PATERNITY AND FILIATION

LIYAO VS. LIYAO

GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

legally married and that her parents

were not separated legally or in fact.

ANDAL VS. MACARAIG . 89 PHIL

165

the separation of the spouses shall be

presumed to be legitimate.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner
can impugn his own legitimacy to be
able to claim from the estate of the
deceased.

FACTS:

o Emiliano is presumed to be
legitimate sine he was born within 300
days following the dissolution of
marriage.

HELD:
FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate
son of the deceased, as represented by
her mother (Corazon), filed a petition
ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L.
Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to
recognize and acknowledge the former
as a compulsory heir of the deceased
and to be entitled to all successional
rights.
Liyao Jr. was in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the
status as the child of the deceased
having
been
recognized
and
acknowledged as such child by the
decedent during his lifetime.
There
were two sides of the story. Corazon
maintained that she and the deceased
were legally married but living
separately for more than 10 years and
that they cohabited from 1965 until the
death of the deceased.
On the other hand, one of the
children of the deceased stated that
her mom and the deceased were

Impugning the legitimacy of the

child is a strictly personal right of the
husband, or in exceptional cases, his
heirs for the reason that he was the
one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity
of his wife produced and he should be
the one to decide whether to conceal
that infidelity or expose it in view of
the moral and economic interest
involved. Hence, it was then settled
that the legitimacy of the child can
only be impugned in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper
parties and within the period limited by
law.
Furthermore, the court held that
there was no clear, competent and
positive evidence presented by the
petitioner that his alleged father had
admitted or recognized his paternity.

- Jan 1941 Emiliano Andal ,who was

married to Maria Duenas, became sick
with tuberculosis. His brother Felix
went to live with them to help them
with the farm.
- Sept 10 1942, Maria eloped with Felix
and lived together from 1942-1943
- Jan 1, 1943 Emiliano died. Maria
didnt attend the funeral
- June 17, 1943 Maria gave birth to
Mariano Andal
- Maria then filed for recovery of land
that was originally given to Emiliano by
his mother upon his marriage to Maria.
Maria said that the land is her sons
since he is the legitimate heir of
Emiliano.
ISSUE:
WON Mariano is
the legitimate son and can thus inherit
the land
HELD:

YES

- Art 108 of NCC - Children born after

the one hundred and eighty days next
following that of the celebration of
marriage or within the three hundred
days next following its dissolution or

- Evidence did not show that Emiliano,

even when he was sick of tuberculosis,
could not sexually perform so even if
Maria was having an affair even before
eloping with Felix, it is still presumed
that Mariano is Emilianos son.
RESULT:
son is the legit heir and
thus inherits the land of his father

JANICE MARIE JAO VS. COURT

OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-49162

July 28, 1987

FACTS:
In 1967, Arlene Salgado was
introduced to PericoJao. After such
introduction, Jao courted Arlene. Not
long thereafter, they had sexual
intercourse and subsequently, they
lived together.
1968, Arlene became pregnant.
Jao paid for all the expenses related to

Arlenes pregnancy but when the child,

Janice was born, Jao insisted that she
could not be the father of such child.
When the case was filed with the
RTC, the RTC ordered the NBI for a
group blood testing. The group blood
testing result showed that Janice could
not have been the possible offspring of
Jao and Arlene.
ISSUE:
Whether or not group blood
testing could be conclusive evidence to
impugn the legitimacy of Janice.
RULING:
Yes, group blood testing could be
admitted as conclusive evidence to
impugn the legitimacy of Janice. For
the past three decades, the use of
blood typing in cases of disputed
parentage has already become an
important legal procedure.
There is now almost universal
scientific
agreement
that
blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to
non-paternity, although inconclusive as
to paternity that is, the fact that the
blood type of the child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged
father does not conclusively prove that
the child is born by such parents; but, if
the blood type of the child is not the

possible blood type when the blood of

the mother and that of the alleged
father are cross matched, then the
child cannot possibly be that of the
alleged father.

Medical science has shown that there

are four types of blood in man which
can be transmitted through heredity.
Although the presence of the same
type of blood in two persons does not
indicate that one was begotten by the
other, yet the fact that they are of
different types will indicate the
impossibility of one being the child of
the other. Thus, when the supposed
father and the alleged child are not in
the same blood group, they cannot be
father and child by consanguinity.

MACADANGDANG V. CA
100 SCRA 73
- FACTS:
Mejias is married to Anahaw

Majias
allegedly
had
intercourse with Macadangdang
sometime in March 1967
Due to the affair, she and her
husband separated in 1967

October 30, 1967: Mejias gave

birthday to a boy (Rolando
Macadangdang)
April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a
complaint for recognition and
support against Macadangdang
Macadangdang opposed claim
and prayed for its dismissal
Court dismissed the complaint
CA reversed the judgment and
declared Rolando to be an
illegitimate son of Antonio
Macadangdang.

-- ISSUES:
Whether or not the child
Rolando is conclusively presumed the
legitimate issue of the spouses
Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw;
and
Whether or not the wife may
institute
an
action
that
would
bastardize her child without giving her
husband, the legally presumed father,
an opportunity to be heard.
- HELD:

YES

The birth of Rolando came more

than one hundred eighty 180
days following the celebration of
the said marriage and before
300 days following the alleged
separation between aforenamed
spouses. Art. 255: Rolando is

conclusively presumed to be the

legitimate son of Mejias and
Anahaw .
Rolando was born on October
30, 1967. Between March, 1967
and October 30, 1967, the time
difference is clearly 7 months.
The baby Rolando could have
been born prematurely. But such
is not the case. Respondent
underwent a normal nine-month
pregnancy.
Presumption of legitimacy
becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there was
physical impossibility of access
between the spouses in the first
120 days of the 300 which
preceded the birth of the child

the fact remains that there was

always the possibility of access to each
other same province
Physical impossibility:
(1) impotence of husband;
inability
copulation,
function

of the male organ to

to perform its proper

(2) living separately in such a way that

access was impossible; and
(3) serious illness of the husband.
HELD:

NO.

Art. 256 provides that the child

is presumed legitimate although
the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy
Art. 257: adultery on the part of
the wife, in itself, cannot
destroy the presumption of
legitimacy of her child, because
it is still possible that the child is
that of the husband
Only the husband can contest
the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife
Art. 220

partitioning of Esperanzas estate (died

intestate on 4/23/77).

Among which he showed are the

following:

Part of her estate is the Calasiao

Bijon Factory which is in possession of
Violeta (alleged child of Esperanza and
Proceso Cabatbat). They were saying
that Violeta is only a ward (ampon)
through the ff evidences:

- Her birth record filed 6/15/48 showing

her birth of 5/26/48 and that shes a
Legitimate Child of Esperanza and
Prospero
- Procesos testimony that shes his
child w/ Esperanza

- Absence of any records that

Esperanza was admitted to hospital
where Esperanza was supposedly born

- Benita Lastimosas denial that she

delivered at Provincial Hospital

PETITION GRANTED. JUDGMENT

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

- Absence of birth certificate in the live

birth section of the Provincial Hospital
(1947- --1948)

- Marriage Certificate of Violeta and

Lim Biak Chiao showed that Esperanza
is the mother of the bride

CABATBAT LIM V. IAC

- Civil registry certification of 3/9/77

that there is no birth record of Violeta
Cabatbat

- Deed of Sale 5/14/60 where minor

Violeta
is
assisted
by
mother
Esperanza

from5/26/48 or 49

- Deed of Absolute Sale

assisted by father Proceso

G.R. No. L-69679 ll Oct. 18, 1988 ll

Grio - Aquino, J.
FACTS:
Case at hand is a squabble over
the estate of late Dra. Esperanza
Cabatbat.
Petitioner
is
Violeta
Cabatbat---Lim who claims to be the
only child of Esperanza while the
respondents are the sisters and
children of a deceased brother.
Private respondents (sisters of
Esperanza) filed at CFI Pangasinan for

- Certification that Esperanza and

Proceso were only guardians (from
Principal II of the Pilot School)
Amparo Resides testimony on
5/21/48 that she was in the Provincial
Hospital to watch a cousin give birth
and there she met Benita Lastimosa
who gave birth to an IC Baby Girl
Lastimosa on 5/26/48 (now known as
Violeta Cabatbat) Violeta on the other
hand tried to adduce evidence that will
support her claim.

4/21/61

TC held that Violeta is NOT

natural child of Esperanza and Proceso
therefore NOT a legal heir.

- 6/15/48. On 5/26/48, Records only

show that there was one birth at that
day and that was Benita Lastimosa
who gave birth to an IC baby girl
Lastimosa. Absence of birth record in
the Civil Registry makes her exhibit
doubtable. Moreover, her reliance on
NCC 263 is misplaced as such action is
not to impugned legitimacy but to
claim inheritance as legal heirs from a
childless aunt.
They do not claim that shes an
Illegitimate Child but that shes not a
child of their aunt at all.

TAN V. TROCIO
191 SCRA 764

DOCTRINE:

ISSUE:
WON Violeta is a natural child of
Esperanza and Proceso
HELD:

the SC. TC then said that the Registry

Book of hospital admission doesnt
even Esperanza was a patient on
5/26/48 and it doesnt even show that
Esperanza was ever admitted from
12/1/47

NO.

TC and CA findings on filiation is

given great accord, conclusive upon

Presumption should be in favor of

legitimacy unless physical access
between the couple was impossible.
NATURE OF COMPLAINT:
Disbarment
conduct.

of

Trocio

for

immoral

FACTS:

April 1971 when as Felicidad

said, Galileo Trocio raped her
which begot a son, Jewel .
Didnt immediately tell the
police
since
Trocio
was
thereatening to have her alien
husband and to tell authrorities
that she was violating the AntiDummy Law in operation of her
vocational school
Nov 1979 Felicidad filed case
of disbarment against Atty.
Trocio
Trocio denied allegation of rape,
only testifying that he dealt her
and her familys cases and said
she was only doing this because
he declined on her request to
increase his fee so that she may
get the extra.
Feb 13 1986 since Trocio failed
to attend the hearings etc,
Provincial fiscal of Lanao Del
Norte, on prima facie evidence
presented,
held
Trocio
administratively liable.

ISSUE:
WON Trocio should
be disbarred for gross immoral conduct

HELD:
evidence

NO, there is lack of

BENITEZ BADUA V. CA
G.R. No. 105625 ll Jan. 24, 1994

After incident, she still asked him

to be the lawyer for her cases
such as a robbery case and her
claim for indemnity when a fire
burned down the school
The fear that her alien husband
would be deported has actually
been an absent fear since she
said she lost contact of her
husband on the night the tryst
happened.
Keeping her peace for 8 years
could be construed as a
condonation of his alleged
immoral conduct. Testimony of
household help that they heard
her cries for help is negated by
fact that she said it happened in
school premises. How could the
help have been there then?
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SHOW IT WAS HIS SON: (1)
unusual closeness as testified by
her household help (2) pictures
of Jewel and Trocio together =
not enough ground to establish
paternity

Presumption is Jewel is the child of the

alien husband since he was born on
1972 when husband and Felicidad were
living together.

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian were owners of
various properties located in Laguna.
Isabel died in 1982 while his
husband died in 1989. Vicentes
sister and nephew filed a complaint for
the
issuance
of
letters
of
administration of Vicentes estate in
favor of the nephew, herein private
respondent.
The petitioner, Marissa BenitezBadua, was raised and cared by the
deceased spouses since childhood,
though not related to them by blood,
nor legally adopted. The latter to prove
that she is the only legitimate child of
the spouses submitted documents
such as her certificate of live birth
where the spouses name were
reflected as her parents. She even
testified that said spouses continuously
treated
her
as
their
legitimate
daughter. On the other hand, the
relatives of Vicente declared that said
spouses were unable to physically
procreate hence the petitioner cannot
be the biological child. Trial court
decided in favor of the petitioner as the
legitimate daughter and sole heir of
the spouses.

ISSUE:
WON petitioners certificate of
live birth will suffice to establish her
legitimacy.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the
case for lack of merit. The mere
registration of a child in his or her
birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid
adoption. It does not confer upon
the child the status of an adopted
child and her legal rights. Such act
amounts to simulation of the
child's birth or falsification of his
or her birth certificate, which is a
public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente
and brother of the deceased wife
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the latter.
In the notarized document, they stated
that they were the sole heirs of the
deceased because she died without
descendants and ascendants. In
executing
such
deed,
Vicente
effectively repudiated the Certificate of
Live
Birth of the petitioner where it
appeared that he was the petitioners
father.

MENDOZA V. MELLA
DOCTRINE:
Although a birth certificate is by
nature a public document, there must
be a CLEAR STATEMENT in the
document that the parent recognizes
the child as his or her own. Without
such, voluntary recognition of filiation
has no basis.
FACTS:
Litigated property was donated
by Paciano Pareja to son Gavino in
1939. Gavino disappeared in 1943 (he
died that year accord. to CA), leaving
common-law wife Mendoza and son
Rodolfo (petitioners).
1948: Paciano sold lot to Mella
(respondent), who notified petitioners
in 1952 to vacate lot. Petitioners
ignored notice. Mella commenced
action in 1955 on basis of deed of sale
by Paciano.
Petitioners claim ownership of
contested land for Rodolfo on grounds
of succession from Gavino and by
adverse possession for more than 10
yrs.
The issue of adverse possession
for more than years is not well taken

because it was raised for the first time

with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N Rodolfo may
be considered acknowledged as natural
child, entitled to successional rights,
with a birth certificate as proof of
filiation.
CA:

NO, for 2 reasons:

HOWEVER: the evidence is a mere

certified copy of registry record, and
not the actual birth certificate. Such is
NOT sufficient proof of filiation because
though it contains names of both
parents, there is no showing that
parents signed the original birth
certificate, let alone that they swore to
its contents.

i) Only evidence is Rodolfos birth

certificate, which is NOT proof of
acknowledgment, because the old Civil
Code was never established in this
country, thus Art. 131 referring to
acknowledgement in record of birth
never came into effect.

Even if birth certificate is in

nature a public document wherein
voluntary recognition of a child may be
made, in such a case, there must be a
CLEAR STATEMENT in document that
parent recognizes the child as his or
her own. Without such, voluntary
recognition has no basis.

ii) NO showing that Rodolfos parents

could have married each other when
he was conceived

HELD:
Rodolfos birth certificate
is not sufficient proof of filiation to
Gavino.

SC: NO, but for a different reason

than CA; SC chose to resolve only the
FIRST issue.

LIM V. CA

Civil Registry Law passed in

1930
contained
provisions
for
registration of births, including those of
illegitimate parentage; record of birth
under such law, if sufficient in contents
for the purpose, would meet requisites
for voluntary recognition.
Rodolfo was born in 1935. Civil
Registry Law applies.

Marriage certificate does not

satisfy the required solemnity of a
public document as proof of filiation.
FACTS:
Felisa Lim and Francisco Uy
claimed they inherited, to the exclusion
of the other, a house and lot in Sta.
Cruz Manila as sole heir of Susana Lim.

Felisa Lims pieces of evidence:

certificate of baptism [stating that
Felisa is natural daughter of Susana]
and marriage certificate [stating that
Susana gave consent to Felisas
marriage] Francisco Uys pieces of
evidence:
application
of
alien
registration, order cancelling alien
registration
and
identification
certificate all issued by Bureau of
Immigration [Uys
Filipino citizenship by derivation
from mom Susana Lim] TC: Felisa Lim
sole heir
CA: neither is entitled to inheritance
because neither of them had been
recognized by Susana Lim as her child
by any of the means provided for by
law; and neither had either of them
been declared in a judicial proceeding
to be a child of Susana Lim."
ISSUES:
1. WON Felisas marriage certificate is
enough proof of filiation
2. WON Fransisco is entitled to the
property because he purchased it w/
his money before Susana died [not
pertinent to class discussion but just in
case]
HELD:

1. No. Section 131 of the Civil Code of

1889 requires that the recognition of a
natural child "be made in the record of
birth, in a will, or in some other public
document."
However, article 1216 of the
Civil Code of 1889 provides that public
documents "are those authenticated by
a notary or by a competent public
official, with the formalities required by
law." The public document referred to
in Sec 131 of CC belongs to the 1st
class [executed by private individual
that is authenticated by a notary].
Marriage contract does not satisfy the
requirement of solemnity mentioned
above. The marriage contract is a mere
declaration by the contracting parties,
in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two
witnesses of legal age, that they take
each other as husband and wife,
signed by signature or mark by the
said contracting parties and the said
witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage.
2. No for two reasons: a) Uy raised the
theory of implied trust for the first time
in her motion for reconsideration filed
with the appellate court; b) the
evidence
regarding
the
alleged
purchase by her late husband is
altogether unconvincing.

BAAS V. BAAS

134 SCRA 260

FACTS:

Plaintiffs
alleged
that
late
Raymundo
Banas,
was
acknowledged natural son of
late BIBIANO Banas therefore, by
descent, they are entitled to
decedents share
Defendants
denied
that
Raymundo was the natural son
of late Bibiano, nor was he
acknowledged by the latter; use
of surname Banas by Raymundo
was justified, Raymundo being
Pedros (Bibianos brother) son
Late Raymundo was a natural
child, born 1894 of Dolores and
of unknown father. It was
Bibiano
who
shouldered
raymundos school expenses (in
Beda) until Raymundo became a
teacher
In 1926, Raymundo married
Trinidad, niece of Bibianos wife
(Faustina); Trinidad lived with
Bibianos family before the
marriage and took care of the
latters children
In Raymundos marriage cert,
name of father was stated to be

Bibiano. Pedro appeared as one

of the sponsors.
Dec 1928, Raymundo and Pedro
executed
sworn
statements
before
an
atty.
Wherein
Raymundo declared that he was
the natural son of Dolores and
came to know tha the his father
was Pedro and he realized that
there had been an error in his
marriage cert; Pedro declared
that he has a natural son named
Raymundo whom he recognized,
and he asked for the correction
of the said certificate
June 30, 1930, Pedro Baas
wrote to "M.R.P. Juez del
Arzobispado de Manila" wherein
he reiterated that he had
recognized his natural son born
of Dolores (who is insane),
Raymundo; he requested for the
correction of his sons and
grandsons baptismal certificate
July, 1930 Bibiano executed
sworn statement stating that
Raymundo is Pedros son
1954,
Bibiano
died;
1955,
Raymundo
wrote
to
Atty.
Faustino in which he complained
about the alleged in justice done
to him by Bibianos wife
June 24, 1955, Bibianos heirs,
the defendants, extra-judicially
settled his estate by means of a
deed of extra judicial settlement

among themselves which was

notarized by Atty. Angel Vecino,
brother of Trinidad
November 7, 1955, the spouses
Raymundo Baas and Trinidad
executed a mortgage over their
house and lot in 1444 Kalimbas
St., in favor of herein defendant
Angel V. Baas
1962 Raymundo died; 1965, his
heirs filed complaint for partition
and recovery of hereditary share
Trinidad said she discovered
certain
documents
w/c
established Raymundos filiation
to Bibiano
1. hand written note addressed
to Raymundo w/ salutation Su
padre from B. Banas
2)
matriculation
certs
of
Raymundo w/ Bibiano as father
3) report card w/ Bibiano as
parent/guardian
4)
autobiographies of raymundo w/
alterations

ISSUE:
WON
RAYMUNDO
WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL
SON OF BIBIANO
HELD:

NO

The note w/ su padre

unreliable,
assuming
its
authentic, the same doesnt

constitute a sufficient proof of a

valid recognition
Formalities
of
voluntary
recognition under Article 278 of
the New Civil Code is that
recognition shall be express and
made either in the record of
birth, in a will, in a statement in
a court of record, or in any
authentic writing
Note w/ su padre is a mere
indication of paternal solicitude.
The Filipinos are known for
having very close family ties.
Extended families are a common
set-up among them, sometimes
to the extent that strangers are
also considered as part of the
family.
the
rule
of
incidental
acknowledgment does not apply
to plaintiffs-appellants' note (w/
su padre) since it is not a
public document where a father
would ordinarily be more careful
about what he says
Even if the evidence presented
by
the
plaintiffs-appellants
constitute a sufficient proof of a
voluntary recognition, still their
complaint will not prosper since
it is evident that if there was
acknowledgment on the part of
Bibiano, he had rectified or
repudiated the same by his
sworn statement

Considering that Raymundo was

born in 1894, and was already of
majority age in 1915, long
before Bibiano's death in 1954,
he should and could have filed
such action either under Article
135 of the Old Civil Code, or
Article 283 of the New Civil Code
Such action for the acknowledgment of
a natural child is not transmissible to
the natural child's heirs; the right is
purely a personal one to the natural
child

civil registrar, a final judgment or by

the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child.

ACEBEDO V. ARQUERO
FACTS:
Edwin Acebedo claims that Eddie
Arqureo, and not he, is the father of his
wifes daughter. Acebedo alleges that
the Baptismal Certificate of the child
reflects the name of Arqureo as father.
HELD:

MARIATEGUI V. CA
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui during his
lifetime contracted three marriages
with three different women and sired
three sets of children. He died intestate
and the children from his 1st and 2nd
marriages excluded the children from
the 3rd marriage in the extra-judicial
partition of deceaseds properties.
HELD:
The children from the 3rd
marriage
continuously
possessed
status of legitimate children. Filiation of
legitimate children may be established
by the record of birth appearing in the

A canonical certificate is conclusive

proof only of the baptism administered.
It merely attests to the fact which gave
rise to its issue, and the date thereof,
to wit, the fact of the administration of
the sacrament on the date stated, but
not the truth of the statements therein
as to the parentage of the child
baptized.

REPUBLIC V. CA AND VICENCIO

G.R. No. 88202 ll Quisumbing, J.
FACTS
Appeal of the decision of the RTC
allowing Cynthia Vicencios change of

surname to Yu. Cynthias legitimate

father Pablo Vicencio left the family
before she turned 1. Her mother
instituted an action to declare her
father
an
absentee
and
then
subsequently married her step-father
Ernesto Yu who acted as her father
since. She used Vivencio on official
documents such as school records and
used Yu when she participated in public
functions.
The trial court granted the
change of name and stated that failure
to resort to adoption by the step-father
should not be a cause for disallowing
the legal change of name.
CA affirmed the TC decision,
holding that it was in the best interest
of the petitioner to change the
surname as the discrepancy between
the original surname and the surname
of the stepfather who has been socially
recognized as her father caused her
embarrassment
and
inferiority
complex.
Sol Gen argued that there is no
proper and reasonable cause to
warrant the change of surname and
that it might even cause confusion and
legal
complications
because
her
mother and step-father have children
of their own and she might even claim
inheritance rights as a legitimate
daughter.

ISSUE:
WON
petitioners
change of surname to that of her
stepfathers is allowed.
HELD & RD NO. The Court upheld the
grave legal consequences that the Sol
Gen argued. Also, since she is the
legitimate child of her biological
parents, she is supposed to bear her
legitimate fathers surname. Change of
name is a privilege and not a right, and
should
therefore
be
carefully
considered by the courts and to deny
the same unless proper and reasonable
causes are shown. Decision is the
same regardless of Cynthias age.

UYGUANGCO V. CA
DOCTRINE:
If the action to establish
illegitimate filiation is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172
(secondary evidence), the action may
only be brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent.
PROOF OF FILIATION:
Open and continuous possession
of status as illegitimate children (lived
with his father from 1967 until 1973,
receiving of support, use of fathers
surname, shared profits of a family

business, directorship
corporation)

in

family

FACTS:
Apolinario
Uyguangco
died
intestate in 1975, leaving his wife and
four
children
(petitioners)
and
considerable properties which they
divided among themselves. Claiming to
be an illegitimate son of the deceased
Apolinario, and having been left out in
the extrajudicial settlement of his
estate,
Graciano
Uyguangco
(respondent) filed a complaint against
the petitioners. To prove his filiation,
Graciano alleged that at the age of 15,
he moved to his fathers hometown, he
received support from his father while
he was studying and he was assigned
by his father as storekeeper at the
Uyguangco store. (SEE OTHER PROOF
MENTIONED ABOVE).
However, he admit that he had
none of the documents mentioned in
Article 278 (record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record on
in any authentic writing) to show that
he was the illegitimate son of the
deceased.
Petitioners: Respondent could no
longer prove his alleged filiation under
the applicable provisions of the Civil
Code as the only evidence allowed

under Article 278 CC to prove the claim

was not available to himself.

1) open and continuous possession of

the status of an illegitimate child or

RTC: Graciano could prove his alleged

filiation.

2) any other means allowed by the

Rules of Court and special laws.

CA affirmed.

The problem of the respondent,

however, is that, since he seeks to
prove his filiation under the second
paragraph (secondary evidence) of
Article 172 of the FC, his action is now
barred because of his alleged fathers
death in 1975.

NOTE:
Since the case was decided in 1989,
the Court already applied the Family
Code provisions as the Civil Code
provisions the petitioners invoke has
been superseded, or modified by the
FC.
ISSUES:
WON
Graciano
should be allowed to prove that he is
an illegitimate child of his claim father,
who is already dead, in the absence of
documentary
(primary)
evidence
required.
HELD:
No.
His
action
should be barred under Article 175 of
the FC.
RULED:
Under Article 175 of
FC, illegitimate children may establish
their legitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. In the absence of
the primary evidence mentioned in
Article 172, respondent is now allowed
to establish his claimed of filiation by

The second paragraph of Article

175 states that when the action is
based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
Respondent can no longer be
allowed at this time to introduce
evidence of his open and continuous
possession of the status of an
illegitimate child or prove his filiation
through any means allowed by the ROC
or special laws.
The simple reason is that
Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead
and can no longer be heard on the
claim of his alleged sonss illegitimate
filiation.
Rationale of the rule (Sempio
Diy): It is a truism that unlike

legitimate children who are publicly

recognized, illegitimate children are
usually begotten and raised in secrecy
and without the legitimate family being
aware of their existence. Who then can
be sure of their Uyguangco v. CA
filiation but the parents themselves?
But suppose the child claiming the
illegitimate child of a certain person is
not really the child of the latter? The
putative parent should thus be given
the opportunity to affirm or deny the
childs filiation, and this, he or she
cannot do if he or she is already dead.

raised a timely objection which the

court sustained.

RODRIGUEZ V CA

"When the father or the mother makes

the recognition separately, he or she
shall not reveal the name of the person
with whom he or she had the child;
neither shall he or she state any
circumstance whereby the other party
may be identified."

245 SCRA 150

FACTS:
1. On October 15, 1986, an action for
compulsory recognition and support
was
brought
before
court,
by
respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos
against
Bienvenido
Rodriguez,
petitioner herein
2. At the trial, the plaintiff presented
his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as
first witness.
3. In the course of her direct
examination, she was asked by counsel
to reveal the identity of the plaintiff's
father but the defendant's counsel

4. The petitioner now comes to this

court questioning the act of the lower
court in sustaining the objection
Contentions:
Petitioner: Felicitas Agbulos Haber
should not be allowed to reveal the
name of the father of private
respondent because such revelation
was prohibited by Article 280 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Said
Article provided:

Respondent:
Navarro v. Bacalla:
the testimony of the mother of the
plaintiff in said case, could be used to
established his paternity
ISSUE:
Was the Lower Court
correct in sustaining the objection?
HELD:

Yes.

REASON 1:

Private respondent cannot invoke our

decision in Navarro v. Bacalla, 15 SCRA
114 (1965). While we ruled in Navarro
that the testimony of the mother of the
plaintiff in said case, could be used to
established
his
paternity,
such
testimony was admitted during the trial
without objection and the defendant
accepted the finding of the trial court
that he was the father of the plaintiff.
Rule: the testimony of the mother may
be used to prove paternity IF the father
does not object. In the case at bench,
petitioner timely objected to the calling
of the mother of private respondent to
the witness stand to name petitioner
as the father of said respondent.
REASON2:
No similar prohibition found in
Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines has been replicated in the
present Family Code. This undoubtedly
discloses the intention of the legislative
authority
to
uphold
the
Code
Commission's stand to liberalize the
rule on the investigation of the
paternity of illegitimate children.
Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and
280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
were repealed by the Family Code,
which now allows the establishment of
illegitimate filiation in the same way

and on the same evidence

legitimate children (Art. 175).

as

Under Article 172 of the Family

Code, filiation of legitimate children is
by any of the following:
"The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
'(1) The record of birth appearing in
the Civil Register or a final judgment;
or
'(2) An admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.'
"In the absence of the foregoing
evidence the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
'(1)
The
open
and
continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
'(2) Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. (265a,
266a, 267a)'"
Of interest is that Article 172 of
the Family Code adopts the rule in
Article 283 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the filiation may be proven
by "any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father."

ARUEGO, JR. V. CA
PETITIONERS:
Jose
E.
Aruego, Jr., Simeona San Juan Aruego,
Ma. Immaculada T. Alanon, Roberto A.
Torres, Cristina A. Torres, Justo Jose
Torres and Agustin Torres
RESPONDENTS: The Hon. Court of
Appeals, 13th Division and Antonia
Aruego
DOCTRINE:

BASIS
OF
ACTION: Open and
continuous possession of the status as
illegitimate children (Art. 285 CC)

Allowance to use his surname

Payment of maternal
baptismal expenses

bills

and

Taking them out to restaurants and

departments stores on occasions of
family rejoicing
Attendance to school problems

FACTS:

Art. 285 (CC) The action for the

recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the
following cases:

The late Jose Aruego, a married

man,
had
an
amorous
relationship with Luz Fabian
Antonia and Evelyn was born
out of this relationship
They are thus illegitimate
children of Jose Aruego

Regular support and educational

expenses

Family
Code
cannot
be
given
retroactive
effect
insofar
as
it
prejudices the vested right of persons
under the Civil Code

In 1983 (Mar. 7), a Complaint for

Compulsory
Recognition
and
Enforcement of Successional Rights
was filed by Private respondent and
her sister (Antonia and Evelyn Aruego),
represented by their mother (Luz
Fabian) The respondents allege that:

prescription has shifted from the CC to

the FC

Introducing them as such children to

family friends

(1) If the father or mother died during

the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority. Petitioners
contend that:
With the advent of the Family Code,
jurisdiction over the complaint of
private respondent on the ground of

From the 4 years after

attainment
of
his
majority to during the
lifetime of the alleged
parent
This is because when the
sisters filed the petition, it
was almost 1 year after
the
death
of
their
presumed father

Art. 172 (FC) The filiation of legitimate

children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgement; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private hand
written instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of
the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1)
The
open
and
continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or

the same way and on the

evidence as legitimate children.

same

The action must be brought

within the same period specified in Art.
173 [during the lifetime of the child]
except when the action is based on the
2nd paragraph of Art. 172, in which
case the action may be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Art. 256 (FC) This Code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.
ISSUE:
WON the provisions of the
Family Code be applied in the instant
case
WON the application of the
Family Code in this case prejudice or
impair any vested right of the private
respondent such that it should not be
given retroactive
effect in
this
particular case
HELD: NO

(2) Any other means allowed by the

Rules of Court and special laws

Vested / Acquired Rights = not defined

by the Family Code

Art. 175 (FC) Illegitimate children may

establish their illegitimate filiation in

Left it to the courts to determine

what it means as each particular issue

is submitted to them In the ruling in

Tayag v. Court of Appeals:
Right of action of the minor child has
been vested by the filing of the
complaint in court under the regime of
the Civil Code, prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code.
This right can no longer be
prejudiced
or
impaired
by
the
enactment of a new law.
The application of Art. 175 of the
Family Code will adversely affect the
right of the private respondent. In the
CC:
Prescription will not yet bar the
respondent
from
filing
the
petition, as they have filed
within 1 year after attainment of
majority and their father died
while they were minors (period
of
within
4
years
after
attainment of majority)
In the FC:

Prescription is barred, as it
requires the filing of the petition
during the lifetime of the
concerned parent

PETITION IS DENIED
DECISION OF CA AFFIRMED

JISON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

286 SCRA 495, February 24, 1998

denounced her filiation with Francisco

was acquired under duress

FACTS:
1. Francisco Jison was married to Lilia
Lopez Jison in 1945 and together, they
had Lourdes
2. Francisco impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar, Lourdes nanny, who gave
birth to Monina Joson on August 4,
1946

d. That Francisco fathered Monina and

recognized her as his daughter and
That Monina has been enjoying the
open and continuous possession of the
status as Franciscos illegit child where
Francisco

3. March 13, 1985: Monina filed a

petition for recognition as Franciscos
illegitimate child
a. That Esperanza was still employed
by Francisco at the time Monina was
conceived in 1945
b. That sexual contact between
Francisco and Esperanza was not
impossible

Castellanes, Sr., a worker in the

Nelly Garden that Lilia managed
testified that Lilia spent her
evenings in the Nelly Garden,
working from 6PM to 3AM

c. That the affidavit she signed on

September 21, 1971 where she

Bilbao, the procurement officer,

hacienda
overseer
and
administrator testified that he
was present during the event

Sent her to school Paid for

her
school
expenses
Defrayed her hospitalization
expenses

1. Testified to by Monina herself and

Ledesma, a banker and former mayor

Gave
her
monthly
allowances
which
he
instructed
his
office
personnel to do . Paid for her
mothers funeral expenses

Acknowledged her paternal greetings

and Called her his Hija or child
1. Testified to by
Gardens paymaster

Tingson,

Nelly

a. who recorded its expenses and

issued vouchers and

b. who knew the persons receiving

money from Franciscos office and
c. who kept Moninas accounts in a
separate book to hide it from Lilia, as
instructed by Francisco

Recommended
her
for
employment in Merchant
Financing Corporation that
is managed by the wife of
his first cousin
Allowed her to use his
house in Bacolod

Paid for her long distance telephone

calls
1. Testified to by the houseboy, Duatin,
that
a. Monina was introduced to him as
Franciscos child when she stayed
there
b. Monina calls Francisco Daddy
c. Francisco instructed him to treat
Monina just like the rest of his children
d. He hid Monina whenever Francisco
and Lilia were there, as instructed by
Francisco

Had her vacation in

apartment in Manila
. Allowed her to use
surname

his
his

ISSUE:
WON Monina is the
illegitimate child of Francisco
HELD:

The trial court decided in her

favor and compelled Juans heirs and
estate to recognize her as a natural
daughter. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed this decision.

ALBERTO V. CA

YES
G.R. No. 86639 ll Jun. 2, 1994

1. The preponderance of evidence

mentioned
above
sufficiently
established her filiation despite
a. the Affidavit dated Sept. 21, 1971,
attesting that Francisco is not her
father, because it would not have been
necessary if it were not true; Francisco
had gone to such great lengths in order
that Monina denounce her filiation
b. Moninas birth and baptismal
certificates were not signed by
Francisco because these are not
conclusive evidence of filiation
c. Notes of Franciscos relatives
attesting to Moninas filiation are
without merit since

they are not shown to be dead

or unable to testify
they are not family possessions

Rule 130, Secs. 39, 40 require that

family possessions to be regarded as
evidence of pedigree should be articles
representing, in effect, the familys
joint statement of its belief as to the
pedigree of a person

PETITIONER:
Alberto

Ma.

Theresa

R.

RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals,

intestate estate of Juan M. Alberto and
Yolanda R. Alberto
FACTS:
Sweethearts Aurora Reniva and
Governor Juan M. Alberto had a
daughter, Ma. Theresa Alberto. Juan
married Yolanda Reyes after Albertos
birth.
On Theresas 14th birthday, the
governor was on his way to visit her.
He
was
assassinated
and
died
intestate.
Juans widow Yolanda petitioned
for the administration of his estate and
was appointed administratrix.
Theresa motioned to intervene
as
oppositor
and
re-open
the
proceedings, praying that she be
declared as having acquired the status
of a natural child, and thus being
entitled to share in Juans estate.

ISSUES
May recognition of
ordered upon the estate
the deceased parent,
evidence that the child
continuous possession
status?

the child be
and heirs of
based on
has been in
of natural

RATIO
Yes. The Court granted the
petition, which reversed the Court of
Appeals ruling and affirmed that of the
trial court.
The following was established by
the trial court, and was deemed to
have sufficiently proven that Juan
recognized Theresa as his daughter:

Theresa used Alberto as her

surname in all her school
records, and Juan was known to
be her father by the school
personnel.
Juan
paid
for
Theresas
education.
She was recognized as Juans
daughter by his relatives and
friends, and was regarded as a

niece by Juans siblings and a

cousin by their children.
He proudly relayed to his friends
the high grades on her report
card.
Juan would have visited her on
her birthday in her school, if not
for his death.
Theresa and her mother were
present in the Philippine General
Hospital when Juan died, and Fr.
Arcilla, Juans first cousin, held
Theresas hand, asking the
guard to make way for her and
saying she was Juans daughter.

The acts not only of Juan but also of his

relatives
demonstrate
that
the
recognition of Theresas status was
made not only by Juan but by his
relatives as well.
Since there were no legal
impediments
between
Juan
and
Theresas mother Aurora, they could
have validly married. As a natural
child, Theresa occupies the highest in
the hierarchy of illegitimate children.
Thus, the present petition was
found to be covered by Art. 235 of the
Civil Code:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition
of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the

following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during
the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority.

rape, but appealed his decision saying

that it was impossible for him to have
intercourse since he was jailed during
the time of the alleged rapes and that
victim's testimony betrays behavior of
a girl who was raped.

Juan died on Sept. 18, 1967

Thereses 14th birthday.
Therese would reach 21 on Sept.
18, 1974, and would still have until
Sept. 18, 1978 to file the action for
recognition. Since the action was filed
on Sept. 15, 1978, it was within the
deadline.

PEOPLE V. NAMAYAN
The crime of rape committed by
the accused carries with it, among
others, the obligations to acknowledge
the offspring if the character of its
origin does not prevent it and to
support the same.
FACTS:
Margie Pagaygay, a mental
retardate, was raped three times by
defendant Namayan. Her mother
noticed that her stomach was bulging
and upon medical examination, she
was found to be four to five months
pregnant. Namayan was convicted for

HELD:
The record shows that it was possible
for the defendant to have raped the
girl. The testimony of the jailer could
not be conclusive because his task was
merely to oversee the records and not
check the physical presence of the
defendant in jail.
On the allegation that victim
betrayed the normal behavior of a girl
that was sexually threatened, the court
reminds us that she was a mental
retardate and had no will to resist his
advances.
There is no doubt that defendant
is the father of the child, the acts of
sexual intercourse having occurred one
month before the start of conception.

MOSSESGELD VS COURT OF
APPEALS 300 SCRA 464

G.R. No. 111455

December 23, 1998
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
On
December
2,
1989,
petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld,
single, 31 years of age, gave birth to a
baby boy at the Medical City General
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.
It was the third time that she
delivered a child.
The presumed father, one
Eleazar Siriban Calasan, 42 years old, a
lawyer, married, and a resident of 8632
San Jose St. Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati,
Metro
Manila,
signed
the
birth
certificate of the child as the informant,
indicating therein the child's first name
as
Jonathan,
middle
name
as
Mossesgeld, and last name as Calasan.
Both the presumed father,
Eleazar S. Calasan and the mother
Marissa A. Mossesgeld, accomplished
the dorsal side of the certificate of live
birth stating that the information
contained therein were true and
correct. In addition, lawyer Calasan
executed
an
affidavit
admitting
paternity of the child.

On December 6, 1989, due to

the refusal of the person in charge at
the hospital to placing the presumed
father's surname as the child's
surname in the certificate of live birth,
petitioner
himself
submitted
the
certificate to the office of the local civil
registrar
of
Mandaluyong,
for
registration.
On December 28, 1989, the
municipal treasurer of Mandaluyong, as
officer in charge of the office of the
local civil registrar, rejected the
registration on the basis of Circular No.
4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil
Registrar General, providing that under
Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, illegitimate children born
on or after August 3, 1988, shall use
the surname of their mother.
ISSUE:
The issue raised is
whether mandamus lies to compel the
Local Civil Registrar to register a
certificate of live birth of an illegitimate
child using the alleged father's
surname where the latter admitted
paternity.
The court denied the petition.
RULING:
The Family Code has
effectively repealed the provisions of
Article 366 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines giving a natural child
acknowledge by both parents the right

to use the surname of the father. The

Family
Code
has
limited
the
classification of children to legitimate
and illegitimate, thereby eliminating
the category of acknowledged natural
children and natural children by legal
fiction.
Consequently, we rule that
mandamus will not lie to compel the
local civil registrar to register the
certificate of live birth of an illegitimate
child using the father's surname, even
with the consent of the latter.
Mandamus does not lie to compel the
performance of an act prohibited by
law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES
the petition for review on certiorari. We
AFFIRM the decision of the Court of
Appeals and that of the Regional Trial
Court, Pasig, Branch 69, dismissing the
petition for mandamus in Special Civil
Action No. 60146. Costs against
petitioner.

TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122906
February 7, 2002
FACTS:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave
birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate daughter with Edgar V.

Daguimol. A year after the birth of

Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where
she found a work as a registerednurse.
Gardin was left in the care of her father
and paternal grandparents.
Edgar
filed
a
petition
forguardianship over Gardin in the RTC
of Quezon City. In March 1992, the
court
granted
the
petition
and
appointed Edgar as legal guardian of
Gardin. In May 1992, Dinah filed a
petition for relief from judgment. She
averred that she learned of the
judgment only on April 1, 1992. The
trial court set aside its original
judgment and allowed Dinah to file her
opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in
turn, filed a motion for reconsideration.

custody of Edgar until otherwise

adjudged. Dinah appealed to the
Supreme Court, contending that she is
entitled to the custody of the minor,
Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the
mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers
parental authority upon her as the
mother of the illegitimate minor.
Second, Gardin cannot be separated
from her since she had not, as of then,
attained the age of seven. Employing
simple arithmetic however, it appears
that Gardin Faith is now twelve years
old.
ISSUE:
Who is entitled to the temporary
custody of the child pending the
guardianship proceeding?
RULING:

In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to

remand custody of Gardin to her. In
1994, the trial court issued a resolution
denying
Edgar's
motion
for
reconsideration and granting Dinah's
motion for custody of Gardin. Dinah
moved for the immediate execution of
the resolution.
Edgar, thus, filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack
of
merit.
Upon
motion
for
reconsideration,
CA
modified
its
decision and let Gardin remain in the

In custody disputes, it is
axiomatic that the paramount criterion
is the welfare and well-being of the
child. Statute sets certain rules to
assist the court in making an informed
decision.
Insofar as illegitimate children
are concerned, Article 176 of the
Family Code provides that illegitimate
children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. Likewise,
Article 213 of the Family Code provides
that [n]o child under seven years of

age shall be separated from the

mother,
unless
the
court
finds
compelling
reasons
to
order
otherwise.
It will be observed that in both
provisions, a strong bias is created in
favor of the mother. This is especially
evident in Article 213 where it may be
said that the law presumes that the
mother is the best custodian.
As
explained by the Code Commission:
The
general
rule
is
recommended in order to avoid many
a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her. No man
can sound the deep sorrows of a
mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by
the rule has to be for compelling
reasons for the good of the child.
For these reasons, even a
mother may be deprived of the custody
of her child who is below seven years
of age for compelling reasons.
Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment,
unemployment
and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity,
and
affliction
with
a
communicable illness.
If older than seven years of age,
a child is allowed to state his
preference, but the court is not bound

by that choice. The court may exercise

its discretion by disregarding the
childs preference should the parent
chosen be found to be unfit, in which
instance, custody may be given to the
other parent, or even to a third person.
In the case at bar, we are being
asked to rule on the temporary custody
of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it
appears that the proceedings for
guardianship before the trial court
have not been terminated, and no
pronouncement has been made as to
who should have final custody of the
minor.
Bearing in mind that the welfare
of the said minor as the controlling
factor, we find that the appellate court
did not err in allowing her father to

retain in the meantime parental

custody over her. Meanwhile, the child
should not be wrenched from her
familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the
people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a
fit parent for her child is a question of
fact to be properly entertained in the
special proceedings before the trial
court. It should be recalled that in a
petition for review on certiorari, we rule
only on questions of law. We are not in
the best position to assess the parties
respective
merits
vis--vis
their
opposing claims for custody.
Yet another sound reason is that
inasmuch as the age of the minor,

Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the

statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori,
her preference and opinion must first
be sought in the choice of which parent
should have the custody over her
person.
For the present and until finally
adjudged, temporary custody of the
subject minor should remain with her
father, the private respondent herein
pending final judgment of the trial
court.

FACTS:
Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra lived
as common low spouses and begot
Tomasa.
They
subsequently
got
married and had two children, Antonio
and
Fortunato.
Tomasa
had
a
legitimate daughter, Maria Luciano.
Antonio took care of Maria when
Tomasa died. Upon Antonios death,
Maria alleges that she is entitled to
inherit from the intestate estate of
Antonio, who has no other heirs.
HELD:

ESTATE OF DE LOS SANTOS V.

LUCIANO

Maria is the legitimate niece of Antonio

Escobar. Tomasa was legitimated by
the marriage of her parents hence a
legitimate sister of Antonio. Maria is
entitled to inherit from Antonio