People vs Andri Marti

Facts

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract
necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and
the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland"
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted
on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box
one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before
the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His
curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening
of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams
of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14,
1987. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at
Ermita, Manila
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the
NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane
wrappers
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that
the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars
the NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after
signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his
passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief
Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was
invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same
day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for
laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified
by the forensic chemist
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Marti's
1.
Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
Contenti violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
on
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be
held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
2. appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that
his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.
3. HE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION

Issue

Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's contstituional rights, be
invoked against the state.

SC Held

1. Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly
indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at
that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass
has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not
the search that is prohibited by the constitution
it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific
request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no
unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom?
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against
whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual
and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and
other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private
sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it
is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
2. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any

reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in
the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he
was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a
German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the
cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day
As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable
value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete
stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such
undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere
say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to
explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters

Burgos vs COS, AFP

Facts

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publishereditor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, be enjoined from using the articles thus
seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset
to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of
the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to
this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent
judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should
have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to
suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de
Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules
or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid
on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six
[6] months.

People vs Chua Ho San

Nature

Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his acquittal and the reversal of the
judgment of 10 February 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch
66, finding him guilty of transporting, without appropriate legal authority, the regulated substance
methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15,[1] Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further amended by R.A. No. 7659,[2] and
sentencing him to "die by lethal injection." In view thereof, the judgment was brought to this Court
for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7659.

Facts

In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid
(hereafter CID), as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the
Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29
March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite
(hereafter ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat the latter had spotted. According to ALMOITE, the vessel looked different from the boats
ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. CID and six
of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA), proceeded forthwith
to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with ALMOITE. CID then observed that the speedboat
ferried a lone male passenger. As it was routine for CID to deploy his men in strategic places when
dealing with similar situations, he ordered his men to take up positions thirty meters from the
coastline. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried
what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE,
CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the
approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right
arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking
in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. CID thus
tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed sign
language; he motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently
understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag,
which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the
latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and
escorted the latter to the police headquarters.
At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the facial features of the man, that he was
probably Taiwanese. CID then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain
silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, CID ordered his
men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime,
BADUA opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline
substances which he and CID suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally
arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." The police authorities
were satisfied that the man and the interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their
uncertainty as to what language was spoken. But when the policemen asked the man several
questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho
San printed thereon. CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp
Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, CHUA
was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station.
Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the
Philippine National Police, Region I, received a letter request[3] from CID incidentally her husband to
conduct a laboratory examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed inside a multicolored
strawbag. In her Chemistry Report No. D-025-95,[4] she stated that her qualitative examination
established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the
RTC which docketed the case as Criminal Case No. 4037. However, pursuant to the recommendation
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, that the facts of the case could
support an indictment for illegal transport of a regulated drug, the information was subsequently
amended to allege that CHUA "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transpor(ted) 28.7 kilos of
[m]ethamphetamine [h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the necessary permit or authority to transport
the same" in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659.
At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not guilty. The RTC was satisfied that
CHUA understood the amended information read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking
interpreter, Thelma Sales Go.

Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a Taiwanese Interpreter through the
auspices of the Department of Foreign Affairs. However, it was only after directing the request to the
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines that interpreters were assigned to CHUA.
Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to establish the above narration of facts
which were culled chiefly from the testimony of CID, its first witness, and whose testimony, in turn,
was substantially corroborated by witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE.
Expert witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her chemistry report in that the contents of
the 29 plastic packets weighing 28.7 kilos sent to her for chemical analysis were pure, unadulterated
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. She also explained that they were unwashed, hence they
appeared yellowish.
Chua's
Defense

For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter Steven Yu. He disclosed that he
hails from Taiwan and was employed in a shipbuilding and repairing company. On 21 March 1995, he
was instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board the latters 35-tonner ship
which would embark for Nan Au Port, Mainland China where they would buy fish. Upon arrival at
their destination, RONG left the ship, came back without the fish, but with two bags, the contents of
which he never divulged to CHUA. RONG then showed to CHUA a document purportedly granting
them authority to fish on Philippine waters. So they sailed towards the Philippines and reached
Dagupan, Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30 a.m., they disembarked on a small
speedboat with the two bags RONG brought with him from China. While sailing, RONG made several
phone calls using his mobile phone. CHUA heard RONG asked the person on the other side of the
line if he could see the speedboat they were riding. Apparently, the person on shore could not see
them so they cruised over the waters for about five hours more when finally, low on fuel and
telephone battery, they decided to dock. CHUA anchored the boat while RONG carried the bags to
shore. The tasks completed, RONG left to look for a telephone while CHUA rested and sat one and
half (1 1/2) meters away from one bag. A child thereafter pointed out to him that one bag was
missing much to RONGs dismay when he learned of it. When a crowd started to mill around them,
the police arrived. CHUA then realized that RONG was nowhere to be found. The police immediately
approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken word, only gestures and hand movements, they
escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police, led by an
officer who CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a
bag. They presented the bag to him, opened it, inspected and weighed the contents, then proclaimed
them as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
CHUA denounced the prosecutions story as a distortion of the truth. He denied he was ever favored
with an interpreter or informed of his "constitutional rights," particularly of his right to counsel.
Consequently, his arrest was tainted with illegality and the methamphetamine hydrochloride found in
the bag should have been regarded inadmissible as evidence. He also maintained that CID never
graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at Tammocalao beach. BADUA certainly never
prevented him from running away, as such thought failed to make an impression in his mind. Most
significantly, he denied ownership and knowledge of the contents of the bag, emphasizing that RONG
alone exercised dominion over the same.

Elmer
Parong

a Sangguniang Bayan member, recalled that on the date in question, he arrived at the beach with the
police. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. He also remembered hearing from the people
congregating at the beach that CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain policeman Anneb had
chased the latters car. He additionally claimed that when the crowd became unruly, the police
decided to bring CHUA to police headquarters. There, the mayor took charge of the situation -- he
opened CHUA's bag with the assistance of the police, he called for a forensic chemist surnamed CID
to take a sample of the contents of the bag, and he ordered his officials to find an interpreter.
Throughout the proceedings, photographers were busy taking pictures to document the event.

Arsenio
CRAIG

a farmer and resident of Tammocalao who narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the beach
when two men and a lady arrived. They were about to get a bag situated near CHUA when they
detected the arrival of the local police. They quickly disappeared. CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE and
PARONG at the beach but not CID.

RTC's
Ruling

the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that CHUA
transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so.
the RTC characterized the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed
the admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti.
The RTC also noted the futility of informing CHUA of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, considering the language
barrier and the observation that such irregularity was rectified when accused was duly arraigned

and (afterwards) participated in the trial of this case. The RTC then disregarded the inconsistencies
and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as these referred to minor details
which did not impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish the credence conferred on the
testimonies thus delivered.
The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged employer RONG and the
Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the illegal trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but with
several other members of an organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit traffic. Such
predilection was plainly evident in the dispositive portion, to wit:
The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the Philippine National Police to
immediately form an investigating Committee to be composed by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity,
who will conduct an exhaustive investigation regarding this case to determine whether there was
negligence or conspiracy in the escape of Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons who
approached the accused in the seashore of Tammocalao, Bacnotan, La Union, and attempted to take
the remaining bag from accused, as well as the whereabouts of the other bag; and to furnish this
Court a copy of the report/result of the said investigation in order to show compliance herewith sixty
(60) days from receipt hereof.
The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu is ordered turned over
immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with the law.
The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and
to be turned over to the Philippine National Police, La Union Command, for use in their Bantay-Dagat
operations against all illegal seaborne activities.
CHUA's CHUA's contentions by asserting that:
Contenti (1) the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search and seizure warrants as
on
circumstances immediately preceding to and contemporaneous with the search necessitated and
validated the police action; and
(2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures since he consented to the search.
Solicitor The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting that: (1) the search was licitly
General conducted despite the absence of search and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately
preceding to and contemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated the police action; and
(2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures since he consented to the search.
Issue

Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's
watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the
Bacnotan seas, Chua's illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua's suspecious behaviour, i.e, he
attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can
return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute
probable cause.
(Whether the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar
constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.)

SC
Ruling

We reverse the RTC.

Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly
ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.[7] Inseparable, and not
merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the
exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course,
forestall reasonable searches and seizure. the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body,
personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in
compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court;
otherwise such search and seizure become unreasonable within the meaning of the aforementioned
constitutional provision.
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances
of
(1) search of moving vehicles,

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

seizure in plain view,

customs searches,
waiver or consent searches,
stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
search incidental to a lawful arrest.

The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest,
the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto,
(2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident. But this Court
is certain that CHUA was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant.
There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUAs participation in an
ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive
search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on
the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended.
In short, there is no probable cause.
persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft
differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas,
CHUAs illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel documents or visa), CHUAs
suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent
ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the
high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws (does not constitute probable cause).
None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other
prohibited drug,[20] confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of
prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same,[21] suspicious
demeanor or behavior[22] and suspicious bulge in the waist[23]-- accepted by this Court as sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner
would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was
not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him
to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in
the process of perpetrating an offense.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a contemporaneous
search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements
used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate
control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy,[26] a valid arrest
must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.
To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown.
From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition.
If evidence obtained during an illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial
information or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree[32] how much more of "forbidden fruits"
which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this case - because the police
admitted that they never harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as
evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain CHUAs
conviction.
In
In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests,
Flagrant 1. a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person,
e delicto 2. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
3. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact[14] or as recent case
law[15] adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or
constitutive of probable cause.
Probabla The term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
Cause
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
Rules of required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to engender as well founded belief
Court
as to the fact of the commission of the crime and the respondents probable guilt thereof.
in Rule
112
that the
quantu
m of
evidence
Search
Incident
al to
lawful
arrest

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be
reversed

Consent
ed
Search/
waiver of
constitut
ional
rights

It is fundamental, however, that to constitute a waiver,

1. it must first appear that the right exists;
2. that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right;
and
3. that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Paderanga vs Drilon
Nature

In this special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction/restraining order, petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public respondents from including the
former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39 for multiple murder, through a second amended
information, and to restrain them from prosecuting him.

Facts

On October 16, 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court,
Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John
Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on May 1, 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora
Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per
Administrative Matter No. 87-2-244.
Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused remained at
large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since then.
In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas"
and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained petitioner Paderanga as his
counsel.
As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the
Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988. The trial court in an order
dated January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct
another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity
to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense."
In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated
herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.
The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the preliminary
investigation against petitioner at the instance of the latter's counsel, per his resolution dated July 7,
1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice, dated July 24, 1989, said city prosecutor
requested the Department of Justice to designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary
investigation against herein petitioner.
In a resolution dated September 6, 1989,1 respondent State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, who
was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary investigation against petitioner,
directed the amendment of the previously amended information to include and implead herein
petitioner as one of the accused therein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, contending that the
preliminary investigation was not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he
was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial
to the determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied
by respondent Gingoyon in his order dated January 29, 1990.

From the aforesaid resolution and order, petitioner filed a Petition for Review4 with the Department of
Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with Memorandum,5 and then a
Supplemental Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed,6 attaching
thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated June 20, 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of
March 30, 1990 wherein he implicated herein petitioner.
On August 10, 1990, the Department of Justice, through respondent Undersecretary Silvestre H.
Bello III, issued Resolution No. 6487 dismissing the said petition for review. His motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, petitioner then flied the instant petition for mandamus
and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Petitione (1) that the preliminary investigation as to him was not complete; and
r's
(2) that there exists no prima facie evidence or probable cause to justify his inclusion in the second
Contenti amended information.
on
SC
Ruling

Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the
quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court.9 Hence,
the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution.10 The
case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al.11 cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit:
a.
To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b.
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions;
c.
When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
d.
When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e.
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f.
When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g.
Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h.
Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i.
Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
j.
When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.
A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however, will readily show that
the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions. Hence, the petition at bar must be
dismissed.
1.

These contentions are without merit.

Firstly, it will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit, pursuant to the
subpoena issued to him on April 17, 1989, wherein he controverted the charge against him and
dismissed it as a malicious design of his political opponents and enemies to link him to the crime. We
hold that this is sufficient compliance with the procedural requirement of the Rules of Court,
specifically Section 3(b) of Rule 112 thereof. Besides, petitioner failed to show that the subpoena
issued on April 25, 1989 involved a separate complaint charging an offense different and distinct
from that charged in the complaint attached to the first subpoena issued to him earlier.
Secondly, the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies are matters of defense
best addressed to the trial court for its appreciation and evaluation.
Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute. The fiscal has the
discretion to determine whether or not he will propound these questions to the parties or witnesses
concerned. As clearly provided for under Section 3(e), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.:
(e)
If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing
to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall
be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the
parties so desire, they may submit questions to the to the investigating officer which the latter may
propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.

Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation
should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance of a preliminary investigation does not go to the
jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived.
Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trail court not an
appellate court."12
2. We are in accord with the state prosecutor's findings in the case at bar that there exists prima
facie evidence of petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently
supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of a crime and
the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are
inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to crossexamine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the
opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were presented to testify during
the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to crossexamine them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such right was never available to
him.
The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court
during the trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case
in the Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the
trial court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does
present such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can rule on the
admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to compel the
presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-examination.

Nolasco vs Cruz Pano

Nature

The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly
stated. The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILARROQUE and TOLENTINO.

Facts

Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of
the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No. MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases
being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.
On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search
Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased
residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises
as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the
military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly
connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:

(a)
The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila
Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE).
Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.
(b)
It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by
Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao.
(c)
According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were
examined under oath by Judge Pao but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us.
The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched
records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including
support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. 1
At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary
Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The
stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose
that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.
At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In
their COMMENT, however, respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same
day"; that is late on august 6

Prudente vs Dayrit
Nature

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated 9 March
1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order
dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.

Facts

On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division
(ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals. an application 1 for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH
WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled
"People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant."
On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-14.
commandeding to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the premises of
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military
Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of the
President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and
forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal properties, to wit:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and hand grenades; and
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200
WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo
Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching team,
alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a
bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old
newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.M33 Fragmentation hand
grenade (live); (b) one (11) pc.M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.PRB
423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that
(1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts

which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant;
(2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers;
(3) the search warrant was a general warrant,for the reason that it did not particularly describe the
place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and
(4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the
complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was
urgent.
The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division,
WPD, opposed the motion. After petitioner had filed his reply to the opposition, he filed a
supplemental motion to quash.
Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the petitioner's motion and
supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the
order dated 20 April 1988.
Prudente filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Petioner' 1. Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was issued on the
s
basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and
Contenti his witness but based on hearsay evidence.
on
2. Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly
describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and
the second floor of the PUP.
3. Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that it was issued in
violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in connection with one specific offense.
The search warrant issued by respondent judge, according to petitioner, was issued without any
reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866
punishes several offenses.
4. that the failure of the applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the
search warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned warrant
invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19, dated 14 August 1987
Issue

Whether the allegations contained in the application of P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the
declaration of P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles in his deposition were sufficient basis for the issuance of a
valid search warrant.

Held

For a valid search warrant to issue,

1. there must be probable cause,
2. which is to be determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
3. particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched." This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been
informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives
described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand,
in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous
surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of
the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and
his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for
issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information
from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that
he verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner had in his possession and custody

the t there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the
earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be
a fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers, but
there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-avis the said applicant.
What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only support to P/Major
Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. For, it avers that they
(presumably, the police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several days of the
suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they "gathered information from verified sources" that
the holders of the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them.
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held
liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported
by a person whom one considers to be reliable.
the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of
his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in
causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant.
Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the
declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a
valid search warrant.
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short.
Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers." On the
contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. Asking of
leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant.
the evidence failed to show the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search
warrant. The Court also notes post facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites, handguns,
pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the application for search warrant, the
supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting hand grenades were itself Only three
(3) live fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP, according to the affidavit of an
alleged member of the searching party.
2. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended . 22 In the case at bar, the
application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the
premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc,
Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground
floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at
the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the
constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched,
even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
3. the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession
of Firearms, etc.) While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case
was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge,
the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was
issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of
the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of
such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal possession of firearms
is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under
Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of items
destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed
within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As observed by
respondent Judge:
The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize the issuance of one
search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of ammunitions,
and another for illegal possession of explosives. Neither is the filing of three different informations for

each of the above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by the
courts is to file a single information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. This practice
is considered to be in accordance with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides that: 'A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Describably, the
servers did not search for articles other than firearms, ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of
Search Warrant No. 87-14 is deemed profoundly consistent with said rule and is therefore valid and
enforceable.
4. it would suffice to state that the section of the circular merely provides for a guideline, departure
from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid search warrant.

People vs Choi
Nature

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks the reversal of the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated April 10, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59587,

Facts

On April 27, 1999, Mario P. Nieto, Intelligence Operative of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau, Department of Finance, applied for a search warrant with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch 56, against respondent Christopher Choi for violation
of Section 168, paragraphs 2 and 3 (a) and (c), in relation to Section 169 of RA 8293,[5] also known
as the Intellectual Property Code.
Subject of search:
[r]eams and packs of fake Marlboro Red Cigarettes, as well as cardboard cases of fake Marlboro Red
Cigarettes (each cardboard case contains two (2) [m]aster [c]ases of Marlboro and each [m]aster case
contains fifty (50) reams) being distributed, kept and sold thereat in violation of Section 168, par. 2
and 3 (a) and (c) in relation to Section 169 of R.A. 8293
After examination of the applicant and his witnesses, namely, Max Cavalera and David Lee Sealey,
Judge Lourdes F. Gatbalite issued Search Warrant No. 99-17 dated April 27, 1999.
The search was conducted on the same date.
On May 12, 1999, respondent filed a motion to quash search warrant[9] and a supplemental motion
to quash on June 22, 1999. Both were denied by Judge Gatbalite in an order dated November 29,
1999. Reconsideration was likewise denied.
On June 19, 2000, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition[13] before the CA.
This was granted by the CA in a decision dated April 10, 2002.

Choi's
1. that probable cause was not sufficiently established as the examination conducted was not
Contenti probing and exhaustive and the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be searched. (CA)
on
2. prayed that Atty. Bennie Nicdao[14] be prohibited from using as evidence the articles seized by
virtue of the search warrant. (CA)
CA
Ruling

According to the CA, in determining whether there was probable cause to believe that the cigarettes
purchased by Nieto were fake and in violation of RA 8293, Judge Gatbalite failed to ask searching and
probing questions of witness David Lee Sealey.
the CA ruled that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion when she merely relied on the
conclusion of Sealey that the cigarettes he received from Nieto were fake. She should have at least
required Sealey to present the alleged fake Marlboro cigarettes and the genuine ones for comparison,
instead of relying on his testimony alone. The CA reasoned that this was an absolute requirement
under the Supreme Court ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals.

People
Conentio
n's on
the
ruling of
CA

1. The People of the Philippines aver that the CA erred in finding that Judge Gatbalite committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant allegedly because she failed to determine
probable cause pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. The People assail the finding of the CA that, in issuing the search warrant, Judge Gatbalite
purportedly did not comply strictly with the requirement to determine the existence of probable cause
by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses through searching questions and answers.
3. The People also assert that the CA erred in applying the doctrine in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation[20] since it had already been superseded by Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

HELD

SC rule for the People of the Philippines

Given the foregoing testimonies and applying the established standards in determining probable
cause, we cannot say that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search
warrant. Her questions were sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. The
testimonies were consistent with each other and the narration of facts was credible. The testimonies
and other evidence on record constituted adequate bases to establish probable cause that the alleged
offense had been committed.
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted
the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses,[35] the
findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon
proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.[36] We
thus find no reason to disturb Judge Gatbalites findings.
3. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, insofar
as it required the presentation of the master tapes for comparison with the pirated copies for a search
warrant to issue, had already been superseded by Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement in 20th Century Fox
calling for the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for determination of probable
cause in copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification.
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular requirement (the
presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox) not provided nor implied in the law
for a finding of probable cause is beyond the realm of judicial competence or statesmanship. It serves
no purpose but to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a courts prerogatives and to
denigrate the judicial duty of determining the existence of probable cause to a mere ministerial or
mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that the existence of probable
cause is or should be determined solely by a specific kind of evidence. Surely, this could not have
been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court intended
the statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master tapes as the dictum for all seasons and reasons
in infringement cases.[37] (emphasis supplied)
It is obvious that 20th Century Fox Film Corporation should not be applied to the present case since
this involves the offense of unfair competition and not copyright infringement. More importantly, as
pronounced by the Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc., the judges exercise of discretion should not be
unduly restricted by adding a requirement that is not sanctioned by law.

Requisit
es for
issuing
Search
Warrant
s

Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 state:

Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.

Examina
tion of
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
complai examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant
nt
and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Probable According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of probable
cause
cause. Probable cause means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[22] The determination of the
existence of probable cause requires the following:
(1)
the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally;
(2)
the examination must be under oath and
(3)
the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and
answers.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof
that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As the term implies, probable cause is
concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are
those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. No
law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule

for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a
given situation.[30] The entirety of the questions propounded by the court and the answers thereto
must be considered by the judge.
Searchin
g
Questio
n

The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on the
discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should
conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma. The judge must not simply rehash
the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application. The questions should not merely be repetitious of the averments stated in the affidavits
or depositions of the applicant and the witnesses. If the judge fails to determine probable cause by
personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions before
issuing a search warrant, grave abuse of discretion is committed.

PICOP vs Asuncion
Nature

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] praying for (1) the nullification of Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City;[2] and (2) the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to
desist from proceeding with IS No. 95-167.

Facts

On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before
the said RTC of Quezon City, stating:
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G[.]
Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives,
which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and
which xxx are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and
bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56,
ten (10) M16 US rifles,
two (2) AK-47 rifle[s],
two (2) UZI submachinegun[s],
two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal.40mm,
ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s],
ten (10) cal.38 revolver[s],
ten (10) handgrenades.'
two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms
the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito,[12] as well as a summary
of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno were
attached to the application.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested
search warrant. (in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition
and Explosives).
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized
various firearms and ammunition.
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash[16] before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion
to Quash and a Motion to Suppress Evidence.
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions.[18]
On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order[19] denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP et al filed a Petition for Certiorari.

PICOP's 1. Probable cause [has] not xxx been sufficiently established and partaking as it does of the nature of
Contenti a general warrant.
on
2. that the Search Warrant was unlawfully served or implemented.
3. that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave abuse of discretion or exceeding his jurisdiction
in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
Respond 1. Respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact, which are
ent's
not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain that the Petition merely assails

Contenti the factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and the regularity of its implementation.
on
2
SC
Ruling

Petition Granted, SW null and void

1. It is settled that there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of
alleged facts.[23] In the present case, petitioners do not question the truth of the facts as found by
the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived at, a procedure
which they contend was violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We agree that the
Petition raises only questions of law, which may be resolved in the present case.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant
The search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant
and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance
of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the
subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.
No Personal Examination of the Witnesses
Chief Inspector Pascuas application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint Deposition of
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary of information and (3)
supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod,
however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court.
Moreover, the applicants participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted
only of introducing Witness Bacolod
Pascuas failed to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound
questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod.
Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach
them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or proforma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of
the application.
Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his testimony
showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were
not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives.
Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was licensed.
Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guards were not licensed. He also said that
some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the trial court that
PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant
and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy of the aforementioned no
license certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to present it during
the hearing. Such certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located
in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based.
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could
be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where
the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of
a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and
control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be
secured at the time of the application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during
the examination by the judge.
Particularity of the Place to Be Searched (Refer to Below Inforation)
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. It

simply authorizes a search of the aforementioned premises, but it did not specify such premises. The
warrant identifies only one place, and that is the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines,
located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur. The PICOP compound,
however, is made up of 200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves,
23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of
which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares.[36] Obviously, the warrant gives the
police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the
PICOP compound.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application
for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search
warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be
seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it
not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process,
and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely
removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly
be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the
police officers conducting the search.
Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all
the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[42] As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures.[43] Verily, they are the fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this exclusionary rule, the
constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
Validity
of the
Search
Warrant

The fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the basic conditions for the
issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present;
(2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;
(3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge,
in writing and under oath or affirmation;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Particul
arity of
the pace
to be
searched

In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search, the
Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant.[33]
Thus, this Court has held that this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the
belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against
the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not
be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards.[34] Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will
make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described
items are to be found in a particular place.[35]

UNILAB vs ISIP
FACTS

Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an
application, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a search warrant
concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street
(formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar
Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure of the following for violation of
Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203:

a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly

REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements
and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit
REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other
books of accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or importation,
distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.[1]

Appended thereto were the following: (1) a sketch[2] showing the location of the building to be
searched; (2) the affidavit[3] of Charlie Rabe of the Armadillo Protection and Security Agency hired by
United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB), who allegedly saw the manufacture, production and/or
distribution of fake drug products such as Revicon by Shalimar Philippines; (3) the letter-request of
UNILAB, the duly licensed and exclusive manufacturer and/or distributor of Revicon and Disudrin,
for the monitoring of the unauthorized production/manufacture of the said drugs and, if warranted,
for their seizure; (4) the letter-complaint[4] of UNILAB issued through its Director of the Security and
Safety Group; and (5) the joint affidavit[5] of NBI Agents Roberto Divinagracia and Rolando Besarra
After conducting the requisite searching questions, the court granted the application and issued
Search Warrant No. 04-4916 dated January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the law to
conduct a search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on January 27, 2004 by NBI agents Besarra and
Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake Revicon multivitamins were found;
instead, there were sealed boxes at the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building which, when
opened by the NBI agents in the presence of respondent Isip, contained ten (10) boxes of disudrin
and atleast one (1) box of Inoflox.
NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized in which he
declared that the search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building at No. 1571, Aragon
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises described in the warrant, was done in an orderly and peaceful
manner. He also filed a Return of Search Warrant,[9] alleging that no other articles/items other than
those mentioned in the warrant and inventory sheet were seized. The agent prayed that of the items
seized, ten boxes of Disudrin 60 ml., and at least one box of Inoflox be turned over to the custody of
the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination.[10] The court issued an order granting the
motion, on the condition that the turn over be made before the court, in the presence of a
representative from the respondents and the court.[
The respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence.
UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the search was limited to
the first and second floors of the Shalimar building located at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They averred that, based on the sketch appended to the search warrant
application, Rabes affidavit, as well as the joint affidavit of Besarra and Divinagracia, the building
where the search was conducted was located at No. 1571, Aragon Street corner Lacson Avenue, Sta.
Cruz, Manila. They pointed out that No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was the old address,
and the new address was No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained that the
warrant was not implemented in any other place.
In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized were different from those listed in the search
warrant. They also claimed that the seizure took place in the building located at No. 1524-A which
was not depicted in the sketch of the premises which the applicant submitted to the trial court.[14] In
accordance with the ruling of this Court in People v. Court of Appeals,[15] the respondents served a
copy of their pleading on UNILAB.[16]
On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an Order[17] granting the motion of the respondents, on
the ground that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not those described in the
search warrant. On March 16, 2004, the trial court issued an advisory[18] that the seized articles
could no longer be admitted in evidence against the respondents in any proceedings, as the search
warrant had already been quashed.
UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI agents, for the
reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used by the court in quashing the warrant
was not that invoked by the respondents, and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain
view doctrine. The respondents objected to the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that
the latter could not appear for the People of the Philippines. The respondents moved that the motion

for reconsideration of UNILAB be stricken off the record. Disputing the claims of UNILAB, they
insisted that the items seized were contained in boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A,
Lacson Avenue corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not apparently incriminating on
plain view. Moreover, the seized items were not those described and itemized in the search warrant
application, as well as the warrant issued by the court itself.
Respond Motion to Quash the SW or to Suppress Evidence
ent's
Contenti that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their search at the first, second, third and fourth
on
floors of the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in open display
were allegedly found.
that such premises was different from the address described in the search warrant, the first and
second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of
properties to be seized in the search warrant.
UNILAB' That the ground used by the court in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents,
s
and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine.
Contenti
on
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day in court when the trial court

quashed the search warrant for a ground which was not raised by the respondents herein in
their motion to quash the warrant.
As such, it argues that the trial court ignored the issue raised by the respondents. The
petitioner insists that by so doing, the RTC deprived it of its right to due process.
The petitioner asserts that the description in the search warrant of the products to be seized
finished or unfinished products of UNILAB is sufficient to include counterfeit drugs within
the premises of the respondents not covered by any license to operate from the BFAD, and/or
not authorized or licensed to manufacture, or repackage drugs produced or manufactured by
UNILAB.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Padilla v. Court of Appeals,[28] the petitioner asserts that
the products seized were in plain view of the officers; hence, may be seized by them. The
petitioner posits that the respondents themselves admitted that the seized articles were in
open display; hence, the said articles were in plain view of the implementing officers.
UNILAB' 2.01 The Honorable Court ERRED in ruling on a non-issue or the issue as to the alleged
s
failure to particularly describe in the search warrant the items to be seized but upon which
Contenti
NO challenge was then existing and/or NO controversy is raised;
ons in
their
2.02 The Honorable Court ERRED in its ruling that finished or unfinished products of
motion
UNILAB cannot stand the test of a particular description for which it then reasons that the
for
consider search is, supposedly unreasonable; and,
ation
dated 11 2.03 The Honorable Court ERRED in finding that the evidence seized is lawfully inadmissible against
March
respondents.[53]
2004
ISSUE

(1) whether the petitioner is the proper party to file the petition at bench;
(2) whether it was proper for the petitioner to file the present petition in this Court under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court; and
(3) whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the Shalimar
building and the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and
Inoflox, were valid. (Plain View Doctrine)

SC
Ruling

1. The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any
adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through
the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[48] the Court
allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and
considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the
petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:

From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which
led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the
general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or
the Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due
process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the
Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow
petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General.[49]
2. The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in
exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.[50] In this case, the Court has opted
to take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties.
3. The Court does not agree with the petitioners contention that the issue of whether the Disudrin
and Inoflox products were lawfully seized was never raised in the pleadings of the respondents in the
court a quo. Truly, the respondents failed to raise the issue in their motion to quash the search
warrant; in their reply, however, they averred that the seized items were not included in the subject
warrant and, therefore, were not lawfully seized by the raiding team. They also averred that the said
articles were not illegal per se, like explosives and shabu, as to justify their seizure in the course of
unlawful search.[51] In their Opposition/Comment filed on March 15, 2004, the respondents even
alleged the following:
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of whether there is a legal
basis to quash the search warrant and/or to suppress the seized articles in evidence. Since the
articles allegedly seized during the implementation of the search warrant Disudrin and Inoflux
products were not included in the search warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully seized by the
raiding team; they are not illegal per se, as it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or shabu
as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful search, or being in plain view or some such. No
need whatever for some public assay.
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without proper examination or assay
that the Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from respondents place were counterfeit. All
the relevant presumptions are in favor of legality.[52]
The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention of the petitioner that the respondents
never raised in the court a quo the issue of whether the seizure of the Disudrin and Inoflox products
was valid.
2.1 On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and Inoflox, the
Court, likewise, rejects the contention of the petitioner. (see below discussion of the Particularity of
Description and Plain view Doctrine)
Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court a quo as among the
properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the officers only to
seize counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in
recording, manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale
and/or distribution of the said vitamins. The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit
Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they
were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were
seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the
plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the
essential requirements for the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the respondents
motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioners motion for
reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain
view exception relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the
petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to
present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of the petitioners representative who
was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers
discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating
and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the
warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were
incriminating and that they were immediately apparent.[65] There is even no showing that the NBI
agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened.

In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential
requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.
Particul
arity of
Descript
ion

A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly
described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a
raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general
or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.[54]

Plain
view
Doctrine

Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing
officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers
not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential
requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer
has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which
he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.[55]
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a
lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search
directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the
fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not covered
by the warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is
evidence of the crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to
require the police to obtain another warrant.[56] Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a
legitimate expectation of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.

The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of
the object or the facts therein available to him, determine probable cause of the objects
incriminating evidence.[57] In other words, to be immediate, probable cause must be the
direct result of the officers instantaneous sensory perception of the object.[58] The object is
apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity.
The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search,
without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of
seizure.[59]
The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not have
known in advance of the location of the evidence and intend to seize it.[60] Discovery is not
anticipated.[61]
The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the
incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively
reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and criminal activity.[62]
Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the guilt
of a person.[63]

PEOPLE vs RAMOS
Nature

Appellant Rosalinda Ramos seeks the reversal of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Third Judicial Region at Olongapo City, finding her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case No. 5990 for violating Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and in Criminal Case No. 5991 for violating
Section 4 of the same Act and sentencing her to:
1)
Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day and a fine of P6,000.00 in Criminal

Case No. 5990; and

2)
Life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 5991.
The two informations filed against the appellant respectively alleged:
Criminal Case No. 5990
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1982 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without being
lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his/her/their person, possession and control twenty (20) sticks of marijuana cigarettes.
Criminal Case No. 5991
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1982 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to
another and distributing four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes which is/are prohibited drug(s).
(Rollo, p. 68)
Facts

Command Office in Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of 'Mama Rose'
was selling marijuana at the comer of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City (TSN, pp. 4-5, 13,
May 4, 1984; pp. 3-4, 11, April 9, 1986). Captain Castillo instructed the informant to conduct a test
buy. he informer left and after thirty (30) minutes came back and gave to Captain Castillo two (2)
sticks of marijuana cigarettes which he bought from appellant.
Captain Castillo again instructed the informer to make another test buy from the suspect. From his
wallet, Captain Castillo extracted another two (2) five-peso bills and before handing the same to the
informer, recorded the serial numbers in his pocket note.
A team composed of Captain Castillo, Sgt. Tahil Ahamad, CIC Danilo Santiago and Angel Sudiacal left
with the informer. The informer proceeded to where appellant was selling cigarettes to conduct the
next test buy while the NARCOM agents waited. After forty-five (45) minutes more or less, the
informer arrived at the Black and White Bar and again gave to Captain Castillo two (2) sticks of
marijuana
The team then proceeded to the place where appellant was selling cigarettes. The team arrested the
appellant. Appellant was requested to take out the contents of her wallet. The four marked five- peso
bills were found among her possessions and were confiscated after the serial numbers were
confirmed by Captain Castillo from his record. The initial of Sgt. Tahil Ahamad was also found from
the confiscated five- peso bills. Sgt. Ahamad searched the stall of appellant and found twenty (20)
sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a trash can placed under the small table where appellant displayed
the wares she was selling. Appellant was thereafter brought to the station.

At the station, appellant executed a statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to
before Assistant City Fiscal Domingo Cabali, Jr.
The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL)
for analysis and thereafter were confirmed to be marijuana. (Chemistry Report No. MD-363-82)