METRO ILOILO WATER DISTRICT VS CA

G.R. No. 122855

March 31, 2005
Ponente: Tinga
FACTS: Metro Iloilo Water District (MIWD), which was granted water rights to extract and withdraw ground water
within its jurisdiction. MIWD filed an injunction case against private respondents (Nava et al.) for withdrawing ground
water within the formers jurisdiction without securing a water permit from NWRC, which was still being done upon
filing the petition. Private respondents averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the matter, as the cases were
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council (Water Council). The RTC
dismissed the petitions saying it had no jurisdiction and that MWID failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision, saying that the NWRC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disputes relating to
appropriation, utilization and control of water which was the subject matter of the case.
ISSUE: W/N NWRC had jurisdiction over the case. NO.
RATIO: The petitions filed before the RTC were for the issuance of an injunction order for private respondents to
cease and desist from extracting or withdrawing water from MIWDs well and from selling the same within its service
areas. The petitions focus on the violations incurred by private respondents by virtue of their alleged unauthorized
extraction and withdrawal of ground water within petitioners service area, visa-a-vis MIWDs vested rights as a water
district. At issue is whether or not private respondents extraction and sale of ground water within petitioners service
area violated petitioners rights as a water district.
The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and jurisprudence in
order to determine whether private respondents actions violate MIWDs rights as a water district and justify an
injunction. This issue does not so much provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge and expertise of the Water
Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. While initially it may appear that there is a dimension to the petitions
which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council, in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of
the petitions.
MIWD had an approved Water Rights Grant from the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications. The trial court was not asked to grant MIWD the right to use but to compel private respondents to
recognize that right. Thus, the trial courts jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the settlement of
a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already granted.

BF NORTHWEST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS IAC AND BF HOMES, INC.

G.R. No. 72370
May 29, 1987
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera
FACTS: BF Homes, Inc. (HOMES), which was granted a certificate of public convenience by National Water
Resources Council (NWRC) [formerly the Board of Power and Waterworks], increased water rates by authority of the
latter. BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc (ASSOCIATION) filed a petition enjoin BF Homes, Inc. from
collecting from ASSOCIATION members the adjusted water rates for being arbitrary and unreasonable and to annul
NWRCs Order granting HOMES authority to charge the increased water rates on the ground that it was rendered
without procedural due process and without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. HOMES
filed a motion to dismiss but was denied.
However, upon petition by HOMES, the CA reversed and held that the RTC was without jurisdiction to
entertain the case since NWRC, which took over the functions of the Public Service Commission, has the rank of a
Regional Trial Court and its decision on water rates may only be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over actions to annul Orders, Resolutions and/or Decisions of the National
Water Resources Council (NWRC) relative to water rates. YES.

RATIO: Under PD 1067, it explicitly states that decisions of the NWRC on water rights controversies may be appealed
to the Court of First Instance. The NWRC is thus ranked with "inferior courts," which, under the SC Interim Rules and
Guidelines are listed as the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Jurisdiction over actions for annulment of NWRC decisions lies with the Regional Trial Courts, particularly, when we
take note of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over NWRC decisions covers such broad
and all embracing grounds as grave abuse of discretion, questions of law, and questions of fact and law.
The distinction made by the CA between "water rights controversies" which it maintains are appealable to the
Regional Trial Courts, and "water rates disputes" which it says are appealable to the Court of Appeals, is not well
taken. Considering that rate- fixing is merely an incident to the grant of a certificate of public convenience, it would be
irregular if disputes over water rates, should be held appealable to the Court of Appeals while controversies over water
rights, the latter being the privilege granted by the government to appropriate and use water and, therefore, a primary
right, would be appealable only to the Regional Trial Court.
However, it is to be noted that since Decision Orders of the NWRC are assailed, the latter agency should be
impleaded as an indispensable party defendant in order that any judgment could be effective and binding on it, and so
that complete relief may be accorded to the parties.

AMISTOSO VS ONG AND NERI

G.R. No. L-60219
June 29, 1984
Ponente: Cuevas
FACTS: Amistoso and Neri are owners of adjoining parcels of agricultural land. An irrigation canal traverses the land of
Neri through which irrigation water from the Silmod River passes and and flows to the land of the Amistoso for the
latter's beneficial use. Amistoso filed a complaint for Recognition of Basement with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against Neri and Ong(cultivator of Neris land) for refusal, despite repeated demands, to recognize the rights
and title of the former to the beneficial use of the water passing through the irrigation canal and to have Amistoso's
rights and/or claims annotated on the Certificate of Title of Neri. Neri denied any right of Amistoso over the use of the
canal, nor was there any contract, deed or encumbrance on their property and assert that they have not performed
any act prejudicial to the petitioner that will warrant the filing of the complaint against them.
Neri asserts that the complaint should be dismissed because Amistosos claim is based on his right to use
water coming from the Silmod River and prays that Amistosos right to the utilization thereof be respected and not be
disturbed and/or obstructed by Neri. The dispute is thus on the use, conservation and protection of the right to water
and the annotation is merely the relief prayed for on the basis of the claim to the use and protection of water passing
through the land of Neri. And since the controversy hinges on the right to use and protect the water from the Silmod
River that passes on the land of Neri to Amistoso's property, the proper authority to determine such a controversy is
the National Water Resources Council, which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over such question. The trial court
dismissed Amistosos complaint for lackof jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Amistoso has the right over the use of the canal. YES.
2. W/N National Water Resources Council has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. NO.
RATIO: Based from the stipulation of facts between the parties, Neri admits that Amistoso , has an approved Water
Rights Grant issued by the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. Neri contends that the
said grant does not pertain to the beneficial use of irrigation water from Silmod River. The records, however, do not
show any other irrigation water going to petitioner's property passing thru respondents' lot aside from that coming from
the Silmod River, making Neris allegations invalid.
The record clearly discloses an approved Water Rights Grant in favor of Amistoso. The grant was made three
(3) years before the promulgation of P.D. 1067 (Water Code of the Philippines). The water rights grant partakes the
nature of a document known as a water permit recognized under Article 13 of P.D. 1067. the WATER RIGHTS GRANT
of Amistoso does not fall under "claims for a right to use water existing on or before December 31, 1974" which under
P.D. 1067 are required to be registered with the National Water Resources Council within two (2) years from
promulgation of P.D. 1067, otherwise it is deemed waived and the use thereof deemed abandoned.
The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the respondent Judge, and incontrovertibly entitles petitioner
to the beneficial use of water from Silmod River. That right is now a. vested one and may no longer be litigated as to
bring petitioner's case within the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council. To resurrect that issue will be
violative of the rule on res judicata. Amistoso is not asking the court to grant him the right to use but to compel Neri to
recognize that right and have the same annotated on the latters TCT. The interruption of the free flow of water caused
by the refusal to re-open the closed irrigation canal constituted petitioner's cause of action in the court below, which
decidedly do not fall within the domain of the authority of the National Water Resources Council.

LONEY et al. VS PEOPLE

G.R. No. 152644
February 10, 2006
Ponente: Carpio
FACTS: Loney et al., are officers of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in
the province of Marinduque. In one of Marcoppers operations, the corporation discharged millions of tons of tailings
(mine waste) into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. The DOJ separately charged Loney et al. for violating various laws
(The Water Code, The Mining act, RPC, and the National Pollution Control Decree). Loney et al. moved to quash the
informations claiming that the informations were "duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a single
act.
The MTC held that Loney et al. is liable under the Philippine Mining Act but dismissed the violation of other
laws. On petition to the RTC, it affirmed the decision and ordered the other charges reinstated. The RTC said that
there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are
separate and distinct from each other. The different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each
crime are different from one another. On petition to the CA, it affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. W/N all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only
the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand. NO.
2. W/N Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.
RATIO:
No Duplicity of Charges
There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. Under
Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a
ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in
preparing his defense. In this case, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense. Thus, Loney et al. erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to
quash the Informations

The Filing of Several Charges is Proper

The filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent with
settled doctrine that where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. A comparative analysis between the laws
shows that each of these laws on which Loney et al. were charged, there is one essential element not required of the
others. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mala prohibita in contrast with those punished by the
Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.The charge for violation of RPC does not absorb the charges for the other
laws because mala in se felonies cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes.

People v. Relova not in Point

In the case of People v. Relova, the court held that a person charged with theft of electric power under the
RPC after being acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring
violates the right against double jeopardy because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance
and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act. However,
such is not the case here because Loney et al.are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national
statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. Although Loney et al. cannot be for multiple prosecuted for
the same offense, they can be charged for offenses arising from the same incident.

G.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008

Concerned Citizens

vs MMDA
Ponente: Velasco
Facts:
January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint
before the RTC Imus, Cavite against several government agencies for the
clean-up, rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay/ The complaint
alleged that the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the
allowable standards set by law (esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).
DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples collected
from the beaches around Manila Bay is beyond the safe level for bathing
standard of the DENR. MWSS testified also about MWSS efforts to reduce
pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports Authority presented as evidence
its Memorandum Circulars on the study on ship-generated waste treatment and
disposal as its Linis Dagat project.
RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to
the cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning
in general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds appropriated for
cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial
act which can be compelled by mandamus.
CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do
tasks outside of their usual basic functions.
Issue:
(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents.
(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not
ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus.
Held:
(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.
Petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two
different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks
may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature
and may be compelled by mandamus.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is
set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in
its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system

cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated;

discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public
functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.
(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best
usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be
necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water
quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the
polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his
own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies
concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons
and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec.
17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution
incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress,
commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to take such
measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality
standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is
not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Note:
- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.
Ministerial duty is one that requires neither official discretion nor
judgment.

TANO v. SOCRATES
G.R. No. 110249
August 21, 1997
Ponente: Davide, Jr.

FACTS: TANO et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Ordinances 1 issued by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa and its Governor (Socrates). Tano et al
contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them
from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. They also
claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association
are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper,
necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion. Socrates et al. defended
the validity of the Ordinances as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare
clause; they likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. Socrates wt al. reasoned that public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance
which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial
distinction existed "between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who
catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live," i.e., "the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does
not." Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class.
ISSUE: W/N the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional. NO.
RATIO: There is absolutely no showing that any of the Tano et al. qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman to
invoke as defense of violation of Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII. Section 7, particularly, speaks not only of the use of
communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development and conservation. As hereafter shown,
the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their
enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. IN addition,
Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of
the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by
law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein
to LGU under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and other provisions, the validity of the questioned
Ordinances cannot be doubted. It is clear that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to
establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2)
to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further
destruction due to illegal fishing activities. Furthermore, Ordinances banning the catching of certain species of fishes
and corals need not be approved by the DENR before they can be effective because in the exercise of devolved
power, such approval is not necessary.
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the
provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the
sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties
for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such
other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance.
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to
effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 170180
November 23, 2007
1 (1) Ordinance No. 15-92 "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business, trade,
occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a
Mayors and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped
out from Puerto Princesa and,
(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THECATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BU
YING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS

Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 of RA
9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in his
possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on him
Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one of the
barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The petitioner
was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered
to have the bag opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were found.
Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his
warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise
contrary to law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the arrest
and the search.
Held:
The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was acquitted by
reasonable doubt.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions
permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the arrest.

(1) the person to be arrested

must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit:

None of the petitioners actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon approach of
the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity to validate the warrantless arrest.
However, the Courts decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact that the
lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the chain of custody
rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the prosecution witnesses.
Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus acquitted.

The Court added that the petitioners lack of objection to the search
and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.

HIZON et al. VS CA
G.R. No. 119619
December 13, 1996
Ponente: Puno

FACTS: HIZON et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous
substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing by "muro ami" led to the apprehension of
such boat (F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police (PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force
Bantay Dagat) directed the boat captain to get random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The initial
results tested the fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information against Hizon et al.
However, a second set of fish samples yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide.
Notwithstanding this, the RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of
the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together with the Solicitor general now question the admissibility
of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of
petitioners.

ISSUE/S:
1. W/N fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson without a search warrant are admissible in evidence.
YES.
2. W/N Hizon et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. NO.
RATIO: As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels
and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery
laws.
Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704. These provisions
create a presumption of guilt for possession of explosives or poisonous substances. However, this presumption is
merely prima facie and the accused has the right to present evidence to rebut this presumption.
In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI
laboratory test on the four fish specimens. The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find
any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the
possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding does
not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were
caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
Apparently, it was the police who were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. "Muro ami", as what
was reported the fishermen were doing, is made with "the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in
the water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net." This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200)
fishermen to execute. What the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their
sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of
illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were
tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of
poisonous substances.

Administrative remedies; exhaustion. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have
availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence,
if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or
her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can
be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of
action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal
reasons. Resort to administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. Furthermore, courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. While the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to several exceptions, the Court finds that the instant case does
not fall under any of them. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010.

Laguna Lake Development Authority; powers. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) has
power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. Adjudication of pollution cases generally
pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as the LLDA
Charter, provides for another forum. Although the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the
National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not
preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility and
to impose fines as penalty. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010.

G.R. No. 165299 December 18, 2009PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. vs. LAGUNA
LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of
laundry services. On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to
respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on
the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioners plant located at 114
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an
investigation and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioners
laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco

Del Monte River. Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that

petitioners plant was operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and
Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September 2001,the Environmental Quality
Management Division of LLDA conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners
effluent.
The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent
standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand
(BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to
petitioner a Notice of Violation. Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA
Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake the
necessary measures to abate the water pollution. No compliance followed. It was
reported that petitioners wastewater treatment facility was under
construction. Subsequently, another wastewater sampling was conducted but the
results still failed. A Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against
petitioner before the LLDA. Petitioner requested another test. This time, it showed
compliance. Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30 October
2001 and its corresponding daily penalty beset aside and that the imposable
penalty be reckoned from the date of actual hearing and not on 5 September
2001. It is respondents position that the Notice of Violation and the
imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual basis because it had already
installed the necessary wastewater treatment to abate the water pollution. This
Public Hearing Committee finds respondents arguments devoid of merit.
Presidential Decree No. 984 prohibits the discharge of pollutive wastewater and
any person found in violation thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding five thousand
pesos (PhP5,000.00) [sic] for every day during which such violation continues. The
mere discharge of wastewater not conforming with the effluent standard is the
violation referred to in PD No. 984.CA held that LLDA has the power to impose
fines.
ISSUE: WON LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984.
HELD: YES. Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such
power to impose penal sanctions, which was once lodged with the National
Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), is now assumed by the Pollution
Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192). SC disagree.
Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under the
Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution
Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the
powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927),
LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively perform its role and
to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement. Under
Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such other
functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities." In
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the

power of LLDA to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even if such power is
not expressly conferred by law, holding that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The
Court ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its express powers under its charter, as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region, has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order." In the
same manner, we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the
exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region

THE ALEXANDRIA CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION (TACC) VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(LLDA)
G.R. No. 169228
September 11, 2009
Ponente: Carpio
FACTS: Philippine Realty and Holdings, Inc. (PhilRealty), which constructed and developed The Alexandra
Condominium Complex, transferred to The Alexandra Condominium Corporation (TACC) such condominium complex
by virtue of a Deed of Conveyance. Subsequently (after 5 years), Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised
TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards, and informed TACC that it must put up its own
Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent discharge to meet government standards. Since constructing an STP
would be expensive (P15M), TACC tried to experiment with other methods of cleaning its wastewater. However, the
wastewater still failed to meet government standards. For this violation, LLDA imposed a P1000 daily fine on TACC
until the wastewater discharge complies with the government standard.
TACC then entered into an agreement with World Chem Marketing for the construction of the STP for P7.5M.
LLDA issued an Order requiring TACC to pay the fine (~P1M) representing the penalty from until the STP was
constructed. TACC requested LLDA to condone the imposition of the penalty of P1,000 per day in recognition of the
remedial and corrective measures it undertook to comply with government standards. TACC further argues that the
non-compliance with government standards was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty. This was denied by
LLDA.
TACC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order. The CA denied TACCs petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N TACC complied with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. NO.
2. W/N TACC is the one liable to pay the fine. YES.
RATIO:
Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may
be elevated to a court of justice for review.11 A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint
without cause of action and dismissible. 12 In this case, TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR
Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. This is
because under Executive order No. 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR "for policy and
program coordination and/or administrative supervision. And although under the same order, DENR only has
administrative power over LLDA, a subsequent EO 192 mandates the DENR to "promulgate rules and regulations for
the control of water, air and land pollution" and to "promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality
including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations."
Powers of the LLDA to Impose Penalty
LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.

Under Section 4-A of RA 48502, as amended, LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages resulting from failure to
meet established water and effluent quality standards.
It is clear that the responsibility to comply with government standards lies with TACC, because PhilRealty turned over
the project to TACC five years before LLDA advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent
standards. If, as claimed by TACC, the non-compliance was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty, TACCs
recourse is to file an action, if warranted, against PhilRealty in a proper court. TACC cannot escape its liability to LLDA
by shifting the blame to PhilRealty. Hence, the LLDA did not abuse its discretion in issuing its 4 September 2003
Order.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA

GR No. 110120
March 16, 1994
FACTS:
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree N o.
1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued a CEASE and
DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite.
ISSUES:
1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint
against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the
City Government of Caloocan?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional Powers and
Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions: (d) Make, alter or modify
orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within
which such discontinuance must be accomplished
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases w here the special law provides for another forum
RULING:
1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory law s to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon
and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from
the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.

2 Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from
failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards and from such other wrongful act or omission of a person, private or
public, juridical or otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality control
and management.

3. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative

agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule
that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise
of its ex press powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its
charter as a regulatory and quasi judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is,
perforce, implied. NOTE: HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the
power of the LLDA to issue.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) VS COURT OF APPEALS (CA)

G.R. Nos. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr.
FACTS: RA 4850, which created the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), was partially amended by Marcos
due to the rapid expansion of Metro Manila and its impact on the environment. This further defined and enlarged the
functions and powers of LLDA. Subsequently, the LGC took effect, where the municipalities in the Laguna Lake
Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. Municipal governments thereupon
assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Fishpen operators took advantage of the
occasion which gave rise to sharp increase in unregulated fishpen and fish cages.
Because of this, the LLDA notified the public that all unregistered fishpen or fishcages are declared illegal and
dismantled otherwise demolition will be effected. The affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA.
LLDAs motions to dismiss were denied by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. The CA held that the power to grant
fishing permits is now vested with the LGUs and the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in
Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the LGC.
ISSUE/S: Which agency of the Government (the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region) should
exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned. LLDA has jurisdiction.
RATIO: The LGC do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority
and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The LGC does not contain any
express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the LLDA.
LLDAs charter constitutes a special law while the LGC is a general law. . It is basic in statutory construction
that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law,
unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the
cases embraced in the special law. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special
statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. Thus, LLDAs charter
should prevail over the LGC.
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes.
On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is
for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake quality
control and management. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the LGC on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated
therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.