Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2937706
2937706
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Political
Economy.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 189.125.124.5 on Tue, 22 Sep 2015 14:27:46 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
668
JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY
Subjects Covered
The book is almost entirely theoretical with a focus on the latest theoretical
advances. An introductory chapter on the theory of the firm provides an
excellent overview of principal-agent theory. The book is then divided into
two parts. The first part (chaps. 1-4) covers single-firm behavior, while the
second part (chaps. 5-11) covers multiple-firm behavior and is the distinguishing feature of the book. Each chapter is wonderfully written.
Chapters 1-4 consider the monopolist's optimal choice of durability, quality, prices, and control of distribution. The heuristic proof of Coase's result
regarding the lack of monopoly power in a durable-good industry is one of
the clearest I have seen. The discussion of quality goes through the Spence
result on optimal product diversity and the signaling literature when consumers must infer quality from a firm's pricing. I have always been skeptical about
the empirical importance of the signaling equilibria in which a firm signals
quality by sinking costs; after reading Tirole's discussion, I remain skeptical.
The discussion regarding asymmetric information and government intervention is all right but sometimes comes close to confusing the theoretical possibility of remedying an externality with the practical ability to do so.
The discussion of price discrimination goes through first-, second-, and
third-degree price discrimination in more detail than is typically done. The
material in the supplementary section on optimal nonlinear tariffs is excellent
but a bit difficult. It is hard to find this material anywhere else in such a
readable form. For example, Tirole concisely discusses the condition on the
distribution function of consumer types that is needed for the optimal nonlinear price to be concave-a difficult but key topic in nonlinear pricing. I
would have spent more time on two-part tariffs and stressed more some of
the relationships between consumer heterogeneity and the optimal two-part
tariff. (For example, the fixed fee tends to rise and marginal charge fall as
consumers become more homogeneous.) Tirole does a good job of proving
I thank Andrew Rosenfieldand George Stigler for helpful comments.
This content downloaded from 189.125.124.5 on Tue, 22 Sep 2015 14:27:46 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BOOK REVIEWS
669
the welfare properties of price discrimination. One minor quibble is that the
section entitled "Welfare" (p. 158) talks about output, not welfare.
Vertical relationships is the last topic in part 1. It is not clear that this
chapter belongs in the first part of the book on single-firm behavior since the
point of many vertical restrictions is to improve a firm's ability to compete
with its rivals. Vertical relationships is a topic in which empirical examples
abound and in which a student may need help understanding the empirical
relevance of the models. Tirole does provide some empirical glimpses, but the
professor will need to supplement them. Tirole's discussion of the antitrust
laws on vertical control is so short (one paragraph) that no student will understand it. Tirole discusses many of the most important reasons for vertical
foreclosure and control but omits some. For example, the rationale for exclusive dealing as a way to prevent free-riding among manufacturers is omitted.
Tirole seems overly modest in the discussion on foreclosure and stresses the
premature nature of any conclusions. Still, I am concerned that antitrust
enforcement agencies will read Tirole to say that foreclosure is a potentially
serious worry that has the support of theoretical models. I would have preferred a statement such as "Although some models of vertical foreclosure
have been developed, most rely on strong assumptions of asymmetry between
incumbent and entrant. It appears then that foreclosure is likely to succeed
only when such asymmetry can be preserved over time. Vertical foreclosure is
an area in which more work is needed." Some of Salop's work on foreclosure
and raising a rival's costs could be profitably discussed at greater length.
Part 2 analyzes competition among firms. Chapter 11 (which is an appendix
to the book) should be read before one begins part 2 since it provides the
basics of game theory used in the remainder of the book. It starts out with
simple concepts but quickly gets into sophisticated topics such as Bayesian
perfect equilibrium. It is an excellent primer, but if students have never seen
Bayes's theorem, the end of this chapter will be too hard. The supplementary
section is clearly designed for advanced students interested in existence
proofs that freely utilize notions of compactness, quasi concavity, and Jensen's
inequality. In short, this chapter will be challenging even for top graduate
students.
Part 2 goes on to analyze static models and dynamic models of oligopoly
and monopolistic competition. The analysis of the standard models (Cournot
and Bertrand) is insightful as is the discussion of monopolistic competition.
The discussion of dynamic models treats subjects that are not presented elsewhere in the same detailed but readable way. Tirole is careful to emphasize
that, at the current stage of development, there is an "embarrassment of
riches" in the sense that in many dynamic games almost any type of behavior
can be justified as an equilibrium. He candidly admits that little attention has
yet been paid to empirical implications of these models. The discussion of
how a rival's earlier behavior can affect others' beliefs about the rival and
benefit the rival is clearly expressed and is an important concept that students
will easily grasp. The supplementary sections of several of these chapters
contain material that will appeal exclusively to advanced graduate students.
The last three chapters (chaps. 8-10) really form the heart of the book.
These chapters apply the insights of game theory to strategic competition.
They contain clear and detailed discussions of topics that students might find
inaccessible if they relied on published articles. Tirole characterizes precommitments in two-period games by how they affect a rival's decisions in the
future, and he goes quite a way in making empirically testable theoretical
This content downloaded from 189.125.124.5 on Tue, 22 Sep 2015 14:27:46 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
670
JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY
The level of difficulty of the book raises some questions about whether undergraduates could handle the material. Tirole excels at simplifying and presenting simple mathematical models. Overall, he does a terrific job of minimizing
reliance on complicated mathematical techniques. Even so, undergraduates
could find the mathematics tough or intimidating. Line integrals are discussed in the preface, control theory is needed for a problem in chapter 1,
and game theory is used extensively (after being presented in a clear but
difficult appendix) later in the book. None of these techniques is so complicated that a mathematically sophisticated undergraduate should be put off,
but I suspect that most undergraduates will be at least a little nervous.
The chapters of the book vary in their level of difficulty. The book does not
This content downloaded from 189.125.124.5 on Tue, 22 Sep 2015 14:27:46 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
671
BOOK REVIEWS
I would use this book as a sole text only in a specialized, advanced graduate
course in industrial organization because of its idiosyncratic coverage of topics, but I would use parts of the book to complement other readings in a more
general graduate course. I have taught graduate industrial organization with
Robert Gertner at the University of Chicago for several years and have used
the Carlton-Perloff (1990) textbook (which is slightly less advanced than
Tirole's, especially on dynamic games under uncertainty, but deals with empirical and theoretical topics) and selected chapters of Tirole plus journal
articles. In particular, Gertner and I use several of Tirole's chapters to discuss
strategic behavior (chaps. 8-10) and to introduce game theory (chap. 11). I
would feel comfortable using parts of selected chapters in an advanced
undergraduate course. Again, parts of chapters 8-10, the heart of the book,
would be the most appropriate, not too hard, and most valuable.
In summary, this book takes as its objective the presentation of several of
the latest theoretical advances in industrial organization. It succeeds admirably in achieving its objective. Tirole is a gifted writer who excels at explaining
the essence of complicated models.
DENNIS W. CARLTON
Universityof Chicago
Reference
Carlton, Dennis W., and Perloff, Jeffrey M. Modern Industrial Organization.
Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1990.
This content downloaded from 189.125.124.5 on Tue, 22 Sep 2015 14:27:46 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions