l;kfxL

jflif{s
jif{ $$
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k|sfzs
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hL cf, sf7df8f}+
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/fi6klt ejg, zLtnlgjf;

sf7df8f}+, g]kfn .

8f= /fdj/0f ofbj

/fi6klt

z'esfdgf ;Gb]z
;]gf lbj; @)^* sf] cj;/df l;kfxL jflif{s klqsfsf] $% cf}+ c\s k|sfzg x'g
nfu]sfdf v'zL JoQm ub{5' .
/fi6 / /fli6otfsf] ;+/If0f Pjd\ ;Dj4{g tyf d'ns
' sf] ljsf; / lxtsf nflu cxf]/fq lqmofzLn
g]kfnL ;]gfsf] pQ/f]Q/ k|ult / ;d[l4sf] nflu xflb{s z'esfdgf JoQm ub{5' . ;fy}, cfgf] :yfkgfsf]
p2]Zo / /fi6n] ;'Dk]sf] lhDd]jf/L cg'?k g]kfnL ;]gfn] ljutdf u/]sf] alnbfg tyf of]ubfg ;fj{ef}d
g]kfnsf] Oltxf;df pNn]vgLo kIfsf ?kdf /xg] / g]kfnL ;]gfaf6 k|blz{t cg'kd /fi6elQm / k/fqmd
;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL hgtfsf] nflu k|]/0ffsf] ;|f]t alg/xg]5 eGg] dnfO{ ljZjf; nfu]sf] 5 .
;d[4 / ;d'Ggt /fi6 lgdf{0fsf nflu k|fs[lts ;Dkbfsf] ;+/If0f, ljkb\ Joj:yfkg tyf
p4f/sfo{df ct'ngLo of]ubfg k'ofpb} cfPsf], ;+oQ
' m /fi6 ;+3sf] sfof{bz
] cg'?k ljZj zflGt :yfkgf
h:tf] kljq sfo{df ljut cfwf ztfAbL cl3b]lv cljl5Gg ?kdf v6L cfPsf] g]kfnL ;]gf k]zfut
bIftfsf] b[li6sf]0fn] cGt/f{li6o :t/d} pTs[i6 /x]sf] s'/f xfdLn] dfq geO{ ljZj ;d'bfo ;d]tn]
JoQm ub}{ cfPsf] 5 . xfnsf lbgx?df g]kfnL ;]gfsf tflnd k|lti7fgx?df ljb]zL ;}lgsx?sf]
;xeflutf ;d]t a9\b} hfg'n] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] uf}/j cem} a9\b} uPsf] d}n] dx;'; u/]sf] 5' .
cGtdf, ;]gf lbj; @)^* sf] cj;/df /fi6sf] nflu k|f0ff]T;u{ ug]{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;Dk"0f{
jL/ ;k"tx?k|lt efjk"0f{ >4f~hnL ck{0f ub}{ ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL ;}lgs kl/jf/ Pj+ ;]jflgj[Q ;}lgs
kl/jf/df ;'v zflGt / k|ultsf] sfdgf JoQm ub}{ o; ;]gf lbj;sf] cj;/df k|sflzt x'g] l;kfxL
jflif{s klqsf @)^* sf] $% cf}+ cn] jf}l4s / Jofj;flos ;fy{stf l;4 ug{ ;sf];\ egL xflb{s
z'e]R5f JoQm ub{5' .
ldlt @)^* df3 @% ut] a'waf/ .

sf7df8f}+, g]kfn .

k|wfgdGqL

z'esfdgf
/fli6o ;'/Iff, ;fj{ef}d cv08tf / :jflwtgfsf nflu ;a} lqmofzLn tyf jL/tfk"0f{ Pjd\
uf}/jzfnL Oltxf; af]s]sf] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;]gf lbj; @)^* sf] cj;/df ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL ;]gf
kl/jf/x?nfO{ xflb{s z'esfdgf lbg rfxG5' .
g]kfnsf] PsLs/0fsf] cleofgb]lv xfn;Dd d'n'ssf] ;'/Iffsf] nflu g]kfnL ;]gfn] b]vfPsf]
axfb'/L, ;fx; / alnbfgsf] d xflb{s ;/fxgf ub}{ d'n'ssf] /Iffy{ cfgf] hLjg alnbfg lbg] jL/
of]4fk|lt xflb{s >4f~hnL JoQm ug{ rfxG5' .
g]kfnL ;]gfn] /fli6o ;'/Iffsf cltl/Qm ljsf; lgdf{0f, k|fs[lts ;Dkbfsf] ;+/If0f / d'n'ssf
clt ;+j]bgzLn ;+/rgfsf] ;'/Iffy{ k'ofPsf] of]ubfg k|z+;gLo /lxcfPsf] 5 . oL sfdsf cltl/Qm
ljut kfr bzsb]lv zflGt ;]gfdfkm{t ljZjzflGt :yfkgf sfo{df g]kfnL ;]gfn] k'[ ofPsf] of]ubfgsf]
;+o'Qm /fi6;+3 / cGt/f{li6o ;d'bfon] ;d]t d'Qms07n] k|z+;f u/]sf] 5 . o; sfo{n] g]kfnsf]
cGt/f{li6o k|lti7f;d]t a9fPsf] 5 .
l;kfxL jflif{s klqsf k|sfzgn] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] uf}/jk"0f{ Oltxf; tyf /fli6o ;'/Iff /
ljsf;df v]ln/x]sf] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsfaf/] ;j{;fwf/0fnfO{ ;xL hfgsf/L lbg ;kmn x'g]5 eGg] ck]Iff
/fv]sf] 5' ;fy} ;]gf lbj; @)^* sf] o; cj;/df /fli6o tyf cGt/f{li6o :t/df g]kfnL ;]gfn]
;Dkfbg u/]sf oL ;a} sfdsf] pRr k|z;
+ f ub}{ cfufdL lbgdf tf]lsPsf lhDd]jf/L cem k|efjsf/L9n]
;Dkfbg ug{ ;kmntf ldnf];\ eGg] z'esfdgf lbg rfxG5' .

@^ df3, @)^*

8f= afa'/fd e/fO{

sf7df8f}+, g]kfn .

pkk|wfg, u[x / /IffdGqL

z'esfdgf
;]gf lbj;sf] kfjg cj;/df l;kfxL jflif{s klqsf @)^* sf] $% cf}+ c k|sflzt x'g] ePsf]df
v';L JoQm ub}{ xflb{s awfO{ tyf z'esfdgf k|s6 ub{5' . l;kfxL jflif{s klqsf k|sfzgn] g]kfnL
;]gfsf] ;+u7gfTds kIf / o;sf] ljljw e"ldsfx?nfO{ /fi6 / ;d:t /fi6jf;Lsf] ;fk]Ifdf d'vl/t
ug]{5 eGg] ljZjf; lnPsf] 5' .
ljzfn g]kfn lgdf{0fsf] P]ltxfl;s cleofgb]lv g} g]kfnL ;]gfn] /fli6o Pstf, ;fj{ef}ldstf,
ef}uf]lns cv08tf, /fli6o ;'/Iffsf ;fy} zflGt / ;d[l4sf nflu pNn]vgLo e"ldsf lgjf{x ub}{ cfPsf]
5 . To;}u/L ljsf; lgdf{0f, k|fs[lts ;|f]t, ;fwgsf] ;+/If0f / ;Da4{g cflbdf o;n] ;Dkfbg ub}{
cfPsf] cu|0fL e"ldsf ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnLsf] x[bodf clj:d/0fLo ?kdf /xb} cfPsf] 5 . /fli6o :jfwLgtfsf]
/Iff / hgtfsf] ;]jfdf ;bf ;dlk{t g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;]gf lbj; n] :jtGq g]kfn /fi6s} cEo'bonfO{
;d]t k|ltlglwTj ug]{ s'/fnfO{ x[bo+ud ub}{ o; cj;/df g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ct'ngLo /fi6elQm, alnbfg
/ lgi7fsf] d pRr k|z+;f ub{5' .
uf}/jzfnL Oltxf; af]ss
] f] g]kfnL ;]gfn] ljutb]lv jt{dfg;Dd, lxdfnb]lv t/fO{;Dd / d]rLb]lv
dxfsfnL;Dd ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnLsf] ;femf ;Dkltsf] ?kdf pbfx/0fLo 5lj lgdf{0f u/]sf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfaf6
;Dkflbt sfo{x?af6 ;]gfsf] dgf]an cem pRr agfpg g]kfn ;/sf/nfO{ ;d]t pT;fx / pTk|]/0ff
ldn]sf] 5 .
cGtdf, ;]gf lbj; @)^* sf] cj;/df ;Dk"0f{ axfnjfnf ;}lgs, ltgsf kl/jf/ tyf cjsfz
k|fKt ;}lgs kl/jf/sf] ;'v zflGt, ;d[l4 tyf pQ/f]Q/ k|ultsf] sfdgf ub}{ l;kfxL jflif{s klqsf
@)^* sf] $% cf}+ csf] nflu ;kmntfsf] z'esfdgf JoQm ub{5' .
wGojfb .
ldlt @)^* df3 @$ ut] d+unjf/

ljho s'df/ uR5bf/

sf7df8f}+, g]kfn .

/Iff /fHodGqL

z'esfdgf
;]gf lbj; @)^* sf] z'ecj;;/df g]kfnL ;]gfk|lt xflb{s awfO{ tyf z'esfdgf JoQm
ub{5' . o;} cj;/df g]kfnL ;]gfsf] d'vkq l;kfxL jflif{s klqsf @)^* sf] $% cf}+ c k|sflzt
x'g nfu]sf]df z'e]R5f k|s6 ug{ rfxG5' .
uf}/jzfnL g]kfn /fi6sf] lgdf{0f, cv08 /fli6o ;Dk|e';Qfsf] /Iff / ;Dj4{g Pj+ g]kfnL
hgtfsf] ;'/Iffdf g]kfnL ;]gfn] u/]sf] of]ubfg / cfkm\gf] :yfkgfsfnb]lv cfhko{Gt /fli6o cfjZostfsf]
38Ldf /fHosf] gLlt, lgb]{zgcg'?k u/]sf] alnbfg clj:d/0fLo 5 . ljz'4 c/fhg}lts, Joj;flos
Pj+ ljlwsf] zf;gk|lt sl6a4 g]kfnL ;]gfaf6 ;Dkfbg ul/Psf sfo{x? Hofb} g} k|z+;fof]Uo 5g\ .
o; cj;/df ljleGg P]ltxfl;s sfnv08x?df g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;Dkfbg u/]sf dxTjk"0f{ sfo{x?
/ of]ubfg :jfwLg g]kfnL Oltxf;sf] cd"No ;DklQsf] ?kdf /xg] tYonfO{ cfTd;ft ub}{ jt{dfg
/fli6o, cGt/f{li6o kl/l:ylt / cfjZostfcg'?k o;n] lgjf{x ub}{ cfPsf] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsfk|lt xflb{s
cfef/ k|s6 ub{5' .
cGtdf, st{Jokfngfsf] l;nl;nfdf k|f0ff]T;u{ ug]{ ;Dk"0f{ jL/ ;}lgsx?k|lt xflb{s >4f~hnL
ck{0f ub}{ k'gM Psk6s g]kfnL ;]gfsf axfnjfn tyf e"tk"j{ ;}lgsx? / ltgsf kl/jf/ ;a}df xflb{s
z'esfdgf JoQm ub{5' .
wGojfb .

ldlt @)^* df3 @$ ut] d+unjf/

/fdjrg ofbj

z'esfdgf
!=
;]gf lbj; @)^* sf] ;'vb cj;/df g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;snbhf{, g]kfnL ;]gfdf sfo{/t lghfdlt
sd{rf/L Pj+ ltgsf kl/jf/sf] ;'v, zflGt, ;d[l4 tyf pQ/f]Q/ k|ultsf] nflu xflb{s d+undo
z'esfdgf JoQm ub{5' . To:t} /fli6o :jflwgtf tyf cv08tfsf] /Iff / g]kfnL hgtfsf] zflGt
tyf cfwf/e"t xs lxtsf] ;+/IF0fsf bf}/fg Oltxf;sfnb]lv jt{dfg;Dd st{Jokfngfsf] l;nl;nfdf
jL/ult k|fKt ug{' ePsf ;snbhf{sf] cfTdfsf] rL/ zflGtsf] sfdgfsf ;fy} 3fOt] eO{ pkrf/sf]
qmddf /x]sf tyf ce eO{ k'g:yf{kgfsf] qmddf /x]sf ;Dk"0F{ 3fOt] lj/fdLxsf] zL3| :jf:Yonfesf]
sfdgf ub{5' .
@=
/ftf] / rGb| ;"o{ hL lgzfg xfd|f] eGg] cfbz{ jfSonfO{ cfTd;ft\ u/L nfdf] Pj+ uf}/jdo
Oltxf; af]s]sf] g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfkm\gf] :yfkgfsfnb]lv g} /fli6o :jtGqtf, ;fj{ef}d;Qf, ef}uf]lns
cv08tf, /fli6o Pstfsf] /Iff tyf ;+j4{g ub}{ ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL hgtfsf] cfwf/e"t lxtsf] /Iff ug]{
cfkm\gf] k|dv
' bfloTj k|lt ;bf ;dlk{t /lxcfPsf] 5 / eljiodf ;d]t ;w} ;dlk{t /lx/xg] 5 . o:tf]
cltLo Oltxf; af]s]sf] ;+u7gn] cfufdL lbgxdf klg ;bf em} /fi6 lxt, /fli6o :jtGqtf tyf
/fi6jf;Lsf] sNof0fsf] nflu ;+:yfutkdf ;dlk{t /xg] s'/f ;a}nfO{ ljZj:t t'Nofpg rfxG5' .
#=
g]kfnL ;]gfn] /fli6o tyf cGt/f{li6o hutdf k]z u/]sf] pRrtd cg'zf;g, jL/tf, st{Jolgi7f,
k]zfut bIftf tyf OdfGbfl/tfaf6 g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dfq geO{ ;du| /fi6s} cGt/f{li6o hutdf k|z;
+ f
ePsf] 5 . xfn g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;+rflnt ljleGg tflndxdf ;}lgs /0fgLlt, /0fsf}zn, snf, ;Lk
cflb xfl;n ug{ cd]l/sf, ef/t tyf rLg nufot ljleGg ljsl;t ldq/fi6xn] cfcfkm\gf] lzIffyL{
clws[tx ;xefuL u/fpg' g} g]kfnL ;]gfsf] pRrtd\ k]zfut bIftfsf] sb/ xf] .
$= ljut b'O{ jif{b]lvsf] nuftf/ k|of; :jk k|fKt k]zfut bIftfnfO{ ;+:yfut ub}{ cfufdL
lbgxdf ;snbhf{nfO{ :t/o'Qm af;:yfg pknAw u/fpg tbf?stfsf;fy nfu]sf] ;a}nfO{ ljlbt}
5 / o; uxg sfo{nfO{ cfufdL lbgxdf ;d]t k|efjsf/L kdf lg/Gt/tf lbOg] 5 .
%=
cGTodf, ;]gf lbj;sf] pknIodf k|sfzg ul/b} cfPsf] l;kfxL jflif{s klqsf sf] o; $%
cf}+ ;+:s/0f g]kfnL ;]gf tyf ljljw If]qsf] 1fg xfl;n ug{ dxTjk"0f{ k':tssf] kdf :yflkt x'g
;sf];\ eGg] z'esfdgfsf ;fy} k|sfzgdf ;+nUg ;a}nfO{ xflb{s wGojfb lbg rfxG5' .

hL cf
ldlt @)^*.!!.

ut] .

5q dfg l;+x u'?

dxf/yL
k|wfg ;]gfklt

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

;DkfbsLo
;]gf lbj; @)^* sf] ;'vb cj;/df /fi6 tyf /fi6jf;Lx?sf] ;]jfdf clj/n lqmofzLn g]kfnL
;]gfsf ;Dk"0f{ ;snbhf{x?df pQ/f]Q/ k|ultsf] sfdgf ub}{ /fli6o ;'/Iff sfo{df cem pRr lgi7f /
;]jfefjsf ;fy Joj;flos ;}lgs eO{ ;dlk{t x'g] ;+sNk ub{5f}F .
uf}/jdo nfdf] Oltxf; af]s]sf] g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfkm\gf] :yfkgfsfnb]lv g} /fli6o :jtGqtf,
;fj{ef}d;Qf, ef}uf]lns cv08tf, /fli6o Pstfsf] ;+/If0f tyf ;Da4{gnufot k|lt/Iff h:tf ;jf{]kl/
/fli6o lxtnfO{ ;b}j cIf'00f /fVg'sf] ;fy;fy} ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL hgtfsf] cfwf/e"t lxtx?sf] /Iff ug{]
cfkm\gf] k|d'v bfloTjk|lt ;bf ;dlk{t /xL cfPsf] 5 / eljiodf ;d]t ;dlk{t /xL /xg]5 . ljZj
dfglrqdf g]kfnnfO{ Pstfj4 Pj+ ;fj{ef}d /fi6sf] ?kdf :yflkt u/fpg] ;Dk"0f{ jL/ k"jh
{ x?k|lt
g]kfnL ;]gf uj{sf;fy xflb{s >4f / ;Ddfg k|s6 ub{5 . jL/ ;k"tx?sf] c6n /fi6 elQm cufw
dft[e"ld k|]d / /fli6o :jfledfgsf] af6f]nfO{ cfTd;ft ub{} g]kfnL ;]gf cfkm\gf] st{Jodf cljrn
/xFb} cfPsf] Joxf]/f ljlbt} 5 . o;}qmddf g]kfnL e"uf]nsf] lxdfnb]lv t/fO{;Dd clg k"j{ d]rLb]lv
klZrd dxfsfnL;Dd t}gfy /xL g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfkm"nfO{ ;'Dk]sf] lhDd]jf/L jkmfbf/Lk"j{s lgjf{x ub{}
cfO/x]sf] 5 .
jt{dfg cj:yfdf g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;+ljwfg k|bQ /fli6o ;'/Iff;DaGwL lhDd]jf/Lnufot cfGtl/
s ;'/Iff sfo{ jftfj/0f tyf jGohGt' ;+/If0f / k|j4{gsf] ;fy} ;+o'Qm /fi6;+3sf] cfXjfgdf zflGt
:yfkgfy{ sfo{df ;xeflutf Pj+ /fli6o dxTjsf] ljsf; lgdf{0f sfo{, dfgj ;[lht jf k|fs[lts k|sf]k
Joj:yfkg tyf g]kfn ;/sf/n] ljlwjt ?kdf lbOPsf] ;Dk"0f{ lhDd]jf/Lx?nfO{ s'zntfk"j{s ;zQm
Pj+ k|+z;gLo 9+un] ;Dkfbg u/L /fi6sf] dfg, OHht / k|lti7fnfO{ /fli6o tyf cGt/f{li6o If]qdf
km}nfpg ;kmn ePsf] 5 .
:yfkgfsf] c9fO{ ;o jif{ nfdf] P]ltxfl;s Pj+ uf}/jdo ofqfsf] qmddf k|blz{t jL/tf, cbDo
zfx;, k/fqmd / pRr cg'zf;g Pj+ cufw dft[e"ld k|]d g]kfnL ;]gfsf] cfd kl/rosf] ?kdf /x]sf]
5 . Oltxf;sf] s7Lg df]8x?df g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;snbhf{x?n] b]vfPsf] ct'ngLo jlnbfg / Tofusf]
ufyf k|ftM :d/0fLo 5 h'g jt{dfgdfdfq geO{ o'u o'ufGt;Dd g]kfnL Oltxf;sf] cd"No lglwsf] ?kdf
/lx/xg] s'/f lglZrt 5 .
pNn]lvt k[i7e"ld;Fu} jb\ln+bf] ljZj kl/j]z / ultdfg /fli6o kl/l:yltsf aLr cfkm"nfO{ k|fKt
x/]s e"ldsfx?df g]kfnL ;]gf cToGt ;xh, ;hu / lhDd]jf/Ljf]wsf ;fy cufl8 a9\b} cfPsf] 5 .
eljiodf cfOkg{ ;Sg] h:tf];'s} lhDd]jf/Lx?nfO{ lgjf{x ug{ g]kfnL ;]gfleq ;do ;fk]If tflndx?
tLa| ?kdf ;+rfng x'Fb} cfPsf] s'/f oxfFg]/ k|f;+lus x'G5 . o;}u/L xfnsf tflndx?df !* /fi6sf
ljb]zL ;}lgs lzIffyL{x?n] ;d]t ;xefuL hgfpg' g]kfnL ;]gfsf] Joj;flos ;Ifdtfsf] Bf]tssf] ?kdf

175

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

lng ;lsG5 h;n] ;}lgs ;+u7gnfO{ cem r':t :k'mt{ / b'?:t agfpg ;xof]u k'Ug'sf] ;fy} Joj;flos
;Ifdtf cGt/f{li6o :t/sf] ePsf] k'li6 ub{5 . o:tf tflndx? ljz'4 ;}lgs k|s[ltcg'?ksf ljifodfq
geP/ xfn ljkb\ Joa:yfkg k|s[lt ;+/If0f dfgj clwsf/ tyf dfgjLo sfg'g ;}lgs gful/s ;DaGw
cflb h:tf ljifox?df ;d]t hf]8 lbPsfn] o;af6 g]kfnL ;]gfleq ljBdfg jx'cfoflds kIfx?;Fu
g]kfnL ;]gf cem k|efjsf/L ?kdf hf]l8g] b]lvG5 .
/fli6o zlQmsf] Ps dxTjk"0f{ / cleGg ;+oGqsf] ?kdf ljsl;t g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ g]kfn
;/sf/sf] nIo / of]hgfcg'?k ;+rflnt ljleGg ljsf;sf k"jf{wf/x?, ;b/d'sfd;Dd df]6/ af6f]
k'ofpg] of]hgfb]lv sf7df8f}+ t/fO{ hf]8g\ b|'tdfu{ lgdf{0f sfo{x?df g]kfnL ;]gfsf] e"ldsf dxTjk"0f{
/xL cfPsf] 5 . ;fy} uf}/jdo Oltxf; lgdf{0f u/]sf] g]kfnL ;]gf /fli6o ;'/Iff tyf d'n'sjf;Lsf]
jx'kIfLo lxtdf dfq geO{ ljZj zflGt :yfkgf sfo{ h:tf] k'gLt sfo{df ;d]t ljut %# jif{b]lv
pRr cg'zf;g, pGgt Joj;flos Ifdtf / st{Jok/fo0ftf ;du| ljZj ;dfh;fd' k|:t't u/]sf] 5 .
oL / o:t} /fli6o / cGt/f{li6o lhDd]jf/L tyf e"ldsfx?df b[9 ?kdf k|:t't x'Fb} cfPsf] g]kfnL ;]gf
;f+u7lgs / k|efjsfl/tf clej[l4sf] nflu ;b}j lqmofzLn 5 . o;af/] rrf{ ubf{ ev{/dfq} ;+rfngdf
/x]sf] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfgaf6 /fi6s} nflu cfjZos bIf :jf:Yo hgzlQm tof/
ug{] sfo{df dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf /xL cfPsf] 5 . To;}u/L cGt/f{li6o :t/sf] :kf]6{; P08 lkmlhsn 6]lg
;]G6/ lgdf{0f u/L /fli6o tyf cGt/f{li6o :t/sf] v]nf8Lx? pTkfbg ug]{tkm{ ;d]t ljz]if hf]8 lbPsf]
5 . g]kfnL ;]gfaf6 ;+rflnt ljljw ultljlwx? ;+u7gfTds :t/ clej[l4 ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sfo{
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The Future of Peace Operations

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Maj Gen Rajendra Chhetri

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Kumari Dikshya Gurung

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Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel (18911944)

Major Pawan Khatri

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The Relation between Information Warfare and Insurgency

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The Future of Peace Operations

- Maj.Gen. Rajendra Chhetri

The UN was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell.
- Dag Hammarskjold,
Secretary-General of the United Nations (1953 to 1961)

1.
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjolds observation remains relevant, although threats
to peace and security have drastically changed in the 21st century. The United Nations (UN)
continues as the sole credible and legitimate international organization that serves all mankind.
UN Peace Operations have been used to contribute to international peace and security since the
UNs inception. The UN has undertaken a number of peacekeeping operations in different parts
of the world with varying mandates, scopes, and duration seeking to resolve various kinds of
conflicts. During the Cold War era, these peace operations were designed on a traditional model
and primarily sought to resolve conflicts between states.1 Following the Cold War, the rise in
intra-state conflicts (insurgencies, genocidal ethnic violence, civil wars etc.) has complicated
traditional peace operations. New missions are likely to be carried out by multidimensional
operations; they are more complex; they sometimes involve a comprehensive approach. These
new missions are multi-disciplinary and increasingly focused on building peace during a postconflict transition, which requires integrated programs. The tasks of peacekeeping missions
have become more diverse and extensive in recent days; their success predominantly depends
on the use of multi-disciplinary experts, including non-military components.
2.
This article briefly examines the evolution and theoretical concepts of UN Peace
Operations, noting challenges and opportunities and various reform efforts. It focuses primarily
on analyzing fundamental aspects of peace operations personnel, mandates, materials, and
funding.
Theoretical and Doctrinal Concepts
3.
UN peacekeeping is defined as the deployment of a United Nations presence in the
field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations
military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique
that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.2
Consistent with established principles of UN peacekeeping, Marrack Goulding defines
peacekeeping as:
Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned,
to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and
control, at the expense collectively of member states, and with military and other personnel
and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using
force to the minimum necessary.3
4.
All peacekeeping operations share some key features: They are based on the basic
principles of peacekeeping consent, impartiality, and no use of force except in self-defense,
and in defense of the mandate.4 The UN published its capstone doctrine in 2008 to provide
principles and guidelines for conduct of peace operations. United Nations Peacekeeping:
Principles and Guidelines, a publication of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
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(DPKO), lists numerous factors for successful operations, drawing on lessons of the best
practices that the world body has derived in its more than six decades of experiences.5
5.
Another conceptual issue concerns the legitimacy and credibility of peace operations.
These concepts play key roles in peace operations. Timely establishment of a UN missions
legitimacy and credibility is vital: The international community will support only legitimate
responses to credible threats to peace or to national sovereignty. But in order to have
greater legitimacy in the eyes of the local actors, the UN peacekeeping mission must have
a multinational image. Hence, it is desirable that the mission have as many national flags as
possible. Legitimacy and credibility on the ground is sustained by the missions conduct and
actions; by the UNs firmness and fairness in exercising the mandate; and by the UNs use of
force, respect for local customs, and respect for national sovereignty.
6.
Failure to deploy in a timely manner will also tarnish the credibility of the peacekeeping
mission. Early and timely deployment can often be a key to success. However, the UN is an
umbrella organization: It brings together many nations to respond to crises and threats. Its
structure prevents rapid decision-making. This structural problem has at times even challenged
the capacity of the UN to perform its core function, such as in Rwanda and in Darfur. Further,
UN- deployed troops must be adequate for the task at hand. The size and capabilities of
deployed forces may actually be a function of the degree of political support that the mission
enjoys from major powers, rather than a function of actual needs.
7.
When deployed, the peacekeeping force must be robust and capable of establishing a
credible deterrence. Robustness means having a force that has the credibility to deter those
who mean harm with power to take the use of force.6 A robust force is needed to enforce the
mandates, to abide by Rules of Engagement (ROE), to maintain an effective force posture.
A robust force is well-equipped, has an effective command and control system, has enabling
and supporting elements (including fire power), and has an effective logistics system. A robust
force must be capable of defending itself and other mission components. It must be able to
carry out the missions mandate. This usually means a relatively large and well-equipped force
is needed to carry out a firm mandate. However, UN constraints on military force non-use
of force except in self defense and in the defense of the mandate do not seem to allow
for the need for a robust force. It is particularly important that the peacekeepers have ROEs
that authorize sufficient use of force to deny an aggressors attempt to seize the initiative and
thwart the peacekeeping mission
Various Reform Efforts
8.
UN peacekeeping has undertaken meaningful reform efforts in the post-Cold War
period. In June 1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali submitted An Agenda for
Peace, in which he described various aspects of peace operations and suggested how the
UN could respond to various forms of conflicts.7 The UN had undertaken many complex
peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, not all of which were successful. Its strategy, modality,
and policies were insufficient to assure appropriate UN responses to genocide in Rwanda and
Bosnia. Under such circumstances, UN peacekeeping operations came under harsh scrutiny,
and the UN commissioned a panel to review the issue under the chairmanship of Lakhdar
Brahimi. In August 2002, this committee presented its findings in a Report of the Panel on
United Nations Peace Operations, a document widely known as the Brahimi Report.8
9.
The Brahimi Report serves as the 21st century vision for UN peacekeeping operations.9
It sets the tone for major reforms to make peacekeeping more responsive, more capable, and
more effective. Peacekeeping today involves a much broader approach as civilian and police
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components serve hand-in-hand with the military.

10.
The Brahimi Report was well accepted by the UNHQ and the member states. As a
result, the DPKO prepared a reform strategy entitled Peace Operations 2010.10 It establishes
reform policies and procedures for peacekeeping, focusing on five key areas: personnel,
doctrine, partnerships, resources, and organization.11 It encourages recruitment and retention
of highly qualified personnel by providing structures and support they would need to build
a career as United Nations Peacekeepers.12 However, it is not an easy task for the UN to
recruit uniformed professional manpower, with the exception of some military retirees. Yet
a significant number of uniformed personnel joined the UN service after retirement for UN
civilian jobs. The UN has a system to recruit serving military professionals from TCCs to
serve on temporary assignments with UN.
11.
The second area of reform was to articulate doctrinally what peacekeeping missions
are suited to achieve and what they are not. Reform also focused on recording experiences
that have worked or not worked in the past. Another key area was the establishment of
frameworks for interactive partnership.13 This has resulted in identifying some regional
and international bodies as key peacekeeping partners as well as identification of the areas
in which such partnerships will be best suited. Attempts are being made to establish such
partnerships, particularly with regional organizations and NGO/INGOs. But much needs to be
done to establish such partnerships. Even so, the UN has entered into new relationships with the
African Union (AU) in a number of missions in Africa and has established greater cooperation
with the World Bank. Peacekeepers ability to implement the mandate is directly related to
its capacity to enforce the mandate; hence another area of reform focuses on strengthening
the UNs ability to secure the essential resources to execute operations. The fifth area is the
establishment of integrated organizational structures at headquarters and in the field.14
12.
Further, in June 2007, the General Assembly approved Secretary General Ban Ki-moons
proposal to restructure the DPKO and to create a separate Department of Field Support (DFS).
These reforms were designed to increase available resources at the headquarters and build
new capacities with integrated structures to match the growing demands for UN peacekeeping
activities.
13.
Almost decade after implementation of Brahimi report, in July 2009 the DPKO and
the DFS jointly prepared a planning document titled A New Partnership Agenda Charting
a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping as another effort to reform peace operations. Their
report represents the most current thinking on future peace operations. It recognizes that their
UN peacekeeping partnership stands at a cross roads. It notes the need to continue ongoing
discussions about the future directions of UN peacekeeping in order for the UN to best serve
the international community. It calls for setting up a new horizon of achievable immediate,
medium, and long term goals.
14.
This new-horizon paper recommends many reform measures that can make peacekeeping
a more efficient UN venture. It very correctly asserts that for peace operations to be successful,
a wide range of partners must participate. Such broad partnerships will enable a clearer political
strategy and direction. They will also enhance cohesive mission planning and management.
Their document also recommends methods for faster deployment as well as the need for
clarity and delivery of critical roles. It also admits the need for improving UN efficiency in
crisis management. Likewise, it identifies the need to project future needs using a capabilitydriven approach. Finally, it cites the need for new field support with a view to expanding the
partnership for peacekeeping. This document offers some strong recommendations for making
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a qualitative improvement in peacekeeping in order to meet new challenges - including those

of personnel, mandate, materials, and funding.
Challenges
15.
The Cold Wars end found the UN in greater demand than ever before to deal with peace
and security issues.15 Although peace operations have become more credible and legitimate
tools for resolving conflicts in the post-Cold War era, meeting the increasing demand has
exceeded the capacity of the world body. Conflicts in the 21st century have tended to be
characterized by uncertainty, complexity, fluidity, and persistence. These features make peace
operations increasingly challenging and demanding. Mingst and Karns observe that:
The United Nations will continue to be challenged to respond to diverse threats to international
peace and securityrequire member states to reconcile the dilemmas of the post-Cold War
world in making choices about where and how to utilize UN capabilities for enforcement.16
16.
Over the last few years, UN peacekeepers have responded unprecedented numbers,
with a budget of US$ 7.8 billion. To meet these unprecedented requirements, ongoing peace
operations have encountered various challenges in four key areas personnel, mandate,
materials, and funding. In the following sections, these challenges are examined in detail.
Personnel
17.
UN Peace Operations are often criticized for an inability to generate peacekeepers from
developed countries. Security of their personnel, possible health hazards in mission areas, lack
of medical facilities (including day and night evacuation capabilities), and national political
attitudes toward host countries are some of the factors cited by countries that are reluctant to
provide peacekeeping personnel. Most TCCs are seeking more active participation during
the planning process of a particular mission in order to gain more transparency. The strategic
military cell established in UNHQ for UNIFIL is an example in which TCCs assumed a more
active role.
18.
Some prominent TCCs are highly selective in the matter of contributing personnel. These
countries prefer to commit their personnel in key staff/command positions only for selected
missions. Some European countries like Ireland, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Finland are also
highly selective in their troop contributions. Most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
countries, including the U.S. and U.K., are heavily committed in Afghanistan and elsewhere,
which gives them valid excuse not to commit more troops to UN peace operations. Whatever the
reasons, the UN lacks capable, well-trained, and well-equipped peacekeepers from developed
countries, and this shortfall undermines the effectiveness of peace operations.
19.
TCCs have pledged to provide standby troops and staff officers at short notice to
be deployed in accord with standby arrangements. However, because of efforts to sustain
complex surge capacities in potential theaters, standby arrangement systems have not worked
effectively to facilitate timely deployments and adequate projections of UN forces.
20.
New TCCs have volunteered in recent years; however, most of them either do not
possess the capabilities to meet force requirements or they are not in position to commit more
troops to meet UN requirements. This personnel issue has been exacerbated by high rates of
turnover of uniformed personnel in peacekeeping operations. Most TCCs rotate their troops
every six months, which is the time they need to understand the dynamics of the area of
operations. This constant and relatively quick turnover has resulted in the non-retention of
experienced manpower.
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21.
Another concern is the caveats that the contributing countries bring into the area of
operations. National caveats are not common among TCC. However, they are mission specific
and also differ from mission to mission and TCC to TCC. Fortunately, very few TCC have
such caveats. But these caveats can prevent the mission leadership from adopting the best
course of action available. National caveats often defeat the purpose of peacekeeping. They
undermine the effective performance of the mandated task and reduce the missions positive
impact on the ground. Peacekeepers also have a tendency to respond first to directives from
home countries, which often undermines the established chain of command. This problem
arises when the mission leader perceives a need to take action beyond a purely defensive
posture. Such decisions may pose risks that some member states are unwilling to accept. So in
times of crisis the force commanders authority may be severely limited.17
22.
Unlike traditional missions that are headed by military commanders who exercise
complete control, most recent peacekeeping missions have been led by political appointees
(Special Representative of the Secretary General - SRSG).18 There must be a balance between
civil control of peacekeeping and the requirement of understanding of military strategy.
Occasionally peace operations have given rise to command and control challenges between
civilian and military components in the field and UNHQ.
23.
The concept of hybrid missions has added complexity to peace operations.19 Indeed,
this concept presents some significant challenges in may mission areas in command, control,
and communication; in interoperability; in disparities of pay and allowances; in logistical
support; and so on. Most of these issues are related to personnel, mandate, material, and
funding. Host countries may accept hybrid forces for political reasons, such as the UNAMID
mission in Darfur. Such missions may not proceed smoothly; they will need support from a
lead nation.
Mandate
24.
A clear, unambiguous, and achievable mandate is essential for successful peace
operations. Lack of a suitable mandate will make it difficult to achieve the desired end state
of the mission. There are occasional complaints about disconnects between Security Council
mandates and resources allocated to implement them. But often such problems are caused
by a lack of political commitment during implementation of the mandate in the field and by
stakeholders failure to assume ownership of the mission. The UN Operations in Somalia
(UNOSOM) is a classic example of a mission that failed because of flawed implementation.
Complex mandates can dilute forces, such as in missions in Africa which have lengthy mandates
that include laundry lists of problems. Mandates must be applied without favor or prejudice
to any party. MONUC provides an example in which the area of operations is so vast that UN
forces and supporting elements are simply insufficient to perform mandated tasks. .
Materials
25.
Modern peace operations demand robust forces, appropriately equipped and augmented
with necessary enabling units. However, the UN is having difficulty in generating critical
enabling assets - such as utility helicopters, tactical helicopters with night-flying capabilities,
fixed-wing reconnaissance squadrons, transport aircrafts, unarmed air vehicles (UAVs), and
other such assets. These shortfalls adversely affect successful execution of mission mandates.
Often, the militaries of the various contributing nations provide varying qualities of equipment
and trainings, which contributes to issues of compatibility and interoperability.
26.

Lack of strategic-lift capability and facilities to manage large deployments in the field is
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adversely affecting rapid UN deployments of personnel and materials. Decision-makers should

consider the cost effectiveness of chartering strategic lift capabilities or procuring appropriate
aircraft to support a large number of field missions. The UN may have to compromise
monetary factors to fulfill its operational requirements. The UN also lacks operational and
tactical lift capabilities in the mission area. If the UN is going to satisfy the current demand
for peacekeeping operations, it must find solutions to a myriad of material problems.
Funding
27.
The current peacekeeping budget exceeds over seven billion dollars annually. The
peacekeeping budget is shared among the UN member states. Occasionally, the partial or
even full cost of a particular mission is shared by a host country or a small group of interested
countries. The U.S. and Japan pay a significant percentage of the UN peacekeeping budget,
whereas some economically prosperous countries, including China and India, pay a small
amount, glaringly disproportionate to their economic capabilities.
28.
The UN is also experiencing budgetary issues in sustaining peace operations. Member
states are not paying their dues on time. UN peace operations almost collapsed when the U.S.
did not pay its dues in the 1990s. Modern multi-dimensional and robust peace operations
obviously demand more resources. However, the cost of UN peace operations is much less
than any high-profile military operations. One report claims that one day of the first Gulf War
cost more than the annual budget of all concurrent UN peace operations.
Future Prospects
29.
The end of the Cold War has given UN peace operations enormous opportunities to
contribute to international peace and security, which is obviously a credible and legitimate
role. To maintain its credibility and legitimacy, a mission must based on a clear and deliverable
mandate with resources and capabilities to match; it must be conducted confidently and
professionally to earn the respect of the involved parties and the host countrys population.
UN peace operations are deployed in volatile environments, so they are likely to be tested
for weakness early in the mission. Therefore, peace operations must be robust in all aspects
to deter or counter all possible threats. Post-Cold War conflicts involve many actors; not all
parties in these conflicts are amenable to negotiations. Also, the peace established in conflictridden nations is often fragile. Many non-state actors may attempt to destroy the fragile peace.
Accordingly, a robust force with rapid deployment capabilities should characterize future
peacekeeping forces.20
30.
Rapid evolution of their doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures has enhanced
effectiveness and standardization of UN peace operations. Strengthening the standby capabilities
and over-the-horizon forces will provide the UN with the flexibility to generate troops in timely
manner. The UN has made significant efforts to increase interoperability and preparedness
of the troops through its reform program. Many new countries are willing to participate in
peacekeeping and willingly carrying out high-risk operations in Chapter VII missions, such as
MONUC and UNAMID. The UNs New Horizon concept is believed to be a breakthrough for
addressing the growing need for multidimensional and robust peacekeeping.
31.
The UN now needs to focus on minimizing TCCs caveats and restrictions as well
as those of host nations, parties to the conflict, and other formal and informal entities. TCCs
must be made aware that once they contribute troops for a particular mission, these troops will
operate under tactical control of mission leadership. TCCs should clearly understand that they
are responsible only for administrative and logistical requirements - not for operational control.
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32.
Hybrid missions have certainly added a new dimension to peace operations; however, their
effectiveness is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, such missions can strengthen UN relations
with regional organizations. They will also enhance regional players sense of ownership and will
alleviate cross-cultural issues and thereby reduce peacekeepers vulnerability to undermining
their image. Such missions are comparatively less costly. Regional solutions based on a hybrid
concept can succeed with sufficient attention to capacity-building and standardization of such
organizations. If problems are addressed carefully, regional organizations can play a dynamic
role by participating side-by-side with international organizations. Clear Standing Operating
Procedures will mitigate most misunderstandings and eliminate weak areas. A better selection
of key international staff and expediting offices under the necessary figureheads can enhance
hybrid missions.
33.
In recent years, five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) nations made little
or no direct contributions to UN peacekeeping. However, the worlds most powerful militaries
are recently heavily engaged in responding to global terrorism and security problems, such as
in Iraq and Afghanistan. So it may not be fair to say that the P5 and developed nations are not
contributing to UN peacekeeping in the contemporary world. Sizeable forces from France,
Italy, Spain, and China are currently serving in UNIFIL. China has also contributed to several
other missions.
34.
We must not overlook the fact that Multi National Forces (MNF) played a vital role
either as a leading element or as a bridging force in the past. The U.S.-led MNF stabilized the
Haitian situation before the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was deployed in 1995. Similarly,
the French-led MNF stabilized the situation in the Ivory Coast prior to UN deployment in that
country. Likewise, in Ituri province of DRC, a French-led MNF stabilized the situation before
the UN could deploy peacekeepers.
35.
Even so, the price for the equipment needed to sustain the UN peacekeeping missions
cannot be compared to contributions of blood. Yet the P5s contributions in Darfur in heavy
equipment and logistics support are enormous. Nevertheless, P5 nations and developed
countries need to contribute more to make peace operations more credible and effective. In
order to encourage greater P5 troop contributions to UN peacekeeping in the future, other UN
member states should acknowledge that the fight against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan is a
common global problem. If this global menace is defeated, the world will be much safer. Then
these nations will be relieved from committing troops to such operations and can commit their
troops and resources to UN peace operations.
36.
The UN needs to be more focused in planning and in implementing its peacekeeping
operations. But it has improved in the wake of a series of reform efforts. Yet there is more
to be accomplished. The UN has formulated impressive policies, but too often these policies
are not implemented. For example, some of the aspects of Integrated Mission Planning
Process (IMPP) have not been implemented as they were conceived. In other cases, the UN
compromises too easily in exercising its new approach when the going gets difficult. The
proposed strategic reserves concept has not materialized mainly due to budgetary problems.
Likewise, the standing police proposal received favorable attention because it seemed costeffective. But the UN needs peacekeeping troops more than it needs police.
37.
Without a sound plan, a mission will not succeed; therefore, there should be no
compromise in any shortcut approach to or negligence in planning. The IMPP must be thoroughly
implemented to produce a workable plan. As the Brahimi Report suggested, development of
more responsive stand-by arrangement is essential for rapid deployments. Late deployments in
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g]kfnL ;]gf

critical situations are sometimes worse than no deployment. The UN has witnessed the horrific
results of its inadequate rapid deployment capability. Yet it has done little to fix this problem.
This international forum must consider creating and maintaining a deployable nucleus HQ and
a few rapidly deployable reserve units. With such assets, the UN can provide first-entry forces
to carry out critical missions. Such reserves could be provided by regional arrangements or by
identifying lead nations or over-the-horizon forces for a probable mission area. The UN needs
to maintain a reliable TCCs list in addition to its list of traditional TCCs to generate timely
responses and to maintain a robust posture. This initiative will enhance UNs credibility and
deterrence capabilities.
38.
Workable mandates with requisite authorizations of clear missions from the Security
Council will demonstrate international will. Consent of the parties; impartiality and uses of
force only in self-defense; protection of civilians, and defense of the mandate will continue
to serve as basic principles of UN peacekeeping. UN credibility will suffer if it authorizes
missions with limited mandates or only partial consent from conflicted parties.
39.
Establishment of a separate UN Department for Field Support has enhanced the
logistics and administration of peace operations. Implementation of focused logistics support
mechanisms for deployed forces and more effective COE/UNOE management systems for
deployed units will facilitate peace operations in a more structured and effective manner. The
UN should focus on streamlining its slow and ponderous bureaucracy, acknowledging that
the best plan implemented too late is not as good as an average plan implemented in time.
40.
Despite scores of technical and practical problems, UN peace operations provide the
most credible, legitimate, and impartial tool to enhance global peace, security, and stability.
The post-Cold War global situation has increased the need for more UN peace operations to
respond to the various hotspots of world. Demand for UN peace operations will continue to
grow because threats to international peace and security are growing daily.
Conclusion
41.
The UN must acknowledge that what might have been good in the past will no longer
suffice. It cannot continue to conduct peacekeeping without developing vital capabilities.
Failure to acknowledge current shortfalls puts future missions at risk. This is particularly
urgent because the demand for peacekeeping keeps rising, while the resources to support
it become increasingly difficult to find. This is not just a routine numbers game involving
troops and equipment. The mandates are becoming increasingly complex and creating new
expectations. In effect, the UNs future is at risk.
42.
Peace operations have entered in new era since the end of the Cold War. But various
challenges in this new era have made peacekeeping more complex and multi-dimensional, in
contrast to traditional peace operations. Fortunately, policy makers in New York have given
new direction to peace operations by making the missions multi-disciplinary to overcome the
new challenges. But, new dimensions have also offered new opportunities. Indeed United
Nations peace operations are the most viable, credible, and legitimate tools for maintaining
international peace and security.
43.
In recent years, the UN has approved profound changes designed to improve its ability
to meet new 21st century peace operation challenges. However, this admirable international
security forum must muster sufficient human, financial, and logistical resources to continue to
carry out its noble endeavor of peacekeeping.
8

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

Endnotes
1

The United Nations was created by a world community determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war during an international conference of 50 countries held in San Francisco in April 1945. The delegates deliberated on
the basis of proposals, worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States, in August-October 1944. This origin of the UN accounts for the increased
responsibilities granted to the victorious nations of World War II within the Organization; their leading role prevails today
in the dominant roles of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The signing of the treaty that describes its
status marked its creation: The Charter of the United Nations.
2

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary General pursuant
to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June
1992.
3

Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1944-), Vol. 69, No. 3 (Jul, 1993), pp. 455.
4

United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines, UNDPKO, UN HQ, NY, (2008)

5
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines list the following factors as being important
to achieving success: a) Genuine commitment to a political process by the parties to work towards peace. b) Clear,
credible and achievable mandates, with matching resources. c) Unity of purpose in the Security Council, with active
diplomatic support. d) Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors. e) Host country commitment
to unhindered operations and freedom of movement. f) Integrated UN approach, effective coordination with other actors
and good communication with host country authorities and population. g) Missions need to demonstrate their credibility,
strengthen their legitimacy and promote national and local ownership.
6

Anonymous.

An Agenda for Peace

Brahimi Report, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/summary.htm

Ibid.

10
In the year 2005, the DPKO UNHQ reviewed the implementation of Brahimi Report. Based on lessons learned, the
DPKO prepared a reform strategy titled Peace Operations 2010, which evaluated the capacities that need to strengthen
to meet the DPKOs goals over the next five years.
11

Peace Operations 2010 reform strategy, excerpts from the Secretary Generals report to the General Assembly on 24
February 2006.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid.

14

Ibid.

15

Karen A. Mingst & Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition, Westview Press,
Boulder Colorado, 2000, pp.1
16

Irid., pp.113

17

Jean-Marie Guehenno and Jake Sherman, Command and Control Arrangements in United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, International Forum Challenges of Peace Operations, Version of 22 October 2009, pp.6

18

Military Force Commanders wear double hats as head of the mission and head of the military component in most
traditional peacekeeping missions, i.e., UNIFIL, UNFICYP, UNDOF.
19

Changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era and especially the conflict having regional effect for, e.g., the
conflict in Darfur has a spillover effect in Chad and Central African Republic. Similarly the conflict in west - Africa Sierra
Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast are interrelated. It is the same lot of militias roving from one area to another; in such
scenarios establishment of regional command structure of PKO could be given thought of and new concept of MOU
arrangement with the regional organization or sub regional organization could be considered. Similarly the joint PKO
(Hybrid missions) could be the new dimensions or future of PKO.
20

The aim of the PKF force should be to stabilize the situation in shortest possible time and hand over to other international
law enforcing agencies to consolidate the peace achieved (ideal would be UN formed police unit) and at the same time
immediately start peace building activities directed at the root cause of the conflict.
9

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

;]gfdf hftLo PsfO, ;dfj]zLs/0f tyf cf/If0f

;xfos /yL lahos'df/ zfxL
ljifo k|j]z
!=
;+;f/sf k|foM w]/}h;f] d'n'sx?df ax'eflifs, ax'wfld{s, ax'hftLo / ax';f+:s[lts dflg;x?sf] ;ld>0f
/x]sf] ;dfh kfOG5 . ;fy}, w]/} b]zx?df hghflt tyf cflbjf;Lx?sf] klg a;f]af; /x]sf] x'G5 . g]kfnsf] ;Gbe{df
klg of] tYo nfu" x'G5 . sl/a kf}g] tLg s/f]8 hg;+Vof ePsf] o; tkf]e"ld g]kfn ljleGg hfthflt, efiff, efifL
tyf wd{;Dk|bfo ldn]/ ag]sf] Ps ;fgf] kxf8L /fHo xf] . cfheGbf b'O{ ztfAbLcufl8 g} a8fdxf/fh :j=>L %
k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] lbJo pkb]zdf klg rf/ hft 5QL; j0f{sf] ;femf k"mnaf/L egL j0f{g u/]af6 klg g]kfn ;a}
hfthfltsf] ;femf af;:yfg / oxfsf afl;Gbf Psdfq g]kfnL x'g\ eGg] k'li6 x'g cfp5 . x'gt lxGb" hftLo j0ff{qmd
cg';f/ a|fd0f, If]qL, j}Zo / z'b| u/L d'Vo rf/ hftdf ljefhg u/]sf] kfOG5 . g]kfndf hol:ylt dNnn] j0f{ljefhg
tyf 5'jf5't k|yfsf] cf}krfl/s?kdf ljhf/f]k0f u/]sf] eP tfklg lj=;+= @)@! sf] d'n'sL P]gn] ;f] hftLo e]befjsf]
cGTo ul/;s]sf] 5 . To;}n] g]kfnsf] Pp6}dfq d'Vo hflt g]kfnL dfq xf] eGg'df cltzof]lQm x'g]5}g .
@=
b]zsf] k|zf;lgs, /fhgLlts, cfly{s If]qx? nufot ;]gf, k|x/L, Gofofno, z}lIfs k|lti7fg cflb PsfOx?df
klg /fi6sf ;a} ju{, j0f{, hfthflt, cflbjf;L tyf wd{;Dk|bfosf JolQmx?sf] k|ltlglwTj ePsf] x'G5 . xfd|f]
b]zsf] ;/sf/L tyf u}/;/sf/L ;+3;+u7gx?df klg o:t} k|ltlglwTj ePsf] kfOG5 . To;dWo] g]kfnL ;]gf klg
Ps ;dfj]zL ;+u7g xf] . g]kfndf a;f]af; ug]{ ;a} hfthflt, ;Dk|bfo, wd{, ;+:s[ltsf JolQmx? o; ;+u7gdf
;dflxt ePsf 5g\ . cfhsfn s]xL blnt tyf hghflt ;+3;+u7gx?n] cf/If0f / ;dfj]zLs/0fsf] d'2fnfO{ cufl8
;f/]sf] kfOG5 . s]xL dw];jfbL bnx?n] klg g]kfnL ;]gfdf dw];Lsf] ;+Vof Go"g ePsf]n] dw];L o'jfnfO{ ;fd"lxs?kdf
;]gfdf egf{ ug'{ kg]{ egL jsfnt ul//x]sf5g\ . ;+VofTds lx;fan] x]bf{ /fHosf w]/} If]qx?df afx'g / IF]qLx?sf]
k|ltlglwTj a9L b]lvG5 . t/, jf:tljstf s] xf] eg] k/fk"j{sfnb]lv g} afx'g IF]qLx? :jefj}n] cWoogzLn x'G5g\,
;fy} oL hfltx?df ;/sf/L ;]jfx?df sfd ug]{ Ps j+zfg'ut u'0f klg 5, To;}n] cfgf] cWoog / of]Uotfsf] cfwf/df
oL hfltx? /fHosf] /fhgLlts tyf cGo IF]qx?df cufl8 b]lvPsf x'g\ . To;f] t /fHosf s]xL lglZrt ljefu tyf
;+u7gx?, ljb]zL ;]gf, kj{tf/f]x0f, 6]ls, /fkml6 cflb k]zfx?df dw]zL tyf t/fO{af;L ;d'bfo tyf cflbjf;L /
hghfltx?sf] afx'Notf sfod 5, o;tk{m klg Wofg lbg' kg]{ b]lvG5 .
#=
hgcfGbf]ng@ kZrft u0ftGq :yfkgf ePkl5 g]kfndf sfg'gtM ;dfj]zLs/0fsf] gLlt nfu" ePsf] 5,
h;cg';f/ /fHosf ;a} ;/sf/L ;+u7gx?df gof egf{ tyf lgo'lQm ubf{ cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf ePsf] 5 . ;f] Joj:yf
cg';f/ %% k|ltzt v'Nnf k|ltof]lutff/f / $% k|ltzt ljleGg hghflt, cflbjf;L, dw];L, lk5l8Psf ju{ /
dlxnfx?sf] nflu cf/If0f ul/Psf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn] klg oxL lgodsf] kl/lwleq /xL clws[t tyf cGobhf{sf] egf{
k|lqmof ;'? ul/;s]sf]5 . t/ cfhsf] cfw'lgs tyf j}1flgs o'udf cf/If0f ls ;dfgtf eGg] ;DaGwdf hf]8bf/
jx; rnfpg' kg]{ ;do;fk]If b]lvPsf] 5 .
;]gfdf hftLo kmf}hsf] P]ltxfl;s k[i7e"ld
$=
;]gfdf hftLo kmf}hsf] ;+u7g tyf Joj:yf ;DaGwdf o;sf] P]ltxfl;s k[i7e"ldsf] cWoog tyf ljZn]if0f
ul/g' kb{5 . cd]l/sfsf] :jtGqtf o'4eGbf cufl8 sfnf hfltx? ;]gfsf] nflu cof]Uo 7flgGYof] . t/ k|]m~r o'4sf]
bf}/fg kmf}hsf] sdL x'bf sfnf hfltnfO{ klg cd]l/sL ;]gfdf ;lDdlnt u/fOPsf] lyof] . vf;u/L ;g\ !*@) df blIf0f
sf/f]lngfdf Toxfsf tTsfnLg o'4 dGqL hf]xg l;= sfnxf]pgsf] cfb]z cg';f/ sfnf hfltnfO{ ;]gfdf ;l/s u/fOPsf]
lyPg, t/ klg :yn ;]gf / hn ;]gfdf dhb'/sf]?kdf sfnf hfltx? g} /flvPsf x'Gy] . cd]l/sfdf ;g\ !*!@ sf] o'4,
d]lS;sf] o'4 tyf u[xo'4sf] bf}/fgdf 7"nf] ;+Vofdf ;]gfdf hgzlQmsf] cfjZostf k/]sf] lyof] . vf; u/]/ cd]l/sfsf]
u[xo'4sf] ;dodf g} clgjfo{ ;}lgs ;]jfdf b'O{ nfv hd{g, cd]l/sg / !,&),))) eGbfa9L cfOl/; cd]l/sg ;]gfn]
;+3Lo ;]gfdf ;]jf u/]sf lyP . o;/L cd]l/sg ;]gfdf hftLo ;]gfsf] ;dfj]zL ;+u7g ePsf] emns kfOG5 .
10

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

%=
sfnf hfltnfO{ k|f/Dedf cd]l/sL ;+3Lo ;]gfdf ;+nUg u/fpg /fHon] vf;} k|f]T;fxg u/]sf] kfOGb}g . t/
;dosf] qmd;u} cd]l/sgx? u[xo'4sf] cltl/Qm cGo o'4x?df ;+nUg x'g' k/]sf] sf/0f kmf}hsf] sdL ePsf] lyof]
eg] csf]{lt/ o'4df 3fOt]x?sf] ;+Vof a9\g', uf]/fx? ;]gfdf egf{sf] nflu sd cfpg' tyf sfnf hfltsf] 7"nf] ;+Vof
o'4sfndf bf;Tjaf6 d'Qm x'b} hfgfn] sfnf a]/f]huf/x?sf] ;+Vof a9\b} uO/x]sf] cj:yfdf cd]l/sL ;+3Lo ;]gfdf
clk|msg cd]l/sgx?nfO{ klg gLltut?kdf egf{ ug{ z'? ul/Psf] lyof] . To;a]nf ;+3Lo cd]l/sg ;]gfdf ! nfv
*^ xhf/ sfnf hfltsf ;]gfx? lyP, h'g To; a]nfsf] ;+3Lo ;]gfsf] s"n ;+Vofsf] !) k|ltzt ;+Vof lyof] . To;}a]nf
;+3Lo hn;]gfsf] Ps rf}yfO{ ;+Vofdf klg clk|msg cd]l/sgx? /x]sf lyP . ;+3Lo hn;]gfsf w]/}h;f] kfgL hxfhx?
k"0f{?kdf sfnf hfltx?n] g} ;+rfng ub{y] . ;+3Lo ;]gfdf To;a]nf sfnf hfltsf] dfq rf/j6f /]lhd]G6 v8f ul/Psf]
lyof] . k|yd ljZjo'4sf] cf;kf;df cfP/ cd]l/sL ;]gfdf sfnf hfltsf] @ j6f l8lehg -k[tgf_ v8f u/L k|mfG;df
tflnd u/fpg ;d]t k7fOPsf] lyof] . t/ kf]ln; cd]l/sgx?n] cfg} hfltsf] jl/i7 clws[t tyf hjfgx? ;lDdlnt
u/L 5'} hftLo o'lg6 agfpg] dfunfO{ eg] To;a]nfsf] cd]l/sL ;]gfsf clwsf/Lx?n] :jLs[lt lbPsf lyPgg\ . t/
cfOl/; cd]l/sgx?sf] eg] cd]l/sL ;]gfdf 5'} PsfO u7g ul/Psf] lyof] . h'nfO{ !($* df tTsfnLg cd]l/sL
/fi6klt x\of/L P;=6'Dofgn] ;]gfdf hftLo ;dfof]hg ug{ sfo{sf/L cfb]z;d]t hf/L ug'{ ePsf] lyof], h;sf]
sfof{Gjog sf]l/og o'4sf] bf}/fg ;DkGg ePsf] lyof] . o;}sf] glthf:j?k cfh cd]l/sL ;]gfdf y'k|} sfnf hg/n
tyf P8ld/n (Generals & Admirals) x?sf] afx'Notf /x]sf] kfOG5 .
^=
ljZjdf hftLo tyf If]qLo ;]gfsf] rrf{ ubf{ ef/t cu|k+lQmdf kg{ cfp5 . ef/tdf O:6OlG8of sDkgL
-la|l6z_ sf] k|j]z;u;u} pgLx?n] cfgf] k|of]hgsf] nflu ef/tdf ;}Go egf{sf] k|f/De u/]sf] Oltxf;df kfOG5 .
c+u|]hx?n] cfgf] ;'/Iffsf] nflu la|l6z ;]gfnfO{ g} ef/tdf NofPsf lyP, t/ Tof] ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkg Hofb} dx+uf]
kb{Yof] . To;}n] ef/tLox? t'?Gt 7"nf] ;+Vofdf pknJw x'g], ;:tf]df sfd nufpg ;lsg], Joj:yfkg ug{ ;lhnf] cflb
sf/0fn] ubf{ ;g\ !&%& lt/ n8{ SnfOen] ef/tLox?nfO{ ;]gfdf egf{ ug{ ;'? u/]sf lyP . h;sf] kmn:j?k Bengal
Army v8f ePsf] lyof], t/ of] cfdL{ hftLo / wfld{s cfwf/df v8f ul/Psf] lyPg . c+u|]hx? ef/tdf Jofkf/ ug{
cfPsf lyP t/ kl5 uP/ pgLx?sf] p2]Zo ablnof] / /fhgLlttk{m xft xfNg k'u] . ;g\ !&%& b]lv !*$( ;Dd
c+u|]hx?n] ef/tdf jf:tljs zf;ssf] ?kdf cflwkTo hdfPsf lyP . o; cjlwdf c+u|]hx?n] ;g\ !&%& df a+ufnsf]
gjfa, ;g\ !&^$ df cjwsf] gjfa, ;g\ !&(( df d};'/, ;g\ !*)# df d/fyf, ;g\ !*$# df l;Gw / ;g\ !*$(
df k+hfjdf ;d]t ljho k|fKt ul/;s]sf lyP . o;n] ubf{ c+u|]hx? ef/tdf ;}Go zlQm lj:tf/ ug{df sl:;P/ nflu
k/]sf lyP eGg] k|df0f kfOG5 .
&=
c+u|]hx?n] hftLotf / wd{nfO{ ;]gf egf{sf] cfwf/ gagfP klg pgLx?sf] 5gf]6df lxGb":tfgL /fhk't jf
lxGb":tfgL k7fg d'lZnd jf /f]lxNnf d'lZndx?nfO{ ;]gf egf{df k|fyldstf lbg] ub{y], lsgeg] logLx? cUnf / /fd|f]
zf/Ll/s agf]6 (Bearing) ePsf x'Gy] . c+u|]hx?n] ef/tdf ;g\ !&$)!&%& sf] cjlwdf If]qLo tyf hftLotfsf]
cfwf/df :ki6?kdf b]lvg] u/L tLg k|sf/sf kmf}hx? v8f u/]sf lyP, tL x'g\ db|f; cfdL{, a+ufn cfdL{ / aDa] cfdL{ .
z'?df oL ;]gfx? k|lt/Iffsf] nflu :yfkgf ul/P tfklg ;g\ !&%& kl5 logLx?nfO{ cfqmfds e"ldsfdf ;d]t k|of]u
ul/Psf] lyof] . ;g\ !*%& df a+ufn cfdL{, db|f; cfdL{ / aDa] cfdL{sf] ;+Vof qmdzM !,!*,^^#, $(,&#& / #!,^)!
k'u]sf] lyof] . a+ufn cfdL{df lxGb"x?sf] afx'Notf ePklg o;sf] k}bn kmf}hdf d'lZndsf] afx'Notf lyof] . db|f;
cfdL{df klg lxGb"x?sf] afx'Notf lyof] t/ k}bn kmf}hdf eg] d'lZndx? g} a9L ;+Vofdf lyP . aDa] cfdL{df k"0f{?kdf
lxGb"x?sf] g} jr{:j /x]sf] lyof] . c+u|]hx?n] ;]gfdf egf{ ug{ s]xL hfthfltx?nfO{ k|fyldstf lbg] ub{y], h;nfO{
"Martial Races" sf] ;+1f lbOPsf] lyof] .
*=
;g\ !*$^ df ef/tdf c+u|]hx?n] ;}Go egf{ ;DaGwdf dxTjk"0f{ gLltsf] th'{df u/]sf lyP . h; cg';f/
klxnf] k6s a+ufn cfdL{df l;vx? egf{ lnOof] ;fy} uf]/vfnLx?nfO{ klg gLltut ?kdf c+u|]hef/tLo ;]gfdf egf{
ug{ z'? ul/Psf] lyof] . ef/tsf k|yd c+u|]h efO;/f]on] ;g\ !*$^ sf] ;}Go egf{ gLltsf] ;dy{g ub}{ k+hfaL -l;v,
d'lZnd, lxGb"_ / k7fg hfltnfO{ ;]gfdf egf{ ug{ z'? u/]sf lyP . To;kl5 ljleGg l;v tyf k+hfaL /]lhd]G6x? v8f
ePsf lyP . ;g\ !*%^ df efO;/f]o 8nxf}hLn] a+ufn cfdL{df k+hfaL / uf]/vfnL ;]gfsf] ;+Vofdf a[l4 ug{ cfb]z
lbPsf lyP . ;g\ !*%&%* tfsf lxGb"sf] tNnf] hfltsf] o'lg6 klg v8f ul/Psf] lyof] . ;g\ !*%*!**% sf]
cjlwdf c+u|]hef/tLo ;]gfdf lxGb" / k+hfaL hftLo kmf}hsf] afx'Notf /x]sf] lyof] . ;g\ !*&**) sf] bf];|f] ckmufg
o'4 / !**%*( sf] t];|f] jdf{ o'4df c+u|]hx?n] a+ufn, aDa] / db|f; cfdL{sf hftLo kmf}hx?nfO{ Jofks ;+Vof
11

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

k|of]u u/]sf lyP . h'nfO{ !($! df c+u|]h zf;gsfndf 8f=la=cf/= cDa]8s/n] dxf/fi6sf] cg';"lrt hfltdf kg]{
dx/x?sf] /]lhd]G6 v8f ug{ ;/sf/nfO{ l;kmfl/; u/L :yfkgf;d]t ul/Psf] lyof], t/ Tof] /]lhd]G6 ljleGg sf/0fn]
ubf{ lbuf] /xg ;s]g . ef/t :jtGq ePkl5 gf]e]Da/ !($& df g]kfnef/tla|6]gaLr x:tfIfl/t ;Demf}tf cg';f/
c+u|]hef/tLo ;]gfdf To;a]nf /x]sf uf]vf{ /]lhd]G6x? dWo] $ /]lhd]G6 la|l6;;u hfg] / ^ /]lhd]G6 ef/tdf g} /xg]
;xdlt ePsf] lyof] . cfh klg ef/tLo ;]gfdf /fhk't, l;v, uf]/vf, gfuf, hf6, d/f7f cflb /]lhd]G6x? /x]sf 5g\ .
g]kfnL ;]gfdf hftLo kmf}hsf] P]ltxfl;s kIf
(=
g]kfnc+u|]h o'4 -;g\ !*!$!^_ sf] bf}/fg g]kfnL kmf}hsf] ;fx; / axfb'/L b]v]/ ;f] o'4kZrft c+u|]hx?n]
ef/tLo ;]gfdf cgf}krfl/s?kn] g]kfnLx?nfO{ egf{ ug{ ;'? u/]sf lyP . c+u|]hx?n] ef/tsf ;;fgf /fHox?df
cfqmd0f ubf{ ljb]zL -g]kfnL_ ;]gf lg;+sf]r k|of]u ug{ ;lsg] x'gfn] klg g]kfnLx?nfO{ egf{ ug{ ;'? u/]sf x'g\ . o;/L
egf{ ubf{ c+u|]hx?n] g]kfnL o'4e"lddf jL/tf b]vfPsf ;fx;L / /fd|f] lhp8fn k/]sf JolQmx? 5gf]6 u/]sf lyP .
t;y{, a[l6;x?n] g]kfnsf /fO{, lnDa', du/, u'? h:tf hfthfltnfO{ 5fg]/ c+u|]hef/tLo ;]gfdf egf{ u/L uf]vf{
/]lhd]G6 v8f u/]sf lyP . To;kl5 tTsfnLg g]kfn ;/sf/n] To:tf cd"No o'jfzlQmnfO{ ljb]lzgaf6 /f]Sg] p2]Zon]
g]kfndf klg cGo kN6gx?sf] ;fy;fy} hftLo kN6gx? klg v8f u/]sf] kfOG5 . h;cg';f/ lj=;+=!*^& efb| !@
ut] e}/agfy /fO{ / lnDa'x?sf] kN6g, lj=;+= !*$@ k'; !^ ut] k'/fgf] uf]/v du/x?sf] kN6g / lj=;+= !*$@ efb|
!# ut] ejfgLbn du/x?sf] kN6gsf] ?kdf v8f ul/Psf] lyof] . To:t} ;g\ !*%%%^ sf] g]kfnltAat o'4kl5 >L
sfnLaS; u0fsf u'? hfltx?nfO{ ;d]t ;dfj]z u/L sfnLaxfb'/ u0f :yfkgf ul/Psf] lyof] . k|yd ljZjo'4kZrft
To; u0fsf tTsfnLg u0fklt k|d'v ;]gfgL >L lrqaxfb'/ u'?n] tTsfnLg >L # dxf/fhdf lgj]bg u/L of] u0fdf
u'?dfq egf{ x'g kfpg] u/L >L sfnLaxfb'/ u0fnfO{ u'? kN6g agfOPsf] lyof] .
!)= >L ejfgLbn kN6gdf sl/a !#% jif{;Dd clws[t afx]ssf bhf{df du/x?dfq lyP, t/ ;g\ !(%@ sf]
;]gfsf] k'gu{7gkZrft of] Joj:yf x6\of] . ;f]xL ;fn vf/]hLdf k/]sf] e}/jgfy kN6g klg lj=;+=@)#! kmfu'g @& ut]
e}/jgfy u0fsf] ?kdf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] 5ftfwf/L kmf}hsf] ?kdf :yfkgf eof] . t/ Tof] u0fdf /fO{, lnDa'dfq egf{ lng]
k'/fgf] k|rngdf eg] kl/jt{g ePsf] 5 . >L sfnLaxfb'/ u0f / >L k'/fgf] uf]/v u0fn] cfh klg g]kfnL ;]gfdf qmdzM
u'? / du/ kN6gsf] ?kdf cfgf] jr{:j sfod} /fv]sf 5g\ . lj=;+= @)$& ;fnsf] k|hftGqsf] k'gM:yfkgfkZrft g]kfnL
;]gfdf ldlt @)^#)@@* ut] ls/ft d"nsf JolQmx? ;lDdlnt >L l/k'db{g u0f / dw];L tyf t/fO{ d"nsf JolQmx?
;lDdlnt >L gof ;a'h u0f :yfkgf ePsf 5g\ . clxn] ;f] u0fx? qmdzM ;nf{xL / cf]vn9'u+ fdf sfo{/t 5g\ .
!!=
g]kfnL ;]gf ;a} hfthfltsf] k"mnaf/L xf] . o; ;+u7gdf hflt / If]qsf] lx;fan] s;}nfO{ sfvfkfvf ul/Psf]
5}g . g]kfndf ePsf sl/a !)) eGbf a9L hfthfltx?dWo] w]/} hfthfltx? g]kfnL ;]gf?kL k"mnaf/Ldf xft]dfnf]
u/L c6fPsf 5g\ . ;]gfdf dfly pNn]lvt s]xL hfltut u0fx? eP tfklg tL hfltx?nfO{ ;d"xut?kdf egf{ ul/Psf]
eg] xf]Og . g]kfn ;/sf/ / g]kfnL ;]gfsf clws[t tyf ;}Go egf{;DaGwL gLlt tyf lgod cg';f/ g} egf{ x'g
OR5's ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL bfh'efO{ tyf lbbL alxgLx?nfO{ :yflkt dfkb08cg';f/ cfjZos kg]{ ;Dk"0f{ k/LIffx? lnP/
of]Uo JolQmx? 5gf]6 ug]{ sfd x'G5 . To;/L 5gf]6 ePsf JolQmx?nfO{ lgod cg';f/ cfwf/e"t ;}Go tflnd lbO{ ;f]
tflnd pQL0f{ u/]kl5dfq ljleGg u0f tyf u'Ndx?df ;?jf u/L k7fOG5 . o; qmddf g]kfnL ;]gfdf xfn ljBdfg
pk/f]Qm $ j6f hftLo u0fx?df klg Toxf kbk"lt{ ug'{ kg]{ ;+Vof cg';f/ ljleGg cfjZos hfltx?nfO{ ;DalGwt
hftLo u0fx?df ;?jf u/L k7fpg] ul/Psf] 5 . t/ clws[tsf] xsdf eg] pQm hfltut u0fx?df s'g} klg hfltsf
clws[t -u0fklt ;d]t_x?nfO{ v6fpg] Joj:yf /xL cfPsf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf hfltut cfwf/df u0fu'Ndx?sf]
Joj:yf ul/g' cg'ko'Qm g} klg b]lvGb}g . t/ o; ;DaGwdf klg jx; x'g' kg]{ b]lvG5 .
g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;dfj]zLs/0f
!@=
g]kfnsf ljleGg ;/sf/L dGqfno, ljefu tyf sfof{nox? dWo] g]kfnL ;]gf hftLo k|ltlglwTjsf lx;fan]
Ps ;dfj]zL ;+:yfdf kg{ cfp5 . of] Ps /fli6o ;]gf xf] . oxf k"j{ d]rLb]lv klZrd dxfsfnL;Ddsf / lxdfn,
kxf8, t/fO{ ;a} If]qsf ;Dk"0f{ hfthfltx? ;dflji6 ePsf 5g\ . jt{dfg g]kfnsf] cGtl/d ;+ljwfg @)^# sf] wf/f
!$$ sf] pkwf/f -$ s_ cg';f/ -kfrf} ;+zf]wgf/f yk_ g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ /fli6o :j?k k|bfg ug{ / ;dfj]zL agfpg
dw];L, cflbjf;L, hghflt, blnt, dlxnf, lk5l8Psf IF]q nufotsf hgtfsf] k|j]z ;dfgtf / ;dfj]zL l;4fGtsf]
cfwf/df sfg"gdf Joj:yf u/L ;'lglZrt ul/g] 5 egL pNn]v ul/Psf] kfOG5 . To;kl5 g]kfn ;/sf/f/f hf/L
12

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

;dfj]zLs/0f P]gsf] Joj:yf cg';f/ g]kfnL ;]gfn] klg clws[t tyf cGobhf{sf] egf{df /fHosf] ;dfj]zLs/0fsf]
l;4fGtnfO{ k"0f{tM c+lusf/ ul/;s]sf] 5 . clxn] ;]gfn] egf{ ubf{ %% k|ltzt v'Nnf tyf $% k|ltzt cf/If0fsf]
Joj:yf cg';f/ egf{ lng] u/]sf] 5 . ;f] $% k|ltztnfO{ ztk|ltzt dfgL @* k|ltzt dw];L, @) k|ltzt dlxnf, !%
k|ltzt blnt, % k|ltzt lk5l8Psf ju{ tyf #@ k|ltzt cflbjf;L / hghfltaf6 egf{ lng] ul/G5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf
;g\ !(^@ af6 k|fljlwstk{mdfq dlxnfnfO{ egf{ lng] ul/Psf]df lj=;+= @)^) ;fnb]lv ck|fljlws ;fwf/0ftk{m klg
clws[t / cGobhf{df dlxnfx?nfO{ egf{ lng ;'? ul/Psf] 5 .
!#=
g]kfnsf] ljleGg hfthfltsf] hg;+Vofsf] cg'kftsf] cfwf/df ljZn]if0f ubf{ g]kfnL ;]gfdf If]qLx?sf] s]xL
a9L jr{:j 5 . To;kl5 7s'/L, du/, u'?, g]jf/, /fO{, bdfO{, 3lt{, ;Gof;L, s'dfn, xhfd7fs'/ cflb hfthflt
klg hg;+Vofsf] cg'kftdf ;]gfdf s]xL a9L ;+Vofdf g} b]lvG5 . t/ a|fd0f, tfdf, sfdL, lnDa', ;fsL{ tyf yf?
hfltx? hg;+Vofsf] cg'kfteGbf s]xL dfq sd ;+Vofdf ;]gfdf ;]jf/t /x]sf] kfOG5 . ;]gfdf egf{ x'g cfpg] ljleGg
hghfltsf] ;+Vofdf x'g] 36a9sf ljljw sf/0fx? /x]sf 5g\ . tL dWo] IF]qL, 7s'/L hfltx? k/fk"j{sfnb]lv ;]gfdf
;]jf u/L cfPsf] x'bf ljutdf j+zfg'ut?kdf pgLx?sf ;Gtfgx? klg a9L dfqfdf ;]gfdf g} hfg] rfxgf ug'{,
;]gfdf s7f]/ zf/Ll/s >d ug{ ufxf/f] dfg]/ k|foMh;f] g]jf/ tyf dw];L ;d'bfox? ;]gfdf ;]jf ug]{ OR5f gb]vfpg',
a|fd0f, If]qL, 7s'/L cflb hfltx? cGo hfltsf] bfhf]df a9L cWoogzLn x'gfn] klg ;]gfdf a9L ;+Vofdf k|j]z kfpg'
OToflb sf/0fx? /x]sf] kfOPsf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;g\ @))* df l;kfxL / kmnf]j;{ kbsf] nflu egf{ lemSg wflb,
nlntk'/, ;nf{xL, bf / cf]vn9'+ufdf egf{ s]Gb| :yfkgf u/L cfj]bg dfu ubf{ kg{ cfPsf] !%,*@% lgj]bsx?dWo]
!)=^ k|ltzt -!,^*# hgf_ dw];L / %=# k|ltzt -*#%_ blntn] dfq ;]gfdf cfpg OR5f b]vfPsf lyP, hasL ;f]xL
;dodf a|fd0fIF]qLaf6 %#=# k|ltzt / hghfltaf6 #)=( k|ltztn] egf{sf] nflu lgj]bg lbPsf lyP . o;af6 klg
g]kfnL ;]gfdf lsg a|fd0fIf]qLsf] ;+Vof a9L ePsf] xf] eGg] :jtM ljZn]if0f ug{ ;lsG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ljlzi6
>]0fLdf /x]sf pk/yL / ;f]eGbf dflysf /yLa[Gbx?sf] h'nfO{ @)!) sf] Pp6f hfltut tYof cWoog ubf{ b'O{ hgf
k|fljlws;lxt ( hgf If]qL, @ hgf a|fd0f, % hgf u'?, @ hgf 7s'/L, ! hgf /f0ff / ! hgf g]jf/ sfo{/t /x]sf]
b]lvPsf] lyof] .
;]gfdf cf/If0f
!$= s'g} klg b]zsf] ;]gfdf ;a} hfthflt / If]qsf JolQmx?n] ;dfg?kdf k|j]z kfpg' k5{, o;df s;}sf] b'O{dt
5}g . g]kfnL ;]gfn] klg oxL bz{gnfO{ c+ufn]/ cfgf] ;+u7gnfO{ k"0f{ ;dfj]zL agfPsf] 5 / of] qmdn] lg/Gt/tf ;d]t
kfO/x]sf] 5 . t/ ;dfj]zLs/0fsf] gfddf cf/If0f sf] Joj:yf ug'{ slQsf] pko'Qm 5 < of] Ps 7"nf] jx;sf] ljifo
x'g cfp5 . ;+;f/s} 7"nf] k|hftflGqs d'n's ef/tsf] ljzfn ;]gfdf egf{ lemSg cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf 5}g . ljZjsf] s'g}
klg d'n'ssf] ;]gfdf egf{sf] nflu hfthflt, wd{, ;d'bfo, ln tyf IF]q cflbsf] cfwf/df cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf ePsf]
lj/n} b]Vg kfOG5 . t/ g]kfnL ;]gfdf $% k|ltzt cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf 5, of] Ps dgg of]Uo tftf] ljifo xf] . o;df
;Dk"0f{ /fhgLlts g]t[Tjju{, a'l4hLjL tyf of]hgflabx?n] ulx/f] ;f]+r lbg} kg]{ b]lvG5 . s]xL lglZrt hfthflt tyf
If]qnfO{ cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf ubf{ csf]{ hfthflt tyf If]qsf] clwsf/df wSsf k5{ ls eGg] klg ;f]Rg' kg]{ x'g ;S5 .
g]kfn h:tf] !)) eGbf a9L hfthflt ePsf] / () eGbf a9L efiff af]lng] ;dfhsf ;a}n] cfcfgf] hfltsf] nflu
cf/If0fsf] dfu u/]df /fHon] s:tf] k|ltlqmof hgfpnf < of] Ps ;f]rgLo / r'gf}tLk"0f{ ljifo x'g ;S5 /fHosf] nflu .
!%=
ljut s]xL dlxgfb]lv dw];jfbL bnx?f/f !) xhf/ dw];Lx?nfO{ ;]gfdf ;d"xut k|j]z lbg' kg]{ dfux?
;txdf cfPsf 5g\ . ;fy} k|f/Dedf #))) dw];Lx?nfO{ ;]gfdf ;d"xut egf{ lnOg] egL ;/sf/L k|jQmfaf6 klg
;'lggdf cfPsf] 5 . t/, o;} ljifonfO{ lnP/ ut * k'; @)^* df /IffdGqLsf sfo{ef/;d]t ;dfn]sf pkk|wfg
dGqLaf6 ljBdfg Joj:yf -cf/If0f_ cg';f/} dw];Lnufot ;d'bfoaf6 ;]gfdf egf{ lnOg] eGg] hfgsf/L klg cfPsf]
5 . o;} ;Gbe{df ;jf]R{ r cbfntdf k/]sf] Pp6f l/6df ldlt @)^* k'; !! ut] dw];L o'jfsf] ;]gfdf ;fd"lxs egf{
/f]Sg cGtl/d cfb]z;d]t hf/L eO;s]sf] l:ylt 5 . To;sf] nuQ} Pg]skf dfcf]jfbL ;ef;b ;Gtf]ifs'df/ yf?sf]
g]t[Tjdf ul7t df]rf{n] ut % k'; @)^* df yf?nufot k"jL{ t/fO{sf ljleGg hfltsf] ;]gfdf ;fd"lxs k|j]zsf] dfu
u/]sf] lyof] . pQm df]rf{n] t/fO{sf cflbjf;L yf?, bg'jf/, /fhj+zL, /fhwfdL, lwdfn, d]r], emfu8, ;Gyfn, b/fO{,
ugufO{, tfhk'l/ofnufot hghfltaf6 !% xhf/ o'jfnfO{ g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;fd"lxs k|j]z u/fpg dfu u/]sf] kfOPsf]
5 . To;}u/L s0ff{nLsf a'l4hLjL ju{n] klg ut & k'; @)^* df Ps e]nf u/L s0ff{nL If]qsf] ljsf; tyf /Iffsf]
nflu 5'} ;]gf u7g ug{ dfu u/]sf] kfOPsf] 5 .
13

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

!^=
g]kfnL ;]gfsf] jt{dfg (%,&%# :jLs[t b/aGbLdf a|fd0fIF]qL %),)#*, cflbjf;Lhghflt @(,@@!, dw];L
%,$##, blnt ^,!!% / dlxnf !,$(! sfo{/t /x]sf] k|fKt tYofdf pNn]v ePsf] kfOG5 . of] ;+Vof cf/If0fsf]
Joj:yf ePkl5 x'g cfPsf] xf]Og . ;/sf/n] cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf u/]sf] t ev{/ b'O{rf/ jif{dfq ePsf] 5 . cfhsf]
k|lt:kwf{Tds o'udf ;a}nfO{ ;dfg?kdf k|lt:kwf{ ug{ lbOg' k5{ . cf/If0f sf] Joj:yfn] ubf{ ;dfgtf sf] l;4fGtdf
k|efj kfg'{ x'b}g . t;y{, /fHon] cf/If0fdfeGbf lk5l8Psf ju{ tyf cflbjf;L, hghflt cflbsf] pTyfgsf] nflu
ljz]if sfo{qmdx?sf] th'{df u/]/ ;a} hfthfltsf] ;zlQms/0fdf hf]8 lbg' kb{5, tf ls pgLx? /fHosf] x/]s c+udf
;dfg?kdf k|lt:kwf{ ug{ ;s'g\ . cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf gx'bf klg g]kfn ;/sf/sf] jg, gfkL, kz' ;]jf, s[lif cflb
If]qx?df dw];L / t/fO{ d'nsf JolQmx?sf] afx'Notf sfod} 5 . g]kfnL ;]gf eg]sf] Ps /fli6o ;]gf xf], To;}n]
o:tf] ;]gfdf hfltut?kdf ;fd"lxs k|j]z tyf cf/If0f h:tf Joj:yfx? /fli6o rl/q ljkl/t x'g ;Sb5g\ .
bL3{sfndf o:tf] Joj:yfn] /fli6o ;]gfsf] nflu k|To'Tkfbs x'g ;S5 / o;n] eljiodf ;]gfleq b"/ufdL gsf/fTds
k|efj lgDTofpg af6f] vf]Ng] ;Defjgf x'G5 . ;fy}, s'g} klg hfltsf] g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;fd"lxs k|j]zsf] ljifo g]kfnsf]
;+ljwfg, P]g, lgod / k|rlnt d"No / dfGotfsf] cg's"n x'g] b]lv+b}g .
lgZsif{
!&=
ef/tdf c+u|]hn] ;]gfdf hfltut?kdf egf{ ug]{ k|lqmofnfO{ ;g\ !*%& sf] ljb|f]xkl5 eg] s]xL sd u/]sf]
b]lvG5 . ef/t :jtGqtfkl5 ;g\ !($( df hftLo, eflifo / wd{sf] cfwf/df ;]gfdf egf{ ug]{ Joj:yfnfO{ ;/sf/n]
k"0f{?kdf x6fPsf] lyof] . ef/tLo ;]gfn] cd[t;/df lzv k[ystfjfbLx? lj?4 ;+rfng u/]sf] 'Operation Blue Star'
kl5 ef/tLo ;]gfnfO{ ;a} hfthfltsf] ldl>t /]lhd]G6 agfpg] k|:tfj cfPsf] lyof], t/ Tof] sfof{Gjogdf cfpg
;s]g . cfh ef/tdf !) nfveGbf a9L o'jfn] ;]gfdf ;]jf ug]{ df}sf kfO/x]sf 5g\ . Toxf cg';"lrt hflt / cg';"lrt
hghfltsf] gfddf ;]gfdf s'g} cf/If0f / sf]6fsf] Joj:yf 5}g . ef/tLo ;+ljwfgsf] wf/f !% -$_ cg';f/ ef/tLo
;]gf k"0f{?kdf lg/k]If /x]sf] eGg] pNn]v ePsf] 5 . To;}n] klg ef/tLo ;]gfdf hfltut cfwf/df ;}Go egf{ ug]{
Joj:yf 5}g . ef/tLo ;]gfdf clxn] klg ljleGg hfthfltsf] /]lhd]G6x? eP tfklg ;}Go egf{ ubf{ k|fGt tyf s]Gb|
zfl;t k|b]zx?nfO{ lbOPsf] sf]6f cg';f/ egf{ ul/G5 . ef/tdf xfn ljleGg hfthfltsf] /]lhd]G6 sfod /x] klg
o;n] b]zsf ;Dk"0f{ hfthfltnfO{ ;d]6g g;s]sf] eGg] ljleGg a'l4hLjLx?sf] egfO{ /x]sf] kfOG5 . c+u|]hsf] kfnfdf
v8f ul/Psf] hftLo / If]lqo /]lhd]G6x?nfO{ cfhsf] kl/k|]Iodf x6fpg' kg]{ w]/}sf] dfu /x]sf] 5 . nf]s;efdf k|lt/Iff
ah]6sf] 5nkmnsf] qmddf klg obfsbf of] k|;+u p7g] u/]sf] 5 . Ps ef/tLo cg';Gwfgstf{ cf]d/ vflnbLn] cfgf]
Pp6f y]l;;df cfhsf] ef/tLo ;z:q kmf}hsf] agfj6n] ef/tsf] ljljwtf af]s]sf] ;dfhsf] P]gf x'g g;Sg] egL
pNn]v ug'{ ePsf] kfOG5 . o;af6 klg clxn] ef/tdf hftLotfdf cfwfl/t kmf}hsf] ;+u7g ul/g[' pko'Qm gePsf]
eGg] hgdt cufl8 cfO/x]sf] b]lvG5 . Oltxf;df @)) jif{ k'/fgf] ef/tLo ;]gfdf t'?Gt 7"nf] kl/jt{g ug{ ;do
nfUg] x'bf clxn] klg ef/tLo ;]gfsf] k}bn kmf}hdf hftLotfsf cfwf/df /]lhd]G6x? sfo{/t 5g\, h;df g]kfnLx?sf]
uf]vf{ /]lhd]G6 klg Ps xf] .
!*= jt{dfg kl/jlt{t ;Gbe{df /fi6sf k|foM ;a} tx tyf tKsfsf JolQmx?sf] Wofg g]kfnL ;]gftk{m hfg] u/]sf]
5, of] :jefljs klg xf] . ljutdf nfdf] ;do;Dd of] ;]gfnfO{ /fhfsf] ;]gf egL cfIf]k nufOPsf] lyof], t/ lj=;+=
@)$& ;fnkl5 klg g]t[Tj txaf6 g]kfnL ;]gftk{m vf;} Wofg lbOPsf] kfOPg . t/ cfh k'gM ;a} bn tyf g]t[Tj
txsf] Wofg ;]gftk{m df]l8Psf] 5 . of] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] nflu v';L / uf}/jsf] ljifo xf] . g]kfnL ;]gf cfh klg w]/}
r'gf}tLx?;u h'lw/x]sf] 5 . clxn] klg g]kfnL ;]gfsf $@ k|ltzt hjfgx? o'4sfnLg a+s/df a:5g\, ;/sf/n]
;]gfsf] nflu lalgof]hg u/]sf] @) c/a ?k}ofsf] ah]6sf] () k|ltzteGbf a9L lx:;f tna, eQf tyf /f;gdf vr{
x'G5 . ce}m klg ;a} ;}lgsnfO{ ;'Tgsf] nflu JolQmut PsPs uf]6f vf6 k'u]sf] 5}g, cGo ef}lts k"jf{wf/ cefjsf]
af/]df t pNn]v u/L ;fWo 5}g . Pshgf o'jfo'jtLnfO{ cfjZos cfwf/e"t tflnd lbP/ ;}lgs agfpg 36Ldf klg
^ nfv ?k}of vr{ x'G5 . ;]gfsf clwsf+z hjfgx?n] clxn] klg %) jif{eGbf k'/fgf] xltof/ k|of]u ug{ afWo 5g\ .
gofgof k|ljlw tyf ;/;fdfgx? ce}m klg ;]gfsf] xftdf kg{ ;s]sf] 5}g . ;/sf/n] jt{dfg cj:yfsf] ljZn]if0f u/L
tof/ ug'{ kg]{ /fli6o ;'/Iff gLlt ;d]t cfh;Dd aGg ;s]sf] 5}g . jt{dfg kl/k|]Iodf /fi6df slt ;]gf cfjZos
kb{5 eGg] ;DaGwdf cfh;Dd cWoog tyf cf}lrTosf] vf]hL ePsf] kfOPsf] 5}g . ;]gfsf] ;+VofTds ljsf;eGbf
u'0ffTds ljsf; ug]{tk{m g]t[Tj txsf] vf;} Wofg uPsf] b]lvPsf] 5}g . b]zsf ;a} ;'/Iff c+ux?nfO{ s] s:tf] sfof{b]z
lbg] eGg] ;DaGwdf vf;} :ki6 ls6fg ePsf] kfOGb}g . o:tf] cj:yfdf g]t[Tjju{ ;]gfdf hfthfltsf] ;d"xut k|j]z
14

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

tyf cf/If0f h:tf ljifodf gcNdlnsg /fli6o ;]gfsf] dgf]an, sfo{s'zntf / o;sf] u'0f:t/ clej[l4 ug{df ljz]if
Wofg lbg' kg]{ ;dosf] dfu /x]sf] 5 . c:t' M
Bibliography (work cited)

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%=
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^=
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(=
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!)= l/hfn, Pg=lk= dw];L ;]gf ;dfj]zLs/0fsf] cf}lrTo gof klqsf, jif{ %, c+s @$^, !@ k'; @)^*,
d+unaf/=
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!#=
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ljleGg j]e;fO6
14.

"British Recruitment Policy and the Indian Army-1757-1947" (www. sikhphilosophy. net)

15.

"Ethnicity and caste in Nepal" (en.wikipedia.org)

16.

"Ethnicity and Military " (www.answers.com)

17.

"Ethnicity and Race in the military in US" (www.answers.com)

18.

"Is Indian Army Secular?" (legalserviceindia.com/articles/indian-army.htm)

19.

"Nepal: Distribution of Principal Ethnic Group, 1990" (www. countrystudies.us/nepal/31.htm)

20.

"Regimentation in Indian Army" (www.hisdustantimes.com)

21.

"State of Inclusiveness in Nepalese Army" (www.nepalarmy. mil.np/inclusiveness.php)

22.

"Who serves in U.S. Military? The Demographics of Enlisted Troops and Officers" (www.heritage.org)

zlxb, jL/ / ;Gt ;a}eGbf 7'nf] pkflw xf] .

UnfO:6g

15

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Augment Co-operation between the Nepalese Army

and the Ministry of Defense through Effective Civil
Military Relations
- Brig Gen Binoj Basnyat
1.
When you are addressing the concern Civil Military Relations (CMR) you come
across commonly used different terms like civil control, political control or civil supremacy
over the armed forces, you are dealing with the productive measures that apply the society and
the interest to oversee the army or political oversight, in other words idyllic definition may vary.
In democracies the armed forces have maintained their credibility at the same time you will
get to read of many challenges that leadership of the forces face. The question is how the civil
society will control those who possess the ultimate power of coercion or oppression. All forms
of government weather from democracies to autocracies, the issue is do they get compliance
or maintain order by consent or coercion to the regime in power and to the procedures of
governance. There are enormous theoretical discussions on CMR.
2.
Civil control can be understood in democracies as the control by civilian officials
elected by the people. The procedure can allow a state to establish its values and rationale, its
institution and practices by the popular will rather than on the choices of military leaders. In the
last two centuries, war has become too complex--the preparations too elaborate, the weapons
too sophisticated, command too arduous, operations too intricate--to leave the waging of
combat to amateurs or part-time practitioners. As a result, the professional military's influence
has grown, either from circumstance or from necessity.1
3.
This paper is an attempt to generate debates on Nepals changing security environment
as well as find measures to effectively professionalize the Nepalese Army (NA) and at the
same time oversee political control. It has been widely recognized that Nepal has been passing
through a transition in its political, social, foreign and security policy purviews.
4.
Democratic control of armed forces focuses not only on the subordination of the military
to democratically elected civilian authorities, but also to the legal standards and principles of
democracy enforced by the agencies of government. This is central to the theory and practice
of CMR.
5.
James Burk suggests that democratic values include the idea that those with authority
ought to be elected representatives of the people and these representatives ought to exercise
ultimate authority over the uniform military elite. 2 It is necessary to align the interests of
both the military leaders and the democratic society.
6.
Half a century ago the great theorist of civilian control, Samuel P. Huntington, argued
in The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations, that the
approach to the most favourable way of civilian supremacy was to acknowledge such "selfdirected military professionalism."3
7.
Civil control has significance in Nepal than ever before for the consolidation of
democracy at the same time not jeopardizing the non political and professional organization,
1

http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html, accessed 25 Sept 2011

Burk, J, Theories of democratic Civil-Military Relations, Armed Forces and Society, vol 29, iss 1, Fall 2002. Pg 8.

http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html, accessed 25 Sept 2011

16

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

therefore all appear to rummage around for a valuable means and measures that can engage in
recreation to enhance the co-operation between the NA and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) for
each and every one of the multiethnic society to exercise their rights. Therefore the foundation
can be determined by the following determinants firstly by the existence of a democratic
government and the rule of law, secondly the accountability to public institutions thirdly is
effective countervailing power and lastly by military tradition committed to neutrality and
for all.
8.
I feel it is essential to look into the backdrop of the ongoing political dilemma in Nepal
that is related to the Security Sector Development (SSD). The clause that spelt democratization
of the NA in the constitution soared oodles of different opinion, the NA translating it as
professionalization, and others as control over by the MoD but the main concern was the
misgiving of NA going against the pronouncement of a legitimate government. The interim
constitution para 114 provides the basis for the Nepalese Army. Sub-para 3 and 4 of para
114 is as follows and plays an important role in the building the co-operative and creating
conducive environment for enhancing the relationship between the NA and the MoD under
CMR
The Council of Ministers shall control, mobilize and manage the Nepal Army in accordance
with the law. The Council of Ministers shall, with the consent of the political parties and by
seeking the advice of the concerned committee of the Legislature-Parliament, formulate an
extensive work plan for the democratization of the Nepal Army and implement it.
In the case of formulating and implementing the action plan pursuant to clause (3), determination
of the appropriate number of the Nepal Army, its democratic structure and national and inclusive
character shall be developed, and training shall be imparted to the army in accordance with the
norms and values of democracy and human rights.4
9.
Political instability plays a significant share in the formulation of the constitution and
establishment of peace in the nation that the people so desire but also assists the countries
to deepen its wounds. The impact may be unimaginable. What is the time doing? It may be
benevolent to the political parties that have come to govern adequate time to consolidate and
legitimize but at the same time the question is; is it really serving the overall security state of
affairs. The dawdling economic development and unemployment is inviting multi dimensional
challenges may it be ethnic issues and values that the nation stood for. The difference inside
the political parties and intra party dissimilarity in ideological theme may be observed as
creating this security vacuum.
10.
This scepticism may impact the relation that the MoD and the NA would desire under
the CMR heading but at the same time the people have in hand the constituent assembly that
can pronounce the national interest and the security policy, which will provide a platform for
the MoD and high level military generals.
11.
The Cabinet few months ago endorsed the structure of the MoD as shown in figure 1 as
a major restructuring initiative. The government has started the process of revamp the MoD to
make more efficient the line of communication and implement better civilian oversight of the
NA.5
4

http://www.nic.gov.np/download/interim-constitution.pdf, accessed on 25 Sept 2011

5
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2011/08/02/top-story/the-shake-up-government-sets-defenceministry-revamp-process-rolling/224717.html, accessed 24 Sept 2011

17

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

Figure 1: Major Restructuring Initiative

12.
Machiavelli would disagree that a "military man cannot be a good man", Voltaire would
depict them as the "manifestation of brute force in rationalized form",6 and Samuel Adams
would state that a standing army, however necessary it may be, is always dangerous to the
liberties of the people,7 more than a few post-war political scientists began thinking of the
military as a lawful pressure assembly, competent of singing a positive role in the sociopolitical alteration of the newly states transiting to democracies after armed conflict.8 Amount
of them come into view with Finers hypothesis that "in all countries ruled by civilians, the
armed forces...are in no better, but certainly no worse a moral position than any (other) branch
of civil management...to persuade the political elites to their point of view".9
13.
The change in the attitude of the civil society towards the military institution was not due
to probability; it was because of the commitment of the armed forces. The Second World War
terminated the long-established position of the military as an instrument of a states territorial
expansion, its usefulness as a conjugal force was improved. It may be argued that one of the
few highly 'westernized' institutions, the military was seen as the single most effective pressure
group capable of playing a positive role in an attempt to reach a higher level in the social and
political progress of a nation state.10The introduction of liberal, western economic and political
institutions in non relevant states had upset the permanence of the latters long-established
socio-political structure; the military appeared to be the only group capable of enforcing and
preserving political steadiness and order. Hence, as the duties of the officers had to undergo
such a substantial change and the entire institution was asked to play a multidimensional
domestic role, the western academic world was forced to re-examine its old views on CMR.
14.
A number of theorists like Janowitz, however, started to point out that one should not
perplex discipline and organizational capacity. Whereas the military officers have been trained
6

Quoted from Lyle McAlister, 'Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America', Annals of the American
Academy of Political Science, Vol.160, (1965), p86

H.A. Cushing, (ed) The writings of Samuel Adams [New York: Putnam, 1907] p250

Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations [Chicago:University of Chicago Press
1964], p101

Allan Millet, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military [Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1979], p137
10

John Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964], p339
18

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

to operate efficiently when assigned to specific tasks, their effect on the broad economic
development of any country would, at best, be minimal due to "limitations inherent in the
profession".11 The process of democratization and CMR cannot take place and bring result
overnight; 12however, it gives the impression that it constitutes the only viable solution to
peace and security. As President Clinton pointed out in his speech at Georgetown University
in 1991, countries with democratic governments are more likely to be reliable partners in trade
and diplomacy and less likely a threat to peace than those with other forms of government.13
15.
For a better perceptive of the type of CMR which control a political life of a country
as well as its level of democratization, the creation of a multi-factorial model is needed. The
following factors must be measured for a composite one: First, the armed forces. A close
surveillance to the size of the military institution,14 the social background 15 and the level
of professionalization16 of its associates, their political ideology,17 their level of consistency
and unity18 as well as that of their aspiration to protect their institutions interest,19 could, as
Janowitz disagrees, offer us a better possibility for comprehend (ing) both the officers, (their)
internal competence and their leaning to interfere in domestic politics.20
16.
Second, the organization should take into account the outcome of the domestic social,21
economic22 and the political23 environment in which the armed forces exist and perform.
11

Janowitz, op.cit., p80

12

Democratic governance , Kagan argues, relies mainly on the fact that there is a body of citizens who possess a good
understanding of the principles of democracy or who have developed a character consistent with the democratic way of
life. All this takes time-not just years but decades. quoted from Strobe Talbott, Democracy and the National Interest,
Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, November/December 1996, p.62
13

At the same time, Huntington was confirming Clintons ideology by pointing out that From the early nineteenth
century down to 1990...democracies did no t, with only trivial or formal exceptions, fight other democracies...On the basis
of past experience, an overwhelmingly democratic world is likely to be a world relatively free of international violence. in
S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1991] p.29
14

Whereas Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in America [New York: Schocken, 1961]p.324 and Stanislav Andrenski,
Military Organization and Society [Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1968] p.5 claim that large militaries constitute
a great danger to ademocratic government, Aristide Zolberg, The structure of political conflict in thenew states of tropical
Africa, American Political Science Review, Vol.64, (1970), andEdward Feit, Armed Bureaucrats [Boston: Mufflin, 1973]
pp6-7, argue that the smallerthe size of the military, the greater their propensity to intervene.
15

Manfred Halpern, Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class, in Johnson,(1962), op.cit., pp286-7, Eric
Nordlinger, Soldiers in Mufti, American Political ScienceReview, Vol. 64, (1970), and Jose Nunn, The Middle
Class Military Coup, in ClaudioVeliz (ed), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America [London: Oxford University
Press,1967]
16

Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State [Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UniversityPress, 1957]; Bengt Abrahamson,
Military Professionalization and Political Power[Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972] ; Jacques VanDoorn, Military Profession and
MilitaryRegimes [The Hague: Mouton, 1969]
17

Morris Janowitz and Jacques VanDoorn (eds), On Military Ideology [Rotterdam:Rotterdam University Press, 1971]

18

William Thompson, Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes,Comparative Political Studies, Vol.9,
(1976) and Clapman and Philip, op.cit., p.6
19
Finer, op.cit., p.41, Nordlinger, (1977), op.cit., p.78 and William Thompson,Corporate coup-maker grievances and
types of regime targets, ComparativePolitical Studies, Vol.12, (1980)
20

Janowitz, (1964), op.cit., p.2

21

Huntington, (1968), op.cit, pp.195-196, Putnam, op.cit., p.96, Andrenski, op.cit.,pp.55-99

22

Ergil Fossum, Factors influencing the occurrence of military coups in LatinAmerica, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.4,
(1967)
23

Huntington, (1968), op.cit., pp193-194 and Juan Linz, The Breakdown ofDemocratic Regimes [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986]
19

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

Consideration must be paid to political factor since it greatly determines if the process of
democratization has established strong roots in any country.24 Third, the role of the international
factor and more particularly the persuade which the important foreign powers exercise upon
both the armed forces and the domestic forces of the country.25 Last but not least, the past and
present role of the military organization in the progression of CMR in any state should be
examined. Foreign power does play an important role and a stress must be put. The military
factor in CMR is only examined and concerned only after an intervention occurs at the same
time the role of the military is often than not neglected in domestic issues or domestic policy
making process. But writers emphasize the abrupt factor that lead to military intervention;
they forget that the armed forces as "a system of continuous purposive activity of specified
kind"26 functions within the civil society before the pre-intervention stage. As Johnson tips
out, "the direct control of government by high ranking officers or military juntas is only a
crude indication of the role that the armed forces may be playing at a given moment, for men
in uniform have sundry ways of making their will felt". 27As a result, patron-client relations
not only inside the military establishment but also between its members and the civilian
government ought not to be overlooked.28 The planned and smooth, or violent, transition from
military rule to another form of government, (mainly democratic), in peripheral countries,
and its effect on the evolution of civilian rule in them, deserves attention.29 Since the role of
the military indecision-making processes often exceeds its immediate sphere of occupational
reference, its changing role in a transformed society must be scrutinized.
17.
If Nepal lies at the lap of China and the top of India both emerging economics and with
the largest top five standing armies can also be observed as the heart of the two giants of AsiaPacific region. Even if the vicinity is close and the difference is almost in everything from their
perception, size, population, religion, culture. Their economic performance is immense but the
geo-strategic importance for both China and India may be considered for the evolution of CMR.
18.
One of the high points in efforts to democratize the nation and civil control over the
NA was the willingness of the political parties including the UNCPM under the democratic
framework. It is imperative for democratic political control and democratic military
professionalism as essential elements for military institutions in a democratic state.
19.
The civilian political elite should and must relate with the professional military in
defining threats and then establishing constitutional and institutional defense policies on
size and complexity, recruitment, training, career planning, retention, retirement, budgets and
acquisitions, force deployment and power projection, rules of engagement and human rights
protection. Other important areas include defense diplomacy, the relationship of the military to
24

Thomas Bruneau and Alex MacLeod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Partiesand the Consolidation of Democracy
[Boulder: Lynne Riemer, 1986], Felipe Aguero,The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Context: Spain
inComparative Perspective [Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Duke University, 1991] andGeoffrey Prindham, Political Actors,
Linkages and Interactions: DemocraticConsolidation in Southern Europe, West European Politics, Vol.13, (1990)

25

Geoffrey Prindham (ed), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context ofRegime Transition in Southern Europe
[New York: St. Martins, 1991], Kenneth Maxwell(ed), Democracy and Foreign Policy [Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1992]
26

Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations (edit) TalcottParsons [New York: Free Press, 1964],
p151

27

Johnson, (1964), op.cit., p7

28

Harold Grouch, 'Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia', World Politics, Vol.31, (1979), pp577-578

29

Henri Barkey, 'Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition', Armed Forces andSociety, Vol.16, (1990) and
Linz, Stepan and Gunther, op.cit.
20

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

the international community, peace operations and regional security issues. Such discussions
should clarify the boundaries of acceptable involvement of the NA in national and international
politics, its relationship with the media, NGOs, nascent environmental pressure groups and
other new non-state actors.
20.
The dialogue on civil control with the civil society on CMR should be constructively
achieved without the usual complicating Nepalese factors of ethnicity, religion, inaccuracy
and plain mischief. What is the relation between the commander and the statesman?
21.
Lastly, sustained commitment of external actors to the professionalization process can
be very important resource building and assistance in capacity building of the MoD and the NA.
22.
The structural alterations of the MoD should lead to facilitating the responsibilities of
the NA in performing its responsibilities and professionalizing the organization under CMR
through god governance.
References
Books
1.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations. (Vintage Books, 1964)
2.
Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder. The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy.
(Doubleday, 1954)
3.
Lyle McAlister, 'Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America', Annals of
the American Academy of Political Science, Vol.160, (1965)
4.

H.A. Cushing, (ed) The writings of Samuel Adams [New York: Putnam, 1907]

5.
Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations [Chicago:
University of Chicago Press 1964]
6.
Allan Millet, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military [Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1979]
7.
John Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America [Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1964]
8.
Democratic governance, Democracy and the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, Vol.75,
November/December 1996
9.
S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century [Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991]
10.

Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in America [New York: Schocken, 1961]

11.

Manfred Halpern, Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class, in Johnson, (1962

12.

Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Mufti, American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, (1970)

13.
Jose Nunn, The Middle Class Military Coup, in Claudio Veliz (ed), The Politics of Conformity
in Latin America [London: Oxford University Press, 1967]
14.
Bengt Abrahamson, Military Professionalization and Political Power [Beverly Hills: Sage,
1972]
15.

Jacques VanDoorn, Military Profession and Military Regimes [The Hague: Mouton, 1969]

16.
Morris Janowitz and Jacques VanDoorn (eds), On Military Ideology [Rotterdam: Rotterdam
University Press, 1971]
17.
William Thompson, Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes, Comparative
Political Studies, Vol.9, (1976)
21

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

18.
Finer, op.cit., Nordlinger, (1977), op.cit., and William Thompson , Corporate coup-maker
grievances and types of regime targets, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.12, (1980)
19.

Janowitz, (1964)

20.
Ergil Fossum, Factors influencing the occurrence of military coups in Latin America, Journal
of Peace Research, Vol.4, (1967)
21.
Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986]
22.
Thomas Bruneau and Alex MacLeod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the
Consolidation of Democracy [Boulder: Lynne Riemer, 1986], Felipe Aguero, The Assertion of Civilian
Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Context: Spain in Comparative Perspective [Unpublished Ph.D
Thesis, Duke University, 1991] and Geoffrey Prindham, Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions:
Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe, West European Politics, Vol.13, (1990)
23.
Geoffrey Prindham (ed), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime
Transition in Southern Europe [New York: St. Martins, 1991], Kenneth Maxwell (ed), Democracy
and Foreign Policy [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992]
24.
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations (edit) Talcott Parsons [New
York: Free Press, 1964]
25.

Harold Grouch, 'Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia', World Politics, Vol.31, (1979)

26.
Henri Barkey, 'Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition', Armed Forces and
Society, Vol.16, (1990) and Linz, Stepan and Gunther, op.cit.
Web Sites
1.

ekantipur.com

2.

nepalnews.com

3.

www.core-hamburg.de/documents/yearbook/english/07/Cottey-en.pdf

4.

www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/karabeli.pdf

5.

www.nic.gov.np/download/interim-constitution.pdf

6.

www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0003.pdf

7.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilian_control_of_the_military

8.

www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl.../kohn.html

9.

www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/DOCS/.../dmpaper12.html

10.

www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45870

11.

http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html

12.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil-military_relations

Journals
1.
Chinas Strategic Perspective 2, Institute fir National Strategic Studies, Civil-Military
Relations in China: Assessing the PLAs Role in Elite Politics, by Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C.
Saunders
2.
Civil Military Relations: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the Military in the Political
Transformation of Post-War Turkey and Greece: 1980-1995, by Dr. Gerassimos Karabelias (Final
Report submitted to North Atlantic, Treaty Organization (NATO) in June 1998)
3.

Nepal Interim Constitution by UNDP

22

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

Nepals Contribution to UN Peacekeeping: An

Analysis of Achievements and Challenges
- Brig Gen Purna B. Silwal1
Background
1.
Peacekeeping is not a job of soldiers, but only soldiers can do it, said UN General
Secretary Dag Hammerskjld back in 1961. The demand for UN peacekeepers has been rising
ever since the end of the cold war era. As of 30 November 1990, number of UN peacekeepers
was 10,3042. Twenty years down the road as of November 2010, the figure surged to 99,2453.
The continuous surge of UN Missions for the maintenance of international peace and security is
the manifestation of trust and confidence parties in the conflict worldwide have bestowed in the
United Nations as impartial and most trustworthy international body. Now, UN peacekeeping
remains stabilized with the figure 98,647 (November 2011) in 15 UN peacekeeping missions
around the world. To backup the surge, annual budget of UN peacekeeping has reached over
USD 7 billion.
2.
As far as Nepals contribution is concerned, it soared amazingly from 851 in 1990
to 5,3184 in Apr 2010. Now, Nepal ranks sixth largest contributor5 with 4,281 peacekeepers
to the UN peacekeeping after Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria and Ethiopia. Nepals
entry into in this noble cause began in 1958 with six military observers in United Nations
Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). Nepal contributed formed military units for the first
time in Sinai in 1974. As of now Nepal has participated in over 40 different UN peacekeeping
missions including the difficult ones. More than 80,000 troops and police have participated
in the UN peacekeeping in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America and 64 brave soldiers and
policemen have made their ultimate sacrifice to the cause of international peace and security.
Four Nepalese Army Generals thus have far served as Force Commander in UN Missions in
Middle East and Africa.
Aim
3.
Aim of this paper is to analyze achievements and challenges of Nepals contribution to
the UN peacekeeping.
Policy and Capacity Dimension
4.
The fundamental objective of the foreign policy is to enhance the dignity of Nepal
in the international arena by maintaining the sovereignty, integrity and independence of the
country6. Thus far, contribution of troops and police peacekeepers to the UN has been one of
1

Brig Gen Silwal has served as Military Adviser in the Permanent Mission of Nepal to the United Nations, New York
from July 2008 to July 2011.
2

UN Peacekeeping Resources: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml

The status is based on the figure as of 30 Nov 2011 as mentioned in the UN website.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mofa.gov.np/foreignpolicy/

23

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the visible and effective tools of the Government of Nepal to enhance her image and dignity in
the international arena. The participation in the UN peacekeeping has been a great opportunity
for country like Nepal to contribute something within its capacity for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
5.
As far as my personal experience goes, at times, United Nations has given high priority
for the deployment of Nepalese troops in the field missions. DPKO has directly made special
requests to Nepal to contribute troops to some specific missions for a particular role. This
is however, not a normal practice of decision-making process in the DPKO. This is the
vindication of image and credibility Nepalese peacekeepers have earned thus far in tough
conflict environments. Nepals contribution of Force Reserve Battalion to Chad (MINURCAT)
and South Sudan (UNMISS) are some examples, among other, to this effect. The operational
role of the Force Reserve Battalion is extremely challenging.
6.
The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations popularly known as
Brahimi report has stressed that UN should have the capacity to deploy peacekeepers within
30 days in traditional peacekeeping missions and within 90 days in multidimensional and
complex peacekeeping missions. There are number of countries that can meet these standards.
Nepal needs to do a lot to build such capacities to deploy troops and police formed units in
peacekeeping missions within the stipulated time. Government of Nepal should invest some
funds to equip at least one infantry / mechanized battalion and one FPU to keep them ready
for this purpose. This would avoid Darfur like situation where procurement and deployment of
major equipment such as APCs was a serious problem. Bilateral assistance is one way of filling
the equipment gap for peacekeeping. During my tenure, after long diplomatic negotiation,
the United States of America assisted Nepal with ten bullet proof military vehicles namely,
HMMVs for Special Force Company in Darfur. Equipping units for peacekeeping should be
the government responsibility rather than that of institutional alone.
7.
Nepal has some added advantages for acceptance in UN peacekeeping due to the fact
that Nepal is non-aligned, impartial, peace-loving and Hindu country, though officially secular.
These characters have provided edge over many other contributors in specific host country
situation. The bravery, discipline, loyalty, professionalism, and the image of Gorkha soldiers
have value added to Nepals acceptance in UN peacekeeping.
8.
The caveat put up by some troop contributing countries has been a serious problem in
implementation of the UN mandates in the UN peacekeeping missions. Nepal has never put up
any caveats that would undermine the Force Commanders orders and instruction. Nepalese
battalion and company commanders have fully complied with the orders from mission
headquarters in accordance with the national policy. Nepal has been redeploying whole units
or part of it for permanent or temporary period in full compliance with the UNs policy. This
has been highly commended by the DPKO.
New Trends and Challenges
9.
In recent years, the United Nations has undertaken some policy review after 2000s
landmark Brahimi report. To assess major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN
peacekeeping today, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of
Field Support (DFS) have jointly undertaken New Horizon Initiative in 2009. New Horizon
aims to reinvigorate the ongoing dialogue with stakeholders on possible solutions to better
24

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calibrate UN Peacekeeping to meet current and future requirements7. Based on the New
Horizon concept, UN has been engaging new and capable troops and police contributing
countries to broaden the base of the troop contributors. DFS has undertaken a study on Global
Field Support Strategy (GFSS) within the framework of New Horizon concepts. According
to the GFSS, UN will establish Global Support Center in Brindisi, Italy and Regional Support
Center in Kampala, Uganda soon. Another important project it has undertaken is designing of
modern and environment friendly camps for uniformed peacekeepers in the field.
10.
As part of the Capacity Driven Strategy of New Horizon Initiative, DPKO has
undertaken three projects development of standards for infantry battalion, development
of standards for staff officers and development of standards for medical unit. Based on
the recommended policy guidelines, troop contributing countries will have to fulfill these
standards for their participation in future. Deployment of major equipments such as APCs
on timely basis has been a critical challenge to Nepal. Government of Nepal should take a
leadership role for the management of procurement, maintenance and reimbursement of major
equipments. Unless equipment issues were resolved through policy decisions, Nepals image
will be tarnished in the international field.
11.
During this authors tour of duty as Military Adviser in the Permanent Mission of
Nepal to the U.N., Nepals contribution surged by over 40%, from about 3,600 to about 5,400
military and police peacekeepers. For the first time in Nepals history, the figures surpassed
5,000 peacekeepers. The latest deployment took place in Darfur, Chad, and Lebanon. Mobile
and Static Security has recently been deployed as part of United Nations Guard Unit (UNGU)
in Iraq and deployment of Force Reserve Battalion to South Sudan is underway. With the
deployment of UNGU in Iraq, Nepals relations with United Nations Department of Political
Affairs (DPA) will be established. Until 2011, Nepal has maintained the deployment of four
mechanized battalions, one engineer company, one special force company, one sector reserve
company and two MP Units in Lebanon, DR Congo, Haiti, Darfur, and Liberia. Four FPUs
are deployed in Liberia, Haiti and Darfur. To ensure sustained contribution, Nepal should
develop capacities to diversify Nepals contribution from predominantly combat units
(Infantry/mechanized) to support units such as Level II Hospital, Military Utility Helicopters,
Engineer Company, MP Units and Transporter Company. Military Utility Helicopters are in
high demand in UN peacekeeping missions. UN is in short supply of about 50% of authorized
military utility helicopters.
12.
Countries emerging from the conflict have large number of military force looking
for the opportunity to participate in UN peacekeeping. Some capable East Asian countries
contribute small number of troops and they fall under potential large contributors. United
Nations is exploring new and capable countries that can deploy well-equipped and highly
trained troops in peacekeeping missions. UN peacekeeping is therefore, highly competitive
enterprise now. Nepal should keep track of fast-changing demands and requirements of the
United Nations and carryout capability reform accordingly. Likewise, UN requires highly
competitive staff officers to work at field mission and UN headquarters. They have to work
with counterparts from Europe, Asia and Africa. A lot of troops contributing countries coming
from these regions are native English and French speakers and some of them have English or
French as their official language.
7

The New Horizon Process document handout.

25

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13.
Currently, DPKO has target of hiring 20% female in Police component and 5% female
in military component in UN peacekeeping. Now, 111 Nepalese female are participating in
UN peacekeeping. This makes 2.6% of the current number. Now India and Bangladesh have
deployed female FPU in field missions. Enhancement of female peacekeepers is one of the
areas where Nepal can explore its potential.
Nepals Concerns
14.
Nepal has been voicing its serious concerns in the United Nations that Nepal does
deserve senior positions at managerial and decision-making level in DPKO and field missions
as being one of the oldest and largest troop contributing countries. As of now Nepal has got
only one Deputy Military Advisers position in the Office of Military Affairs in DPKO. In 53
years history of Nepals contribution to the UN peacekeeping, only four Major Generals have
got Force Commanders position in Israel & Iraq-Kuwait (UNTSO and UNIKOM), Golan
Heights (UNDOF), Cyprus (UNFYCIP) and Sudan (UNMIS). Nepal is lagging behind in
getting senior staff officers vacancies in field mission headquarters. High level diplomatic lobby
and enhancement of officers competencies are both equally important elements in this regard.
Achievements
15.
For last several years, Nepal has constantly maintained the rank of fifth largest troop
and police contributing country on the basis of three years average ranking. There are no other
sectors where Nepal has gained such a height in international arena except peacekeeping. The
contributions of Nepalese peacekeepers in many parts of the world have made the difference
to bring about peace and stability. Nepalese peacekeepers have been a good ambassador to
promote Nepalese cultures, tourism and history in different part of the world. While giving out
message on the fiftieth anniversary of Nepals participation in UN peacekeeping operations,
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called it a shining example. In early 2011, GeneralSecretary Ban Ki-moon highly praised the performance of Special Force and Sector Reserve
Company in Darfur before the Permanent Representatives of top ten troop contributing
countries who were meeting him to discuss the issue of salary raise to UN peacekeepers.
16.
Nepal was elected as member in Security Council in 1969-70 and 1989-90. As five
top providers of military personnel and civilian police to the UN missions Nepal has been
the member of 31-member Peace Building Commission (PBC) from the outset. Other four
members are Bangladesh, India, Nigeria and Pakistan. This is a matter of great achievement
and pride for a small country like Nepal.
17.
As one of the top-fifteen troops and police contributors, Nepalese Prime Minister
Madhav Kumar Nepal was invited by United States President Barrack Obama as chair of
Security Council to the Security Council meeting in 2009. This was unprecedented recognition
to Nepal as one of the old and top troop contributor to UN peacekeeping. In the meeting, Prime
Minister Nepal had the opportunity to deliver Nepals perspectives in UN peacekeeping and
international peace and security.
18.
Nepals UN peacekeeping training centre imparts training to military officers of
United States, UK, China, Bangladesh and many other friendly countries. This is the oldest
peacekeeping training centre in South Asia. This is one area where Nepal can really develop
and strengthen cooperation with the United Nations, and the world and regional powers. Nepal
26

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l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

has lot to share with other stakeholders and they are prepared to listen from Nepal as the oldest
contributor to UN peacekeeping. Therefore, a national effort and commitment is required to
develop and strengthen this centre.
19.
As largest contributor, Nepal has been participating in all thematic discussion forums
on peacekeeping conducted worldwide. United Nations and other host countries have invited
Nepal in all such forums. I have personally participated and shared Nepals experience in
number of forums in New York. All say, they want to listen from country like Nepal about its
vast experiences in UN peacekeeping.
20.
Thousands of Nepalese Army and police officers and men have received international
exposures in the UN missions around the world. Exchange of ideas and professional cultures
with peacekeepers from developed and developing countries have attributed a lot for the
development of professionalism.
Way Forward and Conclusion
21.
There is no doubt that the participation in UN peacekeeping is at the best interest of
Nepal. It has short and long term benefits to Nepal especially as least developed, small, buffer
and land-locked country. Government of Nepal should adopt systematic approach at policy
and operational level to improve preparedness and diplomatic skills in UN peacekeeping.
Intra-governmental and intra-agency coordination and cooperation must be shaped and
institutionalized to achieve national and foreign policy objectives.
22.
At operational level, Nepalese Army should give more emphasis on professional and
language skills development of officers and men. Today, knowledge on English, French and
local language of host country matters a lot to demonstrate professionalism and communication
skills. Another important aspect is the management of support side which includes swift
procurement of major equipment and the maintenance in particular. Experience reveals that
maintenance of equipment in order for keeping the units in operational readiness is most
important. Weaknesses in this aspect would tarnish Nepals image in the field missions. An
institutional mechanism should be established to move this process in coordinated, sustained
and coherent manner.
23.
Lastly, Military Adviser in the Permanent Mission of Nepal to the UN should be
selected from amongst the best. The Military Adviser needs to have three important skillsprofessional, language / communication and diplomatic.
Bibliography
1.

UN website, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resource>

2.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.mofa.gov.np/foreignpolicy>

3.
Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi report), <http://www.
un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/>
4.
The New Horizon Process, United Nations Peacekeeping, < http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/operations/newhorizon.shtml>
5.
Data Archive in the Office of Military Adviser in the Permanent Mission of Nepal to the U.N.,
New York
27

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g]kfnL ;]gf

g]kfn c+u|]h o'4sf] sf/0f / kl/0ffd

dxf ;]gfgL k|]dl;+x a:Goft, Ph.D.
cg';Gwfgdf cK7]/f]
!= g]kfn c+u|]h o'4df g]kfnL ;]gfn] n8]sf] n8fO{+x?sf] af/]df g]kfnsf] tkm{af6 olsg clen]vx? k|FKt ePsf]
b]lv+b}g . jf:tjdf of] o'4 tTsfnLg j]nfot ;fd|fHo;+u ge} j]nfotaf6 ef/tdf Jofkf/ ug{ cfPsf] Oi6 OlG8of
s+kgL gfds k|fOe]6 c+u;+u ePsf] lyof] . g]kfnL hL c8\8Fdf /x]sf k'/fgf o'4 clen]vx?df clGtd g]kfn-ef]6
o'4b]lv dfq cf+l;s?kdf pknAw /x]sf] a'lemG5 . k|fKt hfgsf/L / o; n]vsn] b]v]cg';f/ xfn k//fi6 dGqfnosf]
h};L sf]7fdf ;]gf ;DaGwL cgluGtL k'/fgf sfuhkq 5g\ .! ;'lgG5, tL sfuhkq xfn /fli6o clen]vfnodf k'u]sf
5g\ . To;df o; o'4af/] y'k|} sfuhft /x]sf] 5 . ltgnfO{ ;fj{hlgs ul/Psf] 5}g . xfn;Dd n]lvPsf / k|sflzt
ePsf k':ts tyf n]vx? a[l6;x?n] n]v]sf k':tsx?af6 cg'jflbt 5g, d'Vo ;|f]t tL g} x'g\ . To;df pgLx?n]
cfkm\gf] o'4 s;/L ;+rfng u/] eGg] af/]df j0F{g ul/Psf 5g\ . o'4df ljh]tfn] hlxn] klg b'idgnfO{ a9fO{ r9fO{
u/L n]vs
] f] x'G5, tf ls To;af6 a9f] axfb'/Ltfsf] ;fy o'4 lht]sf] b]lvof];\ . tf ls, d';f]nfO{ la/fnf]n] df/]sf] h:tf]dfq
gxf];\ . t/, g]kfn /fHo cfk}mn] eg] s;/L o'4 n8\of] eg]/ n]lvPsf] e]l6+b}g . cfk\mgf] o'4sf] :j?k (Design of battle)
yfxf g} gkfO{ n]lvPsf] ;}lgs Oltxf; c+w]/f]df 9'f xfg] h:t} x'G5 . g]kfnL kIFsf] sltko j0F{gx? clt /fi6jfbL,
jL/, axfb'/ eP/ n]lvPsf klg 5g\, h;df lbOPsf cf+s8F / o'4 j0F{g l;g]dfsf h:tf klg 5g\ . ;}lgs cfvf /
ljZn]if0Faf6 n]lvPsf kfO+b}gg\ . c+u|]hnfO{ ufnL u/]/ / xfdL g]kfnLn] Tof] o'4 xf/]sf lyof} eGg g;s]/ km'na'f eg'{
kbf{ klg sltko ljj/0Fx? ckTofl/nf 5g\ . oL sdhf]/L n]vs jf AolQmsf]dfq xf]Og, /fi6s} xf] . /fi6n] clen]v
/fv]df jf b]vfO{ lbPdfdfq AolQmn] ;xL Oltxf; n]Vg ;S5 . o;y{, pQm Limitation leq of] n]vs klg k/]sf]
5 . oBlk, g]kfn c+u|]h o'4 ePsf s]xL d'Vo :ynx?sf] hldgL cWoog x]/]/ klg of] n]v tof/ ul/Psf] 5 . xfdLn]
xf/]sf] n8FOnfO{ xf/]sf xf}+ / sdhf]/L ePsf] g]t[Tj ju{sf] sdhf]/L b]vfpg] k|of; ug{' h?/L 5 . pu|/fi6jfbL eP/
xf/]sf] o'4nfO{ lht]sf] egL n]Vg'eGbf casf] k':tfnfO{ jf:tljs Oltxf;sf] hfgsf/L u/fpg' xfdL n]vsx?sf]
g}ltstf 7fGb5' .
o'4 x'g'sf] sf/0F
@=

g]kfn c+u|]h o'4 x'g'df g]kfn / O{i6 OlG8of sDkgL aLrsf] /fhg}lts OR5fdf plAhPsf] G (Clash on
Political Intrest) g} xf] . g]kfn gj pboLdfg ;fd|fHo agfpg] e"ldsfdf lyof], t/ ;fd|fHo agfpg p;n] w]/} kl/>d
ug{ afsL g} lyof] . t'ngf ug'{kbf{ uf]vf{ h:tf] ;fgf] /fHoaf6@ ;'? u/]sf] ljho cleofg k"j{df l;lSsd / klZrddf
sfu8f, pQ/df lxdfno / blIf0fdf k'l0Fof, ;/fg, uf]/vk'/, a/]nL glhs nufotsf] dw];;Dd k'Ug ;kmn ePsf] lyof] .
tL :yfgx? clxn] ef/tsf] clt pAhfp x'g] e"dL / 7"nf ;x/n] 9flsPsf 5g\ . tL hdLg clxn] klg g]kfnsf] ePsf]
eP slt ;DkGg g]kfn x'GYof] xf]nf < sNkgf ug{ ;lsG5 . csf]{ s'/f uf]vf{nLx? t/fOdf hdLGbf/ / ltgsf] df}hf
sAhf u/]/ g]kfnsf] cfly{s l:ylt alnof] kfb}{ lyP . o;/L g]kfn blIf0f-klZrd Onfsf RofKb} PsLs/0F cleofgdf
lyof] eg] c+u|]h pQ/-k"jL{ Onfsfdf cfkm\gf] ;fd|fHo a9fpb} lyof] . xfn g]kfnsf] blIF0FL l;dfjtL{ Onfsf, hxf
g]kfnn] sAhf u/]sf] lyof], tL :yfg c+u|]hn] g]kfnnfO{ 5f8\g] jfnf lyPg eg] csf]{ p;sf] d'Vo OR5f eg]sf] ltAat
/ rLg;usf] Aofkf/ dfu{ v'nfpg' lyof] . h'g p2]Zo sf7df08f}, l;lSsd / s'dfp If]q p;n] sAhf u/]dfdfq ;Dej
lyof] . To;a]nf p;nfO{ s'dfp+ If]q a9L dxTjk"0F{ nfUof] . lsgeg] To; If]q sAhf u/]df ltAat / rLg;u Aofkf/
ug]{ af6f] v'Ng] / w]/} pAhfp x'g] kmf6 klg xft nfUg] lyof] . t;y{ c+u|]h s'dfp+nfO{ a9L dxTj lbGYof] h'g g]kfnLsf]
sAhfdf lyof] .
#= jf:tjdf c+u|]h zlQm sf7df08f}nfO{ sAhf ug]{eGbf klg zlQmzfnL g]kfnsf] kv]6f sf6]/ o;sf] ;}Go zlQmnfO{
/f]Sg rfxGYof] . pgLx?sf] o'4 /0FgLltdf g]kfn b]z k"/}nfO{ Pp6f ;Lldt kxf8L e"-efudf Contain ug{ rfxGy] .

! =lj=;+=@)%* df n]vsn] ( dlxgf hlt Toxf+ /x]sf] k'/fgf sfuhkq 5fglag ug]{ 6f]nLdf sfd u/]sf] lyof] .
@ To;avt uf]vf{ /fHo afO;]rf}aL;]eGbf aflx/sf], ;a}eGbf sfG5f] / ul/a klg lyof] .
28

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

$= g]kfn blIf0f-klZrddf / c+u|]h pQ/-k"j{df /fHo lj:tf/ ub}{ a9\bf cjZo klg b'O{j6f zlQmsf] Ps 7Fpdf
e]6 x'GYof] g} < clg b'j} b]zsf] political intrest df Clash kg]{ k|jn ;Defjgf lyof] / ;f]af/] b'j} b]zn] cGbfh
nufPsf klg lyP . pQm Clash eg]sf] Military confontration g} xf] / Tof] g} To;avtsf] pkfo klg lyof] . o;y{
k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxb]lvs} blIF0Ftkm{sf] ;Ldf ljjfb / g]kfnn] s'dfp+, u9jfn;Dd sAhf ug'{ g} c+u|]hsf] nflu 7"nf]
Threat aGof] .# East India Company k};f sdfpg cfPsf]n] p;n] hlxn] klg cfly{s kmfObf g} x]b{Yof] . csf]{ zAbdf
eGg' kbf{ c+u|]hsf] cfly{s /0FgLltdf g]kfnaf6 afwf k'Ug] eP/ klg g]kfn-c+u|]h o'4 ePsf] lyof] . ljzfn ;fd|fHo
v8f ul/;s]sf] c+u|]h / gof zlQmsf]?kdf pbfPsf] g]kfnaLrsf] d'Vo G /fhg}lts OR5fzlQm g} lyof] . oBlk lgDg
cGo sf/0Fn] ;d]t o'4sf] k[i7e"dL tof/ u/]sf] lyof]M-s_
afO;]-rf}aL;] /fHo 5b} g]kfn / ef/tLo ;Ldfgfsf] olsg x'g g;sL To;avt klg ljjflbt lyof] .
k|foMh;f] t/fO{sf] kmf6x? a+ufn / cjwsf gjfjsf] /x]sf] / g]kfn;u ;Ldf hf]l8Psf lyP . tL hUuf afO;]rf}aL;] /fHo;u ;Ldf hf]l8Psf g]kfnsf /fhfx?n] g} /fHosf] tkm{af6 gjfjx?nfO{ s/ ltb}{ sdfpb} cfPsf
lyP eg] sltko hUuf No man's land h:t} e} slxn] g]kfnn] t slxn] gjfjx?n] hj/h:t cf-cfk\mgf]
:jfldTjdf /fVg] u/]sf] klg b]lvG5 .$ kl5 c+u|]hn] gjfjx?nfO{ k/flht u/]kl5 tL hUufx?sf] :jfldTjsf]
bfjf c+u|]hn] u/] . k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxs} kfnfb]lv k"jL{ t/fO{df ;LdfgfhUuf ljjfb kb}{ cfPsf] lyof] . kl5
l;lSsdb]lv sfu8F;Dd g]kfnn] sAhf ubf{ s/La ()) sf];sf]] df]xF]8fdf w]/} 7fpdf g]kfnLn] c+u|]hsf] hUuf
ldRof] eGg] cf/f]k cfO/x]sf] lyof] .% tL hUUfF c+u|]hsf] cfly{s rfxgf;u hf]l8Psfn] g]kfnLnfO{ 5f8\g
rfxb}gy] . ;'?;'?sf] ljjfb oxL hUuf ;DaGwL lsrnf]af6} ePsf] lyof] .
-v_
k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxsf] PsLs/0F sf/0Fn] k"jL{ t/fO{df c+u|]h;u ;Ldf ljjfb e}/x]sf] ;dodf sflGtk'/
-sf7df08f}_ sf /fhf hok|sfz dNnn] /fhf k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxsf] efjL sflGtk'/dflysf] xdnf /f]Sg / uf]vf{nL
gfsfaGbLaf6 kf/ kfpg pgn] O{:6 OlG8of sDkgLnfO{ ;}Go ;xof]u dfu] .^ ;f]xL cg'?k c+u|]h SofK6]g
lsgnssf] g]t[Tjdf kmf}h sflGtk'/tkm{ /jfgf eof] . t/ l;Gw'nL lhNnfsf] 9']af;-9']e~Hof / kf}jfu9L
-cf8f_ df ltgnfO{ uf]vf{nL kmf}hn] Multiple ambush df kf/]/ g/fd|/L x/fPkl5 ltgLx? efu], sf7df08f} hfg
;s]gg\ .& k'gM tL c+u|]h hgsk'/af6 xl/x/k'/u9L x'b} sf7df08F} a9\g] sf]lz;df nfUbf ltgLx?nfO{ g]kfnL
kmf}hn] xl/x/k'/u9L tn /x]sf] afUdtL gbLdf g} xdnf u/L km]l/ klg v]b] . o;/L uf]vf{nLx?nfO{ jjf{b ug]{
nIo;lxt c+u|]hn] sflGtk'/nfO{ ;xof]u ug{ ;]gf k7fPkl5 uf]vf{nL / c+u|]haLr cf}krfl/s?kn] b'ZdgL ;flwof]
eg] c+u|]h kf}jfu9L / xl/x/k'/u9Lsf] xf/nfO{ s'g} g s'g} ?kn] abnf lng] kvf{O{df lyof] .
-u_
lqmlZrogx? cfk\mgf] wd{cg';f/ ufO{sf] df;' vfg] / g]kfnLx? ufO{nfO{ k"hf u/L ufO{nfO{ b]jL dfGg]
ePsf]n] wfld{s sf/0F b]vfO{ lqmlZrognfO{ ckljq hft dflgGYof] . t/ dNnsfnb]lv g} ltgLx? sf7df08F}}
pkTosfsf ljleGg :yfgdf la/fdLnfO{ cf}ifwf]krf/ ug]{ / wd{ k|rf/ klg ub{y] .* ;fy} tL lqmlZrogx?
/fhgLltdf xft xfnL pkTosfsf /fhfx? aLr h'wf+pg], ahfpg] klg ub{y] . Tof] s'/f] k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxn]
a'em]sf lyP eg] sflGtk'/ / pkTosfsf tLgj6} /fHo lht]kl5 pgn] tL lqmlZrogx?nfO{ cfk\mgf] /fHoaf6
nv]6] . tL klZrdf lqmlZrogx? k[YjLgf/fo0fsf] dxfb'Zdg ag] / ef/tdf /x]sf] c+u|]hx?nfO{ eP gePsf] s'/f
nufP/ uf]vf{nL lj?4 df]rf{aGbL ug{ yfn] . ;Totfsf] vf]hL ug{ afsL /x] tfklg k[YjLgf/fo0Fn] sLlt{k'/sf]
xdnfdf sLlt{k'/]sf] gfs sf6]/ ;hfo lbP eg]/ k|rf/ ug]{ ltg} lqmlZrogx? lyP .( g]kfnL clen]vdf of] s'/f
5}g . ;f]af/] ljb]zLsf] egfO{nfO{ g]kfndf xfn cfP/ a9fO{ r9fO{ ul/Psf] 5 . o;/L wd{df /fhgLlt ld;fP/
uf]vf{nL / c+u|]hsf] j}dgZotf a9]sf] lyof] .
-3_
/fhs'df/axfb'/ zfx b/af/Lof if8\oGqsf] sf/0F k6s k6s ef/tdf lgjf{l;t x'bf pgsf] o'/f]lkog
kfb/L lqmlZrog;u e]6 ePsf] lyof] . axfb'/ zfx /f]uL ePsfn] tL kfb/Lx?n] lbPsf] cf}ifwLn] pgnfO{ /fd|f]
# k|]dl;+x a:Goftf/f lnlvt k|sfzg pGd'v g]kfn c+u|]h o'4 gfds k':tsaf6 pWb[t .
$ 6]saxfb'/ >]i7 -;+_, g]kfnsf /fhfx? tyf t/fOsf yf?, -sf7df8f}+ M g]kfn / PlzofnL cg';Gwfg s]Gb|, lj=;+= @)%*_, k[=$& .
% P]hg, k[= @% .
^ k|]dl;+x a:Goft, g]klnh kmf]6{;\ PG8 lb /f]Pn g]kfnLh cfdL{ Og kmf]6{ Aof6N;, -nlntk'/ M ;femf k|sfzg, ;g\ @))%, k[=#% .
& P]hg, k[= .
* n'Rofgf] k]t]s -;+_, ltAat / g]kfndf O6flnog wd{ k|rf/sx?, -sf7df8f}+ M g]kfn /fhsLo k|1f k|lti7fg, la=;+= @)^)_ k[= ^#^% tyf o'j/fh uf}td csf]{
k[YjLgf/fo0fsf] vf]hL -n]v_, /fhwfgL b}lgs klqsf, k[= $, la=;+= @)^* k'if @^ ut] .
( n'Rofgf] k]t]s, k"j{jt, k[=# .
29

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

ePsf] klg lyof] . cK7]/f]df kbf{;fy kfPsf axfb'/ zfxsf] tL lqmlZrog kfb/L;u /fd|f] ;DaGw a9\of] . kl5
pgL g]kfn kmls{P / /fhsfhdf xft xfNg] df}sf kfP . oxL a]nf tL kfb/Lx?sf] kxntfdf cu|]h;u ;g\ !&(@
df afl0FHo ;lGw eof] . h;df cu|]h kIFaf6 cAb'n sjfbL/ vfgn] g]t[Tj u/]sf lyP .!) t/ kl5 Tof] ;lGw
g]kfn ;/sf/n] dfg]g . c+u|]hn] Aofkf/ ug]{ ;kgf k"/f ug{ g;s]kl5 g]kfn;u b'ZdgL a9]sf] lyof] .
-_
cu|]hn] g]kfnnfO{ b'ZdgL 7fg]sf] d'Vo sf/0F dWo] klxnf] g]kfnn] u/]sf] blIF0f-klZrd Onfsfsf]
/fHo lj:tf/ / bf];|f] ltAat / rLg;u Aofkf/ ug]{ af6f] g]kfnn] aGb ul/lbPsf] pNn]v ul/;lsPsf] 5 . t;y{
k};fsf] dxTj a'em]sf] cu|]h h;/L klg sf7df08F} / ltAat;u Aofkf/ ug{ rfxGYof] . pQm kIFdf sfd xf];\ egL
ljleGg lgx'n] aftf{ ug{ cu|]hn] ljleGg JolQmx?sf] g]t[Tjdf ;b\efjgf jf jftf{ 6f]nL k7Fof] . h:t} ;g\ !&(@
df cAb'n sjflb/ vfgsf] g]t[Tjdf, ;g\ !&(# df sg]{n ljlnod ss{k]l6sf] g]t[Tjdf / ;g\ !*)! sf] ;lGw
cg';f/ SofK6]g gS; (Knox) sf] g]t[Tjdf cfPsf] 6f]nL ;d]tn] c+u|]hsf OR5f k"/f ug{ g;ls ckdfghgs
dgl:ylt lnP/ kms{g' k/]sf] lyof] . tL cfly{s kIF lyP tfklg To;nfO{ c+u|]hn] s'6g}lts ckdfg 7fg]sf]
lyof] .!! ;g\ !*)! df cu|]hsf] klxnf] a[l6z /]lh8]G6 (British Resident) e} g]kfn cfPsf SofK6]g gS; !*)#
df vfnL xft kms{g k/]sf] lyof] .!@
-r_
k"j{ /fhf /0Faxfb'/ zfx agf/;sf] lgjf{;gaf6 g]kfn kms]{kl5 eLd;]g yfkf d'Vo sfhL eP .!#
/0Faxfb'/ zfxsf] xTof ePkl5 g]kfnL /fhgLltdf eLd;]g yfkf c;fWo} zlQmzfnL eP . pgdf o'jf hf];,
/fi6jfbL efjgf, s]xL u5'{ eGg] efjgf, cu|]hsf] a9\bf] bjfjsf] k|ltsf/ ug]{ c7f]6 ePsf bx|f] AolQm lyP . k6s
k6s cu|]h;u ePsf /fhg}lts c;xdlto Aojxf/af6 g]kfnn] cu|]h;u o'4 ug}{ k5{ eGg] ;f]r lnO;s]sf
lyP . To;}n] cu|]h;u o'4 x'g' s]xL jif{b]lv g} pgn] cu|]h lj?4 n8\gsf] nflu cGt/f{li6o ;xof]u h'6fpg
rL+gLof afbzfx, ltAatL ;/sf/, ef/tLo d/f7F, UjfnLo/sf] /fhf, k+hfjL l;v tyf ef/tLo /f]lxNnf;+u
kqfrf/ tyf b"t k7FP/ cu|]h lj/f]wL ;+u7g tof/ ub}{ lyP . h'g s'/f] cu|]hn] yfxf kfPsf] lyof] . To;}n] p
g]kfnL ;}Go zlQmsf] rf8F]eGbf rf8F] kv]6f sf6]/ ckf agfpg rfxGYof] .
-5_
a[l6; /]lh8]G6 e} ;g\ !*)! af6 !*)# ;Dd sF7DFf08F} a;]sf SofK6]g gS;n] cfkm\gf] s'6g}lts
dof{bfdf ga;L, g]kfn b/af/sf ef/bf/nfO{ nf]e, nfnrf, 3';df kf/]/ b/af/Lof /fhgLltdf x:tIF]k u/]sfn]
pgL l5} kms{g k/]sf] lyof] .!$ h;af6 cu|]hsf] g]kfnk|lt b'Zdlgo dg;fo k|i6 x'GYof] . g]kfn Tof] sfo{af6
cu|]h;u l/;fPsf] lyof] .
-h_ cu|]hnfO{ g]kfn lj?4 cfqmd0f u/fpgsf] nflu PsLs/0F o'4df uf]vf{nL;+u xf/ vfP/ efu]sf afO;]rf}aL;] w]/} /fhf /hf}6fn] pS;fPsf lyP .!% pgLx?n] g]kfnLsf] sdhf]/L, ;}lgs l:ylt, b/afl/of /fhgLlt
af/]df vj/ lbg] / cu|]hnfO{ g]kfn lj/f]wL agfpg w]/} e"ldsf v]n]sf lyP . h;af6 cu|]h xdnfsf] nflu
hf]l:;Psf] lyof] .
-em_
sf7df08f} pkTosfsf] tTsfnLg # /fHoleq /x]sf d7 dlGb/x?sf] d"lt{, 5fgf, 9F]sf, tf]/0F cflbdf
;'g} ;'g 5g\ . pkTosf sAhf ug{ ;lsPdf 7"nf] cfly{s nfe x'g] / ltAat;usf] Aofkf/ klg l;w} c+u|]hsf]
xftdf kg]{ s'/fn] pgLx? nfnflot lyP . ;'?df Tof] OR5f eP tfklg kl5 uP/ sf7df08F} sAhf ug]{ nIo
cu|]hn] 5f8]sf] a'lemG5 .
-`_
To;sfndf cu|]hsf] s/ zq' eg]sf] k|m]Grx? lyP . eLd;]g yfkf hg/n ePkl5 pgn] g]kfnL
;]gfsf] k]zfut tflnd / xftxltof/sf] ;'wf/ ug{sf] nflu k|mfG;af6 ;}lgs clws[tx? lemsfO{ sfo{ ;Dkfbg
u/]sf lyP . k|m]Gr cfdL{ ;/xg} hg]{n-sg]{n / ;]gfsf] kf]zfs agfOof] .!^ pgLx?s} ;Nnfxcg';f/ k]zfut cfdL{
agfpg Barrack System sf] Joj:yf e} sf7df08f}df 5fpgLx? ag] . ;}lgs x]8Sjf6{/ aGof] . hxf clxn]
/fli6o ;+u|xfno a;]sf] 5 .!& tL ;a} sfo{n] cu|]h g]kfn;u l/;fPsf] lyof] .
!) rGb| aL= vfGb'/L, P l/8L:sf]e8{ lxli6 ckm g]kfn, -lbNnL M 1fg ;fu/ klAns]zg, ;g\ !((&_ k[= 7^ .
!! P]hg, k[= &&&* .
!@ P]hg .
!# P]hg .
!$ rGb| lb vfh'/L, k"j{jt, k[= &*&( .
!% k|]dl;+x a:Goft, k"j{jt, k[= .
!^ k|]dl;+x a:Goft, zfxL g]kfnL ;]gf / k|wfg;]gfkltx?, -sf7df8f}+ M nIdL a:Goft tyf ;jf]R{ rdfgl;+x a:Goft, lj=;+= @)%#_, k[=%^ .
!& ;}lgs ;+u|xfno 5fpgL sf7f8f}+df /x]sf] clen]v cg';f/ .
30

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

-6_
t/fO{ IF]qsf] hUuf ljjfbs} l;nl;nfdf /f}tx6 Onfsfdf g]kfn ;/sf/sf] tkm{af6 ;'Aaf nId0F lu/L
/]vb]vsf] nflu vlPsf lyP . hUufsf] ef]u rng g]kfnn] ub}{ /x]sf] lyof] . ;f] s'/f] cu|]hsf] s7k'tnL e}
/fh ul//x]sf] hdLGbf/ jL/lszf]/ l;+xn] sl/j !^)) kmf}h NofO{ ;'Aaf nId0F lu/L / pgsf] ;'/IFfsdL{dfyL
PSsfl; cfqmd0f u/], nId0f lu/L / ;'/IFfsdL{x? dfl/P .!* o;af6 7"nf] ljjfb eof] . To; sfo{sf] g}lts
lhDdf cu|]hn] lng' kb{Yof] . s'6g}lts kxntfdf bf]ifLsf] 5fglag u/L sf/jfxL u5'{ eg]/ cu|]hn] g]kfnnfO{
cfZjf;g lbof] . t/ kl5, To; xTofsf08sf] k"/f bf]if g]kfnnfO{ lbP/ cu|]h klG5of] . To;kl5 g]kfn ;fx|}
l/;fof], g]kfnLsf] tftf] /ut plDng ;'? eof] .
o'4sf] tTsfnLg sf/0F (An inmidiate Cause)M
%= g]kfnL lj?4sf] cu|]hsf] lyrf]ldrf]n] klg ;Ldf gfb} lyof] . b'j} kIf aLr >[lht ljjfbx? s'6g}lts tl/sfn]
;dfwfg x'g'eGbf emgemg rs{b} lyP . To;avtsf] d'Vo ljjfb eg]sf] ;LdfhUufsf] g} lyof] . g]kfnLn] c+u|]hL /fhsf]
hUuf ldr]sf] cf/f]k cuh
]| sf] lyof] . o;k6s a'6jn / :o'/fh -slkna:t'_ sf] hUuf ljjfbn] pu| ?k lnof] . kfNkfsf
/fhf k[YjLkfn ;]gsf] sf7df8f}+ af]nfP/ em'SsfP/ xTof u/]kl5 eLd;]g yfkfsf lktf hg/n cd/l;++x yfkfnfO{
kfNkfsf] k|zf;s agfO{ k7fOof] .!( a'6jn / :o'/fh Onfsf klg pgs} dftxtdf kb{Yof] . To; Onfsfdf ePsf hUuf
kfNkfnL /fhfn] cjwsf] gjfjnfO{ s/ lt/]/ sdfO{ vfPsf lyP . gjfjsf] /fHo cu|]hn] lnPkl5 tL hUufsf] :jfldTj
cu|]hn] lnP/ g]kfnLnfO{ sdfO{ vfg klg lbg rfxGg lyof] . kfNkfnL /fhfn] lt/] ;/x s/ lt/]/ v]tLkftL ug{ g]kfn
;/sf/n] cu|]hnfO{ cg'/f]w uof] . t}klg s'/f] ldn]g / cu|]hn] tL hUUffaf6 g]kfnLnfO{ lgsfnL cfk\mgf] ;'/IFf 7fgf
v8F uof] . Tof] s'/f hg/n cd/l;+x yfkfn] ckdfg 7fg] . To;kl5 pgn] tL 7Fgfsf ;'/IFf kmf}hnfO{ nv]6L k"jj{ t
sdfO{ cfPsf] hUuf lkmtf{ u/] .@) Tof] s'/f cuh
]| sf bnfnx?n] a9fO{ r9FO{ cuh
]| nfO{ nufP . ca 7"n} cu|]hL ;}lgs
6f]nL cfO{ g]kfnL rf}sLx? eTsfP/ pgLx?nfO{ kL6kf6 kf/L v]b] / a'6jn / :o'/fhdf k"0F{ clwsf/ hdfP . To;
Onfsfdf alnof] ;'/IFf rf}sLx? v8f u/L cu|]h xfsLd kmls{P .
^= tL ;a} s'/f] hg/n cd/l;+xn] yfxf kfPkl5 pgL l/;n] cfuf] eP . g]kfn b/af/df ;f]af/] va/ ul/of] . b/af/
af6 eLd;]g yfkfn] h;/L klg a'6jn / :o'/fhdflysf] g]kfnLsf] lgoGq0F g5f8\g] cfb]z cd/l;+xnfO{ uof] . ca
cd/l;+x 7"nf] kmf}hL bnan lnP/ a'6jn / :o'/fh uP/ ToxL /x]sf] cu|]hL rf}sLdfly wfjf ug{ nufP . ck|Tofl;t
xdnfaf6 cu|]hL rf}lsbf/x? efufefu eof] eg] !* hgf d/], ^ hgf 3fOt] eP .@! tL ;a} Onfsf g]kfnLn] km]l/ klg
sAhfdf lnP . a'6jn / :o'/fh g]kfnsf] hUuf gx'g' / cu|]hL rf}sLdfly g]kfnn] xdnf u/]/ dfG5] df/Llbg', To;
ljjfbnfO{ s"6g}lts tl/sfn] ;dfwfg ug{ kxn gul/g' h:tf kIfnfO{ xfdLn] dgg ug'{ kb{5 . cu|]hnfO{ dfq ufnL
ug'{ plrt gx'g klg ;S5 . of] clGtd 36gfkl5 cu|]hn] g]kfnL lj?4 cf}krfl/s?kn] o'4 ug]{ lg0f{o uof] . ;g\
!*!$, gf]e]Da/ ! sf] lbg British Indian Governor General Lord Moira -n8{ df]O/f_ n] g]kfn lj?4 cu|]h o'4sf]
ljlwjt\ 3f]if0Ff u/] / o'4 ;'? eof] .@@
o'4af6 k/]sf c;/
&=

;sf/fTds kIfM
-s_
cfkm"eGbf alnof] / cfw'lgs o'4 ;fdu|Ln] ;';lHht zlQm;u o'4 n8]sf]n] ;'uf}nL ;lGw kl5sf]
lbgx?df g]kfnL ;]gfdf k]zfut tflnd ;'? ul/of] . ;]gfnfO{ Aof/]sdf /fvL 5fpgL v8f eP . ;}lgs
d'Vofnosf] :yfkgf, :joDe" af?bvfgf, afnfh'df xltof/ sf/vfgf cflb v8f eP .@# k|mfG;af6 ;}lgs
clws[tx? lemsfO{ km]l/ klg cfw'lgs tflnd lbOof] . ;}lgs ;'ljwf a9fOof] . ;+VofTdseGbf u'0FfTds ;]gf
agfpg g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;+Vof s6f}tL u/L r':t k|sf/sf] ;]gf /flvof] .

!* hf]g k]Dan, b OGe]hg ckm g]kfn, -cS;kmf]8{ M Snf/]G8g k|];, ;g !(&!_, k[=$$ .
!( k|]dl;+x a:Goftsf] k|sfzg x'b} u/]sf] k':ts g]kfn c+u|]h o'4af6 pWb[t .
@) hf]g k]Dan, k"j{jt, k[= $& .
@! P]hg .
@@ lzjk|;fb zdf{ tyf cGo, k"j{jt, k[= #*! .
@# k|]dl;+x a:Goft, k"j{jt= -kfb\ l6Kk0fL !^_ k[= %& .
31

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

-v_
o'4s} a]nf cu|]h tyf ef/tLo d'nsf cu|]h kmf}h;usf] ;Dks{af6 g]kfnL ;]gfdf lzIFf, ;Eotf,
cf}ifwL pkrf/ (Medical System) vfglkg, njfO{vjfO{ cflbdf ;fdflhs r]tgf a9\of] .
-u_
;]gfdf /x]sf k'/fgf sfhL u|'k -eLd;]g yfkfsf] kl/jf/ afx]s_ / gof hg]{nL u|'k -eLd;]g yfkfsf]
kl/jf/_ sf] xfgyfksf] cGt eof] . k'/fgf sfhL u|'k ;a}h;f]n] ;]gfaf6 cjsfz lnP .@$ cj hg]n
{ -sg]{n
;d"xsf] dfq ;]gfdf ks8 /x\of] . h] h;f] u/] tfklg Unity in effort eof] .
-3_
o'4 xf/] klg g]kfnLsf] n8\g] ;Lk, lg8/kg, axfb'/LnfO{ c+u|]hdfkm{t cGo o'/f]k]nL d'n'sn] ;d]t yfxf
kfP . oxL+af6 g]kfnLnfO{ axfb'/x?sf] axfb'/sf] ?kdf u0Fgf ug{ yflnof] .
-_
g]kfnL ;]gfsf]eGbf East India Company sf] ;}lgs ;'ljwf /fd|f] lyof] . To;}u/L Toxf klZrd
d'n'ssf] ;fdflhs ;Eotf eNsGYof] klg . pgLx? lzlIft lyP, Toxf hftkft lyPg . To:tf b]zaf6 tflnd
k|fKt g]kfnL nfx'/]x?n] a[l6; ;]gfdf egf{ eO{ cGttM g]kfns} cfly{s, ;fdflhs, /fhg}lts tyf z}lIFs IF]qdf
kl/jt{g NofP .@% hxfhxf+ nfx'/]x?sf] 3gf a;f]af; 5, Toxf clxn] klg g]kfnLx?sf] /fd|f] cg'zf;g, ;RrfO{,
lzIFf, ;/;kmfO{, ;Ddfg h:tf pTs[i6 ;Eotf b]lvG5 . Tof] g]kfn cu|]h o'4kl5 ljsf; x'b} uPsf] ;sf/fTds
kf6f] xf] .
sdhf]/L kIf
-s_
k"j{df l6:6fb]lv klZrddf ;tnh gbL;Dd ePsf] a[xt g]kfnsf] sl/j cfwf e"-efu o'4sf] sf/0fn]
5f8\g' kof] .@^ h'g g]kfnLsf] nflu 7"nf] lk8F aGof] . /fhf b|Ao zfx, /fhf /fd zfx, /fhf g/e'kfn zfx, /fhf
k[YjLgf/fo0F zfx, /fgL /fh]Gb|nIdL, /fhs'df/ axfb'/ zfx;d]tsf] g]t[Tj / k|]/0Ffaf6 PsLs[t ljzfn g]kfn
tf;sf] 3/ h:t} elTsof] .
-v_
g]kfn-rLg-ltAat o'4df g]kfnn] rLgnfO{ 7"nf] dflnssf] ?kdf dfg]/ o'4 cGt u/]sf] lyof] . To;
o'4kl5sf cf}krfl/s sfuhkqdf ;d]t rLgsf] afbzfxn] g]kfnsf /fhfnfO{ d]/f g'gsf] ;f]emf] ug]{ ltld
h:tf ckdfghgs zAb /fvL n]vfk9L u/]sf] kfOG5 .@& ca cu|]h;usf]] o'4kl5 eg] rLgsf] ;fy;fy} cu|]hsf]
em08} em08} bf;Tj g} :jLsf/ ug'{ kof] . h'g Legecy lj=;+=@))& ;fn;Dd /x]sf] lyof] .
-u_

g]kfn cu|]h o'4 cufl8;Dd g]kfnsf] ;Ldfgf xfn d]rL gbL glhs /x]sf] a+ufnsf] vf8L (Bay of
Bengal) ;Dd hf]l8P/ ;fd''lb|s dfu{ (Sea access) kfPsf] lyof] . t/ o'4 kl5 g]kfnsf] ;Ldfgf d]rL gbL
ePsf]n] ;f] ;'lawfaf6 alGrt e} g]kfn Land locked nation aGg k'Uof] .
-3_
hgwgsf] Iflt x'g' o'4sf] ljz]iftf g} xf] . o; o'4df g]kfnn] elQm yfkf, xl:tbn zfx nufotsf
xhf/f}+ jL/ tyf jL/+ugf u'dfof] . gfnfkfgL, h}ys / dnfp+sf] lsNnfaf6 ;of}+ g]kfnL jL/+ugf gf/Lx?;d]t
n8]sf lyP .@* csf]{tkm{ x]g]{ xf] eg] To; o'4df g]kfnn] 7"nf] wg/fzL vr{ ug'{ k/]sf] lyof] .

-_
;'uf}nLsf] ;lGwkl5, hf] o'4af6 c;Gt'i6 lyP, y'k|} g]kfnLx? g]kfnL ;]gfaf6 cjsfz lnO{ ljb]lzPsf
lyP . gfnfkfgL o'4sf gfos aneb| s'j/n] To;sf] g]t[Tj u/L s/La @ sDkgL kmf}h;lxt k+hfasf] /fhf
/0Flht l;+xsf]df gf]s/L ug{ k'u] .@( ptf a8FsfhL cd/l;+x yfkf ;}lgs gf]s/Laf6 ;Gof; lnO{ l;Gw'kfNrf]s
lhNnfsf] ef]tf eGg] 7fpdf a:g k'u] . kl5 uf];fOs'08 uO{ Wofg ubf{ub}{ pgsf] ToxL+ d[To' ePsf] lyof] .#)
-r_
cyf]{kfh{gsf] nflu eg]/ h;/L kl/eflift ul/P tfklg g]kfnLx?n] a[l6;-OlG8og cfdL{df egf{ x'g]
k|rng ;'? eof] . h'g /fli6o ;Ddfgsf] nflu /fd|f] xf]Og . klxnf] / bf];|f] ljZjo'4df t /f0Ffx?n] vf]hL vf]hL
@$ t'n;L/fd a}B tyf cGo, g]kfnsf] ;}lgs Oltxf; efu@ -sf7df8f}+, hL c8\8f, lj=;+= @)%%_ k[= $)% .
@% lj=;+= !*&@ -;g !*!%_ af6 g} g]kfnLx? a[l6; ;]gfdf elt{ x'g uPsf lyP .
@^ rg' jL vfGb'/L, k"j{jt, k[= @!@!# .
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32

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33

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Prospects for US-China Cooperation in Combating

Terrorism in South Asia
- Brig Gen Himalaya Shumsher Thapa
Introduction
1.
Former U.S President Bill Clinton rightly described South Asia1 as the most dangerous
place on the earth.2 With 1.5 billion people and 23 percent of the worlds population, it offers
one of the most complex security situations in the world. It faces multifaceted challenges
terrorism, poor governance, poverty, transnational crime, environment degradation, and
inter and intra-state conflicts. It remains the flash point for any future nuclear conflict and an
epicenter for militant Islamic terrorism. The region is one of the poorest in the world with 488
million people living on less than a dollar a day.3
2.
To successfully confront these challenges will require international collaboration. All
countries in the region have a national interest in containing terrorism. However, the countries
cant handle the threat alone. Theres a growing realization among the member countries
that the problem of terrorism is international and can only be dealt with through multilateral
cooperation. The US and China are the two dominant external players in the region. Since
9/11 there has been a converging of US and Chinese interests on counterterrorism. A major
question is whether they can cooperate to take advantage of this convergence to promote peace
and stability in the region.
3.
This paper focuses on the prospects for US-China cooperation in combating terrorism
in South Asia. First, it outlines the challenges faced by the region, primarily focusing on
terrorism emanating from Islamist militancy; second, it examines regional efforts and the
failure to control terrorism; third, it analyzes new possibilities for a converging of US and
Chinese interests; and finally it makes recommendations for tackling this serious challenge.
The Challenges
4.
South Asia faces a diverse range of challenges, both traditional and non-traditional
in nature. State collapse in one of the countries could prove potentially devastating for the
stability in the region. Mahin Karim describes South Asia possessing all the ingredients for a
geopolitical nightmare.4
Terrorism and South Asia
5.
South Asia confronts a wide area of terrorist threats. India faces an Islamist separatist
movement in Kashmir, militant Islamist elsewhere in the country, and an ongoing MaoistNaxalite insurgency in south and north-east India. The Maoist-Naxalite movement has formed
a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ), affecting 20 states and 180 districts.5 There are separatist
movements in Indias east and north-east of India. Pakistan-based terrorist organizations,
mainly Laskhar-e-Taiba (LeT),6 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM),7 and Haqqani network8 have
wide-ranging operations and pose an enormous threat to the security of India and Afghanistan.
Pakistan was blamed by India for sponsoring LeT attacks on Mumbai on November 26, 2008,
which led to the termination of ongoing discussions between India and Pakistan.9
6.
Pakistan, on the other hand, is facing considerable challenges from militant Islamist
like Al Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)10. The Taliban, which was successfully
overthrown by US-led force in 2001, has regrouped in Pakistan and is threatening the security of
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Afghanistan.11Besides Al Qaeda and TTP, LeT, JeM, Haqqani network, the anti-Shia Lashkari-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Harkat-ul-jihad-al-islami Pakistan (HUJI-P) are some of the prominent
Islamist militant groups active in Pakistan.
7.
Bangladesh too, is affected by Islamist terrorists who went unchecked under the previous
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government such as Jamaat-ul Mujahedeen Bangladesh
(JMB)12 and Harkat-ul-jihad-al-islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B). In Nepal, there are ongoing
militant and separatist activities in the south and north-east of the country.
Nuclear Proliferation
8.
Regional concerns about terrorism are compounded by the potential for nuclear
proliferation. India and Pakistan both possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear deals signed between
US and India, and China and Pakistan have further complicated the problem. In recent years,
Pakistans has considerably developed its nuclear arsenal, possibly reaching as many as
90-100 nuclear warheads. According to Bruce Reidel and Pavneet Singh, Pakistan has the
fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world.13 It appears that Pakistan is manufacturing fissile
material, adding more production facilities and deploying more delivery vehicles, thereby
improving its nuclear weapons both qualitatively and quantitatively.14 Although its not clear
whether the Pakistans expansion of its nuclear weapons is in response to the US-India nuclear
agreement signed in 2008, its minimum credible deterrent is primarily focused to dissuade
India from opting for any military option against Pakistan.15
Trends in Islamist Militancy in South Asia
9.
The broader concern about terrorism is aggravated by specific concerns relating to
rising Islamist militancy in South Asia. Close to half of the worlds total Muslim population,
525 million or about 33% of all South Asias population, is concentrated in India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Afghanistan.16 Pakistan has become an international hub for militant Islamic
terrorism, mainly due to increasing activities of Al-Qaeda, LeT, JeM, TTP, Taliban and the
Haqqani network. These groups pose immense security threats not only to India and Afghanistan
but to Pakistan as well, thereby threatening regional, US, Chinese, and Western interests. The
US is particularly apprehensive about the safety of Pakistans nuclear facilities, and fears
these could fall into the hands of Islamist militants who can destabilize the region with vast
ramifications for the rest of the world. It is imperative for Pakistan to realize that its support
for Islamist militancy as strategically shortsighted17 and that its confrontational stance with
neighbors, particularly India, has created more regional hostility, which could lead to a major
conflict with India in the future.
Al Qaeda and its Nexus with other Affiliates in Pakistan
10.
Al Qaedas success in forging better ties with Pakistans jihadist groups has provided
it with a secure safe haven in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and a new power
base. Despite Pakistans decade-long involvement in the war on terror, there is clear proof of
Al Qaedas and its affiliates growing strength and escalating activities within Pakistan.18 Amir
states that Pakistan is undergoing a radical change mostly from the phase of Talibanization of
its society to Pakistanization of Al Qaeda.19 The investigation of the May 2011 suicide attack
on the Mehran Naval Base near Karachi revealed that it was a well coordinated attack planned
by Al Qaeda, TTP and Punjabi Taliban to destabilize Pakistan. Ideologically an alliance has
developed between the Al-Qaeda-Taliban alliance and LeT, JeM and other jihadists together,
enabling them an edge over Pakistan.20
11.

It appears that despite the elimination of Bin Laden, Al Qaeda still remains an effective
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threat to regional and global security, as it attracts youths and conducts increasing operations
in Pakistan and Afghanistan with support from other Islamist militants. Similarly, LeT has
close links with the organized criminal syndicate of Dawood Ibrahims D-Company,21 and
other national and regional terrorist organizations and presents a credible threat to the region.
Experts are of the view that with the passage of time these jihadists have become more powerful,
independent, and better connected and pose greater security threat than ever before.
Radicalization of Pakistani Society
12.
Oakley and Hammes argue that the most dangerous outcome in Pakistan from the
conflict in Afghanistan is the increasing radicalization of Pakistani society.22 In Pakistan
there were 180 incidents of suicide bombing and 1,906 terror attacks in 2009-2010.23 Since
9/11 about 35,000 Pakistan have been killed in terror-related violence.24 The radicalization
has mainly been attributed to fundamentalist teachings in madrassas, state inability to address
socio-economic problems and failure of moderate forces to deliver credible results. Civilian
casualties from drone attacks conducted by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Pakistan have further aggravated the Islamists influence. Radicalization has also been seen in
the Pakistani Army. A recent article by Amir Mir describes the arrest of Brigadier Ali Khan of
the Pakistani Army due to his links with the banned Hizbul Tehrir (HuT), an Islamist militant
outfit with close links with Al- Qaeda.25 The above incident is not the first and perhaps will not
be the last, but it sends an alarming signal to the Pakistan military about future security threats
emanating from Islamist militants. If Pakistan does not act boldly and take decisive measures
against Islamist militants, theres a strong possibility of Pakistan losing the grip of the state.
Regional Efforts to Control Terrorism
13.
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is the regional
body of South Asian countries. Although all countries in the region recognize the benefits of
economic and security co-operation, efforts to improve these developments have been hindered
by the political will of the leaders. Since the inception of SAARC in Dec 1985, there has
been growing concerns about terrorism and a call for greater regional cooperation among the
member countries, which have figured significantly during SAARC summits. Disagreement
and hostility between India and Pakistan is the central cause in preventing any significant
cooperative progress.
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
14.
South Asia is comprised of eight nations. These countries together have formed the
SAARC, which was founded on the premise of a peaceful and prosperous South Asia. Nine
countries including China and US hold observer status.26 Regional efforts by the member
countries to tackle terrorism were acknowledged from the initial creation of SAARC. Both India
and Pakistan have been skeptical about SAARC formation since its inception in December,
1985. Indian policymakers feared the possibility of smaller countries ganging up to regionalize
all bilateral issues, while Pakistan perceived that India was organizing other neighbors against
her to expand its economic dominance in the region.27 The seed of mistrust between these two
antagonist countries existed from the very beginning and has been a hindrance in resolving
many key issues, including terrorism.
15.
SAARC has been successful in creating a Free Trade Area (FTA) with the implementation
of South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) which came into force in 2008. Intra-SAARC
trade reached $687 million in 2009 from just $14 million in 2006. An Asian Development
Bank (ADB) study carried out in 2008 reported that SAFTA has a potential for trade of $85.1
billion. Some argue that SAARC is just a talk-shop without any concrete outcome. Nevertheless
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SAARC has provided a platform for experts and policymakers to meet regularly and hold
dialogues on key security, developmental and trade issues.
Steps taken by SAARC to Curb Terrorism
16.
The challenge of terrorism was recognized from the beginning of SAARCs
establishment, and SAARC members undertook many initiatives to combat it.28 The SAARC
Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was signed by member countries on
November 1, 1987 in Kathmandu, Nepal and came into force on August 22, 1988,29 and later
the Additional Protocol on Terrorism was signed on January 6, 2004.30 The member countries
signed a legal agreement during the 15th SAARC summit, held in Sri Lanka in 2008, that
vowed to combat terrorism as the main challenge facing the region.31 This Convention has yet
to be ratified by the member countries.
17.
South Asia has been a victim of hostility carried out by numerous groups with varied
objectives and different ideologies. Home Minister of India, P. Chidambaram described
terrorism as the biggest existentialist challenge in South Asia and further emphasized that
the menace must be tackled through cooperation among SAARC countries.32Although, both
India and Pakistan seem determined to cooperate in combating terrorism, in reality there has
been little progress to address this growing threat.
Failure of SAARC
18.
After nearly 26 years since its inception, neither the SAARC countries have been able to
move the process of integration forward, nor has the organization been able to promote peace,
stability and economic integration. The regular struggle for power and political influence
between India and Pakistan poses a severe challenge not only to the nations and the region but
to global security as well.
19.
As most of the threats are transnational in nature, it is of vital importance for the leaders
to recognize the significance of regional institutions and strengthen SAARC. Former President
Musharraf rightly stated, We must expand the SAARC charter to discuss bilateral issues at the
regional level.33 He further noted that there can be no development without peace and there
can be no peace while political issues and disputes continue to worsen. To evolve SAARC
into a full fledged regional entity will depend upon the ability of the leaders to address the
long standing border issues, differences over sharing of resources and transnational challenges
through peaceful dialogues and strengthening institutions.
New Possibilities
20.
Chinas willingness to cooperate with other nations, especially on counterterrorism,
is perceived as an indication of Chinas need to take greater responsibility for maintaining
world peace and to demonstrate that China can be supportive of the international system.
Chinese experts are apprehensive about the motives for US intervention in weak and failing
states without approval of the UN, such as the US invasion of Iraq, and view such moves
as counter productive. However, the Chinese didnt rule out the military option on another
occasion and accepted the US intervention in Afghanistan in response to 9/11 terrorist attacks.34
China opposes terrorism and has shown willingness to cooperate in combating terrorism
with the US. Chinas threat from militant Islamic terrorism emanates from Muslim Uyghur
35
in Xinjiang Province, frequently referred to as the threat from the three evils, terrorism,
separatism and extremism.36Since 9/11, the bilateral cooperation between the US and China
on counterterrorism has provided the opportunity for both the countries to set aside their
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differences and focus on new realities in international geopolitics.

21.
Since 2005, the extent of cooperation between the US and China in counterterrorism has
increased. In September 2005 US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, acknowledged
that China and the US can do more together in the global fight against terrorism and
further called on China to be a responsible stakeholder.37 Similarly, the US hosted USChina Counterterrorism Sub-Dialogue from 14-15 September, 2009 in Washington D.C.
concluded by their opposition to all forms of terrorism and promoting peace and stability in
various regions of the world.38Chinese analysts recognize that Al Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations that threaten US interests and challenge international peace are also a threat to
Chinese interests as well.39 The rise of Chinas interests in the region may offer an opportunity
to collaborate with the US on counterterrorism where both countries can secure their national
interests and simultaneously assist South Asian countries in promoting peace, stability and
economic development.
Chinese Interests in the Region
22.
China has enormous interests in South Asia, politically, economically, militarily, and
diplomatically because of its close proximity, geo-strategic location, growing trade, political
influence, threats from Uyghur separatists and Tibetans fighting for autonomy, and the increasing
US interests in the region, mainly in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. As Afghanistan, Pakistan
and Central Asia were becoming more dangerous and capable of launching terrorist activities
against Chinese interests at home and abroad, China took the initiative by forming the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) with Russia and other Central Asian republics to form a joint
effort against the three evils. The SCO through its regional counterterrorism cooperation has
been partly successful in curbing separatism, extremism, the spread of terrorism and even drug
trafficking.
23.
Security Interests Chinas main concern regarding militant Islamic terrorism focuses
on increasing Uyghur activities in Xingjian province and the belief that other militant Islamist
organizations based in Pakistan and Afghanistan are supporting the Uyghur cause to destabilize
China and threaten its national security. China blamed Muslim extremists trained by Pakistan
for the attacks conducted by Uyghur separatists in Kashgar in July, 2011, which killed
seven and injured 22 people.40China desires to garner wider support among the international
community because of the Uyghur separatists having close links with Al-Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations. China believes that the US is maintaining a double standard with
regard to releasing Uyghurs from Guntanamo prison to third countries rather than handing
them over to Chinese authorities. China is also concerned that the recently elected Tibetan
Prime Minister-in-exile, Lobsang Sangay, a Harvard scholar could arouse more aggressive
tendencies and even militancy among younger Tibetans.41 Recent high level visits by Chinese
delegations and increasing Chinese assistance to Nepal in development and security reflects
Chinas growing security concern in its periphery.
24.
Economic Interests China has huge economic interests in the region, Recent trends
show that China is investing heavily in its neighboring countries; with $61.7 billion42 trade
with India in 2010 (Indias largest partner), investing $3.2 billion Aynak copper mine in
Afghanistan (though the US is providing the security), funding various projects in Pakistan
worth $25 billion43 and huge investments worth $821.4 million in Sri Lanka with assured
assistance of $3 billion in infrastructure development.44 Similarly, China has promised to fund
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developments along Bangladesh coastline with $9 billion. India, on the contrary, is getting
paranoid about the huge investments made by China in neighboring countries which might
lead to extra dependency on China, reducing Indias influence in the region.
25.
Pakistan has recently requested China further develop its Gwadar port, and build a
network linking Gwadar, Urumqi and Beijing to Shanghai. Such links would benefit China
in enhancing its trade with Europe and the Middle East while reducing its dependence on
sea-borne trade through the overcrowded and unreliable Malacca Straits, and would assist in
the build-up of Chinese naval power. Pakistan sees this development as facilitating Chinas
relations with the Muslim world and assisting Islamabad and Beijing in curtailing militant
Islamic terrorism.45 China has vital energy interests in Central Asia (with investment of more
than $10 billion) and growing trade with Iran, the Middle East and North Africa.
26.
Diplomatic Interests
As Chinas economy grows it will play a more dominant
role in the region, assisting neighbors with huge investments in developing infrastructure,
modernizing its military and controlling important sea-lanes through string of pearls strategy
which includes the port of Gwadar (Pakistan), and construction of other ports like Hambantota
(Sri Lanka), Chittagong (Bangladesh), and Sittwe (Myanmar).46 China will use its soft power
to achieve its goal to stabilize the periphery and continue with its economic modernization
program and the building of peace and stability in the region.47 Although Chinas relations with
Pakistan remain central, its relations with India is significantly developing and converging as
both countries assume a greater role on the global stage, especially on issues like securing
affordable energy supplies and a new global climate change agreement.48
US Interests in the Region
27.
The 21st century is often described as the Asian century, a shifting of global power
away from the Atlantic towards the Indian and Pacific Oceans.49The focus on Afghanistan has
distracted the US from formulating a comprehensive and coordinated regional strategy for
South Asia. Any regional strategy for South Asia should focus on recognizing the significance
of the various states to the US interests.50US interests in greater engagement with regional
organizations of South and Central Asia, with Chinas support, was highlighted by Assistant
Secretary Robert O. Blakes media roundtable in Beijing China.51
28.
Security Interests Pakistan is strategically significant with the worlds second highest
Muslim population of about 187 million people,52 is facing multifaceted problems, ranging from
political and economic instability to natural calamities, and a deteriorating security situation.
Irrespective of the consequences from the attack on Bin Laden which has frayed US-Pakistan
relations, both countries need each others help to pursue their interests. Pakistan in recent
days has been wary of growing US engagement with India, and therefore getting closer to and
forging many agreements with China. Since 9/11, the US has assisted Pakistan with nearly
$20 billion which has more than doubled since President Obama took office in 2009.53 The US
considers Pakistans instability, predominantly terrorism and possession of nuclear weapons
as vital national interests and is very concerned about nuclear weapons falling into the hands
of militant Islamists.
29.
Transnational militant Islamic terrorism will continue to pose a threat to US interests in
the days to come. Al-Qaeda for the time being has been damaged but it will always continue
to attack the US and its interests worldwide. Other regional militant Islamist terrorists groups
like TTP, LeT, and others with global reach, will continue to strike the interests of the US,
India and Pakistan, as well as NATO allies.54 These organizations whenever possible will join
hands with other terrorist groups and organized syndicates like D-Company to pursue their
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interests. The US sees India as a viable partner to balance growing Chinese influence in the
region and has signed the US-India Nuclear Deal in 2008 and forged a Strategic Partnership
with India.
30.
Economic Interests South Asian countries with their enormous fossil fuel, rare earth
elements, and natural gas reserves make attractive economic partners.55 The US presence in
the region provides an opportunity to pursue its economic interests and monitor increasing
Chinese and Iranian influence in South and Central Asia which might threaten those interests.
US markets are expected to benefit and grow from the richer and prosperous Asia. US exports
of goods and services to China are projected to reach more than $100 billion this year.56 India
is a partner that provides opportunities for promoting US economic, political, and military
interests in South Asia and beyond.57 Indias growing economy, geo-strategic location, with
vast human capital (1.189 billion),58 political influence and military power is the most attractive
strategic partner for the US in the region. President Barrack Obama stated that the US sees
Asia-and especially India-as a market of the future and has praised the opportunity to sell our
exports in one of the fastest growing markets in the world.59 The US-India bilateral trade has
increased by 30% in 2010 reaching $ 48.8 billion which reflecting increase in trade between
these two countries.60
31.
Domestic Interests
Any US regional strategy must recognize the fact that the
world is no longer dominated by the US, and that US resources are constrained. The new
reality in US domestic politics will invariably shape the US foreign policy and engagement in
the region.61 The US spends around $10 billion a month in Afghanistan alone which as Senator
John Kerry states is unsustainable.62 The present economic crisis and domestic politics,
notably against the backdrop of Presidential elections in 2012, will be crucial in shaping US
regional strategy in the region.
Recommendations
32.
Since 9/11, the US and Chinese perceptions of the challenges and threats in South Asia
have been converging, especially on the issues of militant Islamic terrorism. Both the US and
China have long-term economic, diplomatic and military interests in the region, and terrorism
poses a considerable threat to those interests. There is a strong realization by the two countries
that besides addressing these threats with short-term initiatives, long-term cooperative,
comprehensive strategies are imperative for more permanently dealing with the root causes of
the problem, focusing on issues of poverty, weak infrastructure, educational reforms, health
and other public services, illiteracy, organized crime, religious extremism, poor governance
and unemployment.
33.
Stability in Pakistan
The failure to stabilize Pakistan would not only affect the
region but would have vast ramifications throughout Central Asia and Middle East as well,
seriously jeopardizing US and Chinese interests. Preventing Pakistan from being taken over
by Islamist militants is not only vital for the US and China but also essential for the safety
of the global community. Since the US cannot solve Pakistans problem alone, China with
its huge economic, diplomatic and security interests can play an important role in bringing
stability in Pakistan. Stability in Pakistan is a win-win equation, not only for the US and China
but for the region as a whole.
34.
The US and China both have huge economic and security interests in the region.
Instability in Pakistan will not only affect security but have immense economic implications in
the region and the world. Therefore it is of paramount importance for the US, China and India
to assist Pakistan in its economic development and prevent it from being overtaken by militant
40

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Islamists. Because of the US financial crisis and the deterioration of US-Pakistan relations,
China may have to play a greater role to secure its economic Resumption of two-way traffic
between Afghanistan and India, and Iran-Pakistan-India gas and oil pipeline could benefit
Pakistan both in terms of its much needed energy demands and the transit fees. Other friendly
countries in the Middle East can also play an important role in assisting Pakistan. Economic
growth on one hand would help to stabilize Pakistan, improve socio-economic conditions,
create more jobs, reform the education system, build infrastructure and, on the other hand, it
would assist in de-radicalization, marginalizing terrorist groups and reduce anti-American and
anti-Western sentiments.
35.
The US and China must use every diplomatic tool and effort to encourage Pakistan to
deny support to terrorist organizations emanating from Pakistan against Afghanistan and India.
The US and China can assist Pakistan (military as well as in the public sector) by providing
much needed training, technological know-how and enhancing its capacity. Similarly, India and
Afghanistan on the other hand must be ready to make necessary compromises in dealing with
contentious issues like Kashmir and power sharing in Afghanistan. Both India and Afghanistan
must realize that growing Islamist militancy in Pakistan would have a spillover effect in their
countries, which would be detrimental to their national security. Both, the US and China can
use their diplomatic skills to bring both India and Pakistan to negotiate in resolving the long
standing contentious Kashmir issue.
36.
Strengthening SAARC as a Regional Organization The creation of SAARC was
well intentioned but it has been ineffective in enhancing regional cohesiveness and thus has
failed in terms of economic integration and regionalism.63 If peace is to be accomplished through
economic integration it is imperative to have a change in the mindsets whereby leaders can
discuss contentious issues like Kashmir. The future of SAARC lies in long-lasting peace and
economic integration, and the dexterity of its leaders to resolve domestic and regional issues.
Lessons learned from other regional organization like the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN), support the premise that their success was mainly based on cooperation in
trade and economic integration. It can be argued that without a properly integrated economy, the
region can never thrive.64 Since the recently formed SAFTA has been successful in promoting
intra-SAARC trade, SAARC members must be ready to dismantle custom barriers, and agree
on common import policy to advance trade and investments among the member countries. For
example, the vast hydropower potential of Nepal (about 40,000 MW)65 could be utilized to
benefit the countries in the region. The US and China must make use of their observer status
to convince and assist in bringing the member countries together in enhancing SAARC as a
regional entity.
37.
Concept of SAARC Regional Security Organization The US and China can cooperate
to help SAARC to form a regional security organization. US, China, India and Pakistan have
huge security, economic and diplomatic interests in Afghanistan. It is certain that ISAF will
be drawing down from Afghanistan. The recent surge in incident by various terrorist groups,
mainly Taliban and Haqqani network, illustrates that the security situation in Afghanistan is
still unstable and needs to be strengthened
38.
Currently, South Asian countries, namely Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nepal, rank
st
nd
1 , 2 , 3rd, and 6th respectively in their contribution to UN peacekeeping missions totaling
34,931 personnel. Likewise, China is the 7th largest budget contributor with 3.94 percent, and
15th largest contributor with 1,997 troops.66 Together with China, the South Asian countries
contribute more than 30 percent of the total 122,000 peacekeepers. Sometimes troops from
various countries operate together under a unified command. It can be argued that if such
41

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cooperation can exist in UN Peacekeeping operations, why cant it be brought to bear in

promoting peace in South Asia? The vast experience and knowledge gained by these countries
in promoting peace and security in various part of the world could be developed to form a
SAARC regional security apparatus in a neutral country like Nepal and be utilized to promote
peace and stability in the region and beyond.
39.
UN peacekeeping also offers an opportunity to break from a zero-sum game in relations
between the US and China. It is one of the fields where China is willing to cooperate, which
could be helpful rather than threatening to the US and its allies.67 The US (the largest budget
contributor with 27.17 percent) and China can work together with the SAARC countries
(under the auspices of the UN) to develop a regional security strategy, contributing various
skills, technical know-how and resources needed to provide security assistance in Afghanistan
during and after the withdrawal of ISAF. It can be argued that these member countries coming
from the same region, having enormous experience in peacekeeping, with similar culture
and social backgrounds and from different religious beliefs, could be well suited to bring
peace and security in Afghanistan. The formulation of such a mechanism on one hand will
facilitate the development of confidence building measures among the member countries as
they work together to assist another member country (i.e. Afghanistan), on the other hand it
will strengthen the bonds of regional friendship to tackle other important regional issues.
40.
Developing Regional Counterterrorism Cooperation Countries in the region have so
far been reluctant to engage in any concrete counterterrorism cooperation. Although there had
been limited cooperation between India-Bhutan, India-Sri Lanka and India-Bangladesh in the
past, willingness to deal with the larger issues like growing militant Islamic terrorism has so
far been unsuccessful. On the contrary, the Islamist militants have forged better relations not
only within these countries but with various organized syndicates, and terrorist and separatist
groups in the region and are getting more organized, connected and powerful. Since theres a
trust deficit among the member countries due to their vested interests, the US and China, could
use their military, economic and political influence to encourage and support the countries in
the region to forge a consensus to tackle this rapidly growing menace before it is too late.
41.
Because of the transnational nature of militant Islamic terrorism, no country in the
region is capable of formulating a mechanism to combat this menace on its own. Since it is less
likely that India and Pakistan will cooperate on counterterrorism, there is an opportunity for
the US and China to use their diplomatic, military and economic leverage to persuade India to
lower its profile in Afghanistan and likewise to encourage Pakistan to discontinue supporting
terrorist activities in India. The US and China can help South Asian countries develop a joint
counterterrorism center (preferably in a neutral country), and assist in information sharing,
training, electronic surveillance, cross border management, and formulate a comprehensive
counterterrorism strategy. The formation of joint center and its activities will not only enhance
member countries capability but will also assist US and China in monitoring the trends, strategy
and future threats that the terrorists can pose to the region and beyond.
42.
Tackling of militant Islamic terrorism can provide a platform for future cooperation
Riedel and Singh propose that the US, China and Pakistan cooperate to deal with the threat
emanating from the Taliban, since each has a huge interest in sustaining a stable Pakistan.68
Against the backdrop of an extended bilateral dialogue between the US and China on combating
militant Islamic terrorism in South Asia, the collaboration can provide a platform to address
other important regional and global challenges like security and stability of Afghanistan after
the withdrawal of ISAF in 2014, climate change, disaster management, nuclear proliferation
in Iran and North Korea, and economic growth.
42

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Conclusion
43.
The shift in the perception of China with regards to terrorism reflects a change in
strategic thinking which provides an opportunity for both the US and China to work more
closely. Although there are some impediments to greater US-China cooperation in South Asia,
including a rivalry for strategic dominance, differences over human rights, and the role of
domestic politics in both countries, there is a convergence of interests: promoting peace and
stability, energy security, trade, and combating terrorism. Addressing these crucial challenges
will require wider cooperation not only with longtime allies but with new partners who have
similar interests in the region.
44.
Ensuring stability in Pakistan by addressing its security and economic needs must
be a top priority not only for the US and China but for all countries in the region as well.
Strengthening of the SAARC as a regional organization could facilitate in building trust,
enhancing economic integration and resolving contentious issues such as Kashmir. There is
an immediate need for these countries to recognize the growing threat posed by transnational
terrorism and hence work together in formulating a well coordinated counterterrorism strategy.
With assistance from the US and China, SAARC countries can use their vast experience of
peacekeeping in developing a regional security apparatus, effective in dealing with regional
security challenges including terrorism.
45.
This convergence of interests in combating militant Islamic terrorism in South Asia
allows the possibility of greater US-China cooperation and strengthening the broader strategic
relationship between the two countries in future. As Henry Kissinger has rightly stated, The
future of Asia will be shaped to a significant degree by how China and America envision it
and the extent to which each nation is able to achieve some congruence with the others
historical regional role.69
(Endnotes)
1
South Asia is comprised of eight nations-Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka.
2

Maleeha Lodhi, Viewpoint: Security Challenges in South Asia, The Nonproliferation Review, summer 2001, 118,
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/82lodhi.pdf, accessed on August 1, 2011.
3

World Bank, Reshaping Global Geography, World Development Report 2009, http://econ.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/EXTWDR2009/
0,,menuPK:4231145~pagePK:64167702~piPK:64167676~theSitePK:4231059,00.html, accessed on July 20, 2011.
4

Mahin Karim, Ecological and Nontraditional Security Challenges in South Asia, The National Bureau of Asian
Research, NBR Special Report #28, June 2011, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Preview/SR28_
EcoSecuritySouthAsia_preview.pdf, accessed on July 21, 2011.

The India Research Group, Ending Maoist Insurgency in India: Practical Propositions, India Research Group, April 23,
2010, http://tirgroup.org/pub/ending-maoist-insurgency-in-india-practical-propositions, accessed on August 21, 2011.

Laskhar-e Taiba, meaning army of the pure has been active since 1993. Its the military wing of a well funded Pakistani
Islamist organization Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irshad, founded in 1989, to fight alongside the Taliban. Experts believe that
LeT received funding and instructions from Pakistans Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in exchange to target Hindus
in Jammu and Kashmir and train Muslim extremists in India. Pakistan government has repeatedly denied allegation of
supporting terrorism.
7
JeM also known as the Army of Mohammad is an extremist group based in Pakistan. It was founded in 2000, by Masood
Azhar, after his release from prison in Indian. JeM aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan, and has openly declared war
against the US. JeM continues to operate openly despite the 2002 ban on its activities. It has close ties with Afghan Arabs
and the Taliban. Its believed that Osama bin Laden provided funds to JeM.
8

Founded by Jalluddin Haqqani, a popular warlord who continues to resist the extension of Karzai government in
43

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Afghanistan. He fought as a Mujahedin against the Soviet, receiving substantial assistance from the CIA through ISI. He
later joined the Taliban and was a Minister, but held separate power in his home town of Zadran. It the strongest faction of
the Taliban and has close links with Al Qaeda. The important Taliban Peshawar Shura is headquarter in Pakistans North
West Frontier Province (NWFP). The militia headed by Gulbuaddin Hikmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani are fighting US
forces alongside Taliban. CIA, in 2008 assessment specifically pointed to links of ISI with militant network of Jalaluddin
Haqqani which maintains close ties to senior figures of Al Qaeda in Pakistan tribal areas.
9

Sumit Ganguly, Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects, The National Bureau of National
Research, December 2009, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=412, accessed on August 2, 2011.

10

TTP started with Taliban supporters and sympathizers operating in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) initiated
when many small militant groups operating independently started networking. Its influence appears to be spreading across
FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPP). Pockets within Punjab and Sind provinces have also been
affected by TTP. Its estimated that TTP has around 10, 000 militias, targeting Pakistan security forces and symbols of
state. Its main aim is to enforce Sharia, unite against coalition force in Afghanistan and fight defensive Jihad against
Pakistan Army.

11

Sumit Ganguly, Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects.

12

Islamic organization operating in Bangladesh was founded in 1998 by Abdur Rahman and gained public prominence
in 2001 when bombs and documents detailing the activities of the organization were discovered. The organization was
officially banned by the government of Bangladesh in February 2005 after attacks on NGOs but struck back in midAugust when it detonated 463 bombs within 50 minutes in 63 out of 64 districts, throughout Bangladesh. It has an
extensive network of organizations, including connections to legal Islamist organizations.

13

Bruce Reidel and Pavneet Singh, U.S.-China Relations: Seeking Strategic Convergence in Pakistan, Brookings
Foreign Policy Paper, Number 18, January 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0112_us_
china_relations_riedel/0112_US_China_Relations_Riedel.pdf, accessed on September 10, 2011.

14
Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, Congressional
Research Service, July 20, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf, accessed on September 17, 2011.
15

Ibid.

16

CIA, The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

geos/xx.html and http://hinduexistence.wordpress.com/tag/increasing-muslim-population-in-india-will-create-severepersecution/, accessed on June 28, 2011.

17

Amir Mir, Al-Qaedas roots grow deeper in Pakistan, Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/
MI10Df01.html, accessed on September 13, 2011.
18

Ibid.

19

Ibid.

20

Ibid.

21

Dawood Ibrahims D-Company is the largest organized criminal syndicate in Asia. Its network is all around the world
with operations focusing in India, Afghanistan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, South Africa and Pakistan. It controls
much of the smuggling activity at key ports such as Dubai, Karachi and Mumbai. It is the only syndicate that includes
members from a particular religious background (Islam).In addition to weapons trafficking and narcotics, racketeering,
extortion, money laundering and contract killings, D-Company is accused of permitting Al Qaeda, LeT and ISI to use
its smuggling routes for intelligence gathering missions and conduct attacks. It is widely known that D-Company was
closely involved in 1993 Mumbai bombings. With its 5,000 members and a criminal-terrorism fusion model, it presents
a credible threat to the US interests in South Asia.

22

Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes, Prioritizing Strategic Interests in South Asia, Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University, No 256, June, 2010, http:// www.ndu/inss, accessed on July 25, 2011.

23

Rashid Ahmad, Terrorism and SAARC, Daily Times, July 07, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=
2010%5C07%5C07%5Cstory_7-7-2010_pg3_4, accessed on August 20, 2011.

24

Amir Mir, Islamists break Pakistans military ranks, Asia Times, June 24, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_
Asia/MF24Df03.html, accessed on July 28, 2011.

25

Amir Mir, Islamists break Pakistans military ranks.

26

Madhavi Bhasin, SAARC I-Evolution, Foreign Policy Association, (May 4, 2010), http://foreignpolicyblogs.
com/2010/05/04/saarc-i-evolution/, accessed on July 24, 2011.
44

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27

Chandra D Bhatta, Regional Integration and Peace in South Asia: An Analysis, http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.
uk/dl/RegionalIntegration.PDF, accessed on July 22, 2011.
28

Rashid Ahmad, Terrorism and SAARC.

29

SAARC website, http://www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Conventions/63/, accessed on August 21, 2011.

30

The Additional Protocol constitutes a single document under which the member countries have undertaken to initiate
within their national legal frameworks certain measures to combat terrorism by suppressing and eradicating the financing
of terrorism, seizing and confiscating of funds and other assets, preventing money laundering, cooperation on immigration
and customs control, cooperation among law enforcement agencies, providing legal assistance and holding consultations
among them.
31

Rashid Ahmad, Terrorism and SAARC

32

Terrorism as the biggest existentialist challenge in South Asia by Home Minister of India P. Chidambaram in Thimphu,
Bhutan. Indian Times, July 23, 2011, www.indiantimes.com/article/084Wd7C23GfNc?q=South+Asia, accessed on August
21, 2011.
33

Muhammad Jamshed Iqbal, SAARC: Origin, Growth, Potential and Achievements, Pakistan Journal of History
and Culture, Vol XXVII/2 (2006).136, http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/SAARC_Jamshed_Iqbal.pdf,
accessed on July 21, 2011.
34

Banning Garrett and Jonathan Adams, U.S.-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational
Threats, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 126, September, 2004), http://www.usip.org/publications/uschina-cooperation-problem-failing-states-and-transnational-threats, accessed on August 10, 2011.

35

Muslim Uyghurs are of Turkic origin and till recently formed the bulk of population in China's western-most XinjiangUighur Autonomous Region. The Chinese government responded by moving Han Chinese into the area. The ethnic group
has decreased to a minority as a result of Han migration, regional protests and violence in recent years. The Uyghurs are
using militant measures to achieve independence, or at least autonomy, and seek to call their area Turkistan. Analysts say
that the majority of Uyghurs do not favor an Islamic state.
36

Denny Roy, Lukewarm Partner: Chinese Support for U.S. Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Asia Pacific Center
for Security Studies, March 2006, http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/LukewarmPartnerChinaandCTinSEA.pdf,
accessed on October 1, 2011.
37

Shirley A.Kan, U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, September
11, 2008, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33001.pdf, accessed on October 1, 2011.
38
U.S. Department of State, U.S.-China Counterterrorism Sub-Dialogue, Media Note, Office of the Spokesman,
Washington D.C. September 22, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/sept/129485.htm, accessed on October 4,
2011.
39

Denny Roy, Lukewarm Partner: Chinese Support for U.S. Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia.

40

Lousie Watt, China Blames Pakistan-Trained Militants for Attack, The Associated Press, August 1, 2011, http://www.
forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/08/01/general-as-china-violence_8594214.html, accessed on August 2, 2011.
41

Stratfor, Dalai Lamas New Leadership Plan Challenges Beijing, Stratfor Global Intelligence, August 9, 2011, http://
www.stratfor.com/memberships/200198/geopolitical_diary/20110809-dalai-lamas-new-leadership-plan-challengesbeijing, accessed on August 9, 2011.
42

Teresita Cruz-del Rosario, Enter the Dragon, Softly: Chinese Aid in South, South East and Central Asia, National
University of Singapore, June 17, 2011, Working Paper Series, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1885213, accessed on September 11, 2011.
43

Dawn Chinese investment in Pakistan crosses $ 25 billion mark, Dawn.Com/Business, August 6, 2011, http://www.
dawn.com/2011/08/06/chinese-investment-in-pakistan-crosses-25-billion-mark.html, accessed on August 27, 2011.
44

Saroj Pathirana, Sri Lanka gains from Indo-Chinese supremacy battle, BBC News Business, November21, 2010, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11753549, accessed on September 8, 2011.

45
Zee news Bureau, Pakistan seeks Chinas help to develop Gwadar port, Zee News Beijing, August 11, 2011), http://
zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/pakistan-seeks-china-help-to-develop-gwadar-port_726102.html, accessed on August
27, 2011.
46

Wall Street Journal, Beijing Agrees to Operate a Key Port, Pakistan Says, Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2011, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303654804576339323765033308.html, accessed on September 11, 2011.
45

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

47

g]kfnL ;]gf

Teresita Cruz-del Rosario, Enter the Dragon, Softly: Chinese Aid in South, South East and Central Asia.

48

Allison Jackson, China, India could shame rich nations: UN scientists, AFP, October 30, 2009, http://www.google.
com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5haqohmGQyum3VBSdfUSqynzOyKdw, accessed on October 1, 2011.
49

Danny Quah, The Global Economys Shifting Centre of Gravity, Global Policy 2, January, 2011, http://onlinelibrary.
wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00066.x/pdf, accessed on August 25, 2011.

50

Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes, Prioritizing Strategic Interests in South Asia.

51

Assistant Secretary of State Robert O. Blakes Media Roundtable in Beijing, China, Press Conference, March 18, 2011,
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2011/158583.htm, accessed on August 21, 2011.

52

Rich Exner, 36 percent of the worlds population lives in China and India: Sunday Number, Cleveland.com, July
3, 2011, http://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/index.ssf/2011/07/36_percent_of_worlds_populatio.html, accessed on
August 10, 2011.

53

Subodh Varma, Since 9/11, Pak has got nearly $ 20 billion in US aid, (Times of India, May 7, 2011), http://articles.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-07/pakistan/29519745_1_coalition-support-funds-pakistan-crs,
accessed
on
October 2, 2011.

54

David W. Barno, Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia.

55

BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2010), http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview, accessed on July 25, 2011.

56

U.S Census Bureau, Top Trading partners-Total Trade, Exports, Imports: Year to Date, November 2010 (January 13,
2011), http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1011yr.html, accessed on August 25, 2011.

57

David W. Barno, Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia.

58

CIA, The World Factbook.

59

Dan Robinson, Obama in Mumbai Calls India Market of the Future, Voice of America, Mumbai, November 6, 2010,
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Obama-Calls-For-More-Trade-with-India-106817488.html, accessed on August
7, 2011.

60

Foreign Trade, Trade in Goods with India, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5330.
html, accessed on October 6, 2011.

61

David W. Barno, Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia.

62

Kerry: bin Laden killing could lead to greater Afghanistan stability, bringing US troops back home, WBUR NEWS &
WIRE SERVICES, May 10, 2011, http://www.wbur.org/2011/05/10/kerry-afghan, accessed on August 25, 2011.

63

Chandra D Bhatta, Regional Integration and Peace in South Asia: An Analysis.

64

Ibid.

65

Hydropower in Nepal, http://www.ippan.org.np/HPinNepal.html, accessed on September 18, 2011.

66

United Nations Peacekeeping, Background Note, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.

pdf, accessed on September 18, 2011.

67

Gideon Rachman, Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011),
288-289.

68

Bruce Reidel and Pavneet Singh, U.S.-China Relations: Seeking Strategic Convergence in Pakistan.

69

Henry Kissinger, On China, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 529.

As long as I have a want, I have a reason for living. Satisfaction

is death.
- George Bernard Shaw

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k|bfg u/L g]kfn / g]kfnLsf] gfd ljb]zdf phfu/ ug{ dxTjk"0f{ of]ubfg k'ofPsf] 5 .
p2]Zo
#=

o; n]vn] g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/n] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]an lj:tf/df k'ofPsf] of]ubfgaf/] k|sfz kfg]5
{ .

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$=

k|:t't n]vnfO{ lgDg a'bfxdf s]lGb|t /xL j0f{g ul/g]5M-s_

d]l8sn sf]/sf] P]ltxfl;s k[i7e"dL

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>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnsf] kl/ro

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d]l8sn sf]/sf] jt{dfg ;+/rgf

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d]l8sn sf]/n] k'ofPsf] ;]jfx

-_

d]l8sn sf]/ ;DaGwL dxTjk"0f{ / rfvnfUbf tYofx

-r_

d]l8sn sf]/ / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]jn aLr ;DaGw

-5_

d]l8sn sf]/sf pknJwLx

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;'emfjx

P]ltxfl;s k[i7e"dL
%=
;fwf/0f= lj=;+= !(&!-&% ;fnsf] k|yd ljZj o'4df g]kfnL kmf]}hn] k|bz{g u/]sf] jL/tfsf] k|l;l4 ;+;f/e/
km}lnPsf] lyof] . To; o'4df w]/} g]kfnL ;}lgsxn] jL/ult k|fKt u/]sf lyP . o;} kl/k]|Ifdf tTsfnLg /f0Ff k|wfgdGqL
rGb| zDz]/n] kmf}hsf ;sn bhf{xsf] tna a9fpg] / :jf:Yo ;]jfdf yk ;'ljwf lbnfpg] of]hgf cg'k lj=;+=
!(*@ ;fn efb| @$ ut] -tbg';f/ O{=;+=!(@% ;]K6]Da/ )(_ sf lbg :j= /fi6lktf >L % dxf/fhflw/fh lqe'jg jL/
ljqmd zfxb]jaf6 dxfsfn:yfgdf >L lq-rGb| ldln6/L c:ktfnsf] 9f]sfdf nufOPsf] ;'gsf] tfNrf vf]nL ;d'b\3f6g
ul/aS;]sf] lyof]] . ;f]xL lbg c:ktfn ejgsf] 5tdf /flvPsf] 9nf}6] l;kfxLsf] k|ltdfnfO{ cgfj/0f;d]t ul/Psf]
lyof] . c:ktfnsf] lgdf0f{ ;' ubf{ o;sf] k|:tfljt gfd jL/ d]df]l/on ldln6/L c:ktfn /flvg] elgP tfklg
47

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

c:ktfnsf] lgdf{0Fdf /f0Ff k|wfgdGqL rGb| zDz]/sf] ljz]if of]ubfg /x]sf]n] lq-rGb| ldln6/L c:ktfn /xg uPsf]
lyof] . o;af6 k|yd ljZjo'4df jL/ult k|fKt ug]{ ;Dk"0F{ ;}lgsxsf] ;DemgfnfO{ g} rL/:d/0fLo agfpg ;fd"lxs
:df/ssf] kdf o; c:ktfnsf] :yfkgf ug]{ p2]Zo /x]sf] lyof], h;nfO{ c:ktfn ejgsf] kf]l6{sf]sf] bfof afof
lznfn]vdf n]lvPsf] ">L !)* kz'kltgfysf r/0fsdndf zL/ w/L of] c:ktfn ;Djt\ !(&!-&% sf] 7"nf] n8fOdf
Hofg lbg] /fHosf ;k't jL/xsf] ;Demgfsf vflt/n] agfOof]" (To the glori of Sri Pashupatinath and to the
memory of those brave sons of the Kingdom of Nepal who fell in the great War 1914-18 A.D.) n] k|i6 kfb{5 .
tTsfnLg lqrGb| ldln6/L c:ktfnsf] k|yd Commanding Officer n]=s=8F=>L gGbnfn zfx x'g'x'GYof] .
^=
>L lqrGb| ldn6/L c:ktfnsf] ef}lts ;'ljwf= cfkm\g} k"h
L / ;Lkn] g]kfnLxaf6 agfOPsf] of] c:ktfndf
9n lgsf;b]lv lnP/ vfg]kfgL, xfjf, 3fd, lah'nL;d]tsf] /fd|f] k|aGw ul/Psf] lyof] . cfw'lgs c:ktfndf x'g] sIfx
h:t} ck/]zg sIf, Pg]:y]l6:6 sIF, xft w'g] / Changing sIF, dfOg/ cf]=6L= / 8]l; sIF, kmfd]{;L, la/fdL hfRg]
sIF, 8FS6/ l8p6L sIF, dRo{/' L / kf]i6df6{d k/LIf0f sIF, efG5f 3/ / 8FOlg xn OToflb a]Unf a]Un} lgd{f0F ul/Psf
lyP . la/fdLxsf] ;+Vof a9\g uPdf kfn 6fu]/ sf}zLdf /fVg ;Sg] k|aGw;d]t ldnfOPsf] lyof] . j]nfotsf
Oltxf;sf/ kl;{en Nof08gn] cfkm\gf] g]kfn gfds k':tsdf o; c:ktfnaf/] cfw'lgs 9Frfn] agfOPsf] /
Plzofsf] ;aeGbf /fd|f] ;fwgo'Qm c:ktfnxdWo] Ps / lxGb":yfgsf w]/} ;}lgs cv8fxn] Oiof{ ul/g] eg]/
pNn]v u/]sf 5g\ . c:ktfnsf] lgdf{0F sfo{ /fd|/L k"/f u/]sf]df O{=lrkm s0f]{n lszf]/ g/l;+x /f0ffnfO{ pgsf] sfdsf]
sb/:jk lrkm s0f]{naf6 sdfl08 sg]{ndf kbf]lGgt ug'{sf] ;fy} =@))) ;d]t kfl/tf]lifs k|FKt u/]sf lyP . sfd
ug]{ cGo hjfgxn] klg Ogfd kfPsf lyP . o; c:ktfn lgdf{0fdf k|FoM ;a} g]kfnL ;fdfgxsf] k|of]u ul/Psf]
lyof] / ljz]if1 / sfdbf/ klg ;a} g]kfnL lyP . o; c:ktfn ;'df ^$ j]8af6 ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] . c:ktfnsf]
lgldQ lkpg] kfgL sf7df8f}+ zx/df ljt/0F ul/Psf] kfOkaf6 NofO{ Jojl:yt ul/Psf] lyof] . To;a]nf k|z:t dfqfdf
kfgLsf] cfk"lt{ gePsf] sf/0Fn] /fgL kf]v/Lsf] g}CTo s'gfdf lah'nLsf] kDk h8fg u/L ;f]xL kDkf/f c:ktfndf
kfgLsf] Joj:yf ul/Psf] lyof] .
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9nf}6sf] l;kfxLsf] ;flns= o; c:ktfnnfO{ ;}lgs :df/ssf] kdf lrgfpg / 6f9Faf6 o;nfO{ ;lhnf];u
b]Vg ;lsg] u/L c:ktfn ejgsf] 5tsf] cu| efudf 5 lkm6 cUnf] Pp6f ;}lgssf] k|ltdf v8f ul/Psf] 5 . /Tgaxfb'/
tdf]6nfO{ pgsf] ;Lk / bIftfsf] k/LIf0F ug{ rGb| zDz]/s} zflns agfpg lbPkZrft ;f] zflns agfpg lhDdf
lbOPsf] lyof] . tof/ ePkl5 d"lt{ agfpg nfu]sf] vr{ ldgfxf x'g'sf] ;fy} =#))).- kfl/tf]lifs;lxt /Tgaxfb'/
tdf]6nfO{ ljz]if bhf{ / vfguL;d]t lbO{ sb/ ul/Psf] lyof] .
*=
lznf :tDe= c:ktfn ejgsf] cufl8 snfk"0f{ 9+uaf6 agfOPsf] :tDesf] kdf lznfn]v /flvPsf] 5 .
ci6sf]0F cfsf/sf tLg kq 9'ufsf] k|:t/df of] lznf :tDe /flvPsf] 5 . Pp6} 9'ufsf] zLv/ z}nLdf ag]sf] rf/kf6]
cfsf/sf] of] :tDe ( lkm6 prfO{sf] 5 . To;dfly 9'uf s} 8]9 lkm6 cUnf] >L kz'kltgfy dlGb/sf] k|ltdf /flvPsf]
5 . lznfn]vsf] :tDedf c:ktfnsf] gfd, pb\3f6g u/]sf] ldlt, c:ktfn vr{sf] aGbf]a:t / eljiodf k|ultsf] nflu
lng ;lsg] sbdaf/] j0F{g ul/Psf] 5 .
(=
cfly{s Joj:yf= o; c:ktfnsf] :yfkgfdf s'g} ljb]zL k"h
L tyf cfly{s ;xfotfsf] k|of]u ul/Psf] lyPg .
O{=lrkm s0f]{n lszf]/ g/l;+x /f0ffn] cfkm\gf] k|ltj]bg efif0Fdf pNn]v u/]cg';f/ c:ktfn lgdf{0Fdf =#,)(,!$^ -=
tLgnfv gf}xhf/ Ps;o 5ofnL;_ vr{ ePsf] pNn]v ul/Psf] 5 .
!)= ;+rfng Joj:yf= o; c:ktfnsf] ;+rfng gLlt lgwf{/0f tyf ;'kl/j]If0Fsf nflu ljleGg 6i6x /flvPsf
lyP . hLtkm{ ;a} sfd hLnf7 -k=s=h=_ n] x]g]{ eP tfklg gjlgld{t ;}lgs c:ktfnsf] lhDd]jf/L tTsfnLg
sdf08/ O{g lrkmnfO{ g} lbOPsf] lyof] .
!!=
c:ktfn :yfgfGt/0f= dxfsfn:yfg cjl:yt o; c:ktfnn] ;dofg's"n cfw'lgs :jf:Yo ;]jf k|bfg ub}{
cfO/x]sf]df lbg k|ltlbg alx/ (Out Door) / cGt/ (In Door) la/fdLxsf] ;+Vofdf a[l4 x'b} uO/x]sf]n] g]kfnL
;}lgs sNof0fsf/L of]hgf cGtu{t axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs / kl/jf/xnfO{;d]t pkrf/ ;]jf lbg] gLlt
sfof{Gjog ePkl5 lq-rGb| ldln6/L c:ktfn x/]s b[li6sf]0faf6 ;fgf] ePsf] dx;'; x'g uof] . :jf:Yo ;]jfdf ePsf]
ce"tk"j{ k|ult / gljg pkrf/ k|a[lt qmldskdf o; c:ktfndf klg leqb} uPsf], zx/sf] aLr efudf c:ktfn
/x]sf] / o; :yfgdf ef}lts ;'ljwf a9Fpg k|FoM c;Dej h:t} ePaf6 c:ktfnnfO{ :yfgfGt/0F ug]{ lg0F{ocg';f/
48

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

5fpgLl:yt :joDe"sf] blIf0F k6flgLdf ;}lgs c:ktfn agfpg] lg0F{o eof] . o;}cg';f/ tTsfnLg >L %
dxf/fhflw/fh jL/]Gb| jL/ljqmd zfxb]jsf] $@ cf}+ z'ehGdf]T;jsf] cj;/df ldlt @)$# ;fn kf}if !% ut] c:ktfnsf]
lznfGof;, $% cf}+ z'ehGdf]T;jsf] cj;/df ldlt @)$^ ;fn kf}if !$ ut] >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn egL gfdfs/0F
tyf tTsfnLg ;DdfggLo k|wfg;]gfklt dxf/yL >L wd{kfn j/l;+x yfkfaf6 >L % dxf/fhflw/fh jL/]Gb| jL/ljqmd
zfxb]jsf] :j0f{ z'ehGdf]T;jsf] cj;/df ldlt @)%@ ;fn kf}if !# ut] ;d'b\3f6g ePsf] lyof] .
>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnsf] kl/ro
!@=
>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn sf7df8f}+sf] 5fpgLdf s/Lj !$$ /f]kgL IF]qkmndf cjl:yt 5 . ";j{ /f]u lgjf/0f"
cfbz{ jfSo /x]sf] o; c:ktfn ljleGg ljefu tyf ljz]if1xsf] ;fy} cTofw'lgs pks/0fxn] ;';lHht Ps
;'ljwfo'Qm General Hospital sf] kdf lrlgg k'u]sf] 5 . sdf08F06 -;xfos /yL_ sf] g]t[Tjdf lSnlgsn /lhi6f/
-;xfos /yL_, Infantry sf k|zf;g /lhi6f/ -dxf-;]gfgL_ tyf d]6f]g -dxf-;]gfgL_ sfo{/t /xL c:ktfnsf] ;+rfng
tyf Joj:yfkg eO/x]sf] 5 . >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnsf] k|yd Commandant ;=/=8F=>L dbgdfg dNn -ldlt @)$^.(.!$
)$(.!!.@) ;Dd_ /xg' ePsf] lyof] .
!#=
^$ a]8 ;+Vofaf6 z' ul/Psf] tTsfnLg lq-rGb| c:ktfn xfn o; c:ktfndf %!* la/fdL a]8 ;+Vof
/x]sf] 5 . o; c:ktfnn] lb+b} cfPsf] :jf:Yo ;]jf ;'ljwfnfO{ ;dofg's"n cem k|efjsf/L agfpg] x]t'n] c:ktfndf
xfn ;lh{sn, d]l8sn, xf8hf]gL{, cfvf, bft, 5fnf, :qL/f]u afn/f]u, k|;'tL, d'6' /f]u, 5ftL /f]u, dfgl;s /f]u, :gfo'
/f]u, SofG;/, lnyf]l6K;L, x]df]8fO{nLl;;, PS;-/], l;=l6=:Sofg, Pd=cf/=cfO{=, Kofyf]nf]hL, Pr=cfO{=le=P8\; /f]u cflb
;DaGwL ;]jf ;'ljwf;d]t k|bfg ub}{ cFO/x]sf] 5 . ldlt @)^$!))! ut]af6 gof cf]=lk=l8=ejgdf /x]sf] GOPD
df /xg] u/L Accident & Emergency (A & E) ;]jf;d]t z' ul/Psf] 5, h;af6 la/fdLx nfeflGjt eO/x]sf
5g\ .
d]l8sn sf]/sf] jt{dfg ;+/rgf
!$= Oltxf;nfO{ cWoog ubf{ lj=;+=@)@) ;fndf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] d]l8sn sf]/sf] kdf >L ;}lgs :jf:Yo ljefusf]
:yfkgf ePsf] b]lvG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfsf] cfw'lgsLs/0f / lj:tf/;u} >L g]kfn ;/sf/sf] ldlt @)^#)&#) ut]sf]
lg0f{o adf]lhd xfn d]l8sn sf]/sf] ;jf]R{ r c+udf >L sfo{/yL ljefu cGt{ut >L ;}lgs :jf:Yo dxflgb]{zgfno
:yfkgf ePsf] 5 . pkrf/ ;]jfnfO{ k|efjsf/L, a9L ;lhnf] / nrsbf/ kfg]{ p2]Zon] o; dxflgb]{zgfno cGtu{t xfn
>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn, >L ;}lgs k'g:yf{kgf s]Gb|, @ lkmN8 c:ktfnx, !% lkmN8 PDa'n]G; u'Ndx / lzIf0f lgsfosf]
kdf >L g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfg cGt{ut tTsfnLg lq-rGb| ldln6/L c:ktfn dxfsfn:yfgdf College
of Nursing / e08f/vfndf College of Medicine :yfkgf ePsf] 5 .
d]l8sn sf]/n] k"ofPsf] ;]jfx?
!%=
d]l8sn sf]/n] k'ofPsf] ;]jfx gf}nf] geP tfklg ;dli6utkdf ljutb]lv xfn;Dd la/fdL pkrf/ ;]jf
/ lzIf0f If]qdf k'ofPsf ;]jfx lgDgfg';f/ k|:t't ul/Psf] 5M-s_
g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;Dk"0f{ axfnjfnf, cjsfz k|fKt ;sn bhf{ tyf tLgsf kl/jf/x, /Iff dGqfno
tyf /Iff n]vf lgoGqssf] sfof{nosf sd{rf/Lx, ;z:q k|x/L, g]kfn k|x/L, /fli6o cg';Gwfg ljefu,
kmfo/ la|u]8, ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfnosf ljBfyL{ tyf sd{rf/Lx, g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfgsf
ljBfyL{x tyf s/f/df sfo{/t gl;{ :6fkmxnfO{ lgMz'Ns pkrf/ ;]jf k|bfg ub}{ cfO/x]sf] .
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b]zsf] ljleGg :yfgdf 36\g] k|fs[lts tyf s[ltd ljkb\, dxfdf/L, b'3{6gf cflb 36gfxdf hgtfnfO{
:jf:Yo ;]jf k|bfg ug'{sf] ;fy} cfkTsfnLg cj:yfdf b]zsf] h'g;'s} :yfgaf6 klg Air Medical Evacuation
;'ljwf pknJw u/fpb} cfO/x]sf] .
-u_
cfsl:ds k|s[ltsf u}x| ;}lgs gful/sxnfO{ pkrf/ ;]jf k|bfg ul//x]sf] . o;} l;nl;nfdf @)%*
;fn d+l;/ !! ut]af6 b]zdf z' ePsf] ;+s6sfnLg cj:yfdf >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnn] 3fOt] ;}lgs tyf 3fOt]
gful/sxsf] pkrf/df k'ofPsf] :jf:Yo ;]jf Oltxf;df clj:d/0fLokdf /x]sf]5 .
-3_

;do ;dodf b]lvg] dxfdf/L ;+qmfds ;jf /f]ux h:t} emf8f kvfnf, cfp, 6fO{kmfO{8, x]kf6fOl6;
49

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

tyf k|f0f3fts HIV AIDS h:tf /f]uxsf] af/]df ;Dk"0f{ ;}lgsxnfO{ :yfg ljz]ifd} uP/ hfgsf/Ld"ns
lzIff k|bfg ug]{ u/]sf] .
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;do ;fk]If :jf:Yo ;]jf:t/ a[l4 ug]{ p2]Zo cg'k c:ktfnsf] tflnd s]Gb|n] cGoq o'lg6xsf
;}lgsxnfO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf ;DaGwL ljljw tflndx ;+rfng u/L ;+:yf tyf JolQm :jodnfO{ pknJwLd"ns
Jojxfl/s ;Lk k|bfg u/fO/x]sf] . o;af6 ;DalGwt o'lg6xnfO{ :yfg ljz]ifdf g} ;fdfGo pkrf/ u/fpg
d2t k'lu/x]sf] .
-r_
pkTosf leqsf o'lg6xdf ;+rfng ul/Psf tflndxdf cfjZostf cg';f/ cf}ifwL;lxtsf]
d]l8sn hgzlQm :yfg ljz]ifd} uO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf k|bfg ub}{ cfO/x]sf] .
-5_

hglxt sfo{dfkm{t b'u{d Onfsfsf hgtfxnfO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf k|bfg ub}{ cfO/x]sf] .

-h_
;+o'Qm /fi6 ;+3Lo zflGt ;]gfdf vlg] o'lg6xdf Level-I c:ktfn :yfkgf u/L cfkm\gf ;}lgs,
ldq /fi6xsf ;}lgs tyf :yfgLo hgtfnfO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf pknJw u/fO{/x]sf] .
-em_ g]kfndf tflnd/t\ ljleGg ldq /fi6xsf ;}lgsx tyf kl/jf/xnfO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf pknJw
u/fO/x]sf] .
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:jb]z leqsf ljleGg :jf:Yo ;+:yfg tyf c:ktfnx aLr pkrf/ ;]jf, ;]ldgf/, tflnd cflb
sfo{qmdxdf ;xsfo{ ul//x]sf] .
-6_
d]l8sn ;]jfsf] If]qdf ljleGg ldq /fi6xsf ;}lgs tyf u}/ ;}lgs d]l8sn OsfOx;u tflnd,
cEof; tyf cGt/lqmofdf ;xsfo{ ul//x]sf] .
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College of Nursing df ldlt @)^*)*!! ut]af6 PCL Nursing / ldlt @)^**@& ut]af6
B.Sc. Nursing tyf BN ;fy} College of Medicine df ldlt @)^*)()# ut]af6 MBBS sIff ;'

ul/;s]sf] .
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u/fO/x]sf] .

d]l8sn sf]/ ;DaGwL dxTjk"0f{ / rfvnfUbf tYofx?

!^=

d]l8sn sf]/ ;DaGwL dxTjk"0f{ / rfvnfUbf tYofx lgDgfg';f/ k|:t't ul/Psf 5gM-s_

>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfnsf] ;a}eGbf 7"nf] lgMz'Ns pkrf/ k|bfg ug]{ c:ktfnsf] kdf /x]sf] .

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g]kfndf tTsfnLg lqrGb| ldln6/L c:ktfn >L jL/ c:ktfnkZrft bf];|f] k'/fgf] ;'ljwf ;DkGg
c:ktfnsf] kdf /x]sf] .
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g]kfndf ;a}eGbf cufl8

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>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfndf
/x]sf] .
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>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnaf6 ;' ePsf] .

nflu ;'ljwf ;DkGg

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>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfnsf ;'/Iff c+uxsf] c:ktfndWo] h]i7 c:ktfn /x]sf] .

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g]kfnsf ;'/Iff c+uxdWo] ;a}eGbf cufl8 g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/n] g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg
;+:yfg :yfkgf u/]sf] .
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g]kfnsf ;a} c:ktfnxeGbf >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfndf ljz]if1 8fS6/xsf] ;+Vof w]/} /x]sf] .
8fS6/xsf] s"n b/jGbLdWo] em08} %) k|ltzt ;+Vof ljz]if1 8fS6/xsf] /x]sf] .
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g]kfndf ePsf c:ktfnxdWo] ;a}eGbf klxn] >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfndf dlxnf sdf08f06 -;xfos
/yL_ lgo'lQm x'g' ePsf] .
-em_ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn cfkm\g} ;|f]t ;fwgaf6 k/]sf] ;dodf b]zsf] s'g} klg :yfgdf tTsfn} t}gfy x'g
;Sg] Psdfq ;IFd c:ktfn /x]sf] .
50

g]kfnL ;]gf

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l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfndf ;a}eGbf a9L ;+Vofdf d]l8sn hgzlQm ePsf] c:ktfnsf] kdf /x]sf] .

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>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfndf la=lk=d]df]l/on c:ktfn / jL/ c:ktfn kl5sf] ;a}eGbf a9L a]8 ;+Vof
-xfn %!* a]8 / lgs6 eljiodf !))) a]8 pknJw u/fO{ u}/ ;}lgs la/fdLxnfO{ ;d]t pkrf/ u/fpg]
nIo /fv]sf]_ ePsf] c:ktfnsf] kdf /x]sf] .
-7_

>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfndf cfkm\g} Oxygen Plant ePsf] Psdfq c:ktfnsf] kdf /x]sf] .

-8_
jflif{s kdf >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnaf6 pkrf/ ePsf la/fdLxsf] nut kl/lzi6 s df pNn]v
ul/Psf] 5 .
d]l8sn sf]/ / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]jn aLr ;DaGw
!&=
g]kfnL ;]gfn] g]kfn ;/sf/ tyf g]kfnL ;]gf sNof0fsf/L of]hgfdfkm{t ljleGg sNof0fsf/L ;'ljwfx
k|fKt ul//x]sf] 5 . g]kfn ;/sf/af6 k|fKt eO/x]sf] ;'ljwfsf] cltl/Qm g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfkm\g} sNof0fsf/L sf]ifdfkm{t
;sn bhf{ tyf pgLxsf cfl>t kl/jf/n] lgMz'Ns pkrf/ ;]jf k|fKt ul//x]sf 5g\, h'g lghfdtL ;]jf / cGo
;'/Iff c+uxdf sfo{/t g]kfnL gful/sxn] k|fKt ug]{ ;'ljwfeGbf w]/} a[xt\ 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn] sNof0fsf/L of]hgf
cGtu{tsf cGo ;]jfx h:t} hL sf/afxLsf] l;nl;nfdf 3fOt] jf d[To" ePdf cfly{s ;xfotf, czQm 3fOt]
;xof]u, s[ofsd{ vr{, aLdf of]hgf, :jf:Yo aLdf, b'3{6gf aLdf, czQm Ifltk"lt{, sfg"gL ;xfotf, ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L
lga[lQe/0f, cfjf; ;'ljwf, e"=k"= ;}lgs ;+u7gsf] cIfo sf]ifdf ;xof]u, :jb]z tyf ljb]z 5fqa[lQ, k|wfg ;]gfklt
5Fqa[lQ, Veteran's Home, ;}lgs dxflaBfno, g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo la1fg ;+:yfg 5fqa[lQ, ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L C0f
;x'lnot h:tf sfo{qmdxnfO{ cem} a[xt ub}{ nu]sf] 5 . o;sf] cltl/Qm ;sn bhf{sf kl/jf/nfO{ lgMz'Ns ;Lkd"ns
tflndx k|bfg u/L pgLxnfO{ :jfjnDaL agfpg] lbzftk{m sbd rfln;s]sf] 5 . axfnjfnf ;sn bhf{xnfO{
;d]t ;]jfs} l;nl;nfdf ;Lkd"ns tflnd k|bfg u/L cjsfz k|fKt ePkl5 cfkm\g} v'fdf pleg ;Sg] ;Ifd agfpg]
sfo{ ljutb]lv ub}{ cfPsf] 5 . ;du|df g]kfnL ;]gfn] k|bfg ug]{ :jf:Yo ;]jf, :jf:Yo aLdf tyf ljljw sNof0fsf/L
Mechanism af6 ;sn bhf{ tyf kl/jf/x nfeflGjt e}/x]sf 5g\ .
!*= dfly pNn]lvt sNof0fsf/L ;x'lnotxsf] dxTj cf-cfk\mg} :yfgdf eP klg g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/n]
pknJw u/fO/x]sf] lgMz'Ns :jb]z tyf ljb]zdf ul/g] pkrf/nfO{ ljz]if dxTjsf ;fy x]g{ ;lsG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn]
/fli6o PsLs/0f cleofgb]lv Oltxf;sf] ljleGg sfnv08df g]kfn / g]kfnL hgtfsf] ;'/Iff / enfO{sf] nflu cfkm\gf]
Hofg cfx'tL lb+b} cfPsf] Oltxf; ;fIfL 5, h;n] ubf{ g]kfnL ;]gfn] g]kfnL hgtfsf] ;w} ;fy kfO/x]sf] 5 . o'4sf]
;dodf g]kfnL ;]gfn] 5fltdf uf]nL yfk]/ b]z / hgtfsf] enfO{sf] nflu nl8/of] . o;/L n8\gsf] nflu g]kfn ;/sf/
/ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] sNof0fsf/L of]hgfaf6 k|fKt x'g] sNof0fsf/L ;'ljwfxnfO{ dxTjk"0f{ Motivating Factor sf]kdf
lng ;lsG5 . cem} lglZrtkdf ls6fgLsf] ;fy eGg' kbf{ g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/n] o'4sf] d}bfgb]lv pgLxsf]
cfl>t kl/jf/xnfO{ lgMz'Ns pknJw u/fpg] d]l8sn ;]jfnfO{ ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]an pRr kfg]{ Ps k|d'v
Contributing Factor sf]kdf lng ;lsG5 . log} ;]jf ;x'lnotsf] sf/0f x/]s l;kfxLn] o'4sf] d}bfgdf h:tf];'s}
hf]lvd klg Right Cause sf] nflu slQ klg ljrlnt geO{ lgjf{x ug{ k|f]T;flxt x'G5, oL ;a}sf] sf/stTj d]l8sn
sf]/nfO{ lng ;lsG5 . t;y{, d]l8sn sf]/nfO{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]an pRr /fVg] Pp6f dxTjk"0f{ ;|f]tsf]kdf lng
;lsG5 .
d]l8sn sf]/sf pknJwLx
!(=

ljutb]lv xfn;Dd g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/sf] pknJwLx a'bfutkdf lgDgfg';f/ k|:t't ul/Psf] 5M-s_
s]Gb|df >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn / k'g:y{fkgf s]Gb|, k"j{ tyf klZrd If]qsf] nflu lkmN8 c:ktfnx /
;a} jflxgL txdf jflxgL lkmN8 PDa"n]G; ;+rfng u/L Decentralization dfkm{t pkrf/ ;]jfnfO{ a9L ;IFd,
nrs / k|efjsf/L agfPsf] .
-v_
>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn leq}
pNn]vgLo of]ubfg k'ofPsf] .

HIV Center :yfkgf

u/L /fi6JofkLkdf

HIV/AIDS lgoGq0f

cleofgdf

-u_
xfQLkfOn], O{G;]km\nfOl6;, d]gO{GhfOl6;, x]kf6fOl6; la h:tf /f]u lgjf/0f ug]{ /fli6o cleofgdf
pNn]vgLo of]ubfg k'ofO/x]sf] .
51

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

-3_

ldlt @)^&^)@ ut] b]lv g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfg cGt{ut College of Medicine /
College of Nursing :yfkgf u/L ;f]sf] Jojxfl/s 1fg >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnjf6 pknAw u/fpg] ePaf6 ca
pk|FGt o; c:ktfn General Hospital dfq geO{ Teaching Hospital ;d]t x'g k'u]sf] .
-_
cfkm\gf Medical Personnel xsf] nflu :t/ cg';f/ :jb]z / ljb]zdf lgMz'Ns j[lQ ljsf;sf
cj;/x pknAw u/fO{ /fi6s} nflu of]Uo / Huge Medical Man Power tof/ u/]sf] .
-r_
lautsf] Gaf6 kLl8t ;}lgs tyf u}/ ;}lgs 3fOt]x tyf ckfxsf] k'g:yf{kgsf] nflu ;}lgs
k'g:y{fkgf s]Gb| :yfkgf u/L xfn ;f]nfO{ /fli6o:t/sf] k'g:y{fkgf s]Gb| lgdf{0f ug]{tkm{ k|of; eO/x]sf] .
-5_
h:tf];'s} kl/l:yltdf -h:t}M g]kfn ;/sf/af6 kof{Kt cfly{s pNemg lgsf; gx'bf ;d]t_ klg
g]kfnL ;]gfsf jxfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|FKt ;sn bhf{ / kl/jf/nfO{ lg/Gt/ lgMz'Ns pkrf/ ;]jf pknAw
u/fPsf] .
-h_
cfjZos kg]{ cf}ifwL / d]l8sn ;fdu|Lx oy]i6 / ;dod} k'tf{n u/L
lgT;flxt ub}{ ldtJooLtf xfl;n ul//x]sf] .

Local Purchase

nfO{

-em_ /fli6o ljkb\sf] 38L tyf cGo ;dodf klg ;a}eGbf l56F] / cu|k\lQmdf /x]/ g]kfnL hgtfnfO{
d]l8sn /fxt pknAw u/fO{ hgtfsf] dg lhTg ;kmn /x]sf] .
-`_

Hospital Preparedness for Emergency sf]

-6_

Mass Casualty Evacuation sf]

nflu tof/L xfntdf /x]sf] .

nflu ;IFd / ;w+} tof/Ldf /x]sf] .

-7_
g]kfndf pkrf/ x'g g;Sg] Chronic lj/fdLxnfO{ pRr pkrf/ ;'ljwf k|FKt c:ktfn -:jb]z tyf
ljb]z_ df nlu lgMz'Ns pkrf/ ;]jf pknAw u/fPsf] .
-8_
ITCU

g]kfndf >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfndf dfq uDeL/ k|s[ltsf lj/fdLxnfO{

;'ljwf ;d]t pknAw u/fPsf] .

ICU, CCU, HCU sf]

cltl/Qm

-9_

;}lgs c:ktfn eP klg Emergency sf] ;dodf u}/ ;}lgs tyf c;xfo lj/fdLxnfO{ lgMz'Ns
First Aid pkrf/ pknAw u/fPsf] .
-0f_

of

lgs6 eljiodf g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo la1fg ;+:yfg cGt{ut College of Dental Surgery /
Medical Poly Technique :yfkgf ug]{ sfo{ b|'t ultdf eO/x]sf] .

College

-t_

>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfndf ;Lldt Ifdtfsf] dfq} eP klg Hospital Management Information System
SoftWare nfu" u/L Data Base System df sfd ug]{ jftfj/0f l;h{gf ul/;s]sf] .
-y_
g]kfnL ;]gf ;+o'Qm /fi6 ;+3Lo zflGt ;]gfdf t}gfy x'bf ldzg Onfsfsf :yfgLo hgtf tyf
;xefuL /fi6sf ;]gfnfO{ ;d]t pkrf/ u/L ljb]zdf g]kfn / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] gfd phfu/ ul//x]sf] .
-b_
xfn ;+o'Qm /fi6 ;+3Lo zflGt ;]gfdf t}gfy x'g] g]kfnL ;}lgsnfO{ Level-I c:ktfn pknAw u/fO{
/x]sf] / eljiodf v6fpg' kg]{ cj:yfdf !-@ j6F Level-II c:ktfn ;d]t t}gfy ug{ ;Sg] Ifdtf /x]sf] .

;'emfjx?
@)= g]kfnL ;]gfsf] cfw'lgsLs/0Fsf] lbzfdf ePsf k|of;x k|z+;gLo 5g\ . cfw'lgsLs/0Fsf] l;nl;nfdf d]l8sn
sf]/nfO{;d]t ;dflxt u/L ;du| g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ k|efjsf/L d]l8sn ;kf]6{ k|bfg ug{ s]xL dxTjk"0F{ ;'emfjx lgDg
cg';f/ k|:t't ul/Psf] 5M-s_
ljutsf] GkZrft g]kfnL ;]gfsf] b/aGbL em08} bf]Aj/ ePsf], t/ xfn;Dd klg >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn,
lkmN8 c:ktfn tyf lkmN8 PDa'n]G; u'NdxnfO{ cfjZos ef}lts tyf Clinical k"jf{wf/x cem} klg kof{Kt
gePsf] x'bf ;f]sf] k|fyldstfsf] ;fy Joj:yf x'g' kg]{ b]lvG5 .
-v_
g]kfn ;/sf/sf lghfdtL sd{rf/LxnfO{ cf}ifwL pkrf/sf] nflu jflif{s hgxL =!))).- - Ps
xhf/_ pknAw x'g] t/ g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ ;f] cg';f/ cf}ifwL pkrf/ vr{ lgsfzf geO{ clwsf+z vr{ xfd|}
52

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifjf6 Joxf]g{ jfWo x'g' k/]sf]n] g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ klg lghfdtL sd{rf/L ;/x cf}ifwL pkrf/
vr{ lgsfzf ug{ ljz]if kxn ug'{ kg]{ b]lvG5 .
-u_
sf7df08f} pkTosf aflx/sf lkmN8 c:ktfn tyf lkmN8 PDa'n]G; u'Ndxdf cfjZos d]l8sn
;'ljwfx kof{Kt gx'bf ;f]sf] ;Dk"0F{ ef/ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfndf kl//x]sf] / aflx/sf lj/fdLxn] ljleGg
;d:of ef]Ug afWo x'g' k/]sf]n] lkmN8 c:ktfn / lkmN8 PDa'n]G; u'NdxnfO{ k|Fyldstfsf ;fy Eqip ug'{
kg]{ b]lvG5 .
-3_
d]l8sn sf]/ leq ljleGg /f]u ;DjGwL cg';Gwfgsf] nflu
:yfkgf ug'{ kg]{ b]lvG5 .

Research and Development Center

-_
sf7df08f} pkTosfeGbf aflx/sf cfl>tkdf t}gfy ePsf ;a} u0f u'Ndxdf clgjfo{kdf !!
hgf 8f=clws[t :yfg ljz]ifdf g} t}gfy ubf{ :jf:Yo ;]jf cem k|efjsf/L x'g] b]lvG5 .
-r_
g]kfnsf] t/fO{ tyf dWokxf8L If]qdf laiffn' ;k{sf] 6f]sfOaf6 jif]{gL w]/} dflg;xsf] Hofg hfg]
u/]sf] 36\gfnfO{ b[li6ut u/L >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn tyf t/fO{ If]qdf t}gfy /x]sf lkmN8 c:ktfn tyf lkmN8
PDa'n]G; u'Ndxdf Specialized Anti Snake pkrf/ ;'ljwf pknAw u/fpg' kg]{ b]lvG5 .
-5_
>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn, lkmN8 c:ktfn tyf lkmN8 u'Ndxdf
cnu u/fPdf Hygiene and Sanitation sf] :t/ ;'wf/ x'g] b]lvG5 .

OPD tyf In Door Patient ejg

-h_
ldq/fi6 rLgjf6 k|z:t d]l8sn ;kf]6{ k|fKt ePsf] t/ ;f]sf] nflu pko'Qm
gePsf]n] e"sDk lg/f]ws High Tech Building lgdf{0F x'g'kg]{ b]lvG5 .

cnu

High Tech Building

-em_ xfd|f] c:ktfn / ldq/fi6xsf] ;}lgs c:ktfn aLr ;+o'Qm d]l8sn tflnd, cEof; tyf ;xsfo{
cem} lj:tf/ u/L xfd|f] d]l8sn hgzlQmnfO{ a9L ;] a9L International Exposure lbg] jftfj/0f l;h{gf ug'{
kg]{ b]lvG5 .
-`_
g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;sn bhf{sf 5f]/f5f]/LxnfO{ a9L nfeflGjt ug]{ p2]Zon] g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg
;+:yfg cGtu{t egf{ x'g] ljBfyL{ ;+Vof cem} j[l4 ug'{ kg]{ b]lvG5 .
-6_
>L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn, k'g:yf{kgf s]Gb|, lkmN8 c:ktfn tyf lkmN8 u'Ndxdf Go"gtd cfjZos ;jf/L
;fwgx -ldlga;, ldlg 6s, lks ck lhk, PDa'n]G; tyf ;j jfxg_ ;d]t gePsf]n] ;f]sf] ;d]t
Joj:yf x'g'kg]{ b]lvG5 .
;+IF]k
@!=
g]kfnL ;]gfsf] cfw'lgsLs/0F cleofg ;u} g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/n] hL c8\8fsf] lgb]{zg / ;xof]udf
;sn bhf{ / kl/jf/nfO{ lgMz'Ns, ;dfog's"n, e/kbf]{ / ljZj;gLo d]l8sn ;]jf k|bfg ub}{ cfO/x]sf] 5 . d]l8sn
sf]/n] zflGt / o'4sfnLg, k|fs[lts tyf s[lqd ljkb\ / ;+o'Qm /fi6 ;+3Lo zflGt ;]gfdf sfo{/t /x]sf] cj:yfdf
ljZj;gLo d]l8sn ;]jf k|bfg u/L ;Dk"0F{ g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ /fi6n] ;'lDkPsf] lhDd]jf/L k"/f ug{ ;w} clek|]l/t /
dgf]an k|bfg ul//x]sf] 5 . d]l8sn sf]/nfO{ o;/L ;IFd agfpg g]kfn ;/sf/af6 klg oyfzSo ;xof]u k|fKt ePsf]
5 . Jofkskdf o;nfO{ yk phf{ lbg] sfo{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] g]t[Tj ju{ tyf sNof0fsf/L sf]ifn] dxTjk"0F{ e"ldsf lgjf{x
u/]sf] 5 .
@@=
jt{dfg @! cf}+ ztfAbLdf d]l8snsf] IF]qdf ljleGg gljgtd\ k|ljlwx k/LIF0f eO{ ;]jfdf nfu" eO;s]sf
5g\ . xfd|f] b]z leq klg o:tf gljg k|ljlwx k|j]z ul/;s]sf 5g\ . ;do / k|ljlwsf] ult;u} o:tf k|ljlwnfO{ g]kfnL
;]gf d]l8sn sf]/n] cfTd;ft ug'{ ;dosf] dfu eO;s]sf] 5 . o:tf gljg k|ljlwxdfkm{t g]kfnL ;]gf / kl/jf/nfO{
pkrf/ ;]jf k|bfg ug{ ;lsPdf ;sn bhf{sf] dgf]an cem lj:tf/ eO{ /fi6 / g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;'Dk]sf lhDd]jf/Lx
lgM:jfy{, b[9tf / kl/kSjtfsf ;fy lgjf{x ug{ yk phf{ ldNg] b]lvG5 .

53

54

524561

510

614

107

221260

58511

127987

115572

067/068

647437

161

582

69

70262

113834

227668

234861

065/66

766908

18532

2013

6603

193156

137035

147214

262355

066/067

861841

7770

963

12

225671

152567

183569

291289

067/068

4216

2993

1212

065/66

8671

27

364

5358

2920

066/067

Operation

8253

31

41

259

688

5020

2212

067/068

6776

12

17

778

546

3013

2405

065/66

8079

10

1336

914

3344

2469

066/067

Admission

8088

1430

878

3250

2524

067/068

6570

13

741

506

2916

2386

065/66

7714

1321

894

3097

2392

066/067

Discharge

8030

11

1304

894

3209

2606

067/068

216

10

79

110

17

065/66

402

198

76

103

25

066/067

Death

454

122

74

222

36

067/068

# S4PM>OH3VI@ W<RIQI2^ G:RJKI9EI!/M/@*E_ FNWIQN_OWOMIG/["VI@ FI\I[@VMLI^ ODWIH3VI@ MW0N_GIOIW[

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OMZIMIVQ
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 !/M/@*E_ FNWIQGIH3VISNUI
OMZI["QI2^ ONP1FNWIQONP13'D
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J@OMIG/VI@9RIGIM>OH3VI@W<RIGIE@OY3WINOJRI@9RIOMIG/VI@9RIM>OH3NO_MW0M>O[
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[@VI@E@OY*

 N/,IIGIOQ23VIMLI^["GI[@VMLI^MI<RN/,IIXJ@^FN@]JHJI^W\IOUIK^[
J@OMIG/["VI@9RIN_7R@VMLI^M>OH3VI@E@OY*

505989

16815

1189

34

182084

56967

126346

122554

066/067

Investigation
(Radiology & Pathology)

JI@0 Non Military Personnel H*JIQ@ J@NIQ/@JIVI@ FNWIQDIOJRGIJ

ISNUI
OMZIN_I.WXJ@^ OJKIGW/VG^UI/KW`0,IIG*TIQR,IIQ@YIOJR*TVFIOEVIVG^UI/
NE^J?

N_W
WW<RIVI@OJUI@0

435956

1356

Civilians

Grand Total

3156

Non Military
Personnel

85674

Ex Army Family

36

38283

Ex Army

APF / Nepal Police

147051

Regular Army
Family

160400

065/66

Regular Army

Description

S.No

Out Patients & Emergency

!/M/@*E_FNWIQGIOMXWMLI^VI@
OMIG/["VI@W<RI

N@KAVI@.RIIA}X'DO*ZWB

NOO]LVr

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

The Mandarin Duck Formation of General Qi

Jiguang
- Trailokya Raj Aryal
1.
In the 16th century China soldiers had one of the lowest social standings1. The ruling
Ming dynasty (1368-1644) had decided that the military should sustain itself and the soldiers,
except those deployed in the frontier regions were not even supplied with ration, let alone
given any pay. As a result, the soldiers had to either sell or mortgage their land given to them
by the state for farming following the peace time policy of creating a self-sustained army.
Naturally, this led to a high desertion of the soldiers.2 Many of those who stayed on too
were preoccupied with making their ends meet, rather than executing their responsibility as
soldiers. Unsurprisingly, both domestic and external forces made attempts to undermine the
states authority by staging rebellions and attacking the frontier regions. In many instances,
a small number of bandits, nomads and pirates easily defeated hundreds and thousands of
soldiers. Although the rebellions and frontier attacks were quelled by suffering huge losses,
the problem of pirates along the east coast of the empire needed a careful handling. According
to Ray Huang, in one instance in 1555 AD, A band of pirates, reportedly fifty to seventy
men, was bold enough to maraud inland on a route that encircled the southern capital, which
unbelievably had a garrison boasting, at least on paper, 120,000 men.3 Clearly, something
needed to be done and the responsibility to effectively deal with the pirates fell on General Qi
Jiguang.
2.
General Qi Jiguang (1528-1588 AD) came from a military family and as it was the
tradition then, following his fathers death, he inherited his fathers position in the army as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Dengzhou Garrison at the age of 17. 4 His discipline, bravery in
the battlefields, leadership and loyalty to the empire soon earned him not only the respect of
his subordinates, but also the nick name, Tiger General and as such it was not a surprise that
in 1557 AD he was appointed to deal with the pirates in the eastern coast, in what is todays
Zhejiang province, where the foreign pirates working together with the locals had emerged as
a formidable force. They not only came inland to establish their bases, but also seized walled
cities. But since they came in ships and targeted the coastal regions, many historians refer to
them as pirates.
3.
General Qi was aware of Sun Tzus maxim that before fighting an organized enemy,
one must know himself and the enemy well. He understood that the pirates and their local
accomplices were exploiting the armys weakness arising from low morale, lack of discipline
and training. He was quite aware of the problems in the army such as salary, recruitment
methods and the system of rewards and punishment. Therefore, he had to revamp the military
before fighting the pirates. According to Huang, His book, Ji Xiao Xin Shu (New Book
Recording Effective Techniques), reveals that Qi himself settled the recruiting procedure,
decided the pay scale, devised general rules governing personnel assignment, standardized
the organization of combat formations, selected weapons and issued his own orders of court
1

http://totallyhistory.com/ming-dynasty-military/

Fairbank, John K. & Goldman, M. 2006. China: A New History. Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press.

Huang, R. 1981. 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline. New Haven, USA: Yale University Press.

http://history.cultural-china.com/en/50History11684.html
55

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g]kfnL ;]gf

martial, which, based on the principle of group responsibility, compelled both officers and
men to guarantee one anothers performance in combat on threat of the death penalty 5 as the
problem of soldiers fleeing at the first sight of the enemy was quite common. Not surprisingly,
with his determination and leadership, General Qi was soon able to create a disciplined army.
His next step was to train the solders for combats.
4.
As the pirates were skilled at using contact weapons, he too, emphasized the training
on the use of contact weapons for his troops. The fact that he even came up with the steps
to manufacture the short sword proves that he was determined to strike a deadly blow to the
pirates.6
5.
However, like every able general, General Qi understood that although the weapons
were important, it was the team spirit of the soldiers that led to victory in battles. He figured
out that the pirates invincibility resulted from their close teamwork in small units and skilled
handling of contact weapons. As Huang explains, Infantry tactics, in fact accounted for most
of their (pirates) field performance. The twin swords were wielded with such dexterity that
onlookers could only see the flash of the weapon, not the man. 7 Therefore, he developed a
tactic called the Mandarin Duck Formatio (Yuan Yang Zhen) to emphasize teamwork in small
units and it was this tactic that was instrumental in defeating the pirates.
6.
The Mandarin Duck Formation was based around a unit of 12 men. According to
Turnbull, Four spearmen constituted the main striking force, with four more soldiers acting as
a protective shield. Two of them had shields: the one on the right held an elongated pentagonshaped shield, while the man on the left had a round shield. He was supposed to throw javelins
then crawl forward towards the enemy to lure them into the open. They were followed by
two men carrying bamboo trees complete with upper branches. These simple devices were
intended to pinion the pirates to the ground. Behind the spearmen were two rearguard men
with fork-headed polearms, from which arrows could be fired by gunpowder. A corporal and a
cook/porter completed the dozen. 8 Since the formation resembled a duck, it became known
as the mandarin duck formation. The beauty or the essence of this formation was such that
there was no room for individual heroism, the squad of 12 men had to work as a team and one
members mistake could cost the life of all and under no circumstances should the lancers

Fig 1: Mandarin Duck Formation (Courtesy: China History Forum)

5

Huang, 1981.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ji_Xiao_Xin_Shu

Huang, 1981

Turnbull, S. 2007. Pirate of the Far East: 811-1639. USA: Osprey Publishing
56

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

be separated from their protective screen. However, when the situation demanded, General
Qi allowed the formation to split into two identical sections and proceed abreast; or leaving
the fork carriers behind, it could line up the eight soldiers in a continuous front line with the
lancers alternating with those carrying shields and bamboo trees. 9
7.
As someone well-versed in the Sun Tzus classic, The Art of War, General Qi realized
that battle was a costly affair and a general needed to take many factors into account before
launching an attack on the enemy. Therefore, following Sun Tzus advice, he developed a
network of spies who would report to him about the enemys activities. He took the intelligence
reports seriously and planned his offensives based on them. And just as Sun Tzu writes in the
sixth chapter of his book, Strengths and Weaknesses, General Qi made sure that his troops
occupied the battlefield first and waited for the enemy.
8.
Given all these preparations, it was not surprising that General Qis army started to
emerge victorious in the battlefields. The pirates then had no choice but to move southward
to Fujian. General Qi followed them there too, and was able to rid the country of the problem
that had been plaguing it for many decades. By the early 1560s, there were no more pirate
raids in Chinas coastal regions. However, defeating the pirates was only one of General Qis
achievements in his long illustrious career. After defeating the pirates in the south, he was sent
to fight the rebels in the north. There too he emerged victorious10. There is no doubt that he
was an exceptional general whose main concern was to defend his country from internal and
external security threats and he fulfilled his duty with utmost dedication until his dismissal in
1585 AD owing to political reasons. His role in strengthening Chinas defense is acknowledged
by all, and it comes as no surprise that he is considered one of the most famous generals in
Chinese history.
9.
One can argue that General Qis success against the pirates had three main components
leadership, innovative approach to problem solving and the ability to put theories into practice.
If it was not for his leadership, it would have been impossible to create a disciplined army.
He realized that if a general is to earn his soldiers respect and loyalty, then he had to not only
instill discipline on them, but also take care of their immediate problems. Therefore, he made
sure that his troops were paid and fed while on active duty. If he had not come up with the
Mandarin Duck Formation, an innovative approach to problem solving by focusing on close
cooperation among the squad members, then perhaps, he would not have been successful to
wipe out the pirates. Similarly, his success also underscores the fact that a general should be
well-versed in military theories and put those theories in practice to emerge victorious in the
battlefields.
10.
Although the nature of warfare has changed a lot from General Qis time and the modern
warfare is fought more with technology as opposed to the ancient and medieval practice of
close combats, the formula for success, i.e., close teamwork, leadership and problem solving
skills of the commanding general are as important today, as it was in the past. Therefore, there
is no reason why we should not study the lives of the past military heroes, both national and
international, as their lives, just like General Qis, provide us with a valuable lesson that when
a general is just, upright, skilled and dedicated to the cause of national defense, there is no way
of defeating his troops.

Huang, 1981

10

http://history.cultural-china.com/en/50History11684.html

57

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

/fli6o zlQmsf tTjx ;DaGwL Ps ;+lIfKt cWoog

;]gfgL ljlht/fh /]UdL
kl/ro
!= ;fdfGo cy{df To:tf tTjx h;n] Pp6f /fi6sf] ;dli6ut zlQm -Overall Power_ df 7f]; of]ubfg
lbO/x]sf x'G5g\, To;nfO{ /fli6o zlQmsf tTjx -Elements of National Power_ elgG5 . csf]{ zAbdf eGg] xf]
eg] h'g tTjxdf k|ToIf jf ck|ToIf ?kdf /fli6o zlQmdf clej[l4 ug{ ;Sg] ;fdYo{ jf Ifdtf -Potentiality or
Capability_ x'G5, To;nfO{ g} /fli6o zlQmsf tTjx elgG5 . To:tf tTjx cfkm}df k"0f{ gx'g] / Pscfk;df
;DalGwt Pj+ k"/s /x]sf x'G5g\, To;}n] o:tf tTjxnfO{ dxTjsf] cfwf/df juL{s/0f -Categories_ ug{ eg] ufx|f]
x'G5 .
@=

/fli6o zlQmsf tTjx ;DaGwL ljZn]if0f ug'e

{ Gbf cufl8 o;;u ;DalGwt zlQm / /fhg}lts zlQm -Power
and Political Power_ tyf /fli6o zlQmsf ;fwgx -Instruments of National Power_ sf] af/]df pNn]v ug{
pko'Qm x'g] b]lvG5 .
-s_
zlQm / /fhg}lts zlQm
s'g} klg /fi6sf] /fli6o zlQmnfO{ slxn]sfxL To; /fi6sf] zlQm jf
/fhg}lts zlQm;u hf]8/] x]g{] u/]sf] ;d]t kfOG5 . zlQmnfO{ lj:t[t?kdf x]bf{, k|sfz rGb|fsf cg';f/, cfkm\gf]
cfsf+IffnfO{ kl/k"lt{ ug{sf] nflu c?nfO{ lgoGq0f ug{ ;Sg' jf cfkm\gf] OR5frfxgf cg';f/ c?nfO{ rNg]
agfpg ;Sg] Ifdtf jf ;fdYo{ xf] eGg] a'lemG5 -Chandra Prakash 2004, 73_ . >Lw/ vqLsf] ljrf/df,
zlQm dfkg ug{ g;lsP tfklg ;DalGwt kIfn] csf]{ kIfsf] lqmofsnfk tyf Jojxf/df s]-slt x:tIf]k jf
k|efj kfg{ ;S5 To;}sf] cfwf/df g} p;sf] zlQm slt 5 eGg] hfGg' kg]{ x'G5 -Khatri 2001, 7_ . af:tjdf,
du{Gyfpsf] egfO{ h:t}, cGt/f{li6o /fhgLlt klg cGo /fhgLlt h:t} zlQmsf] 6s/fj g} xf] -Morgenthau
1973, 27_ . To:t}, s]xL ljfgxsf] egfOdf, /fhg}lts zlQm eGgfn], h;n] /fhg}lts zlQmsf] cEof;
u5{ tyf h;dfly cEof; ul/G5 ltgLx aLrsf] dgf]j}1flgs ;DaGw xf] / o:tf] zlQm k|of]u ug]{n] csf]{
kIfsf s]xL lqmofsnfkxdf lgoGq0f ug{ ;Ifd x'G5 h'g csf]{ kIfsf] lbdfudf kf/]sf] k|efjsf] sf/0fn]
g} ;Dej x'G5 . /fli6o zlQmsf] ;DaGwdf, of] o:tf] IFdtf xf] h;sf] k|of]uaf6 g} s'g} klg /fi6 cfkm\gf
/fli6o :jfy{x k"lt{ ug{ ;IFd x'G5 / o;af6 g} cGt/f{li6o k|0ffnLdf pQm /fi6sf] :yfg -Status_ lgwf{/0F
x'G5 eGg] h:tf egfOx klg kfOG5g\ . t/, cGt/f{li6o?kdf dfGotf k|fKt o:tf] cul0ftLo ;"q eg] 5}g,
h;af6 s'g} /fi6sf] jf:tljs zlQm s]-slt 5 eGg] olsg lx;fa lgsfNg jf dfkg ug{ ;lsof];\ .
-v_

/fli6o zlQmsf ;fwgx

s'g} klg /fi6n] cfkm\gf] zlQmsf] k|of]u jf k|bz{g ug]{ dfWod -Tools
or Means_ nfO{ g} /fli6o zlQmsf ;fwgx elgG5 . o:tf ;fwgxnfO{ /fhg}lts -Political_, cfly{s
-Economic_, ;}lgs -Military_ / va/ -Informational_ u/L d'Votof rf/ k|sf/df afl8Psf] kfOG5 .
obfsbf ljleGg /rgfxdf p:t} h:tf] nfUg] u/L JofVof u/]sf] ;d]t kfOP klg, /fli6o zlQmsf ;fwgx
eGgfn] zlQm k|of]u ug]{ dfWod / /fli6o zlQmsf tTjx eGgfn] /fli6o zlQmnfO{ 6]jf lbg] tTj ePsf] x'bf
oL b'O{ zAbfjnLxnfO{ km/s-km/s cy{df k|of]u ul/G5 .
#=

/fli6o zlQmsf tTjxnfO lgDg cg';f/ x]g{ ;lsg] b]lvG5M

-s_
s'g} klg /fi6nfO{ cfkm\gf] :jtGqtf, ef}uf]lns cv08tf, ;fj{ef}d;Qf / /fli6o PstfnfO{ cIf'00f /fVb}
cfkm\gf d"No dfGotf Pj+ klxrfgx -Norms, Values and Identities_ sfod /fv]/ /fi6sf] ;du| ljsf;
ug{ /fli6o zlQmsf] cfjZostf kb{5 . /fli6o zlQm ljleGg tTjaf6 lgdf{0F x'g] tyf To:tf tTjxdf
/fhg}lts, cfly{s / ;}lgs If]q jf /fi6sf] ;dli6ut zlQm clej[l4sf] nflu k|ToIf jf ck|ToIf?kdf of]ubfg
ug{ ;Sg] Ifdtf ePsf] x'bf To:tf tTjxsf] dxTj w]/} g} /x]sf] x'G5 .
-v_

l;4fGttM ljZjsf x/]s /fi6 cfkm\gf] /fi6df ePsf /fli6o zlQmsf tTjxsf] n]vfhf]vf u/]/
58

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

To:tf x/]s tTjxnfO{ leGbfleGb} / ;dli6ut?kdf /fli6o zlQm s;/L a9fpg] eg]/ ;b}j sl6a4 x'G5 .
k|To]s /fi6n] cfkm\gf x/]s cj:yfnfO{ lj:t[tdf ljZn]if0f u/]/ cfkm\gf] /fli6o zlQmsf] Ifdtf cg';f/ cfkm\gf]
/fli6o lxt -National's Interests_ kl/eflift u/L /fli6o p2]Zox -National's Goals/Objectives_ to
u/]/ To;nfO{ k|fKt ug{ /fli6o gLlt (National Policies) / ljleGg /fli6o /0fgLlt -National Strategies_
lgwf{/0f ug]{ ub{5 . To;}n] x/]s /fi6sf] nflu cfkm\gf] /fli6o zlQm tyf /fli6o zlQmdf 6]jf lbg] To:tf x/]s
tTjxsf] dxTj /x]sf] x'G5 .
-u_
s'g} klg To:tf zlQmsf tTjx cfkm}df kl/k"0f{ -Independent_ x'b}gg\ / o:tf tTjx Ps
cfk;df k"/s -Complementary_, ;DalGwt Pj+ ;xof]uL -Co-operative_ x'G5g\ . cem k|i6?kdf eGbf
To:tf tTjx Pp6f ;du| k|0ffnLsf Ps cleGg cx -Integral Parts of a System_ x'g\, h;n] /fli6o
zlQmdf dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]N5g\ / cfk;df Ps ljz]if cGt/;DaGw -Synergistic Interrelationship_ f/f
/fi6sf] zlQm a9fpg] ub{5g\ . To;}n] oL x/]s tTjxsf] cf-cfkm\g}] dxTj /x]sf] x'G5 .
p2]Zo
$= o; cWoogsf] p2]Zo /fli6o zlQmsf dxTjk"0F{ tTjxsf] af/]df ;+lIfKt?kdf ljZn]if0f u/L o:tf tTjxsf]
dxTjsf] ljifodf k|sfz kfg'{ xf] .
/fli6o zlQmsf ljleGg tTjx
%= ljleGg ljfg Pj+ n]vsxn] ljleGg vfnsf tTjxnfO{ /fli6o zlQmsf tTjxsf] ?kdf JofVof u/]sf]
kfOG5 . kfNd{/ / kfsL{G;n] e"uf]n -Geography_, sRrf kbfy{ / k|fs[lts ;|f]t -Raw Materials and Natural
Resources_, hg;+Vof -Population_, k|ljlw -Technology_, cfbz{ljrf/ -Ideology_, g}ltstf -Moral_ / g]t[Tj
-Leadership_ nfO{ d'Vo tTjxsf] ?kdf lnPsf] kfOG5 -Parlmer and Parkins 2007, 31_ . du]{Gyfpn], tL nufot
/fli6o rl/q / k|lta4tf -National Character and Will_, ;]gf -Military_, ;/sf/sf] :t/ / s"6gLlt -Quality
of Government and Diplomacy_ tyf cy{tGq -Economy_ nfO{ ;d]t /fli6o zlQmsf] tTjxsf] ?kdf lnPsf]
kfOG5 -Morgenthau op.cit._ . o;afx]s pgn] hg;+Vofdf dfgjLo Ifdtf -Human Potentiality_ tyf k|ljlwdf
lj1fg / cf}Bf]lus Ifdtf -Science and Industrial Capicity_ nfO{ ;d]t ;d]6]sf] kfOG5 -Ibid._ . o;}u/L rGb|fn],
oL tTjxdf ljrf/ -Idea_ / tLI0ftfaf}l4s Ifdtf -Intelligence_ h:tf tTjx ;d]t yk u/L ;Dk"0f{ tTjxnfO{
k|fs[lts -Natural_, ;fdflhs -Social_ / j}rfl/s -Ideation_ u/L tLg k|sf/df juL{s/0f u/]sf 5g\ -Chandra
op.cit., 75_ . o:tf tTjxnfO{ ljleGg ljfgxn] l:y/ (Stable) / kl/jt{glzn (Changing Constantly) jf
b]lvg] (Tangible) / cb[Zo (Intangible) u/L cGo ljleGg k|sf/xdf juL{s/0F u/]sf] ;d]t kfOG5 . o;/L ljleGg
k':ts / /rgfx cWoogkZrft ;fdfGotof cfk;df a9L cGt/lgxLt Pj+ ;DalGwt tTjxnfO{ Ps} 7fpdf /fv]/
cWoog / ljZn]if0f ubf{ ;lhnf] x'g] dx;'; ul/Psf] x'bf /fli6o zlQmsf d'Vo-d'Vo tTjxnfO{ lgDg cg';f/ lng
pko'Qm x'g] b]lvG5 .
-s_

e"uf]n

-v_

hg;+VofdfgjLo ;|f]t, /fli6o rl/qk|lta4tf / g}ltstf

-u_

k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{

-3_

lj1fg Pj+ k|ljlw cf}Bf]lus Ifdtf / cfly{s ;|f]t;Defjgfx

-_

;]gfsf] :t/

-r_

;/sf/ Pj+ s'6gLlts :t/, g]t[Tj / cfbz{ljrf/

/fli6o zlQmsf] tTj e"uf]n ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f

^=

/fli6o zlQmsf tTjxdWo] ;fdfGotof /fi6sf] e"uf]n g} ;aeGbf a9L l:y/ tTj xf] . t/ klg o;nfO{ l:y/
59

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

tTj g} xf] eg]/ 7F]s'jf eg] ug{ ;lsGg / ;'8fgaf6 6'lqmP/ xfn;fn} lgdf{0F ePsf] gof /fi6 blIf0f ;'8fg o;sf]
kl5Nnf] pbfx/0F xf] . cTofw'lgs k|ljlwsf] ljsf; nfdf] b"/Laf6 k|xf/ ug{ ;lsg] If]Kof:q / cf0Fljs xft-xltof/
xsf] pTkfbg nufotsf sf/0fxn] ubf{ ;}lgs b[li6sf]0faf6 x]bf{ e"uf]nsf] dxTj s]xL 36\g uPsf] 5 eGg] ts{
/x] tfklg o;sf] dxTj jf:tjd} 36]sf] kfOb}g . jf:tjdf s'g} klg /fi6sf] e"uf]nsf] ljZn]if0F ubf{ To; /fi6sf]
e"-/fhgLlt -Geo-Politics_ nufotsf ljifoxnfO{ ;d]t ;d]6]/ x]g'{ kg]{ x'G5 . ef}uf]lns tTjsf] ljZn]if0f ubf{
kfNd{/ / kfsL{G;sf cg';f/ IF]qkmncfsf/ -Size/Shape_, cjl:ylt -Location_, hnjfo' -Climate_, e"-agf]6
-Topography_ / l;dfgfx -Boundaries_ n] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]Ng] ub{5 -Parlmer and Parkins op.cit., 35_ .
;fgf] /fi6 ePklg, hndfu{af6 x'g] Jofkf/sf] nflu cg's"n :yfgdf /x]sf] / pko'Qm aGb/ufxxsf] sf/0f l;fk'/sf]
cjl:ylt Hofb} dxTjk"0f{ x'g k'Uof] . bf];|f] ljZjo'4df cGo sf/0fxsf ;fy} tTsfnLg ;f]leot ;+3sf] ljzfne"ld /
ljifd df};dsf] sf/0fn] ubf{ hd{gLn] p;sf] ;Dk"0f{ e"-efu sAhf ug{ g;s]/ lkmtf{ x'g' kof] . Oh/fon Ps ;fgf]
/fi6 eP klg rf/}lt/ d'l:nd /fi6xsf] dfemdf /x]sf] x'b f ljZj /fhgLltdf o;n] Ps ljz]if dxTj /fVb5 . ljZjsf
sof}+ 6fk'sf ?kdf /x]sf ;fgf /fi6x -h:t}- dflNbE;_ cGo ljleGg kIfxdf ;an eP klg hnjfo' kl/jt{g /
a9\bf] ljZj tfkqmd -Climate Change and Global Warming_ sf sf/0fn] ubf{ sfnfGt/df cfkm\gf] cl:tTjsf]
ljifodf g} lrlGtt /x]sf] ;d]t kfOG5 . To:t}, e"-kl/j]li7t /fi6xn] ;d'lGb|dfu{df kx'r
gePs} sf/0f cfkm\g} vfnsf
;d:ofx ef]lu/x]sf] klg kfOG5 . xfdLn] clk|msfsf s}of}+ /fi6xn] cGo l5d]sL /fi6xsf] cfGtl/s ;+s6sf
sf/0f pTkGg ePsf z/0FfyL{ tyf cGo ljljw lsl;dsf ;d:ofxnfO{ k|ToIF?kdf Joxf]g'{ k/]sf] klg b]v]sf 5f+} .
o;sf ;fy} Pp6F /fi6df z'? ePsf] wfld{shftLo ;d:of, l5d]sL /fi6xdf cfuf];/L s;/L km}lng] u5{ eGg] s'/f
klg xfdLn] clk|msfs} ljleGg /fi6xsf] Oltxf;af6 yfxf kfPsf 5f}+ . o;n] klg s'g} klg /fi6, l5d]sL /fi6xdf
ljBdfg jf eljiodf pTkGg x'g ;Sg] ljifd kl/l:yltxaf6 k|ToIF jf ck|ToIF?kdf k|efljt x'g ;Sg] ;Defjgf
;b}a /lx/xG5 eGg] s'/fsf] k'li6 ub{5 . dflysf pbfx/0fxaf6 s'g} /fi6sf] cfkm\gf] e"uf]n jf ljz]if ef}uf]lns
cjl:yltsf] sf/0Fn] ubf{ g} /fli6o zlQmdf 7f]; of]ubfg lbO/x]sf] jf lbg ;Sg] tyf s'g} /fi6x cfkm\gf] ef}uf]lns
l:yltsf sf/0fn] g} ;d:ofdf /x]sf] jf eljiodf ;d:of Joxf]g{' kg]{ ;Defjgf /x]sf] klg b]lvG5 .
&= g]kfnnfO{ Pp6f pbfx/0f -Case Study_ sf] ?kdf lnP/ p;sf] ef}uf]lns l:yltnfO{ ljljw kIfxaf6 x]/L
s]-s;/L Pp6f ;fgf] /fi6sf] ef}uf]lns cjl:yltnfO{ /fli6o zlQmsf] Ps ;an tTjsf]?kdf kl/0ft ug{ ;lsG5 eGg]
pbfx/0f lng ;lsG5 -Regmi 2009_ . ;fdfGotof g]kfnsf] ef}uf]lns cjl:yltnfO{ ljleGg kIFxaf6 ;+lIfKtdf
o;/L x]g{ ;lsG5 .
-s_
cjl:ylt / l;dfgf
ljZjsf b'O{ ljzfn /fi6x rLg / ef/tn] 3]l/Psf] e"-kl/j]li7t /fi6
g]kfnsf] ef/t;u s/La !%() ls=ld= v'nf l;dfgf / rLg;u s/La !$!$ ls=ld= l;dfgf hf]l8Psf] 5 .
-v_
IF]qkmncfsf/
g]kfn If]qkmnsf] lx;fan] ljZjsf] t];|f] 7"nf] /fi6 rLgeGbf sl/a ^* u'0ff /
ljZjsf] ;ftf}+ 7"nf] /fi6 ef/teGbf sl/a @# u'0ff ;fgf] /x]sf] 5 .
-u_
e"-agf]6 / hnjfo' !%%, ^*% / !&% qmdzM lxdfn, kxf8 / ;dyn e"-efu /x]sf] g]kfndf
s/La !$$ b]lv @$) ls=ld= -pQ/-blIf0f_ sf] sd b"/Ldf ^$ ld= b]lv **$* ld= ;Ddsf] prfO{ /x]sf]
x'bf, e"-agf]6 / hnjfo'df 7"nf] ljljwtf /x]sf] 5 .
-3_
l5d]sL /fi6xnfO{ g]kfnsf] ef}uflns cjl:yltsf] dxTj ;+o'Qm /fi6 ;+3df le6f] sf] clwsf/
/x]sf] ;'/Iff kl/ifb\sf] :yfoL ;b:o, cy{tGqdf ljZjsf] xfn bf];|f] / klxnf] x'g] k|of;df /x]sf], cf0fljs
xft-xltof/n] ;'-;DkGg ljZjsf !) eGbf sd /fi6xdWo] Ps /x]sf] tyf ljZjsf] ;aeGbf a9L hg;+Vof
ePsf] rLgn] cGo sf/0Fxsf ;fy} cfkm\gf] ;Da]bgzLn :jzfl;t If]q ltAat;u l;dfgf hf]l8Psfn] klg
g]kfnnfO{ Hofb} g} dxTjsf ;fy x]g]{ u/]sf] kfOG5 . o;sf ;fy} ;'/Iff kl/ifb\df :yfoL ;b:o aGg k|of;/t,
cf0fljs xft-xltof/n] ;'-;DkGg, ljZjsf] bf];|f] a9L hg;+Vof ePsf] / ljZjsf] /fd|f] cy{tGq ePsf bz
/fi6xdWo] Ps /x]sf] ef/t b'j} b]zsf gful/sx /fxbfgLk|j]zf1f kq ljgf g} Ps csf]{ b]zdf cfjthfjt ug{ ;Sg] k|Fjwfg tyf b'O{ /fi6sf hgtfx aLr cfk;df /x]sf] ;fdflhs, ;f+:s[lts Pj+ eflifs
;DaGw nufotsf sf/0fxn] ubf{ klg g]kfnnfO{ ljz]if dxTjsf] ?kdf ln+b} cfPsf] kfOG5 . ef/t cfkm\gf]
ljleGg /fHoxdf km}lnPsf] dfcf]jfbL / gSznjfbL h:tf ljleGg ljb|f]xL ultljlw, cfkm\gf] e"lddf x'g ;Sg]
60

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

cft+ssf/L ultljlw tyf cGt/b]zLo cfk/flws ultljlw -Cross Border Crimes_ cflbdf g]kfnL e"-efu
k|of]udf cfpg ;Sg] s'/fk|lt ;r]t /x]sf] a'lemG5 eg] rLg klg ltAat ;DaGwL ultljlwdf g]kfnsf] e"ld
k|of]u x'g ;Sg] ;Defjgfk|lt ;b}j ;+a]bgzLn /x]sf] kfOG5 .
*= ldq abNg ;lsG5 t/ l5d]sL abNg ;lsGg eGg] sygnfO{ dWogh/ /fVb} g]kfnnfO{ g} Case Study sf]
?kdf x]bf{ e"-kl/j]li7t ;fgf] / sd ljsl;t /fi6 eP klg cfkm\gf] ef}uf]lns cjl:yltnfO{ dgg ub}{ cGo s'/fsf] ;fy}
lgDgfg';f/ cufl8 a9]df x/]s b[li6sf]0Faf6 b'O{ ljzfn /fi6sf] aLrdf /x] tfklg cfkm\gf] ef}uf]lns cjl:ylt g]kfnsf]
nflu cj;/sf] ?kdf / cem k|i6;u eGbf /fli6o zlQmsf] Ps dxTjk"0f{ tTjsf] ?kdf kl/0Ft x'g ;Sg] b]lvG5
-Ibid._ .
-s_
;d lgs6tf (Equi-Proximity) sf] l;4fGt cg'?k /fd|f] ;DaGw /fVg]
olb cfkm\gf] cy{tGqnfO{
tLa| ultdf a[l4 ug{ b'j} l5d]sL /fi6x;u jf:tjd} /fd|f] / ;d-lgs6tf -Equi-Proximity_ sf] l;4fGt
cg';f/sf] ;DaGw sfod /fVg ;s]df .
-v_
cGt/f{li6o If]qdf cfkm\gf] egfO / e"ldsf /fVg ;xof]u
b'j} l5d]sL /fi6x;u /fd|f] ;DaGw /fvL
cfjZos k/]sf] ;dodf cGt/f{li6o If]qdf cfkm\gf] egfO{ /fVg / cfkm\gf] e"ldsf b]vfpg ;lqmo Pj+ ;sf/fTds
;xof]u lng ;s]df .
-u_
aGb/ufx, /]n / ;8sdfu{sf] ;b'kof]u
e"-kl/j]li7t eP klg ef/tsf] e"ld x'b} ef/t Pj
a+unfb]zsf aGb/ufx / rLgsf aGb/ufx;Dd ;'ud kx'+rsf] ;'ljwf k|fKt ug{ ;s]df tyf b'j} /fi6xdf
tLa|?kdf ljsf; ePsf] /]n Pj+ ;8sdfu{sf] k|0FfnL -Network_ sf] ;xh k|of]u / ;b'kof]u ug{ ;kmn
ePdf .
-3_
Link State sf] ?kdf ljsf; ug{ ;s]df
b'O{ l5d]sL /fi6x aLr a9\bf] cfk;L Jofkf/nfO{
dWogh/ /fvL ;xL tl/sfaf6 cfkm\gf] /fi6 x'b} b'O{ /fi6sf] Jofkf/ / ko{6g dfu{sf] lj:tf/ eO{ Link State
sf] ?kdf cfkm"nfO{ ljsf; ug{ ;s]df .
-_
pko'Qm ;}Go tof/L
g]kfnsf] las6 Pj+ ljifd e"-agf]6 / xfjfkfgLnfO{ dWogh/ /fvL ;f]xL
cg';f/sf] /0fsf}zntfsf] ljsf; / pko'Qm tof/L u/]df eljiodf ljz]if kl/l:ylt ;[hgf eO{ 7"nf] kmf}h Pj+
cTofw'lgs xft-xltof/ k|of]u ePdf klg g]kfnsf s]xL zx/xnfO{ cf+lzs?kdf Wj:t ug{ jf sAhf ug{
;lsxfn] klg k"/} e"-efunfO{ sAhf ug{ tyf lgoGq0f u/L /fVg ;Dej b]lv+b}g .
(= o;/L x/]s /fi6n] cfkm\gf] ljlzi6 ef}uf]lns cjl:yltnfO{ ;b'kof]u -Exploit_ ub}{ ;f]xL cg';f/ cfkm\gf gLlt
tyf /0FgLlt to u/L To;nfO{ Jojxf/df ptfg{ ;s]df cfkm\gf] e"uf]n jf ef}uf]lns cjl:yltnfO{ g} /fli6o zlQmsf]
Ps ;an tTjsf] ?kdf kl/0ft ug{ ;lsg] b]lvG5 .
/fli6o zlQmsf] tTj hg;+VofdfgjLo ;|f]t, /fli6o rl/qk|lta4tf / g}ltstf ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f
!)= oy]i6 hg;+Vof s'g} /fi6sf] nflu ;d:of jf Ps k|sf/n] af]emsf] ?kdf klg x'g ;S5 eg] s'g} /fi6df /fli6o
zlQmsf] tTjsf] ?kdf /x]sf] x'G5 . ;fdfGotof ljsl;t /fi6xsf] nflu hg;+Vof zlQmsf] ;|f]t / sd ljsl;t
/fi6sf nflu ToxL hg;+VofnfO{ ;xL tl/sfaf6 ;b'kof]u ug{ g;Sbf 7Ls ljk/Lt x'G5 eGg] ul/G5 . s'g} klg /fi6sf]
hg;+Vofn] tadfq /fli6o zlQmdf oy]i6 6]jf lbg ;S5, ha hgtfx cfk;df ;b\efj /fV5g\, /fli6o lxtk|lt
Psh'6 x'G5g\ tyf pgLxdf /fli6otfsf] efjgf x'G5 . cGo kIfxdf ;an eP klg hflt, wd{ / ;fDk|bflostf
h:tf ljifoxdf ljjfb eO{ cfk;df km'6 eP/ jf u/fOP/ pTkGg ePsf cfGtl/s snxsf sf/0fn] ubf{ g} ljZjsf
sof}+ /fi6xdf 7"nf-7"nf ;+s6x plAhPsf] pbfx/0fxaf/] xfdLnfO{ ljlbt} 5 . jf:tjdf, kfNd{/ / kfsL{G;sf]
ljrf/df h:t}, pd]/ / n}ls l:ylt, hGd / d[To'b/, hLjg:t/, :jf:Yo, lzIff, pTkfbglzntf, k/Dk/f, wfld{s
ljZjf;, ufp / zx/sf] hg3gTj, hftLo / ;fDk|bflos ;b\efj h:tf ljljw s'/fxn] klg hg;+Vof To; /fi6sf]
zlQm jf sdhf]/L x'G5 eGg] s'/fsf] s]xL xb;Dd lgSof}{n u5{ -Parlmer and Parkins op.cit., 65_ .
!!= /fli6o rl/qk|lta4tf, hgtfsf] ;f]rfO -Thinking_, Jojxf/ -Behaviour_, b[li6sf]0f -Attitude_ / cGo
ljljw s'/fxaf6 emlNsG5 . o;}u/L s'g} klg /fi6sf] g}ltstf To; /fi6sf hgtfsf] OdfGbfl/tf -Loyalty_, cf6
61

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g]kfnL ;]gf

-Courage_, ljZjf; -Faith_ / cfTd;Ddfg -Dignity_ af6 JoQm x'G5 . jf:tjdf /fli6o g}ltstf hgtfxsf]
ljleGg ljz]iftfxsf] ;du| ?k xf] / pgLx c? ;a} s'/fxeGbf xfd|f] /fi6 dfly xf] eGg] h:tf /fi6k|]dL
efjgfxaf6 k|]l/t ePdf To;n] klg /fli6o zlQmsf] tTjsf] ?kdf sfd u5{ .
!@= sd ljsl;t /fi6xsf] cj:yf x]bf{ Toxf z}lIfs If]q Tolt u'0f:t/Lo g/x]sf], a]/f]huf/Lsf] ;d:of JofKt
/x]sf], ePsf af}l4s ju{ klg ;bfsf] nflu ljsl;t /fi6xdf knfog -Brain Drain_ x'g] ;d:of /x]sf] / cGo
ljljw ;d:ofxsf sf/0f cfkm\gf] /fi6 leq} pBf]uJoj;fo ug'{sf] ;f /f]huf/Lsf] nflu ljb]zdf hfg] h:tf
k|j[lQ;d]t JofKt /x]sf] kfOG5 . o:tf /fi6xdf 5f]6f] cjlwsf] nflu cfly{s cj:yf wfGgdfq j}b]lzs /f]huf/sf]
ljsNk 7Ls} xf]nf, t/ Psflt/ b]zleq s[lif pTkfbg ug{ / pBf]uwGbf Pj+ snsf/vfgf cflb ;+rfng ug{ kf}/vL xft
gx'g] / csf]{tkm{ eg] ljb]zdf ;:tf] Pj++ cbIf sfdbf/ -Unskilled Labour_ sf] ?kdf kl;gf aufpg] sfo{ ;b}j
lg/Gt/?kdf rNg ;S5;Sb}g jf 7Ls xf]xf]Og eGg] af/]df To:tf /fi6xn] ulxl/P/ cWoog ug'{ kg]{ b]lvG5 . sd
ljsl;t /fi6xn] klg cGt/f{li6o :t/dfkb08 cg';f/sf] Jojxfl/s Pj+ k|fljlws lzIffsf] ljsf; af}l4s ju{sf]
:yfoL knfog /f]Sg 7f]; gLltsf] th'{df / j}b]lzs /f]huf/sf] ljsNksf] Joj:yf ub}{ ;fdflhs-/fhg}lts-;f:s[lts
;lxi0f'tf sfod /fvL hgtfsf ljleGg cfsf+Iff / efjgfxnfO{ ;d]6]/ s'g} klg ;Defljt d'7e]6 Pj+ cGt/GnfO{
cfpg' cufl8 g} ;dfwfg ub}{ cfkm\gf] /fli6o zlQm a9fpg ;Ifd x'g' kg]{ b]lvG5 . af:tjdf s[lif If]q xf];\, pBf]u
snsf/vfgf xf];\ jf cGo ljsf; lgdf{0fsf sfo{ g} lsg gxf];\, oL If]qsf] ljsf;sf] nflu cfw'lgs k|ljlw, k"hL
/ b"/bzL{ of]hgfsf ;fy} ljz]if u/L dfgj>dsf] ;d]t Hofb} g} 7"nf] dxTj x'G5 . To;}n] cfkm\gf] hg;+Vof dfgjLo
;|f]tnfO{ ;Ifd bIf Pj+ ;an agfO{ To;nfO{ ;xL tl/sfn] ;b'kof]u u/]/ x/]s /fi6n] cfkm\gf] /fli6o zlQm a9fpg
lg/Gt/?kdf k|of; ug'{ kg]{ b]lvG5 .
/fli6o zlQmsf] tTj k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{ ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f
!#=
k|s[ltaf6 pkxf/ k|fKt, ;b'kof]u ug{ ;lsg] ;fwgx -h:t} k|foM ;a} vlgh kbfy{, jGohGt', jg:klt,
jiff{ / hldgsf] pTkfbgzLntf_ nfO{ k|fs[lts ;|f]t elgG5 . tL dWo] s'g} -vlgh / jgh+un_ nfO{ k|fs[lts ;|f]t
/ sRrf kbfy{ b'j}sf]?kdf klg lng ;lsG5 . To:t} s]xL jg:kltx -h:t}- /a/, s6g cflb_ nfO{ sRrf kbfy{sf]
?kdf ?v la?jf /f]k]/ pTkfbg ug{ klg ;lsG5 . sRrf kbfy{nfO{ klg jg:klthGo pTkfbg -Vegetable Products_,
kz'hGo pTkfbg -Animal Products_ / vlgh -Minerals_ u/L tLg efudf af8]sf] kfOG5 . To;}u/L vlghnfO{ klg
wft' (Metal), u}/-wft' -Non-Metal_ / OGwg -Fuel_ u/L k'gM tLg efudf juL{s/0f ug]{ u/]sf] kfOG5 . kfNd{/
/ kfsL{G;sf] ljrf/df s'g} /fi6df sRrf kbfy{ eP klg pgLxn] To;df >d -Labour_, k|ljlw -Technology_
/ k"hL -Capital_ hf]8]/ -yk u/]/_ dfq ;Defljt IfdtfnfO{ jf:tljs pkof]udf kl/0ft ug{ ;S5g\ -Ibid._ .
pbfx/0fsf] nflu, hdLgd'lg /x]sf vlghx ;Dklt -Asset_ xf]Ogg\ t/ ;Defjgf jf Ifdtf -Potentiality_
dfq x'g\ .
!$= k|s[ltn] k|foM ;a} /fi6xnfO{ ljleGg vfnsf k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{sf] e08f/ k|bfg u/]sf] 5 . s'g}
/fi6df /x]sf] k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{x g} slxn] sfxL Tof] /fi6sf] ;d'Gglt jf Gsf] sf/0F klg x'g ;S5 .
dWo-k"j{sf clwsf+z e"-efudf phf8 d?e"ld /x]sf s}of}+ u/La /fi6xdf t]n -Oil_ pTkfbg z'? ePkl5 s] s;/L
tL /fi6xsf] cj:yfdf Jofks kl/jt{g eof] / sof+} clk|msL /fi6xdf /x]sf ax'd"No vlghn] g} Toxfsf] Gsf]
ljleGg h8xdWo] k|ToIF jf ck|ToIF?kdf Ps d'Vo h8sf]?kdf sfo{ u/]sf]] pbfx/0fxn] klg of] s'/f k|i6 x'G5 .
/fi6df ePsf k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{nfO{ ;xL tl/sfn] ;b'kof]u ug{ ;Sg] g;Sg] s'/fdf g} oL ;|f]txn] /fli6o
zlQmdf s]-slt 6]jf lbG5 eGg] s'/f e/ k5{ .
!%= g]kfnnfO{ Pp6f Case Study sf] ?kdf lnP/ Pp6f /fi6df vlgh kbfy{sf] oy]i6 e08f/ geP klg ePsf
;|f]t Pj+ ;fwgnfO{ ;xL tl/sfaf6 / Hofb} ;+j]bgzLn eP/ s]-s;/L ;b'kof]u ul/Pdf /fli6o zlQmdf 6]jf lbg;S5
eg]/ ;Defjgf cWoogsf] pbfx/0f lng ;lsG5 -Regmi op.cit._ .
-s_
hn;|f]tsf] ;b'kof]u g]kfndf ^))) gbL vf]nfx ldn]/ Pp6f k|0FfnL agfPsf] 5 . ;}4flGts ?kdf
*#=@# xhf/ d]ufjf6 / cfly{s Jojxfl/s ?kdf $@ xhf/ d]ufjf6 hnljB't pTkfbg ug{ ;Sg] g]kfnsf]
Ifdtf /x]sf] dflgG5 . of] Ifdtf g]kfnsf] nflu dfq geO{ ldq /fi6xsf] nflu ;d]t / ljz]iftM ef/tsf]
62

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nflu Ps dxTjk"0f{ ljifo xf] . ljz]ifu/L g]kfnsf] hn;|ft] n] ef/tdf l;+rfOsf] nflu ;d]t 7"nf] dxTj /fVb5 .
hnjfo' kl/jt{g nufotsf k|fs[lts ;d:ofx, hn;|f]tnfO{ ;xL tl/sfn] af8kmf8 ug]{ ljifo / cfGtl/s
gLlt lgdf{0f Pj+ sfof{Gjog h:tf ljleGg kIfxdf /x]sf ljljw ;d:ofx g} g]kfnsf] hn;|f]tsf] ;xL
pkof]udf afwf c8\rgsf] ?kdf ljBdfg /x]sf] kfOG5 . g]kfnn] cfkm\gf] o:tf] ax'd"No ;|f]tnfO{ hnljB't
pTkfbg, l;+rfO, vfg]kfgL, cf}Bflus k|of]u, hn-;+;fwgx;u ;DalGwt ko{6g Pj+ dT:okfng h:tf
ljleGg sfo{xsf] nflu Hofb} g} ;+j]bgzLn eP/ ;b'kof]u ug'{ kg]{ b]lvG5 . slt hnljB't pTkfbg eof]
/ slt hn;|f]t ;b'kof]u eof] dfq eGbf klg /fi6n] jf:tljstfdf o;af6 slt kmfObf p7fof] < eGg] s'/f
a9L dxTjk"0f{ x'G5 . cGo /fi6x;u o:tf ;|f]txsf] af8kmf8 jf ldn]/ ;b'kof]u ubf{ lj:t[tdf cWoog
u/L ;DalGwt ;a} kIfsf] lht x'g] kl/l:ylt -Win-Win Situation_ sf] ;[hgf x'g' cTofjZos x'G5 .
-v_
jgh+unsf] ;b'kof]u sl/a #)% eGbf a9L e"-efu 9fs]sf] jgh+un g]kfnsf] Ps dxTjk"0f{
;|f]t xf], h;n] sf7-bfp/f h:tf jg k}bfjf/x, ljleGg hLjhGt'xnfO{ vfgf Pj+ af;:yfg tyf ljleGg
dxTjk"0f{ h8La'6Lxdfq k|bfg gu/L ljZjsf] a9\bf] tfkqmd lj?4sf] cleofg -Fighting Against Global
Warming_ df ;d]t dxTjk"0f{ of]ubfg lbOcfPsf] 5 . g]kfn cfkm\gf] o:tf] dxTjk"0f{ ;|ft
] sf] ;xL ;Def/ /
;b'kof]u ug{ ;Ifd x'g' kb{5 .
-u_ cGo ljljw ;|f]t / ;Defjgfx g]kfnsf] pRr lxdfnxdf ax'd"No hl8a'6L kfOg], Toxf ko{6sLo
cfsif{0f ug]{ Ifdtf /x]sf] / Toxf rNg] xfjfaf6 jfo' zlQm -Wind Power_ pTkfbg ug{ ;lsg] ;DefJotf
/x]sf] 5 . kxf8L e"-efudf lgdf{0f sfo{xsf] nflu cTofjZos /x]sf] 9'f, /f]8f tyf l;d]G6 pTkfbg ug{
cfjZos kg]{ sRrf kbfy{xsf] e08f/ /x]sf] 5 . o;}u/L t/fO{ Pj+ ljleGg pkTosf -Valley_ xdf pj{/f
e"ld /x]sf] 5 . o;sf ;fy} /fi6sf ljleGg efuxdf vlgh kbfy{sf] ;Defjgf tyf cgluGtL ko{6sLo
cfsif{s :ynx;d]t /x]sf 5g\ . s[lif If]qsf] cfw'lgsLs/0f, cf}Bf]lus If]qnfO{ cfjZos kg]{ sRrf kbfy{
pTkfbg ug]{tkm{ nlIft s[lif pTkfbg, h8La'6Lsf] ;b'kof]u u/L tof/L cf}iflw pTkfbg tyf vlghj:t'sf]
;DefJotf cWoog u/L ;b'kof]u ug]{ nufotsf sfo{ ug{ ;s]df o;n] klg g]kfnsf] /fli6o zlQm a[l4 ug{
7f]; of]ubfg lbg ;Sg]5 .
!^= o;/L x/]s /fi6n] cfkm";u ePsf / ;Defljt k|Fs[lts ;|f]t Pj+ sRrf kbfy{sf] dxTj a'emL To;nfO{ oyf;Dej
;b'kof]u -Exploit_ ug{ ;s]df To;n] klg pQm /fi6sf] /fli6o zlQm clej[l4 ug{ 7f]; e"ldsf v]Ng ;S5 .
/fli6o zlQmsf] tTj lj1fg k|ljlw, cf}Bf]lus Ifdtf / cfly{s ;|f]t;DefJotf ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f
!&= k|ljlwnfO{ ;fdfGotof k|of]ufTds lj1fg -Applied Science_ klg elgG5 -Parlmer and Parkins op.cit.,
68_ . x/]s If]qdf dflg;n] b|'t ultdf ljsf; ug{ ;s]sf] sf/0f lj1fg Pj+ k|ljlwsf] tLj| ljsf;n] ubf{ g} xf] . x/]s
/fi6n] ablnbf] ;do / ljsl;t k|ljlw;u} cfkm\gf k'/fgf ;f]r tl/sf Pj+ k|ljlwnfO{ klg qmdzM kl/dfh{g Pj+ kl/jt{g
ub}{ n}hfg' cfjZos x'G5 . cfhsf] ljZjdf clt g} dxTjk"0F{ /x]sf] ;+rf/sf] ljsf;sf] nflu ;d]t lj1fg Pj+ k|ljlwn]
7"nf] e"ldsf v]n]sf] 5 .
!*= Pp6f /fi6 cfkm\gf ljljw cfjZostfxdf cfTdlge{/ x'g tyf cGo /fi6xdf cfkm\gf pTkfbg ePsf a:t'x
lgof{t u/L cfly{s?kdf ;an x'g Tof] /fi6n] cfkm\gf] cf}Bf]lus Ifdtfdf clej[l4 ug{ cfjZos x'G5 . dhb'/sf]
xs-lxtsf nflu eGg] h:tf nf]slk|o gf/fxsf] cf8df cyjf cGo s'/fxsf] gfddf Joj:yfkg jf cGo b}lgs
lqmofsnfkdf x'g] x:tIf]k, v/fa ;'/Iff k|Tofe"lt, sRrf kbfy{ Pj+ k"+hLsf] cefj, pko'Qm gLlt lgodsf] sdL / ljb]zL
pTkfbgx;u k|lt:kwf{ ug{ g;Sg' h:tf sf/0fxn] ubf{ klg s}of}+ /fi6xn] cf}Bf]lus Ifdtf tyf cfly{s ljsf;
ug{ ;Q}mgg\ . /fi6sf] cfly{s ljsf;df ljleGg If]q -Sectors_ sf] of]ubfg /xg] u5{ / /fd|f] cfly{s ljsf;sf] nflu
oL ;a} IF]q Pj+ kIf cg's"n x'g' kb{5 .
!(= kof{Kt vlgh / t]n tyf cTofw'lgs k|ljlw Pj+ kof{Kt k"hL geP klg sd ljsl;t /fi6x?n] cfkm";u ePsf
cGo ;|f]tx?nfO{ ;xL ;b'kof]u ug{ ;s]df klg cfly{s ljsf; u/L /fli6o zlQmdf 6]jf lbg ;Sg] b]lvG5 . To;sf
s]xL pbfx/0fx?sf ?kdf ko{6g pBf]u, a}b]lzs /f]huf/, sRrf kbfy{ nufot cGo ;Defjgfx?sf] ;b'kof]u tyf
cfjZos k"hL lgdf{0fsf] nflu a}slNks pkfox?nfO{ lng ;lsG5 .
63

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

-s_
ko{6g pBf]u
j}b]lzs d'b|f cfh{g / /f]huf/L ;[hgf ug{sf] nflu ko{6g pBf]u klg Ps pko'Qm
ljsNk x'g ;Sb5 . ko{6g pBf]unfO{ pknlAwd"ns agfpg /fi6df ePsf ko{6sLo cfsif{0fxsf] oy]i6
k|rf/-k|;f/ Pj+ kof{Kt ko{6g ultljlwsf] ;+rfng, ko{6ssf] nflu pko'Qm jf;:yfg Pj+ cGo ;'ljwfxsf]
ljsf; tyf ;'/lIFt jftfj/0fsf] ;[hgf ug'{ clgjfo{ x'G5 . ;+VofTdsdfq eGbf klg u'0ffTds?kdf ko{6s
leq\ofpg]tkm{ ;b}j k|of; ug'{k5{ .
-v_ j}bl] zs /f]huf/
j}bl] zs /f]huf/nfO{ cNksfnLg cfly{s ;|ft] sf] ljsNksf] ?kdf klg lng ;lsG5,
t/ o;af6 cfpg] k"hLsf] ;xL ;b'kof]u ug{ ;Sg' k5{ . o; ;DaGwL sf/f]af/ ug]{ s]xL Joj;foLxnfO{ dfq
kmfObf x'g] cj:yf eGbf klg o;n] /fli6o lxtsf] nflu 7f]; 6]jf lbg ;Sg] / o;af6 k|fKt x'g] k"hLnfO{
;[hgfTds sfo{df pkof]u x'g] jftfj/0F agfpg' kb{5 .
-u_
sRrf kbfy{ Pj+ cGo ;DefJo j:t'sf] ;b'kof]u /fi6sf] cfly{s ljsf;sf] nflu cfkm";u ePsf
sRrf kbfy{x lgof{t ug'{eGbf klg tof/L j:t'x -Redymade Products_ sf] lgof{t ;Defjgfsf] vf]hL
ub}{ gof pBf]uxsf] :yfkgf tyf cfkm\gf] pTkfbgxsf] nflu cGt/f{li6o ahf/sf] vf]hL cflb sfo{ ug{
pko'Qm x'G5 . o;sf ;fy} ljZjsf] a9\bf] hg;+Vof / 36\bf] pAhfp e"ld Pj+ kfgLsf] ;|ft] sf] ;d:ofnfO{
dWogh/ /fvL vfBfGg pTkfbgdf cfkm\gf] /fli6o cfjZostfdf cfTdlge{/ eO{ lgof{t ug{;d]t ;IFd ePdf
eljiodf To;n] 7"nf] of]ubfg lbg ;S5 .
-3_
cfjZos k"+hL lgdf{0Fsf pkfox
pBf]u :yfkgf ug{ cfjZos kg]{ k"hL lgdf{0fsf] nflu /fli6o
lxt x'g] vfnsf] a}b]lzs nufgLsf] vf]hLsf ;fy} hgtfdf s/ ltg]{ afgL tyf crn ;Dkltdfdfq k"hL
vr{ u'g{sf] ;f s'g} Joj;fodf nufgL ug]{ ;+:s[lt -Investment Culture_ sf] ljsf;, 3'; vfg] Pj+ lbg]
k|j[lQsf] cGTo / /fi6nfO{ kmfObf x'g] olsg x'g] u/L ljb]zdf /x]sf cfkm\gf cfk|jf;L gful/sxnfO{ nufgL
ug{ k|f]T;flxt u/]/ k"hL ;+sng ug{ ;lsG5 .
/fli6o zlQmsf] tTj ;]gfsf] :t/ ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f
@)= ;}lgs Ifdtf / tof/Lkg -Preparedness_ ;]gfsf ljleGg s'/fx -Factors_ df e/ k5{ -h:t}- k|ljlw, g]t[Tj,
u'0ffTds / ;+VofTds l:ylt cflb_ . h]=P=gfossf] ljrf/df, /fi6sf] n8\g ;Sg] Ifdtfsf] ljsf; ug{, ;+Vof / xftxltof/ dfq ;a} s'/f xf]Ogg\, of] o:tf] snf klg xf] h'g /fli6o rl/q;u ;d]t w]/} ;DalGwt x'G5 -Naik 2002,
52_ . xft-xltof/ t vl/b ug{ jf ;xof]u k|fKt ug{ klg ;lsG5 t/ xft-xltof/sf] ;xL k|of]u tyf xltof/ k|of]u
ug]{ ;]gfsf] rl/q, k|lta4tf, cfTdan Pj+ ;dk{0fefj h:tf s'/fx a9L dxTjk"0f{ x'G5g\ . cTofw'lgs xft-xltof/,
If]Kof:q Pj+ xjfO{ zlQmn] s]xL k"jf{wf/x Wj:t ug{, cfkm\gf] k}bnL kmf}hnfO{ cufl8 a9\g Pj+ s]xL ;Lldt e"-efux
lgoGq0f ug{ ;xof]u unf{ jf ;lhnf] agfpnf t/ OR5f zlQm ePsf] /fi6k|]dL ;]gfnfO{ hgtfsf] ;fy eof] eg]
xft-xltof/ Pj+ pks/0Fsf] b[li6sf]0faf6 sdhf]/ /fi6dfly klg zq' /fi6n] sfnfGt/;Dd cfkm\gf] ljhonfO{ sfod
/fVg eg] ;Sb}g .
@!= xfnsf] kl/l:yltdf Pp6f /fi6n] ljljw vfnsf ;+efljt vt/fnfO{ cfsng u/L ;f]xL cg';f/ tof/L xfntdf
/xg} kb{5 . vt/fnfO{ ljleGg tl/sfn] JofVof ug]{ u/]sf] kfOP tfklg x/]s /fi6df pAhLg ;Sg] -Manufactured_ /
lgoGq0f ug{ g;lsg] k|fs[lts -Autonomous Natural_ vfnsf vt/fxsf] ;Defjgf ;b}j ljBdfg /xG5 . pAhLg
;Sg] vt/fnfO{ klg b'O{ b]z aLr x'g ;Sg] ljleGg vfnsf o'4x -Intra State War_, b]z leq} cfk/flws ;+u7g
cft+ssf/L ;d"x / ljb|f]x cflbaf6 pTkGg x'g ;Sg] h:tf -Trans-national_ vt/f tyf hg;+Vof a[l4, ljleGg /f]u
/ hnjfo' kl/jt{g cflb;u ;DalGwt -Ecological_ vt/fx u/L k'gM ljleGg k|sf/df juL{s/0f ug]{ u/]sf] klg
kfOG5 . e"sDk, af9L-klx/f], ;'Vvf / Hjfnfd'vL ljikmf]6g cflb lgoGq0f ug{ g;lsg] k|fs[lts vt/fsf pbfx/0fx
x'g\ . x/]s /fi6n] o:tf ljljw vfnsf ;Defljt vt/fxnfO{ lj:t[t?kdf cWoog / k"jf{g'dfg u/]/ cfkm\gf ;]gfnfO{
To:tf vt/fsf] ;fdgf ug{ tyf ;Defljt k|fs[lts ljkb\kZrft k'glg{df{0f ug{ ;d]t ;fdYo{jfg agfO{ tof/L xfntdf
/fVg' cfjZos x'G5 . rfx] cfkm\gf] /fi6 / ;]gf ;fgf] g} lsg gxf];\ ;'/Iff ;DaGwL ;+j]bgzLn ljifodf a[xt 1fg geO{
xr'jf ts{sf] e/df s;}n] cfkm\gf] /fi6sf] ;]gfsf ;DaGwdf pbfx/0Fsf] nflu -oqf 7"nf Pj+ zlQmzfnL /fi6xsf]
cufl8 xfd|f] ;]gfn] s] ug{ ;S5 / < eGg] h:tf_ lg/fzfhgs Pj+ gsf/fTds cleJolQmx lbG5g\ / To:tf
vfnsf e|d km}nfpg k|of; u5{g\ eg] of t Tof] pgLxsf] c1fgtfsf] sf/0f, pgLx Tof] /fi6 lj?4 nfu]sf] s'g}
64

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

c/fli6o zlQmf/f k|fof]lht ePsf] sf/0F jf ;DalGwtsf] sfo/ dgl:yltsf] sf/0fn] klg o:tf cleJolQm lbO/x]sf
x'g ;S5g\ eGg] cg'dfg nufpg ;lsG5 . t/, ;]gfsf ;DaGwdf ;d]t ;sf/fTds p2]Zosf;fy ul/g] cfnf]rgf
-Positive Criticism_ tyf cf}NofOg] sdL sdhf]/LxnfO{ eg] ;b}j cfTd;ft ug}{ kb{5 .
@@= x'g t ljZjsf sof}+ /fi6x -s/La @) j6f_ df, ;]gf g/x]sf] jf Hofb} Go"g ;+Vofdf ;}Go zlQm /x]sf jf cw{
;}lgs k|sl[ tsf kmf}hxdfq /x]sf pbfx/0fx klg gePsf xf]Ogg\ . o:tf /fi6xn] cGo zlQm;DkGg /fi6x;u
lnlvt, clnlvt jf v'Nnf uf]Ko ljleGg vfnsf ;lGw ;Demf}tf u/L cfjZos k/]sf] ;dodf ;xof]u k|fKt ug{
ldnfPsf] kfOG5 . pbfx/0fsf] nflu, Andorra n] cfkm\gf] ;'/Iffsf] nflu France / Spain ;u ;g\ !((# df
;Demf}tf u/]sf] 5 . To:t} Kiribati n] k/]sf] v08df ;}Go ;xof]u Australia / New Zealand ;u lnG5, Marshall
Islands, Micronesia / Palau sf] ;'/Iff United States of America sf] lhDdfdf /x]sf] 5 eg] Manaco sf]
;'/Iff France sf] lhDdfdf /x]sf] 5 . To:t} s]xL /fi6xsf] ;'/Iffsf] lhDdf If]qLo ;'/Iff k|0ffnL cGt/ut /x]sf]
klg kfOG5 -h:t}- Dominica, Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines_ . s]xL /fi6xdf cfkm\gf ;]gf
geP klg cw{;}lgs an jf ljz]if k|x/L eg] /x]sf 5g\ -h:t}- Haiti df k|x/L Pj+ s]xL cw{;}lgs ansf o'lg6x
/x]sf 5g\ eg] Mouritius df cw{;}lgs Pj+ t6Lo ;'/Iff an /x]sf 5g\_ -Wikipedia 2011, "List of Countries
without Armed Forces"_ . o;/L ljZjsf s]xL /fi6xdf ljz]if kl/l:yltjz -h:t}- Hofb} g} sdhf]/ cfly{s
cj:yf, ;]gfn] ;}lgs s' ug]{ k|of; u/]kl5 jf cGo ljz]if sf/0Fn] vf/]hLdf k/]/ cyjf ck|ToIf?kdf zlQmzfnL
/fi6sf] k|e'TjnfO{ afWofTds ?kdf :jLsf/]/_ / ljz]if P]ltxfl;s, /fhg}lts jf ef}uf]lns sf/0fxn] ubf{ s]xL ckjfb
-Rear/Exception_ sf ?kdf Go"g pbfx/0fx kfOP tfklg Pp6f ;fj{ef}d\ ;DkGg /fi6n] cfkm\gf] ljljw w/ftnLo
oyfy{nfO{ dWogh/ /fvL cfkm\gf ljleGg vfnsf ;Defljt vt/f lj?4 n8\g tyf cGo ljljw sfo{xsf] nflu
pko'Qm ;+Vofdf /fli6o ;]gf clgjfo{?kdf /fv]s} kfOG5 .
@#= ljleGg /fi6xsf cf-cfkm\g} P]ltxfl;s k[i7e"ld / uf}/jsf ufyfx /x]sf x'G5g\ . pbfx/0fsf] nflu ljZjsf
;fgf Hofb} sd /fi6xn] dfq cfkm" slxNo} s;}sf] pklgj]z gePsf] tyf ;b}j :jtGq /x]sf] egL, lz/ 7f8f] u/]/
cfTd;Ddfgk"j{s eGg ;S5g\ / To:t} /fi6xdWo] g]kfn klg Ps xf] . Oltxf;df g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfkm\gf] cbDo ;fx;
/ k/fqmd b]vfO{ cfkm"eGbf Hofb} zlQmzfnL ;]gf;u;d]t ljleGg o'4 d}bfgxdf ljho ePsf] x'gfn] g} g]kfnLxn]
cfh o;/L uf}/j ug{ kfPsf] b]lvG5 . ;]gfnfO{ ljleGg /fi6xn] cfkm\gf] cfjZostf tyf ljleGg cj:yfsf] ljrf/
u/L /fi6sf] k"jf{wf/ lgdf{0f k|s[lt ;+/If0f h:tf sfo{xdf;d]t nufpg] u/]sf 5g\ . ljZjsf ;fgf Pj+ sd ljsl;t
/fi6x klg ;+o'Qm/fi6 ;+3sf] cfjfgdf zflGt ;}lgssf?kdf cfkm\gf] ;]gfnfO{ ;xefuL u/fO{ ljZj ;fd' cfkm\gf]
/fi6sf] ;sf/fTds wf/0ff lgdf{0f ug{ ;kmn ePsf] kfOG5 . g]kfn klg ljleGg ;+s6u|:t /fi6xdf ;+o'Qm /fi6;+3sf]
cfjfgdf cfkm\gf] ;]gfnfO{ ;xefuL u/fpg] ljZjsf k|dv
' /fi6xdWo] Ps /lx cfPsf] 5 . o;/L k|To]s /fi6n] cfkm\gf]
cj:yf / cfjZostf x]/]/ cfkm\gf] ;]gfnfO{ u'0ffTds?kdf ljsf; ug{ cTofw'lgs xft-xltof/ Pj+ pks/0fxf/f
;';lHht u/L cfjZos tflnd lbP/ pko'Qm ;+u7gfTds ;+/rgf lgdf{0F u/L ;/sf/sf] k"0f{ lgoGq0fdf t/ /fhg}lts
x:tIf]k/lxt /fVg ;Sg' kb{5 . o;f] ug{ ;s]df g} pQm /fi6sf] ;]gfn] /fi6df cfpg ;Sg] vt/fsf] ;fdgf ub}{ /fli6o
zlQmsf] Ps dxTjk"0f{ tTjsf] ?kdf sfo{ ug'{sf] ;fy} /fli6o zlQmsf cGo tTjxnfO{ 7f]; ?kdf 6]jf lbg ;Sg]
b]lvG5 .
/fli6o zlQmsf] tTj ;/sf/ Pj+ s"6gLlts :t/, g]t[Tj / cfbz{ ljrf/ ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f
@$= ;/sf/n] sfod ug]{ :t/n] klg /fli6o zlQmsf] Ps dxTjk"0f{ tTjsf] ?kdf g} sfo{ ub{5 . clk|msfsf s}of}+
/fi6xdf sRrf kbfy{ / k|fs[lts ;|f]t kof{Kt eP klg cGo sf/0fxsF] ;Fy} Toxfsf] ;/sf/n] ;xL g]t[Tj lbg
g;Sbf pQm ;|f]t ;xL tl/sfn] /fi6sf] nflu ;b'kof]u geO/x]sf] / /fli6o zlQmdf 7f]; ?kdf 6]jf lbg ;s]sf]
kfOb}g . elgG5, ;/sf/ klg :t/Lo gx'g] / :yfoL ;/sf/sf] ?kdf dflgg] k|zf;g klg /fhgLlts x:tIF]k Pj+ e|i6frf/
h:tf ljljw sf/0Fn] ubf{ ;xL 9+uaf6 grNg] /fi6xdf s'g} klg ;dodf ;+s6sf] cj:yf cfpg ;Sb5 . x/]s
/fi6sf] ;/sf/n] cfkm"n] lgdf{0F ug]{ gLlt Pj+ To;sf] sfof{Gjogdf b]lvg] cGt/df sdL Nofpg tyf cfkm\gf] of]hgf
Pj+ hgtfsf cfsf+IFfx aLrdf efjgfTds lgs6tfsf] cj:yf ;[hgf ug{ ;Sg' kg]{ b]lvG5 .
@%= du{Gyfp n]V5g\ s"6gLlt To:tf] snf xf], h;n] ;a} /fli6o zlQmsf tTjxnfO{ Ps ;"qdf cfj4 ub}{ Pp6}
l9Ssf agfO{ To;nfO{ ;xL lbzf / tf}n k|bfg u/]/ To;af6 Ifdtf clea[l4 ub}{ jf:tljs?kdf /fi6sf] zlQm a9fpg
65

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

;Dej t'Nofp5 -Morgenthau op.cit., 140_ . pgsf] ljrf/df, jf:tjdf s"6gLltnfO{ s;}n] /fli6o zlQmsf]
dl:tissf] ?kdf klg lng ;S5g\ . ljZjsf sd ljsl;t /fi6xn] klg of]Uo s'zn / ;xL s"6gLlt1xnfO{ kl/rfng
u/L cfkm\gf] p2]Zo k|flKtdf nlIft -Mission Oriented_ s"6gLlt ug{' pko'Qm x'g] b]lvG5 . o:tf /fi6xn] cfkm\gf]
P]ltxfl;s 36gfqmdnfO{ dgg u/L ljut\df ul/Psf ljleGg ;lGw ;Demf}tfxaf6 ePsf kmfObf a]kmfObfxsf]
ulxl/P/ ;"Id cWoog u/L cfjZostf cg';f/ To;df kl/dfh{g, kl/jt{g ug{ k|of; ug{ tyf eljiodf ug'{ kg]{
;lGw ;Demf}tfxsf] af/]df klg /fi6lxtsf] nflu cg's"n x'g] s'/fsf] olsg u/]/dfq ug{ pko'Qm x'g] b]lvG5 . kof{Kt
sf/0f Pj+ ljsNkx;lxt tfls{s?kdf cfkm\gf s'/fx /fVg tyf To;/L cfkm\gf] kmfObf x'g] u/L ;lGw ;Demf}tf ug{
oy]i6 tof/L ug{] lhDd]jf/ JolQmxdf /fi6k|]d Pj+ cfkm\gf hgtfk|lt OdfGbfl/tfsf] efjgf x'g} k5{ .
@^= /fi6nfO{ g]t[Tj k|bfg ug]{ JolQmx -Leadership_ df /fli6o zlQmsf cGo tTjxsf] ;b'kof]u /fi6lxt /
/fi6fG] gltsf] nflu ug{ ;Sg] v"aLn] klg /fli6o zlQm a9fpg dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]N5 . eGg] ul/G5 ls s'g} klg /fi6sf]
g]t[Tjju{sf] cfkm\gf] kf6L{nfO{ k"0f{?kdf lgoGq0f ug{ ;Sg] v'aL, /fi6nfO{ ;xL lbzfdf 8f]ofpg] c7f]6, OdfGbfl/tf,
/fi6k|]dL efjgf tyf ;lx tl/sfaf6 7"nf lg0f{ox lnP/ sfof{Gjog ug{ ;Sg] cf6n] klg Tof] /fi6nfO{ ;xL lbzfdf
cufl8 a9Fpg 7"nf] e"ldsf v]N5 . /fi6sf] /fli6o zlQm clea[l4 x'g g]t[Tjju{, /fli6o lxt ;b}j JolQmut / kf6L{ut
lxteGbf dfly x'G5 eGg] efjgf ePsf nf]slk|otf eGbf OdfGbfl/tfdf ljZjf; ug]{ vfnsf / Tofu ;dk{0F efj
ePsf k|hftflGqs d"No Pj+ dfGotfxk|lt sl6a4 tyf x/]s b[li6sf]0faf6 pbfx/0FLo x'g}k5{ eGg] vfnsf ;}4flGts
dfGotfx Ps lx;fan] ljZjJofkL?kdf :yflkt eO;s]sf] 5 .
@&= dWok"j{ tyf pQ/L clk|msfsf ljleGg /fi6xdf xfn;fn} ljsl;t 36gfqmdn] s'g} klg /fi6sf] s'g} kf6L{
ljz]if jf g]t[Tj ju{n] hgefjgf / hgcfsf+IFf cg'?k ;a}nfO{ ;d]6]/ ;xL tl/sfn] cufl8 a9\g g;s]df ljzfn
hgnx/ Pj+ hgbjfan] To:tf /fi6xdf 7"nf] kl/jt{g NofP/} 5f8\5 eGg] pbfx/0F klg b]vfPsf] 5 . ljZjsf sof}+
;d:ofu|:t /fi6xdf s'g} ljz]if cj:yf Pj+ kl/l:yltsf] sf/0Fn] ubf{ 7"nf] /fhg}lts kl/jt{gkZrft / ljz]ifu/L
;+qmd0fsfnLg cj:yfdf /fi6sf ;a} ;+oGqx c:tJo:t x'gfn] /fli6o Pstfsf k|tLsx -Symbols of National
Unity_ df vfnLkg -Vaccum_ sf] cj:yf ;[hgf x'g ;S5 . o:tf] cj:yfdf ljleGg afx\o jf cfGtl/s zlQmxn]
cfkm\gf] :jfy{l;4 ug{ c/fhstf -Anarchy_ km}nfpg k|of; ug{ ;S5g\ eg] /fi6sf] sfg"gL Joj:yf -Law and
Order_ df ljljw ;d:ofx ;d]t cfpg ;S5 . To:tf /fi6xdf ;Qfk|FKtL jf To:t} vfnsf tTsfnLg kmfObfsf]
p2]Zon] ul/g] lg0F{oxn] eljiosf] Ps ljGb'df uP/, Tof] /fi6sf] nflu k|To'Tkfbs tyf Hofb} g} vt/gfs klg x'g
;S5 eGg] s'/fx ljleGg /fi6xsf Oltxf;n] klg k|dfl0Ft ul/;s]sf] 5 . t/, h:tf];'s} ljifd kl/l:yltdf klg
/fli6o :jfy{nfO{ g} ;fd"lxs nIo -Common Goal_ sf] ?kdf lnO{ g]t[Tjju{n] hgtfnfO{ pT;flxt / pTk|]l/t
ug{ ;s]df x/]s /fi6df /fli6o zlQm clej[l4 ug{ 7f]; d2t k'Ug hfg] b]lvG5 . dn]lzof nufotsf /fi6xsf]
pbfx/0faf6 klg k|lta4 / of]Uo g]t[Tj ePdf 5f]6F] ;dodf g} ;a}nfO{ cfZro{rlst x'g] u/L /fi6df 7"nf] kl/jt{g
Nofpg ;lsG5 eg]/ b]vfO;s]sf] 5 .
@*= x/]s /fi6sf hgtfxn] ljleGg ljrf/wf/fxdf ljZjf; ug]{ eP tfklg pgLxnfO{ efjgfTds?kdf Ps;"qdf
cfj4 u/L /fi6f]Ggltsf] nflu Pp6} lbzfdf k|jflxt ug{ ;lsof] eg] To;af6 klg /fli6o zlQmdf a[l4 x'g hfG5 .
h'g /fi6df cf-cfkm\gf ljrf/k|lt /x]sf] cf:yfeGbf ;fd"lxs lxtnfO{ a9L dxTj lbg] cfbz{ ;f]rfOsf] ljsf; x'G5,
To; /fi6sf] /fli6o zlQm b|'t ultdf a9\g] ;Defjgf a9L x'g] b]lvG5 .

pk;+xf/
@(= x/]s /fi6sf] nflu cfkm\gf] /fli6o zlQmsf tTjxsf] dxTj Hofb} g} w]/} /x]sf] x'G5 . To:tf x/]s tTjsf]
cfkm}df ljz]if dxTj eP klg To:tf tTjxn] Ps cfk;sf] ;x-;DaGw, ;xof]u / ;dGjon] dfq ;dli6ut glthf
lbG5, lsgsL oL tTjx Pp6f ;du| k|0ffnLsf] cTofjZos Pj+ ckl/xfo{ efu h:t} x'g\ . To;}n] s'g} klg /fi6df
Pp6f jf s]xL tTjx Hofb} sdhf]/ eO{ afsL cGo tTjx hlt;'s} ;an eP klg ;dli6 ?kdf /fli6o zlQmdf
7f]; of]ubfg lbg g;Sg] x'+bf, /fi6sf x/]s To:tf tTjxnfO{ ;an Pj+ ;'b[9 agfpg cTofjZos x'G5 .
#)= x/]s /fi6n] lj:t[t cWoog, a[xt ;f]r / ;fd"lxs k|of;af6 /fli6o zlQmsf x/]s tTjxnfO{ ;dGjofTds
9+uaf6 ;an Pj+ ;'b[9 agfpg ;s]dfdfq /fi6sf] ;dli6ut zlQm a9\g hfg] tyf To:tf tTjxn] /fi6sf] rf}tkmL{
lxtsf] nflu ;d]t 7f]; of]ubfg lbg ;Sg] b]lvG5 . ljz]ifu/L sd ljsl;t, ljleGg vfnsf Gxdf km;]/ pGglt
66

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

ug{ g;s]sf tyf 7"nf] G jf /fhg}lts kl/jt{gkZrft ;+qmd0FsfnLg cj:yfdf /x]sf sdhf]/ /fi6xsf] nflu
/fli6o zlQmsf tTjx ;DaGwL cWoogsf] emg\ a9L dxTj /x]sf] b]lvG5 . o:tf /fi6xn] cfkm";u ePsf /fli6o
zlQmsf tTjsf] klxrfg u/L tL tTjxsf] ;xL tl/sfn] ;b'kof]u u/]dfdfq b|'t ultdf cfkmgf] /fli6o zlQm a9Fpg
;IFd x'g ;Sg] b]lvG5 .

;Gbe{ ;fdu|Lx?
!=

Chandra, Prakash. 2004. Theories of International Relations. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt

Ltd.

@=

Khatri, Sridhar K. 2001. Nepal in the International System. The Political Economy of Small
states. Anand Aditya, ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Foundation For Advance Studies (NEFAS) and FriedrichEbert-Stiftung (FES), Nepal.

#=

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1973. Politics Among Nations-The Struggle for Power and Peace. Calcutta:
Scientific Book Agency.

$=

Naik, J.A. 2002. A Text Book of International Relations. New Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd.

%=

Parlmer, Normans D. and Howard C. Perkins. 2007. International Relations. Delhi: A.I.T.B.S.
Publishers and Distributors.

^=

Regmi, Bijit Raj. 2009. Nepals Elements of National Power Potentials and Strategies to
Enhance. Unpublished Thesis, Submitted to Tribhuvan University, in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Strategic Studies.

&==

Wikipedia. List of Countries without Armed Forces. 2011.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List _of _countries _without _armed _forces. (Accessed on 05, September

2011).

*=

Adhikari, Sudeepta. 2004. Political Geography. Jaipur: Rawat Publication.

(= Dahal, Ram Kumar. 2064. Nepal and International Relations (Text in Nepali). Kathmandu:
Dikshanta Prakashan.
!)= Khand, Jitendra Dhoj. 2005. National Security. Kathmandu: Julu, Rajendra and Milan D.
Khand.

!!=

Regmi, Bijit Raj. 2011. Circumstances of Establishment and Important Aspects of UN

Peacekeeping Missions in the Conflicts of West Asia and Africa. Unpublished Thesis, Submitted
to Tribhuvan University, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in
Political Science.

!@= Singh, Jashwant. 1996. National Security. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors.
!#=

Wikipedia. List of Countries by Size of Armed Forces. 2011.

!$= "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_size_of_armed_forces" (Accessed on 04,

September 2011).

!%= Other related articles published in the different magazines/papers and different websites.

67

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

A Brief Appraisal of Analysis of Air Based

Mechanization and Vertical Envelopment Concepts
and Technologies
- Chiran Jung Thapa
1.
The study, Analysis of Air-Based, Mechanization and Vertical Envelopment concepts
and Technologies, conducted by the Rand Arroyo Center assesses the ability to insert
mechanized forces in enemy-controlled terrain through the use of rotorcraft (including tiltrotor craft) and proposes methods to increase system effectiveness. Vertical envelopment
as used in this report refers to the use of rotorcraft (including tilt-rotor aircraft) to vertically
insert a battle force to conduct an offensive maneuver in which the main attacking force passes
around or over the enemys principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemys
rear. This study was specifically conducted to assist the U.S. military. However, this study is
useful for many other militaries around the globe.
2.
The scope of this study is broad as it delves into the complete operation of air mechanized
battle force concept. The concept of air mechanized battle force is divided into two phases: air
maneuver or insertion of the force and ground combat. The fact that both the transportation
and the combat components are included makes this study more appealing because it presents
a complete estimation of an operation.
3.
Option set explored in air maneuver phase of analysis are: a) Flight Paths , b) Situational
awareness, c) level of air defenses active in simulation and d) Airlifter thermal and visual
signatures. The metrics used in this model more or less reflect the option sets. For the air
maneuver phase the study uses three broad categories, i) survivability, ii) mobility and iii)
sensor/weapon mix to quantify results. These three categories are further divided to represent
these quantifications more accurately. The homogeneous nature of the options has enabled suboptimized metrics with greater objectivity. For the ground force, deployability, survivability,
lethality and mobility are the quantifiable metrics used. Both the option set and metrics are
complimentary. Since the study seeks to find out ways to maximize effectiveness, the option set
is very applicable. Survivability is one of the most significant metrics that could be employed
to calculate effectiveness.
4.
The simulation model employed in this study is an intricate web of models carefully
picked to represent each of the components being analyzed. Three sectors: a) information
domination, b) maneuver & firepower and c) force protection employ separate models.
Simulation tools used for the air maneuver phase are CAGIS, CHAMP AND RJARS, while
JANUS, MADAM, CHAMP, and RJARS serve as simulation models for ground combat
phase. These are deterministic models but not quite as predictive. However, since this study
seeks to predict the outcomes of force on force combat for the year 2020, these models might
not be adequate to reflect the changes that could occur in the nature of warfare, the availability
of weapons and the capability and the types of enemies.
5.
The study uses high-resolution constructive simulation as a tool to explore the military
utility of new war fighting concepts. The simulation tools are useful for two reasons. First, the
simulation can help quantify outcomes of highly complex force on force engagements through
sensitivity and parametric analysis. Second, it can provide context to war fighting concepts by
defining force entities and laying out their associated battle plans in a digitized terrain.
6.
Solely opting for vertical option puts limitations on other options. By employing only
rotary crafts, it limits the concept of inserting mechanized forces into enemy controlled area
through other options like carrier crafts or land vehicles. However, given the terrain limitations,
68

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

lack of air strips for larger carrier crafts, time constraints and issues of maneuverability, the use
of rotor crafts for envelopment option appears most attractive. Also, the question addressed
about the requirements of a deployable force capable of completing the range of vertical
envelopment mission is original and important. While trying to measure the effectiveness, it
is crucial to address the characteristics of the force deployed and find out which optimal mix
will result in the best effectiveness.
7.
As useful as this study maybe, this study also has a few shortcomings. The Air Defense
Artillery type (ADA) used in this study is the one available at the time the study was conducted.
The study incorporates no changes that could occur in the range or lethality of these weapon
systems. Any change in any variable could perhaps yield a different result set. Also, in the
general scenario, the enemy chosen is the Russian Army. Certainly employing Russian Army
as the enemy in the scenario represents the worst case because they are a force with notable
capability. However, using the Russians as the enemy force rules out the possibility of other
armies surpassing the Russian capability by 2020. Given the end of cold war and disintegration
of Soviet Union, it is clearly evident the capability of the Russian Army has waned significantly.
Perhaps China, North Korea or even Iran would better represent a potential enemy.
8.
Another inadequacy stems from the scenario setting. The study only focuses on one
single scenario on mixed terrain. Also, the setting is set for day time (with clear visibility) and
presumed that the flying capability at night is equivalent due to the presence of night vision
capability. However, there is potential bias in this case as it discounts the weather. Weather
impacts visibility. Visibility in turn affects the flying capability, which has implications on the
overall mission. Another bias is that effect of small arms fire is an omitted variable. Usually
when the troops are being dismounted, the crafts are easily susceptible to receive small arms
fire as they are within the range.
9.
The Data set used involves a wide set of data procured through national ground
intelligence center and Janes defense book; these are reliable set of data. Although it may
sound infeasible, but the study would be more productive if it was able to employ some data
sets obtained from the Russian Army itself. Although historical data has been inputted to
the model to predict outcomes, new data set needs to be generated to accurately predict the
outcomes of a 2020 engagement. Due to future setting of this study and the lack of data to
represent that time period, the study would have been useful in predicting outcomes if some
hypothetical data set with improved capabilities of both forces is employed.
10.
Insights presented at the end of the study provide invaluable information for future
engagements. However, they are somewhat redundant too. In general, high levels of Suppression
of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), increased situational awareness (intelligence on the locations
of high-end enemy air defense systems) special flight tactics, and stealth were listed as major
factors affecting survivability. There seems to be nothing original in these findings because it
is almost an acknowledged fact that better technology and intelligence are always favorable
if utilized with proficiency. The insights, however, do lead to the fact that there are other
investigations that need to be conducted to enhance the air-based mechanized capacity. It
specifically presents what technological options would enhance the vertical envelopment
capability.
11.
In this high tech and globalized era, newer technologies, tactics and procedures
are being developed. In this context, it is essential for militaries to explore and assess the
utility of these new developments. More importantly, it becomes imperative to assess the
possibility of the use of these new developments to counter possible military threats that may
arise in spontaneity. For such contingencies, having the air based mechanization and vertical
envelopment capability would undoubtedly be a great force multiplier.
69

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]if ;+rfng, Joj:yfkg tyf kf/blz{tf

xl/axfb'/ v8\sf
pkdxfn]vfk/LIFs -c=k|f=_
k[i7e"dL
!= ax'hg lxtfo a'xhg ;'vfo sf] p2]Zo /fvL /fi6sf nflu k|F0Ff]T;u{ ug{ tTk/ g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;sn bhf{,
cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs / ltgsf cfl>t kl/jf/x?sf] a[xt lxtsf nflu cf}ifwf]krf/, lzIFF, kl/jf/ cfjf; / ljleGg
cfly{s /fxt tyf sNof0fsf/L sfo{ ;~rfng ug]{ p2]Zon] @)#) ;fndf g]kfnL ;]gf /fi6;+3sf] cu'jfO{df ljleGg
/fi6x?df zflGt :yfkgf ug]{ ldzgdf ;xefuL ePjfkt k|FKt /sddWo] zflGt ;]gfdf hfg] ;}lgsx?nfO{ lgodcg';f/
kfpg] /sd e'QmfgL lbO{ art x'g cfPsf] ?=! s/f]8 @$ nfv ! xhf/ $ ;o ^ ?k}of &) k};faf6 lj=;+= @)#@
;fndf ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] :yfkgf ePsf] xf] . ;fljsdf ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if lgodfjnL, @)#@ / @)^!
cg';f/ ;+rfng x'b} cfPsf]df xfn of] sf]if ;}lgs P]g, @)^# tyf ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if lgodfjnL, @)^% cGt/
ut ;+rflnt 5 .
sfg"gL Joj:yf
@= ;}lgs P]g, @)^# sf] bkmf @( -#_ adf]lhd & ;b:oLo sNof0Fsf/L sf]if ;~rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldltsf]
Joj:yf eP cg'?k sfo{ ;~rfng x'b} cfPsf] 5 .
#= pQm P]gdf Joj:yf eP cg';f/ sf]ifsf] ;+/IFsdf k|wfgdGqLHo" / ;x;+/IFsdf /IFFdGqLHo" /xg] Joj:yf 5
eg] ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ug{ lgDgfg';f/sf] sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldlt u7g
u/L sNof0Fsf/L sfo{, sNof0Fsf/L of]hgf tyf cfod"ns sfo{ ;DaGwL gLlt lgwf{/0F nufot sfo{x? ub}{ cfPsf] 5 .
$=

;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if ;~rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldlt

-s_ k|wfg ;]gfklt

cWoIF

-v_ ;+/IFsaf6 e"tk"j{ / axfnjfn ;}lgs clws[tdWo]af6 dgf]lgt @ hgf

;b:o

-u_

k|wfg ;]gfkltaf6 axfnjfnf / e"tk"j{ ;}lgs clws[t dWo]af6 dgf]lgt @ hgf

;b:o

-3_

k|ltlglw cy{ dGqfno -/f=k= k|yd >]0FLsf] clws[t_

;b:o

-_

k|ltlglw /IFF dGqfno -/f=k= k|yd >]0FLsf] clws[t_

;b:o

sf]ifsf] k|of]u
%=

;}lgs P]g, @)^# cg';f/ b]xfosf] k|of]hgsf] nflu dfq sf]ifsf] k|of]u ug{ ;lsg] k|fjwfg /x]sf] 5 .
-s_ g]kfnL ;]gfsf axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs JolQm / lghsf cfl>t kl/jf/sf] lgldQ cfjZostf
cg';f/ sNof0fsf/L sfo{ ;~rfng ug{ .
-v_ sNof0fsf/L of]hgf tyf cfod"ns sfo{ ;~rfng ug{ .
-u_

;fljsdf ;~rflnt sNof0Fsf/L sfo{x?nfO{ lg/Gt/tf lbg .

-3_ g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ cfjZos kg]{ ljljw ;fdu|Lsf] cfk"lt{ ug{ tyf o:tf ;fdu|Lsf] pTkfbg tyf ;~ro
ug{ .
-_ g]kfnL ;]gf, ;+o'Qm /fi6 ;+3sf] cfjfgdf zflGt ;]gfdf ;lDdlnt x'bf ;f];u ;DalGwt sfo{sf] nflu
cfjZos kg]{ /sd tyf ;/;fdfg pknAw u/fpg .
70

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

sf]ifsf] cfo;|f]t
^= sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] d'Vo cfo;|f]t ;+o'Qm /fi6;+3sf] cfjfgdf g]kfnL ;]gfn] efu lnPjfkt k|fKt x'g] /sd
g} xf] . o;sf] cltl/Qm cGo ljljw yk cfo;|f]tx? lgDg cg';f/ /x]sf 5g\ .
-s_ d'Vo cfo;|f]t
-!_

zflGt;]gfdf efu lnPjfkt k|fKt x'g] /sd .

@_

a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?df lgIF]k ul/Psf] /sdaf6 k|FKt x'g] Jofh .

-v_ ljljw cfo;|f]t

-!_

ljBfnox?sf] ljBfyL{x?af6 k|FKt x'g] z'Ns .

-@_

kl/jf/ cfjf; ef8Fjfkt k|FKt x'g] /sd .

-#_

MSA (Mission Submission Allowance)

-$_

ljb]zL d'b|f ;6xL sldzg .

-%_

jL/]Gb| ;}lgs c:ktfnaf6 ljleGg lzif{sdf k|FKt x'g] /sd .

-^_

6]08/ kmf/d laqmL / ;fdfg l9nf a'emfPjfkt k|fKt x'g] ljnDa z'Ns .

-&_

k]6f]n kDkaf6 k|fKt x'g] cfly{s ;xof]u /sd .

k|fKt ug]{x?af6 k|fKt x'g] % k|ltzt /sd .

-*_ ;}lgs P]g, @)^# n] lbPsf] clwsf/ k|of]u u/L cfh{g u/]sf] ljleGg of]hgf tyf cfod"ns
sfo{x?af6 k|FKt x'g] /sd .
sf]ifsf] cfly{s cj:yf
&= @)#@ ;fndf sl/a ?=! s/f]8 @$ nfvaf6 :yfkgf ePsf] ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] df}Hbft /sd @)^*
cfiff9 d;fGt;Dddf ?=!& ca{ $* s/f]8 (# nfv %* xhf/ k'u]sf] 5 . lbgfg'lbg sNof0fsf/L sfo{ IF]q tyf
;xefuLx?sf] ;+Vofdf a[l4 x'b} uPsf] kl/k|]Ifdf klg sf]ifsf] ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg k|efjsf/L?kdf ;+rfng eP
u/]sf] kl/0ffd:j?k sf]ifsf] /sddf a[l4 x'b} uPsf] xf] . sf]ifsf] df}Hbft /sddWo] ?= * ca{ *( s/f]8 %# nfv
g]kfnL ?k}ofdf / afsL /sd ljb]zL d'b|fdf ljleGg a}+s tyf ljlQo ;+:yfx?df lgIF]ksf] ?kdf /x]sf] 5 . a}+s tyf
ljQLo ;+:yfx?sf] juL{s/0Fadf]lhd df}Hbftsf] l:ylt lgDgfg';f/ /x]sf] 5M
l;=g++=
ljj/0F
!
s ju{sf jfl0FHo a}+sx?
@
v ju{sf ljsf; a}+sx?
#
u ju{sf ljQLo sDkgLx?
s'n hDdf

/sd ?= xhf/df
k|ltzt
!^#^*&(# (#=^
$^(^$$ @=&
^%)(@! #=&
!&$*(#%* !))

zflGt ;]gfdf efu lnPjfkt ;+o'Qm /fi6;+3af6 k|FKt x'g] /sddf l;kfxLb]lv /yL;Dd a/fa/ /sd sf ug]{ Joj:yfM
*= ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if lgodfjnL, @)^% cg';f/ ;+o'Qm /fi6;+3sf] cfjfgdf zflGt ;]gfdf efu lnPjfkt
g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;+o'Qm /fi6;+3af6 kfpg] eQf /sddf l;kfxLb]lv /yL;Dd @@ k|ltztn] x'g] /sd sf u/L ;}lgs
sNof0fsf/L sf]ifdf hDdf ug]{ ul/Psf] 5 . o;af6 zflGt ;]gfdf efu lng hfg] ;a} bhf{sf ;}lgs JolQmx?n] a/fa/
/sd kfpg] Joj:yf ul/Paf6 ;fljs Joj:yfdf kl/jt{g ePsf] 5 .
sf]ifaf6 ;+rflnt sNof0fsf/L sfo{x? / xfn;Ddsf] pknAwL
(=

pkrf/ vr{M axfnjfnf ;}lgssf kl/jf/ tyf cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs / ltgsf cfl>t kl/jf/nfO{ sf]ifn] @)#$
71

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

;fnb]lv lgMz'Ns cf}ifwf]krf/ ;'ljwf pknAw u/fpb} cfPsf] 5 . ;}lgs c:ktfn egf{ e} pkrf/ ubf{ nfUg] vr{sf
cltl/Qm dx+uf k|s[ltsf] /f]usf] pkrf/sf] nflu Ps cfly{s jif{df Ps JolQmsf nflu ?= ! nfv;Ddsf] vr{ sf]ifn]
Joxf]g]{ Joj:yf 5 . sf]ifaf6 cf]ifwf]krf/ ;'ljwf k|fKt ug]{sf] ;+Vof k|lt jif{ cf}ift # nfveGbf a9L /xg] u/]sf] /
cf=j= @)^&^* df dfq & xhf/eGbf a9L lj/fdL yk pkrf/sf] nflu c:ktfndf egf{ eO{ ;]jf k|FKt u/]sf 5g\ .
o;sf cltl/Qm axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|FKt ;}lgssf >Ldfg tyf >LdtLsf nflu ;}lgs c:ktfndf pkrf/ x'g
g;Sg] uDeL/ k|s[ltsf /f]usf nflu k|lt JolQm ?= % nfv jf Ps bDkltsf] nflu ?= !) nfvsf] ;'ljwf k|FKt ug]{
u/L :jf:Yo aLdf sfo{qmd ;+rfng ul/Psf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 pknAw u/fpb} cfPsf] cf}ifwf]krf/
;'ljwfnfO{ ut jif{b]lv ljs]Gb|Lt ub}{ hfg] p2]Zocg'?k cfufdL rfn" jif{af6 k[tgfl:yt cf]=lk=l8=x?nfO{ yk ;'ljwf
;DkGg agfpg] / k|To]s k[tgfdf PS;/], d]l8sn Nofa / PDa'n]G; Joj:yf ug]{ gLlt lnOPsf] 5 .
!)= kl/jf/ tyf cfjf; ;x'lnot
axfnjfnf ;sn bhf{sf ;}lgsx?af6 ;]jfaf6 cjsfz k|fKt ubf{ g]kfn
;/sf/af6 k|fKt ug]{ cjsfz e'QmfgLsf cltl/Qm yk Psd'i6 /sd k|FKt u/L cjsfz kl5sf] hLjg;d]t cfly{s
?kn] ;an /xf];\ egL kl/jf/ cfjf; ;x'lnot sfo{qmd ;+rfng ul/Psf] 5 . o; sfo{qmdjfkt k|ltJolQm dfl;s ?=
@)) sf b/n] sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 cg'bfg lbg] tyf pQm /sd lghs} gfddf hDdf ul/ lbg] / cjsfzsf] ;dodf
Psd'i6 ;fjf Aofh;lxt e'QmfgL ul/lbg] Joj:yf ul/Psf] 5 . of] ;x'lnot sfo{qmdaf6 g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;sn bhf{
;dfg ?kn] lgoldt?kdf nfeflGjt eO/x]sf 5g\ .
!!= ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L lgj[lQe/0f
;}lgs ;]jfaf6 cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs tyf lghsf ljwjfljb'/sf nflu
dfl;s ?=@)) sf b/n] cfhLjg sNof0fsf/L lgj[lQe/0f sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 pknAw u/fpb} cfPsf]df cfufdL jif{
@)^*^( b]lv ?= !)) yk u/L dfl;s ?= #)) sf b/n] sNof0fsf/L lgj[lQe/0f pknAw u/fpg] Joj:yf ul/Psf]
5 . xfn sNof0fsf/L lgj[lQe/0f k|fKt ug]{ cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs jf lghsf] xsjfnf;d]t hDdf %^,))* n] sf]ifaf6
lgoldt lgj[lQe/0f ;'ljwf k|FKt ub}{ cfPsf 5g\ .
!@= lzIff axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|fKt / jL/ult k|FKt ;}lgssf 5f]/f5f]/Ln] u'0f:t/Lo lzIff ;'ne b/df k|FKt
ug{ ;s'g eGg] p2]Zon] @)#% ;fndf dsjfgk'/sf] ledkm]bLdf ;'lk ax'd'vL SofDk;sf] :yfkgf ul/Psf] / pQm
SofDk;nfO{ @)$# ;fndf eQmk'/sf] ;Nnf3f/Ldf :yfgfGt/0f u/fO{ xfn ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfno eQmk'/sf]
gfdaf6 ;+rfngdf cfPsf] 5 . sf7df08f} s]Gb|Lt ljBfno ;'ljwfnfO{ qmdzM lj:tf/ ub}{ hfg] p2]Zo cg'?k @)^!
;fndf kf]v/f, @)^@ ;fndf w/fg / @)^# ;fndf ;'v]{tdf ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfnox? :yfkgf u/L ;+rfngdf
cfPsf 5g\ . kf]v/fl:yt ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfno z}lIFs jif{ @)^* af6 pRr df=lj=df :t/f]Gglt ul/Psf] 5 .
;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifsf lxtflwsf/Lsf 5f]/f5f]/Ln] ;'ne b/df u'0f:t/Lo lzIFf k|fKt ug{ ;s'g egL sf]ifn] rfn'
jif{ ;'b"/ klZrdsf] s}nfnLdf ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfno :yfkgf u/L ;+rfngdf NofOPsf] 5 eg] eljiodf dWo
k[tgf cGt/ut;d]t ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfno :yfkgf ug]{ p2]Zo /x]sf] 5 . o;sf cltl/Qm @)%$ ;fnb]lv
ljh]Zj/L 1fgdlGb/ df=lj= / l/k'dlb{gL k|f=lj= ;d]t sf]ifsf] cfly{s ;xof]udf ;+rfng x'b} cfPsf]df pQm ljBfnox?
rfn' z}lIFs jif{ @)^* af6 pRr df=lj= tyf df=lj=df :t/f]Gglt ug]{ lg0f{o ePsf] 5 . sf]ifsf] nufgLdf ;+rflnt
ljBfnox?df jL/ult k|FKt ;}lgssf 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{ lgMz'Ns cWoog u/fpg] Joj:yf ul/Psf] 5 eg] cGosf] xsdf
/yLj[Gb tyf clws[tx?af6 dfl;s z'Nssf] #$=( k|ltzt, klbsaf6 @!=* k|ltzt / cGobhf{af6 !&=$% k|ltzt
c;'n u/L afsL z'Ns ldgfxf ug]{ Joj:yf ul/Psf] 5 . @)^$ ;fnb]lv s'n ljBFyL{sf] ;+Vof $) k|ltzt;Dd u}x|
;}lgs JolQmsf 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{;d]t egf{ lng] Joj:yf qmlds?kdf nfu' ub}{ hfg] of]hgfnfO{ lg/Gt/tf lbOPsf] 5 . sf]if
cGt/ut ;+rflnt ljBfnox?df cWoog/t ljBfyL{sf] ;+Vof @)^* ;fnsf] h]i7;Dddf em08} ^ xhf/ k'u]sf] 5 . sf]if
cGt/ut ;+rflnt ;a} ljBfnox?sf] @)^& ;fnsf] cyf{t o;} jif{ k|sflzt k|j]lzsf k/LIFFsf] glthf zt k|ltzt
/x]sf] 5 .
!#= 5fqj[lQ
g]kfnL ;]gfsf] h]x]Gbf/ 5f]/f5f]/Ln] k|fljlws lzIff xfl;n ug{ ;xof]u k'ofpg] tyf sf]ifaf6
;+r
+ flnt ljBfnodf egf{ x'g gkfO{ cGo ljBfnodf b]ze/ sIFf ^ b]lv !@ ;Dd cWoog/t g]kfnL ;]gfsf 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{
5fqj[lQ pknAw u/fO{ lghx?dfly kg]{ cfly{s ef/ s]xL xb;Dd eP klg sd ug]{ p2]Zon] :yfkgf sfnb]lv g} ljleGg
5fqj[lQ sfo{qmdx? ;+rfng x'b} cfPsf] 5 .
!$= ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L 5fqj[lQ -ljb]zljljw_

o; 5fqj[lQ cGtu{t ef/t, a+unfb]z, kfls:tfg / rLgdf

72

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

Pd=lj=lj=P;= cWoog ug{ hfg >L anflws[t ljefu -;}=la=_ af6 5gf}6 ePsf d]l8sn Sof8]6x?nfO{ lglZrt
;'ljwf k|bfg ul/G5 . o;sf] cltl/Qm :jb]zljb]zdf lghL vr{df d]l8sn, O{lGhlgol/, cf]e/l;o/, :6fkm g;{,
h]=6L=h]=l6=P= tyf lzIFf zf:qtkm{ cWoog ug]{ axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|fKt g]kfnL ;]gfsf h]x]Gbf/ 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{
klg 5fqj[lQ:j?k lglZrt /sd k|bfg ul/b} cfPsf]df xfn of] ;'ljwf eg] :ylut ul/Psf] 5 . k"j{ Joj:yf adf]lhd
cWoog/t ljBfyL{x?sf xsdf eg] of] ;'ljwfnfO{ lg/Gt/tf lbPsf] 5 . of] 5fqj[lQaf6 o;jif{ nfeflGjt x'g]x?sf]
;+Vof #* /x]sf] 5 .
!%= ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L 5fqj[lQ -:jb]z_ g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;]jf/t tyf cjsfz k|FKt ;}lgssf sIFf ^ b]lv !@
;Dd cWoog ug]{ h]x]Gbf/ 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{ dfl;s ?= %)).)) sf b/n] ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L 5fqj[lQ -:jb]z_ jflif{s x'g]
?=^,))).)) Psd'i6 lbg] Joj:yf 5 . cf=j=)^&^* dfdfq of] 5fqj[lQ !# xhf/ @! hgfn] k|FKt ul/;s]sf 5g\ .
k|ltjif{ ;fdfGotof !) k|ltztsf b/n] 5fqj[lQ ;+Vof a9fpb} n}hfg] gLlt 5 .
!^= k|wfg;]gfklt 5fqj[lQ
@)#@ ;fnb]lv nfu" ePsf] of] 5fqj[lQ axfn /xbf d[To' ePsf jf hL sf/jfxLdf
jL/ult k|FKt ug]{ ;}lgssf @ hgf 5f]/f 5f]/LnfO{ ^ jif{b]lv !* jif{sf] pd]/;Dd dfl;s ?=^)).)) sf b/n]
5fqj[lQ lbg] Joj:yf /x]sf]df o; jif{b]lv dfl;s ?=!)).)) yk u/L dfl;s ?=&)).)) sf b/n] Psd'i6 jflif{s
?=*,$)).)) 5fqj[lQ k|bfg ul/g] Joj:yf ul/Psf] 5 . of] 5fqj[lQaf6 cf=j= )^&^* df nfeflGjt x'gs
] f] ;+Vof
&^% /x]sf] 5 .
!&= g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfg ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 ;+rfng x'b} cfPsf] cf}ifwf]krf/ ;'ljwfsf]
bfloTjnfO{ bL3{sfnLg?kdf Jojl:yt ug{ cjsfz k|FKt jf axfnjfnf ;}lgssf h]x]Gbf/ 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{ :jb]zd}
d]l8sn lzIFFsf] df}sf k|bfg ug{ tyf g]kfnL ;]gf :jo+nfO{ cfjZos bIF hgzlQm pTkfbg ug{ / ;du|df sNof0fsf/L
sfo{ / sf]ifsf] cfo;|f]t ;d]t clea[l4 ug]{ p2]Zon] ;}lgs P]g, @)^# tyf sNof0fsf/L sf]if lgodfjnL, @)^%
sf] kl/lwleq /x]/ g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfgsf] :yfkgf u/L ;+rfng ug]{ p2]Zocg'?k rfn' jif{ ;+:yfgsf
nflu cfjZos ef}lts k"jf{wf/x? lgdf{0f ug]{ sfo{ eO/x]sf] 5 . lzIFF dGqfnoaf6 ;+:yfg :yfkgfsf] cfzo kq
(Letter of Intent) k|FKt eO{ lqe'jg ljZj ljBfno, g]kfn d]l8sn sfplG;n, g]kfn gl;{ kl/ifb tyf k|Fljlws
lzIFF tyf Joj;flos tflnd kl/ifbaf6 cfjZos ;+aGwg tyf cg'dlt k|fKt eO{ sn]h ckm d]l8l;g / sn]h ckm
gl;{ ;+rfng eO{;s]sf] 5 . sn]h ckm d]l8l;g cGt/ut MBBS df !)) hgf, sn]h ckm gl;{ cGt/ut PCL
(Nursing) df $) hgf, BSc (Nursing) df @% hgf / BN (Nursing) df $) hgf;Dd ljBfyL{ egf{ ug{ ;lsg] u/L
o; jif{af6 klxnf] ;];g z'? eO;s]sf] 5 .
kl/jf/ cfjf; / k"jf{wf/ ljsf;
!*= kl/jf/ cfjf;
b]zsf] ljleGg :yfgx?df t}gfy ;]gfsf] OsfOx?df sfo{/t ;}lgsx?sf] lxtnfO{ Wofgdf
/fvL jxfn eO/x]sf] ;dodf klg s]xL cjlw kl/jf/sf] ;fydf /xg] cj;/ k|fKt xf];\ eGg] p2]Zon] kl/jf/ cfjf;
lgdf{0f ub}{ hfg] gLlt cg'?k xfn b]ze/ !&! cfjf; u[x lgdf{0f ;DkGg ePsf 5g\ . lgdf{0f ;DkGg cfjf; u[xdf xfn
clws[t, klbs / cGobhf{ u/L ! xhf/ %!# kl/jf/n] cfjf; ;'ljwf lnO/x]sf 5g\ . ;]gfsf] x/]s OsfOdf sDtLdf
!) kl/jf/ cfjf; lgdf{0f ug]{ p2]Zo cg'?k sNof0fsf/L of]hgf lgb]{zgfnoaf6 of]hgf ;+rfng x'b} cfPsf] 5 .
kfrj6} ljsf; IF]qdf cjsfz k|FKt ;}lgsx?sf] nflu c:yfoL cfjf; / hL sf/jfxLdf c+ue+u ePsf ;}lgsx?nfO{
Joj;flos tyf ;Lkd"ns tflnd lbg] p2]Zon] sf7df08f}df k'g:yf{kgf s]Gb| :yfkgf ug]{ nIoadf]lhd lgdf{0f sfo{
;DkGg eO{ ljutb]lvg} ;+rfngdf cfPsf] 5 .
!(= k"jf{wf/ ljsf;
sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 ;+rflnt cf}ifwf]krf/ tyf lzIFF IF]qsf sNof0fsf/L sfo{qmd
k|efjsf/L?kdf ;+rfng ug{ cfjZos c:ktfn, ljBfno tyf dxfljBfnox?sf] ef}lts k"jf{wf/ lj:tf/ ub}{ hfg] gLlt
cg'?k k"jf{wf/ ljsf; sfo{qmd ;+rfng x'b} cfPsf] 5 . k"jf{wf/ ljsf;sf] nflu cfjZos /sd sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6
Joxf]l/g] / ljsf; lgdf{0f tyf :yklt dxflgb]{zgfnodfkm{t pQm /sd vr{ ul/+b} cfPsf] 5 . a9\bf] lj/fdL rfknfO{
b[li6ut u/L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn 5fpgLsf] ;'ljwf, lj:tf/ tyf ;}lgs ljBfno b]ze/ lj:tf/ ub}{ hfg] gLlt cg';f/
k"jf{wf/ ljsf;df jif]{gL 7"nf] wg/flz vr{ ub}{ hfg' k/]sf] 5 . o;sf cltl/Qm lgdf{0f eO;s]sf ef}lts k"jf{wf/x?sf]
;+/IF0f / lgoldt dd{t ;+ef/df;d]t 7"nf] /sd vr{ x'g] u/]sf] 5 .
73

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

cfly{s /fxt tyf ;fdflhs sNof0fsf/L sfo{x?

@)= hL sf/jfxLdf 3fOt] tyf jL/ult k|FKtnfO{ cfly{s ;xof]u
hL sf/jfxLsf] qmddf jL/ult k|FKt ug]{
;}lgssf] xsjfnfnfO{ tTsfn cfly{s ;xof]u:j?k cfjf; ;xof]u jfkt ?= @% xhf/ tyf cfly{s cg'bfg :j?k
?= ! nfv sNof0fsf/L sf]ifn] pknAw u/fpb} cfPsf] 5 . o;}u/L s[ofsd{ vr{ jfkt ;d]t Psd'i6 /sd pknAw
u/fpb} cfPsf] 5 . hL sf/jfxLdf 3fOt] ;}lgsx?nfO{ g]kfn ;/sf/af6 k|FKt x'g] /sd a/fa/ g} yk cg'bfg lbg] ;d]t
Joj:yf 5 .
@!= e"=k"= ;}lgs ;+3nfO{ ;xof]u g]kfnL /fli6o e"tk"j{ ;}lgs ;+3nfO{ cIfosf]ifdf jflif{s ?= ! nfv lbO{ pQm
sf]ifaf6 cflh{t JofhdWo] &% k|ltzt pQm ;+3n] vr{ ug]{ / @% k|ltzt cIFo sf]ifdf yk ub]{ hfg' kg]{ Joj:yf
ul/Psf] 5 . ljZj e"=k"= ;}lgs dxf;+3sf] ;b:otf gljs/0f ug{ jflif{s ! xhf/ & ;o ^) o'/f] cg'bfg pknAw
u/fpb} cfPsf] 5 .
@@= b}jL k|sf]k /fxt ljleGg b}jL k|sf]k tyf cGo sf/0faf6 kLl8t JolQmx?nfO{ /fxt:j?k ?= %) xhf/;Dd
cfly{s /fxt k|bfg ug]{ k|Fjwfg 5 . cf=j= )^&^*df b}jL k|sf]k /fxt /sd &% hgfnfO{ ljt/0f ul/Psf] 5 .
sf]ifsf] cfGtl/s lgoGq0F Joj:yf
@#= sf]ifsf] :yfkgfsf] p2]Zo xfl;n ug{ sf]if cGtu{t x'g] ;a} ultljlwx?sf] lgoGq0F Joj:yfnfO{ k|efjsf/L
agfpg lgDgfg';f/sf cfGtl/s Joj:yfx? cjnDag ul/Psf 5g\M
-s_ a}+s dfkm{t sf/f]af/ sf]if cGtu{tsf ;a} cfly{s sf/f]af/x? a}+s dfkm{t ug]{ u/fpg] x'bf gub
sf/f]af/df x'g] hf]lvdx?af6 sf]if d'Qm /x]sf] 5 .
-v_ ah]6/L lgoGq0F Joj:yf sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifdfly Jooef/ kf/L ul/g] ;a} vr{x? sf]if ;+rfng tyf
Joj:yfkg ;ldltaf6 :jLs[t jflif{s ah]6df ;dfj]z u/]/dfq lgsf;f lbOg] tyf o:tf] ah]6df yk36
ug{' k/]df ;ldltsf] :jLs[ltdfdfq ug{ ;lsg] afWofTds Joj:yf /x]sf]n] sf]ifsf] ah]6/L lgoGq0F Joj:yf
k|efjsf/L /x]sf] 5 .
-u_ :ki6 sfo{ ljefhg
sf]if cGtu{t ;+rfng ul/g] sNof0Fsf/L sfo{x? tyf zflGt ;]gf ;+rfng ug{
ul/g] vl/b sfo{x?sf] nflu /sd lgsf;f lbg] / cfk"t{s 5gf}6 ug]{ sfo{ 5'f5'} lgsfo / lgb]{zgfnox?n]
ug]{ u/L cfPsf] 5 .
-3_ cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIF0F
sf]ifsf] cfo Joosf] lgoldt cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIf0f ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg
;ldltn] tf]s]adf]lhd x'g] u/L ;}lgs P]gn] :ki6 Joj:yf u/]sf] 5 . sf]ifsf] cfly{s sf/f]af/df s'g} ;+nUgtf
g/x]sf pk/yLsf] ;+of]hsTjdf jl/i7 rf6{8 Psfp06]06, jl/i7 cfly{s ljz]if1 ;lDdlnt cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIF0f
af]8{ u7g u/L cf=n]=k= ug]{ / ;f] sf] k|ltj]bg sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldltdf k]z ug]{ Joj:yf 5 .
cfly{s jif{ )^&^* ;Ddsf] cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIF0f ;DkGg eO;s]sf] 5 . sf]ifsf] cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIF0FnfO{
k|efjsf/L agfpg sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldltsf] :jLs[ltdf cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIF0F lgb]{lzsf hf/L
u/L nfu" ul/Psf] 5 .
-_ sf]ifsf] clGtd n]vfk/LIf0f sf]ifsf] cfly{s sf/f]af/sf] clGtd n]vfk/LIf0f b]zsf] ;jf]R{ r n]vfk/LIf0f
;+:yf dxfn]vf k/LIFssf] sfof{noaf6 x'g] Joj:yf ;}lgs P]g, @)^# n] u/]sf] 5 . dxfn]vfk/LIFssf]
sfof{noaf6 k|To]s jif{ lgoldt?kdf n]vfk/LIf0f u/L cfly{s jif{ @)^^^& ;Ddsf] n]vfk/LIf0f ;DkGg
eO;s]sf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifn] ;+rfng u/]sf ;a} cfly{s sf/f]af/sf ;DaGwdf n]vfk/LIf0faf6
cfly{s sf/f]af/sf] n]vfhf]vf u/L ;+j}wflgs Joj:yfcg';f/ dxfn]vfk/LIFsn] jflif{s k|ltj]bg k|sfzg u/L
sf]ifsf] oyfy{ cfly{s sf/f]af/ k|To]s jif{ ;fj{hlgs ug]{ ul/Psf] 5 . of] Joj:yf g} ;+j}wflgs tyf sfg"gL
?kdf sf]ifsf] ultljlw tyf kf/blz{sf ljifodf ;fj{hlgs ul/g] cflwsfl/s dfWod xf] .

74

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

o; jif{sf] a]?h' km5\of}{6sf] k|ult

@$= ;}lgs P]g, @)^# tyf ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if lgodfjnL, @)^% cg';f/ ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] clGtd
n]vfk/LIf0fdf ;jf]R{ r n]vfk/LIf0f ;+:yf dxfn]vfk/LIFssf] sfof{noaf6 ug'{ kg]{ k|Fjwfg cg'?k z'?b]lv cfly{s jif{
@)^^^& ;Ddsf] d=n]=k=sf] sfof{noaf6 n]vfk/LIf0f ;DkGg u/L ;s]sf] 5 . d=n]=k=sf] jflif{s k|ltj]bg @)^&
cg';f/ ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]if nufot cGo ;ldltsf] ;d]t u/L km5\of]{6 ug{ afsL a]?h' ?= $# s/f]8 ^( nfv !!
xhf/dWo] cfly{s jif{ @)^&^* df ?= #) s/f]8 %* nfv $$ xhf/ -&)k|ltzt_ km5\of}{6 eO{ of] jif{ a]?h' km5\of}{6
ug]{ sfo{df pNn]vgLo k|ult xf+l;n ePsf] 5 . pQm km5\of}{6dWo] ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifsf] dfq *^ k|ltzt km5\of]{6
ePsf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifsf] a]?h' km5\of}{6sf] k|ult pNn]vlgo ePsf] cfwf/df a]?h' km5\of}{6 d"Nof+sg tyf
cg'udg ;ldlt / >L /Iff dGqfnon] wGojfb;lxt k'/:s[t ug]{ lg0f{o u/]sf] 5 .
@%= ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]if / cGt/utsf lgsfox?sf] cWofjlws a]?h' km5\of}{6sf] l:ylt sNof0Fsf/L sf]if /
cGt/utsf lgsfox?sf] z'?b]lv cfly{s jif{ @)^^^& ;Dd d=n]=k=sf] sfof{noaf6 n]vfk/LIf0f u/L cf}NofPsf]
hDdf a]?h' ?=!) ca{ %^ s/f]8 ^) nfv @# xhf/dWo] cfly{s jif{ @)^@^# b]lv @)^&^* ;Dd d=n]=k=sf]
sfof{noaf6 ?= ( ca{ *( s/f]8 (@ nfv $) xhf/ km5\of}{6 eO;s]sf] 5 . o; jif{ *^ k|ltzt a]?h' km5\of}{6 ePsf]
5 eg] ;du|df (# k|ltzt a]?h' km5\of}{6 ePsf] x'bf ;do ;dodf /IFF dGqfno tyf Joj:yflksf ;+;b ;fj{hlgs
n]vf ;ldltaf6 a]?h' km5\of}{6sf] k|ltzt cGoGt /fd|f] ePsf]n] wGoafb k|fKt ePsf] ;fy} dlGqkl/ifb cGt/ut a]?h'
km5\of}{6 d"Nof+sg tyf cg'udg ;ldltsf] lg0F{o cg';f/ k'/:sf/;d]t k|bfg ug]{ u/]sf] 5 . o;nfO{ ;sf/fTds
sfo{sf] ?kdf lng ;lsG5 . sNof0Fsf/L sf]if tyf cGo ;ldltsf] ;d]t afsL a]?h' ?=^^ s/f]8 ^& nfv *# xhf/
tyf k|To]s jif{ d=n]=k=sf] sfof{noaf6 n]vf k/LIf0f u/L cf+}NofOg] yk a]?h'x?sf ;DaGwdf cfufdL lbgx?df klg
a]?h' km5\of}{6 ug]{ u/fpg] sfddf ;lqmo e"ldsf lgjf{x u/L a]?h' z"Go u/fpg]tkm{ sNof0fsf/L of]hgf lgb]{zgfnosf]
k|of;nfO{ lg/Gt/tf lbg] Joj:yf ldnfOPsf] 5 .
sf]if Joj:yfkgdf ;'wf/
@^= ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] Joj:yfkgnfO{ ;do ;fk]IF?kdf ;'wf/ ub}{ yk kf/bzL{ / Jojl:yt u/fpb} n}hfg
ljut jif{x?df ul/Psf] ;'wf/x?sf] k|ltkmn k|FKt x'g z'? ePsf] 5 eg] ;'wf/sf] qmdnfO{ cfufdL jif{;d]t lg/Gt/tf
lbg] p2]Zo /x]sf] 5 . sf]ifsf] n]vf Joj:yfnfO{ sDKo'6/s[t ul/Psf] 5 eg] ut jif{ ul7t sfo{bnaf6 tof/ ePsf]
;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] cfly{s k|zf;g sfo{ljlwsf] d:of}bfnfO{ sfg"gL /fosf lgldQ ;]gf k|f8ljjfsdf k7FOPsf]
5 . sfg"gL /fo k|FKt ePkl5 sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldltsf] :jLs[ltdf sfo{ljlw nfu' ul/g] 5 . sfo{ljlw
nfu" eO;s]kZrft sf]ifsf] sfo{ ;+rfng ljlw yk kf/bzL{ x'g] ljZjf; lnOPsf] 5 . sf]if cGt/ut ;+rflnt
sNof0Fsf/L lgsfox?df sd{rf/L lzIfsx?sf] lgo'lQm / ;]jf ;'ljwfdf Ps?ktf Nofpg s/f/ ;]jf lgodfjnL
:jLs[t u/L nfu' ul/Psf] / cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIf0f k|efjsf/L agfpg o;} rfn" cf=j=af6 lgb]{lzsf :jLs[t u/L nfu"
ul/Psf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] Joj:yfkg ;'wf/ ;DaGwdf cWoog u/L ;'fj;lxtsf] k|ltj]bg k]z ug{
ut jif{ lgo'lQm ePsf afx\o k/fdz{bftfsf] k|ltj]bgdf pNn]lvt cfjZos Go"gtd Jofj;flos hgzlQm Joj:yf ug]{
p2]Zo cg'?k rfn" jif{ Ps jl/i7 rf6{8 Psfp06]06sf] lgo'lQm ul/Psf] 5 eg] sf]if cGt/ut sfo{/t sd{rf/Lx?sf]
bIFtf clea[l4 ug{ o; jif{ Joj;flos n]vf / ;fdfGo a}+ls sf/f]af/ ;DaGwL Ps dlxg] tflnd ;+rfng ul/Psf]
5 . sf]ifnfO{ clt cfjZos Joj;flos sd{rf/L lgo'lQm ug]{ tyf sf]if cGt/utsf sd{rf/LnfO{ Joj;flos tflnd
lbg] sfo{nfO{ cfufdL jif{;d]t lg/Gt/tf lbOg] gLlt lnOPsf] 5 .
sf]ifsf] lgIF]k gLlt
@&= ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifdf df}Hbft /sd ljleGg a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfnfO{ lgIF]k pknAw u/fpbf ;DalGwt
a}+ssf] k"h
L kof{Kttf, shf{ tyf nufgLsf] u'0F:t/ l:ylt, Joj:yfkg, ;+rfng glthf tyf t/ntfsf] l:ylt ;d]tnfO{
cWoog u/L juL{s/0F ug]{ / ;f]xL juL{s/0Fsf cfwf/df pknAw u/fpg ;lsg] clwstd lgIF]k ;Ldf tf]Sg] / ;f]xL
;Ldfsf] clwgdf /xL sf]ifsf] /sd lgIF]k pknAw u/fpg] ul/Psf] 5 . g]kfn /fi6 a}+saf6 k|fKt kl5Nnf] ljQLo
;"rgfsf cfwf/df a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?sf] ;do ;dodf k'gM auL{s/0F ug]{ ;d]t ul/Psf] 5 . ljutdf clwstd
lgIF]k ;LdfeGbf a9L pknAw u/fOPsf] lgIF]k /sd qmdzM lemSg] / o:tf] a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?nfO{ yk lgIF]k
75

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pknAw u/fpg] ul/Psf] 5}g . xfn sf]ifsf] df}Hbft /sddWo] sl/a (% k|ltzt df}Hbft s ju{sf jfl0FHo
a}+sx?df /x]sf] 5 .
ljBdfg ;d:of / ;'fj
@*= sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifdf Jooef/ kf/L ;+rfng x'b} cfPsf ljleGg sNof0Fsf/L sfo{x?df ;xefuL x'g]sf] ;+Vof
a9\b} hfbf ;f]xL adf]lhd ;|f]t Joj:yf ug'{kg]{ r'gf}tL 5 eg] sf]ifdf k|FKt x'g] /sd ;Lldt ePsfn] a9\bf] vr{ wfGg
j}slNks cfo cfh{gsf ;|f]t vf]Hg h?/L b]lvPsf] 5 . ;}lgs P]g, @)^# df sf]ifaf6 ljleGg IF]qdf nufgL u/L cfo
cfh{g k|FKt ug{ ;Sg] k|fjwfg eP tfklg o;tkm{ afx\o k/fdz{bftfaf6 k|fKt x'g] Diagnostic Study Report k|fKt
ePkl5 7f]; k|of; ug{ ldnfpg' kg]{ b]lvG5 .
@(= g]kfn /fi6 a}+sn] ;d:ofu|:t 3f]if0FF u/]sf] / lj36gdf /x]sf s]xL a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?df ul/Psf] lgIF]k
nufgLsf] c;'nLdf ;'wf/ eO/x]sf] 5 . oBkL cem} s]xL a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfaf6 sl7gfO{sf afah'b /sd c;'nLsf]
k|of; eO/x]s]f 5 . o:tf s]xL a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?af6 nufgLsf] zt{ adf]lhd ;fjf Jofh k|fKt x'g ;s]sf]
5}g . s]xL hf]lvddf /x]sf] elgPsf] ;a}h;f] /sdsf ;DaGwdf a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?sf] ;Dklf /f]Ssf ul/Psf]
sf/0Faf6 ;d]t clwsf+z /sd p7\g] b]lvG5 .
#)= a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?df df}Hbft /sddf cflh{t Jofhdf !% k|ltztsf b/n] ;|f]tdf s/ sL x'bf rfn"
cf=j=df sl/a ?=!% s/f]8 wg/flz vr{ x'g] u/]sf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]if gfkmfd"ns ;+:yf geO{ ljz'4
sNof0Fsf/L p2]Zon] :yfkgf ePsf] ;+:yf /x]sf] / cfkm\gf lxtflwsf/Lx?nfO{ :jf:Yo, lzIFF tyf cfjf; h:tf cfwf/e"t
;'ljwfx? pknAw u/fpg] p2]Zon] cfkm\gf sfo{qmdx? ;+rfng ub}{ cfPsf] 5 . sf]iff/f ;+rflnt lzIFF :jf:Yo h:tf
cfwf/e"t ;'ljwfx?n] g]kfn ;/sf/ :j+od ;+rfng ug'{ kg]{ sfo{df ;d]t k|ToIF ;xof]u k'ofPsf] x'bf Jofh cfh{gdf
s/ 5'6 u/fpg o; jif{ ;d]t yk cfjZos kxn x'g'kg]{ b]lvG5 .
lgisif{
#!= ;}lgs P]g @)^# n] ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifnfO{ cem a9L Jojl:yt tyf kf/bzL{ ?kdf ;+rfng ug{
;DdfggLo k|wfgdGqLsf] ;+of]hsTjdf k|wfg;]gfkltsf] cWoIFtfdf cy{ dGqfnosf] ;x;lrj / /IFf dGqfnosf]
;x;lrj;d]t ;b:o /xg] Joj:yf 5 . o;af6 sf]ifsf] cfly{s sf/f]af/nfO{ lgb]{lzt tyf lgoGq0f ug{ ;3fp k'Ug'sf]
;fy} sf]ifsf] cfly{s sf/f]af/sf] k|s[ltcg';f/ sNof0fsf/L sf]ifsf] p2]Zo kl/k"lt{ ug{sf] nflu cfly{s sf/f]af/ ;DaGwL
bIF hgzlQmx? jl/i7 rf6{8 Psfp06]06, jl/i7 cfly{s ljz]if1 nufotsf cGo bIf u}/ ;}lgs JolQmx?sf] ;]jf
lng'sf ;fy} afx\o Joj;flos k/fdz{bftfaf6 ;d]t Diagnostic Study u/fO{ k|FKt ;'fjx?nfO{ sfof{Gjog ug]{
gLlt lnPaf6 sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;DaGwL sfo{nfO{ cem a9L k|efjsf/L, Jojl:yt, ldtJooL tyf kf/bzL{
t'Nofpg ;xof]u k'u]sf] 5 .

wgn] /fd|f] ;}lgs k|fKt x'b}g t/ /fd|f] ;}lgsn] wg k|fKt x'G5 .

Dofsj]nL

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Political Ownership of the Military and CivilMilitary Relations

- Lt Col Surendra Singh Rawal
Introduction
1.
Civil-Military Relations (CMR) is an area of study that focuses on the relations between
the particular civil society and its military organization in broader term; specifically, it is the
relation between the military and the civil authority of the country. CMR can be analyzed from
different perspectives focusing on civilian and military's different environment and interaction
that cause different outcomes.
2.
Hierarchical relation or chain of command in any institution is based on fundamental
principles of leadership - authority, responsibility, and accountability. Accountability flows
upwards; whereas, authority and responsibility flow downwards.1 Authority and responsibility
are complementary to each other - absence one of them does not lead to effective functioning
of any organization. If looked at from superiors' stand point, authority exerts superiors' will
upon subordinates; whereas, responsibility demands superiors to take care of subordinates.2
'Responsibility' becomes personal and intimate and generally becomes 'ownership' in those
institutions where human behavior plays a crucial role for attainment of their goals. At times,
even nuances of human behavioral aspects play a critical role in such organizations. With the
same analogy, it can be argued that there are two pillars of relationship between the civilian and
the military - control and ownership. Control is basically a regulatory mechanism to impose
the state's will upon the military - the institution that poses coercive power. Although control of
the military is the vital aspect of civil-military relations, it is less likely to be effective without
giving due consideration to another equally important pillar - responsibility or ownership.
Therefore, effective control as well as proper ownership of the military seems to be essentials
for stable civil-military relations of any country.
3.
The range of explanation available in CMR theories includes subjective, objective,
democratic, and other forms of control of the armed forces. After analyzing various theories
and modalities in CMR, a conclusion can be drawn - existing theories are mainly focused
on control of the armed forces, and very less on the ownership aspects.3 The paradigms such
as professionalism, principal-agent, and democratic control are more convincing to explain
CMR in advanced democracies where sophisticated democratic institutions are in place. Yet,
their focus is on mainly 'control' aspect of civil-military relations. CMR in authoritarian and
1

The relationship between authority, responsibility and accountability must be in balance responsibility and authority
must go hand in hand, and accountability cannot be expected and flow upwards unless authority and responsibility have
first flowed down.

Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility, Answers.com http://wiki.answers.
com/Q/What_is_the_difference_between_ authority_and_responsibility#ixzz1jIJGEnos - He argues, "Responsibility
involves being accountable for, or having obligations or duties, and acting reasonably. It involves communicating, and
being aware of your relationships with others... Authority involves having the power to enforce obedience or compliance.
It can also involve a sense of having the right to control others." (Accessed on 13 Jan, 2012)

See Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1957; Feaver, Peter D. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003; Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.
Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1960; Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, edited by
Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.
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non-democratic countries seems to be more subjective, and it too focuses on 'control' of the
military by political means. If any, the ownership aspect of CMR is vaguely assimilated in
some of the paradigms but not consciously.
A Key Question
4.
Identifying why and how taking ownership of the military by political leaders
contributes to improve CMR provides insights into our understanding of civilian control and
CMR. According to the conventional wisdom, 'control' itself improves CMR by intervening
or allowing the civilian exercising authority over military affairs. However, many examples
show it is not the case most of the times. To 'control' the military, many countries have political
institutions and the civilian led ministry of defense in place, yet a significant number of them
have experienced an unstable civil-military relations. By unstable, I mean instances in which
the military has not followed civilian preferences, either by neglecting civilian orders or by
imposing their own policy preferences on their principals.
5.
For that reason, it is pertinent to analyze whether ownership of the military contributes
to stable CMR or not. Observations show that control alone, without ownership of political
leadership of the country, may not contribute to maintain stable civil-military relations. This
questions the causality of most CMR and international relations theories which often assume
a positive relationship between control of the military and stable civil-military relations.
The 'Ownership' Argument
6.
Many theories exist in CMR based on professionalism, institutional, sociological,
principal-agent, or other frameworks. Although these theories focus on different causes and
effects of CMR, their core argument seems that control of the military by the civilian contributes
to maintain stable CMR. According to these theories, many countries including Nepal should
have enjoyed stable CMR because these countries have been under the civilian control for a
long time. However, this is not the case. Therefore, I argue that a complementary "ownership"
dimension of civil-military relations is equally important.
7.
The arguments based on conventional frameworks are valid explaining the correlation
between the control of the military and CMR. However, after carefully analyzing most of
the studies, I find that their conclusions are based on the analyses of "control" aspect of
CMR without taking much consideration of "ownership" aspect. I believe that the ownership
dimension is as much important as the control dimension, and has to be given equal emphasis
while analyzing the problem holistically. Why is it necessary to control the military by the
civilians? Is the control for the sake of control? Or, there is something else to be achieved by
taking control? Of course, the ultimate goal of achieving stable CMR is not control per se, but
to gain effectiveness of the military so that it can be used as a reliable instrument of national
power.4 Control is thus just one of the means to achieve this end. Hence, there appears to be a
gap in the studies of CMR, lacking proper focuses on the flip side of the civilian control. I argue
that, along with control, taking ownership of the military by political leaders contributes to
promote stable CMR. By ownership, I mean taking interest, acquiring knowledge, looking after
military's needs, solving problems, and active involvement in military activities - ultimately
converging political vision and military objectives to achieve national goals.
8.
Thus, a holistic concept of CMR should be the one that encompasses both the facets of
CMR - control and ownership. This concept of CMR advocates two equally important aspects
4

Bruneau, Thomas C. "Introduction" Who Guards the Gurdians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed.
Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, (University of Texas Press, Austin, 2006), 3.
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of leadership - authority and responsibility.5 Such concept encourages or ensures complete

submission of the military to the political leaders or entities, making military operations a
continuation of politics more realistic than it is with only the control approach.
9.
Control of the military specifically implies restrain, restrict, or limit the prerogatives of
the military. Various mechanisms of control are available in civil-military relations as explained
by different theories. However, defining roles and missions, budgetary control, acquisition, and
personnel management of the military are prominent ones.6 Apart from Ministry of Defense
level control, constitutional arrangements and legislative oversight also constitute important
aspects of control mechanism in democracy. Level and nature of control by these mechanisms
dispense different level of CMR. Control is necessary but not sufficient condition for stable
civil-military relations. Ownership, which is more related to responsibility of political
leaders, is also equally important. The ownership aspect has more intimate, compassionate,
or sympathetic connotation. There are different attributes of the ownership variable in CMR
- caring, supporting, motivating, and encouraging are the common ones.
10.
My further argument is that trajectories of CMR depend upon political leader's nature
of ownership of the military. This function inherently behaves as the complementary aspect of
control thereby contributing to effective civilian control of the military. The term ownership
is vague, if not specified properly it tends to be intangible. Ownership, the important variable,
has two basic functions in CMR - intention and interest. Here, the intention is defined as aim,
objective, or purpose of doing something, and interest is defined as curiosity, involvement, and
personnel or business connections. The intention of taking ownership of the military can be of
two forms. (See Figure 1) A parochial intention aims at achieving a narrow goal. For instance,
taking ownership of the military by an authoritarian ruler, an oligarch, or an absolute monarch
may tend to ensure longevity of their rule by employing or threat of employing military power.7

Figure 1: Different Attributes of Ownership

5

Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility, He argues, "When authority and
responsibility get confused, conflict and tension occurs...a lack of understanding about the nature of the relationship
between responsibility and authority can create hard feelings and alienate people from each other."

Bruneau, Thomas C. and Goetze, Richard B. Jr, "Ministers of Defense and Democratic Control," Who Guards the
Gurdians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, (University
of Texas Press, Austin, 2006), 83.

Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility, He argues,"The danger with authority
is that it can become an end in itself. Authoritarian people are those that focus mainly on their power and authority,
forgetting that any position of authority brings with it the responsibility to communicate and relate with others."
79

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They may also have somewhat broader intention of protecting national interests of the country;
however, in most of the cases, the primordial intention is likely to remain protection of their
own regime. On the other hand, a broad ownership intends to protect national interests of the
country rather than protecting individual or group's vested interests. This ownership can be
termed as national ownership as it aspires to achieve national goals by employing the military.
11.
Not only the intention, but also the political leaders' interest yields a different kind of
ownership. If political leaders do not care about military's need, and just want to maintain an
apathetic or formal relation, then the interest is likely to be a formality. On the other hand, if
the political leaders care about the military and consider it their important instrument and are
compassionate to it, then the interest tends to be intimate.
12.
If the military variable is kept constant, the level of CMR correlates to the nature of
ownership of the military attained by political entities. If the political leader has a good intention
and interest of taking ownership of the military, she or he is going to enjoy successful CMR.
When the political leader has an intimate relation with the military and has a broad intention
such as protection of democracy or furtherance of national goals, that political leader is going
to enjoy a very stable CMR (Q1) (See Figure 2). If the political leader maintains intimate
relations with the military but has a parochial intention, such as protection of oligarchic or
authoritarian rule, still the political leader enjoys somewhat stable CMR (Q2). On the other
hand, when the political leader is uninterested in the military and has a narrow intention of
taking ownership of the military, the CMR is likely to be unsuccessful. If the political leader is
uninterested in military matters but has a broad intention, the CMR is still going to be unstable
(Q3). And, it is going to be very unstable if the political leader is uninterested, maintains a
formality with the military, and has parochial intention (Q4).8

Figure 2: Different Interests and Intentions of Political Leader and Nature of CMR
Political Leader and Military Chain of Command
13.
The military tends to function better under a single chain of command of political leaders;
and being a political tool of the state, it cannot remain without political leaders for more than a
limited period. If it remains without political leaders for a long period, the military either seeks
to find its own political leader, or tends to be an absolute autonomous organization.
8

Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility, He argues," When authority, rather
than responsibility, becomes the basis for a relationship... confrontation and blow-ups will likely occur."
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14.
Political leader of the military varies depending upon the political system of a country.
In an authoritarian system, the authoritarian ruler becomes the political leader, such as a king in
an absolute monarchical system of governance. In democratic system too, the types of political
leader may be different depending on the power sharing mechanism and type of democratic
institutional set up, such as the executive power or the congress. Thus, the prime minister is
the political leader of the military in parliamentary democracy, whereas the president is the
political leader of the military in presidential democracy.9 In either of the system, although the
principal political leader of the military is the president or the prime minister, the parliamentary
or congressional committee members also behaves as political leaders of the military because
of the system of check and balance. In most political systems the Ministry of Defense acts as an
institution to execute the authority and responsibility on behalf of the political leader; thereby,
exercising command upon the military on behalf of the chief executive. In some political
arrangements, the head of state without or very limited executive power is made supreme
commander of the military. Therefore, the question of who would become the political leader
of the military depends on the power sharing arrangement and the structure of the political
system. However, if there is more than one competing political leader, the military is likely to
be less effective. Thus, it will always be better to have only one commanding political leader,
even if there is more than one political leader of the military.
15.
In any circumstances, if the state mechanism fails to provide political leader for a long
time, the military is likely to take one of the three different courses. First, the military tries
to find its own political leader. Second, the military may actively involve in politics. In this
situation, the military is likely to have either high stake in politics, or orchestrates a coup
d'tat. Third, the military behaves as an autonomous entity, shielding itself from any influences
of politics. In some circumstances, it is also possible that some individual, group, or extranational or international entity may take de-facto leadership of the military overtly or covertly.
Obviously, these entities are likely to have their own vested interests.
16.
When there is competitive dual political leadership, it puts the military in a dilemma.
If the dual leadership is divided, it not only put the military in dilemma, but also is likely to
create clashes among the leaders. If the military too divided into different competitive groups,
is likely to cause bloodsheds and cripple the political system as well as state mechanism. On
top of that, the dual political leaders can emasculate the military making it a useless instrument
of the national power because of the contrasting dual chain of command. If there is no contrast
in dual chain of command or leadership, then there may not be a serious problem in CMR and
civilian control; however, it is less likely to have such desirable situation in crucial political
balance of power scenario. When there is dual chain of command or political leadership, the
military is likely to receive divergent orders, and it will be in the discretion of the military which
order to obey and which not to. This allows the military to take initiative and opportunity to
manipulate politics by obeying or not obeying the order in its own convenience. This condition
tends to be complex and compounded if happens in less developed countries where political
institutions are weak and economic condition is bleak.
17.
Therefore, there is an inherent correlation between ownership and loyalty. The
wholehearted ownership of the military by political leaders generally results in unwavering
9

Robert A. Dahl asserts, "In a presidential system the chief executive is elected independently of the legislature and is
constitutionally vested with important powers. In a parliamentary or cabinet system, the chief executive is chosen and
may be removed by the parliament. The classic example of presidential government is the United States; the classic
example of parliamentary government is Great Britain." Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, New, (Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 2000), 122.
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loyalty from the military. The loyalty makes the military submissive to its leader, which in
turn results not only in a stable CMR but also enables the military to serve as an effective
instrument of national power.
The Sociological Aspect of Ownership
18.
The armed servant of a nation is analogous to private servants at home or at private
property in many respects, if not all. To receive effective service, the masters should instruct,
monitor, and give incentives to the armed servants. The more they are trusted with good
monitoring and guidance, the more effective they will be. There may be a good monitoring
mechanism in place; however, if servants' interests are not looked after well, they may not
have incentives to be motivated. It is also true otherwise, if not monitored properly, it can
act as an autonomous entity - this, however, is the 'control' aspect which is not the scope of
this paper. Thus, to achieve utility maximization of servants' service, the master must have
an intimate caring relationship with the servants. However, it should not be forgotten that the
armed servants of a state have two roles to play simultaneously. Unlike, private servants, the
armed servants are servants of the state, and at the same time, they are the citizens of the state
who also have stake in state's decision making. In that respect, the armed servant concept is
not the mirror image of private servants.
19.
Human beings are intelligent, political, and social animals; it is not easy to take control
of them. Similarly, to take control of an institution having many people as its core component is
not as simple as control of other institutions. It is even more difficult to control such institution
when its members are to be prepared to sacrifice their life in others' will. Therefore, behavior of
a manpower intensive institution is complex and contingent on various factors. In this regard,
the military institution is somewhat unique from other social institutions because of (a) nature
of the job - management of violence, and (b) composition - the military heavily rely on human
components even in the age of hi-tech and automation.10 Thus morale, motivation, discipline,
intimate relation, hierarchical structures etc. are very important in military institution.
Problems of Democratic Political Leader of the Military
20.
Military leadership assumed by responsible democratic leaders is likely to experience
more stable CMR because of the broad political intention espoused by them and their intimate
relationship with the military. Yet, the main problem with democracy is periodic changes in
the government. Since the concept of political ownership of the military depends on a very
intimate relationship between the military and political entities in power, frequent changes in
the government make it difficult to maintain such intimate relations and ultimately transfer of
the loyalty could become a problem.
21.
Transferring loyalty is, sometimes, a time consuming process. A new political leader
may have different priorities on national interests; in some cases, national interests may have
different courses of action because of change of political entities in power. This requires time
to adjust the rhythm of both the military and political leaders' functioning. If the change of the
regime is by revolution, transfer of loyalty becomes more challenging.
22.
In highly institutionalized and developed countries, such transitions may not be very
difficult and take less time; whereas, in less developed countries where political institutions are
not very strong, transitions may be rocky, and take more time. The individual characteristics
10

Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. He argues the military's profession as "management of violence" by
quoting Harold Lasswell's phrase in his book.
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and experience of the military and civilian leaders may also affect this transition, which
ultimately influence CMR. If such change of regime is frequent due to political instability,
then the transfer of loyalty becomes problematic.
Conclusion
24.
Some may argue that military's ownership aspect is inherent in the control mechanism
or the administrative function of the state. But this seems less plausible rhetoric because of
the intrinsic restraining intent prevalent in the function of 'control'.11 When the state feels the
necessity of giving extra attention to control the military because of the coercive power it
posses, the state also should give due consideration to other equally important dimension of
the administration, i.e. responsibility or ownership. There will hardly be any doubt that the
control of the military is vital, however, the mere mechanical control may not be sufficient to
achieve effectiveness of the military. The ownership of the military may be implicit in CMR
of some of the economically, socially, and politically developed countries because of the well
developed state mechanism in place. However, this is not the case in many other scenarios.
In case of those countries where political situation is fluid and democratic institutions are
either non-existent or rudimentary, it is imperative to give emphasis on the securing political
ownership of the military in order to have stable CMR.
11

Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility, He says,"Authority may be seen by
people as being bad or wrong."

References
1.
Bruneau, Thomas C. and Richard B. Goetze, Jr. "Ministers of Defense and Democratic Control." In
Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and
Scott D. Tollefson. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.
2.
Bruneau, Thomas C. "Democracy and Effectiveness: Adopting Intelligence for the Fight Against
Terrorism. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Vol. 21 (2008): 448460.
3.
Bruneau, Thomas C., Florina Cristiana Matei and Sak Sakoda. National Security
Councils:
Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations. Defense and Security Analysis Vol. 25, No.
3 (September 2009): 255-269.
4.
Feaver, Peter D. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2003.
5.
1968.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press,

6.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
7.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
8.
1960.

Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe IL: Free Press,

9.
Joshi, Bhuwan Lal and Leo E. Rose. Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political
Acculturation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
10.

Rose, Leo E. Nepal's Strategy for Survival. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

11.

Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility,Answers.com

12.
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_is_the_difference_between_ authority_and_responsibility#ixzz1jIJ
GEnos - (Accessed on 13 Jan, 2012)
13.

Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, New, (Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000)
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A Brief Introduction to Changing World Order and

International Relation
- Major Ajaya Gurung
Introduction
1.
Current international relation is revolving around the survival of the nations. The issue
of survival has become so complex in the present context of the new world order and directly
related with the term "Power" both hard and soft. The existence of Balance of Power in
international relations is always there and it is natural that it keeps on shifting. In any form of
polarity from the very beginning to present world order, there has been balance regionally and
globally but in changing form. The world has seen different forms of world order, emergence
of world and regional powers, concept of regional security/collective security in due course
of time. Political ideologies in present world order seem to be dominated by the economic
issues. Global interdependence has become such an interesting issue, which tend to challenge
all the political issues overshadowing the ideologies practically. The collective efforts of USA
and China to counter their present economic crisis and on the other hand being in a same
region with similar economic-political system the hesitance of European nations to support
the economy of the Greece is the best example of it. At the same time the inclination of USA's
interest to our neighbor India and deteriorating relation with Pakistan shows the shifting of
balance of power regionally. Subsequent paragraphs will deal briefly about the different forms
of World Order in the past, present and the future trend, where we might see the multi polarity
in near future.
Polarity in International relations
2.
Polarity in international relations is any of the various ways in which power is distributed
within the international system. It describes the nature of the international system at any given
period of time. One generally distinguishes four types of systems: Uni-polarity, Bi-polarity, tripolarity, and Multi-polarity for four or more centers of power. The type of system is completely
dependent on the distribution of power and influence of states in region or internationally.
Uni-polarity
3.
Uni-polarity in international politics is a distribution of power in which there is one state
with most of the cultural, economic, and military influence which is different than hegemony.
Before the disintegration of USSR, the balance of power was mainly defined in terms of the
bi-polarity. The collapse of Soviet Union had left a destabilizing void in international affairs.
Many countries today have dropped Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology including the
tiny Benin in Western Africa and has vowed to support private enterprise with the changed
environment. Previously, the Soviet threat and the US policy used to act as counter force
at a constantly shifting geographically and political point, but now the US has become the
only component of balance of power in the world, mainly in controversial regional disputes.
Involvement of US in Iraq, Afghanistan and current proposal of Lebanon to get the 'State'
identity in the UN followed by strong denial of the US in favor of Israel, is the best example
of it. It shows that maintaining a balance of power in any specific region totally depends on
the US.
4.
As the last decade progressed, however, observers seemed to change their view of how
durable the American dominance would be. Samuel Huntington, in a 1998 lecture, described
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the emerging world as neither uni-polar nor multi-polar but still in some sort of transition from
one to the other a hybrid which he termed uni-multipolar. A uni-multi-polar world is one in
which resolution of key international issues requires action by the single superpower plus some
combination of other major states, and in which the single superpower is able to veto action
by a combination of other states. Another distinguished scholar, Coral Bell, writing even more
recently, put even more emphasis on the American ascendancy. Her recommendations for U.S.
policy are similar to Huntingtons and Kissingers namely, that the United States would be
smart not to throw its weight around and to act in consent with other like-minded big powers
and international institutions but she has on doubt about calling the reality uni-polar.
Bi-polarity
5.
Bi-polarity is a distribution of power in which two states have the majority of economic
Military, and cultural influence internationally or regionally. Often, spheres of influence would
develop For example, in the Cold War, most Western and democratic states would fall under the
influence of the USA, while most Communist states would fall under the influence of the USSR.
After this the two powers will normally maneuver for the support of the unclaimed areas.
Multi-polarity
6.
Multi-polarity is distribution of power in which more than two nation-states have
nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence. Opinions on the stability
of Multi-polarity differ. Classical realist theorists, such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr
hold that multi-polarity systems are more stable than bipolar systems, as great powers can
gain power through alliances and petty wars that do not directly challenge other powers, in
bipolar systems, classical realists argue, this is not possible On the other hand, the neorealist
focus on security and invert the formula. States in a multi-polarity system can focus their fears
on any number of other powers and, misjudging the intentions of other states, unnecessarily
compromise their security, while states in a bipolar system always focus their fears on one
other power, meaning that at worst the powers will miscalculate the force required to counter
threats and spend slightly too much on the operation. However, due to the complexity of
mutually assured destruction scenarios, with nuclear weapons, multi-polarity systems may be
more stable than bipolar systems even in the neorealist analysis. This system tends to have
many shifting alliances until one of two things happens. Either a balance of power is struck,
and neither side wants to attack the other, or one side will attack the other because it either
fears the potential of the new alliance, or it feels that it can defeat the other side.
7.
One of the major implications of an international system with any number of poles,
including a multi-polarity system, is that international decisions will often be made for strategic
reasons to maintain a balance of power rather than out of ideological or historical reasons to
maintain a balance of power.
8.
The Concert of Europe, a period from after the Napoleonic Wars to the Crimean War,
was an example of peaceful Multi-polarity (the great powers of Europe assembled regularly to
discuss international and domestic issues). World War I, World War II, the Thirty Years War,
the Warning States Period, the There Kingdoms period and the tripartite division between
Song Dynasty/Liao Dynasty/Jin Dynasty/Yuan Dynasty are all examples of a war time Multipolarity.
Multi-polarity Today
10.
Those claiming that the world is multi-polarity fall into two main camps. A superpower
is something of the past view holds that the USA and USSAR in the Cold War were in
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fact superpowers. But argues that due to the complex economic inter dependencies on the
international scale and the creation of a global village, the concept of one or more states
gaining enough power to claim superpower status is antiquated. The rival view is that even
throughout the Cold War, neither the USA nor the USSR were superpowers, but were actually
dependent on the smaller states in their spheres of influence.
11.
While the US has a great deal of economic clout and has influenced the culture of many
nations, their dependency on foreign investors and reliance on foreign trade have created
a mutual economic dependency between developed and developing nations. According to
those who believe the world is multi-polarity, this interdependency means the US cant be
called a superpower as it isnt self-sufficient and relies on the global community to sustain
its peoples quality of life. These interdependencies also apply to diplomacy. Considering
the complex state of world affairs and the military might of some developing nations, it has
become increasing difficult to engage in foreign policy if it is not supported by other nations.
The diplomatic and economic factors that bind the globe together can sometimes make it
difficult to act unilaterally, however alliances exist and the US is largely considered to be the
sole superpower due to its unchallenged strength and influence, which would suggest a more
Uni-polar world (despite of globalization).
Non-polarity
12.
Non-polarity can be understood as an international system with numerous centers of
power, no one center of power dominates. Centers of power can be Nation-states, corporations,
non-governmental organizations, terrorist groups, and such. Power is found in many hands
and many places.
Balance of Power in International Relations
13.
In international relations, a balance of power exists when there is similarity or stability
between competing forces. As a term in international law for a just equilibrium between the
members of the family of nations, it expresses the doctrine intended to prevent any one nation
from becoming sufficiently strong so as to enable it to enforce its will upon the rest. BoP is
a central concept in neorealist theory. Within a balance of power system, a state may choose to
engage in either balancing behavior. In a time of war, the decision to balance or to bandwagon
may well determine the survival of the state.
14.
More precisely, the theory of Balance of Power has certain key aspects that have been
agreed upon throughout the literature on the subject. First of all, the main objective of states,
according to the Balance of Power theory is to secure their own safety, consistent with political
realism or the realist world-view. Secondly, states reach equilibrium because of this objective
of self-preservation. States, by trying to avoid the dominance of one particular state, will ally
themselves with other states until equilibrium is reached.
15.
As Professor L. Oppenheim points out, equilibrium between the various powers which
form the family of nations is, in fact, essential to the very existence of any international law.
In the absence of any central authority, the only sanction behind the code of rules established
by custom of defined in treaties, known as international law, is the capacity of the powers to
hold each other in check. If this system fails, nothing prevents any state sufficiently powerful
from ignoring the law and acting solely according to its convenience and its interests.
Rise of Regional Watch Dog
16.
In the years to come, under uni-polar environment, the unification of Germany, the fall
of communism in East Europe and the economic decay of the former Soviet Union, indicates
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the possibility of appearance of Regional Watch Dog or multi-polar situation. The pattern of
multi-polar situations could be involving the UK, France, Germany and the erstwhile Soviet
Union emerging in Europe, with its counterpart in Asia involving China, Japan and Southeast
Asia.1 United Germany could attempt to use its economic power not only in European Union
but also in East Europe. On the other hand the political and economic integration of European
states is likely to make united Europe an extraordinarily powerful entity. Again an economically
strong Japan could seek to establish through investment and trade its historical goal of coprosperity region 2 China, could also be a major influence in the affairs of Asia. However, at
present the threats of Regional Watch Dog are not immediate, but it is not impossible.
Concept of Collective Security
17.
Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement in which all states
cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any states
within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. According to Inis
Claudes article Collective Security as an Approach to Peace collective security is seen as
a compromise between the concept of world government and a nation-state based balance of
power system, where the latter is seen as destructive or not a good enough safeguard for peace,
and the first is deemed un-accomplishable at the present time And while collective security is
possible, several prerequisites have to be met for it to work.
18.
Collective security may be defined as a plan for maintaining peace through an
organization of sovereign states, whose members pledge them to defend each other against
attack. The idea emerged in 1914, was extensively discussed during World War I, and took
shape rather imperfectly in the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations and again in the
Charter of the United Nations after World War II. The term has subsequently been applied to
less idealistic and narrower arrangements for joint defense such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
19.
The shorthand term Collective security, not used until the 1930s, is more accurately
security for individual nations by collective means, that is, by membership in an international
organization made up of all or most of the states of the world pledged to defend each other
from attack Collective security is a handier term, and it entered deeply into the international
vocabulary when from about 1931 to 1939 many hoped, in vain, that the league of Nations
through its machinery for collective action might avert war by checking the Aggression of
the revisionist powers Germany, Italy, and Japan.
20.
In the present world order the region will be left alone to solve their threat potential
until the USA has some interests3. After suffering a lot the countries of the same region with
common interest and understanding may realize the need for collective security. In the case
of South Asia it is now full of interstate conflicts. The USA is less likely to involve in South
Asia directly. So after suffering a lot the Countries of this region may feel the reality and
go for regional security allies. The people of this region have already realized the need for
cooperation of each others and the best example is South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC).

Henry Kissinger, How to Achieve the New World Order?, Time, Weekly Newsmagazine, 14 March 1994 P. 73

Ashequa Irshad, Americas Changing Strategic Interest, BIISS Journal, vol 18, No 1, 1997 P.12

Major Mohd Abdus Salam Talukder NEW WORLD ORDER AND ITS EFFECTS OVER THIRD WORLD
BANGLADESH ARMY JOURNAL. 21st Issue, Defence 1993. PP 59 and 62
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21.

g]kfnL ;]gf

Basic Principles of Collective Security

(a)
First: almost every state, especially all major states, have to be in the collective
security arrangement and committed to it for to work. The League of Nations faced
major problems with this given that the United States, a leading international power,
did not join nor give its support to the organization. Similarly, when Italy invaded
Abyssinia, Britains and Frances governments were more committed to blocking the
rise of Germany, and hence did not seriously rebuke Mussolini, who they saw as a
potential ally against Adolph Hitler in 1935.
(b)
Second: no one state can block the decision making process. This was a major
issue with the League of Nations, as it gave every state veto power, as well as with
the UN, which gives it to 5 powerful nations. Should vetoes be allowed, the collective
security arrangement will be greatly weakened as one country can challenge a democratic
decision.
(c)
Third: for sanctions to work, the international economy has to be sufficiently
interdependent such that sanctions harm the intended country enough, but do not harm
the countries doing the sanctioning. And for sanctions to work, universality of their
application is especially important for them to have an effect.

Collective Security in the League of Nations

22.
Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement in which all states
cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any states within
the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. This contrasts with self-help
strategies of engaging in war for purely immediate national interest. An example of the failure
of the League of Nations collective security is the Manchurian Crisis, when Japan occupied
part of China (who was a League member). After the invasion, members of the League passed
a resolution calling for Japan to withdraw or face sever penalties. Japan promptly vetoed the
resolution, after two years League passed a resolution condemning the invasion. The Japanese
replied by quitting the League of Nations. A similar process occured in 1935, when Italy
invaded Ethiopia. Sanctions were passed, but Italy would have vetoed any stronger resolution.
Additionally, Britain and France sought to court Italys government as a potential deterrent to
Hitler, given that Mussolini was not in what would become the Axis alliance of WWIL. The
absence of the USA from the League of Nations deprived the LN of another major power that
could have used economic leverage against either of the aggressor states.
Collective Defense and Current Military Alliances
23.
Collective defense is an arrangement, usually formalized by a treaty and an organization,
among participant states that commit support in defense of a member state if it is attacked by
another state outside the organization. NATO is the best known collective defense organization.
Its now famous Article V calls on (but does not fully commit) member states to assist another
member under attack. This article was raised after the September II attacks on the United States,
after which other NATO members provided assistance to the US War on Terror in Afghanistan.
Collective defense has its roots in multiparty alliances, and leads to benefits as well as risks.
On the one hand, by combining and pooling resources, it can reduce and single states cost
of providing fully for its security. Smaller members of NATO, for example, have flexibility
to invest a greater proportion of their budget on non-military priorities, such as education or
health, since they can count on other members to come to their defense, if needed.

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Conclusion
24.
Since many years, the US is the only country that has the combination of military,
economic and political power to take the lead in defending, extending freedom, deterring
and resisting aggression. Germany and Japan may have the economic punch, but they lack
the Military muscle. China and Russia have the potential military might, but they lack the
economic power. As the only great power without a history of imperialistic clams on neighboring
countries, it seems that the US has the credibility to act as an honest broker considering the
fact that on crisis is irrelevant to the US.
25.
The new power structure of the world, the Uni-polar power equation has three distinct
characteristics. Firstly, worlds new power structure has made the US as the only component
of balance of power in the world power structure. Thus, there is virtually no balance of power
in the world. Secondly, the US interest has become an important factor in solving crisis may
it be political or military. The US focuses her interest on areas where Americas interest in
involved. Thirdly, the threat to security has taken a new dimension. The new dimension of
threat is characterized by escalation of ethnic conflicts, tensions and uncertainties in the former
Soviet Union and nuclear proliferation, emergence of regional power, proxy war and increasing
activities of terrorism by state and non state actors. The effects of Uni-polar power equation of
various region of world are unique. In Middle East, the US will continue to dominate, with the
decrease in importance of security dimension. On the other hand, the US will be more concern
about Asia as both Japan and China have become influential in Asian matters by virtue of
their economic might. In the Uni-polar power structure of the world, UN is expected to ;lay
a more active role. However, there are accusations of UN being polarized by the interest of
the US. Under the Uni-polar environment, the unification of Germany, fall of communism
in East Europe, economic decay in former USSR, emergence of China as future economic
superpower, indicates the possibility of appearance of Regional Watch Dog or Multi-polar
situation. Uni-polarity has to given way to a multi polar distribution of power, however, does
not men there has been an absence of balancing behavior by other states. Precisely because
counterbalancing against an actual hegemony is much more complex than balancing against
a rising one, a reconsideration of the type of state strategies that should be categorized as
balancing in needed.
References
Books
1.
Karen A. Mingst, Essentials of International Relations (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2004)
2.
Racha Chaitanya, The New World Order, (Delhi : Radiant Publisher, 1995).
3.
Dewitt, Haglund and Kirton, Building a New Global Order Emerging Trends In International
Security Oxford University Press 1993.
4.
Trevor N Dupuy, International Military and Defence Encyclopedia, Volume 2, 5 and 6
5.
Finkelstein, Marina S., and Lawrence S. Finkel-stein, comps. and eds. Collective Security San
Francisco, 1966. A handy collection of readings.
Periodical
1.
Henry Kissinger, How to Achieve the New World Order?, Time, Weekly Newsmagazine, March 1994
2.
Ashequa Irshad, Americas Changing Strategic Interest, BIISS Journal, vol 18.
Websites
1.
http://eefy.editme.com/UnipolarWorld, Accessed 25 January 2010.
2.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polarity_in_international_relations, Accessed 25 January 2010.
3.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_security, Accessed 21 january 2010.
4.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_power_in_international_relations, Accessed 19 January 2010.
5.
http://eefy.editme.com/BipolarWorld, Accessed 15January 2010
89

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cEof; j}/L k|xf/ tyf ah| k|xf/ Ps ;+:d/0f

k|=;]= e'jg vqL
k|:tfjgf
!=
Oltxf;b]lv jt{dfg;Dd cfkm\gf] ;Lldt ;|f]t ;fwgsf] afah'b klg g]kfnL ;]gfn] g]kfn /fi6sf] :jtGqtf,
;fjef}d;Qf tyf cv08tfnfO{ cIf'00f /fVb} /fli6o tyf cGt/f{li6o?kdf cfkm\gf] uf}/jdo k/Dk/f, pRr k]zfutkg,
OHht tyf k|lti7f sfod /fVg ;kmn /xb} cfPsf] 5 . /fi6sf] kl5Nnf] kl/j]z, ;do tyf kl/l:yltnfO{ cfTd;ft
ub}{ uPsf] !) jif{] Gdf /fli6o lxtnfO{ ;jf]{k/L dfGb} g]kfnL ;]gfn] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf lgjf{x ug{ ;kmn /x\of] h;sf]
;sf/fTds k|ltkmnsf]?kdf b]zsf] ljBdfg zflGt pGd'v cj:yfnfO{ lng ;lsG5 . o; cy{df ljutdf em} clxn]
klg g]kfnL ;]gfn] /fli6o tyf cGt/f{li6o?kdf ;a}sf] laZjf; lhTg ;kmn ePsf] cg'ej x'G5 .
@=
g]kfnL ;]gfn] ljutb]lv jt{dfg;Dd /fli6o tyf cGt/f{li6o?kdf cfh{g u/]sf] Vofltsf] k|d'v >]o o;
;+:yfdf cfj4 cg'zfl;t, OdfGbf/, st{Aolgi7, akmfbf/ ;snbhf{xnfO{{ hfG5 . /fli6o ;'/Iff ;+oGqsf] d'Vo
c+usf]?kdf :yflkt g]kfnL ;]gfsf] o; lsl;dsf] pRr k]zfutkg -Professionalism_, cg'zf;g tyf st{Aok/fo0ftf
sfod /fVg :t/Lo tyf lg/Gt/ tflnd tyf cEof;sf] cfjZostf kb{5 . l;kfxL eGof ltiff/L /fVGof x'g
a8fdxf/fhflw/fh k[YjL gf/fo0f zfxsf] o; plQmn] klg tflnd / cEof;sf] dxTjnfO{ bzf{p5 . ljut ;z:q
Gsf] ;dodf g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;+ufn]sf /fd|f kIf / l;lsPsf kf7xnfO{ b[li6ut ub}{ ef]lnsf lbgdf g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{
ljleGg tflnd tyf cEof;dfkm{t cem ;zQm k]z]j/, ultlzn agfpg] p2]Zosf ;fy uPsf] b'Oj6f jif{xnfO{ g]kfnL
;]gfn] tflnd jif{sf]?kdf dgfof] . k|wfg;]gfkltsf] cfzo (Chief of Army Staff's Intent) adf]lhd g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{
cem a9L k]z]j/ -Professional_, cg'zfl;t (Disciplined), pTk|]l/t -Motivated_, pRr dgf]jno'Qm -High Moral_
tyf k|ltli7t (Prestigious) agfpg ljut # jif{b]lv tflndnfO{ ;jf]{k/L dfGb} g]kfnL ;]gfdf tflnd tyf cEof;
;DaGwL ljleGg lqmofsnfkx ;+rfng x'g'sf] ;fy} of] cjlwdf g]kfnL ;]gfsf ljleGg :s"n tyf s]Gb|xdf ljb]zL
lzIFfyL{xnfO{;d]t ;xefuL u/fO{ ljleGg tflndx;d]t ;+rfng eO;s]sf 5g\ . ljutsf] ;dodf Gsf sf/0f
nfdf] ;dob]lv ;+rfng x'g g;s]sf] ;fd"lxs tflnd -Collective Training_ klg ;'rf? eO;s]sf] 5 .
#=
'tflnd jif{ @' sf] kl/k|]Ifdf dWo k[tgfsf] ;'kl/j]IF0fdf >L g+= ( jflxgLsf] ;+of]hgdf ;+rfng ePsf]
;fd'lxs tflndsf] pTsif{sf] ?kdf @)^& sf] r}q dlxgfdf cEof; j}/L k|xf/ ;+rfng x'g'sf] ;fy} To;sf] nut}
@)^* sf] k"jf{w{df g+= !) jflxgLsf] ljz]if kxndf cEof; ah| k|xf/ ;d]t ;DkGg ePsf] lyof] . cEof; j}/L
k|xf/ df g]kfnL ;]gfsf] g+= ( jflxgL c8\8f cGt/utsf klbs u0fx, g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ljz]if kmf}h o'lg6x -Special
Forces and Special Operation Forces), ljleGg d2tL tyf aGbf]j:tL (Combat Support & Combat Service
Support) o'lg6sf kmf}hx ;lDdlnt Ps ;+o'Qm cEof; (Combined Armed Exercise) lyof] . To:t} cEof; ah|
k|xf/ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] Strategic Reserve Force sf] ?kdf /x]sf] g+= !) jflxgL c8\8f cGt/ut ljz]if o'lg6x
;lDdlnt Pp6f ljz]if cEof; lyof] . cEof; j}/L k|xf/ sf] ;+rfng tyf cEof; ah| k|xf/ sf] of]hgf, tof/L
tyf ;+rfngsf] bf}/fg n]vs :jodn] xfl;n u/]sf] cg'ejsf] :d/0fdf pQm cEof;xsf] pkfb]otf tyf cEof;af6
xfl;n ePsf nIoxnfO{ k|sfz kfb}]{ pQm cEof;xsf] dxTjk"0f{ kIFxnfO{ lrq0f ug]{ p2]Zosf ;fy of] n]v
n]Vg] hdsf]{ ul/Psf] xf] .
cEof; j}/L k|xf/
$=
g]kfnL ;]gfsf] k]zfut Ifdtf tyf bIftf clej[l4 ug{ tflnd tyf cEof;xn] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf lgjf{x ub}{
cfPsf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn] jflif{s?kdf b'O{ r/0fdf ;+rfng ub}{ cfPsf] ;fd'lxs tflnd dfkm{t ;snbhf{xn] ljleGg
;dodf u/]sf] JolQmut tflnd, ;Lk tyf snfxnfO{ ;d"xut?kdf pkof]u u/L s;/L cfk"mnfO{ lbPsf] 6f:s k"/f
ug{ ;lsG5 eGg] s'/fdf cfTde/f];f k}bf ug'{sf] ;fy} o; lsl;dsf tflnd tyf cEof;xn] ;snbhf{sf] k]zfut
IFdtfnfO{ ;d]t clej[l4 u/]sf] 5 . @)^& ;fndf b'O r/0fdf ;+rfng ePsf] ;fd'lxs tflndsf] pTsif{sf] ?kdf
90

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d'Vo sf/afxL lbg -l8=8]=_ r}q !# ut]nfO{ dfGb} of] cEof; j}/L k|xf/ @ xKtf;Dd ;+rfng ePsf] lyof] eg] of]hgf
d'tfljs cEof;sf] kl5Nnf] r/0fdf ;xefuL ePsf g+= !) jflxgL cGt/utsf ljz]if o'lg6x l8=8]= eGbf @ xKtf
cufl8 sf7df08f}af6 cEof; Onfsftkm{ k}bn d'e ePsf lyP .
%=
>L dWo k[tgf x]=Sjf=sf] ;'kl/j]If0fdf >L g+=( jflxgL c8\8fn] ;+of]hg u/L pQm jflxgL c8\8f cGtutsf]
>L z]/ u0f, /0feLd u0f, l/k'db{g u0f / k'/fgf] uf]/v u0fsf 6f]nLx d'Vo xdn]jf/ 6f]nLsf] ?kdf /xL g]kfnL
;]gfsf] g+= !) jflxgL c8\8f cGt/utsf ljz]if o'lg6x, ljleGg d2tL tyf aGbf]j:tL (Combat Support & Combat
Service Support_ sf kmf}hx ;lDdlnt cEof; j}/L k|xf/ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] Oltxf;d} clxn];Ddsf] ;a}eGbf 7"nf]
;+o'Qm Combined Arms Exercise xf] . cEof;sf] l8=8]=df x'g] d'Vo sf/afxLsf] k|d'v emnsxsf] cjnf]sgsf nflu
cfdGq0f ul/Psf cltlyxdWo] k|wfg;]gfklt, k|FoM ;a} lk=P;=cf]h=sf hg/nx, kmd]z
{ g tyf o'lg6sf sdf08/x,
:s"n, sn]h, tflnd s]Gb| tyf Ps]8]dLsf sdf08]G6x, o'js clws[t 6f]nL tyf j/k/ o'lg6sf ;snbhf{xsf]
pkl:yltn] cEof;sf] eAotfnfO{ cem a9fPsf] lyof] .
^=
pQm

nfdf] ;dosf] cGt/fndf g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;a} cleGg c+uxnfO{ ;dfj]z u/L j[xt?kdf ;+rfng ul/Psf
Combined Arms Exercise df Infantry- Arty close co-operation, Infantry-Air Close Air Support tyf
Infantry-Special Forces Close effort nfO{ ljz]if hf]8 lbOPsf] lyof] . g]kfnL ;]gfsf] Strategic Reserve Force
sf] ?kdf /x]sf] g+= !) jflxgL c8\8f cGt/utsf ljz]if o'lg6x (Special Forces & Special Operation Forces)
sf] ;d]t ;lqmo ;xeflutf tyf ljljw sf/0fn] nfdf] ;do;Dd ;'rf? x'g g;s]sf] Artillery Firing n] cEof;sf]
;fGble{stf tyf /f}gstfnfO{ cem a9fPsf] lyof] .
cEof; j}/L k|xf/ sf] cjwf/0ff tyf ;+rfng
&=
b]zsf] ljleGg :yfgxdf a9b} uO/x]sf] ck/flws ;z:q ;d"xxsf] lx+;fTds ultljlw, ;fDk|bflos
efjgfn] ;+ul7t ;z:q ;d"x, If]lqo tyf hfltotfsf] lgx'df ljv08gsf/Lxf/f >[hgf ug{ ;Sg] ljifd kl/l:yltnfO{
k"jf{g'dfg u/L cEof;sf] syf tyf kl/l:yltsf] kl/sNkgf ul/Psf] lyof] . cEof;df Strategic Counter Offensive sf]
r/0fdf k'u]sf] ljb|f]xLsf] ks8 Onfsf leq v8f ul/Psf] ljb|f]xLsf] d'Vo cv8fnfO{ klbs kmf}h, ljz]if kmf}h, Combat
Support & Combat Service Support ;lxtsf] ljz]if 6f:s kmf];{nfO{ Pp6f Infantry Division sf] ;'kl/j]IF0fdf
Infantry Brigade sf] ;dGjodf s;/L c;/bf/?kdf kl/rflnt ug{ ;lsG5 eGg] s'/f b]vfpg vf]lhPsf] lyof] .
*=

ljb|f]xLsf] d'Vo cv8f leq /x]sf ljb|f]xLsf] Command post, Strong point tyf cGo ljleGg kf]lhzgxdf
Infantry sf] Main effort df ljz]if kmf}h, Combat Support & Combat Service Support nfO{ cEof; bf}/fg lgDg
Sequence df r/0fa4?kdf pkof]u u/L ljz]if sf/afxL ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] .
-s_
>L cfl6{n/L lgb]{zgfno cGt/utsf] kmfo/ o'lg6xf/f Artillery xltof/af6 ljb|f]xLsf] kf]lhzgdf
kmfo/ u/L Target Softening up sf] sf/afxL .
-v_

Kof/f tflnd lzIffnosf] Path Finder 6f]nLaf6 High Altitude High Opening (HAHO) lk|lG;kndf
Free Fall Jump u/L Target Onfsf glhs DZ marking sf] sf/afxL .
-u_

e}/agfy u0fsf] Air borne ;]=d'=af6 Operational Jump u/L lab|f]xL cfpg]/hfg] d'Vo af6f]xdf
Road Block sf] sf/afxL .
-3_
d'Vo xdnf k"j{ u0f d2tL xltof/x *! ld=ld=, MMG/GPMG, *$ ld=ld= sfn{ u':tfe tyf
g+= !) jflxgL c8\8f cGt/utsf] AGL (Automatic Grenade Launcher) Team f/f Target Onfsf ;kf]6{
kmfo/sf] sf/afxL .
-_
>L g+= ( jflxgL c8\8f cGt/utsf] >L /0feLd u0f, >L l/k'db{g u0f, >L z]/ u0f tyf >L k'/fgf]
uf]/v u0faf6 tf]lsPsf kmf}hxf/f ljb|f]xLsf] nf]s]zg d'Vo xdnf .
-r_

xdnfsf] bf}/fg >L OlGhlgo/ lgb]{zgfno cGt/ut /x]sf] >L sfnLzlQm u0f tyf
91

Infantry

u0fsf]

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

Assault Pioneer
Safe Line (ISL)

-5_

6f]nLaf6 ljb|f]xLf/f
agfpg] sf/afxL .

Target

Onfsf cufl8 nufOPsf] dfOg tyf jfo/ la|r u/L

Infantry

xdnf bf}/fg >L xjfO dxflgb]{zgfno cGt/utsf] x]lnsK6/f/f Casevac sf] sf/afxL .

-h_
o'4e}/a u0fsf] Heli-borne Troops f/f ljb|f]xLsf] sdf08 kf]i6df nG;/ ugl;k x]lnsK6/sf]
;kf]6{df /]8sf] sf/afxL .
-em_
sf/afxLsf] bf}/fgdf efu]sf ;fy} cGo sf/afxLsf] nflu Pslqt eO{ xfO8 cfp6df n's]sf
ljb|f]xLxnfO{ l;+xgfy u0fsf] sdf08f] ;]=d'=f/f Search & Destroy sf] sf/afxL .
-`_

ljb|F]xLsf]

-6_

l/-cu{sf] sf/afxL .

Strong point

df >L dxfjL/ u0f /]Gh/' sf]

Heli -borne

;]=d'=f/f /]8sf] sf/afxL

(=

cEof;df ;+nUg cGo dxTjk"0f{ c+uxdWo] >L ;}lgs xjfO lgb]z

{ gfnon] Supporting role cGt/ut cfkm\gf]
Air assets pkof]u u/L Infantry tyf Special Forces nfO{ d2t k'ofpg cfkm\gf] cGt/utsf Pe|f] hxfh, :sfO 6s,
Pd=cfO=!&, nfG;/ ugl;k, P]n'j]6 tyf PSo'/n x]lnsK6/ k|of]udf NofPsf] lyof] . To:t} >L l;Ugn lgb]{zgfno
cGt/ut /x]sf] dWo k[tgf x]=Sjf= l;Ugn l6d / g+= ( jflxgL l;Ugn u'Ndn] cEof; bf}/fgdf cfjZos l;Ugn ldnfk
u/]sf lyP . >L ;}lgs aGbf]j:tL c8\8fn] cEof; bf}/fgdf cfjZos kg]{ ljleGg aGbf]j:tL s'/fxsf] hf]xf] u/]sf]
lyof] eg] >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnn] cEof; ;dodf cfjZos kg]{ d]l8sn ;kf]6{ k|bfg u/]sf] lyof] .
cEof; j}/L k|xf/ af6 xfl;n ePsf nIox
!)= nfdf] ;dosf] cGt/fndf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dxTjk"0f{ c+uxnfO{ ;d]t ;dfj]z u/L a[xt ?kdf ;+rfng ul/Psf]
o; Combined Arms Exercise af6 lgDg nIox xfl;n ePsf lyP .
-s_

g]kfnL ;]gfdf klxnf] kN6 Infantry, Special Forces, Combat Support tyf Combat Service
Support kmf}hx ;Dd]lnt a[xt ;+oQ
' m cEof; Combined Arms Exercise sf] ;kmntfk"js
{ ;DkGg ePsf] .
-v_

cEof;af6

Infantry-Arty Close Co-operation, Infantry-Air Close Air Support(CAS) tyf

Infantry-Special Forces Close Effort sf] Jojxfl/s cg'ej xfl;n x'g'sf] ;fy} o;n] Infantry, Air,
Supporting Arms tyf Special Forces aLrsf] cfk;L ;xof]u tyf ;dembf/LnfO{ a9fPsf] .

-u_

;+o'Qm cEof;n] ljleGg cfD;{x aLr Ps cfk;sf] Ifdtf tyf sdhf]/L (Capabilities and
Limitations) ;d]t kQf nufO{ efjL r'gf}tL tyf vt/f (Challenges and Threats) xsf] ;fdgf ug{ ;Ifd
t'NofPsf] .
-3_
ljut Gsfndf l;lsOPsf kf7x (lessons learnt) nfO{ dWogh/ /fVb} ef]lnsf] lbgdf cEof;df
kl/sNkgf ul/P h:tf] ljifd kl/l:ylt l;h{gf eO{ 7"nf] :t/sf] sf/afxL ug'{kg]{ cj:yf cfPdf To; k|sf/sf]
a[xt sf/afxLsf] ;+rfngsf] nflu o; k|sf/sf] cEof;nfO{ Template sf] ?kdf k|of]u ug{ ;lsg] .
-_
cEof; ;+rfngn] lhDd]jf/L If]qsf] hldg;u kmf}hx kl/lrt x'g'sf] ;fy} a[xtdfqfdf ePsf] kmf}h
kl/rfngn] :yfgLo hgtfdf;Lldt ;dosf] nflu eP klg ;'/Iffsf] k|Tofe"lt ePsf] .
-r_

cEof;;u} nfdf] ;dob]lv cj?4 cfl6{n/L kmfol/ ;'rf? ePsf] .

-5_
cEof; bf}/fg klxnf]kN6 ul/Psf] Pathfinder jump / Operational jump ;u} g]kfnL ;]gfsf] k|:tfljt
ladfg DZ k|of]udf cfPsf] .
cEof; ah| k|xf/
!!=

g]kfnL ;]gfsf]

Strategic Reserve Force

sf]?kdf /x]sf] g+= !) jflxgL cGtu{t /x]sf] ljz]if o'lg6xsf]

92

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

cfcfkmg} e"ldsf, ljz]iftf tyf Ifdtf /x]sf] 5 . ljz]if kmf}h o'lg6xdf tflndsf] ljz]if dxTj x'G5 . oxL tYonfO{
dgg\ ub}{ g+= !) jflxgL tyf cGtu{tsf o'lg6xn] lgoldt?kdf ljleGg tflnd tyf cEof;x ;+rfng ub}{ cfP
tfklg xfn;Dd jflxgL cGtu{t ;a} o'lg6xnfO{ ;lDdlnt u/L cEof; ;+rfng gePsf] cj:yfdf g+= !) jflxgL
cGtu{tsf ;a} ljz]if o'lg6xsf] e"ldsf tyf ljz]iftfdf cfwfl/t /x]/ ldlt @)^*.)!.@@ ut]b]lv #! ut];Dd
cDn]]vu+hsf] 9's'jfaf; Onfsfdf klxnf]kN6 of] Joint exercise ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] .
!@=
cEof; ah| k|xf/ sf] tof/Lsf] l;nl;nfdf ldlt @)^& ;fnsf] kf}if dlxgfdf pxL syf j:t'df cfwfl/t
/x]/ cd]l/sL ;]gff/f ;++rflnt Balance Nail tflnd cGtu{t Military Decision Making and Planning (MDMP)
Kofs]hsf];d]t pkof]u u/L g+= !) jflxgL x]=Sjf= tyf cGtu{tsf o'lg6xdf klxnf] k6s ljz]if sdf08 kf]i6 cEof;
(CPX) ;DkGg ePsf] lyof] . pQm CPX sf] Out come sf]?kdf cEof; ah| k|xf/ ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] .
cEof;sf] cjwf/0ff / ;+rfng
!#=

b]zsf] ljBdfg kl/l:ylt / eljiodf cfOkg{ ;Sg] ;+efljt vt/fxnfO{ dgg\ ub}{ Trans-border Counter
Terrorism sf] Concept df cfwfl/t cEof; ah| k|xf/ df g+= !) jflxgL tyf cGtu{tsf ljz]if o'lg6xn] pknAw
Air Asset xsf] pkof]u ub}{ ;+o'Qm?kdf s;/L ljz]if sf/afxL ;+rfng u/L cfkm\gf] ld;g k"/f ub{5g\ eGg] s'/f
b]vfpg vf]lhPsf] lyof] . cEof; bf}/fg cEof;sf] l;gfl/of] cg';f/ tfu]{6sf] Nature cg'?k l;dfkf/Laf6 cgflws[t
?kdf 7"nf] dfqfdf xftxltof/, PDo'lgzg tyf PS;Knf]l;e 8Dk u/L Camp v8f u/L a;]sf Terrorist Camp df
ljz]if kmf}hxn] Surprise and Swift Action nfO{ d'Vo cfwf/ dfGb} cfkmgf] Pc/af]g{ tyf x]lnaf]g{ 6f]lnnfO{ kl/rfng
u/L lbg / /ft b'j}df cfkm\gf] sf/afxL c;/bf/k"j{s ;+rfng u/L tfu]{6 Onfsfdf Direct Action ;+rfng ul/Psf]
lyof] .
!$= cEof; ah| k|xf/ cGtu{t l;df glhs v8f ul/Psf] Terrorist SofDk dfly g+=!) jflxgL cGtu{tsf ljz]if
o'lg6xaf6 lgDg tlt{jdf cfkmgf] ljz]if sf/afxL ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] .
-s_

Target

-!_
k}bn

Onfsfdf ;xefuL kmf}hf/f x]lnsK6/ tyf k}bn

>L o'4 e}/j u0fsf]

Infiltration .

Recce and Surveillance

Infiltration

sf] sf/afxL .

6f]nLn] Target Onfsf glhs

-@_

>L dxfjL/ u0f /]~h/ tyf >L l;+xgfy u0f sdf08f] 6f]nLaf6
Blocking position sf] :yfkgf .

-#_
k}bn

Heli-drop eO{

Heli-fast-rope

u/L

>L e}/jgfy u0fsf] Assaulting troops f/f Operational Night jump u/L Target Onfsfdf
Infiltration .

-v_

Terrorist
Surveillance ug]{

xsf] af/]df lg/Gt/?kdf va/ xfl;n ug{ tyf Terrorist camp sf] Recce tyf
sfo{sf] nflu >L o'4 e}/j u0fsf] Recce and Surveillance 6f]nLf/f cf]=lk= Position

xsf] :yfkgf .
-u_

sf/afxL bf}/fg efu]sf

-3_
Troop

-_
aLr
-r_

Terrorist

xnfO{ aaf{b ug{

>L Kof=tf=l;=sf] Path Finding tyf

sf] Operational jump .

DZ Marking

v8f ug]{ sf/afxL .

sf] sf/afxLdf >L e}/jgfy u0fsf]

Assaulting

d'Vo sf/afxL cufl8 DA (Direct Action Assaulting troops) / OP (Recce and Surveillance) 6f]nL
Link up sf] sf/afxL .
Camp Attack

sf]

H-Hr

k"j{

OP (Recce and Surveillance)

Sniper 6f]nLx afx]s_

-5_

Blocking position

Terrorist camp

dfly

Camp Attack

sf] sf/afxL .
93

6f]nLsf] lkmtf{

(Fox-hole

df a;]sf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

-h_

Camp Attack kl5 efu]sf Terrorist

Quick Assault sf] sf/afxL .

xsf] d'Vo hTyfdfly

ORF

6f]nLf/f

Heli-fast-rope

u/L

-em_
Target Onfsftkm{ yk d2tsf] nflu cfpb} u/]sf] Terrorist sf] Re-enforrcement group dfly >L
o'4sjr u0fsf] Mobile Blocking ?kdf t}gfy APC 6f]nLf/f sf/afxL ;+rfng .
-`_

Camp Attack

sf] bf}/fg 3fOt] ePsf 3fOt]xsf]

Evacuation

sf] sf/afxL .

-6_

d'Vo Target af6 ljleGg lbzfdf efu]sf Terrorist xdfly Target Onfsf jl/k/L Likely Escape
df t}gfy l;+xgfy u0f -sdf08f]_ / dxfjL/ u0f /]~h/ sf] Blocking 6f]nLf/f Blocking sf]
sf/afxL .
Routes

-7_

Para Re-supply

-8_

Ex-filtration

sf] sf/afxL .

sf] sf/afxL .

cEof; ah| k|xf/ af6 xfl;n ePsf nIox

!%=

cEof; ah| k|xf/af6 lgDg nIox xfl;n ug]{ p2]Zo /flvPsf lyof] .
-s_

cEof;sf] k[i7e"lddf jflxgL cGtu{t /x]sf] ljz]if o'lg6xsf] Ifdtfsf] hfr ug]{ .

-v_

jflxgL cGtu{tsf ljz]if o'lg6x aLr cfk;L ljZjf;, ;xof]u / ;dembf/L a9fpg] .

-u_

jflxgL cGtu{tsf o'lg6x aLr Ps cfk;df ul/g] ;dGjosf] dxTjaf/] olsg ug]{ .

-3_

g]kfnL ;]gfdf /x]sf]

-_

Air borne

tyf

Air Assets

sf]

Capabilities

Heli-borne Operation

tyf

Limitations

af/] 1fg xfl;n ug]{ .

;DaGwL l/k|m];/ ug]{ .

-r_
;du|?kdf jflxgL tyf cGtu{tsf ljz]if o'lg6xsf] Capabilities tyf Limitations nfO{ dgg ub}{
efjL r'gf}lt tyf vt/f (Challenges and Threats) sf] ;fdgf ug{ pRr Operational Readiness xfl;n
ug]{ .
;+IF]k
!^=
aufP kl;gf tflnddf aUg] 5}g /ut /0fe"lddf eGg] tYonfO{ dgg\ ub}{ g]kfnL ;]gfdf lgoldt?kdf
ljleGg tflnd tyf cEof;x ;+rfng ul/+b} cfPsf] 5 . ljut Gsf] ;dodf l;lsOPsf kf7x (Lessons learnt_
tyf efjL r'gf}lt / vt/f (Challenges and Threats) xnfO{ dgg\ ub}{ cfufdL lbgdf g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;+rfng x'g]
tflnd tyf cEof;xnfO{ kl/dfh{g tyf :t/ pGgt ub}{ n}hfg' cfhsf] cfjZostf xf] . hf/L /x]sf] ;+qmd0fsfn
tyf ljBdfg t/n /fhg}lts cj:yfdf g]kfnL ;]gfn] lgjf{x ug'{kg]{ e"ldsf tyf Unforeseen Eventualities nfO{
;d]t b[li6ut ub}{ g]kfnL ;]gfdf cfufdL lbgdf ;+rfng x'g] tflnd tyf cEof;x Jojxfl/s, k|efjsf/L tyf
pRr:t/sf] x'g' cfjZos 5 .
!&=
s'g} ;dodf Psfw?kdf kmnfgf] JolQm ljb]z tflnddf uof] /] eGg] xfd|f] ;]gfdf clxn] xfd|} ljleGg :s"n,
sn]h, tflnd s]Gb|xdf ljb]zLxnfO{ ;dfj]z u/L tflnd ;+rfng ug]{ x}l;otdf xfdL k'u]sf 5f+} . OdfGbfl/k"j{s
eGg'kbf{ xfd|f] ;]gfn] tflndxsf] :t/ pGgltdf df/]sf] dxTjk"0f{ km8\sf]sf] ?kdf o;nfO{ lng'kb{5 . o;sf] cnfjf
PsLs[t ;}lgs tflnd s]Gb| (IATC) sf] :yfkgf, k[tgf lzIFfnosf] :yfkgf, Army Physical Training and Sports
Centre sf] :yfkgf, g]kfnL ;]gf / ljb]zL ;]gf aLr ;+rfng ul/g] ;+o'Qm tflnd (Joint Training), ;fd"lxs tflndsf]
;'rf?kg, cEof; j}/L k|xf/ tyf ah| k|xf/ h:tf a[xt cEof;xsf] ;+rfng cflbnfO{ g]kfnL ;]gfn] tflnd ;Gbe{df
xfl;n u/]sf dxTjk"0f{ pknlAwxsf] ?kdf lng ;lsG5 .
!*=

'Traning is a never ending process'

eGg] tYonfO{ b[li6ut ub}{ >L dWo k[tgfsf] ljz]if kxndf g+=(
94

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

jflxgLsf] ;+of]hgdf ;+rfng ePsf] cEof; j}/L k|xf/ tyf g+=!) jflxgLsf] cfjZostf cg'?k ljz]if?kdf ;+rfng
ul/Psf] cEof; ah| k|xf/ nfO{ cfufdL jif{x gof Onfsfxdf leGg} syf j:t'df kmd]{;g tyf o'lg6xsf] /f]n
abnL u/L o; lsl;dsf] a[xt / ljz]if cEof;x ;+rfng ub}{ nfg ;s]df o;n] lgZro klg efjL r'gf}lt tyf
vt/fx;u ;lhn} ;fdgf ug{ ;Ifd agfpg'sf] ;fy} g]kfnL ;]gfsf] k]zfutkg (Professionalism) df ;d]t gof
cfofd Nofpg ;Sb5 .
;Gbe{ ;fdfu|Lx
!=

g]kfnL ;]gf tflnd lgb]{zg @)^*^(

@=

cEof; j}/L k|xf/ @)^& sf] of]hgf

#=

cEof; ah| k|xf/ @)^* sf] of]hgf

$=

cEof; a}/L k|xf/ tyf cEof; ah| k|xf/ sf] lg/LIf0f tyf ;+rfngsf] qmddf k|wfg;]gfklt, hL
c8\8fsf ;DalGwt /yLj[Gb, dWo k[tgfklt, g+=( jflxgLklt tyf g+=!) jflxgLkltf/f ul/Psf] ;Daf]wgsf
d'Vo c+zx

%=

cEof; a}/L k|xf/ tyf ah| k|xf/ df n]vs :jodn] xfl;n u/]sf] cg'ej

tL axfb'/ n8fs'nfO{ O{Hht u/ h;n] c;+Vo o'ub]lv o'4 ub}{ xfd|f] lglDt
:jtGqtfsf] cd'No k}t[s ;Dklt /Iff u/]/ /flvlbPsf 5g\ .
j608 /;]n

95

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

Traffic Regulations

- Brig Gen (Retd) Dipak Gurung

Kathmandu Traffic
1.
Kathmandu is truly becoming a metropolitan city; its pollution is getting worse day by
day and traffic jams becoming unmanageable. Traffic signs dont exist at all and if they do,
they dont matter at all. And nobody cares whose reponsibility it is. Is it the roads departments
responsibility to maintain the road signs or is it the responsibility of the traffic police or is
it Kathmandu Municipalitys or is it the transport management something committees ?
Whatsoever, the streets of Kathmandu could be a big attraction to draw tourists to visit Nepal
in 2011, our tourism year. The pockmarks of our streets resemble moon surface!
2.
The taxi drivers in our beloved country, including the bus drivers (both micro and
macro), put the blame of all traffic wrongs squarely on the private car owners. The private
owners put all the blame on the government vehicles. And there is an unspoken heirarchy
amongst the government transport too, with each department thinking they have the right
of way! And they all collectively put the blame back on the taxi and the bus drivers. The
motorcyclists are totally different specie, especially the smaller moped ones and dont hesitate
to overtake from either left side or right side. If they could they would have gone over the top
too! Not that they dont try.
3.
The pedestrians and the animals have their own stories to tell. The foot over bridges
of the capital weren't designed for the pedestrians use. These were designed specially for the
motor cyclists to take shelter during the rain! The animals in Nepal dont have to wait till Tihar
to get worshipped. They rein the roads of the country through out the year! The animal rights
activists could do a great favor to the society if they could take care of these stray animals than
crying hoarse about animal sacrifice during Dashain.
The Real Cause
4.
Many people blame the lack of roads for our traffic woes. Others think that the density
of the vehicles per metre width or length is far greater than anywhere else in the rest of the
world. And some think that the traffic cops are the main reason for the traffic jams. Wherever
there is a traffic jam you will invariably find a traffic cop in the midst. And if there are no
traffic cops then people help each other to get out of the jam!
5.
And if two, three or four wheelers are to be blamed for our traffic ills then two legged and
four legged ones are also equally to be blamed for the use of road space. Right from Panchayat
days the landed gentry have been releasing their unwanted cattle free on the capital roads after
consumiing all the dudh, dahi and mohi!! It is different thing that they dont recognise their
own cattle in the streets now. Guilt ridden, most of their pariwar are now working hard in
NGOs and INGOs for the protection of animal rights.
6.
Driving License
The biggest drawback of our driving test to award driving license
is that there is no driving test! Except for reversing and parking there is no real driving test.
96

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

The applicants have to sit for a written test but they are not tested on the road driving where
they have to actually drive. No wonder there is any driving sense amongst our drivers.
7.
Driving Sense
Driving sense is lacking specialy amongst the taxi drivers and the
micro bus drivers. They will stop anywhere on the road to load or off-load their passengers,
without any regard for the other road users. Micro bus drivers, plying on the ring road are
notorious for causing traffic jams. They will stop their buses right on the T of the road junctions,
especially at the ring road junctions blocking all other traffic. And the traffic cops standing
nearby act as if they belong to a totally different palnet! But they become totally different
persons during any VIP movement.
8.
VIP Traffic During any VIP movement or SAWARI the traffic cops are present in
enough numbers and act very efficiently so that the VIPs dont have to face any traffic jams.
When will ordinary public have own Ordinary Public Traffic Police so that they dont have
to face any traffic jams? Aren't we paying taxes or are the VIPs paying any extra? It is quite
evident that there are not enough traffic cops to control the traffic during normal office hours
when they are needed most. And we can again see them in sufficient numbers when there are
impromptu license checks during festival times. Chaad parba hai, bhai!
9.
Road Signs Either there are no road signs at all or if we have them they badly need
new painting. And whose responsibility it is to maintain those nobody knows. In the driving
booklets it is written that the pedestrians should cross the road only at zebra crossings. We
have neither any zebras nor any zebra crossings! Who is going to paint the crossings? Unless
we have proper road signs how can we enforce proper road discipline? We need to educate
people, especially drivers about No Entry, No Parking, No U Turns, No Overtaking, Give
Way, Right of Way etc.
10.
Right of Way Right of way is not clearly understood by our road users. Normally in
left hand drive system the traffic coming from the right side have the right of way. Major road
always get right of way over secondary road. We have our own unwritten system of right of
way. The vehicle whose nose gets in first will always and everytime have the right of way! No
wonder the pointed noses dominate Nepali politics.
11.
Road Space
Road Space is not the actual problem here. Even by constructing
another ring road we will not be solving the problem. After some time we will face the same
problem of congestion again. The real problem is that the drivers do not obey the traffic rules
and regulations. The bus drivers will continue to stop at the road junctions, motor cycles and
the taxi drivers will continue to make illegal U turns, vehicles will continue to double park,
chowks will continue as bus stops or tempo stops. No wonder chowks are also known as
choke points.
12.
Bridges
Since the opening of the river banks as fast lanes the bridges have become
another choke point. The bridges were designed simply for crossing over an obstacle or a river.
Now they too have become a bus stop and parking space. With the opening of river bank roads
the bridges have become crossing place from all directions including even under the bridge!
13.
One Way The narrow streets of Kathmandu must be converted into one way traffic.
Earlier Gairidhara, Baluwatar, Bhatbhateni use to be one way traffic and the area faced less
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traffic jams. One way traffic needs to be reimposed in that section and similar studies need to
be carried out in other places too. Traffic from Baal Mandir must not be allowed north towards
Tangal. People staying in the area will be uncomfortable for sometime in the beginning but
they will get used to it. Afterall it is for overall good of whole Kathmandu. And that will
definitely contribute to Nepal Tourism Year (NTY) 2011 too.
14.
Only Left Turns
As we have the system of left hand drive in the country, only left
turns should be permitted in the majority of the busy roads. Especially during rush hours, no
Right turns should be allowed. Traffic jam is a chronic problem along Gaushala Chahbel
section. Jaya Baageshwari section is one way hence Sifal road should also be one-way catering
for the traffic going in the other side.
15.
Most of the jams occur when vehicles travelling towards Chahbel from Gaushala try to
go to Pashupati or Guheshwari that is, they try to go right and jam is created. Similarly jams
are created when the vehicles travelling from Chahbel Ganesh should not be allowed to cross
over towards Chahbel.
16.
The other choke point is the bridge near Gopi Krishna Hall and Om Hospital. Traffic
from Gopi Krishna should not be allowed to go right towards the bridge. And the traffic from
Om Hospital should be allowed left towards the bridge and should not be allowed to go right
towards Chahbel. Similarly traffic in the other bridges should be allowed to turn left and not
allowed to take right turn.
Remedy
17.
There are people who have specialised in traffic management and other transport
specialists who have better ideas and the traffic system can be improved in Kathmandu. But
till we arrive at the final solution the authorities should take some simple steps to improve the
traffic environment.
18.
Only left turns should be allowed during office hours. There should be practical driving
tests instead of only reversing and parking. More one way streets should be introduced and
strictly followed. Proper road signs must be used and properly maintained. Neither illegal
parking nor U turns should be permitted.It is not that there are no rules and regulations, and
whatever we have must be followed strictly. And the traffic police shouldnt work only during
sawaris but should work for the general public also.
19.
Traffic education must be incorporated in the SLC syllabus too. And last not least the
government must take care of street animals too. By only announcing the tourism year is not
enough to attract the tourists. Hard work is needed to improve the infrastructure. The chaos
in Kathmandu streets need to be cleared whether tourists come or not. I better stop using my
laptop because driving and typing at the same time is quite difficult.

Victory belongs to the most persevering.

- Napoleon Bonaparte
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SUKLA PHANTA WILDLIFE RESERVE

- Hikmat Bahadur Bisht1

1.
It was probably late one autumn in the 16th century when the Tharu people discovered
a unique place on earth and named it "SUKILA PHANTA". The Tharus are the people who
were entrusted with the job of protecting and serving the ladies and children of the north
Indian high cast Rajputs, until they finished fighting with the invading Turks. The densely
forested foothills of Nepal, commonly known as the Tarai, probably were the safest place
for the women and children of the warring Rajputs to take shelter. When the Rajputs were
completely routed by their enemies, they obviously did not return to join their families. After
a long wait, the women decided to marry the male members of their loyal servants, who
had protected and served them faithfully during all these difficult times. Surprisingly, even
today the wife and husband maintain the same traditional relationship, where husbands give
their wives a due place in the family and the wives keep their place of high cast, especially
in the kitchen. These are the people who are known to us presently as Rana Tharus. To write
extensively about these wonderful, friendly people, who are fortunately forgotten, leaving
them unspoiled by time and the tide of civilisation, only a separate article will do justice.
2.
In late autumn the vast grassland, in full bloom, looks like a huge white carpet as far as
one can see. White in the Tharu language is "Sukila", and grassland or savannah is "Phanta".
This is the Tharu story of the name of the present day "SUKILA PHANTA". Today some
people pronounce it as "SUKLA PHANTA". This is probably a colloquial form of SUKILA
PHANTA. For many decades, Sukila Phanta had been a prosperous Tharu village, but primarily
due to robbers from India, its settlers abandoned this village. In 1965 Then His Majestys Govt.
of Nepal declared this part of the Tarai jungle a Royal Hunting Reserve. For a long time this
reserve remained a Royal Hunting Reserve exclusively for the Royal family and their guests.
It is for this reason that the Royal Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve still remains in its pristine
form. Thanks to the Royal family for preserving it in this form and finally opening it to foreign
tourists after it was gazetted as a wildlife reserve in July 1976 with a new name, "Royal Sukla
Phanta Wildlife Reserve", but the local population continues to call it Sukila Phanta. It
would be a nice gesture for the government to go back to the original name, "Sukila Phanta",
in place of the current official spelling "Sukla Phanta", to respect local sentiments. Such a
decision by the government, if ever taken, will be highly appreciated by the local Tharus and
the general population.
3.
The Royal Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve (RSWR) has been re-named, soon after
King Gyanendra made way for Republic Nepal on 24, April 2006 (01.11.2063 BS), as Sukla
Phanta Wildlife Reserve (SWR). Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve is located in the extreme
Southwest corner on Nepal's Tarai (2853'N & 8011'E) in Kanchanpur District of Mahakali
1

The author of this article, born in Dadeldhura, grew up in Tarai, Kanchanpur and Dadaldhura. He has served
in Royal Nepal Army for 18 years including 3 years of diplomatic service in Washington D.C. He is widely
travelled mainly hunting in USA and visiting famous national parks and wildlife reserves of the world. He has
conducted the tourist camp in the, Royal Sukilaphanta Wildlife Reserve for more than 12 years. Thus knows
this UNIQUE reserve very well. He calls this reserve "THE OTHER" NEPAL."
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Zone covering 355 km and ranges in altitude from 150 m to 600 m (WWF Nepal, 2000). The
international border between Nepal and India demarcates the southern and western boundaries
of the reserve. The Luggabugga Florican Reserve in India lies adjacent to the southern boundary
of Sukla Phanta. The western boundary of the reserve is the Mahakali River. The Syali and
Radha rivers form the eastern and western boundary respectively for the part of the reserve
that extends north of the east-west highway to create more habitats and a corridor from the
Terai into the Siwalik Hills (Churia Hills) for the seasonal migration of wildlife. This 355 km
unique reserve consists of a very rich diversity of open grassland, canopy forested jungles, a
very large swamp (about 15km.), two small lakes, riverine forests, and one meandering jungle
river, the Bamhni, that has its source in crystal clear springs in the northern part on the Reserve.
The numbers of large and small Phantas in this reserve are of international importance, first
because they support a number of nationally and globally threatened mammals, birds and
reptiles. Secondly, the grasslands of this reserve are the most diverse, and have the highest
biomass when compared to other similar grasslands in the world. The Phantas of SWR have 54
species of grasses (Schaaf 1978). Largest of all the Phantas of SWR is Sukila Phanta, after
which this reserve has been named. The area of Sukila Phanta proper is approximately 50
km. To this day, no survey has been conducted to determine the exact area of all the Phantas
in the reserve. It is a matter of great concern for any nature lover to see that such rare and
wonderful grasslands are gradually being taken over by trees. If some effective measures are
not taken soon, the present grasslands will disappear.
4.
In April, 1953, British Peter Byrne came to Nepal from India, where he had been a Tea
Planter. In Katmandu, with the assistance of HRH Prince Basundra, he obtained a professional
hunting license for Sukla Phanta (SP), one that allowed him to bring foreign clients to the
area for trophy safaris. He operated in Sukla Phanta until 1969 at which time he approached
His Majestys Government of Nepal and suggested that his SP hunting concession, which
was about 155 km2, be turned into a protected wildlife park. The government agreed but had
no resources at the time to do this. So Byrne agreed to raise the funding himself. This he did,
through the International Wildlife Conservation Society, of which he is one of the original
founders, returning to Sukla Phanta to spend the whole of 1969 working to create the reserve,
building the park's first bridge on River Bamhni, mapping the whole area, demarcating the
boundaries, designing and building the park's inspection roads, providing equipment for guards
and game scouts, and doing counts of its wildlife, especially its Swamp Deer, which at that time
numbered 3000 animals. From this inspiration, of a professional hunter turned conservationist,
Sukla Phanta, which in English means the White Grass Plains, was born. (Byrne)
5.
SWR supports 30-recorded species of mammals (Anon), and probably more are
present, but not yet recorded. Most prominent among these are Swamp Deer Cervus duvauceli
duvauceli (the world's largest herd), Spotted Deer Axis axis, Hog Deer Axis porcinus, and
Samber Deer Cervus unicolor, which have made a remarkable comeback from the jungles
of the nearby foothills. Barking Deer Muntiacus muntjak, Asian Elephant Elephas maximus,
Nilgai Boselaphus tragocamelus, Wild Boar Sus scrofa, and Hispid Hare Caprolagus hispidus
are also present. The Bird list of SWR increases every year with new findings by experts and
serious bird watchers. Many of them consider SWR a bird watchers' paradise. The present bird
list numbers 372 species. Sukila Phanta is internationally important for the following species:
Bengal Florican Houbaropsis bengalensis, Swamp Francolin Francolinus gularis, Whiterumped Vulture Gyps bengalensis, Slender-billed Vulture Gyps tenuirostris, Bristled Grassbird
Chaetornis striatus, Finns Weaver Ploceus megarhynchus and Hodgson's Bushchat Saxicola
insignis, which nests in central Asia and winters in Sukila Phanta (Inskipp and Inskipp 1983,
Baral 1998 abc, Baral and Inskipp 2001, Inskipp and Inskipp 2001). There are a variety of
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reptiles; the most noteworthy of which are the Indian Rock Python Python molurus, Mugger
Crocodile Crocodylus palustris, Gharial Gavialis gangeticus, and monitor lizards Varanus spp.
There are also 27 species of fish found in the lakes and rivers (Bhatta and Shresta 1973).
6.
According to IUCN and Bird Life International, this unique reserve supports six species
of grassland mammals, one species of reptile, fifteen globally threatened and 13 near-threatened
bird species occur in Sukla Phanta. (Groombridge 1993, BirdLife International 2000, Baral
and Inskipp 2009). Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve is of grate interest for the bird-watchers. It
has been listed as an important bird area and a number of bird studies have been conducted
here. Some of the bird species reach their world limit of distribution at Sukla Phanta. Of all the
habitats found in Sukla Phanta, grassland is the most important. Conservation and management
of grasslands that are sympathetic to bird populations are urgent at Sukla Phanta.
7.
There are a number of claims from the authorities of the reserve that they have seen
Pygmy Hogs Sus salvinus in SWR. This is especially important because the Pygmy Hog has
been declared as extinct. Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve has a very healthy population of Tigers
Panthera Tigris. Tiger counts conducted by Dr. Charles McDougal in 1996-97 and by The
King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation in 1999-00 revealed almost the same number
of tigers, i.e. 31 animals, including adults and sub-adult cubs. The reserve also supports a
herd of elephants consisting of 24 animals, including adults, sub-adults and calves, which
keep migrating between Corbett National Park (National Park of India), Sukla Phanta Wildlife
Reserve and the Bardia National Park of Nepal. There are also two young male Elephants that
stay mostly in SWR.
8.
With respect to human history, it is interesting to recall King Sing Pal, who belonged to
the Deuba family of Ruwakhola village in Dadeldhura district of far-west Nepal (Skar 1999),
and whose palace was situated at a place called Singhpur in the middle of the reserve. One
can still see the ruins of Singhpur Palace and the compound walls. The famous Rani Tal, or
Queens Lake, is one of the two above-mentioned lakes in the reserve. The Queen loved this
lake very much and used to spend most of her time there, according to the Tharu people living
in the vicinity. It is because of the proximity of SWR that the culture of the Tharu villagers has
been preserved more or less intact, much as it must have been in the sixteenth century when
the Tharu ancestors found themselves in Sukila Phanta.
9.
Sukla Phanta is a unique wildlife reserve, and it will remain so, if it can be preserved (?)
in its pristine form. Within its small area this reserve contains a vast diversity of habitats: dry
Sal forest, riverine forests, swamps, a jungle river, lakes and South Asia's largest grasslands
which house many globally and nationally threatened mammals, birds and reptiles. On any
winter evening, when the grasses are short or burned by park authorities which generates new
sprouts of the grasses the animals have congregated in the open Sukila Phanta looks like the
game-rich grasslands of Africa. Some foreign naturalists and tourists call it a MINI AFRICA
and some call it THE OTHER NEPAL.
References
1.
Baral, H. S. (1997) Sukila Phanta: a grassland reserve of international importance. Danphe
6(3): 6-8.
2.
Baral, H. S. and Inskipp, C. (2001) Important Bird Areas in Nepal. A report to the Royal
Society for the Protection of Birds, UK. Bird Conservation Nepal.

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3.
Baral, H. S.; Inskipp, C.; Inskipp, T. P. & Regmi, U. R. (1996) Threatened birds of Nepal.
BCN & DNPWC, Kathmandu.
4.
Baral, H.S. (1998a). Status, distribution and habitat preferences of Swamp Francolin
Francolinus gularis in Nepal. Ibisbill 1: 35-70.
5.
Baral, H.S. (1998b). Hodgson's Bushchat in Nepal. Unpublished report to the Department of
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (HMG, Nepal), The Biodiversity Support Program (USA)
and Oriental Bird Club (UK). University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
6.
Baral, H.S. (1998c). Finn's Weaver Ploceus megarhynchus and Singing Bushlark Mirafra
cantillans: two new species for Nepal. Forktail 13: 129-131.
7.
Bhatta, D. D. and Shrestha, T. K. (1979) The environment of Sukla Phanta. Curriculum
Development Centre. Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur.
8.
BirdLife International (2000) Threatened birds of the world. Lynx Edicions and BirdLife
International, Barcelona, Spain and Cambridge, UK.
9.
Groombridge, B. (Ed. 1993): 1994 IUCN Red List of Threatened Animals, IUCN, Gland,
Switzerland and Cambridge, UK. Ivi + 286pp.
10.
Inskipp, C. & Inskipp, T. P. (1982) Results of a preliminary survey of Bengal Floricans
Houbaropsis bengalensis in Nepal and India, 1982. International Council for Bird Preservation,
Study Report No. 2. Cambridge.
11.
Inskipp, C. and Inskipp, T. (2001) A re-visit to Nepals lowland protected areas. Danphe
10(1/2): 4-7.
12.
Schaff, C. D. (1978) Ecology and behaviour of the northern race of swamp deer (Cervus
duvauceli duvauceli Cuvier) in the Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve of Nepal. Michigan State
University, Michigan.
13.

Harald O. Skar. (Becoming Rana: identity and regional self-ascription in lowland Nepal.)

All action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight,

which like a fog or moonlight, often tends to make things
seem grotesque and larger than they really are.
- Karl von Clausewitz

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Development and Prosperity of Asia Pacific in the

21st Century
- Pilot Lt Col Man Bahadur Karki
1.
21st century is the Asia Pacific century. Worlds attention and cooperation will be
increasing more than ever before. It is said that China and India will be more powerful and
rise to the respected positions. During the visit of President Barack Obama to India in 2010,
he said that the relationship between the United States and India-bound by our shared interests
and values-will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century. This is the partnership I
have come here to build. This is the vision that our nations can realize together.1 The Secretary
of the States, Hillary Clinton said, thriving United States of America (USA) is good for China
and thriving China is good for the USA. In her Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
meeting she said that the United States is renewing its focus on the Asia-Pacific region as the
world's economic and strategic center shifting eastward. These statements of top US political
leadership elucidate, how important is India, China and Asia as a whole for the US and the
world in coming days of 21st century.
2.
From 14th to 19th century, Europe dominated the course of history in Asia. Portuguese
as a first European country raised its flag over Goa and Macao in the 16th century. The Dutch
showed its presence in Indonesia, the British in India and Spanish in the Philippines. Likewise,
the French moved into Indo-China region, Russia in the Northern China, Manchuria and
Korea and the United States of America in the Pacific and the Philippines in the later half
of 19th century.2 It is said that the nineteenth century was the century of Europe during the
industrialization period and the twentieth century became the American century.
3.
When two great leaders from China, Deng Xiaoping and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi met in 1988, on their bilateral discussion the phrase of Asian Century originated.
Prior to this meeting it was believed that this term was discussed at US Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations hearing process. Now, term of Asian century is quite frequently used by the
media and diplomats at the regional and international significant areas of diplomacy, military
forum, technology and economics. More recently, the President of Indonesia Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono at the APEC summit in November 2011 reiterated that 21st century belongs to
the Asia Pacific region.3 Given the scope and significance of the Asia Pacific region, it must
identify the roles and way to diversify the economic growth through sustainable, balanced and
inclusive development.
4.
To become a major power, country must have economic, infrastructure, political, social,
cultural, technology and military might so that it can able to show significant diplomatic presence
in the world politics. In terms of the total population, Asia Pacific has the highest population in
the World. In the beginning of 21st century, Asian population was around four billion which is
expected to increase to more than five billion by 2050. However, world population growth is
1

President Barack Obama`s address to Indian Parliament on 8 November 2010

Dr Theo Summer, Is the 21st Century is Going to Be Asian Century, Asian, July 2006, p. 70-78

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/11/13/the-21st-century-belongs-asia-pacific-region-sby.html
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likely to be reduced in other region. North American and European population is expected to
decline. It means, human resource which is the one factor of production in marketing is more
in Asia than other region. Likewise, technology and capital investment are likely to widen.
5.
East Asian nations like Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia have
encouraging progress, development and economic expansion which have already shown
influencing roles in the world arena. Moreover, after the USA, China is the second and
Japan the worlds third largest economies, whereas, India is the sixth in purchasing-power
parity terms.4 These three Asian nations are progressing more and taking a leap in economic
growth by overtaking USA before the middle of 21st century. According to Yao of Nottingham
University, China will overtake the USA to become the worlds largest economy by 2038 and
the Indian economy will overtake the USA by 2043 as per the Goldman Sachs report.5
6.
By 2050, the East Asian and South Asian economies will be increased by many folds
and subsequently the index to measure the standards of living, Human Development Index
(HDI) will be also increased.6 India's HDI will be approached to 0.8 and East Asia's countries
will be approached to 0.94 which is close to the European and the US living standards. This
fact foretells the level of progress and living standard in East Asia and India. In terms of
religion, culture, language and social factors, Asian value is also likely to boom. In spite of
English regarded as universal language, Asian languages such as Chinese, Japanese, Indian
and Korean are also likely to rise. Chinese language has been rated as the second most used
language on the internet, Japanese was fourth, and Korean as the tenth as of 2010. Likewise,
the same report says, China is the country that host the most users, Japan the third, India the
fourth and the South Korea as the tenth as of 2008. India has the largest film industry which
produces more films than Hollywood. Annual growth of Bollywoods film is at 12.6% higher
than Hollywoods 5.6%.7
7.
South Korea, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam have
strong economic influence and can be regarded as East Asian economic hubs. These countries
engagement and more economic cooperation with potential Asian economic power houses
Japan, India and China at one front and big economies like USA, European Union, Russia,
Brazil and South Africa on the other front will yield shared development and prosperity in
the region. These three great economic powers of India, China and Japan will inevitably pose
political and strategic competition and likely to create power shift from the West to the East.
Nevertheless, Asia Pacific region has some challenges of unresolved territorial issues stand
between India and Pakistan, India and China, Vietnam and China, China and Russia, Russia
and Japan and South China issue. In addition, development on the Korean peninsula and six
party talks, nuclear issues of Iran, war on terror, human rights, good governance, transparency,
climate change and natural disaster are other key areas to shape future prosperity and peaceful
rise of the small and big nations in the region.
8.

The relationship of Asian powers with European Union, USA and Russia should be

http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4001&Itemid=206

http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/updates/blog_posts/20_04_2009.php

http://www.cap-lmu.de/publikationen/1999/asias_future_globalization.php

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_Century
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troubled free and it should not be a constant fight for the resources, taking a lion shares in
the region and should prevent the situation to become an adversary. The confrontation or
adversary in the region cannot create confidence and investment friendly environment. Even
if there is conflict, convergence is the better option to correct and march onto the road of Asia
Pacific stability and prosperity.
9.
Trade and investment, democracy, human rights, military engagement, strategic
partnership, and participation on humanitarian and disaster response are likely common areas
of cooperation which cement the relations much stronger. Asian nations and international
powers can best utilize this option to shape their relations and interact to create more business
opportunity and resilient Asia Pacific. Presently, Asia Pacific region has various different
regional organizations consisting member country from within and outside the region. The
regional organizations are not limited to the geographical proximity but it has mainly focused
on the free trade, economic cooperation, investment opportunity and shared prosperity.
ASEAN which consists of nations of South East Asian such as Myanmar, Laos, Thailand,
Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, East Timor, the Philippines and Brunei.
This regional organization also includes Japan, USA and South Korea as ASEAN plus Three.
Similarly SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation) is the forum of eight
countries namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka. Major military and economic power such as the United States of America, China,
Japan, Australia, European Union and Russia are also involved as a partner and observer.
In addition to those organization few other organization, namely Asia Pacific Economic
Forum (APEC), Shangai Cooperation Organization, Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC, Bay
of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)8,
economic organization of big four countries Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
(BRICS) and so on. This type of alliance actually strengthens the country to country contact
and provides a platform to engage for common benefits.
10.
To conclude, the 21st century is the century of business, trade, investment, technology
and strategic competition in Asia Pacific region. Every country in the world aspires to grow
and prosper through peace, stability and development. Given the dynamism and significant
level of economic progress of small, powerful and emerging nations, the Asia Pacific region
is likely to grow further and influence the world activities. However, the level of stability,
development and prosperity of the Asia Pacific nations are likely to vary.
8

BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation was established in 1997.
Nepal and Bhutan got full membership in 2003.

He who whets his steel, whets his courage.

- Steven Pressfield

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;]gfsf] 5jLnfO{ pRr :yfgdf /fVg /fi6;]js l;kfxL ;kmn e};s]sf] 5 . tTsfnLg ljb|f]xLsf] cfqmd0fnfO{ ;kmntd
k|ltsf/af6 ljkmn t'NofO{ ;a} b]zjf;L hgtfx?sf] ;'/Iff ug{df cu|0fL e"ldsf v]ln;s]sf] 5 / lg/Gt/ cu|0fL e"ldsf
v]lng} /xg]5 eGg]df xfdL ;a} ljZj:t x'g' h?/L 5 .
#=
Gdf/;z:q d'7e]8x?df pleP/ h:tfnfO{ To:t} Aojxf/ (Tit for Tat) sf] l;4fGt cjnDjg tyf dfgjLo
sfg"gsf] k"0f{?kdf kfngf u/L k|ltsf/df ;xh 9+un] plqP/ s'g} klg xfntdf Ps sbd kl5 gxl6 ;kmntd?kdf
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hfg]sf] x'G5 . p;nfO{ x]g]{ b[li6sf]0fdf dfq km/s x'g' h?/L 5, ;a} ;dodf Ps?ktf ePsf] 7fGg'x'Gg, o;f] ubf{
;fpgdf cfvf km'6]sf] l8+uf]n] ;w} xl/of] b]Vb5 eg]h:tf] pvfgsf] rl/tfy{ x'g cfpb5 .
$=
nfdf] ;do;Dd ljb]zdf zflGt :yfkgf sfo{sf] nflu ljleGg o'=Pg= ldzgx?df t}gfy /xbf;d]t zflGt
:yfkgfy{ w]/} g]kfnL jL/ ;k'tx?n] cfkm\gf] /ut / kl;gfn] ljb]zL e"ld l;l~rt u/L G ;dfwfgsf] nflu cxd
e"ldsf v]n]sf] xfdL ;a}sf] dfemdf k|i6 5 . cem g]kfnL zflGt :yfkgfy{ 6f]nLx?sf] pTs[i6 sfo{x?nfO{ ljZj
;d'bfon] v'n]/} k|z+;f u/]sf] klg xfdL ;a}nfO{ 1ft g} 5 .
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zflGtsf] cj:yfdf b]zsf] ljsf; tyf hgtfnfO{ k|ToIf nfeflGjt x'g] lx;fasf ljleGg ;}lgs gful/s
;DaGw ;'b[9 ug]{ sfo{x? ;d]t ug{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf sd{7 l;kfxLx?sf] hdft ;Ifd 5g\ . ljkbsf] cj:yfdf /fxt
tyf p4f/ sfo{df First Responder sf] lx;fjn] cl3 a9\g logLx? ;w} tof/ tyf tTk/ /xG5g\ eg] ljsf; lgdf{0fdf
ljleGg lsl;dsf ;8s, af6f3f6f], k'n-k'n];f, vfg]kfgL h:tf lgdf{0f sfo{x?df dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]ln/x]sf] 5 .
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u/fpg;d]t ;Ifd /x]sf] 5 .
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of] /ftlbg vl6O/xG5 eg] ljsf; lgdf{0fsf] qmddf kmfi6 6fs vf]Ng], a]gL-hf]d;f], lxn]-ef]hk'/, s6f/L-cf]vn9'uf,
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el/Psf] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] 7"nf] of]ubfg /x]sf] 5 . To:t} @)%* ;fnb]lv @)^@ ;fn;Dd b]znfO{ cfGtl/s Gaf6
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g/fvL cxf]/fq nflu k/]sf] lyof] / eljiosf lbgx?df klg nflu kl//xg] k"0f{ ljZjf;sf ;fy eGg ;lsG5 . o;df
s]jn cf8e/f];f, pTk|]/0ff / ;fGTjgf ldl;Psf] xf};nfsf] dfq vfrf] /x]sf] 5 .
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cf8e/f];f, pTk|]/0ff / ;fGTjgf ldl;Psf] xf};nfsf]dfq cfzf /x]sf] 5 . p;n] u/]sf jf lgefPsf pTs[i6 tyf /fd|f
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lbgdf xfdLx?nfO{ s]n] /f]Sof] / < olt lemgf] cfzf p;sf] k"/f ePdf p;n] cfkm\gf st{Aokydf cfOk/]sf ljljw
lsl;dsf r'gf}ltx?, afwf c8\rgx? jf sl7gtd h3f/x?;u xf;Lxf;L cfkm" d[To'j/0f ug'{k/]df u/]/ eP klg ;xh}
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plhNofpg cjZo g} ;Ifd x'g]df s;}sf] b'O{ dt x'g] 5}g\ .

cg'zf;gn] ;+u7gdf To:tf] cj:yf;Fu ;DaGw /fVb5 hxfF sd{rf/L ;+u7gsf] gLlt
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l8s]Ghf] P08 /ljG;

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Panauti & Its Nostalgic Cultural Sites

- Lecturer Poonam R L Rana
Distance from Kathmandu
1.
Panauti is 32 Km away from Kathmandu and lies on the South Eastern side of the
valley. It is also known as Asmapur resting on a single rock, like the city of Kirtipur. As
the saying goes, it is a city of temples; here images of deities are found more than the local
populace, where one can see more temples than houses.

The History & Evidence

2.
Mr Uddav an officer of Department of Archaeology reveals that there are in total 54
inscriptions including the one at Gorakhnath hill. The oldest images can be dated up to 12th
and 13th century AD. All these inscriptions belongs to the Medieval period. Beside this there
are 988 Tamrapatra copper plates belonging to 1000 BS. Licchhavi inscriptions found here
mention of the settlement at Panauti.
3.
Inscriptions reveal that King Harashima Deva of Simraungargh escaped and came
here and established his rule. History also reveals that Vardhana Dynasty was residing near
the valley of Planchowk Bhagawati area. It lies very near to Panauti. Hence lot of
development and progress took place during this era.
Origin of the Name
4.
There are numerous myths, legends, local emic views related to the origin of the name
Panauti such as: It is said that in Satya Yuga and Treta Yuga it was known by the name of
Padmawati. In the Dwapar yug it was called Punyawati then Pallawati and Panwati
and finally during Kaliyug the name underwent change and it became known as Panauti.
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This region is as religious as Uttar Prayag of India. From religious point of view it is
known as Pabitra Bhumi or Region of Purity
Panauti Chhetra

Ancient Belief & Panauti

5.
Belief exist that earlier Royalties or Shah vamsis would never set foot on Panauti, as
the saying goes that since the city is situated on a single rock, if any ruler set his foot on this
city, the rock would crack and the people would suffer from natural calamities.
6.
Another belief is that one of the Shah rulers dreamt that Lord Indreswar Mahadeva
appeared in his dream and forbade him to come to Pasnauti. It was since then they never set
foot on this region. However recently, during the 12 years mela, former King Gynendra not
only visited the place but also provided donations to different temples. This is what the
locals told us.
7.
Interesting belief persists that, there was a holy ruler by the name of Satyabara.
During his rule a terrible drought occurred. It is said that he offered flower of gold and silver
to Pulchowki Mai and prayed for water. It is believed that rain fell.
Temples around Panauti
8.
Panauti is an area full of temples, culturally rich in medieval heritages and festivities.
Nearly each and every nook and corner of this city has religious importance attached to it.
Along the four side of this region are the Dikpalas or gurdians, Astamatrikas, Gorakhnath
as well as holy rivers and its confluences with great religious values attached to it.
9.
Holy Lilawati river flows from the highest peak Phulchowki region lying on the
southern side of Panauti. From the western side via Nala quietly flows the holy Punyawati
river. Another myth supports of an invisible river Guptawati known as Rudrawati is said
to flow here only after every 12 years, belief also exist, that one can burn fire on this water.
The confluence of these holy rivers is considered as Triveni. This area is known as Sachi
Tirtha It is believed that if people bathe here it is as bathing in the holy Prayag of India.
Some term this confluence as Uttar Gaya North Gaya.
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10.
Some important temples around this area are Gorakh Nath, Guheshwari, Bhadrakali,
near the confluence of the river is the Brahmayani, Shree Krisna and Indreshwor and within
its premises are the temple of Unmat Bhairab and Tula Narayan etc.
Gorakhnath Temple

Hillock behind is the Gorakhnath Hill

Gorakhnath

New Gorakhnath image

11.
On the North West of the Triveni lies a hillock. On the top of it is the temple of
Guru Gorakhnath; the hillock is named after him. From here one can see Khopasi bazzar
towards the East, cultivated fields towards West and Banepa, Dhulikhel, and Himalayan
range on the North. After climbing more than 389 steps we can reach the top.
12.
Myth exist that in Treta yuga while fighting with Ravana, Laxman fainted and it
was Shree Hanuman who went to bring the medicinal herbs, since he lacked knowledge he
carried the Dronachal Parbat. On the way, a piece that fell is said to be Goraknath hillock.
Dharmaguru are of the view that around this hillock one can find numerous medicinal herbs.
Belief exist that if an individual carries the water from the confluence within the palm of his
hand and is able to offer it at the temple of Guru Gorakhnath, all his wishes is said to be
fulfilled.
Brahmayani temple

Brahmayani Pith

Brahmayani images

13.
On the confluence of the holy rivers is this temple of Brahmayani. As mentioned in
the inscription it was made by Shree Ranjeet Malla. Lord Brahma is the creator and his
shakti is Brahmayani. Brahmayani is a roop of parvati. It is said as required she took
different roopas to overcome the evil.The symbolic form of worship had been prevalent in
Nepal since times unknown. The Brahmayani images are merely placement of stones.
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Bhairab Pith

Bhairab temple

Bhairab pith with Chepu on Toran

14.
Pith is a symbolic place where instead of image usually symbols are placed. In this
case the image of Bhairab is brought to the temple only on Jatra or festival. On the Torana
one can see Chepu which shows Tibetan influence in Nepalese art. Chepu has been
regarded as a guardian. In many temple premises one can see Chepu at the doorway.
Kedareswar Temple

Kedareswar

Mukha Linga Cloth tied around Mukhalinga

15.
Kedareswar temple comprises of Pancha Mukhalinga. The mukhalinga have five
faces with a moustache. The unique feature of this image is that it has animal figures on its
brahma bhaga. On all four sides there are images of lion, tiger, nag, and ox engraved on it.
Ganesh Temple near Triveni

Pillars on the side of Ganesh temple Navagraha icon

Narayana
(Assumed to be of Licchhavi phase. Images of Surya, Naga etc.)
16.
Ganesh temple is an ordinary temple but the extraordinary aspect is that the stone
pillars placed on three sides have been assumed to belong to the Licchhavi period. Scholars
are of the view that it was brought here from elsewhere and placed here. The four sides of
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the temple house four different deities. On the other side of Ganesh temple is the icon of
Navagraha on the other two sides are Narayan and Suryanarayana.
Vansagopal Shree Radha Krisna Temple

Radha Krisna Image

Krisna Radha Temple

17.
This temple lies very near to Shree Ganesh Temple. It was constructed in the year
1784. Interesting point to note is that this temple was not constructed by dwellers of Panauti.
It is said that this temple was constructed by a trader from Lalitpur.
Shree Thampa Bhairab

Thampa Bhairab Outside the Temple The Wooden Tundal

18.
On the way to Indreswar Mahadeva temple, just in front of the main gate lies the
Thampa Bhairab pith This temple does not possess any ornamented image but a symbolic
stone representing as Bhairab is placed at the sanctum.
Indreswar Mahadeva

Indreswar Mahadeva

Tula Narayan

Matrika temple

Strut

19.
The most famous temple of Panauti is Indreswar Mahadeva. Majority of the images
around the temple are based on Panchayan Marg It is believed that Lord Indra did tapashya
and installed this temple. The inscription however reveals that this temple was constructed
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by Ram Vardhana in between 12th to 13th century. It is an exquisite temple in pagoda style.
The Struts are constructed at 45 degree angle; its major function was to support the roof.
20.
Towards the northern side the Struts are of Matrikas and on the southern side the
struts depicts characters of Mahabharata. Towards the west the struts depict Ramayana
characters. On the southern side of the temple lies a huge rock known as Ahilya Sattal
Story reveals of Gautam rishi who cursed his wife Ahilya and she turned into a rock. It was
only when Lord Ram stepped on her she regained her swaroopa and attained mokshya.
21.
Tula Narayana image is a famous image of this premisces. It is approximately 9 ft in
height made up of black stone. It is said that Jaya Verma did tula daan. He measured
himself with gold, silver and rice-grains and gave it to the people; and installed Tula
Narayana image. The image is shown standing on a double- petal lotus. There is also a
temple for the Matrikas. It is a noteworthy fact that on the southern side of Siva temple one
can always see a Bhairab temple.

(Siva Linga within Indreswar premises)

Recent Excavations & Findings & note-worthy monuments
22.
For those interested in the archaeological excavations, this is an interesting site. Seven
years ago excavation had been carried but it was covered. Now again re-excavations is being
carried out. Excavation has revealed ancient structural remains of the gate, palace walls and
other artifacts and coins. This has slowly proved the historical legends associated with
Vardhana Vamsi is true. Hence archaeological excavations are back bone of our history.

Excavated site
113

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Excavated structural remain

The wall

The Excavated artifacts,

coin

Wall section

object.

Interesting Monument
23.
In course of your visit to Panauti an interesting monumental structure may catch your
eyes. It seems to stand out among the barren space.

Stupa like remain

Back view

Monumental Remain

24.
Emic or indigenous view reveals that earlier there were priests or Brahmins known as
Dakshin Brahmin or Brahmins from the south. They were known as Jangam they were
responsible for conducting ritualistic worships or pooja, jatra or festivities. When these holy
priests died they were buried and over their dead body such monumental structures were
constructed. Recently there are no more Jangams nor does this system of burying of the
priest exist.
25.
Panuati is certainly an interesting historical & cultural site worth visiting . For those
interested in the study of medieval art, architecture, and ancient excavated site, Panauti is the
place. The only drawback is that this area does not possess posh hotel to house the tourist
however, there are neat and clean Newari caf to drink a cup of coffee, tea or cold drinks.
There is a regular bus services joining Kathmandu with Panuauti. Panauti always welcomes
visitors. We must be proud of such heritage that build a nostalgic past.
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k|hf df]6f eP b/af/ alnof] x'G5* eGg] pgsf] egfO{ xfnsf] ;dfhjfb jf Equality in Equity
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@ P]hg .
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b'O{ rf/ o'4df kf/ut x'gn
] fO{ bhf{ x]//] ;]gfdf dfg bLg'!! eGg] ;f]rg} pgsf] dxfg sfo{ lyof] .
;]gfdf slxNo} t]/f] d]/f] u/L dfg ;Ddfg lbPgg\ . x/]s txsf] k|df]zgdf of]Uo x'g p;n] n8]sf] n8fO / p;n]
b]vfPsf] l;kfxLkgnfO{ hflrGYof] .
-5_
d/j6sf] Joj:yf!@ pgsf] clt b'/ufdL ;f]r lyof] . hf] sd{rf/L /fHosf] sfd ubf{ub}{ csfndf
d[To' x'GYof], p;sf] kl/jf/nfO{ lhjLsf rnfpg /fHon] v]tL of]Uo hldg lbGYof] eg] tLgsf 5f]/fx? hfuL/]
x'g of]Uo ePkl5 ;]gf nufotsf] c+ux?df :jtM egf{ ul/GYof] . xfnsf] Job Security, Insurance /fHosf]
;DdfgeGbf pgsf] gLlt sdL lyPg .
-h_
To;}u/L pgn] b]zleq v]tL pAhfp x'g] / vfgL ePsf] 7fpsf] a:tL ;f/]/ eP klg cfDbfgL a9fpg,
s[lifsf] ljsf; ug{, b]z leq 3/]n' aGb Jofkf/sf] ljsf; u/L b]z leqsf] cfDbfgL aflx/ hfgaf6 /f]Sg cfk\mg}
b]zdf sk8f agfO{ nufpgsf] nflu u/]sf] cfjfg / pkb]z cfhsf] lbgdf emg} ;fGble{s 5g\ .!#
$=
afx\o gLlt M pgsf] sfo{sfndf k"j{ l6i6fdb]lv klZrd sfu8f;Dds} g]kfn PsLs/0f sfo{ k"/f geP klg
pgn] ljzfn g]kfnsf] kl/sNkgf u/L g]kfn pQ/df rLg / blIf0fdf lxGb':tfgsf] aLrdf 5 eGg] k|i6 ;f]r /fv]sf
pbfx/0f lgDg x'g\ M
-s_
g]kfn b'O{ 9'f aLrsf] t?n!$ eGg] pgsf] ;f]r g]kfnsf] Geo-Political Situation df ;b}j cd/
5 . pgn] b'j} l5d]sdf ;Gt'lnt ;DaGw /fVg' k5{ eGg] ;f]r / sfd b'j} u/] . h;sf] nflu pgn] kf8] If]qL
kl/jf/sf sfhLx?nfO{ pQ/tkm{sf] / a:Goft kl/jf/sf sfhLx?nfO{ blIf0ftkm{sf] k//fi6 dfdnf ldnfpg /
jflif{s / cfsl:ds b"tx?sf] Joj:yf;d]t u/]sf lyP .!%
-v_
hfO s6s gug'{ lemsL s6s ug'{ !^ eGg] pgsf] of] gLlt ;b}j ef/t / rLg h:tf] ljzfn b]zsf]
aLrdf /x]sf] g]kfnnfO{ cfk\mgf] /Iff gLlt agfpg ;b}j c6n /xg]5 . pgsf] egfO{df xfdLn] Offensive
Military Operation gug]{ t/ b]zsf] /Iffsf] nflu Defensive Offensive Operation -k|lt/IffTds cfqmd0f_ ug'{
k5{ eGg] xf] . h'g oyfy{, clxn] klg plts} ;fGble{s 5 .
-u_
d'UnfGofx? dxf rt'/ x'G5g\, ;bf 6f9f /xg'!& eGg] pgsf] csf]{ egfO{ TolQs} ;fGble{s 5 .
To;avtsf d'UnfGof eg]sf O6flnog s]k'rLg kfb/Lx? lyP . hf] lqmlZrog wd{ km}nfpg pkTosfsf ljleGg
;x/df a:y] / /fhfx?sf] aLrdf grflx+bf s'/f nufO{ lbP/ pkTosfdf n8fOdfq ;[hgf ub{y] . To;}n] ljb]zL
x:tIf]kn] b]z leqsf] k'm6 /fd|f] x'b}g eGg] pgsf] ;f]r TolQs} ;fGble{s 5, clxn] klg .
-3_
ljb]zL gt{sLx?sf] gfr gx]g'{ a? cfk\mg} b]zsf gt{sLsf] gfr x]g'{, ljb]zL gt{sLn] cfk\mgf] b]zsf]
uf]Ko s'/f aflx/ n}hfG5g\ eGg] pgsf] ;f]r TolQs} ;fGble{s 5 .!* cfk\mgf] b]zsf] uf]Ko va/ r'lxof] eg]
b'idgn] hlxn] klg kmfObf p7fp5g\ .
cGtdf,
%=
k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxn] !* cf}+ ztfAbLsf] dWolt/} g]kfndf ;dfj]zLs/0f, ;lx dfG5]nfO{ ;lx 7fpdf hflu/ lbg],
;a} hfthfltsf] ;Ddfg ug]{, kf/blz{tf ckgfpg], ;Gt'lnt k//fi6 gLlt sfod /fVg], h:tf gLlt ckgfP . h'g s'/f]
oBkL u'0fsf/L 5 . To;df klg pgn] dg'{ cufl8 cfk\mgf hgtf tyf ef/bf/nfO{ d]/f s'/f ltdLx?n] ;'g, ltdLx?n]
cfk\mgf ;GtfgnfO{ ;'gfp clg ltd|f ;Gtfgn] d]/f ;GtfgnfO{ ;'gfpg] 5g\ / b]zsf] enf] x'g]5!( eGg] h'g pb\uf/
AoQm u/]sf lyP To;df /fi6, /fi6 k|d'v / hgtf aLrsf] cljefHo ;DaGw hf]l8Psf] b]vfpb5 / h'g clxn] klg
pRr dxTj /fVb5 .
!! P]hg .
!@ P]hg k[= %$ .
!# P]hg, k[= %& .
!$ P]hg, k[= $% .
!% xg'dfgl;+x a:Goft tyf k"0f{dfgl;+x a:Goft, >LkfnL a:Goft kl/ro -sf7df8f}+ M>LkfnL a:Goft ;dfh lj=;+= @)%*_, k[= @@ .
!^ afa'/fd cfrfo{, k"j{jt, k[= $% .
!& P]hg, k[= $( .
!* P]hg, k[= ^) .
!( P]hg, k[= #) .
116

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

;}lgs Oltxf;sf] cWoog, dxTj tyf pkfb]otf

dxf ;]gfgL -c=k|f=_ /ltGb| vqL
!=
;}lgs Oltxf;sf] 1fglagf s'g} klg ;}lgs JolQm kl/kSj x'g ;Sb}g . lsgls, ;}lgs k]zfut 1fgsf]
clej[l4df ;}lgs Oltxf;n] dxTjk"0f{ :yfg cf]uf]6]sf] x'G5 . ;}lgs o'4snfsf] qmlds ljsf; (Evolution of
Military Warfare) n] ljZjnfO{ 9'] xltof/sf] o'uaf6 cfhsf] cTofw'lgs xftxltof/n] ;';lHht eP/ ax'cfoflds
9+un] n8fOF nl8g] cj:yfdf NofO{ k'ofPsf]] 5 . of] ljsf;sf] qmdnfO{ bzf{pg] d'Vo dfWod g} ;}lgs Oltxf; xf] . To;}n]
;}lgs Oltxf;sf] 1fgn] ;}lgs o'4snf, xftxltof/, ;]gfdf k|ljlw cflb ljifosf] ljsf;sf] s|lds?kdf hfgsf/L
lbO{ To;sf] ;lx?kdf k|of]u ug{sf] nflu dfu{ lgb]{zg ub{5 . o;} dxTjsf sf/0f klg ljsl;t d'n'sx?df ;}lgs
Oltxf;nfO{ ljz]if dxTjsf;fy tof/ kfg]{ ul/G5 . o; ;Gbe{df jL/tfn] el/Psf] g]kfnsf] Oltxf;af6 vf]hd"ns
9n] jf:tljs ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ s|lds?kdf ljsf; ub}{ n}hfg kg]{ cfjZostf xfdL ;fd' /x]sf] 5 .
@=
ljZjsf] Oltxf;df k|foM h;f] ;a} d'n'sx?sf] Oltxf;df ;}lgs Oltxf;n] g} k|d'v :yfg cf]u6]sf] x'G5 . s'g}
klg b]zsf] /fi6 lgdf{0f (Nation Building) k"0f{?kdf zflGtdo jftfj/0fdf zfob} ePsf] xf]nf < s'g} g s'g} sfn
v08df cfP/ cfGtl/s jf afXo sf/0fn] o'4sf] ;fdgf u/L ;}lgs Oltxf; /Rg kg]{ cj:yf kf/ u/]/ cl3 a9]sf]
b]lvG5 . rfx] Tof] ljZj o'4 xf];\ jf l5d]sL /fHo;Fusf] n8fOF pklgj]zsf] n8fOF xf];\ jf :jtGqtfsf] o'4 cyjf
cfGtl/s u[x o'4 g} lsg gxf];\ ;}lgs k|of]hgsf] cfjZostf clxn]sf :jtGq /fHox?n] ef]u]/ g} cfhsf] l:yltdf
cfO{ k'u]sf x'g\ .
#=
k/fk"j{sfndf dfgjLo lqmofsnfksf] j0f{g ug]{ s|ddf Oltxf;sf] z'?jft ePsf] lyof] . ;flxTosf wgL lu|s
tyf lrgLofx?af6 g} lnlvt Oltxf;sf] z'? ePsf] Oltxf;df kfOG5 . Ozfk"j{ sfndf ld> ;Eotfaf6 Oltxf;
z'?jft ePsf] t b]lvG5, t/ klg vf;u/L lu|s, /f]dg ;Eotf x'F'b} dWosfnLg o'u;Dd cfOk'Ubf Oltxf;sf] /fd|};u
ljsf; eO;s]sf] lyof] . ;f] ;dodf Oltxf;sf] juL{{s/0f u/]/ ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ cnu?kdf st} cleJoQm u/]sf]
b]lv+b}g . cfw'lgs o'udf cfP/ Oltxf;sf] (Historiography) ljsf; x'Fb} uPkl5 Oltxf;sf] pNn]vgLo?kdf ljsf;
x'Fb} uof] . o; ;do;Dd cfOk'Ubf hd{gL, k|mfG;]nL, a]nfotL, cd]l/sL, ?;L, lrgLof tyf d'l:nd Oltxf;sf/
x?n] Oltxf;sf] ljsf;df 7"nf] of]ubfg k'ofPsf] b]lvG5 .! oxL s|ddf ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] klg cfkm\g} klxrfgsf;fy
ljsf; x'Fb} uPsf] lyof] . g]kfndf klg g]kfnL ;]gfsf] kxntfdf ljfg Oltxf;sf/x?sf] ;xof]udf tyf s]xL cGo
Oltxf;sf/x?n] ;d]t ;}lgs Oltxf; tof/ kfg]{ sf]lzz ePsf] 5 .
$=
ltLo ljZjo'4;Dd ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ o'4 ;DaGwL l;nl;n]jf/ ljZn]if0f xf] eGg] ul/GYof] . To:t} o;nfO{
;}lgs sfjf{xLsf] 36gfs|dsf] Joj;flos ljZn]if0f klg elgg] u/]sf] kfOG5 . To;sf] ;fy} ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{
k|of]uzfnf r/0fsf] ;}lgs lj1fgsf] ;+1f klg lbOPsf] b]lvG5 .@ k|l;4 a]nfotL ;}lgs ljrf/s h]=Pkm=;L km'n/n]
bf];f| ] dxfo'4sf] Ps bzs cl3 g} ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ o'4snfs} ;}lgs lj1fgsf] ljsf;sf] ?kdf JofVof u/]sf lyP .#
o;/L ljleGg ljrf/x? a9\g] s|ddf cfw'lgs ;dodf cfP/ cd]l/sL ;]gfn] cflwsfl/s ?kdf ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{
;]gfsf] o'4 tyf zflGt b'j} cj:yfsf] p2]Zod"ns (Objective), b'?:t (Accurate), j0f{gfTds (Descriptive),
tyf JofVofg (Interpretive) sf] clen]v (Record) g} ;}lgs Oltxf; xf] eg]/ kl/eflift u/]sf] 5 .$ xfn}sf] lbgdf
! d'hdbf/ cf/=s] / >Le:tf P=Pg, df]8{g lx:6f]l/of]u|fkmL, lx:6f]l/of]u|fkmL, k[i7 *# b]lv @() .
@ h];k hf]g / SjfSn] /f]a6{, P kz{k\lS6e ckm ldnL6/L lx:6L, P ufO{8 6' o'h ldnL6/L lx:6L, jfl;6g l8=;L=, ;]G6/ ckm ldnL6/L lx:6L k[i6 @( .
# km'n/ h]=Pkm=;L, kmfp08]zg ckm lb ;fO{G; ckm jf/, n08g, x6ls;g, !(@*, k[i7 !( .
$ h];k hf]g / SjfSn] /f]a6{, P kz{k\lS6e ckm ldnL6/L lx:6L, P ufO{8 6' o'h ldnL6/L lx:6L, jfl;6g l8=;L=, ;]G6/ ckm ldnL6/L lx:6L k[i6 #! .
117

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

;+o'Qm /fHo cd]l/sfdf ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ hlt dxTj lbPsf] b]lvG5, zfob} cGt st} lbOPsf] xf]nf <
%=
Pp6f Oltxf;sf] cWoogstf{sf] nflu Oltxf; lzIffk|b ljifo x'g ;Sb5 eg] Pp6f l;kfxLsf] nfuL ;}lgs
Oltxf; pkfbo]tfsf] b[li6sf]0fn] dxTjk"0f{ x'G5 . ;}lgs Oltxf; / c? Oltxf;sf cg';Gwfg tyf vf]h k|lqmofdf s'g}
tflTjs cGt/ x'Fb}g . ;a} d"No, dfGotf, k|fylds tyf ;xfos ;|f]tx? pxL g} xf] . ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] nflu ;|f]tx?sf]
k|flKt ;xh Pjd\ s]xL km/s x'g ;Snf, t/, w]/} xb;Dd Ps csf{sf k"/ssf] ?kdf /x]sf x'G5g\ .
^=
;}lgs Oltxf; tof/ ubf{ syfut ?kdf j0f{g ul/Psf ljifox?n] vf;} dxTj /fVb}g . g]kfndf ;}lgs
Oltxf;sf] cWoog cWofkg ug]{ s|ddf ;fwf/0f Oltxf;s} n8fOFsf] k|;nfO{{ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] ?kdf k|:t't ug{]
ul/G5 . Toltdfqn] ;}lgs Oltxf; k"/f ePsf] dfGg ;lsb}g . k|;j; ul/g] P]ltxfl;s o'4sf] a0f{gnfO{ t cfd
Oltxf;s} ;+1f lb+bf km/s kb}{g . t/, oy]i6 k|df0fx?sf] cfwf/df ;}lgs dxTjsf] ljifox?sf] ljj]rgf ul/G5 eg]
Tof] jf:tljs ;}lgs Oltxf; sxnfpg ;Sb5 . s'g} JolQmaf6 p;Fu ;Da4 36gf / lgsfosf] af/]df Oltxf;
;+sng ul/G5 eg] p;n] lbPsf] oyfy{ ;k|df0f pknJw x'g h?/L x'G5 . cGoyf To;df sldsdhf]/Lx? n'Sg] / /fd|f
kIfx? a9fO{ r9fO{ n]lvg ;Sg] cj:yf l;h{gf x'g ;Sb5 . k|df0f ljgfsf] Oltxf; History geO{ His Story aGg
hfg] ;+efjgf a9L x'G5, To; cj:yfdf To:tf] ljifonfO{ Oltxf; egL xfNg ldNb}g . t/ klg To:tf] aofgnfO{ kl5
Oltxf;sf] ;|f]tsf] ?kdf pNn]v ug{ ;Sg] cj:yf eg] /xG5 .
&=
k|l;4 ;}lgs ljrf/s ln8n xf6{ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf af/]df eG5g\ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf ljBfyL{x?n] ;j{k|yd t
;To tYo kQf nufpg ;Sg' kb{5 . clgdfq To;sf] ;dfnf]rgfTds 9+un] dfkg (Critical Judgment) ug]{ sf]lzz
ug{' kb{5 . ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] cWoog ubf{ ;dfnf]rgfsf] ;fy} p2]Zod"ns b[li6sf]0fn] cWoog ul/Psf] x'g' kb{5 .%
*=
;}}lgs Oltxf; tof/ ubf{ ;}lgs 1fg / l;Sg ;Sg] kf7x? bzf{pg] u/L tof/ ul/Psf] x'g' kb{5 . To;}
k[i7e"dLdf ;}lgs Oltxf; tof/ ubf{ lgDg kIfx?sf] ;TotYosf] n]vfhf]vf ug]{ u/]sf] b]lvG5 M
-s_
;}lgs k]zfulto kIf Pp6f cgle1 JolQmnfO{ ljlzi6 snfn] kf/t agfpg] sfd k]zfut 1fgn]
ub{5 . o;df lgk"0f{tf xfl;n ugf{n] G Joj:yfkg ug{ kf]Vt agfpFb5 / ;fy;fy} cfkm\gf] ;+:yf / l;f]
d'ns
' k|ltsf] lhDd]jf/LkgnfO{ cfTd;fy ug{ ;Ifd agfpFb5 . t;y{, ;}lgs Oltxf;n] ljutsf ljleGg cj:yfsf
k]zfut 1fgsf] ljsf; / o;sf] k|of]unfO{ ;lx ?kdf lrq0f ug{ ;Sg' kb{5 .
-v_
hg]{nlzk
pRr:t/Lo ;}lgs g]t[Tjsf] cg'kd ?k eg]s} hg]{nlzk xf] . o;df g]t[Tj ug{ ;Sg]
Ifdtf / Joj:yfkg ug{ ;Sg] v'jLsf] ;ld>0f /x]sf] x'G5 . vf;u/L o'4sfnLg tof/L, ;'k/Lj]If0f, cfjZolso
aGbf]a:tL kIfsf] lg/Gt/tfsf] ;'lglZrttfdf lge{/ ub{5 . ;}lgs Oltxf; ljutsf o'4df axfb'/L b]vfO{
pbfx/0fLo of]ubfg lbg ;kmn gfosx?sf] hg]{nlzknfO{ k|:t't ug{ ;kmn x'g' kb{5 . c;kmn pbfx/0fx?
klg kf7 l;Sgsf] nflu cWoogsf] ljifo eg] aGg ;Sb5g\ .
-u_
/0fgLlt
d'n'ssf] /fli6o ;'/Iff;Fu hf]l8Psf r'gf}tLx? lg/fs/0f ug]{ tof/Lsf] ;fy} ;+efljt
;}lgs sfjf{xLsf] /0fgLltnfO{ ;lx k|of]usf b[i6fGtx? ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] cWoogsf nflu dxTjk"0f{ ljifo
x'g ;Sb5g\ . o;df vf; u/L /fli6o /0fgLlt (Grand Strategy) tyf ;}lgs /0fgLlt (Military Strategy)
x? ;do, sfn tyf kl/l:yltdf k|of]u / ljsf;nfO{ ;}lgs Oltxf;n] ;d]6\g ;s]sf] x'g' kb{5 .
-3_
o'4snf
o'4snfsf] ;kmn k|of]uc;kmn k|of]u, o;sf] cj:yf / ljsf;sf] n]vfhf]vf ;}lgs
Oltxf;sf] dxTjk"0f{ kIf x'g\ . s'g} klg ;}lgs cleofg ;kmn x'gdf o'4snfsf] 7"nf] e"ldsf /x]sf] x'G5 .
o'4snfsf] j:t'ut tyf Jojxfl/s kIfnfO{ ljleGg kl/l:ylt tyf :yfg ljz]ifsf] nflu ;'xfpFbf]?kdf k|:t't
ePsf] jf x'g g;s]sf] tYon] ;}lgs Oltxf;df dxTjk"0f{ :yfg cf]u6\g] s'/fdf s'g} z+sf x'Fb}g .
% ln8]n xf6{, x\jfO{ 8f]G6 lj ng{ k|md lx:6L, k[i7 !%
118

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

-_
aGbf]a:tL s'g} klg o'4sf] tof/Lsf] ;Gbe{df xf];\ jf o'4sfndf g} lsg gxf];, aGbf]j:tL kIfsf]
oyfy{ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] nflu dxTjk"0f{ kIfsf] ?kdf /x]sf] x'G5 . lsgls, ;lx aGbf]a:tL tyf To;sf]
lg/Gt/tfdf g} ;}lgs sfjf{xLsf] ;kmntf lge{/ x'G5 .
-r_
k|ljlw ;]gfdf
k|ljlw eGgfn] o'4sfnLg cj:yfsf] dfu k"/f u/fpg cfjZos k|ljlw eg]/ a'em\g
kg]{ x'G5 . h'g s'/f k|fljlws pkfo tyf k|fljlws ;fdu|Ldfq geO{ To;sf] ;lx / cfjZosLo k|of]u klg
xf] . t;y{, o;sf] ;lx ?k k|:t't ug{ ;s]sf] cj:yfdf dfq ;}lgs Oltxf; aGbf]a:tL ljifodf pknlJwd"ns
;flat x'g ;Sb5 .
-5_
/fhgLlts kIf
b]zsf] /fhgLlts cj:yf / To;sf] ;]gfdf k|efj tyf o'4sfnLg cj:yfdf
ePsf] ;sf/fTds jf gsf/fTds jftfj/0fsf] ljj]rgf ;}lgs b[li6sf]0fn] a8f] dxTj /fVg] xF'bf of] klg ;}lgs
Oltxf;sf] Pp6f k|d'v cWoogsf] ljifo x'g ;Sb5 .
-h_
;fdflhs kIf ;fdflhs kIfsf] ;Gbe{df eGgkbf{ P]ltxfl;s sfnv08df dfgjLo kIfsf] e"ldsf,
o;sf] k|efj / kl/0ftL xf] h;n] ;]gfsf] k|efjsfl/tfdf 7"nf] e"ldsf v]n]sf] x'G5 . To;}n] ;}lgs Oltxf;
klg o; kIfdf cIf'00f /xg ;Sb}g .
-em_ cfly{s kIf b]zsf] ;|f]t ;fwgx?sf] pTkfbsTj, ljt/0f tyf vkt ug{ ;Sg] Ifdtf ;b}j d'n'ssf]
cfly{s ljifosf dxTjk"0f{ kIfsf ?kdf /x]sf] x'G5 . h;sf] glthfdf ;]gfsf] dfq xf]Og ls ;f] d'n'ssf] ;d]t
;kmntf clg c;kmntf lge{/ ub{5 . t;y{, xfdLn] of] hfGg h?/L x'G5 ls s'g} klg ;}lgs Oltxf; tof/
ubf{ Tof];+u ;DalGwt cfly{s ljifosf] jf:tljstf phfu/ x'g h?/L x'G5 .
(=
g]kfnsf Oltxf;sf/x?n] ljleGg sfnv08x?sf] dxTjk"0f{ 36gfs|d pknJw ;|f]tx?sf] cfwf/df ljj]rgf
u/]/ Oltxf; tof/ kf/]sf] b]lvG5 . t/ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf/x?af6 k"/f ul/g' kg]{ bfloTj eg] cem} ck'/f] cj:yfdf /x]sf]
5 . w]/} o:tf ;}lgs dxTjsf] P]ltxfl;s tYox? Oltxf;s} uj{df n's]/ /x]sf] 5 .
!)= g]kfnsf] Oltxf;df hg]{nlzksf wgL JolQmTjx?sf] sdL 5}g . k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] hg]{nlzk pgs} ;dsIfL
cd]l/sfsf hh{ jf;L6g / k|lzofsf k|m]l8s lb u|]6sf] hg]{nlzk;Fu bfFh]/ x]g{ ;lsG5 . Oltxf;sf/ jfnrGb| zdf{sf]
egfO{df k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] ;Dk"0f{ hLjg o'4 / ljhosf] aLr g} laTof] . pgL :jo+ ;fx;L of]4f lyP . cfkm\gf]
;dosf clwsf+z dxTjk"0f{ / lg0f{ofTds o'4df pgL :jod o'4If]qdf pkl:yt lyP . o'4If]qsf] vt/f pgnfO{ lk|o
lyof] . pgsf] b[li6df jL/tfsf] 7"nf] cfb/ lyof] rfx] Tof] cfkm\gf dflg;df xf];\ rfx] zq'df .^ o;af6 k[YjLgf/fo0f
zfxdf hg]{nlzksf] cg'kd pbfx/0f ePsf] b]lvG5 t/ o;nfO{ phfu/ ug]{ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] xfdLsxFf sdL 5 .
hals hh{ jf;L6g / k|m]l8s lb u|]6sf] ;Gbe{df ;f]xL cj:yfdf cfkm}+f/f jf cflwsfl/s ;}lgs Oltxf;sf/x?f/f
tof/ kfl/Psf k':tsx? k|z:t ePsf] kfOG5 . axfb'/ zfx, aneb| s'Fj/, cd/ l;+x yfkf, elQm yfkf, lzj/fdl;+x
yfkf, aVtfj/ l;+x yfkf, sfn' kfF8], bfdf]b/ kfF8,] jL/eb| ;fksf]6f h:tf cgluGtL ;}lgs jL/ of]4fx?sf] jL/tfsf]
ufyf s'g} ljb]zL hg]{nx?sf]eGbf sd 5}g .
!!=
g]kfnsf] Oltxf;df g t P]ltxfl;s ;}lgs cleofgx?sf] sdL 5 g t ;}lgs jL/ of]4fx? g} . ;}lgs o'4snf
tyf /0fgLltx?sf] ;kmn k|of]un] g} g]kfnsf] cl:tTj hf]lug ;s]sf] jf:tljstf g} cfhsf] l;f], ;fj{ef}d g]kfn
xf] . t/, o;sf] uf}/jdo Oltxf;nfO{ ;}lgs cGbfhdf ;lx tl/sfn] phfu/ x'g g;s]sf] sf/0f g} cf]em]ndf k/]sf]
x'g ;Sg] cg'dfg nufpg ;lsG5 .
!@=
cfw'lgs jt{dfg o'udf Oltxf;sf] dxTj g/fVg] ;f]rsf] klg ljsf; ePsf] b]lvG5 . Oltxf;nfO{ ;f]xL a]nfsf]
gh/af6 gx]/L jt{dfg ;f]raf6 x]bf{ c;fGble{s tyf cJojxfl/s nfUg'sf] ;fy} ck|hftflGqs Pjd\ cdfgjLo ePsf]
^ zdf{, jfnrGb, k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] JolQmTj / dxTj, g]kfnsf] P]ltxfl;s ?k/]vf, t]>f] ;+:s/0f, jf/0ff;L, s[i0f s'df/L b]jL, la=;+= @)##, k[i7 @## .
119

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eGb} lt/:s[t gh/af6 x]/]/ sd dxTj lbPsf] klg b]lvG5 . cfw'lgs ;}lgs g]t[Tjdf k'/ftg z}nLdf cfk"mnfO{ pEofpg
grfxg] ;+:sf/ b]lvg' klg goFf s'/f xf]Og . t/ ljsf;sf] s|d, 1fgsf] cfwf/ tyf k|ult ;a} Oltxf;b]lv g} s|lds
ljsf; eP/ cfPsf] / cem} xfd|f] o'4snf tyf 8S6Lg klg P]ltxfl;s cg'ejs} hudf plePsf] s'/f xfdLn] la;{g
;Sb}gf}+ .
!#=
;lx t/Lsfsf] ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] cWoog u/]sf] cj:yfdf To;af6 jt{dfg cj:yfsf ;d;fdlos ;d:ofsf]
nflu dxTjk"0f{ b[li6sf]0fx? xfl;n ug{ ;lsG5 . h;n] ubf{ clxn]s} ;dodf klg ldNbf]h'Nbf] kl/l:yltdf of]hgf tyf
sfof{Gjog ug{ ;xh x'g hfG5 . ;}lgs Oltxf;n] ;sf/fTds tyf gsf/fTds b'j} kIfnfO{ k|:t't ug{ ;Sg' kb{5 .
tf ls c;kmn kIfsf] cg'z/0f gu/L ;kmn kIfsf] k|of]uaf6 efjL lkF9Ln] kmfObf p7fpg ;Sb5g\ . x'g t Oltxf;
Pp6f dfu{ bz{gdfq xf] To;sf ;sn kIfnfO{ jt{dfg cj:yfdf x'jx' gSsn u/]/ ;kmn cjZo klg x'g ;ls+b}g .
Oltxf;nfO{ ;dofg's"n?kdf kl/dflh{t?kdf ljsl;t kl/j]z;Fu d]n vfg] u/L k|of]u x'g h?/L x'G5 gq c;fGble{s
aGg k'uL c;kmn x'g] 8/ a9L x'g hfg ;Sb5 . h] xf];\ g]kfnsf] uf}/jdo ;}lgs Oltxf; ;lx?kdf lnlka4 ePsf]
cj:yfdf g]kfnsf] nfludfq geO{ ljZjsf] cGo d'n'ssf cWoogstf{sf] nflu;d]t dxTjk"0f{ ljifo ;flat x'g hfg]
lglZrt 5 .
;Gbe{ ;fdu|L
!=

cfrfo{, o1/fh, g]kfnsf] ;+lIfKt Oltxf;, sf7df08f}+, Pstf a'S;, @)%! .

@=

Sofg6f]/, gf]d{g / :gfO{8/ l/r8{, xfp 6' :68L lx:6L, Go'of]s{, yf]d; s|f]j]n, !(^& .

#=
h];k hf]g h'lgo/ / SjfSn] /f]a6{, P ufO{8 6' :68L P08 o'h ldnL6/L lx:6L, jf;L6g, ;]G6/ ckm ldnL6/L
lx:6L, !(** .
$=

d'hdbf/ cf/=s] / >Le:tf P=Pg, lx:6f]l/of]u|fkmL, 5}6f}+ ;+:s/0f, lbNnL, ;'/lht a's l8kf], @))! .

%=

/fO{6, 8fgLon, lx:6 ckm g]kfn, gofF lbNnL, ?kf P08 sDkgL, !*&& .

^=

xf6{, ln8n, :6of6]hL, Go'of]s{, k|]ou/ kJnL;/ OGs, !(&$ .

&=
zdf{, jfnrGb, k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] JolQmTj / dxTj, g]kfnsf] P]ltxfl;s ?k/]vf, t];|f] ;+:s/0f, jf/0ff;L,
s[i0f s'df/L b]jL, lj=;+= @)## .
*=

XofldN6g, k|mfG;L; a'sfgg\, Pg Psfp06 ckm b ls+8d ckm g]kfn, gofF lbNnL, ?kf P08 sDkgL, @))& .

(=

Oef]No';g ckm ldln6/L jf/km]o/,n]egcf]y{, o'=o;=cfdL{ l;=hL=o;=;L= !(&& .

l;+uf] /fi6n] b'Mv kfpg' eGbf Pp6f JolQmn] si6 p7fpg' /fd|f] xf] .
:jfdL ljj]sfgGb

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National Army, Regime Change and the Question of

Sovereign Monopoly
- Pitambar Bhandari
1. The decade of 1920's in which realism theory was dominant in the international relation
and the interstate armed conflict prior to 1990, have been replaced by the issues of individual
security and the intrastate conflict in this era after the establishment of various liberal institutions
and ideological debates. Since the ancient period in the field of political anthropology
different systems of social control, access to power and the sources of legitimate domination
are practiced. With the ultimate objective of control over the territory, expansionism for the
assurance of essential commodities and power orientation, the formation and development of
both political institutions and political communities led to the establishment of modern states
and the nation-states.
2. Based upon the nature, desire and decisive cognitive factors of the leadership, innovative
ideological debates introduced contesting the system of production & distribution of economic,
social & cultural values, quest for power to exercise, the mounted position for the exertion of
monopoly over the physical force, all gave birth to various ways to governing- democratic,
fascism, communism, anarchy, dictatorship when constricted to the governing dimension.
The ways of governing the human communities structured on the basis of backingof citizens/
subjectsand the survival of authority in support of external power are not observed to be
consistent phenomena. Thus, creating different phases of governance within a single political
territory termed as the 'Regime change'. In this paper, the military organization as an institution
of the state and its dichotomous relationship with civilian authority during the situations of
regime changes will be analyzed.
3. Considering democracy as a political regime, Dahl (1971) has emphasized competition
referring to the expression of effective preferences about alternative policies at the national
level & inclusiveness assuring the result of the participation in selecting national leaders as
essential ingredients. The political regimes that do not meet the requirement of competition
and inclusiveness as Non-democratic Regimes which is again divided by 'closed hegemonies',
'inclusive hegemonies' and 'competitive hegemonies'1. On the other hand, Doorenspleet (2006)
has realized communist, fascists and nationalist Regimes, one-party systems, totalitarian
dictatorship, authoritarian government and sultanistic regimes.
4. Regime change is the shift in one of the regimes from another as a technical neologism
used by social scientists to signify the alteration of countries fundamental political institution.2
Reflecting the trend of external influence and political zest Owen (2010) in 'The clash of ideas
1

Robert Dahl (1971)in his contribution Polyarchy: participation and opposition, states that Nondemocratic Regimes
failing to meet the requirements of competition and inclusiveness as 'Closed hegemonies', those meeting only the
inclusiveness as 'Inclusive hegemonies' and those failing to meet the requirement of inclusiveness as 'Competitive
Oligarchies'.

J.M. Owen.(2010).The clash of ideas in world politics.New Jersy: Princeton University Press
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in world politics' argue regime change as a political term and polarizing one since the verb
'change' has come to imply the coercion of outside powers, regime instability and great power
wars being the triggering events in forcible regime promotions. The factors contributing for
regime change range from the domestic turmoil to the international security interest including
political, military cultural and economic factors all being the dimensions of national security.
Development as a modern discourse, Dorenspleet (2006), concludes a positive relationship
between development and the probability that a state makes a transition to democracy3. But the
New modernization theory encompasses Human Development Index and external influenceas
additionalfactors, besides economic development and explores the significance of democratic
diffusion, in the regime changes4.
5. Under the radical dependency theory of Frank, the middle classes and the military
benefit from the model of associated dependent development and they protect the existing
economic and political situation. In this situation, the regime is non-democratic and its mode
of organization is military bureaucratic5.
6. Guillermo O'Donnel (1979) taking the instances of several Latin American States,
Argentina, Brazil & Uruguay during the 1960s turned to non-democratic regimes emphasized
that the dependency created pressure towards non-democratic rule and the regimes as
bureaucratic authoritarian, as a product of economic & political crises. Boniface (2004) has
identified dictatorship, WMD proliferation, genocide or state sponsored or condoned terrorism
as the scenarios where regime change has been considered in the last fifteen years.
National Army: Institution and Profession
7. National army as an instrument for the accessibleauthority of legitimate monopoly over
the use of physical force has varying roles with the motive of broader notion of peace ranging
from domestic security to the international peace and security with the chained form of
organization. National security priority, safeguarding the vital national interests and meeting
the challenges of new security threats emerged at the advent of modernity along with the
management of national economy and extended government services to all citizens demand
the involvement of military organization6.
8. In Realism, the central dialect of military profession is reflected as on one hand military
profession rests in its notions of duty, honor, and country committed to the ultimate sacrifice
and prepared to give one's life for the state, state being the sole client. On the other hand, the
primary purpose is to win wars. The profession constraint, as argued by Sarkesian,Williams and
Cimbala (2008) exist as 'military cannot publicly or formally engage in political partnership
3

There is an indirect relationship between development and the probability that a state makes a transition to democracy,
with class structure being the intervening variable, development increases the size of the middle class, and the middle
class increases the probability that a state undergoes a transition to democracy as concluded by Doorenspleet.

RenskeDoorespleet,( 2006), concludes the direct positive influence of democratic neighbors on the probability that a
state becomes democratic. A nondemocratic regime surrounded by democratic neighbor will be more likely to make a
transition to democracy than a nondemocratic regime surrounded by nondemocratic neighbors.

RenskeDoorespleet.(2006).Democratic Transitions. New Delhi: Viva Books.

Thomas C. Brunean and Scott D. Tollefson,(2006) , In Who Guards the Guardians and How have noted U.S. Army
having a considerable role in setting American west and deciding infrastructure during the nineteenth century.

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to secure better wages, conditions of employment or operational commitments. It must

comply with policy and decision of civilian officials even if it does not agree with them7.
Huntington has expressed the notion of subjective & objective civilian control of the military8,
the subjective being loyal to the individual leader and objective respecting and maintaining
the professionalism. Some authors even argue that the military profession cannot function "as
a silent order of monks"9and 'The military profession must adopt the doctrine of constructive
political engagement, framing and building a judicious and artful involvement in the policy
arena"10.
9. Shemella, (2006) have identified the roles of military operating both at macro & micro
levels11. Fenema P.C. (2010) focuses the contribution of military organization in the response
of national crises resulting from natural disasters and or manmade disasters or non-notice
events such as the terrorist act.
Regarding the goal oriented rationality in the case of involvement of military in the regime
change, Boniface (2004) opines that military action to change regime must be implemented
with a minimum of force and have a reasonable chance of attaining its goals. Indicating the
case of Iraq, he argues, although disarmament could have been perceived to be possible through
diplomatic means, regime change - to liberate Iraqi people from an oppressive dictator and
a stifling economic & social structure was a more efficient way to settle war to a reluctant
international audience, justifying the military involvement in Iraq war.
The phases of Regime Change & Military Role
10. The regional upheavals and the system of governance in reference to the specific interval
of time calibrated by the world's great incidents provide the ground for identifying the phases
of the regimes. As Owen (2010) in 'The Clash of the Ideas in politics' clearly put it:
"Three long waves of forcible regime promotion is depicted, and these roughly
correspond to three long transnational contest over the best regime. The first wave
took place in Central and Western Europe between the 1520s and early eighteenth
century and pitted established Catholicism against various forms of Protestantism.
The second took place in Europe and the Americas between the 1770s and late
nineteenth century; the regimes in questions were republicanism, constitutional
monarchy, and absolute monarchy. The third took place over most of the world
between the late 1910s and 1980s, and the antagonists were, communism, liberalism
and (Until 1945) fascism. Today, a fourth struggle runs through the Muslim world,
a struggle pitting secularism against various forms of Islamism. It is that struggle
that helped Bush administration into using force in Iraq and Afghanistan."
7

8
9

10

11

Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams and Stephen J. Cimbala. (2008). US National Security.New Delhi: Viva
Books
Samuel P. Huntington.(1957).The soldier and The State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor .(2006).The US Military Professional into the 21st Century: War, Peace and
politics. New York: Routledge.
Sam C.Sakesian, John Allen Williams, and Fred B.Bryant.(1995). Soldiers, Society and national Security.Boulder:
LynneRienner publishers
Paul Shemella(2006) in Thoms C. Bruneau and Scott. D Tollefson edited'Who Guards the Guardians and How,' justify
collective armed forces and relative to nonmilitary instruments so governmental power as macro roles and micro roles
determines national security organizations will be used relative to one another.
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11. Doorenspleet (2006) considering the democracy as the major variable has explored the
six temporal phases of regime change with the demarcation of each phase as wave:
Table: 1. Waves of Democratization in reference to Regime Change
Time
period

Phases /Waves

1893-1924 First Wave of democratization

First Reverse Wave (the Rise of
ideologies of communism and
1924-1944
fascism and Regime changes to
authoritarianism)
Second Wave of Democratization
(Installation of democratic
1944-1957 institutions in west Germany
, Japan and Finland by allied
power in world war II)

Major changes
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Poland, New Zealand
introduced democratic political system.
Democratic institutions in Poland, Latvia, and
Estonia overthrown by military coups.

Latin American States of Costa Rica, Chile and

Uruguay adopted democratic system

Chilean democracy overthrown by a military group

led in 1973 by General Augusto Pinochet followed
by seventeen years repressive rule by a rightist
military regime; military coup ended democracy
in Uruguay in 1973; A military coup toppled the
government in Argentina in 1976.
Military withdrawal and elections in 1979 produced
1976-1989 Third wave of democratization a civilian government in Ecuador; Civilian president
was elected in Peru in 1980.
Hungary moved to democracy in 1990. In 1990s,
Emergence of more than dozen democracies in
1989-2001 Fourth wave of democratization Africa, but eighteen transitions back to nondemocratic
regimes including military coup in Gambia in 1994.
Nepal, towards democracy in 1990

Intermezzo(No consolidation
of second reverse wave and no
1957-1976 clear group of transitions from
democratic to non-democratic
regimes)

Source: Compiled based on Doorenspleet(2006) and Huntington (1957)

12. In, South Asia, Pakistan, few years after its formation, experienced the regime change
and the ripple effect exists till today. In 1958, IskandarMirza introduced martial Law in the
country dissolving assemblies. Due to the general election followed by bloody civil war in
1970 and the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. The military was discredited and Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto with democratic features came into power.
13. The Middle East that seemed immune to change and the fourth democratic wave did
not engulfIraq, Iran, Kuwait and Libya, has experienced a great debacle in the year2011.The
professional duty of unified army in the cases of regime change is appreciated if the army is
'in the regime' but not 'of the regime' as the armies of Tunisia and Egypt in the Arab Uprising
of 2011. Objecting the politico-economic motive behind the military quest for power, Shasank
Joshi, an associate in Royal United Service Institute in London, says-"it's impossible to predict
how an army will react in a revolutionary situation based on its role in the economy. Money
alone might not be enough motivation to dump a ruler; Tunisia's army did not have a large
independent stake in the economy.12
12

See, "want regime Change? Win over the Military" by Alan Greenblatt 2011, available at www.npr.org.
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Regime Changes in Nepal

14. State is not a constant phenomenon but is ready to accept potential challenges at any
time. Social integration and creation of disruptive force, construction of new identities and
contradictions, frictions, conflict are experienced in the history of the state formation process
followed by political transitions.
15. During the period of 1769 to 1951, Monarchy and Rana Regime prevailed in Nepal, with
now and then contradictions in acquiring the legitimate authorities, the period ranging from
prior to the first wave of democratization to the just before the emergence of second wave of
democratization. The internal tension within the monarch as an institution was evident after
1816, and the 'very power of monarchy as a military leader had been curbed'13 and RanaFamily
became the hereditary prime ministers and de facto head of the state. Control over the military,
religious sanction to support military oligarchy through caste system, contiguity to the BritishIndian authority, were the important factors for the survivals of Rana Regime which ended
in 1951 due to elite rebellion, military support and a compromise between monarchy and the
emerging political apparatus14.
16. In the transition from democracy to Panchayat regime the national army as a source
of political power was again the opportunity instrument for King Mahendra who took the
advantage over Congress Regime15.
17. The rise of parliamentary democracy in opposition to thePanchayatSystem in 1990, has
an international influence during which the upsurge in Philippines to topple Marcos in 1986,
death of Zia UlHaq in Pakistan, and struggle against General Ershad were the major incidents
that fostered the concept of democratic diffusion beside the peoples quest for civil, political
and socio-economic rights.
18. Many argue that the supremacy of king over the control of army as supreme commander
in chief, fuelled rise of absolute monarchy after the Royal coup of 1st February 2005. But
after 1990's the rise of political violence (Especially after the launch of armed conflict by CPN
(Maoist) in February, 1996) and legitimacy gap were deepening, which became the conducive
environment for the royal coup.
19. The comprehensive Peace Accord signed between the government of Nepal and CPN
(Maoist) in Nov 21, 2006, institutionalized the transitional phase towards Federal Republic of
Nepal, with the series of events - April movement in 2005, suspension of the Monarch by the
reinstated parliament and the declaration of end of monarchy by the first meeting of constituent
assembly in June 2008. During these periods, however wide and skeptically anticipated suspect
of the use of military force for the atrocities were limited.
20. After the declaration of Federal Republic, in the transitional phase, Nepal experienced
a huge change in all the sectors, however, religious disharmony, ethnic resentment, rise of
regional sentiments, political criminalization of youths, rise of impunity,degrading confidence
13
14

15

AliRiaz and SubhoBasu.(2010).Paradize Lost? New Delhi: Adarsha Books.

Regarding the military role in the regime change in 1951 in Nepal, Ali Riaz and SubhoBasu in 'Paradise Lost?
(2010)'state "military confrontations sparked off political uprising in hills. Political toll took its toll on the army. Local
commanders opposed the government moves.A series of regions slipped out of government control.Low level military
officials resigned their commissions in the protest and troops were beginning to surrender to the rebels."
Nepali Congress secured 74 seats out of 109- member parliament in the parliamentary election of 1959 and led the
government.
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of peoples towards the political institutions all of which are the national security threats are
the exposed challenges for the national stability. In this very time the professional national
army, (changed from Royal Nepal Army to Nepal Army now) has experienced the great
institutional shock due to the political interference, especially after the CPN (Maoist) led the
government. The attempt of the Prime ministerPushpa Kamal Dahal, to dismiss army chief
RukmagatKatuwal in 2009, became the historic incident in the 'Pseudo-Civilian control'16 in
the history of regime changes since scholars often focus the role of military as an actor, but in
this case military as the 'sufferer'.
21. The Nepal Army, passing through the critical situation in the post conflict transition phase,
has a long history which was massively restructured in 1955, after the political transformation
of 1950, brought the change in the system of control, mobilization and management of Nepal
army17. The reinstated parliament replaced the army act 1959, with New Army Act 2006 which
has provisioned the army to be controlled, mobilized and managed under the representatives
of the people.
22. The regime change is followed by the replacement of one established legitimate authority
and always the replacing one possessesthe quest to get the legitimacy. On the Weberian concept
of authority the sovereign authority rests upon the three major grounds 1) the traditional, resting
on belief in the sanctity of custom and inheritance, 2) based on the charismatic principles,
resting on devotion to the heroic leader or 3) it can be based on rational grounds, resting
on a belief in the authorities of those who have risen to power through tested competence18.
In the Nepalese Context, all the legitimizing ways are found to be practiced with military
the consistent force not a constant just as a technical instrument but rather a techno-political
body. It's not the base of legitimizing authority that triggered the replacement of one regime
since the sovereign monopoly is valid. And at each time the role and duty of national army
became to obey the order of legitimate authority based on the Webarian authority. Moreover,
the authorities share the common socio-political pool including the security tools of the state
such as military.
23. The notion of sovereign states emerged in the mid fourteenth century followed by the
assumption on the equality of every state after a hundred years of time, now, has become a
question of preference due to the military, economic, political and cultural dimensions of
globalism. And, also the state affairs prioritized for human security play the crucial role.
The military occupation in the cold war era, compelled to pursue the interest of polarizing
powers, indulged in the promotion of regime changes in the satellite countries posing the
question to the sovereign monopoly. After the end of cold war, a number of underdeveloped
countries experienced civil strife, creating a challenging environment for the national armies,
to combat the rise of internal instability-either to back the ruler manipulating the sovereign
monopoly or to support the various interest groups opposing the established regime.In these
two dimensions, National Army, confessing sovereign monopoly as a moral power, especially
in the weak states, is often expected to be the keen observer and professional actor during the
period of regime changes for the consolidation of civil-military relation.
16

17

18

since, CPN (Moist) as a political party with its simple majority in the constituent assembly held maoist combatants as its
own "Maoist Army" while Pushma Kamal Dahal, Maoist Supremo, was elected as prime minister of Nepal, the situation
can be compared to the gray zone somewhere in between the subjective and objective control of Huntington.
NarahariAcharya.(2009)."The Nepalese Army". In Bishnusapkota (ed.), The Nepal Security Sector: An Almanac.
Hungary: Brambeur.
Max Weber. (1947)"The Theory of Social and Economic organization", Talcott Parson (ed,), A.M. Hendersor and
Talcott Parsons (trans.). Free Press, Glencor, III
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References
1. Acharya, N. (2009). "The Nepalese Army". In Bishnusapkota (ed.), The Nepal Security
Sector: An almanac. Hungary: Brambuer.
2. Boniface, P.(2004). "What Justifies Regime Change?" In Alexander T J Lennon and
Camille Eiss (eds.), Reshaping Rouge States. London: The MIT Press.
3. Dahl, R. A.(1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Oppposition. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
4.

Doorenspleet, R.(2006). Democratic Transitions. New Delhi: Viva Books.

5. Fenema, P.C.(2010). "Military organizations and National Crisis Response." In Joseph

Soeters, Paul C. van Fenema and Robert Beeres (eds.), Managing Military organizations. New
York: Routledge.
6. Greenblatt, A.(2011). "Want Regime Change? Win Over the Military".Available at
www.npr.org.
7.

Huntington, S.(1957). The Soldier and The State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

8. Murray, W. (2011). War Strategy and Military Effectiveness. New York: Cambridge
University press.
9. O' Donnel. (1979). Modernization and Bureacratic-Authoritarianism-Studies in the
South American Politics.Berkely: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
10. Owen, J.M.(2010). The Clash of Ideas in World Politics. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
11. Poud, E.(2006). End Game in the Balkans. Washington: the Brookings Institution.
12. Rawal, P.(2011)."Upholding Civil Military Relation: An analytical Study in Nepalese
Context," M.A. Dissertation, Tribhuvan University Nepal.
13. Riaz, A. and Basu, S.(2010). Paradise Lost?New Delhi: Adarsha Books.
14. Sarkesian, Williams and Cimbala.(2008). US National Security. New Delhi: Viva
Books.
15. Shemella, P. (2006). "The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces."In
Thomas C. Bruneau and S.D. Tollefson (eds.), Who Guards the Guardians and How. Austin:
University of Texas Press.
16. Uprety, B.R. and Vanhoutte, P. (2009). "Security Sector Reform in Nepal: Challenges
and Opportunuties." In Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), Security sector Reform in
Challenging Environments. USA: Transaction Publishers.
17. Williams, W.C.andPiotrowsky, H. (2009). The World since 1945. New Delhi: Viva books.

It is fatal to enter a war without the will to win it.

- General Douglas MacArthur

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Mahashivaratri
- Kumari Dikshya Gurung
Shree Maa-Guru Naari Samuha
"Janani Nanma Bhumishcha Swarga Dapi Gari Yashi"
1.
The Motherland is better than even Heaven confirms Bhagwan Ramchandra, and Nepal
being our motherland we definitely think it is better than the Heaven. Loving one's motherland
isn't enough, it doesn't clear the debt owed to her by an individual. Once an individual is born
he or she breathes the air, drinks the water and eats the food grown in its soil thus this debt
towards the motherland has to be cleared before one's death.
2.
One sure way of clearing the debt to the motherland is reciting the following shloka
at least once a day, "Om Mahitale Dushkritaam Raasthra Mewa Rakshaka Chhaya
Namaha". It means protect the Nation from the evil and bad thoughts. This solely doesn't
apply to Nepal but to other countries also. Nepal is a land of many temples, stupas, customs,
culture, traditions and many festivals of both Hindus and Buddhists. Nepal is renowned over
the world by Mount Everest, the brave Gurkhas, birthplace of Lord Buddha and of course
Shre Pashupatinath. Pashupatinath is the temple of Lord Shiva, the Destroyer of evil and the
protector of good. Maha Shivaratri the day of birth of Lord Shiva is one of the main festivals
of the year.
3.
Pashupatinath the temple of Lord Shiva is one of the four holiest shrines for the
millions of Hindus in the world, Many Hindus visit Pashupatinath during Maha Shivaratri.
Pashupatinath is considered as the Head and Kedarnath as the lower potation of the body. And
rightfully the Nepali Army celebrates Maha Shivaratri as the Army day by holding a parade of
conducting fue-de-joi at Tundikhel, centre of Kathmandu.
4.
Lord Shiva, one of the triumvirates of the Hindus was worshipped in these areas even
before the advent of the Hindus in the region. He was worshipped by the locals as the God of
the Animals. And now all the Nepalese and the Hindus believe that Lord Shiva is the destructor
and he specially destroys all the evil, hatred, jealousy, anger etc from the society and from
the person as well. People set fire to logs hoping to wipe off the evil in them as DHUNI and
celebrate Lord Shiva's birthday whole night.
5.
Nepal is definitely a land of many temples, culture and festivals. Festivals of other
religions too are celebrated along with the Hindus and their shrines are placed side by side
without any conflict. The Buddhists visit Hindu temples and the Hindus too light lamps at the
Buddhist monasteries. All the important temples of Nepal are represented within the premises
of Pashupatinath Temple which is located at the bank of river Bagmati near the international
Airport of Kathmandu, the Capital of Nepal.
6.
The Shiva Linga of Pashupatinath has five faces representing the five elements
constituting this universe. The Southern face known as Aghor face of Guru-Mukh is also
decorated as Lord Buddha and the Buddhists worship it once a year. Unfortunately our society
is changing so much that the newer generation is slowly forgetting old customs, culture and
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traditions. Nepalese are forgetting the meaning of Ekadashi, Aunshi and even Satya Narayan
Puja. So much so that even making of Selroti is being forgotten. And Panch Bali is fast
disappearing to the delight of the animal lovers.
7.
Culture, customs, traditions etc are the identity of any nation. And the Nepali Army is not
only preserving the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the nation but also preserve its
traditions, culture and customs. Kaalratri is fast disappearing from the society but is followed
strictly by the military. Satya Narayan Puja and Ekadashi are strictly observed by the Army.
8.
Dashain and Maha-Shivaratri are two important festivals of the millions of Nepalese
and the Nepalese Army celebrates both in a big way. Maha-Shivaratri is celebrated as the day
of birth of Lora Shiva and he is considered as the preserver of the faith and the destroyer of all
evils. Similarly the Nepalese Army is considered as the preserver of the independence of the
nation and its culture and customs too.
9.
Thus it seems just appropriate that the Nepalese Army adopt Maha-Shivaratri as the
Army Day and celebrate it in a big way. Along with preserving the sovereignty, integrity and
the independence of the nation the army is also the protector of traditions, customs and the
culture of the country. And the reciting of the above shloka will also definitely help in making
the motherland a heaven.

The art of concentrating strength at one point, forcing a

breakthrough, rolling up and securing the flanks on either
side, and then penetrating like lightning deep into his rear,
before the enemy has time to react.
- FM Erwin Rommel

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Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel (18911944)

- Maj Pawan Khatri

Introduction
1.
Rommel stands out amongst the World War II generals as a tremendous personality,
possibly the greatest of them all. Sir Winston Churchill while paying tributes to him in the
house of common at the beginning of disastrous moments of 1942 said, We have a very daring
sharp opponent against us in Africa and may I say, across the havoc of war, a great general.
Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, in his book on the German Generals of World War -II, says, They
were the best finished products of their profession anywhere. They could have been better if
their outlook had been wider and their understanding deeper. But if they have had become
philosophers they would have ceased to be soldiers. These words of Sir Basil Liddell-Hart in
which he opines about them as excellent products of their profession, and at the same time
lacking wisdom, are understandable. The problem with German generals, of lacking wider
horizons does not stem from any absence of mental ability or inadequate education, but far
more than from their training in accordance with certain traditions and conditions prevailing
at that time in Germany. The great Rommel can be termed, one out of many, an exception that
was marvelous warrior and man of vision. But at the same time, the aftermath of the wars,
he fought challenges both his being excellent product of profession and possessing wider
horizon.

Prevalent Environment of the Era (Military and Political Aspects)

G r e a t
Wars. The era primarily witnessed mass transformation of both tactical and technical.
Transition to third generation of warfare was hallmark of the era. Trench warfare was replaced
by maneuver warfare. Greater emphasis was laid on the combine employment of various
echelon i.e. tanks, arty and air etc.

2.

3.

Contributions to the Art of War

(a)
Blitzkrieg, (German, "lightning war") An anglicized word describing allmechanize force concentration of tanks, infantry, arty and air power, concentrating
overwhelming force and rapid speed to break through enemies lines, and once the latter
is broken, proceeding without regard to its flank.
(b)

Attack by Erwin Rommel.

(c)

The Rommel Papers (Da Capo Paperback) by Erwin Rommel.

4.
Displayed Leadership Attributes and Skills His sense of valor and chivalry were
the stuff of King Arthur's knights, but it was his "boldness, use of surprise, readiness to
accept risks" and above all his "intuitive sense of the Battle field" that made Rommel one
of the greatest generals in military history. "Brilliantly successful in attack and remarkably
resourceful in defense, "the" Desert Fox raced his armies through France in 1940 and then
repeatedly outwitted the British in North Africa.

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5.

Decisive Military Achievements or Failures

(a)

(b)

6.

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World War I
(i)

First Battle of the Argonne (1915)

(ii)

Carpathian Offensive (1915)

(iii)

Battle of Caporetto (1917)

World War II
(i)

Fall of France

(ii)

Battle of Arras (1940)

(iii)

North African Campaign

(aa)

Siege of Tobruk (1941)

(ab)

Operation Crusader (1941)

(ac)

Battle of Gazala (1942)

(ad)

Battle of Bir Hakeim (1942)

(ae)

First Battle of El Alamein (1942)

(af)

Battle of Alam Halfa (1942)

(ag)

Second Battle of El Alamein (1942)

(ah)

Battle of Medenine (1943)

(iv)

Battle of the Kasserine Pass (1943)

(iv)

Battle of Normandy (1944)

Significant Strengths and Weaknesses of Personality

(a)
Chivalrous A mans action and omissions spring first and foremost from his char
and to a lesser degree, from his origins, his upbringing, and his training. Rommel, who
belonged to a middle class family which had no military background and at the same
time no military aspirations. The way he fought battles starting from his early military
life till his death is full of such events where he exhibited symptoms of gallantry. As
a platoon Commander in 1914, he assaulted twenty French troops with three persons
from his platoon, which he found barring their way. He was repulsed, but this instant
reaction to finding himself in the tight corner was one, which he demonstrated time and
again. The campaigns thereafter are full of examples with his being brave. Some of the
examples are: (i)

World War-1 Battle of Caporetto Pour le Merite.

(ii)

World War-II French Campaign 1940.

(iii)

Battle of Gazala.

(v)

Retreat of German Army from Al-Alemin.

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(b)
Enjoyed Zealous Cooperation from his Under command The perfect
fighting animal described by Desmoned Young in his biography, enjoyed a willing
execution of his orders from his subordinates. He was not at all a Commander who
due to some reconciliation on professional matters would earn the repute. Basic reason
why he enjoyed willing cooperation was his being always with his troops and that too
in front. Although there were occasions when he was away from the front, when his
troops were fighting (celebrating marriage anniversary with his wife in Italy). Another
reason is that he used to take same food as his troops. Even a great critic Wolf Heckman
acknowledged in his preface to book Rommels War in Africa writes certainly, he had
unusual qualities, from personal courage and toughness to a gift for inspiring utterly
spent troops to perform unbelievable feats, (But that was not the whole Rommel).
Even in his own article on the rules of Desert Warfare writes The Commander -in-chief
must have contact with his troops. He must be able to feed and think with them. The
soldier must have confidence in him. In this connection there is one cardinal principle
to remember: one must never simulate a feeling for the troops which in fact one does
not have. The ordinary soldier has a surprisingly good nose for what is genuine and
what is fake. At another place Liddle Hart writes, Exasperating to his Staff Officers,
he was worshipped by his fighting troops.
(c) Loyalty
Here I will not pronounce that he was loyal to objective every time
ordained by his superior, but if I say that what so ever he conceived to be true, pursued
very vividly without any hesitation. He himself writes in his paper the Rules of Desert
Warfare that Normally, there is no ideal solution to military problem, every course
has its advantages and disadvantages. One must select that which seems best from the
most varied aspects and then pursue it resolutely and accept the consequences. Any
compromise is bad. North African campaign is full of such examples such as: (i)

Offensive 1941.

(ii)

Advance after capture of Tobruk.

(d)
Sincerity to German Cause
He was always, very sincere to Germany,
his Fatherland. He always had the national objective in mind and acted to his best
ability. His plan to cross Suez and through Persia reach Soviet Union can be termed
as sincerity towards German nation. His wisdom, ambitions can be questioned but
sincerity to country cannot. He chose, Germany against his master i.e. Hitler, when he
came to know that Hitlers ambitions and Planning will end up in harming the Germany
instead of benefiting, due to this he had to commit suicide and forced to do that. Liddle
Hart in his book the German generals talk in chapter Soldier in the Sun writes, when
Rommel came to see that Hitlers survival and Germanys survival were in compatible
he put his country first and turned against his Pattern.
(e)
How Enemy Viewed Him
Letter of Gen Auchinleck to his subordinate
commanders is an evident, of what type of general, Rommel was: To: All Commanders and Chiefs of Staff
From: Headquarter, British Troops in Egypt and Middle East, Force.
There exists a real danger that our friend Rommel is becoming a kind of magician or
bogeyman to our troops, who are talking far too much about him. He is by no means
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a superman, although he is undoubtedly very energetic and able. Even if he were a

superman, it would still be highly undesirable that our men should not credit him with
supernatural powers. I wish you to dispel by all possible means the idea that Rommel
represents something more than an ordinary German general. The important thing now
is to see it that we do not always talk of Rommel when we mean the enemy in Libya
we must refer to the German or the axis powers or the enemy and not always
keep harping on Rommel. Please ensure that this order is put into immediate effect, and
impress upon all commanders that, from a psychological point of view, it is a matter of
the highest importance.
7.
Relevance of Concepts/Principles/Techniques of Warfare in Current Environment
Blitzkrieg is still relevant and was adopted by many countries. For instance, India had adopted
Blitzkrieg as the main strategy for fighting a conventional war with Pakistan before they
introduced strategy of Pro-Active Operation (PAO). In short Rommel's boldness and aggressive
attitude regarding the trait(s) of personality that still inspire the present soldiers.
References
1.

Wikipedia.

2.

Encyclopedia Encarta.

3.

Encyclopedia Britannica

4.
Fraser, David (1994). Knight's Cross: A Life of FM Erwin Rommel. New York, NY:
HarperCollins. ISBN 0-06-092597-3.
5.
Lewin, Ronald (1998) [1968]. Rommel as Mil Comd. New York: B&N Books. ISBN 07607-0861-4.

Discipline is simply the art of making the soldiers fear

their officers more than the enemy.
- Helvetius

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The Relation between Information Warfare and

Insurgency
- Lt Col Lalit Bahadur Kunwar
"The conventional army losses if it does not win.
The Guerilla wins if he does not loose."
- Henry Kissinger
Introduction
1.
The emergence of war in the information spectrum quantitatively adds new means
for destroying adversary target systems as well as disrupting any kind of operation. Future
Information Warfare (IW) could encompass cyber war (planting of viruses into computer
system), media warfare and electronic warfare (electric destruction of electromagnetic systems).
Information combat could be waged against an adversary's leadership. Likewise, Information
Warfare admits of the concept of Superiority. One side in a conflict may have better access to
information than the other. The former is likely to have more sensors in better places, more
powerful collection and analytical machines and a more reliable process for turning data into
information and information into decisions.1
2.
Thomas Rona, an early proponent of Information Warfare, offered the following definition
on Information Warfare: The strategic, operational, and tactical level competition across the
spectrum of peace, crisis, crisis escalation, conflict, war, war termination, and reconstitution/
restoration, waged between competitors, adversaries or enemies using information means
to achieve their objectives.2 Information Warfare, in its largest tense, is simply the use of
information to achieve our national objectives. Like diplomacy, economic competition, or
the use of military force, information in itself is a key aspect of national power and more
importantly, is becoming an increasingly vital national resources that supports diplomacy,
economic competition and the effective employment of military forces. IW in this sense can
be seen as societal-level or nation to nation conflict waged, in part, through the worldwide
intermitted and interconnected means of information and communication.3
3.
The present day conflict is more of an asymmetric in nature and heavily relies on
information dimension. The insurgents use information as a major tool to achieve their ends
and quite aptly update themselves with the latest updates in the innovations in the field of
information technology and use it in the best possible manner to serve their interests. This
article intends to focus on the relationship between the Information Warfare and Insurgency.
The Importance of Information Warfare
4.
The term Information Warfare is primarily an American concept involving the use
and management of information technology in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an
opponent. Information warfare may involve collection of tactical information, assurance(s)
that one's own information is valid, spreading of propaganda or disinformation to demoralize
or manipulate the enemy and the public, undermining the quality of opposing force information
and denial of information-collection opportunities to opposing forces. In addition, IW can
take many forms:
1

Martin C. LIbicki ;What is information Warfare?; August 1995, p.94

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(a)

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Television and radio transmission(s) can be jammed.

(b)
Television and radio transmission(s) can be hijacked for a disinformation
campaign.
(c)

Logistics networks can be disabled.

(d)

Enemy communications networks can be disabled or spoofed.

(e)
Stock exchange transactions can be sabotaged, either with electronic intervention,
leaking sensitive information or placing disinformation.
5.
The significance of IW cannot be undermined both in conventional and unconventional
forms of war. Electronic means of combat in IW potentially will enable a sophisticated power
to effectively neutralize an opponent without necessarily inflicting physical destruction upon
the opponent s forces, infrastructure and population.4 The insurgents can use this technique of
IW in the 21st century. The IW can provide insurgents with substantively enlarged options for
waging their conflict for the following reasons:(a)
IW attacks can occur across globe and can originate from almost any location of
the world (possibility from sky also) by using satellite.
(b)
The IW capabilities are inherently mobile due to advent of increasing powerful
laptop computers, modems and personal satellite communications services.
(c)
The IW attacks are difficult to detect. Targets of information warfare attacks
may not be aware of identity of their adversary or even that they are under attack.
Technological Trends in IW
7.
Several new technological trends, insofar as IW is concerned, are emerging. The
knowledge on these technologies are relevant for the study of their possible impact, when
used by the security forces or by insurgents, these may be;
(a)

Internet

(b)

Remote securing from space

(c)

Predator, Drones and UAV

(d)

Sensors

(e)

Robotics

(f)

Other new technology

Internet
8.
The development of the Internet has dramatically increased global access to information.
Internet access is now available in most of the countries and the number of individual users
has reached several hundred millions. Now a days, it is possible to link into the internet from
2

Martin C. LIbicki ;What is information Warfare?; p.4

Gorge J.stoin; cyber war: Security, strategy and conflict in the information age; August 1995 , p.4

Gorge J.stoin; cyber warfare: Security, strategy and conflict in the information age. August 1995; p.282
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anywhere in the world with laptop, modem, mobile phone and other equipments. The Internet
has already played a key role in rallying international condemnation of Tiename Square
Massacre in China, international attention on alleged Serbian Military atrocities in former
Yugoslavia and also focusing international attention on Sudan, Egypt, and Tunisia, similarly
now on Syria, Afghanisthan, Yemen,Pakistan and Libya. The internet can be beneficial for
the government in the following ways:(a)
Intelligence Gathering and Sharing Analysis of internet messages traffic
could reveal valuable indicators. The government authority can be alerted about the
emerging crises. States can also share information about insurgent group operating
across their national boundaries.
(b)
Psychological Operators The Internet could be used by government as an
additional medium for conducting psychological operators and propaganda campaign
as required by the nations.
(c)
Gaining International Support for the State Internet could be used to help
generate international support for the states if the latter can make its case strong during
the crises. Such as, 657 Bangladeshi border guards who challenged the government in
a deadly 2009 mutiny ( 74 people killed most of them were commanding officers) have
been sentenced to up to seven years in prison.
(d)
Communication Connecting to Security Forces Military Forces can greatly
benefit from the ability to download and upload important information or encrypted
internet pathway.
9.
However, the benefits that are accrued by the insurgent group or any agitating mass
from the IT are also significant. There are a number of reasons to believe that the internet could
bring about a revolutionary shift in power, away from the authority of the state, as has been
seen in the Arab countries recently. The following reasons make the IT fully exploited by the
insurgent groups.
(a)
User Friendly Icon-based "point and click" interfaces allow the internet to be
used by every individual with the little technical training. Insurgent group will face a
relatively small learning curve in becoming sophisticated exploiters of the internet if
they are not sharing knowledge with IT people. Likewise, state bureaucracies doing
business may have a difficult time adapting to the new era of computer age.
(b)
Easy access to specialized information The internet contains a wealth of
information on almost any topics which any individual can access to. This includes the
knowledge on making Improvised Explosive Devices, chemical and biological weapon
and capabilities of different weapon system.
(c)
Easy access to a mass audience With commercially available bulk electronic
mailboxes around the world at the punch of single button, a leader of an ideological
insurgency for instance, can draft manifests and sends them to millions of potential
sympathizers on the internet.
(d)
Immediacy of mobilization Insurgents are able to spread their words and
mobilize popular support now a days by the mean of internet for instance, in the midst
of conflict vides footage of a state military operations could be captured by hand held
cameras-operated by non-state actors, then transformed into digital data files and then
uploaded into the global information flow, reaching millions of people in a matter of
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seconds. Public opinion and calls for action may be formed before national leaders have
a chance to react to the situation.
(e)
Minimum Infrastructure One needs a laptop computer or mobile set and
an account with an Internet provider to operate in cyber space from any corner of
building.
(f)
The message always gets through With literally millions of point of entry
and even more transmission paths, it will be very difficult for states to interdict
communication on the internet. Even if the state cut off the phone and mail services of
whole civilian doing that time also few individual with internet access will be able to
use electronic mail to communicate with the outside world.
Remote Serving from Spaces
10.
The ability to conduct Remote Serving of Military- relevant terrestrial objects from
space was essentially the exclusive preserve of the USA and former USSR from the early
1960s to early 1980s. Slowly, other states recognized the value of space-based remoteserving and developed indigenous programs. In 1968, France offered to sell medium-to high
resolution image on the open market from its satellite "Pour 1", observation de la Terra, or
"Spot" satellite program. Since that time a number of other commercial providers of spacebased Remote sensing products have entered the industry. It is estimated that more than 30
nations have indigenous Remote sensing industries including India, Pakistan, Japan, Canada,
Brazil, Israel, Italy, South Korea, Spain, Germany, Britain, USA, China, Russia, France,
and the UAE. Every developed country is heading towards to produce such Remote sensors
technologies in a very innovative way. In addition to the burgeoning number of suppliers of
satellite imaginary services, market forces have also resulted in a trend toward progressively
higher resolution and more timely imagery and products being offered for sale. Powerful
laptop computer will be able to access the internet to download, store, process and interpret
satellite imagery. Access to high-resolution imagery will benefit insurgent by making it easier
to locate and attack high pay-off targets such as state-controlled communication nodes, critical
state-owned infrastructure or military installation.
Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
11.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are aircrafts that can be flown remotely by specially
trained operators or pre-programmed to fly missions autonomously. Owing partly to their
relatively small sizes and in some cases, high attitude, UAVs can loiter over specified areas
for extended period of time and provide contemnors, real time, high resolution imagery from
a wide range of on-board sensors. NATO forces especially American are using UAVs in
Afghanistan destroying targets of military values. Insurgents could gain access to range of
UAVs capabilities. Loitering UAVs would provide a valuable complement to space basedremote sensing in locating, tracking and attacking security forces operating in the specific
area.
12.
United States intelligence officials call unmanned aerial vehicles, often referred to as
drones, their most effective weapon against Al Qaeda. The remotely piloted planes are used to
transmit live video from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan to American forces, and to carry out
air strikes. More C.I.A. drone attacks have been conducted under President Obama than under
President George W. Bush. One of Washington's worst-kept secrets, the drone program is
quietly hailed by counterterrorism officials as a resounding success, eliminating key terrorists
and throwing their operations into disarray. But despite close cooperation from Pakistani
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intelligence, the program has generated public anger in Pakistan, and some counterinsurgency
experts wonder whether it does more harm than good. The UAVs are mostly used by NATO
forces to destroy insurgents hide outs on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Sensors
13.
A number of technological development in area such as sensor effectiveness, artificial
intelligence, robotics, micro-electromagnetical system, light weight composites, high intensity
energy storage have enabled the development of a broad range of sensor systems which are
likely to have important implications for insurgency operation, as they reach operational
maturity in the coming years. They include: 5
(a)
Pocket sized" UAVs (about 15cm) Carried by individual soldiers for tactical
surveillance (eg- identifying that is over the next hill or next building or next block or
next city etc), communication and possibly even destroying target, also.
(b)
Air dropped, inexpressive unattended grounded sensor net races These are
designed to monitor friendly territory for adversary locations (physical or electronics)
as well as detect, identify and track any vehicles or personnel.
(c)
Man Portable synthetic aperture radar system These are able to "see-through
wall and characterize objects and peoples inside any type of buildings.
(d)
Autonomous micro-robots These are capable of disguised as common insects
or debris (eg bottle cap, cob, web etc) and also capable of providing reconnaissance
and surveillance within closed structures, attacking electronic equipments and killing
humans which match their pre-programmed attack profile.
(e)
Robotics
Now emerging as a military technology of great importance for
the coming decades is robotics. On land, robotics can create an unsleeping sentry
with an infinite attention span, perfect night vision and no interest in military payer
benefits. Robotic vehicles can be sent on suicide missions behind enemy lines, and
lie indefinitely in undetectable ambush they will be far smaller than manned vehicles.
Also their small size will make the army more mobile. In the nearer term; robotics can
provide an efficient autoloader for a future tanks gun.
5

Christy Campbell; Understanding Military Technology,1985; p.24,25

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Other new technology

14.
Electromagnetic Spectrum, Laser, Radio Receiver, Direction Finder, Radar, Tracking
Radar, Radar Guided Missile, Fully Active Missile, Semi-active Missile, Laser Guidance,
Infrared Imaging Guided weapons, Digital Scene Matching, Gyroscopic Guidance, Scud
Guidance, Terrain Contour Matching, Spread Spectrum Technique6 are other new advanced
technologies that are likely to emerge prominently in the field of IW by developed nations in
the days to come. To be precise, there is no limitation in the technological advancement.
Cyber warfare
15.
Cyber warfare has been defined by government security expert Richard A. Clarke,
in his book Cyber War (May 2010), as "actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's
computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption." The Economist
describes cyber warfare as "the fifth domain of warfare," and William J. Lynn, U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense, states that "as a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized
cyberspace as a new domain in warfare . . . (which) has become just as critical to military
operations as land, sea, air, and space." In 2009, President Barack Obama declared Americas
digital infrastructure to be a "strategic national asset," and in May 2010 the Pentagon set up
its new U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), headed by General Keith B. Alexander,
director of the National Security Agency (NSA), to defend American military networks and
attack other countries systems. The United Kingdom has also set up a cyber-security and
"operations centre" based in Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British
equivalent of the NSA. In the U.S. however, Cyber Command is only set up to protect the
military, whereas the government and corporate infrastructures are primarily the responsibility
respectively of the Department of Homeland Security and private companies.

The changing Battle space

16.
The oldest guided weapons, developed soon after the Second World War to attack
aircraft, relied on a radar beam transmitted from a ground-based control unit on which they
could ride towards the target. The latest missiles carry their own active radar transmitter
with which to seek and find the target. A more advanced technology involves guidance by
television.7
6

Air Vice Marshal Vishwa Mohan Tiwari(retd.),Dr.Rajani Kant Tewari; THE HIGH-TECH WAR OF TWENTY
CENTURY; p.268-286
7

David shukman; Tomorrows war;1995;p.149

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17.
Changing information technologies are having a profouned effect on the nature of battle
space. One way to look at the battle space is through the lens of time, of force and of space
.Using this technique we find that traditional notion of time, space and force have changed
forever. Time has been compressed, space has been distorted and expanded, and our notion of
force will have to change8.
18.
The elite US Navy SEALs team used top secret stealth helicopters to swoop down on
an unsuspecting al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in his Abbottabad safe heaven and shoot
him dead on May 2, 2011. The live telecast of the raid on building of Osama bin Laden was
observed by US President Barak Obama and other members of security advisor at White House,
USA. Before carrying out raid, CIA has kept continuous surveillance to the Laden building of
Abbottabad (Pakistan) from August 2010 by using infra red equipment, sophisticated camera,
listening system including 36 satellites.

Conclusion
19.
In future insurgency, insurgents or any revolutionary groups is likely to exploit many
of the emerging technologies of 21st century which are already introduced by the developed
nations. If this becomes true then it is certain that future counterinsurgency operations will
increase substantially in intensity and lethality. The insurgents have become resolute, skillful
and tenacious. Acquisitions of remote control for activities of IEDs, sophisticated weapons
and modem communication systems used by insurgents have added a new dimension in the
counter insurgency operation.
20.
However, state will not have exclusive access to these technologies. Many sophisticated
means of information warfare are likely to become available in either the open or black market
of any corner of the world. Information warfare can reach to combatant across great distances
and over large population. We stand today at the new technological edge of information
revolution involving the Military for a challenging and uncertain future. The demand of
the new era for any army of the world is acquire information of insurgents, apply advanced
information warfare technology in their respective military organization, make a sound IW
policy and ultimately destroy the insurgents.
21.
We, as a security forces therefore need to continuously review our tactics, drills,
techniques, information technology system and design of our battle to first, counter the
insurgents modes operation and secondly, to be proactive to keep them guessing of our
objectives and intentions for this result, As security forces, we need to have knowledge of new
techniques, apply appropriate means of information systems, train our people in this regard
and implement new technology in the security forces. The security forces of 21st century need
to look at solutions and not the problem.
8

Michael L. brown ; Cyber Warfare: Security, Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age; p.33
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References
Books
1.
Christy Campbell; Understanding Military Technology, 1985. Hamlyn Publishing,
London.
2.
Gorge J.stoin; cyber warfare: Security, strategy and conflict in the information age,
August 1995.
3.
Martin C. LIbicki; what is information Warfare? August 1995. National Defense
University. Washington DC.
4.

David shukman; Tomorrows war;1995. Harcourt Brace & Company, New York.

Michael L. brown ; cyber war: Security, strategy and conflict in the information age.
5.
Air Vice Marshal Vishwa Mohan Tiwari(retd.),Dr.Rajani Kant Tewari; THE HIGHTECH WAR OF TWENTY CENTURY. 1996. Vikas Publishing house, New Delhi
Newspapers
1.

The kathmandu post, June 29,2011, p.5

Websites
1.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_
vehicles/ index. html
2.

http://www.bing.com/search?/Information_warfare

3.

http://www.bing.com/search?Cyberwarfare

4.

http://www.bing.com/search?Cyberwarfare#Cyberwarfare_limitation_treaty

5.

http://www.bing.com/search?q=Military+Cyber+Warfare&FORM=QSRE3

For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is

not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting
is the acme of skill.
- Sun Tzu

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Theories of Clausewitz in the Analysis of Current

War in Afghanistan
- Maj Ranjit Thapa
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adopts its characteristics to the given case. As
a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinitycomposed
of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force;
of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of
its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason
alone.
Carl Von Clausewitz1
Background
1.
The idea of prominent theorists, such as Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz, has
helped to understand and analyze the nature and conduct of war. The idea of Clausewitz gained
wide currency, after his work On War was first published in 1832.2 Clausewitzs many dictum
and rules for winning various types of engagements and battles, are valid and remarkably
similar to those found in the tactical manuals of contemporary armies around the World.3 In
the analysis of the current war in Afghanistan, the idea of Clausewitz has provided a sound
underpinning to truly understand the nature and conduct of war. Drawing extensively on the
various literatures available on Clausewitz, scholarly articles and literatures on the US Armys
current involvement in Afghanistan, this paper attempts to analyze the relevancy of theories of
Clausewitz, especially on means and ways, and friction in war, in the analysis of current war
in Afghanistan.
What is War?
2.
Clausewitz's idea on what is war is very useful because it has helped to understand the true
nature of war in Afghanistan. War is a continuation of policy, carried on with other means.4
The United States Armys involvement in Afghanistan is a means of the Governments policy
on Global War on Terror (GWOT), to maintain global peace. Policy will permeate all military
operations.5 To attain the policy objective, military means are employed to conduct GWOT.
The political leadership should ultimately control and direct the conduct of war. That it is not
to say that it should displace soldiers in the planning and conduct of operations. It should take
care not to ask impossible, and collaborate with the senior commanders in developing overall
1

Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1976), 89.

Ibid. xi.

Stephen L. Melton, The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
(Zenith Press: Minneapolis, 2009), 11.
4

Clausewitz, On War, trans. Colonel J.J Graham (Barnes and Nobel: New York, 2004), 3-4.

M.L.R Smith, Rethinking Nature of War, ed. Duyvesteyn Isabelle and Jan Angstrom (Frank Cass: New York), 33.
Online at <http://www.netlibrary.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/Reader/> (accessed 18 Aug 2010).
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l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

policy.6 The top-level political decision is vital, in terms of timely formulating policies and
strategies, providing clear military objectives, and resources to sustain the war.
the first, the supreme, the most farreaching act of judgment that the statesman
and the commander have to make is to establish The kind of war on which they are
embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into. Something that is alien to
its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.7
3.
The civilian officials are responsible to influence other than the objective condition
on battlefield. The very valid fact is that, military not the transient occupants of high office,
generally bears the heaviest burden during the armed conflict.8 Nevertheless, managing
appropriate resources, funding, and integration of Department of State and other civilian
agencies, to support overall military effort in Afghanistan could be considered as an appropriate
political interest, which validates the idea of Clausewitz"continuation of national policies by
other means."
Means and Ways in War
4.
The ideas of Clausewitz amply resemble in the analysis of the current war in Afghanistan,
because the judgment, to use the military means was carried out by the legitimate political
authority to attain the political objective. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11
attacks, President George W. Bush declared a War on Terror in his September 20, 2001
address to a Joint Session of Congress and American People: Our war on terror begins with
Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach
has been found, stopped and defeated.9 Since 7 October 2001, military means has been
employed, extensively, to fight and destroy the terrorists operating and getting support from
its base in Afghanistan.
5.
The political decision on invasion could be considered correct, and the conduct of
war in Afghanistan has been observed very relevant. According to Clausewitz, one of the
peculiar ways of directly increasing the waste of the enemys force is the invasion, which
is the occupation of the enemys territory not with a view to keeping it, but in order to levy
contribution upon it. The immediate object in such cases is not the conquest of the enemys
territory, nor the defeat of his armed forces, but merely to do him damage in a general way.10
Military Forces in Afghanistan are operating not with the aim of holding territory for a long
time, but taking advantage from those to destroy terrorists' network and bases, which facilitates
in achieving the objective of GWOT.
6

Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University
Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1986), 200.
7

Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Oxford Worlds Classics (Oxford University Press: New
York, 2007), 30.
8

David H. Petraeus, Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam, in H300 Roots of Todays Operational Environment
Syllabus and Book of Readings, (Fort Leavenworth, KS USACGSC, December 2009),H305RC-271.
9

Hall Garner, A Companion to American Military History Volume I, ed. James C. Bradford (WileyBlackwell: MA,
USA, 2010), 298.
10

Clausewitz, On War, Barnes and Nobel Library of Essential Reading, 26.

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6.
Another idea of Clausewitz on means and ways in war is very useful because it has
helped to understand the conduct of war, and its relevancy in Afghanistan. War is an act of
violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.11 The use of force is vital to
destroy the terrorists, their network, and to create an environment non-conducive for terrorists
acts. Violence, a physical force, is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the
enemy will is the ultimate object. To attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and
disarmament becomes therefore the immediate object of hostilities in theory.12 Clausewitz
greatly emphasizes on making enemy defenseless by the optimum use of force. Jan Willem
Honig, a senior lecturer in the department of War Studies at Kings College London, writes:
All soldiers, before and after the war, accepted Clausewitzs logic that defense does
not win wars; if anything, it could invite defeat by leaving the initiative to the enemy.
Today, the same idea inspires the American military doctrine of overwhelming force.
Irrespective of political aims, the US armed forces main strategic preoccupation is with
making their enemies defenseless. The war against Iraq over Kuwait, the war against
Serbia over Kosovo, the final war against Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the war against
Afghanistan, were all fought with the intent to destroy the enemy capacity to resist.13
7.
Ali Ahmad Jalali, a distinguished Professor at the US National Defense University,
writes in a journal of the complex operations, Prism, The new US policy for Afghanistan
and Pakistan aims at disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda in both countries and
preventing its return.14 Due to the extensive military operations in the past 11 years, numbers
of terrorist activity have been reduced, not only in Afghanistan, but also in the other parts of
the World. Statistically, the gradual increase of the boots on ground in Afghanistan from 4,100
in January 2002 to 87,600 in April 2010 is a clear indication of the importance of the use of
force.15 Hence, it validates one of the principles of war of Clausewitzthe concentration of
troops at the decisive point.16 The employment of military to destroy Al Qaeda leader Bin
Laden in May 2011, rather than using other means amply demonstrate the importance of the
use of force, which validates the idea of Clausewitzto destroy the armed power and sources
of strength of the enemy.17 The New York Time writes, The death of Bin Laden marks the
most significant achievement to date in our nations effort to defeat Al Qaeda, and is a defining
moment in the American-led fight against terrorism.18
11

Clausewitz, On War, Oxford Worlds Classics, xxvi.

12

Ibid. 36.

13

Jan Willem Honig, Introduction, On War, Carl Von Clausewitz, trans. Colonel J.J Graham (Barnes and Noble: New
York, 2004), xxi.
14

Ali Ahmad Jalali, Afghanistan: Long-term Solutions and Perilous Shortcuts. Prism, Vol.1, No. 4, (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, September 2010), 57-66.

15

Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11, Prepared for
Members and Committee of Congress (Congressional Research Service 7-5700: US), 38-39. Online at <http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf> (accessed 19 August 2010).

16

Colonel Ardant du Picq, Roots of Strategy, trans. Colonel John N. Greely and Major Rober C. Cotton (Stackpole Books:
PA, 1987), 350 & 354.
17

Ibid, 349.

18

Peter Baker, Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, Bin Laden Is Dead, Obama Says. The New York Times, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html?Pagewanted=all (accessed 26 Jan 2012).
144

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l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

8.
While using the force, the duration of the use of force is also important. One of the
peculiar ways of directly increasing the waste of the enemys force is the wearing down of
the enemy. The wearing down in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring
a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.19 By realizing the fact that the
ongoing effort only inside Afghanistan may not suffice, the use of force have been extended
even inside Pakistan, areas bordering Afghanistan, in the hot pursuit of terrorists, which appears
as extending the duration of war. The National Security Strategy of the United States2010,
states Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue
to underwrite global securitythrough our commitments to allies, partners, and institutions;
our focus on defeating Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the
globe.20
9.
In the recent years, close to the successful killing of Al Qaeda leader Bin Laden, the
intensity of the military operation was increased and the focus in Afghanistan was widened.
Ashraf Ghani, a former Finance Minister and presidential candidate for Afghanistan, writes
in Prism, President Barrack Obamas engagement with Afghanistan has made it a global
foreign policy issue. The resulting commitment of forces and resources has given International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) the means to launch its counteroffensive.21 In the recent
past, NATO Special Operations Forces were engaged in an intensely lethal war. In the past
90 days as of August 2010, these units have captured or killed 365 militant leaders, detained
1,335 insurgent foot soldiers and killed another 1,031 insurgents on top of that.22 Ghani, further
writes, The ISAF, armed with a new counterinsurgency doctrine and resources to conduct
a forceful campaign, is engaging in a counteroffensive against the insurgency.23 Given the
modus operandi of terrorist, capabilities and their activities in the recent past, if appropriate
means and ways were [are] not employed in a timely manner, terrorists would [will] even dare
to snatch the weapons of mass destruction and assault on the US and allies forces deployed
overseas, the US homeland, and peace loving countries of the world.
We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that
slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide
an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later
someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms.24

19

Clausewitz, On War, Barnes and Nobel Library of Essential Reading, 26-27.

20

The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 1. (Washington DC, May 2010). Online
at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
national_security_strategy.pdf> (accessed 9 Jun 2010).
21

Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan: Opportunities and Risks. Prism, Vol.1, No. 4, (Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, September 2010), 15-24.

22

Spencer Ackerman, Drones Surge, Special Ops Strike in Petraeus Campaign Plan Wired News, 18 August 2010.
Online at <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/petraeus-campaign-plan/#more-29588> (accessed 19 Aug 2010).

23

Ghani, 15.

24

Clausewitz, On War, Oxford Worlds Classics, ix.

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Friction in War
10.
Clausewitzs idea of friction in waris very useful to understand the growing complexities
of the war in Afghanistan. Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the
factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.25 The current condition in Afghanistan is
such that the situation is very unpredictable, and enemy patterns of operation are completely
unorthodox. Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.26 Friction
refers to uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties, the unforeseen, and their effect
on decisions, morale, and actions.27 The complexities of Afghanistan; uncertainties, complex
terrain, extended deployment, and adverse weather conditions, coupled with psychological
factors, has put heavy demand on professionally sound, adoptive, agile, resilient, and
motivated leaders, with strong moral courage, to sustain all frictions, and operate even for
an extended durations. Clausewitz argues, If one has never personally experienced war, one
cannot understand it what the difficulties really consists, or why a commander should need any
brilliance and exceptional ability.28
11.
Most of the personnel of the United States military have already had or doing multiple
tours of duty in Afghanistan, or Iraq, since 2001 and 2003. Moreover, most of the top-level
military commanders today, have the past war experience, which had helped to nurture soldiers
to encounter friction in war. The US Army has been laying optimum importance upon leader
development, and has prepared leaders to negotiate situations arising from complexities. The
US Armys Field Manual on Army Leadership states, Modern organizational leaders are
multi-skilled and multi-purpose leaders, who have developed backgrounds in doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedure, as well as an appreciation for the geopolitical consequences of their
application. From their personal experience and refined skill at the operational and tactical
levels, they have grown the instincts, intuition, and knowledge, which allow them to operate
across the spectrum of conflicts.29 Furthermore, such ability would enhance to anticipate and
overcome the situation arising from friction in war.
Conclusion
12.
In the analysis of the current war in Afghanistan, the ideas of Clausewitz are very
relevant, because the recognition of the military as an instrument of national policy, purpose
and means in war, and the friction in war, all falls under the current realm of the US and the
Western policy of GWOT. Furthermore, the preparedness of the military to defeat terrorists
and to encounter all complexities in war in Afghanistan also validates his idea. His ideas
are deeply explored, widely accepted, and extensively applied by the modern militaries. The
Americans, Germans, French, British, RussiansImperials and Communistsand the Chinese
under Mao studied On War in search of useful lesson, to be applied in wars seen retrospectively
25

Paret, 202.

26

Clausewitz, On War, Oxford Worlds Classics, 65.

27

Ibid.

28

Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University Press, 119.

29

Department of the Army, FM 6-22, Leading at Organizational and Strategic Levels, in Army Leadership (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, October 2006), 11-1.
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g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

in many different guises: as just wars or imperialist wars, wars to impose Germen nationalist
and racist aims upon the world, war against Nazi Germany, wars of liberation, or wars of
colonial expansion.30 However, during the early period of cold war, his ideas were dismissed.
Many argued, Clausewitzs dictum that war is the continuation of politics by military means
was inapplicable because irrational in the nuclear age.31
13.
Since the 1980, the US military has placed great emphasis on the theories and concepts
of Clausewitz.32 Military means has been employed not only in destroying terrorists but also
for the purpose of nation-building in Afghanistan. John Arquilla, writes in Prism, to date, the
American response has been to double down on its big net in Afghanistan, sending more
troops and rebuilding more roads in pursuit of nation-building.33 Whether peacekeeping
or nation-building operations require continued presence of military forces for decades or
generations is not an issue of military expertise. However, it is a political and strategic issue
as to whether the benefits to national interests and international security are worth the costs,
literal and professional, of tying up military assets for such purposes, argues Martin L.
Cook.34 In Afghanistan, involvement of military in nation-building with civilian agencies
does not fall under the threshold of the Clausewitzs principles; however, it has opened up a
new paradigm in the employment of military means to fulfill the policy objective under the
strategic environment of 21st century. Above all, the current military effort in Afghanistan to
support overall effort on GWOT will continue to truly hold the theories of Clausewitz.
30

Clausewitz, On War, Oxford Worlds Classics, viii

31

Ibid., ix.

32

Rudolph M. Janiczek, A Concept at the Crossroads: Rethinking the Center of Gravity (US Army War College: Carlisle,
PA, 2007), v. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
pdffiles/PUB805.pdf> (accessed 18 Aug 2010).
33

John Arquilla, A Net Shift for Afghanistan? Prism, Vol.1, No. 4, (Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, September 2010), 25-40.
34

Martin L. Cook, Moral Warrior: Ethics and Services in the US Military (Albany: State University of New York Press,
2004), 82.

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Smith M.L.R, Rethinking Nature of War, ed. Duyvesteyn Isabelle and Jan Angstrom,
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148

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g]kfnL ;]gfdf sYoefiffsf] k|of]u
#=
g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;ff efiffsf kdf g]kfnL sYoefiffsf] k|of]u x'g] u5{ eg] hftLo ldqxsf] cfGtl/s
ldngdf dft[efiffsf] klg k|of]u ePsf] kfOPsf] 5 . kLkfsf] bhf{b]lv k|wfg;]gfklt;Dd sYoefiffsf] k|of]udf hf]8
lbOPsf] kfOG5 . o; egfOsf] clek|fo g]kfnL ;]gfdf k|of]u ePsf] ;ff sYoefiff g]kfnL sYoLo efiffj+zdf
gf}nf] k|of]u eg] cjZo xf]Og . pgLxn] k|of]u ug]{ u/]sf] sYo g]kfnL efiffsf j0f{ljGof;, kbfjnL, jfSo;d"x,
cg'R5]b cflb ;a}df g]kfnL ;ff k|of]ukIfLo ;dfg kljGof; e]l6G5 . eflifs gjLgtf / ;'Gb/tf, snfTdstf /
k|of]uwld{tf gkfPnf . t/ g]kfnL ;]gfn] k|of]u ug]{ u/]sf] g]kfnL sYoefiffdf /fi6;]jLo ;d"xut k[ystf eg] lgZro
g} kfpg ;lsG5 .
g]kfnL ;]gfdf n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u
$=
g]kfnL ;]gfdf k|of]u x'g] sYoefiffsf] rrf{ ubf{ To; ;]jf;d"xdf n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u x'Fb}g t < eGg] s'/f] klg
p7\g;S5 . olb of] cfz\sf ul/of] cyjf o:tf] ts{ p7fOof] eg] To;nfO{ cGoyf gdfg] klg x'G5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf
n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u lGfDg ljifout If]qdf x'g] u5{ .
-s_

g]kfnL ;]gf;Da4 /fli6ocGt/f{li6o ;lGw;Df}tfkq,

-v_

g]kfnL ;]gfsf] tflnd;]ldgf/uf]i7L,

-u_

;}lgs k|zf;g / cfly{s k|zf;g,

-3_

;}lgs sfg'g,

-_

dflyNnf] bhf{sf ;}lgs clws[taf6 lbOg] gLltlgb{]zg,

-r_
ljz]if u/L ;}lgs clws[taf6 cGtu{tsf ljljw sfo{qmd, tflnd, uf]i7L, ljljw sfo{qmd, ;]gf
lbj;df lbOg] lnlvt dGtJo,
-5_

;]gfsf ;sn bhf{dWo]sf s]xL pT;fxL ;|i6f, cGj]ifs, n]vssf sljtf, n]v /rgf,
149

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

-h_
sjfot k'l:tsf, g]kfn ;/sf/sf dGqfno tyf cGt/f{li6o ;}lgs k|lti7fg;Fu ul/g] dxTjk"0f{
kqJojxf/,
-_

Od]n cflb .

%=

dfly pNn]v ul/Psf k|d'v ljifout If]qxdf g]kfnL ;]gfn] n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u ug]{ u/]sf] kfOPsf] 5 .

^=

g]kfnL ;]gfdf sYoefiffsf] k|of]u x'g] k|d'v ljifout If]qx lgDg 5g\ M
-s_

3/fo;L / ;}lgs ;]jf;Da4 cfk;L s'/fsfgL,

-v_
;]gf / ljleGg bhf{sf Joltm;Fu ul/g] 6]lnkmf]g, df]afOn kmf]g cflbsf dfWodaf6 ljrf/
cfbfgk|bfg,

&=

-u_

;]gf;Da4 k|zf;lgs, cfly{s / cGo b}lgs kdf e}kl/cfpg] gLltlgb{]zg / cGo s'/fsfgL,

-3_

;sn bhf{sf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] aLrdf ul/g] df}lvs gLltlgb]{zg,

-_

ljleGg bhf{sf g]kfnL ;]gf;Fu e]63f6 x'Fbf ul/g] ;Daf]wg, If]ds'zn / cGo s'/fsfgL cflb .

g]kfnL ;]gfdf n]Voefiffsf] t'ngfdf sYoefiffsf] ljifout If]q Jofks / dxTjk"0f{ /x]sf] 5 .

g]kfnL ;]gfn] af]Ng / n]Vg gx'g] efiff

*=
g]kfnL ;]gf eGg] ljlQs} d'n'ssf] ;+j]bgzLn ;'/Iff;d"x xf] eGg] a'lG5 . To;}n] g]kfnL ;]gf cfkm"eGbf
dflyNnf] lgsfosf] cfb]z cyjf lgb]{zg kfngf ug{ k|oTg/t /x]sf] x'G5 eg] p;sf] OdfGbfl/tf / st{Jok/fo0ftf,
;]jf;d"xut ljlzi6Ls/0f cflbn] ;fdfGo hg;d'bfob]lv /fi6k|d'v;Dd ;ts{ x'g] u5{g\ . lsgeg] g]kfnL ;]gfn]
cfgf] lhDd]jf/Lsf] If]q ;DxfNg;Sg] /fli6o kl/l:ylt k|lts"n eof] eg] d'ns
' jf;L ;a}sf] dgdl:tis ulnt x'gk'U5 .
ToxLsf/0f d'n'ssf ;a} kIfn] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]an lug]{ lsl;dsf] sYo / n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u ub}{gg\ug'{x'Fb}g .
g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfgf] kbLo bfloTjn] af]Ng / n]Vg gldNg] ljifosf] efiffut k|d'v k|of]uIf]q lgDg a'Fbfdf k|:t't ug{
;lsG5 M
-s_

/fi6, /fli6otf / /fi6jf;Lk|lt Jo\Uo ul/Psf],

-v_

cfgf] kbLo bfloTj / dof{bfeGbf aflx/sf ljifodf s]Gb|Lt eP/,

-u_

k/d;]gflwklt, k|wfg;]gfklt, nufot ljleGg txsf k|d'v JolQmx?sf] cfnf]rgf,

-3_
cfkm"eGbf dflysf] kbsf] cfb]zljk/Lt s'/fsfgL / dGtJosf] ;Dk|]if0f cyf{t\ cfb]zsf] pNn\3g
x'g]u/L af]lnPsf :jsLo ljrf/,
-_

/fi6 / /fi6af;LnfO{ k|lts"n c;/ kg{;Sg] cleJolQm,

-r_
s'g} klg /fhgLlts kf6L{nfO{ k|ToIf / ck|ToIfkdf ;xof]u k'Ug] lsl;dsf] ljrf/, dGtJo k|s6
cflb .
(=
g]kfnL ;]gf g]kfnsf] dxTjk"0f{ /fli6o ;'/Iff ;d"x ePsf] x'gfn] p;n] cfgf] kbLo cg'zf;g / st{Jokfngdf
afwf k'Ug;Sg] s'g} klg ljrf/ k|s6 ug{' dgfl;a 7xb}{g . k|:6 kdf eGg'kbf{ d'n'ssf] cg'zfl;t / st{Jolgi7
/fi6;]jssf] rrf{ ubf{ ;]gfnfO{ cu|k\lQmdf /fVg ;lsG5 . To;}n] g]kfnL ;]gfdf sfo{/t JolQmn] kbLo bfloTjsf]
sf/0f cfkm"n] k|of]u ug{ ldNg] / gldNg] efiffsf] cWoogdf ljz]if rgfvf] x'g'kg]{ b]lvG5 .
g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;d"xut sYoefiff
!)= g]kfndf ljleGg k];f / Joj;fodf nfu]sf JolQmxsf] 7"n} ;d"x /x]sf] kfOG5 eg] :jtGq kdf hLjgofkg
ul//x]sf dflg; klg w]/} 5g\ . h:t} s[lif, ljleGg Jofkf/Joj;fo, hflu/, ljZjljBfno:t/Lo k|fWofkg / ljBfno
150

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

txsf] cWofkg, cflbdf k|of]u x'g] efiffsf] k|of]uut :jk cnucnu ePh:t} ;]gfn] cfgf] kbLo bfloTjcg';f/
k|of]u ug'{kg]{ efiff klg leGg x'g] u5{ . jf:tjdf eGg] xf] eg] efiffn] g} s'g} klg JolQmsf] kb, k];f, cfr/0f, ljj]s
cflbsf] klxrfg u/fpF5 . sYoefiffsf] k|of]udf ;do / k|;\ucg';f/ b[li6 k'ofpg ;lsPg eg] 7"nf7"nf b'3{6gf x'g]
;Defjgf /xG5 . To;}n] dL7f] sYoefiffsf] k|of]un] dflg; ljj]szLn / cg'zfl;t b]lvG5 . tLtf], 6/f]{ / cfnf]rgfTds
sYoefiffn] eg] dflg;sf] ul/df / OHht lu/fpg ;xof]u k'ofpF5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf kbLo bfloTjcg';f/ sYoefiffsf]
k|of]u x'g]u5{ . o;nfO{ klg lgDg a'Fbfdf k|sfz kfg{ ;lsG5 M
-s_
g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;]jfk|j]zsf ljleGg kb xF'b} ;]gf;Da4 lgodfjnL cg';f/ kbf]Gglt eP/ k|wfg;]gfklt
;Dd kbu|x0f ug{ kfpg] l:ylt b]lvG5 . k/d;]gflwkltsf] kb eg] ;}lgs ;]jf;d"xaf6 kbf]Gglt eP/ xf]Og,
/fi6k|d'vsf x}l;otn] k|fKt ug]{ ;]gfsf] ;jf]R{ r kb xf] eGg] a'lG5,
-v_
k/d;]gflwkltn] cfjZostf cg';f/ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] pRrkb:y JolQm;Fu d'n'ssf] ;'/IffgLltsf
af/]df k/fdz{ / gLltlgb]{zg ug{;S5g\ . pgn] k|of]u ug]{ efiff zfnLg, ;Eo / lzi6 x'g] u5{ . To;df
cfg'eljstf -cg'ej_ / cWoogsf] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf x'g] u5{,
-u_
k|wfg;]gfklt nufotsf hg]{n, sg]{nb]lv ;]s]G8 nK6g;Ddsf clws[t Pj+ klbs ;d"xn] k|of]u ug]{
sYoefiff gLltlgb]{zg / cfb]zsf] k|s[lt cg';f/ m/sm/s x'g;S5,
-3_
g]kfnL ;]gfdf kLkfb]lv ;'j]bf/;Dd sfo{/t ;d"x k|foM sd lzlIft x'g;S5 . -casf] k':tf k"/}
clzlIft gx'g ;S5_ . To;}n] Tof] ;d"xn] clws[t bhf{sf ;]gfn] k|of]u u/]h:tf] cfb]zfTds zfnLg / lzi6
sYoefiffsf] k|of]u gu/] klg ljj]s, cg'zf;g, lzi6tf / dof{bfsf] pNn\3g u/]/ s'g} klg zAbxsf] pRrf/0f
ug{ ldNb}g . csf]{ s'/f, kLkf;d"xb]lv ;'j]bf/;Dd kbLo bfloTjsf sf/0fn] xLGftf af]wLo sYoefiffsf zAbx
k|foM ;'Gg] ul/G5 . To;}n] pgLx cf}krfl/skdf cfm"cfm"df cfqmfds efiff klg k|of]u ug{;S5g\ .
cf}krfl/skdf eg] cfm"eGbf dflyNnf] bHof{gL lrGx nufPsf JolQm;Fu ;ts{tf / cf1fsfl/tfsf] cj:yfdf
k|of]u ul/g] efiffsf] k|of]u u5{g,
-_
g]kfnL ;]gfdf sfo{/t JolQm s]xL 306fsf lglDt cfp6 uPdf cyjf nfdf] ;do;Dd labfdf a;]sf
a]nf klg ;]gf;Da4 sYoefiffsf] k|of]u ug{ la;{+b}gg\ .
g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;fj{gflds kbsf] k|of]u
!!=
Jofs/0fcg';f/ gfdsf] ;fdf k|of]u x'g] kbnfO{ ;j{gfd elgG5 . Jofs/0fsf ljleGg sf]6LdWo] ;fj{gflds
kb sf] dxTjk"0f{ :yfg /x]sf] x'G5 . o; ;fj{gflds kbfjnLn] s'g} klg gfdjfrL knfO{ csf]{ zAb cyjf kbfjnLaf6
a'fpg] sfd u5{ . efiffdf cy{k"0f{tfsf tLg kbfjnL x'G5g\ . h:t} M
-gfdkb_

stf{

sd{

lqmof

/fd

eft

vfG5

!@=
dfly lbOPsf tLgj6f kbfjnLn] jQmfsf] ljifo cyjf cfzo k"0f{ u/fpg ;xof]u k'ofPsf 5g\ . To;}n]
pko{Q
' m tLgj6f kb Ps csf{;uF ;DalGwt 5g\ . Jofs/0fsf cGo sf]6Lx stf{, sd{ / lqmofkbLo :jksf lj:tf/
dfq x'g\ . g]kfnL efiffdf ;fj{gflds kbx lgDg 5g\ M
d'Vo ;fj{gflds kb M

d, tF, ltdL, tkfO{+, xfdL, xh'/

;xof]uL ;fj{gflds kb M

pm, hf], sf], ToxfF, oxfF, sxfF, hxfF

cfTdsyg M

d l;kfxLnfO{ sjfh v]nfpF5' .

cfb]zfTds jfSo M

tF nfOgdf ldn]/ a;\ .

cfb]zsf] kfngf M

tkfO{{+sf] cfb]z kv]{/ a;]sf 5f}F .

cfTdf]Gglt M

xfdL ;}lgs tflnd ln+b}5f}+ .

151

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

cg'/f]w M

g]kfnL ;]gf

xh'/ oxL+ /fhxf];\ -/fhxf]OalS;of];\_ .

!#=
dfly lbOPsf 5cf]6f jfSox ;fj{gflds kbsf ;fdfGo k|of]ufTds k x'g\ . pko'{Qm jfSodf cfb]z cyjf
lgb]{zg / To;sf] kfngfsf] cfzo ;fdfGokdf k|:t't ePsf] b]lvG5 . To;df hf]8tf]8sf] efj b]lv+b}g .
hf]8sf] cfTdsyg M

d l;kfxLnfO{ sjfh v]nfpF5'

hf]8sf] cfb]z M

ltdL 3/labfdf uOxfn

tF nfOgdf ldn]/ a;\

cfTdf]Gglt M

xfdL ;}lgs tflnd lnG5f}F

ljz]if cg'/f]w M

xh'/ oxLF /fh xf]OalS;of];\ t

;xof]uL ;fj{gflds kbsf] k|of]u

!$=

g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;xof]uL ;fj{gflds kbfjnLsf] k|of]udf ljz]if Wofg lbg] u/]sf] kfOG5 . h:t},
pm M

pmM /fdaxfb'/ -l;kfxL, kLkf_ cfof] .

hf] M

of] aLrdf xl/, Zofd, 6+sk|;fbdWo] hf] cfP/ a;] klg x'G5 .

sf] M

/ftL/ftL gaf]nLsg cfpg] sf] xf] <

-8\o6' Ldf a;]sf] l;kfxL g]kfnL ;]gfsf] SofDk glhs} cfPsf] ckl/lrt JolQmnfO{ cfqmfds efiffdf xsfl//x]sf
x'G5g\ ._
ToxfF M ltdLx krf; hgf ToxfF '?Kk eP/ a; .
oxFf M clxn] oxfF s;sf] 8\o'6L 5 <
sxFf M ltdL sxfF k'u]/ cfof} <
hxFf M 8\o'6L rflxF /fd|f];Fu u/\ . To;kl5 tF hxfF uP klg d vf]lHbg .
csf]{ z}nLaf6 k|:t'lt
!%=

dfly lbOPsf ;fj{gflds kbxnfO{ cfb/fyL{ gfd / ;j{gfd kbfjnL;Fu hf]8]/ klg eGg ;lsG5 . h:t},
pm M

/ljnfO{ xh'/n] plxn] af]nfOaS;]sf] lyof] . pm eg] e/v/ kf] cf]Nof\6f]Nof\ ub}{ cfOk'Uof] .

hf] M h/;fx]a o;kfnfsf] zflGt;]gfdf lgoldt k|lqmofaf6 o; sfnLk|;fb u0faf6 hf];'s} JolQm kg\
cyjf 5flgo'g\ . -xfdL cfm"v';L zflGt;]gfdf dgf]gog x'g] hjfgsf] rog gu/f}+ . _
sf] M

rLm;fx]a xh'/nfO{ e]6\g aflx/ sf] cfof] <

ToxfF M ToxfF -6'Fl8v]ndf_ pkTosfsf ;a} u'Ndsf hjfg k/]8 tflnd lnO/x]sf 5g\ .
oxfF M h;f{x]a xh'/ oxfF /fhxf]OalS;of];\ .
sxfF M xh'/n] xl/axfb'/nfO{ sxfF k7fOaS;]sf] <
hxfF M h;f{x]asf] hxfF ;jf/L x'G5, dnfO{ klg pxLF nlualS;of];\ .
!^=
g]kfnL Jofs/0fdf k|o'Qm ;xof]uL ;fj{gflds kbfjnLsf] k|of]u u/]/ c w]/} sf]6Lsf jfSoxsf] /rgf ug{
;lsG5 . To:t}, ;fj{gflds kbfjnLsf] k|of]u u/]/ cg'R5]bsf] klg lgdf{0f ug{ ;lsG5 . h:t},
152

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

ks'df/ u'/fufO{+sf] 3/ /fd]5fk xf] . pm l;kfxLdf egf{ eP/ gf]s/L ug{ nfu]sf] b; jif{
eof] . ks'df/ d]xgtL l;kfxL xf] . gf]s/Ldf k|j]z u/]b]lv g} pm Ps lbg klg labf lnP/ 3/ uPsf]
5}g . Ps 306f cfp6 uPsf] klg /]s8{ 5}g . 8\o6' L k/]sf] a]nf ;ts{ eP/ kf]:6df a;]sf] b]lvG5 .
n];gfosb]lv rLm;fx]a;Ddsf] ;jf/Ldf klg pm st{Jok/fo0ftfdf g} hf]8 lbO/x]sf] x'G5 . To;}n]
p;nfO{ g]kfnL ;]gf;d"xdf Odfgbf/ l;kfxL eg]/ lrlgG5 .
sYoefiffsf] ljifout k[ystf
!&=
efiffsf] d"n k g} sYoefiff xf] . ;+;f/df clwsf+z dflg;x b}lgs Jojxf/df sYoefiffsf] k|of]u
u5{g\ eg] ljZjsf] s'n hg;\VofdWo] ;fdfGotM Ps ltxfOn] n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u unf{g\ . To;sf/0f ;+;f/df
efiffkl/jf/sf] ljsf; k|ydtM sYo efiffaf6} ePsf] a'lG5 . sYoefiffsf k|d'v k|of]u If]qnfO{ lgDg tflnsfdf
k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5
gf]s/L

aGbJofkf/

ofqf

v]tL ls;fgL

z}lIfs If]q

;+:sf/ut k/Dk/f

3/Jojxf/

dgf]/~hg

wfld{s

:t/ut gftf;DaGw

;fdflhs

;f+:s[lts, hfqf / cGo

!*= g]kfnL ;]gfdWo] cg'dfgtM b'OltxfO{ -;\Vof_ df sYoefiffs} k|of]u x'g] u/]sf] kfOPsf] 5 . jf:tjdf efiffn]
dgsf] cd"t{ ljifonfO{ d"t
{ kdf k|:t't ug{ ;xof]u u5{ . To;}n] efiffnfO{ ljrf/ ljlgdosf] cleGg ;fwgsf kdf
lnOPsf] xf] . g]kfnL ;]gfdf klxn]sf] t'ngfdf k9]n]v]sf hjfgxsf] ;\Vof al9/x]sf] 5 . z}lIfs of]Uotf cfh{g u/]
klg j}olQms cg'ej / sfo{Ifdtfn] kl5 k/]sf / ;]s]G8nK6gsf] v'nf k|ltof]lutfdf ;mn x'g g;s]sfx l;kfxLdf
egf{ ePsf kfOPsf 5g\ . pgLxsf dgdf txut kdf xLgtfaf]w eP klg ;]gfdf clgjfo{ kdf kfngf ug'{kg]{
cg'zf;g / st{Jok/fo0ftftm{ eg] ljz]if ;hu b]lvG5g\ . To;}n] l;kfxLnfO{ sDd/df v's'/L / Ao"g]6 le/]sf / bflxg]
xftdf aGb's af]s]/ Ps} gf;sf] ;}lgs kf];fsdf ;lhPsf JolQmsf kdfdfq x]g'{ plrt xF'b}g . cbDo ;fx;, zf}o{,
k/fqmd ePsf / cg'zf;g kfng ug{ tTk/ /fi6;]jssf kdf d"Nof\sg ug'{ plrt x'G5 .
g]kfnL ;]gfsf] kbLo dof{bfkfng / cfqmfds efiffsf] k|of]u
!(=
zflGt;'/Iffsf If]qdf sfo{/t g]kfnL ;]gf, g]kfn k|x/L, ;z:q k|x/Ln] kbLo bfloTj kfng ug{ ljz]if kdf
pT;flxt b]lvG5g\ . cGo ;]jfdf sfd ug]{ g]kfnsf /fi6;]jsxdf cg'zf;g x/fpFb} uPsf] a'lPsf] 5 . pgLxdf
st{Jok/fo0ftfsf] cefj 5 . t/, g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;]jf;d"xdf eg] l;kfxLb]lv k|wfg;]gfklt;Ddsf kbflwsf/L
/fi6;]jsxn] ;do / k|;\ucg';f/ cfqmfds efiffsf] klg k|of]u u/]sf] ;'lgG5 . t/, To;nfO{ pgLxn] cfg}
kbLo st{Jo kfngsf lglDt xf] eGg] dx;'; u5{g\ . /fi6sf s'g} klg ;]jf;d"xdf 8/, s/ / cg'zf;g ePg eg]
kbLo dof{bf sfod /xFb}g . csf]{ s'/f], dflg; crDdsf] k|f0fL xf] . /fd|f] af]nLn] ;Dfpg vf]Hof] eg] dflQG5 . 7"nf]
:j/n] xKsfof] eg] 8/fP/ p;sf] dfgl;s cj:yf sdhf]/ aGg;Sg] l:ylt x'g;S5 . To;}n] g]kfnL ;]gfdf pko'{Qm
b'j} lsl;dsf] Jojxf/nfO{ ;Gt'ngdf /fv]/ cfb]z cyjf lgb]{zg ug]{ k/fDk/f /x]sf] 5 .
g]kfnL ;]gfdf Psn sYoefiff
@)= g]kfnL ;]gfdf sYoefiffsf] k|of]u;Fu} ljrf/sf] cg'R5]bfTds k|jfx x'g] u5{ . cfjZostf / ;do ;Gbe{cg';f/
j0f{gfTds sYoefiff / ;+o'Qm j0f{gfTds sYoefiffsf] k|of]udf ljz]if hf]8 lbg] ul/G5 . ;fy}, sYozAbfTds k|of]u;Fu}
cg'R5]bfTds sYo ljrf/x klg k|:t't ul/G5 . h:t},
Psn

d cfPF . d 3/ uPF . d < of pm <

153

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

;+o'Qm

g]kfnL ;]gf

g]kfnL ;]gfdf z"/f JolQmdfq gf]s/L ug{ kfpF5g\ .

of] s:sf] aGb's xf] <
el/;So ef]ln g} u'Nddf xflh/ x'g' .
lah'nL aQLn] 3/ pHofnf] x'G5 .

cg'R5]bfTds k|:t'lt M
d]/f] ljrf/df ;}lgs ;]jf g} ;a}eGbf pQd ;]jf xf] . lsgeg] of] ;]jfdf sfo{/t kLkfb]lv
k|wfg;]gfklt;Dd sfo{/t ;sn bhf{sf ;}lgsn] 3';, sld;gsf] hfnf]df k/]/ ckdflgt x'g'kb}{g .
kljq dft[e"ldsf] ;]jf ub}{ g'gsf] ;f]f] lrtfP/ rf]vf] dfl;s tnadf ;Gtf]if u/]/ afFRg] cEof;
u/]sf] x'G5 . To;}n] sd{7, of]Uo / OdfGfbf/ g]kfnL gful/sn] lgle{stfk"j{s ;]jf ug]{ If]q g} ;}lgs
;]jf xf] . of] ;]jfdf ;]jfsflns kbLo tflndsf ;fy} zflGt;]gfdf efu lng kfpg] cj;/, z}lIfs
of]Uotf cfh{g ug]{ / ;flxTo l;h{gfsf ;fy} k|fl1s cg';GwfgfTds lqmofsnfkdf ;d]t ;xeflutfsf]
cj;/ k|fKt x'g] u5{ . To;}n] gf]s/L ubf{ cGo ;]jfdfeGbf ;}lgs ;]jfdf g} /dfOnf] x'G5 .
;}lgs ;]jfsflns tflndsf] efiff
@!=
g]kfnL ;]gfdf gf]s/L ug]{ p2]Zon] v'nf k|ltof]lutff/f l;kfxL / ;]s]G8 nK6gdf egf{ ePsfxn] clgjfo{
kdf kbLo ;]jfsfnLg tflnd lng'kg]{ x'G5 . cfkm";Fu zfl/l/s tGb'?:tL / z}lIfs of]Uotf eP/dfq x'Fb}g . g]kfnL
;]gfdf gj;]jfk|j]zLxn] clgjfo{kdf ;}Go tflnd lng'kg]{ x'G5 . tflndn] kbLo bfloTj lgjf{x ub}{ cg'zfl;t
hLjg latfpg ;xof]u k'ofpF5 .
@@=
g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ tflnd lb+bf s] s:tf] efiffsf] k|of]u x'G5 eGg] s'/f ;]gfsf] cfGtl/s ljifo eP klg 6'Fl8v]n
/ kN6gsf] v'nf k6f\lugLdf tflnd lbOg] ePsf] x'gfn] ;}Go tflnddf k|of]u ul/g] ;\s]tfTds / zAbfTds efiff
uf]Ko /x]sf] b]lv+b}g .
@#=
;}Go tflndsf] nflu g]kfnL efiffdf ;/bf/ 5ljnfn pkfWofo ;"l/ n] sjfot eGg] k':ts n]v]sf lyP .
of] k':ts clxn];Dd 5flkPsf] 5 eGg] hfgsf/Ldf cfPsf] 5}g . ;}Go ;\ux| fnosf] clen]v zfvfdf ;f] tflnd k':ts
;'/lIft /x]sf] 5 eGg] s'/f] ;}Go clen]vxsf] ljj/0ffTds ;"rLkqsf] k|sflzt k|ltsf] cWoogaf6 k|:6 x'G5 .
@$= ;}lgs ;]jfsflns tflnd ljleGg r/0fdf ;~rfng x'g] u5{ . ;}Go kf];fsdf ;lhP/ bflxg] xftdf aGb's
lnPsf / sDd/df v's'/L / Ao"g]6 le/]sf ;}GoxnfO{ k\lQma4 eP/ pleg] tflndb]lv b'Zdgsf] cfqmd0faf6 aRg] /
k|Tofqmd0f ug]{ h:tf s7f]/ tflnd;d]t lbOG5 .
@%= ;ts{ eP/ pleg], uf]8f km6\ofpg] -uf]8f kmf6\_, ;nfdLsf] nflu tof/L x'g] / ;nfdL ck{0f ug]{ -;nfdL
ck{0f sjfh_, a9fOFsf lglDt kf]lh;gdf /xg], a9fO{F ug]{ cflb ljifodf tflnd u/fpg] ;}Go clws[tn] tflnddf
;xefuLxnfO{ ;}Go;\s]t / ;}Goefiffdf cjut u/fpF5g\ . ;}Go tflnd ljleGg txsf] x'G5 . ;]jfk|j]zsf] tflnd,
ljifo lj1sf] tflnd, u'Nd, cGtu'N{ d, If]qLo cyjf k[tgf :t/Lo, cGtk[{tgf, cGt/f{li6o ldq/fi6sf s'g} d'n'sdf
lnOg] pRr:t/Lo ;]jfsfnLg tflnd cflbdf k|of]u x'g] efiffsf] tflTjs cyjf ljifout / txut leGgtf x'g;S5 .
g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;Gbe{ut eflifs ljljwtf
@^=
g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;do / ljifout ;Gbe{ cyjf k|;\ucg';f/ efiffk|of]udf leGgkg kfOG5 . k|dv
' ljifo /
;Gbe{nfO{ tnsf a'Fbfdf k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5 M
-s_

;]gfsf] cf}krfl/s sfof{noLo hg;Dks{sf] efiff -;fdfGo_,

-v_

;]gfsf] cgf}krfl/s 3/fo;L k|of]hgsf] efiff,

-u_

;}Go;]jf;Fu ;DalGwt lgb{]zgfTds efiff,

154

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

-3_
;}Go tflnd, ;?jf, a9'jf, zflGt;]gf, cfGtl/s lab|f]x, ;LdfIf]qsf] ;'/Iff, cGt/f{li6o o'4, ;}Go
;fdu|Lxsf] cfk"lt{ / e08f/0f;'/Iff,
-_

;}Go ;]jf;Fu ;DalGwt df}lvs cfb]zsf] efiff, cflb .

@&= cfkm"eGbf dflyNnf] txdf sfo{/t xflsdxsf] sYo efiffsf] k|of]un] ;}Go;]jfsf hjfgxnfO{ /fxt cyjf
k|f]T;fxg ldNg;S5 . ;]gf;Fu ;DalGwt ;a} lnvtsf] cfzo ;}Go;]jfsf ;a} txsf hjfgn] tTsfn k9]/ yfxf kfpF5g\
eGg] lglZrt x'Fb}g . ;/f]sf/jfnfO{ lnlvtkq yDofP, s;}n] lnlvt kqsf] a]xf]/f ;'gfPdf yfxf x'g] s'/f xf] . w]/}h;f]
hjfgxn] df}lvs cfZjf;g / hjfgx aLr rn]sf] xNnfnfO{ ljZjf; dfGg' kg]{ l:ylt x'g;S5 .
;}Go;]jfdf sfnLkf]s] efiffsf] k|of]u
@*= sfnLkf]s] efiffsf ljifodf efiff lj1fgsf] Oltxf;df st} pNn]v ePsf] kfOFb}g . t/, ;dfhdf sltko
ljifd kl/l:ylt pTkGg eP/ ;Dxflng g;s]sf] / cfkm"eGbf dflysf] JolQm;Fu v'n]/ cfgf s'/f eGg;d]t g;Sg]
l:yltdf sfnLkf]s] efiffsf] k|of]u x'G5 . sfnLkf]s] eg]sf] ds}sf] 3f]uf nfUg g;s]/ j}slNks ds}sf] 3f]ufsf
kdf nfu]sf] P]+h]?h:t} sfnf] 3f]uf] xf] . sfnLkf]s] df u]8f eGbf klg k|foM sfnf] w"nf] x'G5 . of] w"nf] ePsf] 3f]uf]
g} sfnLkf]s] xf] . of] 3f]uf] sdnf] x'G5 . htg u/]/ e'\u|fdf kf]Nof] eg] vfg ldN5 . dL7} x'G5 . of] sfnLkf]s] e'6]/
vfg, l9+8f] agfP/ vfg ldNb}g . To;}n] sfnLkf]s] ds}sf] kl/jf/df clNkN6f], Psnsf6] / c:jfefljs 3f]uf] ePh:t} ;}Go
kl/jf/ cyjf ;}Go ;]jfsf] sYoefiff kl/jf/df sfnLkf]s] efiffnfO{ af]Ng / ;'Gg gldNg] cyjf c:jfefljs njhsf
kdf lng ;lsG5 . ;}Go ;]jfdf hLjgsf x/]s If]qdf ljifdkl/l:ylt ef]lu/x]sf] JolQm cyjf hjfgn] af]Ng] efiff
ds}kl/jf/sf] c:jfefljs 3f]uf] sfnLkf]s] h:t} c:jfefljs g} x'g] u5{ . sfnLkf]s] efiffsf] k|of]u ug'{kg]{ cj:yf
a'Fbfutkdf lgDgcg';f/ lrq0f ug{ ;lsG5 .
-s_

w]/} jif{;Dd ;}Go;]jfdf /x]/ klg kbf]Gglt cyjf a9'jf gx'Fbf,

-v_

zflGt ;]gfdf hfg dgf]gog gx'Fbf,

-u_

3/fo;L kl/l:ylt lau|Fbf,

-3_

;xsdL{ ;fyLx;Fu af]nLJojxf/ lau|Fbf,

-_

xflsdx cfkm"k|lt ?i6 x'Fbf, cflb

@(= dflysf] dfgl;s cj:yfdf /x]sf ;}Go ;]jf cGtu{t sfo{/t /fi6;]jsxn] k|of]u ug]{ efiff sfnLkf]s]
xf] . dfgl;s cj:yf ;Gt'lnt gePsf] JolQmn] af]Ng] dgf]jfbfTds sYoefiffnfO{ klg sfnLkf]s] g} elgG5 . ;}Go;]jf
cg'zfl;t / st{Jolgi7 ;]jf;d"x ePsf] x'gfn] cfkm"eGbf dflyNnf] bhf{sf xflsd;Fu cfgf] dfgl;s ;Gt'ng
lalu|Psf] cj:yfdf k|of]u x'g] sfnLkf]s] efiff af]lnxfNb}gg\ . oyf;Dej ;+oldt x'G5g\ . ;Dxflng] k|of; u5{g\ .
;Dxflng g;s]/ sfnLkf]s] efiff af]lnxfn] eg] To:tf] efiff af]Ng] /fi6;]js ;}Go hjfgnfO{ c:ktfndf pkrf/fy{
k7fOG5 cyjf ;}lgs sfg'g cg';f/ sfo{jfxL ul/G5 . o;/L ;}Go ;]jfdf sfo{/t JolQmn] k|of]u ug]{ efiffsf] gd'gf
k|:t't ug'{ plrt b]lv+b}g t/, pgLxn] k|of]u ug]{ sYoefiffsf] ;\s]t eg] k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5 M
-s_

cg'xf/df dnLgtf b]lvg',

-v_

af]nLdf c:ki6tf / cJofjxfl/stfsf] cfef; kfOg',

-u_

vfg, a:g, 8\o'6L ug{ / lx+88'n ug{ klg dg gnfu]h:tf] b]lvg',

-3_

hLjgk|lt g} lg/fz b]lvg',

-_

cfkm"nfO{ ;DxfNg;Sg] sf]xL klg gePsf] dx;'; ug'{ cflb .

#)= o;/L ;fdflhs Jojxf/ / s'g} klg kbLo bfloTj lgjf{x u/]sf JolQmn] k|of]u ug]{ sfnLkf]s] efiff sf]
cg';Gwfg / cWoog cfjZos 5 .
155

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;'Tn] cyjf kfN;] efiff sf] k|of]u

#!=
;'Tn] efiff sf] gfd klg efifflj1fgsf] Oltxf;df sxLF pNn]v ePsf] e]l6+b}g . t/ ;dfhsf ljleGg kIf /
/fi6;]jfsf ljleGg txdf sfo{/t JolQmn] k|of]u ug]{ u/]sf] efiffsf] cg';Gwfg / cWoogsf qmddf k|fof]lus efiffsf]
Ps knfO{ ;'Tn] efiff sf] gfd lbg ;lsg] l:ylt b]vfk/]sf] xf] . k|f/lDes cWoogcg';f/ ;'tnLsf] cfsf/h:tf]
efiffsf] ;+lIfKt k g} ;'Tn] efiff xf] eGg ;lsG5 . of] efiff ;}Go;]jfsf JolQmn] dfq geP/ ;dfhdf ;fdfGo
kdf hLjg u'hf/f u/]sf JolQmn] ;d]t k|of]u ug'{ pko'Qm x'Fb}g . ;'Tn] efiff sf] k|of]u ug]{ cj:yf lgDg a'Fbfdf
k|:t't 5 M
-s_
s'g} k'/fgf] cyjf gofF ljifosf] ;Gbe{ut 1fg 5 t/, kfN;] efiff cyjf ;'Tn] efiffsf] k|of]u u/]/
csf]{ JolQmsf] dfgl;s cj:yf vnanlng] u/L eoeLt jftfj/0f tof/ ug'{,
-v_
;j{;fwf/0f dflg;n] s]xL uNtL u/]sf] b]lv+b}g . t/ p;sf] dgsf] efj a'g] lgotn] cgfjZos
k|Zgx ;f]w]/ p;nfO{ x}/fg kfg'{,
-u_

g;fsf] ;'/df ;j{;fwf/0fnfO{ b'Mv lbg] lgot /fVg',

-3_
8\o'6Ldf /xFbf, xflsdn] sfd lj/fPjfkt xKsfpFbf, 3/3/fo;L u8f kbf{, s'g} 6]G;g cyjf kL/
k/]/ /GylgPsf] cj:yf, cflb .
#@=

;'Tn] cyjf kfN;L efiff sf] k|of]unfO{ klg lgDg a'Fbfdf k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5 M
-s_
af6fdf ;j{;fwf/0f dflg;sf] cfjthfjt eO/x]sf] 5 . ToxL a]nf ;}Go kf];fs nufPsf cyjf cfp6
8];df b]lvPsf ;}lgs hjfg c;fGble{s k|Zg ug{ ;'? u5{g\ M
cF ;fFlRr, of] s] sf] v c/] . ef]u6]sf] v xf] < -Tof] ljzfn d;nfsf] v xf] . yfxf
kfP/ hfg]/ klg yfxf gkfPsf] / ghfg]sf] cj:yf l;h{gf ug]{ ._ /fli6o r'gfj glhs} cfPsf] 5 x}g <
ef]6 sxfF 5flk+b} 5 < hgs lzIff ;fdu|L s]Gb|df l;kfxLsf] kf]i6 a;]h:tf] 5lg lsg xF <
dflysf k|Zgsf] hafkm ;j{;fwf/0fn] lbg] cj:yf lyPg . t/, obfsbf o:tf] cj:yf klg
l;h{gf x'g] u5{ . To; cj:yfdf s] pQ/ lbg] < o;f] x]bf{ cfkm";Fu k|Zg ug]{ JolQm l;kfxL h:tf]
klg b]lv+b}g t/ p;sf] lqmofsnfkn] l;kfxL xf] eGg] dx;'; x'G5 .
-v_
w]/} ;do klxn]sf] s'/f xf] . xl/k|;fb kf}8]n xn];L dxfb]jsf] bz{g u/]/ sf7df8f}t+ km{ kmls{b} lyof] .
To;a]nf :yn oftfoftsf] ;'ljwf lyPg . xjfO{ oftfoftsf] pkof]u ug]{ p;sf] cfly{s x}l;ot lyPg . To;}n]
k}bn ofqfs} qmddf pm cf]vN9'\uf ahf/df af; a:of] . /ftL ;]gfsf] u:tL lyof] . asfObf;Fu 3/j]6L;Fu
af; dfu]/ a;]sf], 3/j]6L klg pRr s'n3/lgofF ePsf], a]n'sf pxLF eft vfP/ bnfgsf] vl6ofdf ;'t]sf]
k/b]zL;Fu u'Ndaf6 u:tLdf lgl:sPsf] l;kfxL k|Zg u5{ M
clxn] /ft k/]sf] 5 . tkfO{F af; a;]/ ;'Tg' eP5 . of] 3/ xf] < of] 3/df dflg; a:5g\ ls
ufO{, e}+;L, afv|f a:5g\ < of] 3/df v klg 5g\ . as}gfsf] vdf pHofnf] eP 5 x}g t
u:tLdf lx+8]sf] l;kfxLnfO{ ;]jf ;DaGwL / 3/3/fo;L lrGtf k/]sf] b]lv+b}g . t/ jf; a;]sf]
k/b]zLnfO{ t;f{pg pm kfN;] cyjf ;'Tn] efiffsf] k|of]u ul//x]sf] 5 . ;fob /flq u:tLdf lgl:sPsf
;'/Iff lgsfon] k|of]u ug]{ ;f\s]lts efiff klg x'g;S5 .
o:tf s'/f s]xL ;j{;fwf/0fn] ef]u]sf xf]nfg\ . t/ o:tf ;fgfltgf s'/fdf s;}n] ph'/L
ub}{g . ph'/L u/]df ;}Go lgodfjnL cg';f/ sfo{jfxL x'Fbf] xf] . o:tf ljifo ef]ufpg] / ef]Ug] JolQmd}
;Lldt x'G5g\ .

g]kfnL ;]gfsf] lzi6 efiff

##=

g]kfnL ;]gf cg'zfl;t / lzi6 efiffsf] k|of]u ug]{ /fi6;]js xf] . p;n] cfgf] ;}lgs hLjg / ;]jflgj[Q
156

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

hLjgdf ;d]t cg'zf;g / lzi6tfsf] k|of]u ul//x]sf] x'G5 . ;}Go ;]jfaf6 lgj[Q eP klg p;n] lgj[lQe/0f kfpF5 .
To;}n] pm ;}GozlQmsf] cfjZostf k/]sf] a]nfdf xflh/ eP/ 8\o'6L ug{ afWo x'G5 . g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;]jf /fi6sf
nflu / /fi6sf] ;xof]u g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ eGg] dxTjk"0f{ egfO k|rlnt 5 . ;fdflhs tyf kbLo bfloTj lgjf{x u/]sf
JolQmxsf] k|of]ufTds efiff efifflj1fgsf] cg';Gwfg / cWoogk/Dk/fdf cfjZos ljifosf kdf /x]sf] 5 .
af:tjdf :j/sf] c j0f{b]lv Jo~hgsf] x j0f{;Ddsf] ;+of]hgaf6 k|fof]lus kdf lgikGg x'g] zAbxsf] ljsl;t
k g} jfSo xf] . jfSosf] ljsl;t k cg'R5]b tyf 7"nf7"nf u|Gysf kx x'g\ . dflg; ;fdflhs k|f0fL ePsf]
x'gfn] p;n] k|of]u ug]{ efiff klg ;dfheGbf leGg x'Fb}g . g]kfnL ;]gf klg ;dfhsf cleGg c\u x'g\ . ;}Go ;]jf
d'n'ssf ljleGg ;]jf;d"xdWo] Ps 5'} ;]jf xf] . o;n] /fi6sf tkm{af6 ag]sf ;+ljwfg, P]gsfg'g dfGb5 tfklg
o;sf] 5'} ;}Go lgodfjnL klg x'G5 . ;]gf d'n'sdf cGofo cTofrf/, lyrf]ldrf] ;xb}g . o;lj?4 n8\g] p;sf]
cfg} an / tfut x'G5 . Tof] 5'} tfut slxn] lnlvtkdf cleJoQm x'G5 . slxn] sYoefiffsf dfWodaf6 k|l:6G5 .
slxn] ToxL ;]gfsf] Nofst / tfut ;f\s]lts lzi6 efiffdf cfPsf] x'G5 . To;}n] ;}lgs ;]jfsf] ljleGg ;Gbe{df
k|of]u x'g] sYoefiffsf ljleGg k b]lvG5g\ .
lgisif{
#$= ;docg';f/ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] gfd km]l/Psf] 5 . g]kfnsf] Oltxf;df ls/ft sfnb]lv clxn];Dd /fi6sf] k|d'v
;'/Iffb:tf ;]gfsf ljleGg ;+/rgf, kbLo efiff, kf];fs, ;]jfsflns tflnd, ljleGg klbs ju{sf] l;h{gf x'bF } cfPsf] 5 .
d'Vo s'/f] s] 5 eg] g]kfnL ;]gf cg'zfl;t, lzi6 / tflnd k|fKt /fi6 ;]jssf kdf b]vfk/]sf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf
k|o'Qm sYoefiffsf ljleGg kdWo] j0f{dflqs, zAbu'lDkmt / jfSo;+of]lht k g} ;jf]{kl/ dxTjsf] /x]sf] 5 .
#%=
;}Go ;]jf cGtu{t ljleGg bhf{sf ;]gfxn] cfgf] ;do / ;Gbe{ cg'sn
" sYoefiffsf] k|of]u u5{g\ . h:t}M ;}Go
tflnd, o'4, ;Ldf;'/Iff, /fi6k|d'v tyf ;/sf/k|d'vsf] ;'/Iffk|aGw, ;fj{hlgs sfo{qmd cyjf ;ef;df/f]x, /flqef]h,
lbjfef]h, cGt/f{li6o If]qsf ljlzi6 kfx'gfsf] ;Ddfgdf cfof]hgf x'g] sfo{qmd, u0fu'Ndsf v]ns'b / dgf]/~hgfTds
sfo{qmd, gf6\o, ;+uLt, uLt, k|x;g cflb_ df k|of]u ug]{ sYoefiff cltlzi6 / ;Ddflgt x'g] u5{ . jf:tjdf s'g} klg
bhf{sf JolQmsf] :t/ut kl/ro p;n] k|of]u ug]{ sYoefiffsf] kaf6 kfpg ;lsG5 . j0f{ljGof;, kbfjnL, jfSof+z
/ jfSosf] k|of]udf hf]8 lbg] k|j[lQ g]kfnL ;]gfdf /x]sf] kfOG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf k|of]u x'g] sYoefiffsf] :jk /
ljz]iftfnfO{ lgDg a'Fbfdf k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5 M
-s_

g]kfnL ;]gfdf tF, tkfO{,F ltdL, xh'/ h:tf ;fj{gflds kbxsf] k|of]u k|;\u / bhf{cg';f/ ul/G5,

-v_
kLkfb]lv ;'j]bf/;Dd k|of]u ePsf] sYoefiffdf :t/Lotfsf] sdL dx';; eP klg ;]s]G8nK6gb]lv
k|wfg;]gfklt;Dd axfnjfnf clws[tn] eg] kbLo dof{bf sfod x'g] lzi6 efiffsf] k|of]utkm{ ljz]if hf]8
lbG5g\,
-u_
;}Go ;]jfdf ljleGg ;d"x x'G5g\ . h:t} lrlsT;f, Ol~hlgol/\, Kof/f;'6, b}jLk|sf]ksf] p4f/,
k|zf;g, k|fljlws, cflb . ;}Go ;]jf;d"x;Fu ;'xfpFbf] cyjf ljifout sYoefiffsf] k|of]u x'g] u5{,
-3_
g]kfnL ;]gfx 8\o'6L ckm ePkl5 :jtGqh:tf b]lvP klg pgLxn] kbLo dof{bf pNn\3g u/]/
sYoefiffsf] k|of]u ub}{gg\ .
-_
;}Go ;]jf cg'zfl;t / st{Jolgi7 ;]jf xf] . o; ;]jfdf sfo{/t hjfgxsf] efiff klg cg'zfl;t
g} x'g'k5{ . x'G5 .

lk|o arg af]Ng]x?sf] sf]xL klg zq' xF'b}g.

rf0fSo

157

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

cd]l/sL ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs n]hg ckm d]l/6 /

g]kfncd]l/sf s"6gLlts ;DaGwsf] :yfkgf
pkk|fWofks 8f= ljgf]b yfkf
k[i7e"ld
!=
g]kfn / cd]l/sf* ef}uf]lns b[li6n] 6f9f /x]sfn] g]kfnsf] PsLs/0f sfo{ ;DkGg ePkl5 / cd]l/sfn]
:jtGqtf k|fKt u/]kl5 tTsfn} b'j} b]zaLr s'g} ;DaGw sfod x'g ;s]sf] lyPg . /f0ff zf;gsfndf klg k|foM /f0ff
k|wfgdGqLxn] ef/tdf /x]sf c\u|]hx;Fudfq ;DaGw hf]8\g] gLlt lnPsfn] g]kfnsf] cd]l/sfnufot ljZjsf cGo
/fi6x;Fu s'g} ;DaGw sfod x'g ;s]sf] lyPg . t/ /f0ffsfnsf bf];|f clGtd k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/n] g]kfnsf]
j}b]lzs gLltdf kl/jt{g ub}{ ljZjsf cGo /fi6x;Fu klg g]kfnsf] s"6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8\g] 3f]if0ff u/] . pgsf] of]
gLlt;Fu} g]kfn / cd]l/sf tTsfnLg ;dodf ljkl/t /fhgLlts l;4fGt / Joj:yf ePsf /fi6x klg Pscfk;df
glhs x'g k'u] . h;cg';f/ ljleGg sf/0fxn] ubf{ ;g\ !($& clk|n @% sf lbg b'O{ b]zaLr jfl0fHo tyf d}qL
;lGw ;DkGg eO{ s"6gLlts ;DaGw :yfkgf ePsf] lyof] . t/ g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLr Ps}rf]6L s"6gLlts ;DaGw
:yfkgf ePsf] lyPg . of] ;lGwsf] cj:yf;Dd cfOk'Ug ljleGg 36gfxn] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]n]sf lyP . tLdWo]sf]
Ps k|d'v / tTsfnLg 36gf lyof] bf];f| ] ljZj o'4kl5 cd]l/sL ;/sf/n] cfgf] ;]gfsf] ;jf]R{ r ;}lgs kbs n]hg
ckm d]l/6 g]kfnnfO{ x:tfGt/0f ug'{ / To; cj;/df b'j} b]zn] s"6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8\g k|an OR5f JoQm ug'{ .
cd]l/sL ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs n]hg ckm d]l/6 sf] x:tfGt/0f -;g\ !($^ gf]e]Da/_
@=
g]kfnsf] PsLs/0fsf] yfngL;Fu} g]kfnL ;]gfn] ljb]zL ;]gfx;Fu klg o'4 ug'{ k/]sf] lyof] . h;cg';f/, /fhf
k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf lj?4 dsjfgk'/sf /fhf lbUaGwg ;]gsf] ;xof]usf] nflu a+ufnsf gjfa dL/sfl;dn] u'/lug
vfFsf] g]t[Tjdf / sflGtk'/sf /fhf hok|sfz dNnsf] ;xof]usf] nflu ef/tdf /x]sf c\u|]hxn] SofK6]g lsgnssf]
g]t[Tjdf ;]gf k7fPsfn] g]kfnL ;]gfn] Tolta]nf g} a+ufnL / c\u|]h ;]gfx;Fu o'4 ug'{ k/]sf] lyof] . To:t}, axfb'/
zfxsf] gfoaLsfndf g]kfnL ;]gfn] ltAatL / lrlgofF ;]gf;Fu / eLd;]g yfkfsf] k|wfgdlGqTjsfndf c\u|]h ;]gf;Fu
7"nf] o'4 g} ug'{ k/]sf] lyof] . tL o'4xdf g]kfnL ;]gfxn] 7"nf] jL/tf k|bz{g u/]sf lyP . To;}u/L ;g\ !*%& df
k|wfgdGqL h+uaxfb'/n] ef/tdf ePsf] l;kfxL ljb|f]xdf c\u|]hxnfO{ ;xof]u ug{ k7fPsf] g]kfnL ;]gfxn] w]/}
7fpFsf] ljb|f]x bafO{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] jL/Tj k|bz{g ug{ ;kmn ePsf lyP . To;sf] ( jif{kl5 ;g\ !*^^ df cd]l/sfdf
ePsf] u[x o'4 -l;len jf/_ df klg k|wfgdGqL h+uaxfb'/n] cd]l/sL /fi6klt ca|fxd ln\sg;dIf g]kfnL ;]gf k7fO{
;xof]u ug]{ OR5f JoQm u/]sf lyP .1 g]kfnsf] pQm k|:tfjnfO{ /fi6klt ca|fxd ln\sgn] ;sf/fTds?kn] lnPklg
pgn] To;sf] nflu g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;xof]u lnPgg\ . olb Tolta]nf g]kfnL ;]gfxn] cd]l/sfsf] u[x o'4 bafpg
e"ldsf v]Ng] cj;/ kfPsf] eP cGt/f{li6o hutdf g]kfn / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] uf}/j cem a9\g hfGYof] xf]nf . ;g\ !*%)
df a]nfotsf] e|d0fdf hfFbf a]nfotsf nflu cd]l/sL /fhb"t n/]G;;Fu nG8gdf e]6]/ u/]sf] kl/ro cfbfgk|bfg2
af6 k|]l/t eO{ cd]l/sfsf] u[x o'4df ;}lgs ;xof]u u/L b'O{ b]zaLr ldqtf hf]8\g] k|oTg k|wfgdGqL h+uaxfb'/n]
u/]sf x'g;S5g\ . ;g\ !()* df k|wfgdGqL rGb|zdz]/ klg a]nfotsf] e|d0fdf hfFbf cd]l/sL /fhb"t;Fu kl/ro
cfbfgk|bfg u/]sf lyP .3 t/ tL s'/fxn]dfq g]kfn / cd]l/sfnfO{ glhs agfpg ;s]sf] lyPg .
*

oxfF cd]l/sf eGgfn] ;+o'Qm /fHo cd]l/sf eGg] a'g'k5{ .

jN8{dfs{ OG;fOSnf]k]l8of ckm b g];g M Pl;of PG8 cf]l;ofgf, ef]nd $, 8]l6cf]6, ldlrug M ufn] l/;r{, gfOGy Ol8;g, !((*, k[= $)^ ljho
s'df/ dfgGw/, P slDk|x]lG;e lx:6L ckm g]kfnrfOgf l/n];G;\ ck 6' !(%% P= 8L=, ef]nd !, -Go' lbNnL M P8f]O6 klAn;;{, @))$_, kfbl6Kk0fL
g++= #!, k[= @#% af6 p4[t .
2
-s_ k'?iff]Qd zdz]/ h=a=/f=, >L # xsf] tYo j[QfGt, -sf7df8f}+ M ljBfyL{ k':ts e08f/, @)%(, bf];|f] ;+:s/0f_, k[= ^$ .
-v_ kb\d h+uaxfb'/ /f0ff, nfOkm ckm dxf/fhf ;/ h+uaxfb'/, -sf7df8f}+ M /Tg k':ts e08f/, !(*), bf];|f]
d'b|0f_, k[= !@( .
3
uf]kfn lzjfsf]6L / /fds'df/ bfxfn, cGt/f{li6o /fhgLlt, -sf7df8f}+ M /Tg k':ts e08f/, @)^), ;ftf}+ ;+:s/0f_, k[= $!$ .
158

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

#=
g]kfn / cd]l/sfnfO{ glhs t'NofO{ s'6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8g\ ] cj:yf;Dd k'ofpg dxTjk"0f{{ e"ldsf v]Ng]
sfd bf];|f] ljZjo'4n] uof] . bf];|f] ljZjo'4df g]kfnn] ldq/fi6xsf] kIfdf o'4df efu lnPsfn] g]kfnL / cd]l/sL
;]gfxn] klxnf] k6s Pscfk;df glhs x'g] cj;/ k|fKt u/]] . pQm o'4df g]kfnL ;]gfxn] b]vfPsf] axfb'/Laf6
cd]l/sL ;/sf/, ;]gf / hgtf Hofb} k|efljt ePsf lyP . o'4df ldq/fi6x ljhoL ePkl5 k|wfgdGqL h'4zdz]/n]
cd]l/sL /fi6klt x\of/L P;= 6'dgnfO{ awfO{ Pj+ z'esfdgf ;Gb]z klg k7fP .4 ;f]xL ;dodf nG8gl:yt g]kfnL
ldlg:6/ hg/n l;+xzdz]/ /f0ffn] klg g]kfn ;/sf/sf] tkm{af6 ;g\ !($% sf] cGTolt/ cd]l/sfsf] e|d0f u/] .
pQm e|d0fsf] cj;/df pgn] cd]l/sL /fi6klt x\of/L P;= 6'dg Pj+ cGo pRr kbflwsf/Lx;Fu e]6;d]t u/] .5
o;}qmddf, bf];|f] ljZj o'4kl5 ;g\ !($^ h'nfO{df cd]l/sfsf] ljb]zdGqfno / o'4dGqfnosf] cltlysfkdf g]kfnsf]
Ps ;b\efjgf d08nn] klg cd]l/sfsf] e|d0f uof] .6 pQm ;b\efjgf d08nsf] g]t[Tj tTsfnLg k"jL{ sdflG8\
hg/n aa/zdz]/ /f0ffn] u/]sf lyP eg] n]l6g]G6 hg/n Ps/fhzdz]/, d]h/ hg/n ls/0fzdz]/, n]l6g]G6 s0f]{n
k|sfzh\u, d]h/ s0f]{n ;'/]Gb|axfb'/ zfx klg e|d0fdf ;+nUg lyP . o;/L s] b]lvG5 eg] pQm ;b\efjgf d08nsf
;a} ;b:ox ;]gfsf pRr kbflwsf/Lxdfq lyP . bz lbg;Dd cd]l/sfdf /x]sf] pQm ;b\efjgf d08nnfO{ cd]l/sL
;/sf/n] ;/sf/L cltlysfkdf 7"nf] ;Tsf/ u/L jfl;\6g / Go'of]s{nufotsf :yfgxsf] b[Zofjnf]sg u/fpg'sf]
;fy} kmf}hL tflndsf] k|bz{g;d]t u/fPsf] lyof] . e]63f6sf] cj;/df cd]l/sL /fi6k lt x\of/L P;= 6'dgn] o'4df
g]kfnn] ldq/fi6x nfO{ lbPsf] ;}lgs ;xof]usf] ;/fxgf ub}{ g]kfn;Fu ldqtfsf] xft cufl8 a9fpg cd]l/sL ;/sf/n]
klg Ps ;b\efjgf d08nnfO{ g]kfnsf] e|d0fdf k7fpg] s'/f JoQm u/] . Tolta]nf cd]l/sL /fi6k lt 6'dgn] lrgf]sf]
nflu cfgf] Ps tl:j/ klg g]kfnL ;b\efjgf d08nsf] xft k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/nfO{ k7fPsf lyP7 eg] g]kfnL
;b\efjgf d08nn] /fhf lqe'jgsf] tkm{af6 /fi6klt 6'dgnfO{ /fd k lae"if0f;d]t k|bfg u/]sf] lyof] .8
$=
cd]l/sL /fi6k lt 6'dgn] g]kfnL ;b\efjgf d08n;dIf JoQm u/]sf] s'/f cg';f/ g]kfn;Fu ldqtf cufl8
a9fpg Ps ;b\efjgf d08n g]kfn k7fpg] / g]kfnL ;]gfn] bf];|f] ljZjo'4df ldq/fi6xnfO{ u/]sf] ;xof]u /
b]vfPsf] axfb'/Lsf] sb/ ug{ cd]l/sL ;]gfsf] ;jf]R{ r ;}lgs kbs n]hg ckm d]l/6 (Legion of Merit) -l8u|L ckm
lrkm sdf08/_ k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/nfO{ x:tfGt/0f ug]{ ljrf/ u/] . To;sf nflu /fi6klt 6'dgn] ef/tdf /x]sf
cd]l/sL sfo{jfxs /fhb"t hh{ cf/= ld/]nsf] g]t[Tjdf Ps ;b\efjgf d08nnfO{ sf7df8f}+ k7fP . h;cg';f/ ;g\
!($^ gf]eD] a/df ld/]n sf7df8f}+ cfOk'u] / k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/nfO{ cd]l/sL ;/sf/sf] tkm{af6 cd]l/sL ;]gfsf]
;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs n]hg ckm d]l/6 x:tfgfGt/0f u/] .9
%=
pQm cj;/df hh{ cf/= ld/]n;Fu} g]kfn cfPsf cd]l/sL ldlg:6/ NjfO{ 8An'= x]G8/;gn] s'g} ljb]zL
/fi6xsf k|dv
' JolQmnfO{ ;+o'Qm /fHo cd]l/sfn] lbg] ;DdfgxdWo] of] ;Ddfg ;a}eGbf 7"nf] xf] eGg] s'/f JoQm
ub}{ klxnf] / bf];|f] ljZj o'4df ldq/fi6x;Fu ldn]/ g]kfnL ;]gfn] b]vfPsf] axfb'/Lsf] k|z;
+ f;d]t u/]sf lyP .10
o;/L bf];|f] ljZj o'4kl5 ljZjs} Ps zlQmzfnL b]zsf] ?kdf b]vf k/]sf] cd]l/sfn] g]kfnL ;]gfn] klxnf] / bf];|f]
ljZj o'4df b]vfPsf] axfb'/Lsf] k|z+;f / ;Ddfg u/]/ Tolt 7"nf] ;}lgs kbs lbg' g]kfn / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] nflu Hofb}
uf}/jsf] s'/f lyof] . cd]l/sfn] cfgf] ;jf]R{ r ;}lgs kbs g]kfnnfO{ k|bfg ug'{n] cd]l/sfn] g]kfnnfO{ dxTjk"0f{{
b[li6sf]0fn] x]/]sf] k|i6 x'G5 .
^=
k|foM Oltxf;sf k':tsxdf klxnf] / bf];|f] ljZj o'4df g]kfnn] ldq/fi6xsf] kIfdf ;}lgs k7fP/ ;xof]u
u/]afkt ePsf] kmfObfsf] s'/f p7fpFbf g]kfnn] 7"nf] wg/fzL k|fKt u/]sf] s'/f pNn]v ul/Psf] kfOG5 . t/ wg eGg]
4

ljj]s l3ld/], g]kfncd]l/sf ;DaGw, -sf7df08f}+ M lqe'jg ljZjljBfno, dfgljsL tyf ;fdflhs zf:q ;+sfo, /fhgLltzf:q s]Gb|Lo ljefu,
ck|sflzt zf]wkq:gftsf]Q/ tx, @)^#_, k[= #) .
5
!($&!(*& M g]kfncd]l/sf ;DaGw :jtGq ljZj, -jif{ @), c+s !, !(*& clk|n_, k[= $ . oxfFaf6 cufl8 !($&!(*& M g]kfncd]l/sf
;DaGw
6

P]hg .

uf]/vfkq, -efu $^, ;+Vof %^, ;+jt @))# sflt{s @#+_, k[= ! .

Clifs]z zfx, df]8{g g]kfn -P kf]lnl6sn lxli6 !&^(!(%%_, -Go" lbNnLM dgf]x/ klAn;;{ PG8 l8li6Ao"6;{, !((^_, k[= !&) .

!($&!(*& M g]kfncd]l/sf ;DaGw, kfbl6Kk0fL g+= % .

10

uf]/vfkq, -efu $(, ;+Vof (#, ;+jt @))% dfu{ @!_, k[= ! .
159

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

s'/f 7"nf] x'Fb}g / Tof] ;wF}e/L /xG5 eGg] klg lglZrt x'Gg . h;/L Tolta]nf g]kfnn] kfPsf] wg clxn] 5}g . t/
bf];f| ] ljZjo'4kl5 ljZjs} Ps zlQmzfnL b]z cd]l/sfn] cfgf] ;]gfsf] ;jf]R{ r ;}lgs kbs lbP/ g]kfnnfO{ ;Ddfg
u/]sfn] Tof] g} g]kfn / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] nflu dxTjk"0f{ pknAwL lyof], h;n] b]z / ;]gfsf] OHht a9fPsf] lyof] . tL
s'/fxsf] j0f{g cd]l/sL Oltxf;sf k':tsx Pj+ ;\ux| fnoxdf dxTjk"0f{ b:tfj]h ag]/ a;]sf 5g\ . t/ b'ef{Uo
o:tf s'/fxk|lt g]kfndf s;}sf] Wofg hfg ;s]sf] b]lvb}g . clxn] o; ljifodf ;]gfsf pRr txsf kbflwsf/Lx
klg cgle1 /xsf] kfOG5 . of] tSdf / tSdf;Fu} lbOPsf] k|df0fkq sxfF 5 egL g]kfnL ;]gfn] vf]hL ug'{ h?/L 5 .
olb o;nfO{ vf]hL u/L k|sfzdf Nofpg ;s]df g]kfn / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] uf}/j /fli6o Pj+ cGt/f{li6o hutdf emg\
a9\g hfg]5 .
g]kfncd]l/sf s"6gLlts ;DaGwsf] :yfkgf -;g\ !($& clk|n @%_
&=
cd]l/sL ;/sf/n] g]kfnnfO{ cfgf] ;]gfsf] ;jf]R{ r ;}lgs kbs n]hg ckm d]l/6 k|bfg u/]sf] kfFr dlxgfkl5
;g\ !($& clk|n @% df b'O{ b]zaLr s"6gLlts ;DaGw :yfkgf ePsf] lyof] . t/ o;eGbf cufl8 b'O{ b]znfO{ glhs
agfpg] cGo kl/l:yltx klg b]vf gk/]sf xf]Ogg\ . h:t}, Oltxf;nfO{ s]nfpFbf s] b]lvG5 eg] cd]l/sL :jtGqtf
;\uf| d ;dfKt ePsf] s]xL ;dokl5 g} Ps cd]l/sL Jofkf/L g]kfnsf] l5d]sL b]z ef/tsf] kflG8r]/L / snsQf
aGb/ufxdf cfOk'u]sf lyP . To;kl5 cd]l/sL Jofkf/Lxn] ef/tdf /x]sf la|l6z / k]|mGr sDkgLx;Fu ;Dks{ /fvL
Jofkfl/s ;DaGw;d]t hf]8]sf lyP eg] ;g\ !&($ df cd]l/sfn] Ps ;lGw (Jay's Treaty of 1794) g} u/L la|l6z
;/sf/af6 ef/tdf Jofkfl/s 5'6;d]t k|fKt u/]sf] lyof] .11 ;fob of] g} cd]l/sLx g]kfnsf] ef}uf]lns l;dfgf
glhs cfOk'u]sf] ;a}eGbf klxnf]k6s lyof] . ;g\ !(!) df snsQfdf /x]sf cd]l/sL sG;n hg/n ljlnod Pr=
dfOsnn] g]kfnaf6 cfoft ug{ ;lsg] j:t'xnfO{ tTsfnLg cd]l/sL eG;f/ lgodcg';f/ Go"gtd z'Ns nufP/
:jLsf/ ug{ ;lsg] s'/f pNn]v u/]sf lyP .12 o;sf] tfTko{ Tolta]nf cd]l/sL ;/sf/ g]kfn;Fu Jofkfl/s ;DaGw
:yfkgf ug{ OR5's /x]sf] / To;sf] nflu g]kfnL j:t'xnfO{ Go"gtd eG;f/ z'Nsdfq nufpg tTk/ /x]sf] s'/f :ki6
x'G5 . t/ To; ljifodf la:t[t hfgsf/L yfxf x'g ;s]sf] 5}g . To:t} ;g\ !(#( df nG8gsf nflu g]kfnL ldlg:6/
hg/n s[i0fzdz]/ /f0ffn] cd]l/sfsf] e|d0f u/] . pQm e|d0fnfO{ g} g]kfnsf] tkm{af6 ul/Psf] cd]l/sfsf] klxnf]
;/sf/L e|d0f dflgG5 .13 P6nflG6s dxf;fu/ kf/ u/]/ pgL cd]l/sf s'g p2]Zo lnP/ uPsf lyP eGg] s'/f :ki6
x'g ;s]sf] 5}g .
*=
k|foM ;a} /f0ff k|wfgdGqLxn] ef/tdf /x]sf c\u|]hx;Fudfq g]kfnsf] s"6gLlts ;DaGwnfO{ ;Lldt /fVg]
j}bl] zs gLlt ckgfPsfn] cGo b]zsf] cltl/Qm cd]l/sf;Fu g]kfnsf] s"6gLlts ;DaGw :yfkgf ePsf] lyPg . t/
/f0ffsfnsf bf];|f clGtd k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/n] ;f] gLlt TofuL ljZjsf cGo /fi6x;Fu klg g]kfnsf] s"6gLlts
;DaGw lj:tf/ ug]{ gLlt lnP . t;y{ ljleGg cGt/f{li6o ;Dd]ngxdf klg ;/sf/L k|ltlglwxn] ;f]xL cg'k
g]kfnsf] j}b]lzs gLlt :ki6 kfb}{ uP . h;cg';f/ ;g\ !($^ dfr{ dlxgfdf lbNnLdf ePsf] ck|mf]Pl;og ;DaGw
;Dd]ng (AfroAsian Relations Conference) df g]kfnn] 7"nf] k|ltlglw d08n k7fPsf] lyof] . pQm ;Dd]ng
cgf}krfl/s ePklg To;df efu lng @* b]zsf /fhgLlts g]tf tyf ;fdflhs JolQmTjx e]nf ePsf lyP .14
pQm a}7sdf efu lnb} hg/n ljhozdz]/n], g]kfn cfgf k'/fgf ldq/fi6x;Fusf] ;DaGwnfO{ alnof] kfb}{ ljZjsf
cGo /fi6x;Fu ldqtfsf] xft cufl8 a9fpg rfxG5 eGg] s'/f JoQm u/] .15 pgsf] of] egfOn] cGt/f{li6o hutn]
;d]t g]kfnn] cfgf] k'/fgf] j}b]lzs gLlt TofuL cGo /fi6x;Fu klg s"6gLlts ;DaGw la:tf/ ug{ rfxG5 eGg] s'/f
a'g ;Sof] .
11

cho l;Gxf, O08f]o'P; l/n];G;\ -k|md lb Od{h]G;\ ckm lb a+unfb]z 6' lb P;]:g];g ckm OlGb/f ufFGwL !(&!!(*$_, -k6gf M hfgsL k|sfzg,
!(($_, k[= #$ .

12

o'= P;= OGkm{d];g ;le{;, lkmK6L Po;{ ckm ;S;]; -!($&!((&_, -sf7df8f}+ M o'= P;= OGkm{d];g ;le{;, k|sfzg ldlt pNn]v gul/Psf]_, k[=

(.
13

dfwj kL= vgfn, g]kfn o'= P;= l/n];G; M P lxi6f]l/sn cf]e/Eo", OlG:6Ro"6 ckm km/]g ck]mo;{, g]kfN; l/n];G;\ ljy o'gfO6]8 :6]6;
\ ckm
cd]l/sf, -sf7df8f}+ M cfO{=Pkm=P=, @))$_, k[= ! .
14
uf]/vfkq, -efu $*, @))% j}zfv !$_, k[= ! .
15

P;= 8L= d'gL, km/]g kf]ln;L ckm g]kfn, -lbNnL M g];gn klAnl; xfp;, !(&#_, k[= !& .
160

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

(=
g]kfnsf] j}b]lzs ;DaGwnfO{ cGo /fi6x;Fu klg hf]8\g] gLlt cg'k /f0ff kbflwsf/Lxn] bf];|f]
ljZjo'4kZrft ljZjsf] Ps zlQmzfnL /fi6sf] kdf b]vf k/]sf] cd]l/sftkm{ Wofg lb+b} uP . h;sf qmddf b'j}
/fi6sf aLr klxnf] ;Dks{ ;g\ !($% df gofF lbNnLdf g]kfnL clwsf/Lx Pj+ cd]l/sL ljb]z cfly{s k|zf;gsf
k|fljlws ljz]if1xsf] cf}krfl/s a}7sdf eof] .16 pQm cj;/df cd]l/sf;Fu ;DaGw lj:tf/ ug]{ p2]Zon] g]kfn
;/sf/n] cd]l/sL k|fljlws ljz]if1xnfO{ g]kfnsf] cfly{s ljsf; ug]{ ;DaGwdf 5nkmn ug{ sf7df8f}+ cfpgsf
nflu lgdGq0ff lbPsf] lyof] .17 t/ tL cd]l/sL k|fljlws ljz]if1x Tolta]nf g]kfn cfPsf lyP ls lyPgg\ eGg]
s'/f yfxf x'g ;s]sf] 5}g . tfklg oL s'/fxn] g]kfn / cd]l/sfnfO{ glhs agfpg] jftfj/0f tof/ kfb}{ nUof] .
!)= o;}qmddf g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLr s"6gLlts ;DaGw g} :yfkgf u/fpg dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]Ng] sfd n]hg ckm
d]l/6 x:tfGt/0fsf] cj;/n] k|bfg uof] . n]hg ckm d]l/6 x:tfgfGt/0f ug]{ cj;/df af]Nb} cd]l/sL sfo{jfxs
/fhb"t hh{ cf/= ld/]nn] dxTjk"0f{ jQmJo lbPsf lyP . h;sf] d'Vo c+z o; k|sf/ lyof],
!!=
;+o'Qm /fi6 -;+o'Qm /fHo cd]l/sf_ em+} g]kfn klg o'/f]ksf] /0fe"ldaf6 3/} kms]]{sf] lyof] . t}klg km]l;i6
-kmfl;i6_ cTofrf/LnfO{ gx6fP;Dd ;+;f/sf zflGtlk|o /fi6xnfO{ eo x6\g] 5}g eGg] lgwf] u/]/ d]/f] d'n's ;+o'Qm
/fi6 -;+o'Qm /fHo cd]l/sf_ n] e}+m g]kfnn] klg cfgf] 5f]/fxnfO{ cfg} v'zLn] n8fOFdf k7fof] . cd]l/sf / g]kfnsf]
aLrdf ePsf] lgs6 ;DaGw cfufdL zflGtsfndf emg\ emg\ lgs6 / alnof] x'Fb} hfg]5 eGg] dnfO{ k"0f{ ljZjf; 5 .
ldqtf / z'esfdgfsf] nflu cd]l/sf g]kfntkm{ clu ;/]sf] 5 .18
!@=
pgsf] of] egfOn] cd]l/sf g]kfn;Fu :yfoLkdf s"6gLlts ;DaGw ufF:g rfxG5 eGg] s'/f :ki6 kfof] .
cd]l/sL sfo{jfxs /fhb"t hh{ cf/= ld/]nsf] ;Gb]zsf] k|To'Q/df k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/n] lgDg s'/f JoQm u/]sf
lyP,
tkfO{+n] xfdL;Fu :jfut of]Uo e]6 lbg'eO{ s[kfk"0f{{ s'/fx;d]t ;'gfpg' ePsf]df xfdL ;a} ;Gt'i6 ePsf 5f}+ .
gofF b'lgofF -cd]l/sf_ af6 lxGb"xsf] k|frLgtd /fHo g]kfndf tkfO+{xsf] of] k|yd cfudg Pp6f P]ltxfl;s
36gf xf] . tkfO{+sf] dxfg\ hfltnfO{ xfd|f] ;nfd 5 . d]x/jfgLsf ;fy xfdL kl km}nfpg' ePsf] tkfO{+xsf]
z'e]R5f / ldqtfnfO{ bob]lvg} xfdL :jfut ub{5f}+ . n8fOFsf ;dosf] lgs6 / cfgGbbfos ;DaGw zflGt
sfndf emg\ lgs6t/ x'g hfg] cfzf 5 .19
!#=
k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/sf] of] egfOn] g]kfn klg cd]l/sf;Fu s"6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8\g rfxG5 eGg] s'/f
:ki6 kfof] . tSdf x:tfGt/0fsf] sfo{qmdsf] ;dfkgdf k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/n] g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLrsf] ldqtfk"0f{{
;DaGwnfO{ cem alnof] / lgs6 agfpg ;Sbf] k|of; ug]{ s'/f JoQm ub}{ cd]l/sL hgtfsf] pQ/f]Q/ k|ultsf nflu
xflb{s z'esfdgf;d]t JoQm u/]sf lyP .20 ;f] cj;/df k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/n] b'j} d'n'saLr s"6gLlts ;DaGw
:yfkgf ug{ / jfl0fHo tyf d}qL ;lGw ug{sf nflu Ps ljz]if k|ltlglw d08nnfO{ g]kfn k7fpg cd]l/sL ;/sf/nfO{
cf}krfl/s lgdGq0ff;d]t k7fP . hh{ cf/= ld/]n gf]eD] j/ !^ b]vL @@ ;Dd sf7df8f}+df a;L g]kfn ;/sf/sf] pQm
lgdGq0ff lnO{ cd]l/sf kmls{P .21
!$= tSdf x:tfGt/0fsf] cj;/df b'j} b]zsf k|ltlglwxn] JoQm u/]sf cleJolQmxn] b'O{ b]zaLrsf] ldqtfnfO{
cem ufF9f / glhs agfof] . pQm cj;/n] klxnf]k6s b'O{ /fi6sf ;/sf/L k|ltlglwxnfO{ k|ToIfkdf cfdg];fdg]
a;]/ cfk;L larf/ cleJoQm ug]{ cj;/ ldNof] . To;cj;/df g} b'j} b]zsf k|ltlglwxn] cf}krfl/s?kn] b'O{ b]zaLr
s'6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8\gtkm{ Wofg lbP . To;sf] nflu cd]l/sL /fi6klt x\of/L P;= 6'dgn] g]kfn;Fu jfl0fHo tyf
d}qL ;lGw ;DkGg ug{sf nflu hf];]km ;L= :of6/y\j]6nfO{ cfgf] ljz]if k|ltlglw agfO{ ;g\ !($& clk|ndf g]kfn
16

!($&!(*& M g]kfncd]l/sf ;DaGw, kfbl6Kk0fL g+= %, k[= $ .

17

d'/nLw/ w/dbzfgL, kf]lnl6sn Osf]gf]dL ckm km/]g P8 Og b y8{ jN8{, -j/f0f;L M sf]gf{s klAnl; xfp;, !(*$_, k[= ^% .

18

uf]/vfkq, -efu $^, ;+Vof ^), ;+jt @))# dfu{ &_, k[= !$ .

19

P]hg .

20

P]hg, -efu $(, ;+Vof (#, ;+jt @))% dfu{ @!_, k[= ! .

21

!($&!(*& M g]kfncd]l/sf ;DaGw, kfbl6Kk0fL g+= % .

161

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

k7fP . h;cg';f/ :of6/y\j]6 ;g\ !($& sf] clk|n !# df g]kfn cfOk'u] / clk|n @! sf lbg /fi6klt 6'dgsf] kq
/fhf lqe'jgnfO{ x:tfGt/0f u/] .22 To;sf] rf/ lbgkl5 clk|n @% sf lbg lbpF;f] @ ah]/ #! ldg]6 hfFbf l;+xb/
af/ Uofn/L a}7sdf g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLr jfl0fHo tyf d}qL ;lGw eO{ s"6gLlts ;DaGw :yfkgf eof] . ;dfgtf /
a/fa/Ldf ul/Psf]23 pQm ;lGw kqdf g]kfnsf tkm{af6 k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/ / cd]l/sfsf] tkm{af6 :of6/y\j]6n]
x:tfIf/ u/]sf lyP . pQm x:tfIf/ ;df/f]xdf pRr cf]xbfsf ef/bf/x Pj+ ;}lgs clws[txsf] klg pkl:ylt
lyof] . pQm cj;/df /fi6klt 6'dgsf] pkl:ylt geP klg pgsf] ;Ddfgdf @! tf]ksf] ;nfdL lbOPsf] lyof]24 eg]
/fhf lqe'jgsf] ;Ddfgdf #! tf]ksf] ;nfdL lbg'sf] ;fy} b'j} yl/sf ;nfdLsf] Jof08 klg ahfOPsf] lyof] .25
pQm ;Demf}tf z'qmjf/sf] lbg ul/Psf] lyof] lsgeg] pQm lbgnfO{ g]kfnn] z'e lbg 7fg]sf] lyof] / ;Demf}tf ug]{ lbg
tyf ;do Hof]ltiff/f lgwf{/0f ul/Psf] lyof] .26 ;Demf}tf kqdf x:tfIf/ ;DkGg ePkl5 g]kfnL ;}lgs hg/nxn]
cd]l/sL kbflwsf/Lx;Fu g]kfnsf] cfly{s ;j]I{ f0f, hnljB't pTkfbgsf] ;DefJotf, t/fO{ k|b]zdf pBf]u :yfkgf
cflbsf nflu ;xof]u dfu u/]sf lyP .27
!%=
cd]l/sL /fi6klt 6'dgn] pQm ;lGw kqdf g]kfnnfO{ ;fj{ef}d;Qf ;DkGg d'n's egL ;Daf]wg u/]sf
5g\ . bf];|f] ljZjo'4kl5 ljZjs} Ps zlQmzfnL /fi6sf] kdf pbodfg /fi6 cd]l/sfn] klxnf]k6s lnlvtkdf
g} g]kfnnfO{ ;fj{ef}d;Qf ;DkGg /fi6 dfGg] sfd u/]sfn] pQm ;Demf}tfn] cGt/f{li6o hutdf g} g]kfnnfO{ Ps
:jtGq Pj+ ;fj{ef}d;Qf ;DkGg b]z eg]/ kl/lrt x'g] df}sf ldNof] . cd]l/sfh:tf] bf];|f] ljZjo'4kZrft ljZjs}
Ps zlQmzfnL b]zsf] kdf b]vf k/]sf] /fi6n] g]kfnsf] :jtGqtf / ;fj{ef}d;QfnfO{ :jLsf/ ub}{ s"6gLlts ;DaGw
hf]8o\ f] . pQm ;lGwn] cGt/f{li6o hutdf g]kfnsf] cfg} :jtGq x}l;ot k|:t't u/]sfn] pQm ;lGwnfO{ Ps dxTjk"0f{{
P]ltxfl;s 36gfsf] kdf lng ;lsG5 . g]kfnn] a]nfotkl5 ljb]zL /fi6x;Fu hf]8]sf] of] bf];|f] s'6gLlts ;DaGw
lyof] . To;}n] Ps cGtjf{tf{df g]kfnsf nflu cd]l/sL /fhb"t lncf]g h]= jfOnn] g]kfnnfO{ dfGotf lbg] ljZjsf
/fi6xdWo] xfdL bf];|f /fi6 xf}+ eg]sf lyP .28 pgsf] egfOsf] tfTko{ g]kfnnfO{ Ps :jtGq Pj+ ;fj{ef}d;Qf ;DkGg
d'n's xf] eg]/ a]nfotkl5 dfGotf lbg] /fi6 cd]l/sf xf] eGg] lyof] . x'g klg of] ;Demf}tf u/]/ cd]l/sfn] g]kfnsf]
:jtGqtf / ;fj{ef}d;QfnfO{ dfGotf lbPsf] lyof] .
!^= o;/L bf];|f] ljZj o'4df g]kfnL ;]gfn] b]vfPsf] axfb'/L clg cd]l/sL ;/sf/n] cfgf] ;]gfsf] ;jf]R{ r ;}lgs
kbs n]hg ckm d]l/6 lbP/ g]kfnnfO{ u/]sf] ;Ddfg / To; cj;/df b'j} b]zn] d}qL ;DaGw sfod ug{ b]vfPsf]
k|an OR5fsf] sf/0fn] ubf{ g} g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLr s"6gLlts ;DaGw ufFl;Psf] lyof] . g]kfn / cd]l/sfnfO{ Ps
cfk;df glhs t'Nofpg] sfd bf];|f] ljZj o'4n] u/]sf] lyof] / bf];|f] ljZj o'4df g]kfnL ;]gfxn] b]vfPsf] axfb'/Laf6}
cd]l/sL ;/sf/ / hgtfx k|efljt ePsf lyP . olb g]kfnL ;]gfxn] 7"nf] jL/tf k|bz{g ug{ g;s]sf] eP cd]l/sL
;/sf/ / hgtfsf] Wofg cd]l/sfaf6 w]/} 6f9f /x]sf] g]kfnh:tf] ;fgf] / sdhf]/ b]ztk{m kSs} hfg] lyPg / b'O{
b]zaLr t'?Gt s"6gLlts ;DaGw gufFl;g klg ;SYof] . s'g} Pp6f 36gfn] csf]{ 36gfsf] hGd u/fpF5 eg] em}+ tSdf
x:tfGt/0fsf] qmddf JoQm efjgfaf6} g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLr s"6gLlts ;DaGw ufFl;g uPsf] lyof] .
22

o'= P;= OGkm{d];g ;le{;, kfbl6Kk0fL g+= !@, k[= !) .

23

ljgf]b yfkf, g]kfncd]l/sf ;DaGw -;g\ !($&;g\ @))&_, -sf7df08f}+ M lqe'jg ljZjljBfno, dfgljsL tyf ;fdflhs zf:q ;+sfo,
ck|sflzt ljBfjfl/lw zf]wk|aGw, @)^*_, k[= $* .

24

uf]/vfkq, -jif{ $&, ;+Vof &, ;+jt @))$ a}zfv !%_, k[= ! .

25

P]hg .

26

!($&!(*& M g]kfncd]l/sf ;DaGw, kfbl6Kk0fL g+= %, k[= ^ .

27

u'8jfO{ 6' cn b\of6

(http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,855659,00htm/ retrived on 2008 June 10)

28

:jtGq ljZj, -jif{ @), ;+Vof $, ;g\ !(** dfr{{_, k[= !@ .

162

g]kfnL ;]gf

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

k"j{ k|wfg ;]gfklt dxf/yL >L tf]/0f zDz]/ /f0ffsf]

;+lIfKt hLjgL
xl/x/ zDz]/ /f0ff
!=
k"j{ k|wfg ;]gfklt dxf/yL >L tf]/0f zDz]/ /f0ffsf] hGd lktf sdfl08 s0f]{n OGb| zDz]/ /f0ff tyf dftf
b'uf{ lbJo>/L /f0ffaf6 !(^! ;fn dfu{ jfnf rt'b{zLsf lbg klZrd sdfl08 hg/n wd{ zDz]/ /f0ffsf] xfFl8ufpF
b/af/df ePsf] lyof] . tf]/0f zDz]/ /f0ffn] Dofl6s kf; u/L cfO{=P;=;L= k6gf, lxGb':yfgdf k9]sf lyP . lktf
s=s=OGb| zDz]/ /f0ffsf] #^ jif{sf] pd]/df b]xjzfg ePsf] x'Fbf pxfFsf] pd]/ @! jif{ 6]s]sf] lyof] . 3/Jojxf/ x]g'{
kg]{ ePkl5 cWoogsf] qmd lg/Gt/tf lbg kfpg' ePg .
@=
Tolt a]nf hdfgf cs}{ lyof] . rGb| zDz]/ /f0ff >L # dxf/fh k|fOd ldlg:6/ lyP . pgn] sdf08/ Og rLkm
eLd zDz]/ /f0ffnfO{ af]nfP/ tf]/0fnfO{ s] lbg] egL ;f]w]sf lyP . hjfkmdf ;d/zDz]/ /f0ffsf 5f]/f b'O{ k'is/ zDz]/
/f0ff Pjd\ afns[i0f zDz]/ /f0ffnfO{ d]h/ lbOPsf] lyof] egL eLdzDz]/n] lgj]bg u/] . k|fOd ldlgi6/sf] gfltnfO{
s] lbg] egL ;f]w]sf] kf] t egL >L # rGb|n] 3'dfP/ k|lt k|Zg u/]kl5 tf]/0f zDz]/nfO{ n]km\l6g]G6 s0f]{nsf] bhf{df
lgo'lQm lbOof] .
#=
;]gfdf sfo{/t ePkl5 pxfFn] sjfhsf] kf7 a'emfpg] qmddf klxnf x'g' eof] . k6s k6s gub k'/:sf/ ;d]t
kfpg' ePsf] lyof] .
$=
To; ;do lxGb':yfgdf c\u|]hsf] Ps 5qzf;g a[l6z /fh lyof] . a]nfa]nf a[l6z ;]gfsf hg/nx?sf e|d0f
x'g] ub{Yof] . pgLx?sf ;Ddfgdf dfr{kf:6 u/L 6F'l8v]ndf pxfFn] b]vfpg] ub{y] .
%=
>L # h'4sf] sfof{jlwdf pxfFnfO{ k"j{ bf}8fxdf tyf klZrd bf}8fxdf;d]t xflsd agfO{ v6fOPsf] lyof] . kl5
xh'l/of hg/n axfb'/ zDz]/ /f0ffsf] df]/ bf}8fxdf cl;:6]g eO{ vlO{ uPsf lyP . !(() ;fnsf] dxfe"sDkaf6
Ifltu|:t sf7df08f}sf] p4f/ sfo{ u/]afkt e"sDk kbs k|fKt u/]sf lyP .
^=
ltLo dxf;d/ z'? ePkl5 !((^ ;fndf pxfFnfO{ >Lgfy kN6gsf] sdfl08 clkm;/df lgo'lQm u/L
lxGb':yfg k7fOof] . ToxfF a[l6z ;]gfsf n]km\l6g]G6 sf]nf]g]n /f]h/;\ (Rozers) l;t s'/f gldnL v6k6 x'g k'Uof] .
n]=s= /f]h/;\n] ToxfF vlPsf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] sdfl08 hg/n axfb'/ zDz]/ /f0ffnfO{ tf]/0fzDz]/nfO{ x6fpg] ljifo
k|ltj]bg n]vL k7fP . >L # h'4nfO{ hg/n axfb'/ zDz]/ /f0ffn] ;f]xL Joxf]/fsf] k|ltj]bg k]z u/L k7fP .
&=
g]kfndf l;+xb/af/sf] >L # sf] dxlkmndf >L # h'4af6 xfdLsxfF Tof]eGbf nfos dfG5] 5}g / x6fpg ldNb}g
eGg] cfb]z eof] . dxf;d/sf] sfo{sfn k"/f u/L ^ jif{ sfo{/t eO{ @))@ ;fndf g]kfnL kmf}hsf ;fy :jb]z
kmls{P . km"n s0f]{nsf] kbdf a9'jf eP .
*=
lxGb':yfg :jtGq x'g] ;dodf a[6]g tyf Ol08ofsf] uf]/vf kN6gx?sf af8kmfF6 u/L Joj:yf ldnfpg] sfo{df
pxfFsf] g]t[Tjdf 8]lnu];g lbNnL k7fOPsf] lyof] .
(=
>L # df]xg zDz]/ /f0ffsf] sfo{sfndf ;]gftkm{sf] sfdsfhsf] ;fy;fy} lghfdtL klsf] laGtLkq lgsf;fdf
sfd ;dfn]sf lyP .
!)= >L # df]xgn] d]3/fhzDz]/ /f0ffnfO{ d]h/ hg/ndf kbf]Gglt u/]kl5, cfkm"n] klg hg/n kfpg' kg]{ egL
lgj]bg k7fP . t/ >L # sf] dxlkmndf dxf/fh df]xgn] ;a}sf ;fd' tf]/0fzDz]/n] hg/n dfu]sf] x]/ egL b]vfP .
clg To;kl5 tf]/0fzDz]/ labf lnP/ snsQf -lxGb':tfg_ uP . ToxfF ;'j0f{zDz]/ /f0ff;Fu sfu|]; kf6L{df k|j]z
u/] .
!!=
uf]Ko ld;g lnP/ sf7df08f} n'sLl5kL cfPsf]df kf]n v'Ng uO{ @))& ;fn OGb|hfqfsf] /flt pxfFnfO{ lu/km\tf/
u/L l;+xb/af/sf] a/kmafudf y'g] .
163

l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL ;]gf

!@=
^ ge]Da/ !(%) O=;=sf] k|ftMsfn >L % lqe'jg PsfPs /fhkl/jf/sf ;b:ox?;lxt gf/fo0flx6L /fhb/af/
kl/Tofu u/]/ Ol08og b"tfjf; ;jf/L eof] . lxGb':yfgaf6 ljz]if?kn] k7fOPsf] ladfgf/f !) ge]Da/ !(%) O{=df
>L % lqe'jg ;kl/jf/ lbNnLtkm{ ;jf/L eof] . To;kl5 ToxfFsf] k|wfgdGqL hjfx/nfn g]x?sf] ljz]if bafa cfPkl5
@))& ;fn df3 dlxgf /ft ^ ah] u0f]zdfg l;+x nufot tf]/0f zDz]/ tyf ;a}nfO{ d'Qm ul/of] .
!#=
k|hftGq :yfkgf ePkl5 >L % lqe'jgaf6 kfFr hgf /f0fftkm{sf / % hgf sfu|]; tkm{sf dGqL d08n
aGof] . Soflag]6 ldl6df /f0fftkm{sf lzIff dGqL g[kh /f0ffn] tf]/0fzDz]/nfO{ k'gM ;]gfdf lgo'lQm ug{ ldNb}g eGg]
s'/f p7fPsf]df sfu|];tkm{sf kfFr}hgfdWo sf]xLn] s]xL gaf]nL df}g /x] .
!$= @))& ;fn r}q #) ut] e/tzDz]/ /f0ffsf] uf]/vfbnn] sf7df8fF}sf] ;]G6/ h]n pk/ cfqmd0f u/L cfkm\gf
gfosx?nfO{ 5'fO{ u[xdGqL ljZj]Zj/ k|;fb sf]O/fnf a;]sf] g+= ! anfdf ;d]t xdnf ug{ k'u]kl5 ToxL /ft !!
ah] tf]/0fzDz]/nfO{ af]nfO{ k'ln;sf] OG;k]S6/ hg/n ckm k'ln; -cfO{=lh=lk=_ df lgo'lQm ul/of] . clg uf]/vfbnsf
e/tzDz]/ nufot cGox? klg kqmfp u/L n}grf}/ y'lgP .
!%=
>L % lqe'jgnfO{ dnfO{ ;]gf ;DaGwL Toltsf] 1fg gePsf] x'Fbf bfO{ tf]/0fzDz]/nfO{ ;]gfdf aS;L dnfO{
k'ln;df lgufx aS;] x'GYof] egL hg/n g/zDz]/ /f0ffn] laGtL r9fPkl5 tf]/0f zDz]/nfO{ ;]gfdf n]km\l6g]G6
hg/nsf] kb / hg/n g/zDz]/nfO{ k'ln;df cfO{=lh=lk=lgo'lQm alS;of] . @)!# ;fn h]i7 & ut] >L % dx]Gb|af6
pxfFnfO{ dxf/yLdf kbf]Gglt u/L k|wfg;]gfklt lgo'Qm u/L alS;of] .
!^=
k|wfg ;]gfklt ePkl5 Ol08ofsf] ;]gfWoIf hg/n s]=P;= lyDd}ofsf] lgdGq0ffdf >LdtL;lxt Ol08of e|d0f
ug'{ ePsf] lyof] . kl5 a[l6z uf]/vf kN6gsf] lg/LIf0f e|d0f ug{ l;fk'/ hfg' ePsf] lyof] .
!&=

>L % dx]Gb|sf ;jf/L;fy g]kfnsf &$ lhNnfx? e|d0f ug{' ePsf] lyof] .

!*= @)!^ ;fn h]7 & ut] pxfFn] ;}lgs ;]jfaf6 cjsfz kfpg' eof] . @)@@ ;fndf lrlgofF b"tfjf;nfO{ ;ft
nfvdf cfkm\gf] 3/ a]rL lj/f6gu/ df]/df gofF 3/ agfO{ a:g' eof] . clg sf;Ljf; a:g] dg;fo lnO{ >LdtL;fy
@)@^ ;fndf agf/; -Ol08of_ hfg' eof] . @)$* ;fndf tTsfnLg k|wfgdGqL s[i0fk|;fb e/fO{af6 7"nf] cfu|x
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Transitional Pacts as Determinants of Future Civil

Military Relation
- Lt Col Shantosh B Poudyal
Introduction
1.
The current state of Civil Military Relations (CMR) in Nepal appears stable on the surface
but there are too many undercurrents that can destabilize this situation. First and foremost, the
environment of consensus among major stakeholders has faltered despite some promising
breakthroughs in the process of integration of the Maoist combatants. The combatants are
anxious and frustrated about their future while the major political parties are not able to agree
on the details. Even the Maoist leadership remains divided over the issue.
2.
Similarly, despite the fact that institutions like Ministry of Defense, National Security
Council and State Affairs Committee, are maintaining regular oversight over the functions of
the Nepalese Army (NA), it has been facing allegation that it is neither transparent nor under
effective civilian control. On the other hand, there are serious grievances among the members
of the NA about the harsh and one sided provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), which they feel have contributed in eroding its professional competencies. They are
also anxious and worried over their future and possible politicization of their organization
once integration of the Maoist combatants takes place.
3.
In this circumstance, it will only be natural if NA and the Maoists combatants contest
political decisions if they deem it to be unjust and contrary to their interests. Although it is
not uncommon that political forces and institutions try hard to preserve their prerogatives and
interests during democratic transitions, but it is during transitions that we can set things on
the right course. Since we are in the process of completing the peace process and drafting a
new constitution, it provides us with a historic opportunity to ensure that Nepals future CMR
remains a healthy one and Nepal moves towards democratic consolidation. 1 The future state
of CMR will depend upon the nature of current transition, the pacts forged between various
forces on power sharing and the institutional mechanisms that they create today.
4.
It is in this backdrop that, I argue that political forces should firstly craft transitional
pacts in such a manner that leaves little room for misinterpretation and at the same time also
addresses the just interest of all stakeholders especially the military. But they should also be
sensitive towards the fact that transitions are fluid hence pacts they make today may need
revisiting and renegotiation tomorrow. To support my hypothesis, I will firstly explain the
concept and value of a transitional pact then demonstrate how ambiguous pacts made in the
past have led to unstable CMR through analysis of certain episodes from the recent Nepalese
history.

1
For detail on the concept of democratic consolidation please read Philippe Schmitter, The consolidation of political
democracies: processes, rhythms, sequence and types, Transition to Democracy, Ed. G Pridham, (Dartmouth, Aldershot,
1995) and Adam prezeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin
America, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

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Transitional Pacts Explained

5.
A transitional pact may be defined as a pact between the incumbent and emergent or
among the emergent political forces in the context of a transition from authoritarian regime
to democratic one. It is expected to address the modalities of management of distribution
of political power and can also be called the political pact.2 Within this framework the
military pact or the understanding with or about the military assumes pivotal role because
of the crucial contribution of the military in making the transition from an authoritarian to a
democratic regime.
6.
It is because some form of support or endorsement from the military is invariably
required for the transition to begin in the first place. Second, the new regime needs the support
of the military to establish and sustain their fragile authority and last they need to establish
adequate control over the coercive authority of the state because without such control they will
ultimately lack both the legitimacy and authority. This becomes obvious if we refer to Philippe
Schmitters visual representation of regime change diagram where he clearly outlines the
negotiation of a military pact as a required pre condition for the demise of authoritarian rule
and formal transfer of power, similarly, he cites submission of military to civilian control as
the condition for persistence of democracy. 3
7.
Despite control of military being one of the central themes in democratic consolidation,
it is important to note the undeniable role of the military even in modern day democracies. It
is in this context Samuel Finer states that, since the military possess superior organization and
arms their political advantage vis--vis civilian groupings are overwhelming, thus, instead of
asking why the military engage in politics we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise.4
This scenario may become more accentuated in a post conflict transitional situation like that in
Nepal, where contending military forces or the state military and the rebel military coexist in
an ill defined environment driven by the concerns over preservation of their prerogatives and
their future status. This is why a transitional (military) pact assumes greater significance.
8.
Strangely, there are hardly any examples of a written military pact prior to democratic
transition hence they remain a non -tangible idea which is not observed in terms of actual
signing of the pact but is often reflected in institutions like the constitutions and acts that
are promulgated in the post transitional structure. It is usually not de jure but a de facto
arrangement. While a pact with the military or among the elites about the military, can facilitates
transition, it may also produce unstable civil military relations. It is because militaries often
tend to facilitate democratic transition only if they are ensured preservation and protection of
their prerogatives and interests in the post transitional scenarios. Here military prerogatives
can be defined as areas where, whether challenged or not, the military assumes they have an
acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal
governance, or to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus.5 Although
2

Schmitter, The consolidation of political democracies, p.541.

Ibid.

Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics, (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1962), p.5.

Alfred C. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and Southern Cone, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1988) p. 125-129.
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the initial military pact usually involves preservation of certain military prerogatives, in reality
it is important that they also reflect the genuine institutional interests of the military. The pact
thus needs to be comprehensive, flexible and just if it is to avoid contestation and survive the
fast paced development of transition.
9.
Easier said than done, the transitioning democracies are quick to negotiate a military pact
in order to facilitate transition but are not careful enough to gauze the possible consequences.
Once such arrangements are in place they tend to persist and become difficult to abrogate. The
militaries will contest if abrupt and arbitrary change to such a pact is made unilaterally leading
to problems in CMR.
10.
We have noted that military contestations usually center around preservation of agreed
upon prerogatives but the nature and mode of transition plays a crucial role in defining the
prerogatives thus in outlining possible sphere of contestation.6 The military of the state may
not enjoy such prerogative if it is defeated by the insurgent / rebel forces hence will be subject
to arbitrary treatment or vice versa. In such circumstances spheres of contestations will be
less ambiguous. But if the transition takes place as a result of ambiguous compromise then
prerogatives tend to persist leading to frequent contestations and ultimately an unstable
CMR.
Case Study
11.
Through some historical examples, I will attempt to highlight the pivotal role of the
military as an actor in the transition and demonstrate how nature of transitional pacts and
mode of transition can lead to a specific trajectory of CMR. I will also highlight how CMR
suffers a setback when political elites adopt utilitarian views of the military in their quest for
political survival once they realize their position in a changed power equation. The political
force emerging stronger usually starts ignoring the pact whereas the weaker ones tend to
be extremely defensive. Because of the above mentioned possibilities, the political forces
managing the transition must emphasize in executing unambiguous pacts clearly outlining
the military prerogatives in the first place. In the case, where this is not practicable they must
make an effort to continuously revisit and renegotiate their military pacts in the light of new
realities. I will set out the context of the two major democratic transitions in Nepal and some
critical events that vindicate the abovementioned arguments.
The First Democratic Transition
12.
Riding on the third wave a popular movement led by a coalition of left and liberal
parties forced the King to give up the single party rule and accept the role of a constitutional
monarch within a parliamentary democracy in 1990. Unlike some other autocracies the then
King clearly refrained from using the Army to suppress the protests. It is also widely believed
that he rather took the counsel of the army leadership that advised him not to go against the
popular demands and pursued him to facilitate a peaceful democratic transition.7 Until this
time the NA was considered a key player that assisted the King in sustaining the single party
6
Schmitter, The consolidation of political democracies, pp. 541- 549 and Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, p.
93-97.
7

Unverified reports claim that the then COAS Gen Gadul Shamsher JBR and Gen Satchhit Shamsher JBR had advised the
then King Birendra against repression and for facilitation of political transition.
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Panchayat system.8 The mode of transition thus was consensual involving the King and the
democratic parties. A pact was made certain key issues including the role of the military which
later became evident in the new constitution.
13.
The provisions in the constitution of 1990 adequately reflected the nature of the pact
reached between the monarchy (incumbent elite) and the democratic parties (emergent elite)
about power sharing and especially perseverance of the monarchy military relationship
intact. There were provisions in the new constitution that curtailed the involvement of the
army from all domestic affairs. The Army was not given any representation in the various
security committees formed at the district, zonal and regional level.9 The new constitution also
provided for the establishment of a National Security Council (NSC) however, the King as the
Supreme Commander in Chief was provided with the final authority to mobilize the army.10
The new government focused in controlling the army through allocation of a meager defense
budget and moved towards other national priorities leaving the army alone with its internal
autonomy intact in the hands of the palace.11 The King continued to exercise his control over the
army from a Military Secretariat located inside the palace bypassing the Ministry of Defense
and the government.
14.
This is a good example how the mode of transition (a compromise) can shape military
prerogatives and define sphere of contestations. It is also an example of how neglect of
the transitional governments of the military in post transitional settings can pave a way for
renewed or continued alliance between the elements of the military and the past regime. The
full impact of such constitutional ambiguity and isolationist policies of the new government
will be realized only later.
Dunai and Holeri: Acts of Omission?12
15.
The Nepal Communist Party-Maoist began an armed insurgency in Nepal since 1996.
The government initially responded to it through the use of police force but, once the Maoist
insurgents started getting stronger militarily, the government started to plan on deploying the
army to restore the law and order situation. The army however held the opinion that declaration
of state of emergency, an all party consensus, and the labeling of the Maoists as terrorists
should be the preconditions for its mobilization.13 The preconditions although justified given
the situation of political instability because of intra and inter party disputes represented a
subtle contestation of the political authority by the military. This led to the development of
friction between the government and the NA and subsequently resulted in the establishment of
a new para military force, the Armed Police Force (APF). The NA budgets then on reflected
8

Prakash Nepali and Fanindra subba, Civil Military Relations and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, Small Wars and
Insurgencies, Vol. 16, Issue No. 1, p. 91

Ibid.

10

Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal: 1990. http://www.vakilno1.com/saarclaw/nepal/consitution/consitutionofnepal.

htm (accessed November 19, 2010).

11

Nepali and Subba, 93.

12
For details on the concepts of acts of omission and commission please see The Man on the Horseback, by Samuel E
Finer.
13

Nepali and Subba, 94.

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a significant cut whereas government priority went to the APF indicating the governments
neglect of the military.
16.
As the insurgency progressed, the NA continued to face accusation of insubordination
from the government. Two incidents are worthy of analysis here. First, the NA allegedly
did not get mobilized to support the police force under attack by the Maoists in the district
headquarters of Dolpa in the far West. Second allegation is that of the NA refused to conduct
operations against the Maoist combatants gathered in Holeri village of the Rolpa district.
There are, however no recorded official communication of the government order or the NA
refusal. Whatever the reasons may be, it remains a fact that NA was not mobilized in both the
occasions. Furthermore the then Home Minister Govinda Raj Joshi of the Nepali Congress
party and the Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala both resigned after the Dunai and the
Holeri incident respectively clearly suggests the state of CMR and the level of contestations
existing at the moment.14 In these incidents the primary blame has been assigned to the King
and the constitutional provisions that allowed him to make a final say in the mobilization of
the NA. This presents a clear example of how a pact concerning the control of military can
challenge the legitimacy and authority of a transitional government and lead to an unstable
CMR.
Royal Takeover: an Act of Commission?
17.
While Maoist insurgency continued to grow in strength, King Gyanendra came to
power and unlike his brother, the late King Birendra, he took a more proactive position in
politics of Nepal.15 By the end of the year 2001 it was becoming increasingly clear that the
police and the newly formed armed police force would not be able to hold on for long. The
government did mobilize the NA but only when Dang barrack was attacked and captured by
the Maoists. The government declared state of emergency and implemented the Terrorists
and Disruptive Activities Ordinance (TADO) to facilitate the mobilization. As the NA begun
conducting military operations against the Maoists, the government resorted to a series of
negotiations, all resulting in failures. In this context, on October 4, 2002, the King in a bold
move, dissolved the House of Representative, dismissed the prime minister and his cabinet,
and formed his own government.16 In doing so, the King used article 127 of the constitution
which allowed the King to issue necessary orders to remove any difficulty in connection
with the implementation of the constitution.17
18.
But successive governments assigned by the King also failed to produce any desired
results in terms of either suppressing the Maoist insurgency or conducting successful
negotiation. Then the King once again dismissed the government and assumed all executive
powers of the state himself through a proclamation of emergency on February 1, 2005.18
During this intervention by the King, the NAs involvement appeared more visible as the

14

Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, Paradise Lost: State Failure in Nepal, (New York: Lexington Books, 2010), 61-63

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid.

17

Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990.

18

Riaz and Basu, Paradise Lost, 63.

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g]kfnL ;]gf

central authority of the Unified Command.19 The joint forces were seen taking control of
the telecommunications, media houses, and the international airport.20 Although legality of the
constitutional provision (article 127) used by King Gyanendra is a matter of debate, the main
point here is that the the historic compromise of 1990 enabled the monarchy to retain control
over the army and to declare emergencies.21
19.
The abovementioned opinion is shared by many who argue, that in fact, the 1990
constitution was a compromise document between the monarchy and the political parties.22
This compromise or transitional pact arguably resulted in the retention of the prerogatives by
the King and also contained the illiberal characteristics of the past regime.23 The impact of
such a pact circumscribed the governments ability to wrest control of the coercive authority
of the state from the King.
The Second Democratic Transition
20.
While the above mentioned events describe how a transitional pact can lead to unstable
civil military relations and subsequent military contestations of the political authority; the
following event contrastingly presents a case where a military pact facilitates a democratic
transition.
21.
During the second transition from a constitutional monarchy to a federal democratic
republic in 2007 the NCP Maoists and seven mainstream democratic parties concluded a
CPA. Prior to that, a proclamation of the House of Representative made sweeping changes
in the political structure and also redefined the relationship between the Nepalese Army and
the Nepalese polity.24 The purpose of the proclamation was mainly two fold, first, it severely
curtailed the powers of the king and second, it not only severed the link between the monarchy
and the military but also attempted to bring the military under civilian control. All the while
the armed combatants belonging to the Maoist party were kept in cantonments pending a
modality of their rehabilitation and integration. While there were clear articulations on what is
to be done with the NA there was ambiguity about the management of these combatants. This
ambiguity surrounding the management of combatants has now become the primary cause for
the political stalemate.
22.
The new transitional government decided to declare Nepal a federal democratic
republic at the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly. Given the history of its long term
loyal association with the monarchy and the incidents of contestations in the past, there
was apprehension about how the military would react to this particular decision. The army
19

Under the Unified Command concept the overall control of all the security forces, The Nepal Police, The Armed Police
Force and National Investigation Department was assigned to the Army and all security operations were conducted jointly
by the forces under the leadership of the Army.

20

Rita Manchand reporting as Soldiers went into the office of the countrys leading internet service provider and suspended
its services.The Armys Signal Corps disconnected all the transponder satellite links. For the Frontline, Vol.22, Issue:4,Feb
12-25, 2005, http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2204/stories/20050225005612700.htm (accessed 7th June 2011)

21

Ibid. 64.

22

Adhikary, The Context of Conflict and Human Rights Violation in Nepal, p. 16.

23

Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Seize: Nepals Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003, p. 59.

24

The Proclamation of the House of Representative of Nepal May 18, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/gazette/2006/05/
nepal-parliament-sovereignty.php
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leadership, contrary to the apprehensions, did not contest in the implementation of the republic
bringing an end to the more than 200 year long active alliance with the monarchy.
23.
The puzzle here is what could have prevented the army from contesting this particular
decision? Again, there may be a range of explanation such as respect for peoples decision and
discipline of the NA but a military pact could again be the reason. Although nothing has been
expressed formally, the NA retained a key prerogative during this transition, that of succession
of command. In a clear demonstration of such pact, the new government retained the Army
leadership while it suspended all other heads of security and intelligence agencies of the time.
Although the pact facilitated the transition at that particular time, the events in the future will
show that transition alone is no guarantee of consolidation and end to contestations.
Breach of the Transitional Pact and Consequences
24.
Once the monarchy out of the way, the new political elites, particularly the Maoists
moved towards consolidating their gains by imposing stricter control mechanisms upon the
NA but their inability to institutionalize such mechanism and outright prejudice came in the
way of sustained and true defense reform. The parties initially concluded an Arms and Army
Management Agreement (AAMA) and subsequently added few more agreements pertaining
to the control and restructuring of the NA and management of the Maoist combatants in the
interim constitution. But, as the shift in the political power became apparent with the Maoist
winning maximum number of seats in the constituent assembly and leading the government,
the pact between the political elites became shaky. Furthermore, the bulldozing attitudes
of the Maoists once in government gave rise to fear and anxiety within the NA and further
entrenchment of the other political parties. This led to realignment in the political equation
with the same democratic parties now advocating for the NA and the Maoists going for the
complete domination of the NA.
25.
The Maoist government under the premiership of Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Prachanda
tried to implement policies and took actions that rather indicated a different agenda than that
of true defense reforms. These attempts naturally was contested by the NA and supported by
other political forces. Three incidents in this regards are crucial in demonstrating the tensions
in CMR during the time.
26.
Firstly, the NA decided to continue recruitment despite protests from the United Nations
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the Maoists. Both argued that the recruitment was against the
CPA. The process however had already been approved by the defense ministry itself that too
under a Maoist minister and was already half way through and was difficult to reverse. 25 Second,
eight qualified and promising Brigadier Generals of the NA were given abrupt retirement in an
unprecedented manner by the Maoist government. This was widely perceived as an attempt by
the Maoists to deliberately cripple the future NA leadership. But upon the intervention by the
judiciary all eight Brigadier Generals got reinstated. Here again the Maoist government alleged
the army leadership of showing insubordination for not awaiting formal communication from
the Ministry of defense before recalling them on duty.26 Third, was the withdrawal of the
25

Dr. S. Chandrashekharan, Nepal: Precipitate Action on Sacking the Army Chief Will Derail the Peace Process, South
Asia Analysis Group update no. 187, April 28, 2009 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/notes6/note510.html (accessed
December 2, 2010).
26

Ibid.
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Army sports team from the 5th national games as a response to a last minute entry of the team
of the Maoist combatants against the charter of the National Sports Council.27 These incidents
demonstrated the environment of growing contestation and the Maoist government on the
name of establishing civilian control sought a clarification from the Chief of Army Staff, a
constitutional provision that allows the government to fire the Chief if his clarification is found
to be unsatisfactory.
27.
Finally on 3 May, 2009 the minority cabinet (the coalition partners of the governments
walked out of the cabinet meeting in protest thus rendering the cabinet decision incomplete)
decided to fire the army chief. The president, who is also the Supreme Commander of the
army, in response to this rash decision, ordered the army chief to continue in his job saying
that the government had not completed the required procedure for the Chiefs removal.28 The
incident finally ended in the army chief continuing in his job while the Maoist prime minister
resigned over the issue leading to the collapse of the government.29
28.
The incident proves that the military may / will contest political decisions if its
institutional interests and prerogatives are threatened abruptly without adequate justification.
Additionally, the military may well receive support from other political forces if they feel that
the pact between the parties is being breached. Thus it can be concluded that the transitional
governments policies towards the military should reflect the spirit of the transitional pact
between the political elites. Breach of such pact will only lead to contestations by both the
military and other political forces. Disregard or misinterpretation of such a pact can result in
confrontation between the political elites, which not only results in the further continuation of
military prerogatives and unstable CMR but also promotes stalemate of political progress.
29.
Here the military pact between the emergent forces (the Maoists and the seven parties)
that was meant to address the post transition situation appears to have broken down under the
pressure of a fast changing dynamic environment that had dramatically altered the previous
power equation. In summary, the pact between the Maoists and the then government could
not envision the electoral political strength of the Maoists.30 Similarly, it also failed to foresee
the problem that could arise out of an unresolved issue of the status of the militaries in the
post conflict scenario. While there was unanimous agreement on the need to isolate the NA in
the name of dismantling the old authoritarian order and severing its link with the Monarchy,
the urgency to do the same with the Maoist combatants and their mother party took a back
seat. Thus the lingering problem of the management of the Maoist combatants, leading to
diminishing political consensus hence diminishing possibilities of a new constitution in time.
Conclusion
30.
The case study demonstrates how modes of democratic transitions and the nature of
transitional pacts impact course of civil military relations. It also reminds political leadership
about the need to pay due attention to the genuine concerns of the military. If these facts are not
considered then they can pose serious obstacle to the process of democratic consolidation.
27

Ibid.

28

Ibid.

29

Ibid.

30

The Maoist secured the largest number of seats in the CA assembly elections conducted in 2008.
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31.
The most important point of departure again is the transitional (military) pact. Whether
the pact is between the political elites or between them and the military, it must be unambiguous
and just. Here, understanding that these pacts are not static but dynamic is very important for
the political elites to continue negotiating and re-negotiating the pact both among each other
and with the military. The re-negotiation of pacts is also related to another important aspect
of civil military relation which is the understanding the genuine concerns of the militaries and
their need to be effective for which adequate resource needs to be allocated by the political
leaders.
32.
Nepal is on the verge of writing a new constitution and this is the perfect time and a
historic opportunity to both review military prerogatives and re-negotiate the military pact
from a framework that not only addresses the concern of the political forces of controlling the
military but also the concern of the military about its effectiveness and institutional interests.
This may provide a good opportunity to both create institutions that help consolidate a better
CMR.
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173

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bfloTj l;kfxL tyf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] /xg] 5}g .
;= d+=
k"j{ :jLs[ltljgf of] klqsfdf k|sflzt s'g} klg /rgfx? jf ltgLx?sf] s'g} lx:;f c?
kqklqsfdf k|sfzg ug{ lgif]w ul/Psf] 5 .
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k|f= hd= ;'lgn l;jfsf]6L

sDKo'6/ n]cfp6

k|f= x'= ljlkg s'df/ zfxL

l;kfxL jflif{s
@)^*
174

/ftf] / rGb| ;" o { hL lgzfg xfd| f ]

lhpbf] /ut ;/L of] aNbf] of] zfg xfd|f]
lxdfn em}+ c6n of] e'ms]g of] slxNo}
nq] g of] slxNo} hL lgzfg xfd| f ]
of] hGdb} hut\ d f s} o f} + k| x f/ cfP
;fd| F Ho b' O { xf/] xf/] g zfg xfd| f ]
ha;Dd rGb| ;" o { cfsfzdf /xG5g\
ta;Dd x'G5 cfkm\g} /ftf] /ut of] xfd|f]
ufO{ ;/L 5g\ ;fw' hf] hf] oxf hut\df
;asf] z/0f alnof] hL lgzfg xfd|f]