were neither wars nor rumours of war. Suppose that the peoples
of Europe were able to free themselves from a nightmare that
haunts them and from an expenditure upon armaments that
beggars them. Could we not then devote the almost incredible
inventions and discoveries of our time to the creation of a golden
age in which poverty could be reduced to insignificance, and the
standard of living raised to heights that

we have

never been able

to attempt before?

'Here indeed

is

the greatest opportunity that has ever been

of the world. Five men in Europe [Hoare

had in mind the heads of Government in Britain, France,
offered to the leaders

Germany,

Italy

and the U.S.S.R,

singleness of purpose

LM.]

if

they worked with a

and a unity of action to

this end,

might in

an incredibly short space of time transform the whole history of

99

WHO HELPED

100
the world,

HITLER?

Our own Prime Minister has shown his determina-

and soul to such an end. I cannot believe that

in the high endeavthe other leaders of Europe will not join him
our upon which he is engaged/
When one now re-reads the speech of Sir Samuel Hoare it is
example of hypocrisy,
difficult to conceive of a more vivid
really
and complete lack of understanding of what was

tion to

work

heart

stupidity

after Munich
going on in the world (though, of course, Halifax
in Europe4),
had spoken of the coming of fifty years of peace
thoughtful
and
sober
more
the
But even then, in March 1939,
dangerous,
even
and
politicians found Hoare's speech foolish,
of wide circles of the
since it was calculated to lull the vigilance
the very great
people and psychologically disarm them in face of
value of that
danger of war. Real life very soon exposed the true
generously
so
had
gilded tinsel which the Home Secretary

distributed.

Hitler made
Exactly five days after his speech, on March 15,
Prague and
occupied
Czechoslovakia,
his lightning attack on
while
Protectorate,
Moravia a German

declared

Bohemia and

state'. Europe
he transformed Slovakia into an 'independent
earthquake. The
shuddered under the impact of a political

Munich Agreement was torn

to shreds.

How did Chamberlain react?

On that same day, March 15,

the Prime Minister had to

make

House of Commons on the seizure of Czechoto condemn Hitler s

slovakia, Of course, in words he was obliged
recommend any
behaviour, but he did not think it necessary to
action

to

Parliament,

Chamberlain continued ob-

he would as before strive for the return of.

goodwill among all
an atmosphere of mutual understanding and
international disputes by
the Powers, and for the settling of
spite of all that had
negotiation. Chamberlain also asserted that, in
correct, and was
happened, he thought his policy at Munich
opinion.
public
world
of
convinced that it enjoyed the support
only on
not
Chamberlain's attitude aroused a violent reaction,
from
of the Labour and Liberal Opposition but even
stinately to assert that

the part

IOI

certain elements in the Conservative Party. In particular,

Eden

sharply criticized the foreign policy of the Government, and gave

the warning that the annexation of Czechoslovakia

would be

new acts of aggression on the part of the Fascist

Eden vigorously demanded the setting up of an allparty Coalition Government with the task of effective resistance
to aggression, which would for this purpose enter upon close cofollowed by
dictators.

operation with other peaceable States, 1

The

following day, March 16, the British press unanimously

attacked
trusted.

Germany and
The Times

declared openly that Hitler could not be

called the rape

brutal act of repression'; the

of Czechoslovakia a

'cruel

Daily Telegraph described

it

and
as a

'monstrous crime'; the Daily Herald called Hitler's aggression the

postscript to Munich'^ and appealed to the country to organize
resistance to the Fascist dictators jointly with France, the U.S.S,R*

the Yorkshire Posty a newspaper with

and the

Eden was connected,

which

declared that Nazi promises could not be

regarded with the confidence displayed in them in recent times

by

Government. The other newspapers declared themselves in the same spirit.

It was clear that the widest social and political circles in Great
Britain, in particular the masses of the workers, were profoundly
the British

indignant not only at Hitler's aggression but also

a statement in the

practical

THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

of their

own Government- In such

He changed

obliged to manoeuvre-

at

the activities

a situation Chamberlain
his attitude

was

very quickly. As

March 17, i.e, two days after his statement in Parliament,

Prime Minister made a big speech at a Conservative meeting
in Birmingham. The 'soul' of Chamberlain, as subsequent events
proved, had not changed in the least, but the whole tone of the
speech was quite different from that of his words two days before.
This time he expressed his regret for the excessive moderation he
had shown in Parliament, explaining it by the inadequate
early as

the

information he had had at that

actions,
1,

He

moment about

the events in

condemned Hitler's aggressive

and gave the pledge that Britain would resist to the last

Czechoslovakia.

strongly

Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons^ Vol,

34^

cols*

435-62.

WHO HELPED

102

HITLER?

domination of

to establish
extremity any attempts by Germany
must be done to avert
what
of
the world. But on the question

very vague and even

such a menace the Prime Minister was
state that he was not
ambiguous. In particular, he did not fail to
which might have to be
ready to assume indefinite obligations
be foreseen.
conditions which could not at present
fulfilled in

meant that Chamberlain

of mutual assistance ot
was an opponent of the conclusion of pacts
Translated into

more simple terms

this

(he had, of course,

general character with other countries

more
in mind the U.S-S.R.}.
Next day, March
a

manoeuvre,

all

from

Rumanian Minister

in

London,

Tilea,

who

the electrified atmosphere

spread these rumours most actively. In
believed, because a new
easily
of those days such rumours were
Rumania with its oilfields would be
'leap' in the direction of
appetites of the Fuehrer. All
quite in keeping with the aggressive
probable. The rumours
admitted that it was possible and even
it much alarm.
caused
and
reached the British Government
March
18 Sir William
The result was that on the morning of
Moscow, visited the People s
Seeds, the British Ambassador in
his
Aifairs and on the instructions of

Commissar for Foreign

do in the event
Government asked him what the U.S-S.R, would
Litvinov,
evening
same
of an attack by Hitler on Rumania. The
replied that the
on the instructions of the Soviet Government,
danger overhanging Rumania
best means of combating the
of representatives
would be the immediate calling of a conference

Turkey, Poland and Rumania.

Litvinov, that
The Soviet Government considered, added
best of all summoned
psychologically such a conference could be
other place found
to
any
agree
willing to

of

Britain, France, the U.S.S.R.,

in Bucharest: but

In this

it

was

participants in the conference.

by
way began

convenient

all

the U.S.S.R., Britain and France, negotiations destined to play

such a great part in the events which directly preceded the
outbreak of the second world war.

At

this

point

it

will

be timely to dwell for a moment on the

views with which the two sides entered upon the negotiations.
The Soviet side was striving more than ever for the preservation of peace. It understood perfectly

how

close the peril of a

second world war had come, and was ready to use any appro-

means to avert or at least postpone it. The Soviet side

no illusions. Recent experience had left behind only
extreme distrust and irritation towards the British Government,
priate

18,

he also did not at that

spread through Europe
seized Czechoslovakia strong rumours
be
Berlin) that the next victim would

Rumania. It was the

IO3

cherished

Chamberlain undertook one more

be supposed,
the consequences of which, it must
had
time foresee. Immediately after Hitler

(possibly inspired

THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

between
the tripartite negotiations of 1939

and

particularly towards

Chamberlain personally; but the Soviet

side considered that in the sphere

of international relations policy

must be governed by reason and not by emotion. Hence the

Soviet side, even after all the disappointments of the preceding
years, thought it essential to try to bring about co-operation with
Britain

and France for resistance to the aggressors. The represen-

of the Soviet side still nourished a faint hope that possibly

the tragedy of Czechoslovakia had opened the eyes even of the
Clivedenites to the danger of appeasing Hitler, a danger which

tatives

threatened Britain herself, and that in view of this the

berlain

Government might

at

long

last

Cham-

agree to effective co-

operation with the U,S,S.R, in averting a second world war.

And

if such a hope in the long run proved illusory, nevertheless

was necessary to try to come to an understanding with
Chamberlain and Daladier. That was why the Soviet Government
gave its reply with such phenomenal speed (the same dayl) to the
British Government's enquiry of March 18, and made a proposal
which testified to its readiness to take really effective steps against
the danger looming over Rumania.

even
it

The behaviour of the British side, that is, the Chamberlain

Government, was quite different. As later events showed, the
tragedy of Czechoslovakia had taught the Cliveden set absolutely
nothing, The general line of policy of the Chamberlain Government had not altered in the least. This Government, as before, put
its chief hopes upon the launching of a German-Soviet war, and

WHO HELPED

HITLER?

want to quarrel with Hitler, Chamberlain

on not only as a person but also
(1 mention him here and further
Conservative Party)
the embodiment of the majority views in the
therefore least of all did

it

respect of the
maintained his policy of class hatred in
he did not see,
that
passion
that
US.S.rL, and was so blinded by
at that time
precisely
and did not wish to see, that abyss which
Great
before
was beginning more and more visibly to open
1
the course of the 1939
Britain. Hence followed his behaviour in

THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

no other name for it) began on March 18, 1939. The following
morning I received a telegram from Moscow informing me of
the conversations which had taken place between Seeds and
Litvinov the day before, Remembering the tendentious 'subjec-

still

Prime Minister had really been

declared,
concerned for the maintenance of peace, as he repeatedly
him by
to
made
he would gladly have seized upon the proposal
Union on March 18. And if this had happened the
negotiations.

If the

British

the Soviet

taken another
whole sequence of subsequent events would have
such an event
in
that
direction- It is possible, and even probable,
But Chamberlain
there would have been no second world war.
woodpecker:
continued stubbornly to strike at one point, like a
March 1 8 he
on
Therefore
war.
a Soviet-German
the prospect of

to him by the
not only did not seize the hand outstretched
sabotage of
U.S.S-R. but, on the contrary, began that systematic
with the Soviet Government
all attempts at honest collaboration
the negotiawhich ran like a red thread through the conduct of
tions

by the

British side to the very end.

profoundly convinced of the

infallibility

Chamberlain was so

of

his political calcula-

of a German-Soviet conflict, that

tions, and
country much
he did not even notice war creeping up to his own
detail of this
in
more
sooner than to the Soviet Union, However,
of the inevitability

tivity*

of Sir Esmond Ovey during the Anglo-Soviet

The

A
(one can find
sabotage of negotiations with the U.S.S,R.

quotes the followKeith Felling, Neville Chamberlain's biographer,

to his sister: I must
March
of
26,
letter
1939,
Chamberlain's
ing extract from
I have no belief whatever
confess to the most profound distrust of Russia.
if she wanted to. And
even
offensive,
in her ability to maintain an effective
connection with our
little
have
to
me
to
seem
I distrust her motives, which
everyone else by the
getting
with
only
concerned
to
be
ideas of liberty, and

{The Life of Neville Chcmbtrhm, 1946, p- 403)*

of Neville Chamberlain
It will be seen that our own distrust
was well founded.

ears*

at that time

conflict

over

when the Ambassador had

London on his conversations

the Metropolitan- Vickers case in 1933,

sent extremely inexact reports to

with Litvinov,

negotiations in

decided this time, parallel with the Anglo-Soviet

Moscow,

to inform Halifax of

all

that

was going

from my end as well. This would make it easier to

any misinformation on the part of Seeds should he wish
to follow Ovey's example. To be fair, however, I must say that
throughout the tripartite negotiations we had no justification for
suspecting Sir William of any act of bad faith.
And so, having received on the morning of the 19th the
communication from Moscow about the Seeds-Lkvinov talks, I
at once asked for a meeting with Halifax, and repeated to him
what Litvinov had said, Halifax thanked me for the information,
and stated at once that the British Government had that morning

on

there

anticipate

already discussed the Soviet proposal for the immediate

ing of a Six-Power Conference, and had come

summon-

to the conclusion

was undesirable.

that such a conference

asked why.

Halifax's reply

was very

significant.

forward two arguments: in the

first

The Foreign Secretary put

place the British

Government

could not at present find a sufficiently responsible person to send

it was risky
would end.

to such a conference and, secondly,

later,

105

ference without
I

looked

knowing how

to call a con-

with surprise, and did not conceal that

at Halifax

these arguments seemed to

I expressed the

it

me most

opinion that

if

unconvincing. In particular,

the U.S.S.R., Britain and France

were unanimous the conference could not end unsuccessfully.

Halifax, however, did not agree with me, and I drew the only
possible

conclusion

that

evidently he did not believe that

unanunity between the U.S.S.R. on one side and Britain and France

on

the other

was

possible.

This alone was very symptomatic.

WHO HELPED

In conclusion Halifax said

THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HITLER?

Polish

for
that, fully realizing the necessity

governments were now

urgent action, the British and French
might take the place of the
discussing another measure which
more precise reply to my
Soviet proposal. But he evaded a
1
question as to what exactly was intended.

Two days later,

on March

21, this

Government

(the notorious

towards the Soviet Union. This

knocked the

last nail into

Thus
-

the draft

Four-Power

declaration had failed.

now

left

for the Clivedenites to do?

replied very rapidly.

on March 23 I informed
and
March 22 Litvinov informed Seeds,
Foreign Affairs, that
Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary for
measure insufficiently
although the U.S.S.R. considered this
to sign the declaration as soon
effective, none the less it was ready
On the same day, March 23,
as France and Poland did so.
an opponent of the
Chamberlain stated in Parliament that he was
Powers opposed to one another."
setting up in Europe of blocs of
enough already, of the
This still further reduced the value, low
and French.
Four-Power declaration proposed by the British
not fated to
was
But even this politically anaemic declaration
sign it as a co-signatory with the
see the light. Poland refused to
Daladier did not think it
U.S.S.R., and Chamberlain and
pressure on her. In conversanecessary to exercise the necessary
explained the behaviour of
tion with me on March 23, Cadogan
with
Government by its fear that such open association

Fascist

in order to

On

Government again

the Polish

the U.S.S.R.

would make Germany

angry. 3 I

can allow that

this

the refusal of the Poles

motive might have played a certain part in
main reason lay elsewhere ot
to sign the declaration, but the
profound hostility of the then
course. The main reason was the
I.

TV p
'

Documents on British Foreign Policy,

IW'939,

Series, Vol.

coL 14*1.
Series, Vol,
Third
Documents on British Foreign Policy, W*-1939*

J Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol

3.

Third

IV, p. 53*-

345,

shall see further,

the coffin of the tripartite negotiations

became known. The British

we

of 1939,

preferred to have done nothing at

Soviet

'Government of Colonels')

hostility, as

immediate pubUcation
and French put forward a scheme for the
PowersBritain, France, the
of a declaration, signed by four
in the event of a new act
U.S.S.R. and Polandto the effect that
immediately consult
of aggression the Powers concerned would
be adopted.
discuss the measures which should

The

IO7

all.

wave of public indignation aroused

What was

They would have most

this was difficult. The

But

in Britain

stood very high.

by the annexation

On March 22 Hitler had

of Czechoslovakia still
occupied Memel, and Mussolini pronounced a thunderous speech
in support of his action. This

mood

in the country,

still

further increased the anti-

Chamberlain had once again to

manoeuvres capable of tranquillizing, at least to some

extent, excited public opinion. So he thought of a device which
was patent evidence of his complete helplessness.
resort to

On
to

March 31 the Prime Minister unexpectedly

come and see him at twelve noon. When I was

he handed

me

invited

me

in his study

a sheet of paper, saying: 'Please read through

this.'

began rapidly to run through the typed sentences. They

constituted an official statement by the British Government that,
while consultations were now going on with other governments,
I

and before those consultations were concluded, the British

Government would come to the aid of Poland with all its
resources if during that period there occurred 'any action which
clearly threatened Polish

independence and which the Polish

Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their

no reciprocity from Poland.
'I will be reading this statement today at 2 p.m. in the House
of Commons/ said Chamberlain, when I had finished reading. 1
hope its contents will not arouse any objections on your side.
Mr, Stalin in his recent speech at the Congress of your Party also
promised the support of the Soviet Union to any country which

national forces'. Britain required

May
became a victim of aggression and resisted the aggressor
I say in Parliament today that our guarantee to Poland meets with
the approval of the Soviet Union?'

WHO HELPED

io8

HITLER?

but
was outraged by Chamberlain's unceremoniousness,
maintained my external calm and replied:
Without any preliminary
'I do not understand your request.
and quite indepenGovernment,
consultation with the Soviet
I

Government has decided to give a guarantee to

of this decision only now, two hours before its

dently, the British

Poland.

I learn

publication in the

House of Commons.

have not the physical

contact with my
possibility in such a short time of making
Government and learning its opinion of your declaration. How
Government
then can I authorize you to state that the Soviet
on
declaration? No, whatever its contents, I cannot

approves the

my own responsibility

give

you

Chamberlain expressed his regret at my

The same day the Prime Minister informed Parliament of the
explanGovernment's decision. The House approved it. In his
assert that the
atory statement Chamberlain did not venture to
by the Soviet
British guarantee to Poland had been approved
that the
Union, but nevertheless he said: 'I have no doubt
meet with the
principles on the basis of which we are acting
The
Government.'
Soviet
understanding and sympathy of the
impression
the
Prime Minister needed this hint in order to create
inquisitive about
(possibly the general public would not be too
maintaining contact
the details) that the British Government was
work out measures
to
jointly
with the Soviet Government in order
were at that
people
to resist Fascist aggression. The mass of the

was
time demanding such a contact, and the closer it
to Poland.
guarantee
similar
a
gave
At the same time France
the effective
and
Minister
Three days later Beck, Polish Foreign
the better.

During

little, I

no

'Government of

Colonels', arrived in

his three days' stay he carried

on

will

clarity as to

what

this

meant in

London.

negotiations with

British
Chamberlain and Halifax. As a result, the unilateral
so that
one,
bilateral
a
guarantee to Poland was transformed into
independence
event of 'any action' threatening British

in the

addition, it
Poland would likewise come to the aid of Britain. In
formal
was decided to begin discussions for the conclusion of a
Anticipating
countries.
pact of mutual assistance between the two

practice.

On

April 6, in

conversation with Halifax, I asked whether the guarantee

would

be supported by military negotiations between the General

Staffs

of the two countries. The Foreign Secretary's reply was very

characteristic:

'Conversations between the

we parted.

IO9

mention that these negotiations for various reasons

dragged on and on, and the Anglo-Polish Pact of Mutual
Assistance was signed in London only a few days before the
outbreak of the second world war.
The British guarantee to Poland had been announced, a pact of
mutual assistance with Poland had been promised, but there was
a

this authorization.'

reply, and

leader of the

THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

It

may

Staffs, certainly, are

not excluded.

well be that they will be found convenient. But so far

nothing definite about

To my

this

has been decided.'

further question as to

what should be understood by

the Premier's expression, in the course of his statement about the

with Beck, that each side would come to the help of the
other in the event of any threat, direct or indirect*, to its

talks

fi

independence, Halifax shrugged his shoulders and replied:

'Yes, this
clear,

is

undoubtedly a question on which

but the Polish Government and

discussions about

it.'

we

it is

will

vital to

be

have further

Poland was still only a

was vague and mysterious.
On April 7 Mussolini occupied Albania, once again by a
lightning blow. There were stubborn rumours that he would not
confine himself to this, and would also seize the Greek island
It

was obvious

that the guarantee to

scrap of paper. Its future significance

of Corfu.
Panic broke out among the Clivedenites, During barely three
weeks there had been three most undoubted acts of aggression:
on March 15 against Czechoslovakia, on March 22 against
Lithuania, and

now on

April 7 against Albania. Hitler and

Mussolini, encouraged by the appeasers of Paris, London and

Washington, had completely thrown off

1.

P- S3-

all

Could

it

Series, Vol.

V,

restraint.

Documents on British Foreign Policy^ jpjp-jpjp, Tliird

WHO HELPED

110

HITLER?

be that the Cliveden policy of conspiracy with the aggressors

opponents
against the U,S,S,R. had collapsed? Could it be that the
of that policy would gain the upper hand? The Clivedenites could
not reconcile themselves to such a prospect.
And so the most feverish activity broke out in

the
concentrate at Gibraltar and Malta, Halifax made a protest to
tried
and
Albania,
Italian charge d'affaires against the seizure of

him with

the 'strong feelings'

Poland on March 31, and Rumania and Greece on April 13. On

its part, the French Government proposed a draft joint declaration

by the U.S-SJL and France, based on the

On

political circles

London. The Prime Minister had just gone on

returned
fishing in Scotland (he was a passionate angler), but he
meeting
extraordinary
an
was
There
immediately to the capitalLabour
and
Liberal
of the Cabinet with the leaders of the
Opposition in attendance. A special meeting of the Committee of
Imperial Defence was held. British naval forces began ao

to frighten

III

principle of mutual

obligations.

holiday trout-

in

THE KAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

which Mussolini's

aggression had aroused in Britain, Continuous consultations went

on between London and Paris as to what was to be done.

same day, April

the

14, Roosevelt addressed

In Berlin this appeal was met with coarse abuse, while Mussolini
replied that that

was

just

what he was concerned with

strengthen peace and co-operation

among

and France Roosevelt's appeal met with

U.SpS.R, also was sympathetic, and M_

I.

warm

in this sense. But the practical significance of the

to
In such a situation the British Government was compelled
appear
would
do somethingand something, moreover, which
as

display of speed,

resolution

and energy. As a

result,

Chamberlain on April 13 stated in Parliament that Britain was

that
giving a unilateral guarantee to Rumania and Greece, like

which on March 31 had been given to Poland,

On the

same day

the years which have passed since these events many

have
been made to give a satisfactory explanation of the
attempts

Only now, when

Britain

had

hastily

assumed the obligation to

named, did

of the three countries

defend the independence

Chamberlain think it timely to remember theU,S,S.R. On April 14
the Soviet
the British Government made an official proposal to
should give Poland and Rumania the same
given
kind of unilateral guarantee that Britain and France had

Government

that

it

Government

adopted in March and April, 1939. This was not easy, because
from the standpoint of common sense, which the British so
Chamberlain's

resembled

lunacy.

said to

'You know
but what he

behaviour

remember

in

that

those

critical

immediately

weeks

after

the

Rumania and Greece had been proclaimed Lloyd

guarantee to

is

me:
I

have never had a high opinion of Chamberlain,

doing

now is breaking all records

for stupidity

We are giving guarantees to Poland and Rumania, but what can

we do for them if they are attacked by Hitler?

Practically nothing*

Geographically these two countries are so situated that

we

cannot reach them. Even arms and munitions can only be supplied
to

France made a similar statement.

American

During

George

the U.S.A.

The

President's action was, at the very best, modest.

respect,

It

support.

of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) sent Roosevelt a telegram

was stated in Washington that the

the
actions of the aggressors had destroyed confidence on
of
international field, and that this was a threat to the security
men.

to

Kalinin (then President

policy of unilateral 'guarantees' which the British

forces to 1,200,000

how

the peoples! In Britain

spread to the Continent. France, Belgium and

Holland called up certain classes of reservists, and the mouths
of the Scheldt and Meuse were mined- Italy increased her armed

The alarm

an appeal to

Germany and Italy to keep the peace and abstain from aggression.

in

of

them through Soviet territory, The key to their salvation lies

your hands. Without Russia nothing can be done
So first

Moscow, But
what does Chamberlain do? Without coming to any agreement
with the Soviet Union, and in fact behind its back, he distributes
"guarantees" right and left to countries in Eastern Europe, What
all

there should have been an agreement with

crying folly!

What

a disgrace for British diplomacy!'

WHO HELPED

112

HITLER?

There was much truth in Lloyd George's words. It was no

secret to any politically literate person that even if Britain and
France wanted conscientiously to perform the obligations they
had assumed, their help to Poland and Rumania could not be
particularly effective* At best it could take only the form of
operations holding

down part of the German Army to the Franco-

of a naval blockade of
air
raids on her- In Hitler's
Germany, and British and French
hands there would remain in all circumstances sufficient armed

German

frontier,

organization

the

forces rapidly to overthrow the Polish

and Rumanian armies.

the real value of the Anglo-French guarantees?

What then was

And what would have been the
these guarantees being

situation of Britain and France

if,

tested in practice, their military insignif-

icance had been revealed?

Chamberlain's behaviour was in complete contradiction to the

usual caution and prudence of British foreign policy. It looked

break with the diplomatic traditions of the past, and there

was a moment when it even seemed to me that it might lead,
against the will of Chamberlain himself, to great consequences

like a

favourable to the cause of peace. But the power of the Cliveden

set and its thick-wittedness in the sphere of foreign policy soon

my

banished such ideas from

that

Chamberlain was

of provoking a
remained in

mind.

incorrigible,

conflict

full force.

It

very soon became clear

his main political aim

and that

between Germany and

How then could

the U.S.S.R.

one nevertheless explain

When

today,

many

later, I

sum up

know, Chamberlain moved

looking to right or to

saw and
learned from the

all

that I

observed in 1939, and all that I have since

books, memoirs and documents published since the war,

am

But the Prime Minister was overtaken by a tempest of events

over which he had no control- The insolent acts of Fascist
aggression caused profound alarm in France and in a
small

(Belgium,

countries

Norway, Sweden and

ties

whether they had any

gravitated to

Holland,

Switzerland,

number of
Denmark,

which had political or economic

These countries, independently of

others)

with Great Britain,

with Britain, spontaneously

treaties

London and were now

seeking

its

protection

which had suddenly arisen.

The same impudent acts of Fascist aggression aroused in
Britain herself a great wave of public indignation and concern.
People of the most varied views and social condition (including
considerable circles of the bourgeoisie) were involuntarily asking
themselves: Where was Britain going? Where was Europe going?
Could the world really be moving towards Fascist dictatorship?
Was the Government's policy correct when it was only increasing
the appetite of Hitler and Mussolini for aggression? And many,
very many, people (the great mass of the Labour Movement in
against the peril

particular) replied: 'No, the policy of the

and even criminal. There are

the

is

first

needed
place

is

it is

to

Government

sufficient forces in the

the Fascist aggressors, and at

all

is

wrong

world to crush

events to stop their aggression.

combine and organize those

forces,

^And

in

essential to bring into being, together with the

Soviet Union, a mighty coalition for peace and resistance to the

Fascist dictators.'

To

which had
tion of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel, Albania
and would no less easily have put up with
already taken place
and Polandwhich might yet take
Rumania
the destruction of
we
place. An extremely narrow-minded and stubborn man, as

directly to his objective, without

left.

time the leader.

inclined to give this reply:

In March and April, 1939, Chamberlain was as faithful as ever

to his political line. For its sake he put up easily with the destruc-

113

Moreover he had behind him the

powerful support of the Cliveden set of which he was at that

What

the appearance of his policy of guarantees?

years

THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

these external and internal forces

which were counteracting

was also added powerful
U.S.S.R., which was demanding resolute

Chamberlain's general
pressure

from the

line

there

struggle against the German-Italian aggressors as the only

to prevent a second world war.

AH these influences, intertwined

up

in Britain such a political

and

interacting,

way

were building

atmosphere that the Cliveden

set

WHO HELPED

HITLER?

THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

was unwillingly having to face the question of whether it would

be able to remain in power? In order to parry the danger of the
forced resignation of Chamberlain the Cliveden set had to
Samuel Hoare said one Saturday at Lady
necessary to throw the dog a bone to make
was
Astor's house it
be urgent and
it stop barking, if only for a time. Actions had to
manoeuvre.

As

own

And

The whole

action,

foreign policy of Great Britain in those days

was being made by Chamberlain, together with his evil genius

Sir Horace Wilson. As a consequence, the British Government's
actions in March and April, 1 939, often bore an accidental, hasty
and near-sighted character. If there was in them any element of
statesmanship in the main it amounted to the two following
considerations:
(a)

By

giving 'guarantees' to Poland,

the internal opposition

preserved in
(b)

was

to

be

pacified

Rumania and Greece

and the Cliveden

set

office.

on
of aggression by them

certain psychological pressure

Hitler and Mussolini,

and new

acts

would be

exercised

disadvantageous for Britain could be delayed, in the hope that in

the meantime some change in the international situation would
enable the Clivedenites to return to the open and consistent
pursuit of their general line.

The

first

consideration, of course,

was the

principal one: but

taken seriously, since thereby the Clive-

was
were gaining time in the hope of avoiding any necessity
to accept co-operation with the U.S.S.R,
Moreover, as was shown by the suggestion that the Soviet
Government should give a unilateral guarantee to Poland and
Rumania, the Clivedenites cherished the quite unfounded hope

the second, too,

denites

that, in

one way or another,

if

not on the swings then on the

roundabouts, they would force the Soviet Union to serve their

finally, if all

the rest did not produce the desired result,

the Clivedenites had in reserve one

,

more 'way out': to betray

Poland, Rumania and Greece, as they had just betrayed Czechoslovakia, Austria and Spain,

hasty.

himself one of the members of the Cliveden set, willingly drifted

along the stream, leaving the Prime Minister full freedom of

without assuming any obligations whatever in

relation to our country.

Sir

There was no time to think out all the possible consequences of the measures adopted- The best specialists in foreign
policy, like Vansittart or Eden, had been eliminated. Halifax,

interests

nj

Naturally, the Clivedenite policy, so zealously applied

by

Chamberlain, was a policy of blindness and stupidity. The

subsequent course of events demonstrated this completely. But
that always happens when, at a turning point in history, power
is

in the

hands of the representatives of reaction and obscurantism-

THE U.S.S R PROPOSES A PACT

+

117

terms of the alliance should provide the simplest and most

automatic system of sanctions possible against the aggressor.

But the British proposal did not answer such requirements at all.
In the

first

place

it

did not set

up any common combination of the

U.S.S.R., Britain and France to combat aggression in Europe;

confined

event of an attack

The U.S.S.R, proposes

a pact

operations

the British proposal could not prevent

by

war

at all: it

might only

aggression in those directions which were not protected

'canalize*

of mutual assistance

it

by the three Powers only in the

by Germany on Poland and Rumania. Thus

itself to joint

and

guarantees

particularly in such an important direction

for the U.S.S.R. as the Baltic States.

The

Union
Poland and Rumania

British Government's suggestion that the Soviet

should give a unilateral guarantee to

brought the Soviet Government face to face with the question of

what the really effective measures would be to prevent further

What Chamberlain was trying to get us to do was unacceptable

two reasons it could not prevent

to
main aim; and
the outbreak of a second world war, which was our
compared with Britain
it put the U.S.S.R. in an unequal position
for

and France, greatly increasing the danger of an attack by

Germany

fact,

Hitler and Mussolini properly understood only one

argumentforce. Consequently,

to avert further Fascist aggres-

and the inevitable consequence of a second world war , it

was necessary to bring into being such a powerful defensive
inclination to
coalition that Hitler and Mussolini would lose the
and the
France
test its strength. We considered that Britain,
sions,

strength, but
U.S.S.R., taken together, disposed of the necessary
Fascist dictators there
if this was really to stay the hand of the

strength would

really fall

upon them

must be no doubt that this

its turn required
at any new attempted aggression- And this in
be visible,
that the combination of these three Powers should
the whole
indubitable, that its sphere of operation should include
of Europe

and not separate corners of the Continent,

n<5

and

that the

armed

assist-

ance which they would afford one another and the victim of
aggression. Yet this

was of

first-class

importance.

The

Soviet

already had an extremely unpleasant experience with

France in

this respect. In May, 1935, as has already been mentioned, a Pact of Mutual Assistance had been concluded between

the U.S.S.R. and France, but the drafting and signature of a

supporting military convention had been postponed until

The French Governments which

later.

rapidly succeeded one another

thereafter systematically sabotaged

on our country.
In

precisely the dimensions, dates, conditions, etc., of

Union

Fascist aggressions.

the Soviet Government

Furthermore, the British proposal did not provide for any

military convention between the three Great Powers establishing

the conclusion of such a

convention, however, and in 1939 it still did not exist. Naturally

the absence in the British proposal of any hint of the possible

conclusion of a military convention was regarded by the Soviet

Government

very serious defect. Any agreement to combat

had to have sharp teeth. Without such teeth it
became a sword of cardboard, which could be waved but which
as a

the aggressors

could not strike a blow.

When

guarantees were so indefinite, there were

differences

among

the obligations they

common

bound

to be

participants in the agreement in interpreting

had assumed, and

working out
and many other

difficulties in

strategy and tactics, delay in action

loose ends were inevitable. In the long run the British proposition

could not promote that concentration of forces on the side of the

WHO HELPED

n8

HITLER?

peace-loving powers which alone could restrain the Fascist

dictators from new acts of aggression. And still less could it assure
rapidity and unity of punitive operations

the U.S.S.R. against those

who

by

Britain^

France and

might wish to launch a second

THE

PROPOSES A PACT

U.S.S.R.

from a new and

Soviet
sense,

TI9

At this fateful hour the

Government decided to follow only the dictates of common
and to make one more attempt to come to an agreement
terrible catastrophe.

with Britain and France for joint action against the Fascist

But

had to be a

world war.

aggressors.

But the British proposal was not only useless for averting a
new world slaughter: it was also insulting for the U.S.S.R. since
Britain and
it put the latter in an unequal position compared with

forward serious proposals for the adoption of serious means of

France,

not

The

Soviet

Government was

interested here, of course,

in the legal but in the factual state of affairs-

The

factual

situation was that Britain, France and Poland were bound by

agreements for mutual assistance, and in the event of an attack by
Germany on any one of them the other two Powers had immediassistance with all their resources, including

come to
armed forces. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had a
pact of mutual assistance only with France. Neither Britain nor
Poland was obliged to assist it in the event of a German attack.
Yet the granting by the Soviet Union of a guarantee to Poland
and Rumania was bound beyond question to worsen its relation
ately to

its

their

with Germany, and increase the peril of Hitlerite aggression

against the Soviet Union, in particular through the Baltic States.

The

result

was

on the

the other in such an important

and France on
national and State security. This was of the highest

one hand and

respect as

obvious inequality between the U.S.S.R.

Britain

it

really serious attempt, putting

reaching the objective

to avert a second world war.

Taking into account both the British and the French attitudes,
the Government of the U.S.S.R, on April 17, 1939
that is, three

we

days after the British Government had proposed that

give a

unilateral

forward

its

own

basic points:
1.

guarantee

to

should

put

Rumania
amounted to

Poland and

proposition. Essentially

it

three

The conclusion of a triple pact of mutual assistance between

the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and France.

2.

The

conclusion of a military convention to reinforce this

The

provision of a guarantee of independence for

pact.
3.

States bordering

on the U.S.S.R-, from

In handing our counter-proposition to Halifax,

'If Britain

seriously,

and France

really

all

want to

resist

and to avert a second world war, they

I said:

the aggressors

will

be bound to
them
/

accept the Soviet proposals. But if they don't accept

There

made

the

the Baltic to the Black Sea.

a gesture, the sense of which

it

was not

difficult to

understand.

importance.

Such were the main considerations which obliged the Soviet

Government to reject the British proposal. But it did not stop at
that. Although the experience of Czechoslovakia and Spain had
greatly undermined its belief that Britain and France were ready

Halifax began to assure me of the utter seriousness of British and

French intentions, but silently I said to myself: Tacts will show-'
At the same time as he sent me our counter-propositions M- M,

had assumed, although

conscientiously to fulfil
their behaviour over the seizure of Memel and Albania by the
Fascist Powers augured nothing of promise, nevertheless the
Soviet Government did not think itself entitled to wash its hands
of them. The moment was too serious, the peril of a second world

discussion

obligations they

war too great, to allow even quite legitimate emotion to induce it

to throw aside even the tiniest chance of preserving the world

Litvinov recalled

on

me

to

Moscow

to take part in a

and the prospects of its conclusion.

returned nine days

later.

The

On April 19 1 left London, and

sight of Nazi

swastikas and goose-stepping soldiery

decided to travel

London

Government

the question of the triple pact of mutual assistance

by

was repulsive

a roundabout route,

to Stockholm, and

Germany with

me, and

to

plane took

Moscow,

me from

from there to Helsinki, where

the train to Leningrad and so to

its

took

On the way I spent the

WHO HELPED

120

HITLERT

THE

U.S.S.R.

PROPOSES A PACT

121

night at Stockholm, and had a long and interesting conversation

on current political subjects with my old friend of emigrant days,

None the less, the Government decided to continue

the negotiations, and to make every possible effort to persuade the

Alexandra Mihailovna Kollontay, then Minister of the U.S.S.R.

understand that his policy is
leading Britain straight to disaster?' Alexandra Mihailovna asked

and the French to change their attitude. For both at this

Conference and in private conversations with members of the
Government whom I knew, I felt dominating everything, all the
way through, one idea: 'At all costs a new world war must be

me

avoided. An agreement must be reached as soon as possible with

,in

Sweden.
'Can Chamberlain

really not

in Surprise.

I described to her in detail the situation

London, and summed up

which had

arisen in

things, I

at the end:

am

being shown

this just

now by

the

example of Chamberlain and the whole Cliveden set. Of course,

history will punish them severely, but unfortunately that will
probably be after the guns have begun to
In

Moscow

the question of

British

Britain

fire/

of the French Government hi relation to the pact. Our

in France, Yakov Zaharovich Suritz, a most cultivated man with a wide political horizon, willingly acquainted me
with the situation in Paris in all its detail
feelings

Ambassador

attended the Government conference, at which

a triple pact

was examined

in great detail. I

had to

give the fullest possible information and explanation about the

the relationship of forces between

of public feeling in Britain,

the supporters and opponents of a pact, the position of the
Government as a whole and of its individual members in respect
state

of the pact, the immediate

political prospects in the British Isles

and many other questions bound up in one way or another with

the probable destiny of the Soviet counter-proposals.
"When informing the Government, I tried to be honest and
objective to the very limit.

have always considered that an

Ambassador must frankly tell his Government the truth, and must
create no illusions in its midst, either optimistic or pessimistic.
Basing itself on the information of its Ambassador, the Government may enter upon this or that practical line of policy, and if the
Ambassador's information has been artificially coloured in too
rosy or too darkened a hue the Government may find itself in a
difficult or embarrassing situation. Observing this principle
strictly, I have sometimes had some unpleasant experiences, but

do what I thought right. At

remembered conference in the Kremlin, I repeat, I told the truth
and only the truth and the picture in consequence was not a very

nevertheless continued to

and France/

returned the same way, but from Stockholm I flew not

direcdy to London but to Paris, in order to get to know better the
I

'Class hatred can so blind people that they cease to see the

most ordinary

consoling one.

that well-

'With

his defects, and he has plenty,' concluded Suritz,

would nevertheless meet our counter-proposals more

all

'Daladier

favourably than Chamberlain. Moreover, France has already, of

course, its Pact of Mutual Assistance with the IIS.S-R.
at any

on paper
At this very moment, for example, the French
Government is pressing the British to accept our proposals for a
triple pact, made on April 17, as a basis. Leger [the secretaryrate,

general of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs] has even

drawn up a counter-draft to present to the Soviet Government. It
is

not so comprehensive as ours, but

London

doesn't want to accept

on the same

and continues

it,

proposal for a unilateral guarantee

is

by

basis.

But

to maintain

its

the U.S.S.R. to Poland and

Rumania which it made on April 14. I don't know how the

Anglo-French argument will end, but I am pessimistic,
Suritz waved his hand hopelessly, and went on: 'The whole
trouble is that France nowadays has no independent foreign
policy, and everything depends on London. France nowadays is a
Great Power of the second rank, which is still reckoned a Great
3

Power by tradition more than anything else. And the strange thing
is that

the French have

along at Britain's
themselves as

somehow become reconciled to it, and plod

tail.

In the Anglo-French bloc they regard

2, and are not indignant. . . /

Power No.

WHO HELPED

122

how

'Well, and

The

are the

Americans behaving

Americans?' said Suritz.

here?* I asked.

think the

*I

HITLER?

name of

their

Ambassador here William Bullitt tells you the whole story/

There went through my mind a chain of recollectionsBullitt
the representative of President Wilson,

who

come to Moscow with the offer of peace;

in

March, 1919, had

Bullitt the active partici-

pant in Soviet-American negotiations in Washington in 1933 for

mutual diplomatic recognition;

who

bassador in Moscow,

Bullitt the first

American

Am-

became famous for his extravagant

diplomatic receptions 1 and (what was

much more important) who

THE

US,S,R.

and assured him insistendy of the most sincere desire of

the Soviet Government to co-operate with Britain and France in
possible,

me with a sceptical smile,

asked him whether the British Government accepted
our counter-proposals he replied very vaguely that it had not yet

resisting aggression. Halifax listened to

and when

its consultations with France, This had the effect on

of a bucket of cold water. Then he talked of other current

Britain's negotiations

affairs

with Rumania, the various suggesan Anglo-Turkish agreement and so on. I left the
Foreign Office very irritated with the obstinate blindness of the

And now

Cliveden

this

same

from the Soviet Government

Bullitt represented the

U.SA-

very interested in the course of the

sometimes reads them lectures based
his
advice,
negotiations, gives
on his supposed knowledge of the U.S,S.R. and its Government/
Suritz

went on:

Of course,

'Bullitt is

his opinion counts for a great deal with Daladier

and

he supported them energetically in the days of

Munich, and even met Daladier with a bouquet of flowers when
Bonnet. After

all,

the Premier returned

Later on,

when

home

after the

Munich betrayal/

the negotiations had developed, Bullitt

of which the British and French governments were already

well saturated even without his help.
On April 29, the day following my return from Moscow, I
visited Halifax, Still full of my fresh Moscow impressions, I long
spirit

arranged in his Embassy

some witches' Sabbath. During this reception
it was not only a case of rivers of champagne flowing and various dishes in
homeric dimension, but the building itself was transformed into something
1.

Once, for example,

was more

a diplomatic

Bullitt

like

about the rooms, goats ran about among

growling angrily in a 'place of honour* in
a
live
bear
stood
the tables, while
the corner, among the plants* Of course, such a reception was quite an
recalling a menagerie: birds flew

exceptional 'sensation' in

Hollywood

standing of the American Ambassador.

but

style

it

were

my visit to Moscow two events had

clear evidence that the aggressors

added nothing to the

taken place which

had taken the

bit between
and were tearing along at full speed to their criminal
objective: on April 28 Hitler had simultaneously torn up his Pact
of Non-Aggression with Poland and the Anglo-German Naval
Aggreement of 1935- But the Clivedenites did not see, or did not
want to see, these threatening signs of the times, and were wilfully

their teeth,

continuing their

more

than once tried to obstruct them with his 'advice' to Bonnet and
Daladier, This, of course, only intensified the sabotage, with the

reception which

set.

During

in France.

completed

me

tions for

after getting a rebuff

123

and warmly demonstrated to the Foreign Secretary the importance of concluding a triple pact of mutual assistance as rapidly as

under cover of external friendliness to dictate to the Soviet

Government; Bullitt, who had changed from 'friend* to enemy

tried

PROPOSES A PACT

fatal

progress towards the precipice.

How

example, was the following fact which also

occurred during my absence from London, Immediately after the
characteristic, for

annexation of Czechoslovakia the British Government had recalled Nevile Henderson, its Ambassador in Berlin, 'for consultations'

a symbolic gesture to

on April

24, the British

show its dissatisfaction- But now,

Government had permitted Henderson to

return to Berlin. This was also a symbolic gesture, but in the

directly opposite sense.

On May 3 Litvinov was relieved of his post as People's

Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and V, M. Molotov was appointed
in his place, This aroused a great sensation in

Europe at the time,

and was interpreted as a change in the foreign policy of the
U.S.S.R.

Three days later, on May 6, Halifax asked me to come and see

him. Tellingme that Britain had not yet concluded its consultations

WHO HELPED

124

HITLER?

THE U.S.S.R. PROPOSES A PACT

I2J

with other capitals ahout the Soviet proposal for a pact of

mutual assistance, he put the question direct: what did the changes

granting of a unilateral guarantee to Poland and Rumania was

unacceptable for the Soviet Government, and that the only real

which had just taken place in Moscow signify?

'Before communicating our reply to the Soviet proposal/ said
Halifax, 1 should like to know whether these changes also signify

and genuinely

in personnel

a change of policy?

Do

the proposals

made by you

still

hold the

field?' 1
*

Contrary to what

Union do not conduct

their

own

policy.

Every Minister puts into effect the general policy of the Government as a whole- Therefore, although M. M. Litvinov has resigned
as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the foreign policy of
the Soviet Union remains the same, Consequently the proposals
we made on April 17 remain in force/
On May 8, after three weeks of consultation and meditation,
the British Government at length handed us its reply which was

to our proposals for a triple pact of

But what kind of a reply was it? The British
Government repeated in a slightly modified form its previous
proposals of April 14, i.e. it continued to press for a unilateral
guarantee to Poland and Rumania by the Soviet Union- Evidently
also the reply

of France

assistance.

the resistance of France had been of no avail, and the pessimistic

anticipations of Suritz

had been

to deceive

its

own

Clivedenites,

people, a smoke-screen to gain time for the

line

of the Prime Minister,

Government

reacted to the British

purpose of applying the same general

Not

surprisingly, the Soviet

reply with firmness and resolution.

On May

15

Seeds was handed

a written statement in Moscow, saying in black and white that the

1.

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* Third

P- 453-

negotiations.

There was an impasse all the more strange because at that

very time Britain and France concluded a Treaty of Mutual
Assistance with Turkey. Excitement began to rise in the press and

London. The clouds on the international

horizon were growing ever darker. Encouraged by the behaviour
of Chamberlain and Daladier, Hider was becoming more and
in political circles in

more unbridled. Now he opened a furious campaign over Danzig,

and demanded that Poland should return the city to Germany and
give the latter freedom of transit across the Polish Corridor,
Polish

Government

Polish-German

Series, Vol.

V,

rejected these claims.

The
The atmosphere in

was growing more tense, and any day

one might expect an explosion, Yet, in spite of all this, Chamberlain would not hear of accepting the Soviet proposals for a triple
relations

pact of mutual assistance. It

intelligent

justified.

and particularly Chamberlain,

were continuing to put their money on a conflict between
Germany and the U.S.S-R., and therefore did not want to quarrel
with Hitler- It was also clear that all the negotiations for cooperation between Britain and the U.S.S.R. to resist the aggressors
were merely a hypocritical manoeuvre by the British Government

was clear that the

It

triple pact

choice of either a pact of mutual assistance or the collapse of the

often happens in the West/ 1 said, individual

Ministers in the Soviet

mutual

form of resistance to aggression was a

of mutual assistance on the basis of the conditions set
forth in the Soviet proposals of April 17. The whole tone of our
reply was such that the British (and the French) were faced with a
effective

is

not surprising that

all

the

more

among the British

politicians (not to speak of the great

mass of the people) were extremely worried, and were looking for
ways of exercising pressure on the Government.

On May

18 Churchill telephoned to me.

'Tomorrow,' he
Parliament-

satisfactory

way

on
to

said, 'there will

be a foreign policy debate in

intend to speak, and to draw attention to the unthe negotiations with Russia are being carried

But before speaking on this subject in public I would like

know from you what exactly are the Soviet Government's

proposals which Chamberlain doesn't want to accept? There are

many rumours going

I

telephone.
said

about.'

answered Churchill's question in

He

listened very attentively,

with surprise:

detail

on

and when

the spot,
I

by

had finished

WHO HELPED

126
(

in

HITLER?

don't understand what Chamberlain has found unsatisfactory

your proposals,

'You know
conduct/

should think that they are

better

how

all

acceptable/

to interpret the Prime Minister's

I replied to Churchill

with a laugh.

19, there did in fact develop a big debate on

British foreign policy in the House of Commons. Churchill, as he

had promised, made a big speech in which, among

other things,

'Undoubtedly the proposals put forward by the Russian

Government contemplate

triple

alliance

against aggression

between England, France and Russia, which alliance may extend

its benefits to other countries if and when those benefits are
desired. The alliance is solely for the purpose of resisting further
acts of aggression and of protecting the victims of aggression, I
is

wrong with

that

trust

Chamberlain?"

"Can you trust

Moscow they say:

It is said:

the Russian Soviet Government?" I suppose in

"Can we

contemplated offensive scheme against someone or other in whom

The main military purpose and scheme of

produce quick results, to avoid a prolonged war.
prolonged war never suits dictators/
are interested.

the dictators

And

is

to

in order not to permit a quick victory of the dictators

Lloyd George thought

he said the following:

In such questions one must be

guided not by feelings but by an

Personally I believe that the important and vital interests of Russia
dictate to her co-operation with Britain and France in preventing
analysis of the interests involved.

extremely necessary to bring into being

it

as quickly as possible a triple

agreement against them,

'Without the help of Russia it will be impossible to fulfil our
obligations to Poland and Rumania/ said Lloyd George. The
U.S.S.R. possessed the best

powerful tank forces.

the world and extremely

had the Government still not con-

air force in

Why

cluded a pact of mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R.? Evidently

because it did not trust the Soviet Government. 'But has not
Russia the grounds for not trusting us?' exclaimed Lloyd George.
'Since 1930

we have violated

all

the pacts

we have

signed bearing

on a situation like the present.' In conclusion Lloyd George

demanded that the Government should urgently complete the
tripartite negotiations.

Eden

further acts of aggression/

127

themselves against attack from either France, Britain or Russia.

That has never been threatened
They are preparing for some

we

The next day, May

cannot see what

THE U.S.S.R. PROPOSES A PACT

also spoke

warmly

in favour

of the building of a 'peace

After touching on

the assertions of the Clivedenites that a

was impossible because, forsooth, Poland, Rumania

and the Baltic States were afraid of being guaranteed by an alliance
in which the U,S.S.R. was included, Churchill ridiculed these
arguments and added, addressing himself to members of the
Government:
if you
Tf you are ready to be an ally of Russia in time of war
triple pact

are ready to join hands with Russia in the defence of Poland,

which you have guaranteed, and of Rumania, why should you

shrink from becoming the ally of Russia now,

when you may by

that very fact prevent the outbreak of war?'

No

less firmly

did Lloyd George speak at the same sitting

against the Government. Referring to the armament of Germany

and

Italy,

he

They are

said:

not preparing for defence

front as rapidly as possible,

as a first step in this direction

urged the immediate conclusion of a triple alliance between

Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. on the basis of complete
reciprocity and equality. 1

The

firm attitude of the U.S.S.R.,

on the one hand, and the

on
the other, convinced
19,
Chamberlain that he needed to make a new hypocritical
manoeuvre. Otherwise the Government might fall between two
Parliamentary debate on

stools.

And

May

Chamberlain carried out

this

manoeuvre, but on

this

occasion in Geneva.

On May

22 the usual session of the Council of the League of

Nations opened there-

It

was

U.S.S.R. to take the chair.

1.

They are not preparing

and

the turn for a representative of the

The Soviet Government appointed me

Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons^

VoL

347, Cols. 181a-

WHO HELPED HITLER?

128
for this duty;

and on

May

spent several hours in Paris

the French

20

I left

London

me

that

been expressing great

dis-

on the way, and

Government had

lately

for Switzerland. I

Suritz told

and obstinacy of the British in the

negotiations with the U.S.S.R, Even Bonnet, then the French
Foreign Minister and long an enemy of Moscow, thought that
a critical situation had been reached and that an agreement
satisfaction with the tardiness

should be concluded with the Soviet Government as sooruas

^
possible,
Halifax and Bonnet were also going to Geneva, and I had the
prospect of meeting them daily at the Council table for a whole

London, Halifax had kindly warned me

THE U.S.S.R. PROPOSES A PACT

I did

I29

not agree with Halifax, and said that the Anglo-French

guarantees to Poland and

Rumania

did not impress

'Imagine such a case/ I continued. 'Germany

bribery, or combining the tactics of carrot

Poland and Rumania to enter into an

alliance

by

and

me

either,

terrorism, or
lash, induces

with her against the

Germany transit for her troops through

their territory. In that event the British and French guarantees do
not operate, because they are valid only on the condition that
Poland and Rumania themselves are offering resistance to
Germany. Consequently in such a hypothetical case, which is by
no means improbable, the U.S.S.R. would have to fight Germany
U.S.S.R., or at least allow

that

single-handed, without receiving any help from the Western

he hoped to continue negotiations with myself in Switzerland. In

of May 22, and
fact, we had a meeting at Geneva on the morning

Powers/ Halifax tried to parry my arguments by pointing out

that France and the U.S.S.R, have a Pact of Mutual Assistance.
'Quite true/ I replied. 'But there is no such pact between
Britain and the U.S.S.R., and that is of very great importance.'
Then Halifax suggested: 'Perhaps we could add an article to
our proposals binding the States which have a common frontier

week. While

still

had a long, and

in

in a certain sense a 'decisive, conversation about

the pactHalifax began

ment was

by asking me to

why the Soviet Governof May 8 (i.e. the slightly

explain

rejecting the British proposal

touched-up original proposal that the Soviet Union should give

a unilateral guarantee to Poland and Rumania).
I replied that

we were

rejecting the British proposal for

two

main reasons: (a) we were striving to prevent war

which was possible only with the help of a triple pact of mutual
altogether,

assistance,

whereas

most important

the British proposal completely ignored this

aspect;

and

(b) the British proposal put the

with Britain

and

U.S.S.R. in an unequal position compared

France, to which we could not in any way agree. And I briefly
explained where we saw this inequality (I have already discussed
Halifax began to argue that there was little probability of an
and
attack by Germany on the U.S.S.R. through the Baltic States,

such an attack did take place Poland and Rumania

would also without doubt be drawn in, and in that event the

even

if

Anglo-French guarantees to these two States would

come to
force. In this way Britain and France would in practice
enter into

the aid of the U.S-S.R.

through their

object of attacking
I

or

territory,

German

transit

of German troops

bases to be built with the

your country?'

expressed the opinion that the border States were hardly

likely to agree to accept such

agree

would be simply unable

an obligation, and even

to observe

it.

if

they did

All these complicated

and tortuous combinations, which the British

many

efforts in

character.

way

working

They

out,

side had spent so

were of a half-hearted and amateur

decided nothing.

The only genuinely

effective

to resist aggression was the triple pact of mutual assistance

being proposed by the Soviet Government,

this above).

that

with the U.S.S.R. not to allow the

Then

of a sudden Halifax took it into his head to try to

frighten me. Such a pact might arouse Hitler to fury, he would
begin to shout about 'encirclement' of Germany, this would
unite the

all

whole German people around him, and he would launch

way ^e would ourselves provoke precisely what we

a war. In this

wanted to avert by our

actions.

I retorted that Halifax evidently

1

did not understand very well

WHO HELPED

1^0

the psychology of men like Hitler. In his

all

He would

a fool.

lose

it-

HlTLERf

THE U.S.S.R. PROPOSES A PACT

own way he was not at

never engage in a war if he thought he might

Even our present

negotiations were forcing

him

to display

But
a certain care: so
would
Hitler
if a triple pact of mutual assistance were concluded
be obliged to retreat. People like him recognized only one
argument force. The Soviet Government knew this well from
far,

for example, he had not attacked Poland,

its

experience with Japan.

would bring

And

a triple pact of mutual assistance

on

into being such a concentration of power

of the forces of peace that there would be nothing

the side

left for

the

Government

any agreement for a triple pact of mutual

assistance that there should be guarantees of security not only for
the small East European States, but also for those in the West
(Halifax gave me to understand that he had in mind Belgium,

was ready

to provide in

could not say anything about this

at the

moment,

on behalf of the Soviet Government, since such a problem had not

been raised or discussed up to the present: but I thought it could
be examined^ and it did not seem to me very difficult to solve.
Our conversation lasted an hour and a half, and when I was
leaving it seemed to me to have made a considerable impression
on the Foreign Secretary. In any case I had given him quite clearly
.

to understand that in order to achieve agreement the Soviet

Government could make concessions on secondary questions,

but would accept no compromise on the basic three points which

have been mentioned earlier (a triple pact of mutual assistance, a
military convention, guarantees of security for

tions or agreement

Warsaw'

On

(i.e.

of paragraph

lines

break
4,

think the

down of negotia-

telegram No. 165 to

LM,).

same day, May 22, I had a conversation on the same

basic theme with Bonnet. The French Minister for Foreign
Affairs was in a much better frame of mind that Halifax, and we
soon came to an understanding. He even slightly complained of
the British for their slowness and obstinacy.
Now the British Government was faced firmly with the choice:
either
or. Chamberlain understood that at the present stage of
development his new manoeuvre (and he was thinking only of a
manoeuvre) was bound to include a triple pact. But, as further
events showed, the Prime Minister remained unalterably loyal to
his previous general policy.

Two

days

later,

on May

24,

he made a short statement in the

assessed the immediate prospects

all

with great optimism.

1 have every reason to hope that as a result of proposals which

now in a position to make on the

His Majesty's Government are

main questions
agreement

at

on

his

main points of

on

it

will

be found possible to reach

full

This hypocritical optimism was needed by Chamberlain

at the

time in order to calm British public opinion.

On May 25 Sir William Seeds, the British Ambassador in

Moscow, handed the Soviet Government the new proposals of
the British Government mentioned by Chamberlain in his
Parliamentary statement.

the small

insistence

arising,

an early date/ 1

22 with the following words:

'I am afraid I was unable in the course of the long conversation
at all

on

i.e.

the

Today, reading the documents published by the British

Foreign Office, I see that my impression at the time was justified.
Halifax concludes his record of tile conversation with me on May

M, Maisky

direct aggression

disagreeably plain,

a triple pact of mutual assistance

countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea).

to shake

is

House of Commons in which he

Holland and Switzerland).

I replied that I

choice before us

aggressors but to quieten down-

In conclusion Halifax asked whether the Soviet

mutual guarantee against

triple

131

1.

Ibid., p. 66%.

TWO DRAFT PACTS

133

with the U-S-S.R, a united front against aggression. In any

case we thought our political and historic duty, in spite of all the
disappointments of the past, was once again to make an attempt to
find a common language with the British and the French govern-

Two
And

so, it

ments.

draft pacts

seemed, the main

difficulty in the negotiations

had

we acted quickly and resolutely.

raised to
That was exactly how the Soviet side was getting

ready to

act.

were thinking approximately on the following lines: The

recognized in
triple pact of mutual assistance has now been

We

and French

guarantees for the Baltic States;

know

that

we

we know that the British

on
and French are insisting on guarantees for a number of countries
in which they are particularly interested (Belgium, Greece,
Turkey, etc.); in principle neither we nor they object to such
guarantees and consequently it will not be difficult to agree on
supporting
this point; the desirability of the political pact and the
insist

military convention entering into force simultaneously cannot

arouse any doubts and, consequently, on this point too it will

be easy to arrive at a settlement. From all this it is clear that the

both
prospects now opening are favourable, if, of course
sides really want an agreement. We want it very much indeed
.

but what about the British and the French?

We hoped or, more precisely, dared to hope that even now,
by the beginning of June, the British and French Governments
.

had learned something, and had realized the necessity (even

though it was for them a not quite pleasant necessity) of forming
132

all events in the course of June,

Unfortunately we were completely mistaken. Chamberlain and
Daladier (I use the name of Daladier, here and later, as that not
only of a person but also of the embodiment of the notorious '200

families')

policy

continued to hold firmly to their unswerving

of

Germany on

line

of

Even at this
moment, when the dreadful spectre of a second world war could
already be clearly seen on the horizon, they were thinking, most
setting

of all, not of how to conclude a

but of how to avoid signing

strike, if

sides; the British

convinced that with goodwill pn both

of mutual assistance could be concluded in a

very short time, and at

been overcome. The governments of Britain and France had at

of mutual
last recognized the necessity of concluding a triple pact
and
manoeuvres
opposition,
their
assistance. True, on account of
purpose,
to
no
hesitations ten weeks of valuable time had been lost
but still it was not too late to arrest the hand of the aggressor

principle by both

And we did make it,

sides the triple pact

to the U.S.S.R,

triple pact as speedily as possible

it.

Did the British and French governments realize that a new

by Hitler was close at hand? Yes, they knew it, and I can

'leap'

bring convincing evidence of it.

On

June 12

had an important

conversation with Halifax, to which I shall return

course of it I asked him

The

how he

British Foreign Secretary

later.

In the

thought the summer would pass?

answered

me

in the following

words
quote his own record):
It seemed to me that Herr Hitler would find it difficult to face
the Nuremberg Conference without first having made an attempt
to solve the Danzig problem, and that, if this were so, we must
expect that July and August would be disturbed months/ 1
As we see, the British Government understood perfectly well
that a thunderstorm was looming ahead, and that on this occasion
what was at stake was the fate of Poland, the integrity and
independence of which Chamberlain and Daladier had just
guaranteed. The British Government surely realized that without
(I

an agreement with the U.S.S,R.

1.

it

could not save Poland. Yet in

Documents on British Foreign Policy^ 1919-1930, Third Series, Vol.

The 'Conference' Halifax had in mind was the big Fascist parade

VI, p. 50,

which the

Hitlerites organized every year in

September

at

Nuremberg.

^HO HELPED

134
spite

of

this,

HITLER?

instead of concluding the triple pact as rapidly as

from the beginning of June it embarked on an obstinate

it had officially just admitted to
sad
story
of
this
sabotage will be told in the
be necessary. The
following pages. At this point I want to repeat that it is difficult
in the annals of diplomacy to find another example of such double^
dealing and hypocrisy as the behaviour of Chamberlain and
possible,

sabotage of the very pact which

Daladier in the tripartite negotiations of 1939.

to find a

more
At

class hatred.

Britain

It is also difficult

vivid example of political blindness dictated

by

the same time the attitude of the governments of

and France

months of the negotiations

they were least of all concerned to

in the critical

doubt that

beyond
save Poland, and that Poland, like Czechoslovakia the year before,
was for them only a bargaining counter in their big game with
Hitlerite Germany.
Recalling those days, I must include one more figure which
played no small part in the Anglo-French sabotage of the trithe figure of Joseph Kennedy, then
partite negotiations
Ambassador of the United States in London and father of the
present President of the U.S A.
all

testifies

Scion of a wealthy family, Joseph Kenedy made a rapid career

and business man, and by the time he was in his fifties

had become very wealthy indeed. For his services to Franklin D.
Roosevelt during his election campaign he had received the
as financier

customary American recompense, and had arrived in Britain as

Ambassador of the U.S.A. in 1938, Here he at once became one

of the 'sensations' of the season first of all as the father of nine

children That is not very frequent among members of the
Diplomatic Corps. For several months the smiling face of the
I

American Ambassador constantly adorned the pages of the newspapers and magazines sometimes with his whole family, some-

times with his

four sons, sometimes with

his five daughters.

Then

began a campaign of honourary LL.D. degrees for Kennedy: six

universities (Dublin, Edinburgh, Manchester, Birmingham,
Bristol and Cambridge) conferred this honour upon the American
Ambassador. On each occasion all kinds of praises were lavished

TWO DRAFT PACTS

135

upon him, and the photographers reproduced his likeness, now in

his Doctor's gown, now without it, sometimes in his academic cap
and sometimes bareheaded.
However, the American Ambassador devoted himself not only
to society life and representative functions: he also took an active
part in politics.
set.

And here he soon became the idol of the

Cliveden

Two main ideas dominated Kennedy's mind: faith in the might

of Hitlerite Germany, disbelief in the

vitality

of Great

Britain.

As

American Ambassador was far from benevolently

to the U.S.S.R., he naturally became the apostle of

in addition the

inclined

appeasement of the aggressors.

He

supported the policy of

Chamberlain during the Czechoslovak

crisis, and said after

Munich that the British people should put up a statue to
their Prime Minister for having saved Britain and Europe from

war*

how somewhat

later, in June 1940, after France had

and
capitulated
Britain was faced with the question of whether
she should make peace with Germany or continue the war,

I recall

Kennedy visited me at the Embassy and asked me what I thought

it. Kennedy himself was almost in a state of panic. He

about

thought that Britain was powerless in face of Germany, that she

had lost the war hopelessly and that the sooner she signed a peace

The American Ambassador was very

with Hitler the better.

surprised

when

began

nothing was

to disagree,

and

to

prove to him that so

had great possibilities to

and to beat off the German threat, provided, of
course, she retained her courage and readiness for struggle, I
far

lost, that Britain still

resist successfully

emphasized

that,

according to

my own observations,

the spirit of

the great mass of the people

was firm, and that even in the ruling

were people who would not want to put up their hands
of the impudent Fascist aggressors. Hence I drew the

class there

in face

conclusion that

it

would be wrong

exceptionally dark colours.

When

to paint the prospect in

had finished Kennedy with a

gesture of surprise exclaimed:

'Well,

you know, you

are just an optimist, ... I have never

heard anything like this even from the

British.'

WHO HELPED

136

HITLER?

Of course not! The only

British with whom Kennedy mingled

of the Cliveden brand, who believed neither in

TWO DRAFT PACTS

iyj

themselves nor in the future of their country.

Naturally, this draft could not at all satisfy the U.S.S.R, because
of a number of defects. The principal among these were;
In the first place it linked the triple pact with the League of

However, at that moment there was in power in Britain a

Government headed by Churchill. It had its defects, but never-

Nations. This meant in practice that, given the rules and manners
dominating that organization at the time, the pact would never

were

British

theless

it

better reflected the feeling of the masses: and Britain as a

lead to quick and effective action. All

Germany, The American

Ambassador and his friends wrung their hands in despair, but
history has fully justified the decision of the British Government

words and paper

of that day.

France

result did not capitulate to Hitlerite

It

is

easy to understand

influence,

and

how

man

like

Kennedy could

really did influence, the behaviour

in the tripartite negotiations of 1939*

for Chamberlain in

all

He was

of the British

a faithful support

the complex gyrations of that lamentable

affair.

On May

25 Seeds

Naggiar proposed

Government.

was sent new

instructions. In

keeping with

Its

their draft

essence

of a

triple pact to

the Soviet

was the following:

Britain,

of the League of Nations', would give one another all the support
and assistance in their power in three cases: (a) should any of them

be subjected to aggression on the part of a European Power: (b) if

any of them were involved in military action as a result of a
guarantee which it had given to any European State; and (c) if any
of them were involved in military action as a result of assistance to
any European State which, while not having a guarantee from the
participants in the pact, had nevertheless requested such assistance
in resisting aggression (Articles 1

and

1.

come

to the aid of Britain

its

and

they were involved in war as a result of their guarantees

to Poland, Rumania, Greece and some other States, but it did not
if

bind Britain and France to come to the aid of the U.S.S.R- if the
latter were involved in war as a result of an attack by Germany on
the Baltic States, since Britain

and France had not given them any

The three governments should discuss together the methods

The pact was

pp. 679-80-

in case of

to remain in force for five years. 1

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third

surprises

from

that direction.

about reinforcing the pact with a military

convention was formulated in such general and indefinite terms
Finally, the clause

it

was difficult to say when the military convention would be

and whether it would be signed at all. The impression was

signed,

inevitably created that the British and French conceived of the

pact as one more 'piece of paper' with which to speculate in their

Germany, but not as a real instrument for

armed with sharp teeth.
The content of the Anglo-French draft pact aroused melancholy reflections, and foreshadowed nothing good- Nevertheless
negotiations with

resisting aggression,

the Soviet side decided to continue the negotiations in the hope of

gradually straightening out the position. Therefore on June 2 the

Soviet

Government presented its partners in the

negotiations with

a counter-draft, the substance of which

2).

by which such mutual support and assistance would,

need, be made most effective (Article 3)*
3,

put the U.S.S.R. in an unequal position with

partners, obliging the U.S.S.R. to

that

France and the U,S.S,R., 'acting in accordance with

the principles of Article 16, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Covenant

2,

it

to fine

guarantees. Yet the U.S.S.R. could always expect unpleasant

them, the British Ambassador in Moscow and his French colleague

1,

Secondly,

would be confined

resolutions.

Series,

was the following:

1. France, Britain and the U.S.Sit. afford one another immediate and effective aid if any of them is involved in hostilities with a
European Power in the event of;
(a)

VoL V,

aggression

by

that

Power

against one of the signatories of

the pact;
(b) aggression

by

that

Power

against

Belgium,

Greece,

WHO HELPED

38

HITLER?

Turkey, Rumania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland, whom

Britain, France and the U.S.S,R, had undertaken to defend against
aggression;

being granted by one of the signatories of the

(c) assistance

Power (not among those guaranteed) which

has requested such assistance in

its

struggle against violation^ of

its neutrality,

undertook not to conclude an armistice of peace except

by common
3.

consent.

In the event of a threat of aggression arising on the part of a

European Power, the three signatories would immediately consult

and, should it become necessary, decide in common when and how
the machinery of mutual assistance should be set in motion,
irrespective of any procedure laid down by the League of Nations
for the examination of this question.
4.

The three signatories would

as rapidly as possible conclude

an agreement as to the methods, forms and dimensions of their

mutual assistance. The pact would enter into force simultaneously
with
5.

agreement.

this

The

It will

pact was to be concluded for a five-year period.

be seen that the Soviet

draft,

Baltic countries
its

brought into being equality between the

western partners) and it laid down firmly that the
(i.e. it

pact and the military convention

would enter into force simultane-

ously. In addition, the Soviet draft pledged

pact, in the event

only by

common

all

participants in the

of war, to conclude an armistice or sign peace

consent (though this latter point in the pact did

not play any substantial part in the negotiations).

Had

far

mentioned

all

the countries which they them-

as particularly interesting them,

and

did in fact create an effective and rapidly operative machinery of

mutual assistance for resisting aggression.

Had
was

they been

lacking!

But that was just the main condition which

Chamberlain and Daladier were hypocritically

up a serious barrier

in the

way of Fascist aggression

they should have welcomed the Soviet draft and accepted

it as soon as
were cursing the day and hour when bitter
necessity had forced them to begin tripartite talks. That was just
why they had so pitilessly emasculated the very soul of the

possible, but in reality

pact in their draft of May 25, That was just why, when they met
with the Soviet counter-draft of June 2, they began a wearisome

and prolonged sabotage with the help of endless amendments,

reservations, additions and alterations. When they lost one
position in this process they clung to another,

second they snatched

it

at a third,

when they lost the

and so on without end. The most

obvious things were suddenly subjected to question and doubt.

Under our pressure the British and French were forced constantly
to take step after step backwards: but they did

it slowly, unwillgrinding their teeth and demanding on each occasion some

'compensation* from us for every such 'concession*.

ing^

remember

heavy with the

that stifling, exhausting

electricity

of thunderstorms,

all

summer of

1939,
those arguments,

conversations, meetings, discussions, disputes and compromises

in the atmosphere of which I had to pass that summer, I can in full

have never had a more painful period in my

world was rapidly sliding to disaster, that the
efforts of giants were necessary to avert a new world-wide
slaughter and here before my eyes, on the banks of the Thames
and the Seine, pygmies were crawling about who did not want to
sincerity say that I
life,

I felt that the

understand, and did not understand, what was going on in the

world, and who were living only for the day, sunk entirely in
petty

the governments of Britain and France been sincerely

striving to set

fully guaranteed

it

had so

When

while of a purely defensive

character, eliminated the defects of the Anglo-French draft. It

broke off its links with the League of Nations, it gave a precise
list of States guaranteed by the three Great Powers, including the

U,S,S.R. and

selves

declaring that they wanted a pact, and even wanted

In the event of joint military operations beginning as a

result of the application of the pact, the three Powers which had
2.

it

rapidly: for

j-j^

it

pact to any European

signed

TWO DRAFT PACTS

moves and counter-moves of standard diplomatic

routine*

TO NAME OR NOT TO NAME

141

simply put on record that on June 12 Strang left London by air

and arrived in Moscow on June 14, Here he took an active part in
the negotiations right up to the beginning of August.

To name

In order to conclude the pact really quickly, as was our main

aim, and at the same time to probe the genuine intentions of our

or not to

name

Government decided to invite Halifax

Moscow- However, not being certain of his attitute to such a
step, it clothed its invitation in a more careful form- On the mornBritish partners, the Soviet

to

To be fair to the British and French, they speedily retreated on

the question of the League of Nations, and even attempted to

present matters as though differences had been caused

misunderstanding:

it

by

a pure

wasn't that they had had in view that League

procedure should be applied in connection with the

triple pact,

was only a question of putting on record, in

the academic sense, that the pact was in keeping with the principles
of the League of Nations, I had considerable doubts as to the
sincerity of such an explanation, and a much greater part was
probably played by the complete discrediting at this time of the
League as an instrument for combatting aggression; nevertheless,
it was a fact that in the first days of June this item in our differences
had already disappeared. The Soviet side welcomed this step
forward in the negotiations, but abstained for the time being from
any guesses about the future.
but, they alleged,

On

it

8 Halifax told

June

me

that, in

order to accelerate the

he had decided to send to Moscow a prominent

of the Foreign Office, William Strang- This created a mixed

negotiations.,
official

impression.

On

the one hand, the dispatch of Strang, a

man of

and well acquainted with the Soviet Union through

his past work there, seemed to bear witness to the desire of the
intelligence

Government to reach agreement as rapidly as

the other hand, it seemed somewhat strange that
British

possible.

On

for such an

important purpose instead of an important political personality an

official

(even if a capable one) of the diplomatic department should

be sent, Halifax's information put

me

a litde

on

my guard,

but I

did not wish to draw any premature conclusions. Therefore I

140

ing of June 12, the very day that Strang

for the U.S.S.R., I

left

received an instruction to visit Halifax immediately and 'purely

personally' and in friendly fashion to

come

to

to

Moscow

as

soon

'Now

pressingly

as possible in order to complete the

negotiations and sign the pact.

Secretary and carried out

recommend him

The same day I visited the Foreign

my instructions,

I said:

have agreed on the most important

question, and the pact of mutual assistance is to be concluded
between the three States, it is most important that this necessary
diplomatic act should be rounded off without any delay. The
that the sides

international situation

must hurry

may

is

extremely tense, and events fraught with

may occur in Danzig at any moment

peril

If the triple pact

cool off Hitler considerably

in this.

is

The forces of peace

signed in the next few days

I think

Thinking over what could

we

are

facilitate

all

it

interested

the speediest

possible creation of a triple coalition against the aggressors,

have

come to the conclusion that a great deal depends on you personally, Lord Halifax- If you were to agree immediately, this week or
at latest next, to go to Moscow, to carry the negotiations through
to the end there and sign the pact, peace in

preserved. Is not this task

Europe would be
worthy of an important statesman, and

ought not every possible effort be made to achieve it successfully?

can assure you quite definitely that the Soviet Government

would welcome such a decision on your part, and you would meet
with the wannest possible reception in Moscow/
I

watched Halifax attentively while

was speaking. His imAs I went

adopted a more and more serious expression. Halifax was a

passive face at

on,

it

first

preserved

its

usual sceptical smile.

WHO HELPED HITLER?

142
experienced

sufficiently

diplomat

to

know

that

the

Soviet

TO NAME OR NOT TO NAME

143

greater pleasure, I did not feel that

it

was possible for

me

Ambassador could not advise him so pressingly, even though it

was 'purely in a personal capacity', to make the journey to

present to absent myself from

Moscow

was reduced here to a few very streamlined phrases, there are

least two definite untruths in Halifax's record, quoted here,

he had not had the sanction of his Government.

If, Lord Halifax/ I concluded, you thought it possible to
travel to Moscow now I would ask my Government to send you>
an official invitation/
if

became severe and enigmatic. He gazed

the ceiling, then stroked the bridge of his nose and

Halifax's expression

attentively at
finally said
C

I will

with great significance:

have

this in

mind,

byand

everything was

In the
to

Halifax continued to be silent.

want

to

go

to

Now

Moscow, and

views but a simple manoeuvre imposed on it by circumstances. It would be quite impossible to put our trust in this
agreement. In this way the Soviet Government had the reply to
its

had been

interested: Halifax's passivity

end of the negotiations he did not return to the

had raised) was more eloquent than the most elaborate

'I

did not feel

Secondly, Halifax in his record asserts that he at once told me

it was impossible for him to go to Moscow at the time, when

Foreign Secretary said nothing of the kind, replying

my proposal in mind.
If the second untruth is not of particular importance, the first
was a real and malicious falsification which completely distorted
in reality the

only that he would keep

the truth. I don't

question

counsel with

diplomatic statement.

but there
later, I

can add a very important postscript

to the conversation with Halifax

on June

12, 1939,

which

have

The Documents on British Foreign Policy published

by the British Government contain a record of this conversation

made by Halifax himself immediately afterwards. How does he
represent there

the

literal text

'7,

thing
to

my invitation to him to come to Moscow? I quote

M- Maisky remarked that it would be a good

when things were quieter, I were to go to Moscow myself,

which

I replied that, whilst nothing,

is

God

know whether

of course, would give

me

Halifax took his customary

before making the record of our conversation,

no doubt on

this

point that the Noble Lord on this

occasion behaved in quite unworthy fashion,

The question obviously arises, why did he need to do

explanation

is

that as the records

sadors were usually circulated to

Halifax wished to conceal
colleagues, lest

it

this?

My

of conversations with Ambasall

members of

the Cabinet,

my invitation even from his Ministerial

might cause

internal complications

members of the Government. For

of this record:

In conclusion
if,

Moscow only after things 'became

is confirmed by Halifax himself, since in

what his reply was to my proposition, he says:
that it was possible for me at present to absent

(for until the

just described.

to visit

evidently after the signature of the pact. In essence

i.e.

myself from London': in other words, what we were talking

about was a visit by him 'at present', and not in some distant

that

Today, many years

were

his record, stating

future.

means ensure

the truth of my version

agreement to sign a triple mutual assistance treaty,

had informed us on May 2j, was not a sincere change

pact. Its

it

that very

Europe: whereas Halifax says exactly the opposite

was advising him

quieter',

clear: Halifax didn't

the question in which

recommending Halifax to go
that 'things

quieter* in

Government was not dreaming of a rapid conclusion

in

insistently

1939, in order urgently

of the

it

was

by

to sign the pact and

the British

of which

place, I

first

at

Moscow at once, in the middle of June,

that I

understood, of course, that Halifax could not decide the

question of going to Moscow without it being discussed in the
Cabinet. I waited a few days; there was no reply to my invitation,

week went

Leaving aside the fact that our fairly long talk about the journey

at

London/ 1

at that

among

the

time the whole foreign

policy of Great Britain was in effect concentrated in the hands of

1-

VI> p-

Documents on British Foreign Polky, 1919-1939, Third

j 1.

Series,

Vol.

WHO HELPED

144
three
role

Chamberlain, Horace Wilson and

men

HITLER?
and the

Halifax,

of Wilson was moreover much more important than that of

Halifax.

The

services

my

supposition

confirmed by one other

is

About the same time, learning of Halifax's unwillinggo to Moscow, Eden on his own initiative offered his
to the British Government
1

*I

have reason to believe, he

...

inconvenient for Lord Halifax to go to

charge

However,

me

the

that the Russians are not

If for

some reason

Moscow

at present,

it

is

send

with the completion of the negotiations/

Chamberlain Government rejected Eden's

proposal. 1

it

we had

and what

set ourselves,

have to

on the main

The whole of June

relate will

Alas,

we

show why. At

never

present

stages of those negotiations.

passed in dispute (only to think of

it!)

about whether the countries which the three Great Powers were
to guarantee should or should not be named in the text of the
pact.

As

pointed out

the Anglo-French draft of May 25

earlier,

contained a clause binding Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. to

come

to one another's assistance

the event of their being

involved in war as guarantors of some European State- This was
too general and indeterminate a formula, which in practice

permitted of various interpretations.

Had

relations

between the

Government on the one hand and the French and British

governments on the other been founded on friendship and mutual
Soviet

And so we now knew that the British Government had had no

change of heart, and that it remained true as before to the political
line of the Clivedenites, None the less the Soviet Government
decided to continue the negotiations despite

through to the

bitter

end

its

the Soviet people and of

all

all,

and

to carry

attempt to assure peace

creation of a triple coalition. This

was

dictated

mankind.

It

by

was

by

the

the interests of

dictated

by our

responsibility to history.
I

reached

145

stated,

unfriendly disposed towards me,

me and

forward to the aim

I will dwell only

accuracy of

striking fact.

ness to

TO NAME OR NOT TO NAME

have not the space here to describe in

we might possibly have reconciled ourselves to this

formula. But in fact the relations between these governments
confidence

were

full of mutual distrust and suspicion, for which the Soviet

Government, as we know, had more than adequate grounds.

Therefore the U.S.S.R., in

its

counter-draft of June 2, mentioned

precisely the eight countries

which the three Great Powers

undertook to guarantee. They were (I venture to repeat them)
Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Rumania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and

all its details

nor is it
of many mice around the
triple pact with the help of which the British and French governments in the summer of 1939 sabotaged a successful outcome of

Finland, Here the interests both of the U.S.S.R, and of Britain and
France were being taken into account. It might have seemed that
Chamberlain and Daladier should have been satisfied. But no,

the negotiations. I will only say that I

they were discontented. With what?

really necessary

that scurrying as

felt all the time as though

were bursting through a thick and prickly
which at every step we were also encountering

we, the Soviet

side,

mass of bushes,

in

ruts

and

pitfalls-

hands and

Our

clothes were being torn to rags, our faces,

were being covered with deep scratches and even

bleeding wounds, but all the same we were stubbornly pressing
legs

summer of 1^39 only a few vague rumours reached me about

this attempt by Eden to put matters right. Much later, when the war was in
progress, Eden himself told me about the failure of his attempt. Mention is
made of this by Neville Chamberlain's biographer, Keith Feiling (op dr.,
p. 409), and by Winston Churchill (op. dt., Vol. I, 1948 edition, p, 303).
1.

In the

First, that the three Baltic States

the countries guaranteed.

had been introduced among

Why

was that necessary? It was an

and French governments tried in
various ways to convince us that such a guarantee was unnecessary, and incidentally laid special stress on the assertion that
extra burden!

The

British

the territory of the Baltic States

was too narrow

to permit

creation of an effective military front. Consequently

it

of the

could not

be made use of by the Germans against the U.S.S.R. without

simultaneously the front being extended to the territory of
Poland.

And

if

Poland were involved in the war the guarantee

WHO HELPED

146

HITLER?

given her by Britain and France would enter into force. Naturally,

TO NAME OR NOT TO NAME

mutual assistance between

Britain,

the Sovier

the event of a direct attack

that

Powers.

Government could not accept such arguments, and, in

same conversation with Halifax on June 12 which I mentioned

earlier, I said plainly that

without a guarantee for the three Baltic

147

France and the U.S.S.R. in

by Germany on one of

This aroused great concern in London and

If the Soviet proposal

Paris,

the three

They began

any mention by name in the

of the States which were being guaranteed. Why?
All kinds of arguments were brought forward. An open guarantee

become of
Rumania which were given by
Britain and France in March and April, 1939? They will be left in
the air and become mere scraps of paper, capable however of
dealing a very sensible blow to the prestige of the Powers which
gave them/ Therefore the British and French governments

would

hastened to reject the conclusion of a simple pact of mutual

States there

When

would be no

to argue:

pact.

after this the British

and French had to withdraw

their

objections to guarantees for the Baltic countries they suddenly

said that they considered undesirable
text of the pact

allegedly offend the national pride of the guaranteed

An

and once again returned to a pact with guarantees for

At a number of sessions in Moscow they tried in
various ways to avoid the necessity of naming the guaranteed
assistance,

without the direct consent of the guaranteed States would

countries in the pact, and

allegedly be an infringement of the principles of international

law.

When the Soviet side in reply suggested that Britain and France
should exercise their influence in the States to be guaranteed, and
should induce their governments

not to object to the

at least

guarantees, Chamberlain and Daladier

a solemn attitude and proclaim that

therefore

it

would be

the anti-Hitler front.

sinful to suggest that

More than

tions

would immediately strike

every State was sovereign, and

particularly the British

that,

it

should participate in

our partners in the negotia-

incited (officially or unofficially)

the reactionary governments of the Baltic States to

make open

declarations that they did not want to receive any guarantees of

any kind from the three Great Powers. In fact, the Foreign
Ministers of Finland, Estonia and Latvia did issue declarations
in this sense, and with particular belligerency in the case of

Estonia.

Then the Soviet Government drew the logical conclusion from

the situation which had been created.

On

June 16 the People's

Commissar for Foreign Affairs invited the British and French
Ambassadors to renounce any mention at all of guarantees
for other

European

States,

and simply sign a

triple

pact of

accepted what will

the guarantees to Poland and

open guarantee would allegedly frighten the

guaranteed States, for it would create the impression that they
were being included in the anti-Hider front. An open guarantee
country.

is

other countries.

when they became convinced that this

was impossible, on June 21, they put forward the proposal (in
practice it was made by the French Ambassador Naggiar) that the
of guaranteed countries should be transferred from Article I
of the main text of the pact to a secret protocol attached to the
pact, 1 It was not quite comprehensible why this seemed more
list

suitable to the British

and French, because in our day the content

of every secret document very soon becomes

ledge: but since our partners

Soviet

In

Government did not think

this

relations

connection

between the

Y. Z.

Suritz,

think

British

partite negotiations, I

common know-

were insisting on such a protocol, the

it

it

necessary to object.

useful to

make

and French

a remark about the

in the course

of the

tri-

have already mentioned the comment of

our Ambassador in Paris,

character, the Daladier

that, for all its reactionary

Government had

nevertheless a

more

favourable attitude to the pact than the Chamberlain Government,

This was to be explained, of course, not by any particular nobility

of character or far-sightedness of the French Munichites, but by

Germany was a much more direct menace to France

Britain, However that might be, in spite of all the identity

the fact that

than to
1.

Documents on British Foreign

VI, pp. 140-2.

Policy^ l0ip-l?p 5

Third

Series,

VoK

WHO HELPED
of the

line

HITLER?

pursued by London and Paris in the negotiations there

were differences in shades of opinion between them, which made

their

appearance from time to time.

showed

itself

on

It

was

this in particular that

the question of enumerating the guaranteed

countries, when Naggiar made his proposal for transferring theirnames to a secret protocol. It will be seen later that this occurred
more than once.
However, the affair of naming the guaranteed countries was
by no means at an end. When the question of a secret protocol
had been agreed the British and French suddenly stated that they
wanted the guarantee to be extended to three more countries in
which they were interested Holland, Luxembourg and Switzerland, In this way it turned out that the three Great Powers must
now guarantee not eight countries, as had been presumed in all

the negotiations hitherto, but eleven countries,

among whom

two, Holland and Switzerland, did not even maintain diplomatic

relations

with the U.S.S.R.

TO NAME OR NOT TO NAME

extremely problematical.

was decided,

therefore, in the

Holland, Luxembourg and Switzerland would, after

included in the

end that

all,

of guaranteed countries, but that the

list

149

not be
secret

protocol mentioned earlier would say that in the event of a threat

to the independence of these three States arising, the members of
the Big Three

would consult

as to the

measures which should be

taken.

The

and French not only endlessly dragged out the

demanded that we should Compensate'
them for every Concession' they made. On this subject I had a
sharp encounter with Halifax on June 23, Inviting me to the
Foreign Office, Halifax began bitterly complaining of Soviet
'stubbornness and 'obstinacy*, and then, with the severe and
enigmatic expression I had seen before, asked me blundy whether
the Soviet Government really wanted a triple pact.
Why do you ask such a question?" I said. Tou know perfecdy
British

negotiations, they also

that the Soviet

This naturally was bound to increase the burden devolving on

It

Government

is

a convinced partisan of a triple

pact/
C

was the
U-S.S-R. which in the event of war would have to bear the main
burden of the guarantee for six of the StatesPoland, Rumania,
Turkey and the three Baltic States. The Soviet side at one of the

I don't see this/ said Halifax. In all negotiations both sides

make concessions, and in the end agree on a compromise. We, the
British side, have made many concessions to you in the course of
these negotiations, but you have not moved one iota from your

sessions pointed out that already the obligations in respect

of the

original position,

eight States first provided for, translated into military terms,

would

interested in the pact/

the guarantors, and particularly the U.S.S.R., for

it

require if they had to be carried out that the U.S.S.R. should put

ioo divisions into the

field,

and

if

the

number of guaranteed

Obviously the Soviet Government

'Excuse me, Lord Halifax/ I retorted.

The

were extended still more would be needed* In view of

Government expressed its readiness to extend the
protection of the Big Three to the three additional States only if it

matic negotiations.

this the Soviet

as

received a certain 'compensation' in the shape, for example, of

begin to lower them, and

pacts of mutual assistance with Poland

in the process each

unilateral guarantees to these States

by

the Soviet Union, as

something

first

again behind the sovereignty of Poland and Turkey, and more-

negotiations.

of mutual assistance

finally they arrive at an agreement

and
merchant demands, for every concession he

has made, a similar concession from his partner

Soviet

on their part, it was clear that pacts

with the two countries mentioned would be

of them
which two merchants are haggling:

British side evidently conceives

like a bazaar in

the merchants incredibly inflate their prices, then gradually

previously provided* Britain and France at once hid themselves

over, with such an attitude

different

conceptions on the Soviet and British sides as to what are diplo-

countries

and Turkey, instead of the

There must be

not

is

side,

Well, we, the

have a somewhat different view of diplomatic

We

don't try at

first

to

make demands beyond

all

We

measure in order to have something afterwards to "yield".

say straight away what, in our opinion, is needed to reach the

WHO HELPED

I S0

HITLER?

at. We have acted in this way in these negotiations

What was set out in the Soviet draft on June 2 was that "iron
minimum" which can ensure peace in Europe. You, on the other
hand, began with what could not in any way assure this peace, and
therefore naturally had gradually to move in our direction,

TO NAME OR NOT TO NAME

objective aimed

The

too.

June 18 Goebbels arrived there, and made a frenzied speech in

which he stated openly that the time was coming when Danzig

because you too should be interested in preserving European

peace,

minimum" without betraying the cause of peace/ 1 continued, Vhile you need still to come a
little

depart from our "iron

closer to us, so that with our joint strength

we should be in a

position to set the limit to aggression. Therefore

you had

better

put away your catalogue of those concessions you have made, and
don't ask us for any compensations for them.
shall not make

We

them.

We are realists. Please understand that we are interested not

in juridical formulae, not an equilibrium of concessions

on one

we

are interested in the essence of the case,

real prevention

of aggression and assurance of peace in

side

and the other;

that

is,

To

Europe.

way

achieve this objective there

along which the Soviet side

is

is

only one

way

the

going. Let's go along

it

together/
Halifax heard

began

would become

now

element*

is

me

out attentively, but would not agree-

to prove to

me

that in

all

negotiations the

He

'human

very important, and this 'element' implies an obligation

of mutual concessions. Without such mutual concessions there

cannot come into being an 'atmosphere' which promotes the

and outcome of negotiations. We were making

a mistake if we were ignoring the question of 'atmosphere*.
'After hearing your views,' I summed up, 'I am ready perhaps
to admit that the Soviet Government has really made one
mistake: it did not take into account the "bazaar methods" of
British diplomacy, and therefore revealed too early and too
successful course

frankly

its

"iron minimum"- But really

we have no grounds

to

apologize for this mistake/

The longer negotiations went on, the more clear it became that

part of Hitlerite

German

days thousands of
quantities

there

'We cannot

thunder-cloud was obviously gathering over Danzig,

flooded into the

'tourists'

city.

Vast

by contraband, Foerster, the Nazi leader in Danzig, made an

appeal to the population to spare no effort to turn

into a

German

Under

city.

the influence of

all

it

once again

these events the

tension in German-Polish relations grew, and so did excitement

in

London and Paris. Speaking in Parliament on June 27, Daladier

had Europe been

said that 'never yet

in such a state of confusion

as at present', and five days later, on July 2, the French

Prime Minister recognized that 'the general situation in Europe
is extremely serious In a speech on June 28, in London, Churchill
said that he was very concerned with the situation in which they

and alarm

was very similar to that of the previous year

however, that now there was no possibility
of retreat. Britain had not been tied by any treaty to Czechoslovakia, But now she had given an absolute guarantee to Poland.
Everything pointed to the fact that the Nazis had made the necessary preparations in order to force Poland to yield. If she did not
yield she would be attacked by great forces from the west and the
were
with

at present. It

this difference,

south.

Even
Yet

on June 29, drew the prosvery gloomy colours.

Halifax himself, in a speech

Europe

pects opening before

in spite

of

all

in

and French governments

wearisome, artificially thought-up

this the British

continued to drag on their

delays in the negotiations for a triple pact.

One of their favourite

was to hold up their replies to our

proposals or amendments. It was just at this time that I made a
small statistical calculation of how long had been taken during the
negotiations for the Soviet and Anglo-French sides respectively
methods

in this respect

to prepare their replies.

The

ing. It turned out that out

The European

negotiations had

was becoming more heated day by day.

Germany. During the following

of arms of all kinds, even heavy artillery, were delivered

the British and French were simply applying tactics of sabotage.

situation

On

by

resulting figures

were very

interest-

of the seventy-five days which the

that time occupied, the U.S.Sit.

had taken

WHO HELPED

HITLERf

only sixteen days, while Britain and France had taken

fifty-nine.

IJ2

Not
an

surprisingly, these figures

article

which appeared

in

were used

in the Soviet press. In

Pravda on June

29, 1939,

it

was

stated:

TO NAME OR NOT TO NAME

Pravda concluded
It

would seem

agreement

entered a blind

facilitate

The fact of the intolerable delays and endless pretexts for

dragging out the negotiations gives ground for doubt of the
sincerity of the true intentions of Britain and France, It obliges us
to consider what precisely is at the bottom of such a policy
serious aspirations to ensure a peace front, or the desire to

make

use of the fact of the negotiations, and of the dragging out of the
negotiations themselves, for

nothing in

common

some other purposes which have

with the cause of the creation of a front of

peace-loving Powers,

'Such a question arises

all

the

more because in

the course of the

negotiations the British and French governments are piling up

artificial difficulties,

creating the appearance of serious differences

between Britain and France on the one hand and the U.S.S.R, on
the other, over questions which, given good will and sincere
intentions

on the part of

Britain

and France, could be resolved

without delay and without difficulty/

Pointing further to one such

of guarantees for the Baltic

cases,

where

Artificial difficulty* (the

States)

and underlining

question

that in other

Britain felt herself really interested (the question of

guarantees for Holland and others) she reckoned very

little

with

the wishes of the countries which she was undertaking to

guarantee, Pravda continued:

The

British

and French do not want an agreement with the

tLS.S.R. based on the principle of equality and reciprocity,

though they swear every day that they too are for "equality"; they

want an agreement in which the LLS.S.R, would act as their hired

labourer, bearing on its own shoulders all the burden of the
obligations undertaken,'

Declaring that there could be no question of such an agreement,

with the following very significant

and French want, not a real

agreement acceptable to the U,S,S.R., but only talk about an

'The Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations for the conclusion of

an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression have
alley.

its article

words:

that the British

in order,

by

speculating

on the imaginary

rigidity of

the U,S,S,R, in face of the public opinion of their countries, to

a deal with the aggressors,'

This was straight talking.

PACT AND MILITARY CONVENTION

The

of the two

attitude

sides

on the question of the pact and

the military convention was essentially the following.

The

Government considered

Soviet

that the pact

military convention should represent an integral whole,

and the
two parts

of one and the same agreement, entering into force simultaneously.

In other words, without a military convention there could not be

Pact and military convention

JrlowEVER

that

any political pact. This point of view had been clearly expressed in
our very first proposals of April 17, and we had consistently
maintained it in all our conversations with the British and the
French, whether in Moscow, London or Paris. I have already
explained why we were obliged strictly to adhere to this point of

might be, by the beginning of July the question

of enumerating the States guaranteed by the three Great Powers

had been settled. The time had come to solve the other problems
before signature was possible.

view.

Most important among them was

The

convention.
earlier:

It

It

had already been referred

to

more

too closely-

than once in the course of June, during the conversations between

the Soviet, British and French representatives in
also

in

Why?

touched on

first

Moscow, and

between myself and Halifax in London, Nevertheless,

two differthem together

When in conversation with Halifax on June 8 I

ent documents, and that

cannot be said that this question had not been raised

not by any means.

and French governments, on the contrary, con-

British

sidered that the pact and the military convention were

the question of a link between the pact and the supporting military

this

it

was undesirable

question the British Foreign Secretary said:

'To require the simultaneous entry into force of the pact and
the military convention

June

on the question of
guaranteed by the Big Three should or should

would mean considerably delaying the

the main efforts of each side were concentrated

signature of an agreement.

whether the States

worked out so

not be named.

Now in July the

And

There were special grounds for this. The

atmosphere in Europe was now terribly tense, war might break
out at any time, and it was necessary to establish as rapidly and as
exactly as possible what help the three Great Powers would give
one another if any of them were involved in war with Germany.

. .

...

military convention

154

not

We must hurry!'

Halifax urged that the pact should

first

be concluded and

with

this,

but

as at that

moment it was most important of all for us

to come to terms about the enumeration of the States guaranteed

by the pact, the problem of its relation with the military conven-

was postponed

tion
\

until a

more appropriate moment. Later on

both the British and the French invariably maintained the point of

view

set

out by Halifax in this conversation, constantly repeating:

'A military convention will only delay the conclusion of the pact,
and

we must

hurry, hurry on.

The

international situation is

assuming such a threatening character!'

It is difficult to

imagine a more vivid example of double-faced,

hypocritical behaviour-

What was

the true reason for this be-

haviour of the British and French governments?

feet.

is

Any delay would be dangerous for the

then the military convention should be considered, I did not agree

into the foreground.

very

speedily.

cause of peace.

question of the military convention came up

During the negotiations with the Anglo-French representatives

in Moscow it was more than once underlined that a pact without
a military convention was 'an empty piece of paper', and that in
the situation which had arisen a military convention was more
important than the pact. However, on this question too our
partners with obstinate blindness pursued the same tactics of
sabotage, even though the ground was becoming hot under their

to bind

WHO HELPED

1^6

HITLERf

consisted in the same unchanged devotion to the general line

It

of a

triple pact

of

of the Clivedenites and the consequent

mutual assistance. It was just at this time, at the beginning of July,
that I was told of an exchange between Chamberlain and his close
dislike

friend Sir Kingsley

'How
Wood.

Wood, Air

irritably:

1 still have not lost hope that we

this deplorable

Government
If such was the state of mind
one can scarcely be surprised at the unwillingness of Halifax and
Daladier to consider the pact and the military convention as an
inseparable whole.
at the

beginning of July, the Soviet Government

categorically put this question before them^ the British

governments had willy-nilly to take

it

and French

come and

this,

see him,

and once

was useless to argue

would not in any
Government
because the Soviet

I interrupted

him

at once,

and said that

it

circumstances sign a pact without a convention, Halifax asked

what was the reason for our obstinacy on this question. In reply I
briefly told

him of our

unsuccessful experience with the Franco-

Government had
Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, The
firmly decided that nothing like this should happen again, all the
more because times now were much more dangerous than in 1935.
Halifax was silent for a few moments, plunged in meditation,
Soviet

and then, with a side-long glance

at

me, said with an

air

of great

significance:

That means
I

shrugged

that

you don't

my shoulders

trust us?'

and

replied:

"Three great States are coming to an agreement about very

important things, and it should all be precise and clear. Otherwise
there may arise the most undesirable misunderstandings and
disputes/

Government

persistently defended the

gain time suggested that negotiations for a military convention

should begin immediately, without waiting for the final conclusion

this.

The political negotiations could continue parallel with

This proposal did not please Halifax at all; but the Soviet side

pact.

attitude that there

would

simultaneous pact and convention or no pact at alL

either

As a

be a

result,

to agree to the interdependence of pact and convention, and also

to the early commencement of talks about the latter: but gave the
Ambassador the right himself to decide when to inform the
Soviet side of this. Seeds, on his part, dragged matters on for

another week, and only

Soviet People's

at

Commissar

the meeting of July 24 informed the

that the British

Government did not

object to the immediate opening of negotiations for a military

up,

July 12 Halifax asked me to

again began arguing about the undesirabiliry of the simultaneous
entry into force of the pact and the military convention. However,

On

about

the Soviet

Halifax had already in the middle of July given Seeds the directive

pact/

of the head of the

as,

Moscow

was firmly maintaining the

not have to sign

But

In

conception of a single agreement in two parts, and in order to

of a

Minister:

are the negotiations for a pact going on?' asked Kingsley

Chamberlain replied
shall

PACT AND MILITARY CONVENTION

convention.
take place in

The

Soviet

Government proposed

that they should

Moscow,

In this way, thanks to the sabotage of our partners, three more

weeks were needed to settle the question of the link between the
pact and the military convention.
But this was not yet all. Now, when the two questions
enumerating the guaranteed States and integrating the pact and
the military convention had been settled, another difficulty had
to be overcome. It was necessary to give a more precise definition
of what was meant by aggression. Three Great Powers were

undertaking to come to the help of eight other countries

if

they

became victims of aggression: but how was the term 'aggression*

to be understood?
And so an endless new palaver began once again. The Soviet
Government took up a very conciliatory position on this question.
It took full account of the objections of our partners and frequently

made

concessions to them, altering and re-fashioning

its

The suspicious eye of Halifax invariably

discovered in any formulation some word or comma which aroused
in him a negative reaction. The arguments about definition of
proposals; but

all

in vain.

WHO HELPED HITLER?

Ij8

through July and continued in August,

without bringing us to any agreement. They had not been finished
aggression went on

when

all

the tripartite negotiations collapsed altogether.

must mention again the differences which arose between

the British and the French in the course of the talks. A telegram
from Seeds on July 22 contains the following paragraph:
Trench Ambassador's personal view is that M. Molotov's
definition of indirect aggression (my telegram No, 157) could be
Here

would intimate to us privately that this is in fact

the view of the French Government, though they have agreed
reluctantly to support His Majesty's Government in their
accepted, and he

objection to

it,'

Simultaneously, on the same July 22, Halifax was cabling to

Seeds:
press reports in Paris and London to the
French Government are prepared to meet M. Molotov
at all points and have been urging His Majesty's Government in
vain to fall into line. If subject is raised you may inform your

There have been

effect that

French colleague that we have every reason

2
leakage is from French sources/

The

to believe that

question of the source of the leakage was of secondary

Much more

important was the fact that, the longer

were dragged out through Chamberlain's
machinations, the more obvious became the differences between
London and Paris.
Observing the conduct of the British side day by day, during
importance.

negotiations

the

the discussions

on the

definition

of aggression, we involuntarily

returned again and again to the question, could a

way if it

Government

PACT AND MILITARY CONVENTION

deepened our doubts as to the sincerity of our British partner.

the 20th of that month Mr. Hudson, Secretary of the

About

Department of Overseas Trade, had a meeting with Goering's

adviser on economic questions, Helmuth Wohlthat. Officially
Wohlthat had come to London to take part in an international
conference of the Whaling Commission; but in fact his task was
to

make soundings

as to the possibility of a broad settlement of

between Britain and Germany, At that time we did not
all the details of Wohlthat's conversations with British

relations

know
official

personalities.

We

did

talks

Hudson developed

far-reaching plans for

new world markets and

existing ones. In particular,

he said that Britain and Germany

In July there was an important event which

1,

still

Documents on British Foreign Policy^ jpjp-jp3p ? Third

VI, p- 450,
2. Ibid.,

pp. 44B-9.

further

Series, Vol*

exploiting

could find wide opportunities for their activity in China, Russia

and the British Empire. Hudson thought it was essential to delimit

the spheres of British and German interests.
Then, on the initiative of Sir Horace Wilson, Wohlthat
visited him too. The two conversations between Wohlthat and
Chamberlain's principal adviser on foreign policy were of a more
all-round character, Wilson stated that his purpose

Anglo-German agreement on

and

pact-'

Anglo-German

co-operation in opening up

not wish to conclude a

really

(this

which Wohlthat had

with Sir Horace Wilson- In the record made by von Dirksen,
then the German Ambassador in London, on July 21, 1939, we
find the following data as to the conversations between Wohlthat
and Hudson and Horace Wilson:
Hudson had asked Wohlthat, through the Norwegian member
of the Whaling Commission, to come and see him. During the

particular (a) the conclusion

this

not know, in particular

transpired only after the war), of the talks

wanted to conclude a triple pact as

soon as possible? And every time we were obliged to reply: 'No,
it could not: evidently the British Government, as before, does
behave in

159

all

was

'a

broad

important questions', and in

of an Anglo-German pact of non-

aggression, (b) the conclusion of a pact of non-intervention and

delimitation of spheres of influence, (c) limitation of land, naval
air

armaments, (d) the granting to Germany of the possibility

of joining in exploitation of the colonies and

(e) mutual financial

and problems of international trade- When Wohlthat
asked whether the German Government could put down other

assistance

questions for discussion as well, Wilson answered 'that the

WHO HELPED
Fuehrer had only to take a sheet of paper and jot
the British

Government would be prepared

HITLER?

down his points;

to discuss

them/

PACT AND MILITARY CONVENTION

i6l

A commercial deal on this scale was of first-class political significance. If a

member of the

British

Government thought

it

possible

Wilson asked that Hitler should authorize some person to

negotiate on all the questions bearing on Anglo-German co-

to discuss such a scheme with an important official of the Hitlerite

operation.

conclusions. Naturally, our distrust of the true intentions of the

Dirksen also recorded: 'Sir Horace Wilson definitely told Herr

Wohlthat that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact [with

British

Germany LM-] would

enable Britain to rid herself of her

com-

State did

programme which had been developed

to Wohlthat. But the latter avoided a meeting with the British

Prime Minister.
Such were the conversations which Chamberlain carried on
with Germany in the summer of 1939, behind the back of the
U,S*S.R. If nothing came of them in the long run this was the
result of factors over which the British Prime Minister had no
control. All this, and western historians and politicians have the
it

of

Germany behind the backs of

Britain and France! Even if the Soviet Government had acted in
this way it would have only been paying back the western democracies in their own coin. But in reality, as will be shown later, it
did not do anything of the kind. I repeat that in the summer of
conspiracy and almost alliance with

1939

we

did not yet

know

the details of the secret conversations

between the governments of Britain and Hitlerite Germany.

However, what did percolate into the press and political circles
in July, 1939, was quite sufficient to create serious concern. As the
newspapers wrote then, and as Chamberlain admitted in his
Parliamentary statement of July 24, Hudson and Wohlthat had
talked of the expansion of Anglo-German commercial and
financial relations,

and of the granting by Britain to Germany, on

of the order of 500-1,000 millions.

definite terms, of a vast loan

I*

Documents and Materials Relating to

(English edition,

Moscow^

the

But we did not draw too far-reaching

Government, which had grown up as a result of all our

and particularly of the experience of the
tripartite negotiations
was only increased.

Wilson suggested that Wohlthat should have an immediate

conversation with Chamberlain in order to convince himself that

audacity to cast a stone at the Soviet Government, accusing

not mean

previous experience

mitments vis-a-vis Poland/ 1

the latter agreed with the

it

Eve of the Second World War

1948), Vol. II, pp. 67-^72,

PREPARING FOR THE MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS

becoming almost

intolerable.

On

for Foreign Affairs declared that

July 21 the

Polish

attempted to

Preparing for the military negotiations

settle

Ministry

Danzig must be returned to

Germany 'without any conditions'. To this

Army, Marshal Rydz-Smigly, replied

German

163

the leader of the

that if

Germany

the fate of Danzig unilaterally Poland

would
up arms. About the same time the British General Ironside
visited Warsaw and had talks there with the Polish General Staff.
take

Serious events were also taking place in the Far East.

On july 25 Halifax invited me to come and see him, and told

me of the agreement reached in Moscow to begin military conversations immediately. I

knew

People's Commissariat for

earlier,

from a telegram of the

Foreign Affairs which I had received
this already

but nevertheless expressed great satisfaction at the

Foreign Secretary's communication,

was

still

worried by some

The SinoJapanese war had been going on already for two years, and no
end to it could be seen. At Khalkhin-Gol battles were going on
between the Japanese aggressors and the Soviet-Mongol forces*
The Japanese imperialists were carrying on a furious campaign

bombing her ships on the Yangtse,

organizing hostile demonstrations in Chinese cities and threatening British citizens resident there with death. All this was arousing
against Britain in China,

doubts, however, and tried at once to find out to what extent they

tremendous alarm

were

particular the workers,

justified.

me, Lord Halifax/

and broad masses of the people, in

were attacking the Government more and

in Britain,

'when in your opinion can

more violently for its sabotage of the tripartite negotiations. From

end to end of the whole country there was a loud demand for an

Halifax pondered, looked at the ceiling as though casting up

immediate pact with the Soviet Union.

Chamberlain once again had to wriggle out of the situation. On
July 31 there was a stormy foreign policy debate in the House of
Commons, Sir Archibald Sinclair, leader of the Liberals, sharply

'Tell

I asked,

these negotiations begin?'

something in

his

mind, and then replied:

'We shall need at least a week or ten days to do all the necessary
preliminary work.'

This meant that in practice the negotiations could hardly begin

So Halifax did not intend to hurry.

'And have the members of your mission for the military
negotiations already been selected? 1 asked again.
'No, not yet. . We shall do this in the next few days/ said
Halifax, Then he added: 'We think the most convenient place for
the military talks would be Paris, but as the Soviet Government
has expressed the wish that they should be conducted in Moscow
we are ready to meet there/
for a fortnight.

I left Halifax

with a feeling of great alarm: the old game was

going on, while the international situation was becoming worse

and worse. The militarization of Danzig was going on at an
increasing tempo,

and the

strain

on Polish-German

162

relations

was

criticized

Chamberlain's policy, and demanded that

'a

person of

the highest political rank' should be sent to Moscow to complete

the negotiations for the pact, Dalton, on behalf of the Labour
Party, suggested that Halifax himself should go to Moscow, or

member of the Soviet Government be invited to London.

Eden insisted on the urgent dispatch of a political mission headed
by someone of such standing that he could deal direct with the
that a

Soviet Government.

Many

other

members spoke

in the

same

spirit.

Beating off these attacks on the sabotage of negotiations,

Chamberlain was minded to

call in

said that negotiations for the

took

six

precedents from the past

He

Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1903

months, negotiations for the Anglo-French Entente of

WHO HELPED

I {$4

HITLER?

PREPARING FOR THE MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS

l6j

negotiations with the

someone who would command the necessary 'respect* of the

Soviet Government.
And what was the result? On July 31 Chamberlain announced

U.S.SJFL have been going on only four and a half months, what

in Parliament that the Cabinet had placed leadership of the

1904 went on for nine months, negotiations for the AngloRussian Entente of 1907 took fifteen months. * The conclusion
<

to be

drawn was obvious: 'The present

do you

expect?' 1 It is difficult to imagine a

more

striking

example

British military delegation in the hands of Sir Reginald Plunkett

of political thick-headedness than these arguments of the British

Prime Minister in conditions of the historic storm which had

Ernle-Erle-Drax.

almost begun.

Ambassador

In spite of the widespread indignation of British public opinion,

Chamberlain continued to stand by his original

still

line

of policy.

hope of bringing Germany and the U.S.S.R.

of the British Government, even at
hour, spoke clearly of this.
had not

lost

conflict, All the actions

late

After

my

He

into
that

attempt to influence the composition of the military delegation

which Britain was intending to send to the U.S.S.R, I argued:

'Even if Halifax did not go to Moscow in June, let today, at any
rate, the chief representative of Britain be some really prominent
and active military figure. This would be valuable for the negotiations themselves; it might somewhat cool the aggressive ardour
of Hitler; it would be evidence of a serious attitude to the triple
pact on the part of Britain if even now, on the very threshold of
war, there took place some change for the better in the attitude of
its ruling group/
I turned to Arthur Greenwood, Deputy Leader of the Labour
Party in Parliament, with

him

whom

had good

unofficially to let the British

relations,

and asked

Government know

Soviet side hoped to see a very prominent military

that the

man

at

the

head of the British delegation best of all General Gort, who was
then Chief of the British General Staff. I know for certain that

Greenwood

carried out

from Chamberlain

(I

my request-

have read

it

In reply he received a

letter

myself) in which the Prime

Government unfortunately could not send

Lord Gort to Moscow, as he was too much required at the moment
in London: but that the delegation would be headed instead by
Minister stated that the

Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons^ Vol, 350, Col. 2023,

in

all

must admit

my

that I

had never heard

seven years of previous

work

his

name

as Soviet

London. That was not surprising. It turned out

Drax had no operative relation to the

that Sir Reginald Plunkett

armed forces at that time whatever, but in return was

close to the Court and Chamberlainite in his inclinations- Even
had one wished, it would have been difficult to find a candidate

British

more unsuited

made an

conversation with Halifax on July 25 I

before during

to conduct negotiations with the U,S,S.R, than

The other members of the delegaMarshal Sir Charles Burnett and Major-Getieral
Heywood, did not rise above the average level of the leading
personnel in the British land forces.
this elderly British

tion,

Air

When
I

Admiral.

I learned

of the composition of the British delegation

could only draw the conclusion that everything remained as

it

was, and the sabotage of a triple pact would continue.

The French Government took the line indicated for it by its

London colleagues: General d'Armee Doumenc was appointed
head of the delegation, and General Valin, of the Air Force, and
Capitaine de Corvette Willaume were members. Here too there
was not one of them who could speak with authority on behalf of

armed forces of his country. At the beginning of August

the French delegation arrived in London, whence they were to
travel together to Moscow, I decided to give a luncheon for
them: however disappointed I was in the composition of the
delegations, diplomatic politeness required such a gesture on my
part. Moreover, I wanted to have a personal talk with the members
of the delegations. The luncheon was held in the former conservatory of the Embassy, In addition to the British and French
delegations there were also present our military personnel (the
military, air and naval attaches) and responsible officials of our
Trade Delegation. To my right, as senior among the guests, sat
all

the

WHO HELPED

i66

HITLER?

PREPARING FOR THE MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS

Admiral Drax, a tall, lean, grey-headed Englishman, tranquil in

his movements and unhasty in speech. When luncheon was over
and coffee had been served the following conversation took place

was one of

between

was

us:

maisky: Tell me, Admiral,

when

are

you leaving

for

Moscow?
few

DitAx: It has not yet been finally decided, but in the next
days.

You are flying,

the situation in

drax:
if you
It

delay in arranging and dispatching the delegations to the U,S,S.R.

the expressions of that spirit of sabotage with which

we were
by

only too well acquainted. Undoubtedly, on the whole, I

But today, from the diplomatic documents published

right.

the British Government,

special

it can be seen that there was also a

purpose in the leisurely manner in which Drax and his

colleagues were

maisky:

Europe

is

of course?

. .

There

not

is

much time,

very tense!

Oh no, there are about forty of us in the two delegations,

reckon the technical

staff,

and we have a lot of baggage.

if it isn't suitable by plane, I hope you are going

Union on one of your fast cruisers- It would be very
much in style and very impressive: military delegations on a
warship.
. And it wouldn't take much time from London to

maisky: Well,

Leningrad.

drax: (beginning to look sour); No, a

we were

to

go by

cruiser wouldn't

cruiser

should we put people to such inconvenience?

Moscow

one of your
is

way to Moscow. I have already said

a very

as quickly as

settled. It was proposed

and military negotiations would go on simul-

taneously. And so, in the written instructions given by the

Foreign Office as a guidance to the delegation during the Moscow
negotiations, clause 8 read:
f

Until such time as the political agreement

is concluded the
Delegation should go very slowly with the conversations, watching the progress of the political negotiations and keeping in very
close touch with His Majesty's Ambassador.' 1

As

at the

time the military delegations were leaving

the question of definition of aggression

air,

will take

their

reached between the two sides for the

immediate beginning of military talks the political pact had not
yet been completely elaborated: the question of defining the

Why

No, we won't be

fast-going commercial vessels? I must repeat that this

urgent moment, you ought to be in

be

would mean

it

depriving a couple of dozen of its officers of their cabins

going by cruiser,
maisky: But in that event perhaps you

making

when agreement was

that the political

to the Soviet

suitable either. If

that

conception of 'aggression' had yet to be

wouldn't be convenient to go by plane.

167

the British

Government considered

was

still

that there

London

hanging in the

was no need

for

haste in their dispatch.

Here there once again was revealed the divergence between

London and Paris. In a telegram of August 13 Seeds asked

possible I

drax

Halifax to resolve his perplexities.

(obviously unwilling to continue this conversation any

further): Really, I can't

of Trade
I don't

is

tell

you anything

definitely.

organizing the transport. Everything

know what

is

is

The Board

in

its

hands.

going to happen.

And what happened was

the following.

steamer, City ofExeter^

agreement has been reached on

ing. ...

On

August

the

from London on a cargo and passenger

making thirteen knots, and arrived at last
in Leningrad only on August io. Five whole days had passed on
the journey, at a time when hours and even minutes counted on
the scales of history! At that time I imagined that the phenomenal
military delegation sailed

'Admiral Drax's written instructions', wrote Seeds, 'seem to be

to the effect that military conversations

must go slowly

until

political questions still outstand-

On the other hand, the

French General has instructions

utmost to conclude military agreement at the earliest
possible date, and such instructions clearly do not tally with those
given to Admiral Drax.'
to

do

his

Yes, of course, there was an obvious divergence between

i*

Documents on British Foreign Polky

1910-193^ Third

Series,

WHO HELPED

168

London and
and

Paris

on

this point.

was

Paris, but also (and this

the British

Government

Moscow. However well

in

And

HITLER?

not only between

London

particularly significant)

between

London and

own Ambassador

its

in

trained Seeds might be, even he in the end

could not stand jJie British Government's mockery of the interests

of European security and of the most elementary

common

sense.

Military negotiations in

Moscov

In the same telegram, Seeds went on:

'I shall be grateful for earliest possible information as to
whether His Majesty's Government definitely wish progress of
military talks, beyond vague generalities, to be made dependent
on a previous solution of "indirect aggression" problem, I should

were the actual decision of His Majesty's

deeply regret

if that

Government,

as all indications so far

go

to

show

political short-sightedness

British bourgeoisie

be more

with

all

The

of the then leaders of the

blatant, blinded as they

were by

their

this point, in substance,

end

personal recollections of

the tripartite negotiations of 1939, because after the departure of

the military delegations to the ILS.S.R. these negotiations ceased,

concerned- Their centre of gravity put on

and moved to Moscow, where I took no direct
part in them. However, I cannot simply put a full stop here. The
logic of the whole narrative impels me to describe, if only briefly,
what took place in Moscow and how the lamentable story of the

London was

military uniform

tripartite negotiations

ended. In this part of my exposition I will

have to make use not of my

from other

own recollections but of what I heard

reliable witnesses

learned later

Soviet mission consisted of persons of the very

first

rank.

time People's Commissar for

at that

M. Shaposhnikov;

the People's

Navy, Flagman of the Fleet Grade

Commissar

N. G. Kuznetsov,
the Chief of the Air Force, Army Commander Grade II, A, D.
Loktionov; and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Corps

my

which they deserved-

Defence of the U.S.S.R., was appointed head of the mission- Its

members consisted of Army Commander Grade I, and Chief of
for the

so far as

the seriousness

the General Staff, B,

*

and French governments, the

treated the forthcoming military negotiations

Marshal K. E. Voroshilov,

class prejudice?

At

to the British

Government

Soviet

that Soviet

military negotiators are really out for business.' 1

Could the

In contrast

of the events in Moscow, and what

on from various printed and documentary

sources.

II,

Commander L V, Smorodinov,
The British and French missions on their arrival in Leningrad,
were met by the highest representatives of the military and naval
authorities in that city, They were taken on a sight-seeing tour of
}

Leningrad and

its

environs. Sir William Seeds, in his report to the

Foreign Office, underlined that the Soviet authorities Vere

evidently anxious to place every facility at their disposal', 1

In

Moscow

the British and French delegations also had a

class reception,

by

the People's

Commissar

and on the very day of their

Commissar

for

arrival

first-

were received

Foreign Affairs and the People's

for Defence; while in the evening they attended a

dinner organized in their honour

Spiridonovka House for

official

by

the Soviet mission at the

receptions. Describing his visit

to K, E, Voroshilov, Seeds remarked in the same report:

1.

Documents on

VI, pp. GB2-3.

British Foreign Policy^ 1919-1939,

Third

Series,

VoL

1.

vn, P

Documents on British Foreign Policy, ipip-lpjp, Third

.

4i-

160

Series, Vol.

WHO HELPED

1JO

whom

HITLER?

had not had an opportunity of

meeting before, wore an unusually smart white summer uniform
and gave a most favourable impression, both of friendliness and
'Marshal Voroshilov,

energy.

The

He seemed

really pleased to

dinner at the Spiridonovka

meet the mission/ 1

made

a deep impression

MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

Supreme

Command

171

of the Soviet Armed Forces on

questions

two

countries/ This was considerably less than the authority given to

the Soviet delegation, but nevertheless General

on the

all

pertaining to co-operation between the armed forces of the

Doumenc was

able to conduct serious negotiations with the Soviet side.

somewhat of a hindrance to conversation. In an official statement

which appeared in I^yestia of August 12 reference was made to

Drax turned out to be much worse*

no written authority at all! Could there
have been a better proof of the lack of seriousness with which
the British Government approached the military negotiations? It
was clear that the British mission had been sent to Moscow not in
order urgently to conclude a military convention but to carry on

the "friendly toasts" that were exchanged at the dinner/ 2

irresponsible conversations about a military convention.

British

The

Ambassador.

The

reception lasted until a late hour

followed

by an

excellent concert', he

cordial atmosphere prevailed,

In this

way the

the dinner being

wrote in

though language

his report,

difficulties

Soviet side did everything possible to

were

show

its

serious attitude to the negotiations for a military convention, and

its

sincerity in the desire to create

repetition of aggression.

The

an

effective barrier against

any

British themselves bore witness to

But what of the Anglo-French side? Alas, here everything

remained as before: the sabotage of a triple pact continued.
This was revealed at the very first official meeting of the three
this.

missions on August 12, After

all

the formalities had been

com-

pleted the head of the Soviet delegation proposed that they should
familiarize

themselves with the written powers which each

delegation possessed,

With

this

he presented the written powers

of the Soviet delegation, which declared that our delegation was

empowered

to

conduct negotiations with the British and French

military missions and sign a military convention

on questions

pertaining to the organization of the military defence of Britain/

France and the ILS.S Jt. against aggression in Europe/

General Doumenc, the head of the French delegation, read his

powers, which authorized him

'to

come

to an agreement with the

It

position of Admiral

transpired that he had

Drax attempted

to get out of his difficult situation

it

London to Moscow was easier than for so big a company

London'. 1 In the end the Admiral promised to ask

pp, 46-7,
3. 'Negotiations between the military missions of the ILS.S-tL, Britain
and France in Moscow in August^ 1939' (referred to henceforth as
<

.*),

to

go

to

Govern21
powers
which
he
received
only
on
August
ment for written
when, as we shall see later, the need for them had disappeared.
Thus the lack of written authority for Admiral Drax was the
last drop which filled the cup of the Soviet Government's
patience, that had lasted for so many months. It became finally
convinced that Chamberlain was incorrigible and that the hope of
a pact had become an infinitely small quantity* The problem of
his

defending Soviet interests would have to be solved otherwise.

However,

it

would be

politically

unwise sharply to break off

negotiations, so long as the other side

had not renounced them.

In spite of the absence of properly drawn-up authority for

Admiral Drax, the Soviet delegation

fact,

said

it

did not object to the

on August

13, 14, 15, 16

and

17 seven meetings were held, at which the three sides exchanged

Ibid*, p. 46.

2. Ibid.,

Negotiations

that

were convenient to transfer the negotiations to London, he

would be given full powers: but the head of the Soviet delegation
remarked amid general laughter that 'bringing papers from

if

conference continuing. And, in

1.

Admiral

by saying

published in the Soviet magazine International Affairs^

February, 1959, p, 14J.

information about their armed forces and their plans in the event

of Hitlerite aggression. Admiral Drax, Air Marshal Burnett and

1*

Ibid*, p. 145

1. Ibid*, p.

145

WHO HELPED

172

General

Heywood spoke on behalf of Britain,

Commissar

Doumenc
and Army Com-

Generals

and Valin and Captain Willaume for France,

mander Shaposhnikov, Army Commander
People's

Loktionov

Navy Kuznetsov took

for the

HITLER?

and

part in the

discussion for the U_S,S.R,

The general picture of the armed forces of the three Powers

proved to be the following:
France disposed of no divisions, without reckoning its antiaircraft forces, its coastal defence forces

and

its

troops in Africa.

In addition there were about 200,000 soldiers of Republican Spain

which was much exaggerated), who had taken refuge in

France after the victory of Franco and had asked to be incorporated in the French forces. The French Army possessed 4,000
modern tanks and 3,000 large-calibre guns of 150 mm, and higher
(a figure

(without reckoning divisional

artillery).

The French Air Force

MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

set

up

Soviet

Government wanted

voroshilov: Yesterday I asked General Doumenc the following question: what part do the present missions, or the General
Staffs of France and Britain, consider the Soviet Union should
play in war against an aggressor,

if he attacks France and Britain,

he attacks Poland or Rumania, or Poland and Rumania together, and if he attacks Turkey?

if

general doumenc: General Gamelin holds the view, and

his subordinate share

hold firm on

As

Britain

had ready

'in the

their

second

echelon add another sixteen divisionsin

two

divisions.

than 3,000

The

The

air forces

all,

therefore, thirty-

of Great Britain comprised more

first-line aircraft.

Soviet

to fight aggression

m Europe

10,000 tanks and 5,000 to 5,500 fighting aircraft.

In addition the three Great Powers possessed navies
British

was

120

among

particularly powerful. 1

be seen that the armed forces of the anticipated signatories of the triple pact were very impressive, and far surpassed
the then forces of Germany and Italy. These forces would unIt

own

duty

it

front and group

own

to defend their

for

I as

that our initial task is for each party to

all its

forces

on

that front.

we consider that it is
But we extend help to

earlier,

territory.

it.

voroshilov: But what if they do not ask for it?

doumenc: We know that they are in need of assistance,
voroshilov: If they do not ask for this assistance in good time
will mean that they have put up their hands, that they have

surrendered.

Union possessed

infantry and sixteen cavalry divisions, 5,000 heavy guns, 9,000 to

which the

its

it,

regards the countries referred to

them when they ask

six divisions, could 'in the shortest possible

and

that very

Doumenc:

were modern as then understood namely, aircraft with a speed

of 450-500 km, per hour in the case of fighters and 400-450 km.
in the case of bombers.
time' transfer another 10 to the Continent,

The

much, but this could not in

the least be said of the governments of France and, particularly,
Britain, Here are two characteristic facts.
At the meeting of August 14 there took place the following
exchange of opinion between Marshal Voroshilov and General

consisted of 2,000 first-line aircraft, of which about two-thirds

173

a single effective front against Hitler and Mussolini,

will

doumenc: That would be highly deplorable.

voroshilov: What will the French Army do then?
doumenc: France will then keep on her own front
she deems necessary. 1

And

the forces

so the French General Staff was obviously suffering from

a passivity complex. In the event of a

recommending the future

firm on its own front and

new

'leap*

by

Hitler,

it

was

participants in the pact each to 'hold

questionably have been sufficient to avert Fascist aggression, but

to wait ... to wait until the victim of

aggression appealed for their assistance. Applied to the U.S.S.R,,

only on one condition

this

1.

'Negotiations

March, pp. 139-58)*

if all

three governments really wanted to

/ {International Affairs,

195^ February, pp. 144-58;

meant

Soviet
I.

that,

should Hitler attack Poland or Rumania, the

Government should concentrate

'Negotiations

.*

its

forces

on

its

western

(International Affairs, February, 1959, p. 154.

WHO HELPED

174

HITLER?

and calmly observe what was happening on the other side.

Only if the Polish or Rumanian governments requested, should
frontier

it

come

to their assistance,

Or if they asked

And if they did

late? What then?
.

not make the re-

MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

17J

the competence of the military missions. But as the head of the

Soviet delegation stated that the question of the passage of Soviet

troops was 'most cardinal', and that without

its

satisfactory

could not be

solution there could be no question of concluding a military

doubted that the strategy which the French General Staff was
recommending could lead only to the triumph of the aggressor.

convention, the heads of the two western delegations in a written

quest?

too

Even more acute was

and the Anglo-French
question.

The

It

if

itself

one were seriously

it

was necessary

to arrive. It was for this reason that at the

August
same meeting of
14 the head of the Soviet delegation,
bearing in mind that the U.S.S.R. and Germany had no common

put the direct question to the heads of the British and

French missions:
'Do the French and British General

Staifs think that the Soviet

with the enemy in case Poland

is

it

passage of Soviet troops through the Vilno Corridor and Galicia,

the Soviet representative underlined that

'if

this question is

not

solved favourably I doubt the usefulness of our conversations

3
-

did the British and French missions reply?

first

they began to argue that there was no problem of

passage of Soviet troops at

all since,

in the

words of General

Doumenc, in the event of an attack by Germany 'Poland and

Rumania will implore you, Marshal, to come to their assistance*.
When, however, Marshal Voroshilov retorted that 'perhaps they
will not', 2 Drax and Doumenc gave him to understand that the
question put by the Soviet side
1.

Ibid, pp. 155<S-

2. Ibid., p. 156-

was

to secure a reply

a political question,

beyond

from Poland and Rumania to the question of the

passage of Soviet troops.

At the end of

that

same session on August 14 the Soviet

read a written statement which

declared,

among

other

things:

make

attacked? ... Is

proposed to allow Soviet troops across Rumanian territory if the

aggressor attacks Rumania?*
Having made clear later that it was a question first of all of

At

be put by London and Paris.

The Soviet Government, of course, had no grounds for making
demarches in Warsaw and Bucharest, As a result, Drax and
Doumenc undertook to ask the British and French governments
priate question could

side

land forces will be admitted to Polish territory in order to

What

the

and Rumania. They recommended the Government of the

U,S.S.R, to do this, and at the same time allowed that the appro-

which revealed

moment

direct contact

by

on another

side

Soviet side considered that,

beforehand to come to a precise agreement as to the practical

action to be taken at the moment of danger, without waiting for

frontier,

that a reply to the question put

Soviet side required an approach to the governments of Poland

thinking about plans for fighting the aggressors,

the critical

communication declared

the divergence between the Soviet side

The

Soviet military mission expresses

its

regret at the absence

of an exact answer on the part of the British and French missions

to the question raised about the right of passage of Soviet armed
forces over Polish

and Rumanian

territory,

'The Soviet military mission considers that without a positive

solution of this question the whole present attempt to conclude a
military convention

Union

is,

in

its

between France, Britain and the Soviet

opinion,

doomed

to failure/ 1

The following day, August 15, Drax stated that both missions
had sent enquiries to London and Paris respectively on the
question which interested the Soviet delegation. But as, however,
there were no replies from London and Paris either on the 16th or
the 17th, the Soviet side stated that

tomorrow from the

British

'if there is no reply today and

and French governments we shall,

unfortunately, have to interrupt our meetings for

we

wait for

it,'

some time while

1.

Ibid., p. 158-

2.

'Negotiations

/ (International Affairs^ 1959, No.

3, p.

153.)

WHO HELPED

I76

HITLERT

was agreed that the next meeting of the delegations

As a result it
would take place on August 21.
However, the people in Paris and London who were continuing
the tactics of sabotage were obviously not in a hurry. Neither on
the

8th or the 19th, nor

on the 20th or the

21st did the British

and French missions receive any reply to their enquiry. In view of

this, on the evening before the appointed day, Drax and Doumenc
sent Voroshilov a letter asking that the meeting be postponed
another three or four days.

The head of the Soviet

delegation did

and a meeting took place after all on the

morning of August 21- Here Marshal Voroshilov firmly stated
that in view of the delay in replies to the cardinal question of the
not agree to

this proposal,

negotiations

it

was necessary

to arrange a longer interruption,

members of the Soviet delegation would now be engaged

autumn manoeuvres.

since

the

in

MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

governments and General

instructions
(

on such an elementary

intention

it

'In

view of the above, the

in a blind alley.

The

quote the following extracts:

c

Just as British and

American troops

in the last

world war could

not have taken part in the general action with the military forces

of France had they not had the opportunity of operating oh

French soil, similarly the Soviet armed forces cannot co-operate
with the armed forces of Britain and France if they are not allowed
.
on Polish and Rumanian territory. That is a military axiom.
-

'The Soviet military mission cannot picture to

1. Ibid., p.

156.

itself

how

turned

by

the British

responsibility for the delay in the

on the

and French sides/ 1

In this way, thanks to the sabotage of the British and French
governments, the military negotiations likewise found themselves
tions naturally falls

French and British missions are therefore unable to accept any

1
responsibility for the delays that have arisen.'
At the afternoon session on the same day the Soviet side likewise read out the written reply of the Soviet mission, from which
I

military negotiations and for the interruption in these conversa-

apparently was to start out

political questions.

is

serious military co-operation with the U.S.S.R,

it

and important

a military

and French into a great problem requiring long study this means
that there is every reason to doubt their desire for effective and

We were invited here to negotiate a convention for military

difficult to understand the action of
action. We therefore find
raising difficult

question,

If3 however, this axiomatic question

fi

by

on

convention, could have failed to give them precise and positive

throw responsibility for this failure on the Soviet Government, In

the written statement which he read they asserted:

whose

of Britain and France, in sending

their missions to the U.S.SJR. for discussions

Understanding that things looked like a collapse of the negotiations, Drax, on behalf of both delegations, made an attempt to

the Soviet mission,

Staffs

177

the
1. Ibid., p.

157.

British

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA

they immediately cease

hostilities

179

and conclude a

general, just

democratic peace without annexations or indemnities.

Government considered that such a termination of the war was the

most desirable, and most in keeping with the interests of the
working class and all mankind.

It is

The

and

The Soviet

Soviet Government's dilemma

well

known that the Soviet Government's initiative fell on

stony ground. Neither Germany and Austria-Hungary, nor

Britain,

France and the U.S.A. responded to the appeal of the

Soviet State. Locked in deadly combat, they continued the war

for

What was to be done?

There arose before the Soviet Government an acute dilemma.
it continue tripartite negotiations with the governments
of Britain and France, which obviously did not desire a pact; or
should it seek for other ways to strengthen its security?
At this point one could not help recalling a striking episode in
the early history of the Soviet Union,
Immediately after the October Revolution the young and still
weak Soviet State was faced with the solution of an important and
difficult problem: how to end the war in the midst of which it had
Should

On the

whole
future of the revolution and of the Soviet country, and, more than
that, of all humanity.
What was the situation in fact? The great revolution in Russia
had only just taken place. It had encountered furious resistance
from the old ruling classes, supported by the whole capitalist
world* It had inherited from the Tsarist regime terrible economic
collapse and illiteracy among wide masses of the people, In order
to maintain itself and live out these difficulties the young and still
weak Soviet Republic needed most of all peace, or at any rate a
temporary 'breathing space'.
How did the Soviet Government under Lenin's leadership
been born?

solution of this problem depended the

then act?
In the famous Decree

on Peace of November

8,

1917, and in the

subsequent Notes addressed to the various governments,

appealed

first

of all to

all

it

the belligerent countries, proposing that

more than another

year.

How did the Soviet Government and Lenin act in this situation?
The Soviet Government did not take the path of 'revolutionary
war' to which the so-called 'Left Communists* were pushing

nor the path of 'neither peace nor war' which was recommended

by Trotsky. The

Government chose another way. The

if for reasons over which
it had no control it could not at present secure a general democratic peace, which would of course have been the best way out,
at least it should ensure that its own country should leave the war
as soon as possible- It was exceptionally important to save the
Soviet

course of argument was the following:

revolution and to save the fatherland of Socialism. If a breathing

by the conclusion of a general peace it

should be secured even through a separate peace with Germany.
Yes, of course, Germany was an aggressively imperialist Power
space could not be secured

but what of that? Soviet Russia was existing not in a vacuum, but
in concrete encirclement

by

a hostile capitalist world. Since a

general democratic peace, in spite of the will of the Soviet

Government, could not be achieved

a temporary breathing space

at the time, it

ism (of course on condition that it did not

affairs of Soviet Russia).

And

must seek even

by agreement with German imperialinterfere in the internal

Lenin took the resolute step which then seemed to some

renunciation of the principles of the October Revolution, but

which in

reality

was

a manoeuvre of genius, precisely for the

greater glory of those principles.

Hence followed the Peace of Brest-Litovsk

178

it,

a very painful

WHO HELPED

HITLER:

peace, a peace with annexations and indemnities at the expense of

the Soviet Republic, a bad peace, an 'obscene' peace as Lenin

called
all

it.

future
ful

But that peace gave the Soviet Republic what

needed

was

at the time;

to show,

was the necessary preliminary

development of the U.S.S.fL in

completely

justified

it

most of

provided a breathing space which, as the

it

for the

later decades.

Lenin's action in those

difficult

power-

which domi-

In 1939 the Soviet Union was again threatened with a great

dangerthe danger of aggression by the Fascist Powers,
particularly Germany and Japan, and moreover of the creation of
a united capitalist front against the Soviet State. For the history of
the tripartite negotiations had demonstrated vividly that

Cham-

any moment go over to the side of

the Fascist Powers and, in one form or another, support their
attack on the U,S.S.R. This danger had to be .covered at all costs
might

at

but how?
1

An interesting confirmation of the correctness of Lenin's manoeuvring

confirmationj strange

days of Brest

enernies

to say, from the camp of our

German General Hoffmann who took
negotiations on the German side. In his book

are the meditations of the

part in the Brest-Litovsk

has been demonstrated sufficiently in the preceding pages that

the Soviet

Soviet

with London and Paris for such a pact, displaying almost angelic
patience in the course of the negotiations.

But

of the consistent sabotage of Chamberlain and

banked on provoking a German-Soviet war, the

as a result

Daladier,

who

August, 1939, finally reached an impasse,

and the argument about the passage of Soviet troops through the
territory of Poland and Rumania was but the final and decisive
tripartite negotiations in

link in the long chain

to seize

power

firmly and maintain it/

of previous disappointments. Now it became

no fault of our own, a triple pact for

combating the aggressors was impracticable. For in reality, even
perfectly clear that, through

we had admitted the possibility that such a pact might be signed

first of all, how much longer
would be needed to achieve such a result? And would it not come
if

in the long run, the question arose

the raised hand of the aggressors? After

too

late to arrest

soil

of Europe was already aflame!

How

would

And

then arose a

all,

still

the

more

and France observe the

had recently witnessed the
lamentable examples of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Spain. The
British and French governments had simply betrayed these
countries. Where was the guarantee that they would behave any
pact which they had signed?

Britain

We

The War of Lost Opportunities he wrote: *I have often wondered whether it

would not have been better for the Imperial Government and the Supreme
War Command to have avoided any negotiations with the Bolshevist
authorities, By the very fact that we gave them the possibility of concluding
peace, and thus meeting the passionate desire of the masses of the people,

we helped them

the resources at

pact of mutual assistance between Britain, France and the ILS_S.IL

important question.

The very best way, for which the Soviet Government had been
in the

all

Government first took precisely this road. It was the

Government which proposed to Britain and France the
conclusion of a triple pact of mutual assistance, it was the Soviet
Government which for four whole months stubbornly negotiated

nated in 1917.

berlain and Daladier

the strength and

It

In 1939, twenty-two years after Brest, the Soviet Government

once again was faced with an important and difficult problem. Of
course much had changed in the world during the intervening
years, and particularly in the strength of the Soviet Union, which
had grown enormously. But in the situation of 1939 there were
similar to those

all

days. Lenin

revolutionary phrase- 1

number of elements

its command,
would have been the creation of a mighty defensive coalition of
Powers who were not interested in launching a second world war*
In practice, what was involved in the first instance was a triple

striving with

History has

showed himself in them as the greatest master of revolutionary

action, who would not sacrifice its substance for the sake of a

nevertheless a

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT^ DILEMMA

better in fulfilling their obligations towards the ILS.S.fL?

Was

it

much more probable that Chamberlain and Daladier at the

critical moment would, on one pretext or another, turn their backs
not

on us? Every justification for these doubts was confirmed three

weeks later when Germany attacked Poland.
There was in fact no ground for reckoning on an effective triple

WHO HELPED

182
pact

worth while, in that case,

negotiations? Was it worth while sup-

now, in August, 1939-

continuing the tripartite

Was

HITLER?

it

the masses as to the possibility of a

defensive alliance of Britain, France and the U.S.S.R- against the

porting illusions

among

Fascist aggressors?

Of course

it

was

not.

Something else had to be thought of- And here the manoeuvres

of Lenin in the days of Brest provided the reply to the question of
what should be done.
In the event of the conversations with Britain and France

an end, two possible prospects appeared before the

Soviet Government a policy of isolation, or agreement with
Germany. But in the circumstances of that moment, when the
guns were already going off on our Far Eastern frontiers (at Lake
Hassan and Khalkhin-Gol), when Chamberlain and Daladier

coming

to

were making great efforts to incite Germany against the U.S.S.R.,

and when in Germany itself there was hesitation as to the direction
in such a situation a
in which the first blow should be struck
policy of isolation would have been extremely perilous, and the
Soviet Government with full justification rejected it. There

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA

possibility that the Soviet

agreement

way

out

with Germany.

Was

it

Government was conducting

In order to prove the existence of such a double game, the

American Government in 1949 published a special volume on
Soviet-German relations in 1939-41, containing an extremely
tendentious selection of documents of the German Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, seized by the Western Powers as trophies at the
end of the second world war. 1
In view of the foregoing, it is hardly necessary to prove that all
such assertions are a slanderous and malignant invention. Nevertheless it is of interest to examine the collection mentioned somewhat more attentively, and to see what the documents it contains
narrate- In doing so, two facts must be borne in mind.
First, its compilers were undoubtedly seeking to choose those
materials which were most to their advantage, and consequently
least to the

advantage of the U.S.S.R.

Secondly, the documents

it

contains consist of correspondence

between the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs and its Embassy
in

Moscow, records of

the conversations between

and

representing only the reflection of the views of one

etc.

and turns with great attention.

As has already been pointed out, politicians and historians in
the west have created the legend that in the spring and summer of
Thus, for
1939 the LLS.S.R, was carrying on a double game.
example, Daladier wrote in April, 1946: 'Since the month of May

are entirely anti-Soviet in their tendency,

the U.S.S.R- had conducted two negotiations, one with France,

1
the other with Germany/ Churchill is less definite, but he too

diplomats?

all

Yes,

it

their twists

remarks in his war memoirs:

'It is

not even

now

possible to fix

abandoned all intention of

working with the Western Democracies and of coming to terms
the

moment when

with

Hitler,'

Stalin definitely

Hence

it

Quoted by Winston
p. 289.
2. Ibid-, p. 184.

follows that Churchill likewise admits the

Churchill, The Second

World War, Vol.

I (1948)3

German and

Soviet diplomats, discussions of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.,

was, for from the very beginning of the tripartite

negotiations Berlin had been extremely nervous, and had followed
feasible?

a double

game.

remained one

183

side, the

simply a

all

German. Naturally,
falsification

therefore, the materials in question

and sometimes are

of the truth to the advantage of Germany. If

was shown above, could completely distort in his

my talk with him on June 12, 1939, why
should we have greater confidence in the documents of German

Lord Halifax,

as

record the substance of

Thus

the collection referred to contains the quintessence of

all

be said against the Soviet Union. In any case, there cn be

found in its pages no indulgences and no understatements favouring the U.S.S.R. It is all the more interesting, therefore, to look at
the documents contained in this act of accusation' against the
Soviet Government. What then do they say?
that can

k Nap-Soviet ReIations t 1939-*941> Department of State, Washington,

1948 (referred to further as *N.S.R.*).

ft

WHO HELPED HITLER?

184

The whole
only the

collection

first is

of

is

divided into eight sections, of which

interest for

our purposes.

It

almost entirely

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA

questions)

which had been interrupted

not be renewed in the near future-

covers the period of the tripartite negotiations (from April 17 to

evasive reply.

August

tion, writes:

14, 1939)-

There

are thirty-two

documents in

this first

section, very unequally distributed:

Thereupon Schnurre,

taken place two days before

more important than

direct questions to learn

In April, May and June the documents in the main deal with
economic questions of a current nature. Political questions are
also

touched upon sometimes, but only infrequently and in pass-

ings

bearing the character of entirely noncommittal mutual

soundings. Usually

it is a question of the possibility of improving

between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, which at that time
were marked by extreme tension. Such conversations are an everyday matter of routine between the diplomatic representatives of

relations

any two

countries, the relations between which leave much to be

There is nothing 'sinister' directed against the interests
of Britain and France in the Soviet-German conversations of this
period. There can be no talk of any duplicity in Soviet policy.
desired-

in his record of the conversa-

LM.]

whether

give a few concrete examples.

If Schnurre gives a correct

this

and

tried

without asking

event would cause a change

Union/ 1
account of what Astakhov

connection (and of this, of course, one cannot in the

of the Soviet Trade Delegation in

Prague, and as to the fulfilment of Soviet orders placed with the

Soviet relations was put

Skoda Works before Czechoslovakia had been seized by Germany, This question, therefore, was in the sphere of current
economic relations between the two countries, and had no edge
directed against the "Western Powers.

of the German
5
Ministry for Foreign Affairs principally concerned with economic
questions, invited Astakhov, the Soviet charge d'affaires in Berlin,
to come and see him, and informed him that the Skoda Works had
Schnurre, a prominent

been instructed to

fulfil

official

the Soviet orders. Astakhov naturally

expressed his satisfaction at this information, and enquired

whether the Soviet-German negotiations

(also

on economic

least

sure)

place in

tives in Berlin as to the status

said in

be
one must suppose that he was wishing to probe a little.
Litvinov's resignation was then being interpreted in the West as
meaning that the U.S.S.R. was passing from co-operation with
Britain and France to a policy of isolation, or even to one of cooperation with Germany. As I have already mentioned, Halifax
on May 6 put me the direct question of how Litvinov's being
relieved of the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
was to be understood, and whether the proposals for a triple pact
of mutual assistance we had made on April 17 remained in force.
It might be useful to the Soviet Government to know how the
ruling circles in Germany reacted to the changes which had taken
this

As I have mentioned, there is only one document for April. It is

a record of conversations between German and Soviet representa-

On May

might

Schnurre gave an

in our position towards the Soviet

content.

I will

this

'Astakhov touched upon the dismissal of Litvinov [which had

one in April, twelve in May,

seven in June, five in July, seven up to August 14. However, much
their chronological distribution is their

in February, 1939,

To

Moscow. But

it

is

most probable

that in reality the

question as to the effect of Litvinov's resignation on German-

by Schnurre himself, and

that

it

was only

in his record of the conversation that he represented matters as

though the question had been put by Astakhov (such devices are
met with in the practice of bourgeois diplomacy). For, when on

May 9,

four days

later,

the same Astakhov presented Fiiippov, the

new Tass correspondent, to an official of the German Ministry for

Foreign Affairs, Braun von Stumm, the latter asked what influence
on Soviet foreign policy would be

exercised

by

the change in the

post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Astakhov replied

that Litvinov carried out a policy

which complied 'with general

1.

N.S.R.j p.
N.S.R., p.

3.
4,

which was not his own but

Whichever version of

principles*, 2

WHO HELPED

l8<5

HITLERr

was the correct one, there can be no doubt in

any case that the sounding as to the effect of Litvinov's resignation
meant nothing even remotely resembling negotiations for an
agreement with Germany.
On May 17 Astakhov again visited Schnurre and talked with
this conversation

him about

the status of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Prague.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA

187

was giving the Soviet Government the impression that

playing some frivolous game a game which was
evidently pursuing some political end or other. From this the
People's Commissar drew the natural conclusion that before these
negotiations were resumed the necessary 'political bases' should
be constructed, i.e. that political relations between the two
countries

Germany was

Schnurre then writes in his report:

countries should be improved- 1

'During the subsequent conversation Astakhov again referred

in great detail to the development of German-Soviet relations/
It is not clear from Schnurre' s way of putting it who was the

had a very discouraging effect in Berlin, and on May 21 State Secretary Weizsaecker telegraphed to the German Ambassador in Moscow:
*On basis of results so far of your discussions with Molotov,

was Astakhov,
Schnurre's own record shows that all he said on the subject was
impregnated with a great distrust of Germany. Astakhov exinitiator

of

this

conversation: but even if

it

pressed satisfaction at a certain restraint in respect of the U.S.S.R.

which the German press had been displaying in the preceding

weeks, but added that 'the Soviets could not judge whether this
was only a temporary break that was used for tactical reasons',
Astakhov pointed to the example of Italo-Soviet relations as a
model of what was also possible in Russo-German relations. 1
In all the conversations between Soviet representatives in
Berlin and German diplomats there was absolutely nothing which

went beyond the bounds of natural everyday concern for the

improvement of relations between two countries which were in
a state of great tension. It would not be possible even with a
microscope to find in them any signs of some ill-intentioned
'conspiracy* against Britain and France.

day Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow,

visited the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and made an
attempt to revive the German-Soviet trade negotiations which had
that

been suspended in February. This was an obvious advance which

Germany was making to the U.S.S.R, But what did he get in
reply? The People's Commissar not only did not express any

on the contrary remarked

sit

this conversation

tight (gan{ still

kalten)

Russians will speak more openly/

Such

and wait to

see if the

the true picture of German-Soviet relations in

is

May,

even from the documents of the German Ministry

1939, as
for Foreign Affairs, tendentiously selected on the orders of our
adversaries in the ILSA. Yet Daladier dares to allege, without a
scrap of evidence, that the U.S.S.R. 'since the month of May had
is

clear

conducted two negotiations, one with France, the other with

Germany

However, the tripartite negotiations very much worried

Hitlerite Germany, and the 'sitting tight' did not last very long.

On May

27 Weizsaecker wrote to Schulenburg: 'We are of the

opinion here that the English-Russian combination certainly will

not be easy to prevent', 3 and on

May

30,

by

Hitler's special

he invited Astakhov to come and see him, and

declared that the status of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Prague
involved great problems of principle* He therefore put before

Astakhov

at full length the question

of political relations between

Germany and theU.S.S.R. In doing so, Weizsaecker developed the

following conception. In Berlin,

they had put an end to

Berlin that there

fairly sharply that the

whole history of the previous trade negotiations between the two

1. Ibid., p. 5.

we must now

on

s report

instruction,

On May 20 there took place a much more important event* On

delight at this but

Schulenburg

2. Ibid., p. 7,
3. Ibid,, p. 9.

it

Communism was

in the country.

would be any

They

not liked, and

did not expect in

liking for National-Socialism in

WHO HELPED

l88

Moscow- But

HITLER?

ideological differences should not interfere with the

maintenance of normal business

relations

between the two

countries.

he reminded the

of the

latter

Germany which had become rooted

agreed with Weizsaecker's view
differences,

it

was

distrust

of Hitlerite

in

Moscow, but of course

that,

in spite of ideological

two countries to normawas one of the fundamental

quite possible for the

lize their relations.

Such, after

all,

of Soviet foreign policy in generalEven more important was the fact that Moscow did not react
in any way to this new step in the German diplomatic offensive.
principles

During June very animated negotiations on trade affairs went on

between Germany and the U.S.S.R., but by the end of the month
they had ceased, because of the impossibility of settling the
differences existing

sidered the

between the two

German

sides.

The

U.S.S.FL con-

position insufficiently favourable towards

itself

In spite of this reverse, and in spite of the fact that the Soviet

Government had not responded to the conversation between

Weizsaecker and Astakhov on May 30, Schulenburg on June 28
visited the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and once
again, on behalf of his Government, officially declared that
Germany desired normalization of the relations between the two
countries. In doing so he pointed to a

clusion
States,

by Germany of

number of facts

(the con-

pacts of non-aggression with the Baltic

a change in the tone of the

German

press towards the

U.S.S.R., etc.) which, in his opinion, were evidence that Berlin

was ready to meet the point of view of the Soviet Union,

This was in accordance with Soviet wishes, and indicated a
change in German policy which was favourable for us. However,
the People's Commissar here too displayed no particular enthusiasm but, judging from Schulenburg's own record, calmly
he received Schulenburg's words 'with satisfaction'
and that 'the foreign policy of the Soviet Government was, in
replied that

accordance with the pronouncements of its leaders, aimed at the

cultivation of good relations with all countries, and this, of course,
applied

This was a new German advance to the U.S.S.R.: but Astakhov

reacted to it very cautiously. From Weiszaecker's record it is
clear that

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA

provided

there

was

reciprocity

to

Germany

too'. 1

Thereafter a whole month passed

that same lamentable month
of July in which the British and French governments were
stubbornly sabotaging the integration of the pact and the military

convention

but the collection in question does not provide one

document testifying to any progressive coming together of
the U,S,S.R. and Germany in the political sphere. In spite of that
sabotage, in spite of the growing doubts of the Soviet Governsingle

ment

as to the possibility of concluding the triple pact,

it firmly
negotiations with Britain and France and abstained
from any advances in the direction of Germany.

continued

its

Quite otherwise was the behaviour of Berlin,

negotiations,

and in

The

tripartite

particular the agreement that British

and
French missions should be sent to Moscow, aroused ever-growing
alarm in Hitlerite government circles. They feverishly discussed
and attempted to put into effect various measures which they
thought might frustrate, or at any rate postpone, the signature of
a triple pact. In the second half of July the trade negotiations

between Germany and the U.S.S.R,, suspended three weeks

were renewed, and this time the German side willingly
advanced towards what the Soviet side desired.

before,

On

July 26 Schnurre,

by

from above,
Trade Representative in Ger-

direct instruction

Astakhov and the Soviet

many, Babarin, to dinner. Here
demonstrate that good relations
Germany and the U,S,S.R., and
invited

Schnurre zealously sought to

were quite possible between

even indicated concretely the
successive stages by which they could be improved. Schnurre
asserted further that

Germany was ready

agreement with the U.S.S.R, on

all

for a far-reaching

problems 'from the Baltic to

the Black Sea',

But what did Schnurre's Soviet guests reply?

quote his

own

record:

'With the strong agreement of Babarin, Astakhov designated

i.

Ibid., pp. 26-7.

WHO HELPED

190
the

way of rapprochement with Germany

ponded with the

vital interests

as the

one

that corres-

of the two countries. However, he

emphasized that the tempo must probably be very slow and

The

Soviet Union had been forced to feel itself most

menaced by the National-Socialist foreign policy.
Astakhov mentioned the Anti-Comintern Pact and our relations
with Japan, Munich and the free hand in Eastern Europe that we
gained there, the political consequences of which were bound to
gradual.

seriously

<

be directed against the Soviet Union.

believe in a shift of

Union,

German

<

Moscow could not quite

policy with respect to the Soviet

A change could only be expected gradually/ 1

It will

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA

HITLER?

be seen that the Soviet representatives in Berlin took a

siren, and in

that the Minister for Foreign Affairs himself received the charge
d'affaires indicated in diplomatic

terms the extreme urgency and

importance of the demarche. Ribbentrop stated that a radical
remoulding of German-Soviet relations was possible on two main
conditions: (a) non-interference in each other's internal affairs:
(b) abandonment [by the U.S.SJEL
LML] of a policy directed
against German interests, Ribbentrop assured Astakhov that the

German Government was favourably disposed towards Moscow

and added that if Moscow would meet the German Government
in this, then 'there was no problem from the Baltic to the Black
Sea that could not be solved between the two of us\
Astakhov, even in Ribbentrop' s record, remained very cautious
commit himself in any way and only stated
Government had the desire to pursue a policy

very cautious attitude to the speeches of the Nazi

in his replies, did not

any

that 'he thought his

go beyond the bounds of a

quite legitimate desire to promote an improvement in relations
between the two countries. And here is an interesting assessment
of the general position of the Soviet Government in relation to
the German advances, which we find in a telegram of Wefesaecker
to Schulenburg on July 29:
'It would be important for us to know whether the statements
made to Astakhov and Babarin have found any response in
Moscow* If you see the opportunity of arranging a new talk with
case in their statements did not

Molotov

I request that

you sound him out

should develop that Molotov abandons

tained by him

[my

italics

you can advance another

LM,]

in this sense.

the reserve thus far

step in

If it

main-

your presentation*

And so, in the opinion of the German side, the Soviet Government, during the months from April to July inclusive, had not
responded to the overtures in the German diplomatic offensiveOne week

later

new and very important step

On August 3, just when the British and

Germany made

towards the U.S.S.R.

French military missions were making

come and
1.

see

their unhurried prepara-

Moscow, Ribbentrop invited Astakhov to

him and made a very important statement. The fact

tions for travelling to

Ibid. j pp. 32.-4.

2, Ibid., p. 36.

of mutual understanding with Germany', This, of course, did

not in any

way

contradict the possible conclusion of the triple

pact.

Informing Schulenburg of his conversation with Astakhov,

Ribbentrop added for the Ambassador himself:

The

charge^

who seemed interested, tried several times to pin

down to more concrete terms, whereupon I gave

the conversation

him

to understand that I

would be prepared to make it more

Government officially communi-

concrete as soon as the Soviet

cated

its

fundamental desire for a

Astakhov be instructed in
interested in

191

'

an early

this sense,

new

we

relationship:

for our part

should

would be

definite settlement.' 1

The next day, August 4, Schulenburg on Ribbentrop' 5 instruc-

tions set forth to the People's

Commissar for Foreign Affairs all

had told Astakhov the previous day. And how
did the People's Commissar react to the words of the German
Ambassador?
that Ribbentrop

Schulenburg informed Berlin that the People's Commissar

stated that the Soviet

Government was favourably inclined to the

conclusion of an economic agreement between the two countries,
expressed the opinion that the press on both sides must abstain
1*

N*S.R., pp. 37-9.

WHO HELPED HITLER?

192

from anything

that

might exacerbate

relations

between them and

questions in

all

quarters of the globe. Such

193
is

the indubitable

of cultural relations desirable,

evidence of those same documents which our adversaries in the

Molotov

United States collected for the express purpose of discrediting the

Soviet Government. 1

considered the gradual resumption

Schulenburg went on:

'Going on to the question of

declared that the Soviet

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA

political

Government

relations,

also desired normalization

and improvement of mutual relations. It was not

relations had so deteriorated. The reason for this he saw, first, in
the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and in everything
that had been said and done in this connection/
Schulenburg touched on the question of Poland, He said that
Germany was striving to settle its differences with Poland by
peaceful means. But if it were forced to act otherwise it would
take Soviet interests into account. The People's Commissar
its fault that

Only in August, when the tripartite negotiations as a result of

Anglo-French sabotage had finally entered their impasse, when all
hope of the conclusion of an effective mutual assistance pact
between the U.S.S.R., Britain and France had disappeared, was
the Soviet Government obliged to make a major change in its
policy. Surely this

is

when

a natural and legitimate conclusion

government discovers

that

due to

special circumstances

it

has no

replied that a peaceful solution

Thus in the spring and summer of 1939 there was no

double game by the Soviet Government^ as its foreign enemies
charge, but there was a clear, firm and absolutely loyal striving, in

depended

respect of Britain and France, to conclude a triple pact with

first

of all

between Poland and Germany

on Germany, As can be seen from Schulen-

him at all.
The German Ambassador did not fail to touch on the tripartite
negotiations, to which the People's Commissar replied that they

other choice.

them
end the

burg's further remarks, this reply did not please

against the aggressors. If this proved unattainable in the

aimed

blame should not in any case fall on the U.S.S.R.

However^ even now the Soviet Government did not wish to
break down all the bridges immediately. On August 3 Germany

at

purely defensive ends.

Commenting on

this

conversation, Schulenburg wrote to

was that 'the Soviet Governmore prepared for improvement in German-

Berlin that his overall impression

ment was

in fact

Soviet relations, but that the old mistrust of

Germany

1
persists'-

We see, therefore, that throughout the spring and summer of

Government maintained complete loyalty towards
its western partners in the negotiations. There were no secret
conspiracies with Germany directed against them. There were no'
1939 the Soviet

Soviet attempts to enter into a bloc with Berlin behind Britain's

back and to betray London and Paris, There was nothing even
remotely resembling Horace Wilson's talks with Wohlthat,
German-Soviet relations right up to August bore the character
of ordinary diplomatic contacts, coloured moreover by a not too
friendly tone. The conversations between the representatives of
the two governments were customary conversations, such as are
conducted daily by Ministers and Ambassadors on various current
1.

N.S.R., pp, 40-1,

(precisely

Germany, and not the Soviet Union)

officially

made

its

far-reaching proposals for a radical reconstruction of relations

between the two countries. This reconstruction, first of all, was to

normalize those relations, and then was gradually to lead to what
in diplomatic language is called friendship.

Here

Such a prospect was

an interesting piece of evidence, showing the absence of any

disloyal acts by the Soviet Government, wliich comes from sources far from
friendly to us, William
Bullitt, the American Ambassador in Paris,
i-

is

reporting

on June

28,

1939, his conversation with the

Daladier, wrote: Daladier said that he of course

French Premier

knew he could not trust any

Russian assurances [about loyalty in respect of the British and French

LM.] 3 but that neither the French nor British Embassies nor Secret Services
had been able to unearth any information indicating that the Russians were
negotiating with the Germans* (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939,

VoL

I (Washington, 1956), p. 278). The explanation was simple: there had

not been any such negotiations. How are these statements by Daladier to

be reconciled with the assertions of the same Daladier, quoted above,

alleging that the U.S.S.R. had 'conducted negotiations since the month of

May* with Germany behind the back of France?

WHO HELPED

194

HITLER?

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA

keeping with the peaceable aspirations of the Soviet

Government, and its achievement would considerably strengthen
the security of the Soviet Union. But Moscow even now did not

solely by the fault of Chamberlain and Daladier. The time

had
come to go over to the only way out which still remained.
The position of the Soviet Government during the tripartite

Moscow

negotiations could be compared to the position of a man who is

being overtaken by the incoming tide: another moment, and his
head will disappear under the waters, if he does not make some
rapid and resolute eifort to reach a rock which the tide will not

fully in

yield to the seductive picture put before

continued to think of a
effort to realize the

triple pact,

it

by

Berlin.

and wanted to make one

final

optimum alternative for combating aggression.

Notwithstanding each and every doubt born of the preceding

Moscow

history of the tripartite negotiations,

still

did not lose

hope that perhaps the governments of Britain and France, even

though it were five minutes before catastrophe, would have
second thoughts and take the correct road.
For that reason Moscow waited another ten days. But Berlin
meanwhile could not stand the delay, and tried somehow to
hasten the course of events. On August to, a week after Ribbentrop's conversation with Astakhov, Schnurre, in conversation

with the latter, was insisting on the speediest possible

clarification

of the attitude of the U.S.S.R. to the proposals made to

German
But

it

by

the

side.

Moscow even now continued to

abstain from taking a final

had done ever since Ribbentrop's talk with Astakhov on August 3. Moscow waited while the British and French
decision, as

it

military missions

steamer from

were

London

sailing

on

their passenger

and cargo

to Leningrad. It waited while the

consultations were going

on with the

first

military missions in the

Soviet capital. But when, in the course of these consultations,

there arose the question of the passage of Soviet troops through

the territories of Poland and

military agreement),

when

Rumania
it

(the central question of any

transpired that neither the British

and French military missions nor the British and French governments had any reply to make to this question, when London and
Paris reacted to the telegrams sent on this subject by only a
protracted silence, Soviet long-suffering patience came to an end.
It had become quite clear that Chamberlain and Daladier were
incorrigible, and that no collective security for peace-loving
Powers could be built with their assistance.
The best method of resisting Fascist aggression had failed,

submerge.
In

and

the danger of a second world

fact,

war was coming

closer

In March and April it was only noticeable, in May and

began to assume more definite outlines; in July it clouded

closer.

June it
the whole atmosphere of Europe, and by the middle of August no
one doubted any longer that in a few days' time the guns would
begin to speak and aircraft drop their bombs.
It was impossible to wait any longer. Only now, in the
middle
of August, was the Soviet Government obliged to take its final
decision as to what was to be done. The dilemma with which
it
had previously been faced was now transformed into the bitter
necessity of coming to agreement with Germany. The
five
months' sabotage of the tripartite negotiations by the govern-

ments of Britain and France, supported by the U.S.A.,

other

way

out for the U.S.S.R,

left

no

COLLAPSE OF THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS

197

The People's Commissar, as the Ambassador reported to

'welcomed German intentions of improving relations with
the Soviet Union', but expressed the opinion that Ribbentrop'
Berlin,
Berlin,

Moscow Required adequate preparation'. He was

know whether the German Government was

visit to

interested to

The

collapse of the tripartite negotiations

and the forced agreement with Germany

also
dis-

posed to conclude a pact of non-aggression with the U.S.S,R. ?

sign jointly with the U.S.S.R. a guarantee of the Baltic States and
influence Japan for the purpose of improving Soviet-Japanese
relations. 1

On august

14 Schnurre telegraphed to Schulenburg that he

had been visited by Astakhov and told that the Soviet Government was ready for 'a discussion on the individual groups of
questions* in the sphere of German-Soviet relations. The Soviet
Government proposed that the negotiations should be carried on
in

Moscow. 1
.On the same day, August

cation,

on

immediately after this communi-

Bibbentrop sent Schulenburg an urgent directive to

the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and state

call

on behalf

of the German Government, 'there is no question between the Baltic and the Black Seas
which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both
countries'. Ribbentrop underlined the possibility of expanding
against the other'

and that,

non-aggression with the U.S.Sit,, to guarantee the Baltic States

jointly with the Soviet Union and to exercise its influence with

Japan for an improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations. At the

same time he urgently repeated that it was necessary for him to

come

14,

of the German Government that 'there exist no real conflicts of

interest between Germany and the U.S.S.R/, that 'there is lacking
all cause for an aggressive attitude on the part of one country

>

On the following day, August i6 y Ribbentrop, in a telegram to

Schulenburg, asked him urgently to inform the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs that Germany agreed to conclude a pact of

in the opinion

German-Soviet economic relations in every direction, Ribbentrop

f
also stated that with the object of a speedy clarification of Gerrelations* he was ready himself to come to Moscow,
on condition that he would be received by Stalin, 2
Thus the German Government once again took the initiative
and now quite officially made a decisive step forward. On August
15 Schulenburg carried out the instructions he had received from

man-Russian

N.S.R.j p. 4&.
2. Ibid., pp. 50-2,
r.

Moscow, and stated that he was ready to undertake this

any time after Friday, August i8\ 2
On August 18 Schulenburg informed the Soviet Government
of all this, and received the Soviet reply to the German proposals
of August 14. What was the nature of this reply?
to

journey

It

'at

bore a

strictly practical character. It

take part in organizing the united front against aggression.

The

German Government
improve its political relations with the
U.S.S.R, the Soviet Government could look upon such a change
only with pleasure and> for its own part, was prepared to alter its
policy in the direction of an appreciable improvement in relations
with Germany.
reply further stated that if the

sincerely intended to

The

reply stated that the Soviet Government considered an

improvement of Soviet-German
i-

Ibid, p. 52.

2. Ibid., p. 58.

196

enumerated the reasons

which had hitherto obliged the Soviet Government to be suspicious of the intentions of Germany, and to take steps to
strengthen the defensive measures of the U.S.S.R., and also to

relations

was

entirely possible,

WHO HELPED
since the principle

HITLER?

of the peaceful coexistence of various

political

systems side by side represented a long-established principle of

the foreign policy of the ILS.S.R.

Going on,

the sphere of practical measures, the reply

of all a trade and credit agreement should be

finally, to

proposed that

first

concluded and then,

after a short interval, a pact

should be signed. As regard the proposed

German

Moscow of the

Minister for Foreign Affairs, the reply stated that the

Government welcomed

Soviet

of non-aggression

visit to

intentions of the

this as evidence

of the serious

German Government. But it considered that such

a visit required thorough preparation, and should be accomplished

with the

minimum of publicity and newspaper

We see that the Soviet Government,

sensation.

compelled by Chamber-

and Daladier to change the course of its foreign policy,

approached the necessary turning point calmly, soberly, coollain

The German Government,

was extremely nervous and in a great hurry. In a
telegram to Schulenburg on August 18 Ribbentrop gave his
Ambassador the following instructions:
headedly, without any excessive haste.

on the

contrary,

'This time please conduct conversation [with the People's

Commissar
.

Foreign Affairs

for

for a rapid realization of

I.M.]

my trip

pressing emphatically

and by opposing appropri-

any possible new Russian objections/ 1

Schulenburg carried out the orders of his Minister: but on
August 19 had to inform Ribbentrop that the Soviet Government agreed to the latter's visit only a week after publication
of the news that a trade and financial agreement had been
ately

signed.

Thereupon Germany brought

1.

its

He

stated that the

and

insistently

begged him to receive Ribbentrop in

Ibid, p. 63.

On August 19 there had been signed in Berlin a trade and credit

agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, providing for a credit from
Germany to the U.S*S.R. of 200,000,000 German marks^ for a period of
2.

became necessary once again to

On August 16 Marshal
Voroshilov, in reply to General Doumenc's
proposal that they
should^begin drafting a military convention,
categorically de-

clared:

The time has not yet arrived toprepare any document. We

have not solved what

is for the Soviet side the cardinal

problem,
the problem of the right of passage for
the Soviet armed
forces on Polish and Rumanian territory
for joint action by the
contracting parties against the common
enemy.' 4

that

is,

The enquiry by the military missions as to the passage

of Soviet
Poland and Rumania had been sent to London and
Paris on August 14. It was now August
21, Seven days had passed,
yet there was no reply from the British and
French governments.
In the feverish atmosphere of the time
this prolonged silence was
forces through

a reply in

itself At the same time the most

discouraging informawas coming from Warsaw: the 'Government of
Colonels
would not at any price permit the passage

tion

of Soviet troops

through

its territory.

In such circumstances there was nothing

left for the Soviet
to do but to take the final and decisive
step.

Government

On

heaviest artillery into action.

Hitler sent a message to Stalin.

trade and financial agreement had been signed the day

before, 2

a pact of non-aggression itself It

assess the situation created in the sphere

of the tripartite negotiations. Here all was very gloomy, as
before.

that

same day, August 21, when it was established

that
Paris had not replied for a whole week
to the

London and

On August 20
new

COLLAPSE OF THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS

199
Moscow not later than August 22 or 23,3
The hour of great decision had come for the Soviet Government. Up to now there had been only an exchange
of opinions
between Moscow and Berlin, mutual probing, the
study of each
other's frame of mindbut now the
question was of concluding

seven years, at per cent per annum, German

goods on accountof this credit
5
were to he purchased within two years. Within
the same period the U.S.S.R
was to supply Germany with goods to a sum of
180,000,000 marks. It will

be seen that the amount covered by the

agreement was fairly modest, and
could not be compared in any way with
the sums of 500,000,000 to
1,000 co^ooo which figured as a possible Joan in the
negotiations of
Wohlthat with Hudson and Sir Horace Wilson.
3.
4-

p. 66-7.

'Negotiations

/ (International

airs,

1959,

No,

3, p, i 4 8).

WHO HELPED

200

HITLER?

enquiry of the military missions, and Marshal Voroshilov in

consequence proposed the interruption of the sessions of the
military missions, J,

V.

Stalin

gave

his reply to Hitler's message.

expressed the hope that the German-Soviet pact of non-

He

aggression would be a turning point for the better in the political

relations between the two countries, and agreed that Ribbentrop
should come to Moscow on August 23.
As the documents published by the British Government after
the war prove, this step by the Soviet Government was more than
justified, since it follows from these documents that London did

not even intend to give a reply to the enquiry of its own military
mission as to the passage of Soviet troops. The sabotage of
1
negotiations for a triple pact continued even at that stage,

On the appointed day Ribbentrop with an appropriate suite

flew to Moscow. In the Soviet capital he had two meetings with
Stalin.

By the end of the same day a Pact

of Non-Agression, valid

by the U.S.SR. and Germany. It

immediately upon signature, though its ratifica-

for ten years, had been signed

entered into force

was provided. The content of the Pact differed little

which the U.S.S.R. had concluded in previous
years with many other Powers. This was the traditional policy of
the Soviet Union, which sought to apply Lenin's principle of
peaceful coexistence in practice. The two sides undertook to
abstain from any aggression against each other (Article 1), to
resolve disputes arising between them only by peaceful means
tion later

from

similar pacts

any groupings hostile to the other

and not to support any third Power should either

(Article 5), not to participate in

side (Article 4)
side

by the

by that third Power (Article

Germany and the U.S.S.R, would

object of hostile activities

2). Article 3

provided that

'remain in contact with each other for the future for consultation,
in order to

common

inform each other of questions which affected their

draw attention to the words 'consultation' and 'inform'. Like

the whole contents of the Pact, they are unquestionable evidence
Documents on British Foreign Policy

VIII, p. 119.

201

document signed on August 23, 1939, was only a Pact of

Non-Aggression. It was in no way something lite a military
alliance between the two countries, as western politicians and
that the

generals have repeatedly tried to represent

U.S.S.R, to give any help to

Germany

it.

It

did not bind the

whatever. In signing the

Government was indulging in no illusions: it

sooner or later Hitler would break the obligations

Pact, the Soviet

presumed

that

entered into under the Pact, But

it

the U.S.S.R. a certain delay, which

considered that the latter gave

would give

it

the opportunity

of making better preparations for a future war. As we know, this

delay provided the Soviet Union with nearly two years more of
peace.

But the Soviet Government succeeded not only in securing

this delay- It also received the assurance from the German

Government

that hostilities

would not be transferred into the

by the sabotage of Cham-

Baltic regions- In the situation created

and Daladier on the one hand, and the 'Government of

Colonels' in Warsaw on the other? the Soviet Government was in

berlain

Poland which had been so catestill could be done

was to save Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia from

no position

to afford the aid to

gorically rejected

by

the 'Colonels'. All that

German invasion. The Soviet Government acted accordingly.

As a result, the U.S-S.R. received the following advantages
from the agreement with Germany.
In the

first place,

the possibility of a united capitalist front

Union was averted. More than that, the basis

was laid for the formation later on of the anti-Hitler coalition, of
which the Western Powers at that moment were not even
against the Soviet

dreaming.
All that Chamberlain and Daladier were thinking about at that

time was

at all costs to

impel Hitlerite Germany into war with

the Soviet Union.

interests'.

1.

COLLAPSE OF THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS

Third

Series, Vol.

The Pact of Non-Aggression made it impossible to launch the

second world war by an attack on the Soviet Union.
The conclusion of the Pact meant the complete bankruptcy of
this

shameful Munichite strategy,

WHO HELPED

202

HITLER?

undoubtedly played an important part in the destinies

of the Soviet Union, and therefore in the destinies of all mankind.
This

fact

Secondly, thanks to the agreement with

Germany the

an attack on the U.S.S.R. by Japan, Germany's

Soviet bloc, disappeared.

Had

threat

of

ally in the anti-

there not been a Pact of

Non^

Aggression with Germany, the Soviet Union could have found

itself in a difficult situation,

For

at that

moment an

having to carry on a war on two fronts.

attack

by Germany on

the

HS.S.R,

in the

west would have meant an attack by Japan in the east. It was

precisely in August, 1939, that the battles on the River Khalkhin-

COLLAPSE OF THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS

sibility for

on

Hitler,

these

launching the second world war falls, on the one hand,

and on the other on Chamberlain and Daladier (I use

names

as symbols).

heavy responsibility for all the

war falls on those political
groups which in the second half of the thirties were in power in
Britain and France: on those groups which in their undiscerning
class blindness were carrying on a policy of appeasement of
the
aggressors, and were hoping for the launching of a war of mutual
miseries caused

by

the second world

Germany and the U.S.S.R, It was just these

groups which were setting the trap for the Soviet Union into
which, however, they fell themselves for the first blow of
destruction between

Gol reached their greatest intensity, while the Hiranuma Government was stubbornly rejecting a peaceful settlement of the
conflict. On the contrary, it was concentrating troops in the
Soviet frontier in anticipation of an attack by Germany, But hardly
had the German-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression been signed
(August 23) than the Hiranuma Government fell (August 28),
and the Abe Government which replaced it hastened to agree to
a peaceful settlement of the armed clash. Thus the immediate
consequence of the signature of the agreement with Germany was
the liquidation of the flames of war which had been blazing up on

In order to complete my account

of the miserable end of the luckless

the Far Eastern frontiers of the U.S.S.R,

1939.

Of course,
that

its

the Soviet

Government had

to reckon with the fact

agreement with Germany might be used (and in

fact

was

used) to excite anti-Soviet feelings in the 'democratic' countries,

and that people might be found abroad, even among those not
hostile to the U.S.S.R,,

who would

not understand

its

correctly (as indeed happened). Nevertheless, considering

actions
all

the

203

Hitlerite aggression in the

second world war

fell not on Moscow,

This was the outcome because Soviet
diplomacy proved to be wiser than that of the British and French
governments. But for this we have no reason to apologize.

but on

London and

Paris,

have

still

briefly to tell

tripartite negotiations

On August 22, the day after the final decision of the Soviet
Government to make an agreement with Germany, General
Doumenc

received an urgent communication from Paris, The

French Government considered that as soon as Poland was at war
with Germany, Soviet troops should have the right to enter

Polish territory. The French Government considered.

But
what did the Polish Government consider? Paris maintained
complete silence on such an important question; while from
.

advantages and disadvantages, the Soviet Government came to

the conclusion that the pros unquestionably outweighed the cons.

As

Germany was signed, That was

the only way out imposed on us by the stupidly criminal policy of
a result, the agreement with

Chamberlain and Daladier.

one more accusation which the enemies of the Soviet

Union abroad like to make, By the agreement with Germany',
they say, 'you launched the second world war/ Pitiful and blind
slanders! As can be seen from all the foregoing, the real responThere

is

of

Warsaw

there

continued

to

come extremely unfavourable

information.

From the documents published by the British Government we

now know that Seeds, referring to the instructions received by
General Doumenc on August 22, asked London: 'Can we assume
that

you

agree?'

But London did not reply

Moscow Ambassador,

Instead,

there

to the

enquiry of its

was written on Seeds'

WHO HELPED

204

telegram, in the handwriting of Strang

HITLER?

(who had returned home

'In this lies the basis

of the

differences.

was not possible to send an

answer to this telegram as no decision was taken/ 1 So far did the
sabotage of the British Government go!
beginning of August):

at the

COLLAPSE OF THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS

It

And

it

was on

20J
this that

the negotiations broke down.'

Replying further to a
stated

by

questionwas it true, as
Government had broken off

journalist's

Reuters, that the Soviet

At that time we did not know all these details, but we knew the
basic fact that London did not want to reply to the cardinal

the tripartite negotiations in view of its conclusion

of an agreement with Germany?the head of the Soviet delegation said:

question in the military negotiations. This meant a great deal.

'The military negotiations with Britain and France were not

broken off because the U.S.S.R, had concluded a Pact of Non-

And

in these circumstances the head of the Soviet delegation

gathered

all

the three military missions

on August

was

21 and, as

mentioned

earlier, proposed that the meetings should be interrupted. This was simply a diplomatic way of saying that the

had suffered a fiasco.

and French military -missions, like Seeds and
Naggiar, understood the meaning of the Soviet delegation's statement perfectly. And although in the next two, three or four days
the heads of the missions and the Ambassadors of Britain and
France still called upon and talked with the People's Commissars
for Defence and Foreign Affairs, this could no longer change the
situation. There was nothing left for the missions to do than to go
tripartite negotiations

The

home

British

Aggression with Germany. On the contrary, the U.S.S.R.

concluded the Pact of Non-Aggression with Germany as

a result,

among other things, of the circumstance that the military negotiations with France

and Britain had entered an impasse, in consequence of insurmountable differences/ 1

This put all the dots over the Vs.

as quickly as possible.

In the interview published in the Soviet press on August 27,

1939, the head of the Soviet military mission described in the
following

way

the reasons for the failure of the military negotia-

tions:

The

Soviet military mission considered that the U.S.S.R.,

common

having no

its

with the aggressor, could give

frontier

assistance to France, Britain

and Poland only on condition

were given passage through Polish

forces

that

territory, for

no

other ways exist for the Soviet forces to enter into contact with
the forces of the aggressor.

'In spite of all the obvious correctness of such a view, the British
and French military missions did not agree with this view of the

Government openly declared

did not need, and would not accept, military aid from the

Soviet mission, while the Polish

that

it

^J*S.SR.
1.

Ibid., p. 119.

I.

Prayda, August

27, 1939.

CONCLUSION

207

Europe a peace advantageous to Great Britain.

Gradually gathering force, this foolish and criminal
conception
reached its peak after 1937, when Neville Chamberlain
dictating to

Conclusion

1 he most important conclusions

to

be drawn from the preceding

pages are these

i.

During the years before the war covered by these recollecUnion sincerely and persistently strove

tions (1932-9) the Soviet

for the best possible relations with Great Britain- This

was

became
Prime Minister and Lord Halifax Foreign Secretary. From
this
conception which inspired the Cliveden set there followed
the
policy of appeasement of the aggressors of Hitler
in the first place;
and in order that such a policy should be successful (an aim
which
after all was never achieved) Britain and
France, with the support
of particular circles in the U.SA. in 1938 and
sacrificed
1939,

Austria, Spain and Czechoslovakia.

dictated,
3.

on

the one hand,

by

its

general policy of peace and peaceful

coexistence with States based on a different system from that of the

on the other by the practical political calculation

Soviet Government that together with Britain and France

U.S.S.R., and

of the

a reliable barrier could be brought into existence against

aggression of the Fascist Powers in Europe

2-

Germany and

the

Italy.

Unfortunately, however, the good wishes of the Soviet

Union did not meet with

True, there were

many

a sympathetic response in Great Britain.

elements in the

countrythe workers,
more far-sighted

considerable sections of the intellectuals, the

who sympathized with

representatives of the bourgeoisie

the

idea of creating a triple barrier against the Fascist aggression

which threatened

and her world interests. But the

State during the period described was firmly in the hands of the
most reactionary strata of the bourgeoisie, for whom class hatred
Britain herself

of the U.S.S,R, as a land of Socialism blotted out everything else.

The leading political centre of this was the so-called Cliveden set

which gathered

drawing-room of Lady Astor, while their

generally recognized leader was Neville Chamberlain. On account
of its extreme hostility to the Soviet Union, the Cliveden set was
resolutely opposed to the creation of a triple barrier for the defence
of Britain's interests against the Fascist aggressors, and hit upon
what seemed to it the happy idea of bringing about a conflict
between Germany and the U.S.S.R., with the aim, once both
these

in the

Powers had been bled white

in an exhausting war, of

In spite of such unfavourable conditions, the Soviet Union

nevertheless continued
Britain,

and

form of a

efforts to improve its relations with

up a barrier to Germany and Italy in the
pact of mutual assistance, seeing in this the best
its

in 1939 to set

triple

guarantee against Fascist aggression. In fact it was

precisely the
U.S.S.R. which took the initiative in proposing such a
pact. The
Cliveden set, although strongly opposed to such plans,
found

under pressure from wide sections of British public opinion

and from some foreign States, which particularly
feared Hitler
and Mussolini: and in consequence was obliged to
manceuvre,
and to make believe from time to time that it was ready
to take
the path of creating such a triple barrier against
the aggressors.
This manoeuvring assumed its most pronounced
itself

character in

1939 after Hitler had torn up the Munich agreement. Hence

followed the granting to Poland, Rumania and
Greece, in March

and April, 1939, of unilateral guarantees by Britain

(and France)
in the event of their being attacked by the
Fascist States. Hence
also followed the necessity for the

likewise the Daladier

Chamberlain Government (and

Government) of taking part in the tripartite

negotiations for the conclusion of a pact of mutual

assistance with
the U.S,S.R. But these were negotiations
undertaken against their
will, under the lash so to speak, in
order to deceive the masses:

and consequently they amounted in practice to

pure sabotage,
examples of which have been abundantly produced in
the preceding pages. The chief concern of Chamberlain
(and of Daladier)
was not to strive for the conclusion of the triple pact
as rapidly as

206

CONCLUSION

208

ways and means of avoiding its signature. The

inevitable consequence of such a line of conduct on the part of the
British (and French) Governments was that in August, 1939, the
tripartite negotiations finally reached an impasse. It became quite
possible but to find

clear that the creation

Fascist aggressors

owing

of a truly

effective triple barrier against the

was becoming impossible owing and only

to the sabotage of Chamberlain and Daladier.

form of resistance to the aggression of the

Fascist States had become, in spite of us, unattainable, the Soviet
Union had to think of other means of assuring its security, even
though this assurance would be temporary and unstable. The
great Lenin, in the first months after the October Revolution, had
4. Since the best

displayed his genius in a

model manoeuvre on the

international

arena. Striving to ensure that Soviet Russia, only recently born,

should have the 'breathing space' which

at that

time

it

needed

most of all, Lenin began by offering all the belligerent Powers the
conclusion of a general democratic peace without annexations
and indemnities, Lenin considered

this to

be the most desirable

way of securing for the Soviet Republic a 'breathing space' which

might become even a prolonged period of peace- But when it
Soviet Government had

fallen

became clear that the appeal of the

on stony soil Lenin decided that a separate peace with the German
coalition should

be concluded. This was, as Lenin

called

it,

an

'obscene' peace, extremely unfavourable for Soviet Russia: nevertheless,

it

did provide her with a temporary

as subsequent events

showed, was

'breathing space' and,

historically entirely justified.

Remembering this notable political example, the Soviet

Government decided to follow it. Of course, circumstances and
conditions in 1939 were somewhat different from those prevailing
twenty-two years before, and first and foremost in the tremendous
increase in strength of the Soviet Union: yet nevertheless in the
world situation of 1939 there were not a few elements which made
it akin to the situation in 1917-18. It was necessary at any price to'
prevent the creation of a single
U.S.S.R,; and

it

was

vital, if

capitalist

front

against the

not ultimately to prevent,

at least to*

postpone for as long as possible an attack by the Fascist Powers

conclusion

209

on our country. This was dictated by the elementary feeling of selfpreservation inherent in any State, irrespective of its nature. But
it was also dictated by considerations of a more general character.
The Soviet Union at that time was not simply one of the great
Powers existing on our planet. The Soviet Union represented
something much more important: it was at that time the only
country in the world which was the fatherland of Socialism, and
which bore within itself the embryo of the Communist future of
mankind. On the shoulders of Soviet people at that time,
and particularly on the shoulders of the Soviet Government, deall

volved the greatest responsibility for preserving the integrity and

independence of a country so exceptional in
cance.

The

greatest responsibility

its

demanded

historical signifi-

also the greatest

courage, flexibility and resolution.

In the middle of August, 1939, the Soviet Government

of Chamberlain and
Daladier excluded any possibility of signing a triple pact, and it
j.

finally reached the conclusion that the policy

by ending negotiations with Britain

and to conclude an agreement with
Our adversaries abroad put into circulation the

decided to change

and France

Germany.

its

policy

as purposeless,

summer of 1939 the

Government had been playing a double game carrying
on public negotiations with Britain and France for a triple pact of
slanderous legend that in the spring and

Soviet

mutual assistance against the aggressors, and behind

secretly discussing a friendly agreement with

in the long run

it

preferred

Germany

their backs

Germany

and

that

to the western democracies.

In order to prove these malignant inventions the State Department

of the U.S.A. even published in 1948 a particularly tendentious

of German diplomatic documents captured in Germany

by the Americans. But the detailed analysis of these documents for
selection

the period of the tripartite negotiations, which has been

made

in

can leave no doubt whatsoever that such assertions

are completely false. On the contrary, right up to the middle of

earlier pages,

August, and in spite of the crying sabotage of the

negotiations

by

tripartite

the governments of Britain and France, the

U.S.S-R, continued to be their completely loyal partner, and

CONCLUSION

210

by Germany, of which there were not a

wedge between the tLS.S.R. and the western
democracies. But when, in the middle of August 1939, the Soviet
Government came to the conclusion that it was quite hopeless to
rejected

all

the attempts

few, to drive a

continue the tripartite negotiations,

it decided to change its line

of policy, and really did change it. In doing so it used the legitimate right of any Government to change its line of policy, should

conclusion
c

211

common knowledge

that it was not by any means

Khrushchov wrote, 'that the United States, or
the United Kingdom and France either, drew the conclusion that it
was necessary to establish co-operation with the Soviet Union with
the aim of resisting Hitler aggression, though the Soviet Government constantly displayed readiness for this. In the capitals of the
It

is

immediately,' Mr,

In this particular case the change

western States opposite tendencies prevailed for a long time. .

'It was only when Fascist Germany, upsetting the short-

was all the more justifiable because it was imposed on the Soviet
Government by the stupidly criminal behaviour of Chamberlain

sighted calculations of the inspirers of Munich, turned against

the western Powers, and when the Nazi army began moving

and Daladier.

westward,

circumstances compel

6.

to

it

do

so.

The Soviet-German agreement of August

and

course, not an act of perfection

never regarded

it

as such-

23, 1939, was,

the Soviet

of

Government

But at any rate it did avert the possibility

of the creation of a united

capitalist front against the

freed 13,000,000 western Ukrainians and Byelorussians

U.S-SJL,

from the

of becoming slaves of Hitler, ensured the national reunion of all Ukrainians and Byelorussians into single nations
advancing rapidly on the path of Socialist development, and
terrible fate

pushed forward the Soviet

frontiers several hundred kilometres

which was of great strategic importance. As later
events showed, this agreement postponed the German attack on

to the west,

the U.S.S.R. for nearly

two

years, substantially facilitated the

defence of the main centres of the country and then the victorious
destruction of Hitlerite

armed forces, made possible the

Germany and ensured the preliminary

more

rapid restoration of the strength of the

counter-offensive of the Soviet

conditions for the

U.S.S.R, in

its

present frontiers.
*

men who

to quote here

from the statements of two

belong to opposite camps,

On November

N,

Khrushchov addressed an
extensive Note to the then President of the U.S.A., Dwight
Eisenhower, in which he touched upon the world situation as it
existed on the eve of the last war.
27,

1958,

Denmark, Norway,

Belgium

and

the

Netherlands and breaking the back of France, that the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom had no
alternative but to acknowledge their miscalculations and take the
road of organizing, jointly with the Soviet Union, resistance to
Fascist Germany, Italy and Japan, Given a more far-sighted

policy

on the

part of the western Powers, such co-operation

between the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom
and France could have been established much earlier, in the first
years after Hitler seized power in Germany, and then there would
have been no occupation of France , no Dunkirk and no Pearl
Harbour [my italics LM.]. In that case it would have been

possible to save the millions of human lives which were sacrificed

by

the peoples of the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia, France,

Britain, Czechoslovakia, the

United States, Greece,

other countries in order to curb the aggressor/

Winston

Churchill, touching in his

Norway and

war memoirs on the

of 1939, writes:
There can be no doubt, even in the after-light, that Britain
and France should have accepted the Russian offer
But Mr,
Chamberlain and the Foreign Office were baffled by this riddle of
tripartite negotiations

As a postscript, I want

crushing

S.

the sphinx.

When

events are

tremendous mass as
time.

The

alliance

moving

at

at this juncture, it is

of

Britain,

such speed, and in such

wise to take one step at a

France and Russia would have

struck deep alarm into the heart of

Germany in 1939, and no one

can prove that war might not even then have been averted [my

212

CONCLUSION

italics

LMJ. The

next step could have been taken with superior

power on the side of the Allies. The initiative would have been
regained by their diplomacy. Hitler could afford neither to
embark upon the war on two fronts, which he himself had so
deeply condemned, nor to sustain a check.

was a pity not to

have placed him in this awkward position, which might well have
cost him his life- If, for instance, Mr. Chamberlain on receipt of
the Russian offer had replied: "Yes. Let us three band together
and break Hitler's neck", or words to that effect, Parliament
would have approved, Stalin would have understood and history
might have taken a different course.
Instead, there was a long
.

silence while half-measures

and judicious compromises were

being prepared.' 1
In spite of all the differences between the authors of these two
quotations (and I do not need to prove that they are very great)
they are united in their opinion that the second world war could
have been averted if the U.S.S.R., Britain, France and the

(and

at least the U.S.S.R., Britain

and resolutely created an

of the Fascist States.

Who

and France) had rapidly, firmly

effective barrier against the

prevented the formation of such a barrier?

Union? No, the Soviet Union

contrary, the Soviet

Union did

not guilty of

is
all

that

aggresson

The

this.

Soviet

On

was humanly possible

to

What has been written in these

pages should not leave the least doubt about this. The formation
of the barrier in reality was prevented by the Cliveden set in
Britain

and the 20o

the persons

who

And if we are to speak of

who most completely embodied

families' in France.

helped Hitler,

these reactionary forces and

most

i.

which

it

brought mankind,

The Second World War,

VoL

Abe, Nobuyuki (Japanese Premier,

m9-4\ 202
Astakhov,
G.
(Soviet
Charge"

I (1948), pp. 284-6.

Names

lose relevant to the text)

R. A. (Under-Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, 1938^41),

Butler,

83

d'Aifaires in Berlin,
1939), 184-91,
1 94
Aster,

Cadogan,

Lord and Lady, 53-4,

Sir Alexander (Permanent

Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
I93MO, 72 3 106
Cedl, Lord Robert (Viscount Cecil of

69, II4(

206

Bauawn,

(Soviet Trade RepresenGermany), 189-90

Baldwin, Stanley (Conservative Prime
Minister, 1924-9 and
1937-7), *7,

Chelwood,

tative in

49> fo^3> 6 <S) 77

Barthou,
Louis
(French

British

Foreign

Minister, 1933^4),
44-S, 47
39, 54, 56-8
Joseph (Polish Foreign
Minister, 1932-9), 108-9
Benes, Dr. Eduard (Czechoslovak
Foreign Minister, 1918-3^ Presi-

Beck,

Col,

the Exchequer, 1931-7,

206-12
Churchill, Winston,
39-41, 4

Foreign

u^

rfi, rB2,

2n-iz

Cooper, Alfred Duff (Secretary for

War, 1935-7, First Lord of the
Admiralty, 1937-3), 87
Cranborne, Lord (later Marquess of

co-author of 'BriandKellogg Pact August 1928),

74
Bullitt, William
(U.S. diplomat),
1

Sir

60-1, 67, 69-70, 79-^81, 125-6,

136,

Minister,

Marshal

Prime Min-

131-6, 139, 144, I4 g~7 I?(5j iyB _

s
toj l6 3-5, 171, 180-2,
194-5 j 2 J-3 3

Minister, 1938-9), 8a, 122, 12a,

131
Briand, Aristide (as French Foreign

122, 193
Burnett, Air

various

1937-40), 9>
40-1, 52,
T4> <53-4 *7-74, 7<S, 77, 80-97,
100-4, rotf^S, 110-1G, ric-i, 124-^7,

1919-22, Secretary for India, 1924-^

(French

of

to 1927,

ister,

dent, 1935-8X52,79? 84
Bevan, Aneurin (Labour leader),
5(^7
Birkenhead, Lord (Lord Chancellor,

40
Bonnet, Georges

member

Governments

and
of British delegations at League of
Nations to 1932), 63
Chamberlain, Sir Austen (Foreign
Secretary, 1924-9),
40, 67
Chamberlain, Joseph, 67
Chamberlain, Neville (Chancellor of

8),

actively applied the policy

which suited them, we have in the first place to name Neville

Chamberlain and Daladier. It is difficult to over-estimate all the
depth of their historic responsibility for the launching of the
second world war and for the innumerable sacrifices, losses and
sufferings

(Dates given are only

Beaverbrook, Lord,

the

bring the barrier into existence.

Index of

It

Salisbury)

(Parliamentary UnderSecretary for Foreign Affairs,

1935-

Charles

S), 7i

(member of British military delegation to Moscow,

1939), 165, 171

Cummings, A.
tator,

News

J.

(Political

Chronicle), 35

commen-

INDEX

214
Curzon of Kedleston, Lord (Foreign
Secretary, 1919-23),

itf,

40

the French General Staff, 1931-9),

173

George V, 62
Daladier, Edouard {French Minister
of National
Premier and

Defence,

Foreign

1936-^7,

Minister,

1938-40), 9, 81-4, 90, 103, 106,

121-2, 125, 133, 139, 145-6, IJI,
156, 180-2, 187, 193-5, 198, 201-3,
2079, 212
Dalton, Hugh (Labour Party leader),

Goebhels, Joseph (German Minister

of Propaganda, 193S-45), 151
Goeringj Marshal Hermann (Commander-in-Chief of German Air

Force and Air Minister, 1935-45),

Gort, Field-Marshal Lord (Chief of

INDEX

2IJ

Hoesch, Leopold von (German Ambassador in London, 1932-6), 24

Hoffmann, General Max von, 1B0
Hudson, Robert Spear (later Lord)
(Secretary, Department of Overseas
Trade, 1937-40), i5S>-6> *99

Jovnson-Hicks, Sir William (later

Lord Brentford) (Home Secretary,
i9M-9>) 40

Imperial General Staff 1937$)* 164

Klement (General Secre-

Gotrwald,
163
Dirksen, Herbert von (German

bassador

Am-

London, 1938-9),

in

86,

160

Doumenc, General Joseph (head of

French military delegation to Moscow, 1939), 165, 170-6, 199, 203
Drax, Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett

tary,

Communist Party of Czecho-

Kalinin,

Mikhail

Russian

slovakia, 192953), 79

Green woo d> Arthur (Deputy Leader

of Labour Opposition, 1939), 80,

D. FL (Labour
Gower, Glamorgan), 35

M.R

for

Executive

All-

Com-

and of Presidium
of U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, 1938mittee, 1919-38,

46),

164
Grenfell,

(President,

Central

in

Keltogg, Frank B. (U.S. Secretary of

State, 1924-9), 74
Kennedy, Joseph P (U.S. Ambassador in London, 1938-40), 134-6
Khrushchov, Nikita (Chairman of the
Council
of Ministers
of
the
U.S.S.RO, 210-11
Kollontay, Alexandra (Soviet Minister
to Sweden, 193CK-45), 120
Kuznetsov, Nikolai (People's Comt

Emle-Erle- (head of British military

delegation to

Moscow,

1939), 165-7,

171, 174-6

Edek,

Sir

Anthony

(later

Lord Avon)

(Lord Privy Seal, 1934-5, Minister

for League of Nations Affairs, 1935,
Foreign Secretary, 19358), 39, 48
52, 60-6,

70-r, 73, 101, 114, 144,

163

Eisenhower,
(President

1952-60),

D wight D

General
of the
3,

United

States,

210

Feiltng, Professor Keith, 104, 144

Filippov {Toss correspondent in Ber-

90, 92, 94, ioo, 105-6, 109-10, 114,

1939), 185
Flandin,
Pierre-Etienne
t

(French

Premier, 1934-5, Foreign Minister

January-June 1936), 61
Albert (Nazi

Danzig), 151
General

Franco,

Gauleiter in

122-4,

119,

149-51,

65,

71,

91-3, 172

General Maurice (Chief of

162-4,

iJ4-&>

i4-4*

i<S7i

183,

missar for the Navy, 1939-45), 169-

(member of British military delegation to Moscow, 1939), 165, 172

Hiranuma, Kiichiro (Japanese Premier,
i939)i 202
Hitler, Adolf, 7, 15-16, 36-7, 39, 4S,

60-1 1 65, 63-70, 73-4,

77-S, 81-2, 84-7, 90, 100-4, 107,
109, 111-14, "6, 123-5, 129-30,
55-6,

133,
182,

I(S 4,

I4*i

131,
187,

198,

200-1,

203,

Sir

Samuel

(Secretary

of
the French Foreign Ministry, 19334o) 5 1311

Lenin (Vladimir Ilyich Ulianov), 178So, 182, 208

Maxim

(People's

for

MacDonald, James Ramsay (Labour

Premier, 1924, 1929-31, Premier in
the 'National* Government, 1931-5,

Lord

President of the Council,

T935-7)) 27, 41,62
Matsudaira, Tsuneo (Japanese Ambassador in London, 1928-35), 23

Molotov, Vyacheslav (Chairman of

the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers,
People's

1930-9,

Foreign

Affairs,

Commissar

for

1939-49X 123, 158,

190-2

Monck, John Berkeley (Sir)

(Assistant-

Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps,

1920-36), 22
Mussolini, Benito, 61-2, 64-5, 70-1,
85-6, 89, 91, 107, 109-10, 113-14,
116, 173, 207

Naggiar, Paul (French Ambassador

in
Moscow, 1938-40), 78, 136,
147-8, ijB, 204
Sir

Esmond

(British

Ambassa-

dor in Moscow, 1929-33),

29, 312,

105

Ozersky,

Alexander

(Soviet

Trade

Representative in London, 1931-7),

*7

Payart,

Jean

d'Aflaires in
So, 82,

Charge
78-

(French

Moscow,

1939),

88

Commissar

32, 45, 47, Si, 53,

74, 77-&,
82-3, SS, 102, 105-6, 119, 123-4,

Secretary, 1937-9))

99-100

Minister, 1935-6), 52, (Si, 64-5

Leger, Alexis (Secretary-General

for Foreign Affairs, 1930-9), 15-20,

1931-5, Foreign Secretary,

1935, First Lord of the Admiralty,
54, 62-5, 69,

Laval, Pierre (French Foreign Minister, 1934-5, Premier and Foreign

Litvinov,

1903-5), 62

Ovey,

173)

India,

Home

71

207,

210-12

1936-7,

Gameun,

*33>

Henderson, Nevile (British Ambassador in Berlin, 1937-9X 123

Heywood, Major-General T. G. G,

Hoare,
Francisco,

H-3i,

185, 207

50,

lin,

Foerster,

Halifax, Viscount (Lord Privy Seal,

1935-7, Foreign Secretary, 193840), 40, 54, (59-70, 72-6, 79-81, 86-

Air Force, 1939), 169, 172

Lothian, Lord (Philip Kerr), 53
Lyttelton, Alfred (Colonial Secretary,

185-6
Lloyd George, David (Prime

Ribbentrop, Joachim von (German

Ambassador in London, 1936-5,
Foreign Minister, 1938-43), 74,
190-1, 194, 196-8, 200

Minister,

1916-22), 17, 3S-9, 53, 67-8, 80,

111-12, 126-7
Loktionov, A* D. (Chief of the Soviet

Roehm, Ernst {Leader of Nazi Stormtroopers), 36

Roosevelt, Franklin

D. (President of

the United States, 1932-45),

1 1,

134

INDEX

2l6
Runtiman,

Walter O ater Viscount)

of Board of Trade
head of mission to Czecho-

Suritz,

Sir

93 17,

Yakov

(Soviet

Ambassador

in

Paris, 1937^40), 121-2, 124, 147

(President

Suvich, Fulvio (Italian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), 61

slovakia, 1938), 34, 78

Rydz-Smigiy, Marshal Edward (Inspector-General of Polish Armed

TmomaSj

Forces, i935"9)i l6 3

J.

H. (ex-Labour leader), 41
(Rumanian Minister in

Tilea, Virgil

Samuel,

Sir

Herbert

London, 1939-40), 102

Trotsky, Leon, 179

Lord)

(later

(Liberal leader), 53

Schmidt, Professor Otto (head of the

Chief Northern Sea Route), 38-9

Valin, General (member of French

of Trade Department, German Foreign Minis-

Schnurre, Erich

try),

(official

(German Ambassador

von
Mos-

in

Vansittart,

in

iof-<5,

Moscow, 1939-40), 102,

1 57_s > ^7-9j
124, 13 1
!

203-4
Shaposhnikov, Boris (Chief of the
Soviet General Staff, 1936-9, 1941-

Home

1935-7, Chancellor
chequer, 1937-40))

Secretary,

of

the

Ex-

27-3x 3'i
54~5>
34-5, 40, 43-4, 49-5>

61-1
Sinclair, Sir

Archibald (Liberal leader),

53) l6 3

Smorodinov, L V, (Deputy Chief of

Soviet General Staff)?
leader), 41

7%

107j lg2 >

9T" 8

>

200, 212
Strang, William (later Lord) (Foreign
Office official), 51, 140-1, 204

Stumm, G* Braun von (Press Department official, German Foreign

Ministry), 185

7<5

Robert

(later

Lord)

54-5, 61-2, 71^2, 76, 114

Voroshilov, Kliment (People's Commissar for Defence, 1934-40), 16970, 173-4*

199- 200

I7<S,

la

(Lord Privy

Seal,

1937-aX 83
Weizsaecker, Ernst von (State Secretary at German Foreign Ministry,
J93 8 -43X 187-8, 190

Wiilaume, Captain (member of French

military

delegation

to

Moscow,

I939X ifiSi
Wilson, Sir Horace (Chief Industrial
Adviser to the British Government,
Jp3^9)j 7i-^ H4j I44i i59~(5oi
192, 199

1<s 9

Snowden, Philip (Lord) (ex-Labour

Stalin, Joseph, 31,

Sir

WarRj Lord de

3 ), 169, 172

Shaw, G. Bernard, 53
Simon, Sir John (later Lord) (Foreign
Secretaryj 1931-5*

Moscow,

(Permanent Under-Secretary for

Foreign Affairs, 1930-B), 36, 42-9*

cow, 1934-41), iStf-Sj 190-2, 196-B

Seeds, Sir William (British Ambassa-

dor

to

delegation

i939) s
Vansittart, Lady, 43-4,

1S4-G, 189, 194, *9*>

Count Friedrich

Schulenburg,
der

military

Wilson, Woodrow (President of the

United States, 1913-21), 122
Winterton, Lord, M.P. (Chancellor of
the Duchy of Lancaster, 1939), 87-9
Wohlthat, Helmuth (Trade official
in Nazi 'Four Year Plan* Department), 159-tfo, 192, 199
Sir Kingsley (Air Minister

Wood,

1938-40), 69, 156