Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 8

Article 37-51

FOREIGN MARRIAGE
Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad Sagalongos, G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007
514 SCRA 294 Civil Law Family Code Retroactive Effect of Article 26 of the Family
Code
FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luiss dad) contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos. He had no children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from the time
of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo
sought the dissolution of their Felicisimos conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that
Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already
been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by
virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate Felicidads bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this
would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over Felicisimos
estate.
HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as
the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof
of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule

132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance
with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139


139 SCRA 139 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Laws Nationality Principle
Divorce Obtained Abroad
FACTS: In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an American, married in Hong
Kong. However, in 1982, Upton obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, USA. Later, Reyes
married Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Reyes in Pasay City. Upton was petitioning that he
be granted management rights over a property in Manila (The Galleon). It was his
contention that the divorcedecree they obtained abroad do not apply to properties in the
Philippines, hence, despite the divorce, Reyess property in the Philippines remained
conjugal with Upton. Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed with Upton. The judge ruled that the
divorce decree issued by the Nevada court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over the declared
national policy of the Philippines which prohibits divorce.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Romillo, Jr. is correct.
HELD: No. Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality (nationality principle). Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada Upton from the marriage from the standards of American
Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law,
Upton is no longer the husband of Reyes. He would have no standing to sue as Reyess
husband as he is not entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the
decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes van Dorn should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Pilapil vs. Somera, 174 SCRA 653, June 30, 1989


FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths
at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April
20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as
early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.
Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.
Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

VOID MARRIAGE

Gomez v. Lipana, GR. No. L23214, June 30, 1970


FACTS: The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the first with
Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the
time of the second marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana
concealed from the second wife.
On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired by purchase a piece
of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the price of P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property
(Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on
February 1, 1944, in the name of Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez. On July 20,
1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as the
nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate,
commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husbands share in the Cubao
property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code,
the Spanish text of which provides:
La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al ser declarado nulo.
El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad, no tendra parte en los
bienes gananciales.
The society of joint property concludes after the marriage dissolves or on having been
declared void. The conjuge that for his bad faith will have been a cause of the nullity, will not
have part in the community properties.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the husband was
the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his
interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the trial court: (1) in
allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second marriage and in holding it to be
bigamous and void ab initio; and (2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is
applicable in this case.
ISSUE: WON a collateral attack on the validity on the second marriage in holding it to be
bigamous and void ab initio.
WON that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.
HELD: Yes. The party who challenges the validity of the second marriage can be challenged
collaterally. There is no suggestion here that the defendants 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto
Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is
no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). the burden is on
the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not
discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him at the

trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the first, and he
has not shown that his first wife was then generally considered dead or was believed by him
to be so.
On the second issue, the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial declaration of
nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after dissolution by death had taken place
and when Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.
Even though the said provision was no longer in force it is still presumed, with respect to the
spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever
existed, and hence such spouse has no right to share in the conjugal properties; but this
legal effect of such presumption derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still in force,
and in any event is of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice
of the right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal partnership formed
thereby, which includes properties acquired by the husband during its existence.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.
The decision appealed from is reversed and the complaint is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Ninal vs. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They
had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by
Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived
together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a
car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack
of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit
for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the
time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his
first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma
is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It
can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.

Villanueva v. CA, 505 SCRA 564

FACTS: In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In
November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and
duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening
him and that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to
threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant
hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the
marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys allegations and she said that Orly freely
cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlys affection
and care towards her.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face,
it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the
pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of
the case, Orlys allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not able to prove
that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by
the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security
guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described done
against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be
raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual
intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part
of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings
merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

You might also like