VHJ

Bakit irerecognize
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised before this Court. However, there are recognized exceptions
to the rule, such as when the findings and conclusions of
administrative agencies are frontally inconsistent, in this case the
PARAD and the DARAB, and when the findings of the appellate
tribunal are based on mere surmises and speculations, and are
contrary to the evidence on record. In such case, the Court may
delve into and resolve questions of facts.
INTENT
Indeed, a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be
evidence to prove this allegation.1[19] The principal factor in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy
is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship.

Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, does not automatically

authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the consent of
the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized.
For the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a
landowner, except as may be provided by law. But certainly
nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding
is automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon. A different
interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation where a
person who wants to be a tenant, and taking advantage of this
perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third person to become a civil
law lessee of the landowner. Incredibly, this tenant would technically
have a better right over the property than the landowner himself. This
tenant would then gain security of tenure, and eventually become
owner of the land by operation of law. This is most unfair to the
hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law
lease agreement in good faith only to realize later on that he can no
longer regain possession of his property due to the installation of a
tenant by the civil law lessee.
SINONG PEDE

DE JURE LANG PEDE

The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be
invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and
lawful tenants.2[24]
BAWAL SELF SERVING STATEMENTS
To prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence
must be presented. Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate;
competent proof must be adduced.

owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the

person who personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there is
already an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., a tenant
or agricultural lessee already works the land. The epigraph of
Sec. 6 merely states who are Parties to Agricultural Leasehold
Relations, which assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on
the land; not until then. This is precisely what we are still asked to
determine in the instant proceedings.3[31]
LUDO
TENURE

SEC. 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation.

The agricultural leasehold relation once established
shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to
continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his
landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.

I n t he ca se at bar, i t bear s em pha si zi ng t h at no

one ha s de ni ed t h e ex i st enc e of t he t ena n cy st at u s of
decea sed Vi cent e C. Barr et o ov er t he su bj ect t hi rt y -six hect are l a ndh ol di ng wi t h re spect t o i t s f orm er owner,
Ant oni o Bart ol om e. T here bei ng n o wai v er ex ecut ed by

ND NACHECHANGE
decea sed t e nant Barret o, no l ess t han t he l a w cl ari f i es
Ev en as we uph ol d t im e and agai n t he ex i st ence
and v ali di t y of im pli ed agri cul t ural t enancy agreem ent s,
t he i nv erse doe s not e ssent i al l y f ol l ow. T he i nt ent i on of
a t ena nt t o surr end er t he l andh ol di ng an d co ncom i t ant l y
t he st at ut ory ri ght s em anat i ng f rom t he st at us of bei ng a

t hat t he ex i st ence of an a gri cul t ural t enancy rel at i onshi p

i s not t erm i nat ed by m ere chan ge s of owner shi p, i n
case s of sal e or t ransf er of l egal posse ssi on a s i n
l ease. [ 2 4] Sect i on 10 of Rep. Act No. 38 44 prov i des
t hat :

t enant , ab sent a po si t iv e act , cannot , an d sh oul d not , b e

pre sum ed, m uch l ess det erm i ned by im pl i cat i on al one.
O t herwi se, t he ri ght of a t enant t o securi t y of t enure
becom es a n i ll usory on e. T enancy rel at i on s canno t be
bargai ne d a way ex cept f or t he st ro ng r ea so ns prov i ded
by

l aw[ 23]

ev i dence.

whi ch

m ust

be

co nv i nci ngl y

sh o wn

by

SEC. 10. Agri cul t ural Lease hol d

Rel at i on Not Ex t i ngui shed by Ex pi rat i on of
Peri od, et c. T he agri cul t ural l ease hol d
rel at i on und er t hi s C ode shal l not be
ex ti ngui sh ed
by
t he
sal e,
of
t he
l andhol di ng. I n ca se t he agri cul t ural l essor
sel l s, t he p urcha ser shal l be sub r ogat ed t o
t he
ri ght s
and
su b st i t ut ed
to
t he
obl i gat i ons of t he agri cul t ural l essor.
TENANT PA DIN SIYAAA
A t enant ha s be en def i ned und er Sect i on 5(a ) of Rep.
Act No. 1199 a s a per son wh o, hi m self , and wi t h t he ai d

av ai l abl e f rom wi t hi n hi s imm edi at e hou seh ol d,

cul t iv at es t he l and bel ongi n g t o or po sse ssed by
anot her, wi t h t he l at t ers co n sent f or purpo se s of
product i on, shari ng t h e prod uce wi t h t he l and hol der
under t h e share t en ancy sy st em , or payi ng t o t he
l andhol der a pri ce cert ai n or a sc ert ai nabl e i n p roduce or
i n m oney or bot h, und er t he l ea seh ol d sy st e m . Appl yi ng
t he prece di ng t o t he ca se at bar, wh at becam e appar ent
f rom t he record s i s t hat t hou gh t he l at e Vi cen t e C.
Barret o wa s d e si gnat ed a s a c o-overs eer of the subj ect
l andhol di ng, he wa s al so t i l l i ng t he l and and had a
sh ari ng arra ngem ent wi t h pet i t i oner LUDO and Ant oni o
Bart ol om e. W hat i s gl i tt eri ng, t heref ore, i s t hat t he
decea sed al so t ook on t h e add ed dut y of bei ng t he
ov erseer of t he pet i t i oners. Not hi ng i n l a w an d i n t he
f act s of t he case at bar ex cl udes on e f rom t he ot her.
NI RECL ASSI F Y L ANG
To begin with, the declaration by the Boards a quo to the
effect that as early as 1975, the subject landholding ceased to be
agricultural in nature when the DAR issued a conversion permit is
extremely misleading because the conversion permit was not issued
in 1975, but was actually signed by then Secretary Estrella only on
30 March 1978. What was in reality referred to by the Boards was
only City Ordinance No. 1313, otherwise known as the Zoning
Regulation of Iligan City. Pursuant thereto, the subject landholding of
the case was reclassified from agricultural to residential/commercial
as such fell within the Commercial-Residential Zone of the City of

Iligan. In 1975, the subject landholding was just merely reclassified

and not converted.
DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION
1. The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited
for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes:
Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross
harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar
years;
DAPAT MAY COURT HEARING
From the foregoing provision of law, it is clear that a tenant can be
lawfully ejected only if there is a court authorization in a judgment
that is final and executory and after a hearing where the
reclassification/conversion of the landholding was duly determined. If
the court authorizes the ejectment, the tenant who is dispossessed
of his tenancy is entitled to disturbance compensation. Put simply,
court proceedings are indispensable where the
reclassification/conversion of a landholding is duly determined before
ejectment can be effected, which, in turn, paves the way for the
payment of disturbance compensation.
PEROOO BUT HINDI QINUESTION AY FINAL NAAA
In the case of Bunye v. Aquino,[ 32] the Court allowed the payment
of disturbance compensation because there was an order of
conversion issued by the DAR of the landholding from agricultural to
residential. The decree was never questioned and thus became final.
Consequently, the tenants were ejected from the land and were thus
awarded disturbance compensation. From the preceding discussion,
it stands to reason that deceased Vicente C. Barreto, who used to be

a tenant of petitioner LUDO at the time of the conversion of the

subject landholding, is entitled to disturbance compensation for his
dispossession.

(4) the purpose is agricultural production;

. . . It would appear however from the records that

the respondents, through its general manager
terminated the services of the late petitioner Vicente
Barreto only on July 29, 1991. The instant complaint
was filed also in the same year before the Office of
the Agrarian Adjudicator in Iligan City
DONATO

have been concurrently satisfied by the plaintiff herein which

convince this court that they are working in the land of the defendant
in the concept of tenants.

Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is
contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial for the appellate
court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the
trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what
evidence is entitled to belief. (Picardal vs. Lladas, 21 SCRA 1483).
REQUISITES
As defined by law a "tenant is a person who himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the
land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's consent
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying the landholder a price
certain or ascertainable in produce or in money, or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system. Likewise, as ruled by the Honorable
Court of Appeals in the case of Pedro Montero vs. Necitas Rama, et
al, CA-G.R. No. SP-07204, March 28,1978, the essential requisites
of tenancy relationship which are the following to wit:
(1) the parties are landholder and tenant;
(2) the subject in litigation is an agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;

(5) consideration;

TENANT CLAAAA
By allowing the plaintiffs to cultivate the landholding in question and
in receiving the owner's share of the produce defendant impliedly
recognized the plaintiffs as tenants and there arose between them
implied contract of tenancy. In the case of de la Cruz vs. Castro (CAG.R. No. 47039-K, January 5, 1972) the Court of Appeals has held
that by allowing a person to cultivate the land and accepting share or
rental from him is an eloquent example of implied consent.
FERNANDEZ
Respondent did not merely aid his father in the latters farm work, but
completely took over that work since Policarpo was already very old
and incapable to continue farming. Section 5 (p)i[11] of R.A. No.
1199 defines incapacity as any cause or circumstance which
prevents the tenant from fulfilling his contractual obligations.
Respondent fully assumed his fathers leasehold obligations for 15
years precisely because Policarpo could no longer perform his duties
as petitioners tenant and respondent is the only member remaining
of the original tenants immediate farm household.
PEDENG ORALLY OR IN WRITING
A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in
writing, expressly or impliedly, in accordance with Section 7 of R.A.
No. 1199. As aptly held by the Regional Adjudicator:

the transfer and/or delega tion of such tenancy obligations to herein

complainant [respondent] was in conformity to the general practice
among farmers, especially so in the case of complainant who had
been assisting his father in the farmworks (sic). When defendants
failed to intervene or object to this development, and continued to
accept their shares as proferred by the new cultivator, they have
thereby impliedly consented to it giving rise to the new tenancy
relationship with the complainant.ii[13]
WHAT IS LACHES
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned or
declined to assert it. The principle of laches is based on grounds of
public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims. It is principally directed against the
unfairness of permitting an alleged right or claim to be enforced.iii[14]
It concerns itself with whether or not by reason of long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, a person claiming a right should be barred from
asserting the same, because to allow him to do so would be unjust to
the person against whom such right is sought to be enforced
TAN
Section 7 of RA 3844 as amended provides that once there
is a leasehold relationship, as in the present case, the landowner
cannot eject the agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized
by the court for causes provided by law.[27] RA 3844 as amended
expressly recognizes and protects an agricultural leasehold tenants
right to security of tenure.[28]

Section 36 of RA 3844 as amended enumerates the grounds

for dispossession of the tenants landholding, to wit:

SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding;

Exceptions.Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due
hearing it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the
department head upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other
urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five times the average of the gross
harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to
substantially comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of
this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous
event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or
used the landholding for a purpose other than what
had been previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt

proven farm practices as determined under
paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent
improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through
the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;

Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended[29] mandates that not x

x x more than 25% of the average normal harvest shall constitute
the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs
demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental,
which clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount prescribed by

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the

lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the
non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop
failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a
result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall
not be a ground for dispossession, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is
not thereby extinguished; or

law. Therefore, the Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of

the landholding for non-payment of rental precisely because the
lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.

KUNG DI MAG-AGREE DAPAT AY IFIX

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation
of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.

UNG LEASE AY MORE THAN UNLAWFUL DAPAT AY LAWFUL

Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental.
Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional lease rental
payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended
KELAN PEDE I EXTINGUISH

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that for nonpayment of the lease rental to be a valid ground to dispossess the
agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the lease rental
must first of all be lawful. If the amount of lease rental claimed
exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-payment of lease rental cannot
be a ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding.

SEC. 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold

Relation.The
agricultural
leasehold
relation
established under this Code shall be extinguished
by:
(1)
Abandonment of the landholding
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2)
Voluntary surrender of the
landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice
of which shall be served three months in advance; or

(3)
Absence of the persons under
Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event
of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.
SEC. 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural
Lessee During Agricultural Year.The agricultural
lessee may terminate the leasehold during the
agricultural year for any of the following causes:
(1)
Cruel, inhuman or offensive
treatment of the agricultural lessee or any member
of his immediate farm household by the agricultural
lessor or his representative with the knowledge and
consent of the lessor;
(2)
Non-compliance on the part of
the agricultural lessor with any of the obligations
imposed upon him by the provisions of this Code or
by his contract with the agricultural lessee;
(3)
Compulsion of the agricultural
lessee or any member of his immediate farm
household by the agricultural lessor to do any work
or render any service not in any way connected with
farm work or even without compulsion if no
compensation is paid;

(4)
Commission of a crime by the
agricultural lessor or his representative against the
agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate
farm household; or

(5)
Voluntary surrender due to
circumstances more advantageous to him and his
family.