The Atomic Bomb and The End of World War II

The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II
A Collection of Primary Sources

Updated National Security Archive Posting Marks 70th Anniversary of the Atomic
Bombings of Japan and the End of World War II
Extensive Compilation of Primary Source Documents Explores Manhattan Project,
Petitions Against Military Use of Atomic Weapons, Debates over Japanese
Surrender
Terms,
Atomic
Targeting
Decisions, and Lagging Awareness of
Radiation Effects
New Information Spotlights General Dwight
D. Eisenhowers Early Misgivings about First
Nuclear Use
General Curtis Lemay's Report on the
Firebombing of Tokyo, March 1945
August 4, 2015- A few months after the

atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, General Dwight D. Eisenhower
commented during a social occasion how
he had hoped that the war might have
ended without our having to use the atomic
bomb. This virtually unknown evidence
from the diary of Robert P. Mieklejohn, an
assistant to Ambassador W. Averell Nagasaki,
August
10,
1945;
Harriman, published for the first time today photograph by Yosuke Yamahata;
by the National Security Archive, confirms used with permission of copyright
that the future President Eisenhower had holder, Shogo Yamahata/Courtesy:
early misgivings about the first use of IDG films. Photo restoration by TX
atomic weapons by the United States. Unlimited, San Francisco
General George C. Marshall is the only
high-level official whose contemporaneous (pre-Hiroshima) doubts about using
the weapons against cities are on record.
On the 70th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, the
National Security Archive updates its 2005 publication of the most
comprehensive on-line collection of declassified U.S. government documents on
the first use of the atomic bomb and the end of the war in the Pacific. This
update presents previously unpublished material and translations of difficult-tofind records. Included are documents on the early stages of the U.S. atomic
bomb project, Army Air Force General Curtis LeMays reporton the firebombing of
Tokyo (March 1945), Secretary of War Henry Stimsons requests for modification
of unconditional surrender terms, Soviet documents relating to the events,
excerpts from the Robert P. Mieklejohn diaries mentioned above, and selections
from the diaries of Walter J. Brown, special assistant to Secretary of State James
Byrnes.
The original 2005 posting included a wide range of material, including formerly
top secret "Magic" summaries of intercepted Japanese communications and the
first-ever full translations from the Japanese of accounts of high level meetings
and discussions in Tokyo leading to the Emperors decision to surrender. Also
documented are U.S. decisions to target Japanese cities, pre-Hiroshima petitions
by scientists questioning the military use of the A-bomb, proposals for
demonstrating the effects of the bomb, debates over whether to modify
unconditional surrender terms, reports from the bombing missions of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, and belated top-level awareness of the radiation effects of atomic
weapons.
The documents can help readers to make up their own minds about longstanding controversies such as whether the first use of atomic weapons was
justified, whether President Harry S. Truman had alternatives to atomic attacks
for ending the war, and what the impact of the Soviet declaration of war on Japan
was. Since the 1960s, when the declassification of important sources began,
historians have engaged in vigorous debate over the bomb and the end of World
War II. Drawing on sources at the National Archives and the Library of Congress
as well as Japanese materials, this electronic briefing book includes key
documents that historians of the events have
relied upon to present their findings and
advance their interpretations.
The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II:
A Collection of Primary Sources
Sixty years ago this month, the United States
dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the Soviet Union declared war on
Japan,
and
the
Japanese
government
surrendered to the United States and its allies. A nuclear weapon of the "Little
The nuclear age had truly begun with the first Boy" type, the uranium gunmilitary use of atomic weapons. With the type detonated over Hiroshima.
material that follows, the National Security It is 28 inches in diameter and
Archive publishes the most comprehensive on- 120 inches long. "Little Boy"
line collection to date of declassified U.S. weighed about 9,000 pounds
government documents on the atomic bomb and had a yield approximating
and the end of the war in the Pacific. Besides 15,000 tons of high explosives.
from
U.S.
National
material from the files of the Manhattan Project, (Copy
Archives,
RG
77-AEC)
this collection includes formerly Top Secret
Ultra summaries and translations of Japanese
diplomatic cable traffic intercepted under the Magic program. Moreover, the
collection includes for the first time translations from Japanese sources of high
level meetings and discussions in Tokyo, including the conferences when
Emperor Hirohito authorized the final decision to surrender.[1]
Ever since the atomic bombs were exploded

over Japanese cities, historians, social scientists,
journalists, World War II veterans, and ordinary
citizens have engaged in intense controversy
about the events of August 1945. John
Herseys Hiroshima, first published in the New
Yorker in 1946 encouraged unsettled readers to
question the bombings while church groups and
some commentators, most prominently Norman
Cousins, explicitly criticized them. Former
Secretary of War Henry Stimson found the
A nuclear weapon of the "Fat criticisms troubling and published an influential
for
the
attacks
in Harpers.
Man" type, the plutonium justification
[2]
During
the
1960s
the
availability
of primary
implosion type detonated over
Nagasaki.
60
inches
in sources made historical research and writing
diameter and 128 inches long, possible and the debate became more vigorous.
the weapon weighed about Historians Herbert Feis and Gar Alperovitz raised
10,000 pounds and had a yield searching questions about the first use of
approximating 21,000 tons of nuclear weapons and their broader political and
implications.
The
controversy,
high explosives (Copy from diplomatic
especially
the
arguments
made
by
Alperovitz
U.S. National Archives, RG 77and others about atomic diplomacy quickly
AEC)
became caught up in heated debates over Cold
War
revisionism. The controversy simmered over
the years with major contributions by Martin
Sherwin and Barton J. Bernstein but it became
explosive during the mid-1990s when curators at
the National Air and Space Museum met the
wrath of the Air Force Association over a
proposed historical exhibit on the Enola Gay.
[3] The NASM exhibit was drastically scaled-down
but historians and journalist continued to engage
in the debate. Alperovitz, Bernstein, and Sherwin
Taken at Tinian Island on the
made new contributions as did other historians,
afternoon of August 5, 1945,
social scientists, and journalists including Richard
this shows the tail of the Enola
B. Frank, Herbert Bix, Sadao Asada, Kai Bird,
Gay being edged over the pit
Robert James Maddox, Sean Malloy, Robert P.
and into position to load "Little
Newman, Robert S. Norris, Tsuyoshi Hagesawa,
Boy" into the bomb bay. The
and J. Samuel Walker.[4]
weapon is in the pit covered
The continued controversy has revolved around with canvas. Various personnel
and guards are standing
the following, among other, questions:
around the loading area.
were the atomic strikes necessary primarily to (Photo from U.S. National
avert an invasion of Japan in November 1945?
Archives, RG 77-BT)
Did Truman authorize the use of atomic bombs
for diplomatic-political reasons-- to intimidate the Soviets--or was his major goal
to force Japan to surrender and bring the war to an early end?
If ending the war quickly was the most important motivation of Truman and his
advisers to what extent did they see an atomic diplomacy capability as a
bonus?
To what extent did subsequent justification for the atomic bomb exaggerate or
misuse wartime estimates for U.S. casualties stemming from an invasion of
Japan?
Were there alternatives to the use of the weapons? If there were, what were they
and how plausible are they in retrospect? Why were alternatives not pursued?
How did the U.S. government plan to use the bombs? What concepts did war
planners use to select targets? To what extent were senior officials interested in
looking at alternatives to urban targets? How familiar was President Truman with
the concepts that led target planners chose major cities as targets?
What did senior officials know about the effects of atomic bombs before they
were first used. How much did top officials know about the radiation effects of
the weapons?
Did President Truman make a decision, in a robust sense, to use the bomb or did
he inherit a decision that had already been made?
Were the Japanese ready to surrender before the bombs were dropped? To what
extent had Emperor Hirohito prolonged the war unnecessarily by not seizing
opportunities for surrender?
If the United States had been more flexible about the demand for unconditional
surrender by explicitly or implicitly guaranteeing a constitutional monarchy
would Japan have surrendered earlier than it did?
How decisive was the atomic bombings to the Japanese decision to surrender?
Was the bombing of Nagasaki unnecessary? To the extent that the atomic
bombing was critically important to the Japanese decision to surrender would it
have been enough to destroy one city?
Would the Soviet declaration of war have been enough to compel Tokyo to admit
defeat?
Was the dropping of the atomic bombs morally justifiable?
This compilation will not attempt to answer these
questions or use primary sources to stake out
positions on any of them. Nor is it an attempt to
substitute for the extraordinary rich literature on
the atomic bombings and the end of World War II.
Nor does it include any of the interviews,
documents prepared after the events, and postWorld
War
II
correspondence,
etc.
that
participants in the debate have brought to bear in
framing their arguments. Originally this collection
did not include documents on the origins and
development of the Manhattan Project, although
This shows the "Little Boy" this updated posting includes some significant
weapon in the pit ready for records for context. By providing access to a
loading into the bomb bay of
4
the Enola Gay. (Photo from
U.S. National Archives, RG
77-BT)
broad range of U.S. and Japanese documents, mainly from the spring and
summer of 1945, interested readers can see for themselves the crucial source
material that scholars have used to shape narrative accounts of the historical
developments and to frame their arguments about the questions that have
provoked controversy over the years. To help readers who are less familiar with
the debates, commentary on some of the documents will point out, although far
from comprehensively, some of the ways in which they have been interpreted.
With direct access to the documents, readers may develop their own answers to
the questions raised above. The documents may even provoke new questions.
Contributors to the historical controversy have deployed the documents selected
here to support their arguments about the first use of nuclear weapons and the
end of World War II. The editor has closely reviewed the footnotes and endnotes
in a variety of articles and books and selected documents cited by participants
on the various sides of the controversy.[5] While the editor has a point of view on
the issues, to the greatest extent possible he has tried to not let that influence
document selection, e.g., by selectively withholding or including documents that
may buttress one point of view or the other. The task of compilation involved
consultation of primary sources at the National Archives, mainly in Manhattan
Project files held in the records of the Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77,
but also in the archival records of the National Security Agency. Private
collections were also important, such as the Henry L. Stimson Papers held at Yale
University (although available on microfilm, for example, at the Library of
Congress) and the papers of W. Averell Harriman
at the Library of Congress. To a great extent the
documents selected for this compilation have
been declassified for years, even decades; the
most recent declassifications were in the 1990s.
The U.S. documents cited here will be familiar to
many knowledgeable readers on the HiroshimaNagasaki controversy and the history of the
Manhattan Project. To provide a fuller picture of
the transition from U.S.-Japanese antagonism to
reconciliation, the editor has done what could be
done within time and resource constraints to
present information on the activities and points
of view of Japanese policymakers and diplomats. This shows "Little Boy" being
This includes a number of formerly top secret raised for loading into the
summaries of intercepted Japanese diplomatic Enola Gay's bomb bay.
communications,
which
enable
interested (Photo from U.S. National
readers to form their own judgments about the Archives, RG 77-BT)
direction of Japanese diplomacy in the weeks
before the atomic bombings. Moreover, to shed light on the considerations that
induced Japans surrender, this briefing book includes new translations of
Japanese primary sources on crucial events, including accounts of the
conferences on August 9 and 14, where Emperor Hirohito made decisions to
accept Allied terms of surrender.
[Editors Note: Originally prepared in July 2005 this posting has been updated,
with new documents, changes in organization, and other editorial changes. As
noted, some documents relating to the origins of the Manhattan Project have
5
been included in addition to entries from the Robert P. Mieklejohn diaries and
translations of a few Soviet documents, among other items. Moreover, recent
significant contributions to the scholarly literature have been taken into
account.]
Table of Contents for the Documents

I. Background on the U. S. Atomic Project
II. Targeting Japan
III. Debates on Alternatives to First Use and Unconditional Surrender
IV. The Japanese Search for Soviet Mediation
V. The Trinity Test
VI. The Potsdam Conference
VII. Debates among the Japanese Late July/Early August 1945
VIII. The Execution Order
IX. The First Nuclear Strikes and their Impact
X. Toward Surrender
XI. Confronting the Problem of Radiation Poisoning
XII. Eisenhower and McCloys Views on the Bombings and Atomic Weapons
I. Background on the U.S. Atomic Project
Documents 1A-C: Report of the Uranium Committee
1A. Arthur H. Compton, National Academy of Sciences Committee on Atomic
Fission, to Frank Jewett, President, National Academy of Sciences, 17 May 1941,
Secret
1B. Report to the President of the National Academy of Sciences by the Academy
Committee on Uranium, 6 November 1941, Secret
1C. Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development, to
President Roosevelt, 27 November 1941, Secret
Source: National Archives, Records of the Office of Scientific Research and
Development, Record Group 227 (hereinafter RG 227), Bush-Conant papers
microfilm collection, Roll 1, Target 2, Folder 1, "S-1 Historical File, Section A
(1940-1941)."
This set of documents concerns the work of the Uranium
Committee of the National Academy of Sciences, an
exploratory project that was the lead-up to the actual
production effort undertaken by the Manhattan Project.
The initial report, May 1941, showed how leading
American scientists grappled with the potential of
nuclear energy for military purposes. At the outset,
three possibilities were envisioned: radiological warfare,
a power source for submarines and ships, and
explosives. To produce material for any of those
purposes required a capability to separate uranium
isotopes in order to produce fissionable U-235. Also
necessary for those capabilities was the production of a
nuclear chain reaction. At the time of the first report,
various methods for producing a chain reaction were
envisioned and money was being budgeted to try them
The mushroom cloud
out.
billowing up 20,000
feet over Hiroshima on Later that year, the Uranium Committee completed its
the morning of August report and OSRD Chairman Vannevar Bush reported the
6, 1945 (Photo from findings to President Roosevelt: As Bush emphasized,
U.S. National Archives, the U.S. findings were more conservative than those in
RG 77-AEC)
the British MAUD report: the bomb would be somewhat
less effective, would take longer to produce, and at a
higher cost. One of the reports key findings was that a fission bomb of
superlatively destructive power will result from bringing quickly together a
sufficient mass of element U235. That was a certainty, as sure as any untried
prediction based upon theory and experiment can be. The critically important
task was to develop ways and means to separate highly enriched uranium from
uranium-238. To get production going, Bush wanted to establish a carefully
chosen engineering group to study plans for possible production. This was the
basis of the Top Policy Group, or the S-1 Committee, which Bush and James B.
Conant quickly established.[6]
In its discussion of the effects of an atomic weapon, the committee considered
both blast and radiological damage. With respect to the latter, It is possible that
the destructive effects on life caused by the intense radioactivity of the products
of the explosion may be as important as those of the explosion itself. This
insight was overlooked when top officials of the Manhattan Project considered
the targeting of Japan during 1945.[7]
Documents 2A-B: Going Ahead with the Bomb
7
2A: Vannevar Bush to President Roosevelt, 9 March 1942, with memo from
Roosevelt attached, 11 March 1942, Secret
2B: Vannevar Bush to President Roosevelt, 16 December 1942, Secret (report not
attached)
Sources: 2A: RG 227, Bush-Conant papers
microfilm collection, Roll 1, Target 2, Folder 1,
"S-1 Historical File, Section II (1941-1942): 2B:
Bush-Conant papers, S-1 Historical File, Reports
to and Conferences with the President (19421944)
The Manhattan Project never had an official
charter establishing it and defining its mission,
but these two documents are the functional
equivalent of a charter, in terms of presidential
approvals for the mission, not to mention for a
huge budget. In a progress report, Bush told The Enola Gay returns to
President Roosevelt that the bomb project was Tinian Island after the strike
on a pilot plant basis, but not yet at the on Hiroshima. (Photo from
production stage. By the summer, once U.S. National Archives, RG
production plants would be at work, he 77-BT)
proposed that the War Department take over
the project. In reply, Roosevelt wrote a short
memo endorsing Bushs ideas as long as absolute secrecy could be maintained.
According to Robert S. Norris, this was the fateful decision to turn over the
atomic project to military control.[8]
Some months later, with the Manhattan Project already underway and under the
direction of General Leslie Grove, Bush outlined to Roosevelt the effort necessary
to produce six fission bombs. With the goal of having enough fissile material by
the first half of 1945 to produce the bombs, Bush was worried that the Germans
might get there first. Thus, he wanted Roosevelts instructions as to whether the
project should be vigorously pushed throughout. Unlike the pilot plant proposal
described above, Bush described a real production order for the bomb, at an
estimated cost of a serious figure: $400 million, which was an optimistic
projection given the eventual cost of $1.9 billion. To keep the secret, Bush
wanted to avoid a ruinous appropriations request to Congress and asked
Roosevelt to ask Congress for the necessary discretionary funds. Initialed by
President Roosevelt (VB OK FDR), this may have been the closest that he came
to a formal approval of the Manhattan Project.
Document 3: Memorandum by Leslie R. Grove, Policy Meeting, 5/5/43, Top
Secret
Source: National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Army Corps of
Engineers (hereinafter RG 77), Manhattan Engineering District (MED), Minutes of
the Military Policy Meeting (5 May 1943), Correspondence (Top Secret) of the
Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, microfilm publication M1109
(Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1980), Roll 3,
Target 6, Folder 23, Military Policy Committee, Minutes of Meetings
Before the Manhattan Project had produced any weapons, senior U.S.
government officials had Japanese targets in mind. Besides discussing
programmatic matters (e.g., status of gaseous diffusion plants, heavy water
production for reactors, and staffing at Las Alamos), the participants agreed that
the first use could be Japanese naval forces concentrated at Truk Harbor, an atoll
in the Caroline Islands. If there was a misfire the weapon would be difficult for
the Japanese to recover, which would not be the case if Tokyo was targeted.
Targeting Germany was rejected because the Germans were considered more
likely to secure knowledge from a defective weapon than the Japanese. That is,
the United States could possibly be in danger if the Nazis acquired more
knowledge about how to build a bomb.[9]
Document 4: Memo from General Groves to the Chief of Staff [Marshall], Atomic
Fission Bombs Present Status and Expected Progress, 7 August 1944, Top
Secret, excised copy
Source: RG 77, Correspondence ("Top Secret")
of the Manhattan Engineer District, 19421946, file 25M
This memorandum from General Groves to
General Marshall captured how far the
Manhattan Project had come in less than two
years since Bushs December 1942 report to
President Roosevelt. Groves did not mention
this but around the time he wrote this the
Manhattan Project had working at its far-flung
installations over 125,000 people ; taking into
account high labor turnover some 485,000
people worked on the project (1 out of every A "Fat Man" test unit being
250 people in the country at that time). What raised from the pit into the
these people were laboring to construct, bomb bay of a B-29 for
directly or indirectly, were two types of bombing practice during the
weaponsa gun-type weapon using U-235 weeks before the attack on
and an implosion weapon using plutonium Nagasaki. (Photo from U.S.
(although the possibility of U-235 was also National Archives, RG 77-BT)
under consideration). As the scientists had
learned, a gun-type weapon based on
plutonium was impossible because that element had an unexpected
property: spontaneous neutron emissions would cause the weapon to
fizzle.[10] For both the gun-type and the implosion weapons, a production
schedule had been established and both would be available during 1945. The
discussion of weapons effects centered on blast damage models; radiation and
other effects were overlooked.
Document 5: Memorandum from Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, Office of
Scientific Research and Development, to Secretary of War, September 30, 1944,
Top Secret
Source: RG 77, Harrison-Bundy Files (H-B Files), folder 69 (copy from microfilm)
While Groves worried about the engineering and production problems, key War
Department advisers were becoming troubled over the diplomatic and political
9
implications of these enormously powerful weapons and the dangers of a global

nuclear arms race. Concerned that President Roosevelt had an overly cavalier
belief about the possibility of maintaining a post-war Anglo-American atomic
monopoly, Bush and Conant recognized the limits of secrecy and wanted to
disabuse senior officials of the notion that an atomic monopoly was possible. To
suggest alternatives, they drafted this memorandum about the importance of the
international exchange of information and international inspection to stem
dangerous nuclear competition.[11]
Documents 6A-D: President Truman Learns the Secret:
6A: Memorandum for the Secretary of War from General L. R. Groves, Atomic
Fission Bombs, April 23, 1945
6B: Memorandum discussed with the President,
April 25, 1945
6C: [Untitled memorandum by General L.R.
Groves, April 25, 1945
6D: Diary Entry, April 25, 1945
Sources: A: RG 77, Commanding Generals file
no. 24, tab D; B: Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling
Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of
Congress); C: Source: Record Group 200, Papers
of General Leslie R. Groves, Correspondence
1941-1970, box 3, F; D: Henry Stimson Diary,
Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at A photo prepared by U.S. Air
Library of Congress)
Intelligence for analytical
Soon after he was sworn in as president work on the destructiveness
following President Roosevelts death, Harry of atomic weapons. The total
Truman learned about the top secret Manhattan area devastated by the
Project from a briefing from Secretary of War atomic strike on Hiroshima is
Stimson and Manhattan Project chief General shown in the darkened area
Groves, who went through the back door to (within the circle) of the
escape the watchful press. Stimson, who later photo. The numbered items
wrote up the meeting in his diary, also prepared are military and industrial
with
the
a discussion paper, which raised broader policy installations
of
total
issues associated with the imminent possession percentages
destruction.
(Click
on
photo
of the most terrible weapon ever known in
enlarge.)
human history. In a background report to
(Photo
from
U.S.
National
prepared for the meeting, Groves provided a
Archives,
RG
77-AEC)
detailed overview of the bomb project from the
raw materials to processing nuclear fuel to
assembling the weapons to plans for using them, which were starting to
crystallize.
With respect to the point about assembling the weapons, the first gun-type
weapon should be ready about 1 August 1945 while an implosion weapon
would also be available that month. The target is and was always expected to
be Japan. The question whether Truman inherited assumptions from the
Roosevelt administration that that the bomb would be used has been a
10
controversial one. Alperovitz and Sherwin have argued that Truman made a real
decision to use the bomb on Japan by choosing between various forms of
diplomacy and warfare. In contrast, Bernstein found that Truman never
questioned [the] assumption that the bomb would and should be used. Norris
also noted that Trumans `decision was a decision not to override previous
plans to use the bomb.[12]
II. Targeting Japan
Document 7: Commander F. L. Ashworth to Major General L.R. Groves, The Base
of Operations of the 509th Composite Group, February 24, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5g
The force of B-29 nuclear delivery vehicles that was being readied for first
nuclear usethe Army Air Forces 509th Composite Grouprequired an
operational base in the Western Pacific. In late February 1945, months before
atomic bombs were ready for use, the high command selected Tinian, an island
in the Northern Marianas Islands, for that base.
Document 8: Headquarters XXI Bomber Command, Tactical Mission Report,
Mission No. 40 Flown 10 March 1945,n.d., Secret
Source: Library of Congress, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-36
As part of the war with Japan, the Army Air Force waged a campaign to destroy
major industrial centers with incendiary bombs. This document is General Curtis
LeMays report on the firebombing of Tokyo--the most destructive air raid in
history--which burned down over 16 square miles of the city, killed up to 100,00
civilians (the official figure was 83,793), injured more than 40,000, and made
over 1 million homeless. [13]According to the Foreword, the purpose of the
raid, which dropped 1,665 tons of incendiary bombs, was to destroy industrial
and strategic targets not to bomb indiscriminately civilian populations. Air
Force planners, however, did not distinguish civilian workers from the industrial
and strategic structures that they were trying to destroy.
The killing of workers in the urban-industrial sector was one of the explicit goals
of the air campaign against Japanese cities. According to a Joint Chiefs of Staff
report on Japanese target systems, expected results from the bombing campaign
included: The absorption of man-hours in repair and relief; the dislocation of
labor by casualty; the interruption of public services necessary to production,
and above all the destruction of factories engaged in war industry. While
Stimson would later raise questions about the bombing of Japanese cities, he was
largely disengaged from the details (as he was with atomic targeting).[14]
Firebombing raids on other cities followed Tokyo, including Osaka, Kobe,
Yokahama, and Nagoya, but with fewer casualties (many civilians had fled the
cities). For some historians, the urban fire-bombing strategy facilitated atomic
targeting by creating a new moral context, in which earlier proscriptions
against intentional targeting of civilians had eroded.[15]
Document 9: Notes on Initial Meeting of Target Committee, May 2, 1945, Top
Secret
11
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5d (copy from
microfilm)
On 27 April, military officers and nuclear scientists met to discuss bombing
techniques, criteria for target selection, and overall mission requirements. The
discussion of available targets included Hiroshima, the largest untouched
target not on the 21st Bomber Command priority list. But other targets were
under consideration, including Yawata (northern Kyushu), Yokohama, and Tokyo
(even though it was practically rubble.) The problem was that the Air Force had
a policy of laying waste to Japans cities which created tension with the
objective of reserving some urban targets for nuclear destruction. [16]
Document 10: Memorandum from J. R. Oppenheimer to Brigadier General Farrell,
May 11, 1945
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret
Documents, File no. 5g (copy from microfilm)
As director of Los Alamos Laboratory,
Oppenheimers priority was producing a
deliverable bomb, but not so much the effects
of the weapon on the people at the target. In
keeping with General Groves emphasis on
compartmentalization, the Manhattan Project
experts on the effects of radiation on human
biology were at the MetLab and other offices
and had no interaction with the production The polar cap of the "Fat Man"
and targeting units. In this short memorandum weapon being sprayed with
to
Groves
deputy,
General
Farrell, plastic spray paint in front of
Oppenheimer
explained
the
need
for Assembly Building Number 2.
precautions because of the radiological (Photo from U.S. National
dangers of a nuclear detonation. The initial Archives, RG 77-BT)
radiation from the detonation would be fatal
within a radius of about 6/10ths of a mile and
injurious within a radius of a mile. The point was to keep the bombing mission
crew safe; concern about radiation effects had no impact on targeting
decisions. [17]
Document 11: Memorandum from Major J. A. Derry and Dr. N.F. Ramsey to
General L.R. Groves, Summary of Target Committee Meetings on 10 and 11 May
1945, May 12, 1945, Top Secret
microfilm)
Scientists and officers held further discussion of bombing mission requirements,
including height of detonation, weather, radiation effects (Oppenheimers
memo), plans for possible mission abort, and the various aspects of target
selection, including priority cities (a large urban area of more than three miles
diameter) and psychological dimension. As for target cities, the committee
agreed that the following should be exempt from Army Air Force bombing so they
would be available for nuclear targeting: Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and
Kokura Arsenal. Japans cultural capital, Kyoto, would not stay on the list.
Pressure from Secretary of War Stimson had already taken Kyoto off the list of
12
targets for incendiary bombings and he would successfully object to the atomic
bombing of that city. [18]
Document 12: Stimson Diary Entries, May 14 and 15, 1945
Source: Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at
On May 14 and 15, Stimson had several conversations involving S-1 (the atomic
bomb); during a talk with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, he estimated
that possession of the bomb gave Washington a tremendous advantageheld
all the cards, a royal straight flush-- in dealing with Moscow on post-war
problems: They cant get along without our help and industries and we have
coming into action a weapon which will be unique. The next day a discussion of
divergences with Moscow over the Far East made Stimson wonder whether the
atomic bomb would be ready when Truman met with Stalin in July. If it was, he
believed that the bomb would be the master card in U.S. diplomacy. This and
other entries from the Stimson diary (as well as the entry from the Davies diary
that follows) are important to arguments developed by Gar Alperovitz and Barton
J. Bernstein, among others, although with significantly different emphases, that
in light of controversies with the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe and other
areas, top officials in the Truman administration believed that possessing the
atomic bomb would provide them with significant leverage for inducing Moscows
acquiescence in U.S. objectives.[19]
Document 13: Davies Diary entry for May 21, 1945
Source: Joseph E. Davies Papers, Library of Congress, box 17, 21 May 1945
While officials at the Pentagon continued to look closely at the problem of atomic
targets, President Truman, like Stimson, was thinking about the diplomatic
implications of the bomb. During a conversation with Joseph E. Davies, a
prominent Washington lawyer and former ambassador to the Soviet Union,
Truman said that he wanted to delay talks with Stalin and Churchill until July
when the first atomic device had been tested. Alperovitz treated this entry as
evidence in support of the atomic diplomacy argument, but other historians,
ranging from Robert Maddox to Gabriel Kolko, have denied that the timing of the
Potsdam conference had anything to do with the goal of using the bomb to
intimidate the Soviets.[20]
Document 14: Letter, O. C. Brewster to President Truman, 24 May 1945, with
note from Stimson to Marshall, 30 May 1945, attached, secret
Source: Harrison-Bundy Files relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb,
1942-1946, microfilm publication M1108 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives
and Records Administration, 1980), File 77: "Interim Committee - International
Control."
In what Stimson called the letter of an honest man, Oswald C. Brewster sent
President Truman a profound analysis of the danger and unfeasibility of a U.S.
atomic monopoly. [21] An engineer for the Kellex Corporation, which was
involved in the gas diffusion project to enrich uranium, Brewster recognized that
the objective was fissile material for a weapon. That goal, he feared, raised
terrifying prospects with implications for the inevitable destruction of our
13
present day civilization. Once the U.S. had used the bomb in combat other great
powers would not tolerate a monopoly by any nation and the sole possessor
would be be the most hated and feared nation on earth. Even the U.S.s closest
allies would want the bomb because how could they know where our friendship
might be five, ten, or twenty years hence. Nuclear proliferation and arms races
would be certain unless the U.S. worked toward international supervision and
inspection of nuclear plants.
Brewster suggested that Japan could be used as a target for a demonstration
of the bomb, which he did not further define. His implicit preference, however,
was for non-use; he wrote that it would be better to take U.S. casualties in
conquering Japan than to bring upon the world the tragedy of unrestrained
competitive production of this material.
Document 15: Minutes of Third Target Committee Meeting Washington, May 28,
1945, Top Secret
microfilm)
More updates on training missions, target selection, and conditions required for
successful detonation over the target. The target would be a city--either
Hiroshima, Kyoto (still on the list), or Niigata--but specific aiming points would
not be specified at that time nor would industrial pin point targets because
they were likely to be on the fringes a city. The bomb would be dropped in the
citys center. Pumpkins referred to bright orange, pumpkin-shaped high
explosive bombsshaped like the Fat Man implosion weapon--used for
bombing run test missions.
Document 16: General Lauris Norstad to Commanding General, XXI Bomber
Command, 509th Composite Group; Special Functions, May 29, 1945, Top
Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5g (copy from
microfilm)
The 509th Composite Groups cover story for its secret mission was the
preparation of Pumpkins for use in battle. In this memorandum, Norstad
reviewed the complex requirements for preparing B-29s and their crew for
successful nuclear strikes.
Document 17: Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Memorandum of
Conversation with General Marshal May 29, 1945 11:45 p.m., Top Secret
Source: Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret
Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File), July 1940-September
1945, box 12, S-1
Tacitly dissenting from the Targeting Committees recommendations, Army Chief
of Staff George Marshall argued for initial nuclear use against a clear-cut military
target such as a large naval installation. If that did not work, manufacturing
areas could be targeted, but only after warning their inhabitants. Marshall noted
the opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered employment of such
force. This document has played a role in arguments developed by Barton J.
Bernstein that figures such as Marshall and Stimson were caught between an
14
older morality that opposed the intentional killing of noncombatants and a newer
one that stressed virtually total war.[22]
Document 18: Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting Thursday, 31 May 1945,
10:00 A.M. to 1:15 P.M. 2:15 P.M. to 4:15 P.M., n.d., Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 100 (copy from microfilm)
With Secretary of War Stimson presiding, members of the committee heard
reports on a variety of Manhattan Project issues, including the stages of
development of the atomic project, problems of secrecy, the possibility of
informing the Soviet Union, cooperation with like-minded powers, the military
impact of the bomb on Japan, and the problem of undesirable scientists.
Interested in producing the greatest psychological effect, the Committee
members agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant
employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers
houses. Exactly how the mass deaths of civilians would persuade Japanese
rulers to surrender was not discussed. Bernstein has argued that this target
choice represented an uneasy endorsement of terror bombing--the target was
not exclusively military or civilian; nevertheless, workers housing would include
non-combatant men, women, and children.[23]
Document 19: General George A. Lincoln to General Hull, June 4, 1945, enclosing
draft, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 165, Records of the War
Department General and Special Staffs, AmericanBritish-Canadian Top Secret Correspondence, Box 504,
ABC 387 Japan (15 Feb. 45)
George A. Lincoln, chief of the Strategy and Policy
Group at U.S. Armys Operations Department,
commented on a memorandum by former President
Herbert Hoover that Stimson had passed on for
analysis. Hoover proposed a compromise solution with
Japan that would allow Tokyo to retain part of its
empire in East Asia (including Korea and Japan) as a
way to head off Soviet influence in the region. While
Lincoln believed that the proposed peace teams were
militarily acceptable he doubted that they were
Ground
view
of
workable or that they could check Soviet expansion
Nagasaki before and
which he saw as an inescapable result of World War II.
after the bombing;
As to how the war with Japan would end, he saw it as
radiuses in increments
unpredictable, but speculated that it will take
of 1,000 feet from
Russian entry into the war, combined with a landing,
Ground
Zero
are
or imminent threat of a landing, on Japan proper by us,
shown. (Photo from
to convince them of the hopelessness of their
U.S. National Archives,
situation. Lincoln derided Hoovers casualty estimate
RG 77-MDH)
of 500,000. J. Samuel Walker has cited this document
to make the point that contrary to revisionist
assertions, American policymakers in the summer of 1945 were far from certain
that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria would be enough in itself to force a
Japanese surrender. [24]
15
Document 20: Memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, Interim Committee

Secretary, to Mr. Harrison, June 6, 1945, Top Secret
In a memorandum to George Harrison, Stimsons special assistant on Manhattan
Project matters, Arneson noted actions taken at the recent Interim Committee
meetings, including target criterion and an attack without prior warning.
Document 21: Memorandum of Conference with the President, June 6, 1945, Top
Secret
Source: Henry Stimson Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at
Stimson and Truman began this meeting by discussing how they should handle a
conflict with French President DeGaulle over the movement by French forces into
Italian territory. (Truman finally cut off military aid to France to compel the French
to pull back). [25] As evident from the discussion, Stimson strongly disliked de
Gaulle whom he regarded as psychopathic. The conversation soon turned to
the atomic bomb, with some discussion about plans to inform the Soviets but
only after a successful test. Both agreed that the possibility of a nuclear
partnership with Moscow would depend on quid pro quos: the settlement of
the Polish, Rumanian, Yugoslavian, and Manchurian problems. At the end,
Stimson shared his doubts about targeting cities and killing civilians through area
bombing because of its impact on the U.S.s reputation as well as on the problem
of finding targets for the atomic bomb. Barton Bernstein has also pointed to this
as additional evidence of the influence on Stimson of an an older morality.
III. Debates on Alternatives to First Use and Unconditional Surrender
Document 22: Memorandum from Arthur B. Compton to the Secretary of War,
enclosing Memorandum on `Political and Social Problems, from Members of the
`Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, June 12, 1945, Secret
Physicists Leo Szilard and James Franck, a Nobel Prize winner, were on the staff
of the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago, a cover for the
Manhattan Project program to produce fuel for the bomb. The outspoken Szilard
was not involved in operational work on the bomb and General Groves kept him
under surveillance but Met Lab director Arthur Compton found Szilard useful to
have around. Concerned with the long-run implications of the bomb, Franck
chaired a committee, in which Szilard and Eugene Rabinowitch were major
contributors, that produced a report rejecting a surprise attack on Japan and
recommended instead a demonstration of the bomb on the desert or a barren
island. Arguing that a nuclear arms race will be on in earnest not later than the
morning after our first demonstration of the existence of nuclear weapons, the
committee saw international control as the alternative. That possibility would be
difficult if the United States made first military use of the weapon. Compton
raised doubts about the recommendations but urged Stimson to study the report.
Martin Sherwin has argued that the Franck committee shared an important
assumption with Truman et al.--that an atomic attack against Japan would
16
`shock the Russians--but drew entirely different conclusions about the import of
such a shock. [26]
Document 23: Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew to the
President, Analysis of Memorandum Presented by Mr. Hoover, June 13, 1945
1945, box 8, Japan (After December 7/41)
A former ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grews extensive knowledge of Japanese
politics and culture informed his stance toward the concept of unconditional
surrender. He believed it essential that the United States declare its intention to
preserve the institution of the emperor. As he argued in this memorandum to
President Truman, failure on our part to clarify our intentions on the status of
the emperor will insure prolongation of the war and cost a large number of
human lives. Documents like this have played a role in arguments developed by
Alperovitz that Truman and his advisers had alternatives to using the bomb such
as modifying unconditional surrender and that anti-Soviet considerations
weighed most heavily in their thinking. By contrast, Herbert P. Bix has suggested
that the Japanese leadership would probably not have surrendered if the
Truman administration had spelled out the status of the emperor.[27]
Document 24: Memorandum from Chief of Staff Marshall to the Secretary of War,
15 June 1945, enclosing Memorandum of Comments on Ènding the Japanese
War, prepared by George A. Lincoln, June 14, 1945, Top Secret
Commenting on another memorandum by Herbert Hoover, George A. Lincoln
discussed war aims, face-saving proposals for Japan, and the nature of the
proposed declaration to the Japanese government, including the problem of
defining unconditional surrender. Lincoln argued against modifying the concept
of unconditional surrender: if it is phrased so as to invite negotiation he saw
risks of prolonging the war or a compromise peace. J. Samuel Walker has
observed that those risks help explain why senior officials were unwilling to
modify the demand for unconditional surrender.[28]
Document 25: Memorandum by J. R. Oppenheimer, Recommendations on the
Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons, June 16, 1945, Top Secret
In a report to Stimson, Oppenheimer and colleagues on the scientific advisory
panel--Arthur Compton, Ernest O. Lawrence, and Enrico Fermitacitly disagreed
with the report of the Met Lab scientists. The panel argued for early military
use but not before informing key allies about the atomic project to open a
dialogue on how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to
improved international relations.
Document 26: Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday, 18 June
1945 at 1530, Top Secret
17
Source: Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal
Files, 1942-1945, box 198 334 JCS (2-2-45) Mtg 186th-194th
With the devastating battle for Okinawa winding up, Truman and the Joint Chiefs
stepped back and considered what it would take to secure Japans surrender. The
discussion depicted a Japan that, by 1 November, would be close to defeat, with
great destruction and economic losses produced by aerial bombing and naval
blockade, but not ready to capitulate. Marshall believed that the latter required
Soviet entry and an invasion of Kyushu, even suggesting that Soviet entry might
be the decisive action levering them into capitulation. Truman and the Chiefs
reviewed plans to land troops on Kyushu on 1 November, which Marshall believed
was essential because air power was not decisive. He believed that casualties
would not be more than those produced by the battle for Luzon, some 31,000.
This account hints at discussion of the atomic bomb (certain other matters),
but no documents disclose that part of the meeting.
The record of this meeting has figured in the complex debate over the estimates
of casualties stemming from a possible invasion of Japan. While post-war
justifications for the bomb suggested that an invasion of Japan could have
produced very high levels of casualties (dead, wounded, or missing), from
hundreds of thousands to a million, historians have vigorously debated the
extent to which the estimates were inflated. [29]
According to accounts based on post-war recollections and interviews, during the
meeting McCloy raised the possibility of winding up the war by guaranteeing the
preservation of the emperor albeit as a constitutional monarch. If that failed to
persuade Tokyo, he proposed that the United States disclose the secret of the
atomic bomb to secure Japans unconditional surrender. While McCloy later
recalled that Truman expressed interest, he said that Secretary of State Byrnes
squashed the proposal because of his opposition to any deals with Japan. Yet,
according to Forrest Pogues account, when Truman asked McCloy if he had any
comments, the latter opened up a discussion of nuclear weapons use by asking
Why not use the bomb?[30]
Document 27: Memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, Interim Committee
Secretary, to Mr. Harrison, June 25, 1945, Top Secret
For Harrisons convenience, Arneson summarized key decisions made at the 21
June meeting of the Interim Committee, including a recommendation that
President Truman use the forthcoming conference of allied leaders to inform
Stalin about the atomic project. The Committee also reaffirmed earlier
recommendations about the use of the bomb at the earliest opportunity
against dual targets. In addition, Arneson included the Committees
recommendation for revoking part two of the 1944 Quebec agreement which
stipulated that the neither the United States nor Great Britain would use the
bomb against third parties without each others consent. Thus, an impulse for
unilateral control of nuclear use decisions predated the first use of the bomb.
Document 28: Memorandum from George L. Harrison to Secretary of War, June
26, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED, H-B files, folder no. 77 (copy from microfilm)
18
Reminding Stimson about the objections of some Manhattan project scientists to

military use of the bomb, Harrison summarized the basic arguments of the
Franck report. One recommendation shared by many of the scientists, whether
they supported the report or not, was that the United States inform Stalin of the
bomb before it was used. This proposal had been the subject of positive
discussion by the Interim Committee on the grounds that Soviet confidence was
necessary to make possible post-war cooperation on atomic energy.
Document 29: Memorandum from George L. Harrison to Secretary of War, June
28, 1945, Top Secret, enclosing Ralph Bards Memorandum on the Use of S-1
Bomb, June 27, 1945
Source: RG 77, MED, H-B files, folder no. 77 (copy from microfilm)
Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard joined those scientists who sought to
avoid military use of the bomb; he proposed a preliminary warning so that the
United States would retain its position as a great humanitarian nation.
Alperovitz cites evidence that Bard discussed his proposal with Truman who told
him that he had already thoroughly examined the problem of advanced warning.
This document has also figured in the argument framed by Barton Bernstein that
Truman and his advisers took it for granted that the bomb was a legitimate
weapon and that there was no reason to explore alternatives to military use.
Bernstein, however, notes that Bard later denied that he had a meeting with
Truman and that White House appointment logs support that claim.[31]
Document 30: Memorandum for Mr. McCloy, Comments re: Proposed Program
for Japan, June 28, 1945, Draft, Top Secret
Source: RG 107, Office of Assistant Secretary of War Formerly Classified
Correspondence of John J. McCloy, 1941-1945, box 38, ASW 387 Japan
Despite the interest of some senior officials such as Joseph Grew, Henry Stimson,
and John J. McCloy in modifying the concept of unconditional surrender so that
the Japanese could be sure that the emperor would be preserved, it remained a
highly contentious subject. For example, one of McCloys aides, Colonel Fahey,
argued against modification of unconditional surrender (see Appendix C`).
Document 31: Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to Colonel Stimson, June
McCloy was part of a drafting committee at work on the text of a proclamation to
Japan to be signed by heads of state at the forthcoming Potsdam conference. As
McCloy observed the most contentious issue was whether the proclamation
should include language about the preservation of the emperor: This may cause
repercussions at home but without it those who seem to know the most about
Japan feel there would be very little likelihood of acceptance.
Document 32: Memorandum, Timing of Proposed Demand for Japanese
Surrender, June 29, 1945, Top Secret
19
Probably the work of General George A. Lincoln at Army Operations, this
document was prepared a few weeks before the Potsdam conference when
senior officials were starting to finalize the text of the declaration that Truman,
Churchill, and Chiang would issue there. The author recommended issuing the
declaration just before the bombardment program [against Japan] reaches its
peak. Next to that suggestion, Stimson or someone in his immediate office,
wrote S1, implying that the atomic bombing of Japanese cities was highly
relevant to the timing issue. Also relevant to Japanese thinking about surrender,
the author speculated, was the Soviet attack on their forces after a declaration of
war.
Document 33: Stimson memorandum to The President, Proposed Program for
Japan, 2 July 1945, Top Secret
Source: Naval Aide to the President Files, box 4,
Berlin Conference File, Volume XI - Miscellaneous
papers: Japan, Harry S. Truman Presidential
Library
On 2 July Stimson presented to President Truman
a proposal that he had worked up with
colleagues in the War Department, including
McCloy, Marshall, and Grew. The proposal has
been characterized as the most comprehensive
attempt by any American policymaker to
leverage diplomacy in order to shorten the
Hiroshima, after the first
Pacific War. Stimson had in mind a carefully
atomic bomb explosion. This
timed warning delivered before the invasion of
photo was taken from the
Japan. Some of the key elements of Stimsons
Red Cross Hospital Building
argument were his assumption that Japan is
about one mile from the
susceptible to reason and that Japanese might
bomb burst. (Photo from
be even more inclined to surrender if we do not
U.S. National Archives, Still
exclude a constitutional monarchy under her
Pictures Branch, Subject
present dynasty. The possibility of a Soviet
Files, "Atomic Bomb")
attack would be part of the threat. As part of
the threat message, Stimson alluded to the
inevitability and completeness of the destruction which Japan could suffer, but
he did not make it clear whether unconditional surrender terms should be
clarified before using the atomic bomb. Truman read Stimsons proposal, which
he said was powerful, but made no commitments to the details, e.g., the
position of the emperor. [32]
Document 34: Minutes, Secretarys Staff Committee, Saturday Morning, July 7,
1945, 133d Meeting, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental
Committees, Secretarys Staff Meetings Minutes, 1944-1947 (copy from
microfilm)
20
The possibility of modifying the concept of unconditional surrender so that it

guaranteed the continuation of the emperor remained hotly contested within the
U.S. government. Here senior State Department officials, Under Secretary Joseph
Grew on one side, and Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish
on the other, engaged in hot debate.
Document 35: Combined Chiefs of Staff, Estimate of the Enemy Situation (as of
6 July 1945, C.C.S 643/3, July 8, 1945, Secret (Appendices Not Included)
Source: RG 218, Central Decimal Files, 1943-1945, CCS 381 (6-4-45), Sec. 2 Pt. 5
This review of Japanese capabilities and intentions portrays an economy and
society under tremendous strain; nevertheless, the ground component of the
Japanese armed forces remains Japans greatest military asset. Alperovitz sees
statements in this estimate about the impact of Soviet entry into the war and the
possibility of a conditional surrender involving survival of the emperor as an
institution as more evidence that the policymakers saw alternatives to nuclear
weapons use. By contrast, Richard Frank takes note of the estimates depiction of
the Japanese armys terms for peace: for surrender to be acceptable to the
Japanese army it would be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it
would not entail discrediting the warrior tradition and that it would permit the
ultimate resurgence of a military in Japan. That, Frank argues, would have been
unacceptable to any Allied policy maker.[33]
Document 36: Cable to Secretary of State from Acting Secretary Joseph Grew,
July 16, 1945, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 59, Decimal Files 1945-1949, 740.0011 PW (PE)/7-1645
On the eve of the Potsdam Conference, a State Department draft of the
proclamation to Japan contained language which modified unconditional
surrender by promising to retain the emperor. When former Secretary of State
Cordell Hull learned about it he outlined his objections to Byrnes, arguing that it
might be better to wait the climax of allied bombing and Russias entry into the
war. Byrnes was already inclined to reject that part of the draft, but Hulls
argument that may have reinforced his decision.
Document 37: Letter from Stimson to Byrnes, enclosing memorandum to the
President, The Conduct of the War with Japan, 16 July 1945, Top Secret
Source: Henry L. Stimson Papers (MS 465), Sterling Library, Yale University (reel
113) (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Still interested in trying to find ways to warn Japan into surrender, this
represents an attempt by Stimson before the Potsdam conference, to persuade
Truman and Byrnes to agree to issue warnings to Japan prior to the use of the
bomb. The warning would draw on the draft State-War proclamation to Japan;
presumably, the one criticized by Hull (above) which included language about
the emperor. Presumably the clarified warning would be issued prior to the use of
the bomb; if the Japanese persisted in fighting then the full force of our new
weapons should be brought to bear and a heavier warning would be issued
backed by the actual entrance of the Russians in the war. Possibly, as Malloy
has argued, Stimson was motivated by concerns about using the bomb against
21
civilians and cities, but his latest proposal would meet resistance at Potsdam
from Byrnes and other.[34]
Document 38: R. E. Lapp, Leo Szilard et al., A Petition to the President of the
United States, July 17, 1945
On the eve of the Potsdam conference, Leo Szilard circulated a petition as part of
a final effort to discourage military use of the bomb. Signed by about 68
Manhattan Project scientists, mainly physicists and biologists (copies with the
remaining signatures are in the archival file), the petition did not explicitly reject
military use, but raised questions about an arms race that military use could
instigate and requested Truman to publicize detailed terms for Japanese
surrender. Truman, already on his way to Europe, never saw the petition.[35]
IV. The Japanese Search for Soviet Mediation
Documents 39A-B: Magic
39A: William F. Friedman, Consultant (Armed Forces Security Agency), A Short
History of U.S. COMINT Activities, 19 February
1952, Top Secret
39B:Magic Diplomatic Summary, War
Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, No. 1204 July 12, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Sources:
A:
National
Security
Agency
Mandatory declassification review release; B:
Record Group 457, Records of the National
Security Agency/Central Security Service,
Magic Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945,
box 18
Beginning in September 1940, U.S. military
intelligence began to decrypt routinely, under
the Purple code-name, the intercepted cable Ground Zero at Hiroshima
traffic of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Today: This was the site of
Collectively the decoded messages were Shima Hospital; the atomic
known as Magic. How this came about is explosion occurred 1,870 feet
explained in an internal history of pre-war and above it (Photo courtesy of
World War II Army and Navy code-breaking Lynn
activities prepared by William F. Friedman, a Eden, www.wholeworldonfire.c
central figure in the development of U.S. om)
government
cryptology
during
the
20th century. The National Security Agency
kept the Magic diplomatic and military summaries classified for many years
and did not release the entire series for 1942 through August 1945 until the early
1990s.[36]
The 12 July 1945 Magic summary includes a report on a cable from Japanese
Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow
concerning the Emperors decision to seek Soviet help in ending the war. Not
knowing that the Soviets had already made a commitment to their Allies to
22
declare war on Japan, Tokyo fruitlessly pursued this option for several weeks. The
Magic intercepts from mid-July have figured in Gar Alperovitzs argument that
Truman and his advisers recognized that the Emperor was ready to capitulate if
the Allies showed more flexibility on the demand for unconditional surrender.
This point is central to Alperovitzs thesis that top U.S. officials recognized a
two-step logic: relaxing unconditional surrender and a Soviet declaration of war
would have been enough to induce Japans surrender without the use of the
bomb.[37]
Document 40: John Weckerling, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, July 12,
1945, to Deputy Chief of Staff, Japanese Peace Offer, 13 July 1945, Top Secret
Ultra
Source: RG 165, Army Operations OPD Executive File #17, Item 13 (copy
courtesy of J. Samuel Walker)
The day after the Togo message was reported, Army intelligence chief Weckerling
proposed several possible explanations of the Japanese diplomatic initiative.
Robert J. Maddox has cited this document to support his argument that top U.S.
officials recognized that Japan was not close to surrender because Japan was
trying to stave off defeat. In a close analysis of this document, Tsuyoshi
Hasegawa, who is also skeptical of claims that the Japanese had decided to
surrender, argues that each of the three possibilities proposed by Weckerling
contained an element of truth, but none was entirely correct. For example, the
governing clique that supported the peace moves was not trying to stave off
defeat but was seeking Soviet help to end the war.[38]
Document 41: Magic Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1205 July 13, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central
Security Service, Magic Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18
The day after he told Sato about the current thinking on Soviet mediation, Togo
requested the Ambassador to see Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov
and tell him of the Emperors private intention to send Prince Konoye as a
Special Envoy to Moscow. Before he received Togos message, Sato had already
met with Molotov on another matter.
Security Service, Magic Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
Another intercept of a cable from Togo to Sato shows that the Foreign Minister
rejected unconditional surrender and that the Emperor was not asking the
Russians mediation in anything like unconditional surrender. Incidentally, this
`Magic Diplomatic Summary indicates the broad scope and capabilities of the
program; for example, it includes translations of intercepted French messages
(see pages 8-9).
Document 43: Admiral Tagaki Diary Entry for July 20, 1945
23
Source: Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and
Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 916-917 [Translation by Hikaru
Tajima]
In 1944 Navy minister Mitsumasa Yonai ordered rear admiral Sokichi Takagi to go
on sick leave so that he could undertake a secret mission to find a way to end
the war. Tagaki was soon at the center of a cabal of Japanese defense officials,
civil servants, and academics, which concluded that, in the end, the emperor
would have to impose his decision on the military and the government. Takagi
kept a detailed account of his activities, part of which was in diary form, the
other part of which he kept on index cards. The material reproduced here gives a
sense of the state of play of Foreign Minister Togos attempt to secure Soviet
mediation. Hasegawa cited it and other documents to make a larger point about
the inability of the Japanese government to agree on concrete proposals to
negotiate an end to the war.[39]
The last item discusses Japanese contacts with representatives of the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) in Switzerland. The reference to our contact may refer
to Bank of International Settlements economist Pers Jacobbson who was in touch
with Japanese representatives to the Bank as well as Gero von Gvernitz, then on
the staff, but with non-official cover, of OSS station chief Allen Dulles. The
contacts never went far and Dulles never received encouragement to pursue
them.[40]
V. The Trinity Test
Document 44: Letter from Commissar of State Security First Rank, V. Merkulov, to
Peoples Commissar for Internal Affairs L. P. Beria, 10 July 1945, Number 4305/m,
Top Secret (translation by Anna Melyaskova)
Source: L.D. Riabev, ed., Atomnyi Proekt SSSR (Moscow: izd MFTI, 2002), Volume
1, Part 2, 335-336
This 10 July 1945 letter from NKGB director V. N. Merkulov to Beria is an example
of Soviet efforts to collect inside information on the Manhattan Project, although
not all the detail was accurate. Merkulov reported that the United States had
scheduled the test of a nuclear device for that same day, although the actual
test took place 6 days later. According to Merkulov, two fissile materials were
being produced: element-49 (plutonium), and U-235; the test device was fueled
by plutonium. The Soviet source reported that the weight of the device was 3
tons (which was in the ball park) and forecast an explosive yield of 5 kilotons.
That figure was based on underestimates by Manhattan Project scientists: the
actual yield of the test device was 20 kilotons.
As indicated by the L.D. Riabevs notes, it is possible that Berias copy of this
letter ended up in Stalins papers. That the original copy is missing from Berias
papers suggests that he may have passed it on to Stalin before the latter left for
the Potsdam conference.[41]
Document 45: Telegram War [Department] 33556, from Harrison to Secretary of
War, July 17, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File 5e (copy from
microfilm)
24
An elated message from Harrison to Stimson reported the success of the Trinity
Test of a plutonium implosion weapon. The light from the explosion could been
seen from here [Washington, D.C.] to high hold [Stimsons estate on Long
Island250 miles away] and it was so loud that Harrison could have heard the
screams from Washington, D.C. to my farm [in Upperville, VA, 50 miles away]
[42]
Document 46: Memorandum from General L. R. Groves to Secretary of War, The
Test, July 18, 1945, Top Secret, Excised Copy
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 4 (copy from
microfilm)
General Groves prepared for Stimson, then at Potsdam, a detailed account of the
Trinity test.[43]
VI. The Potsdam Conference
Document 47: Trumans Potsdam Diary
Barton J. Bernstein, Truman at Potsdam: His Secret Diary, Foreign Service
Journal, July/August 1980, excerpts, used with authors permission.[44]
Some years after Trumans death, a hand-written diary that he kept during the
Potsdam conference surfaced in his personal papers. For convenience Barton
Bernsteins rendition is provided here but linked here are the scanned versions of
Trumans handwriting on the Truman Librarys web site (for 16 Julyand 17-30
July).
The diary entries cover July 16, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, and 30 and include Trumans
thinking about a number of issues and developments, including his reactions to
Churchill and Stalin, the atomic bomb and how it should be targeted, the possible
impact of the bomb and a Soviet declaration of war on Japan, and his decision to
tell Stalin about the bomb. Receptive to pressure from Stimson, Truman recorded
his decision to take Japans old capital (Kyoto) off the atomic bomb target list.
Barton Bernstein and Richard Frank, among others, have argued that Trumans
assertion that the atomic targets were military objectives suggested that either
he did not understand the power of the new weapons or had simply deceived
himself about the nature of the targets. Another statementFini Japs when that
[Soviet entry] comes abouthas also been the subject of controversy over
whether it meant that Truman thought it possible that the war could end could
end without an invasion of Japan.[45]
Document 48: Stimson Diary entries for July 16 through 25, 1945
Stimson did not always have Trumans ear, but historians have frequently cited
his diary when he was at the Potsdam conference. There Stimson kept track of S1 developments, including news of the successful first test (see entry for July 16)
and the ongoing deployments for nuclear use against Japan. When Truman
received a detailed account of the test, Stimson reported that the President was
tremendously pepped up by it and that it gave him an entirely new feeling of
confidence (see entry for July 21). Whether this meant that Truman was getting
25
ready for a confrontation with Stalin over Eastern Europe and other matters has
also been the subject of debate.
An important question that Stimson discussed with Marshall, at Trumans
request, was whether Soviet entry into the war remained necessary to secure
Tokyos surrender. Marshall was not sure whether that was so although Stimson
privately believed that the atomic bomb would provide enough to force surrender
(see entry for July 23). This entry has been cited by all sides of the controversy
over whether Truman was trying to keep the Soviets out of the war.[46] During
the meeting on August 24, discussed above, Stimson gave his reasons for taking
Kyoto off the atomic target list: destroying that city would have caused such
bitterness that it could have become impossible to reconcile the Japanese to
us in that area rather than to the Russians. Stimson vainly tried to preserve
language in the Potsdam Declaration designed to assure the Japanese about the
continuance of their dynasty but received Trumans assurance that such a
consideration could be conveyed later through diplomatic channels (see entry for
July 24). Hasegawa argues that Truman realized that the Japanese would refuse a
demand for unconditional surrender without a proviso on a constitutional
monarchy and that he needed Japans refusal to justify the use of the atomic
bomb.[47]
Document 49: Walter Brown Diaries, July 10-August 3, 1945
Source: Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243,
Walter J. Brown Papers, box 10, folder 12, Byrnes, James F.: Potsdam, Minutes,
July-August 1945
Walter Brown, who served as special assistant to Secretary of State Byrnes, kept
a diary which provided considerable detail on the
Potsdam conference and the growing concerns
about Soviet policy among top U.S. officials. This
document is a typed-up version of the handwritten original (which Browns family has
provided to Clemson University). That there may
be a difference between the two sources becomes
evident from some of the entries; for example, in
the entry for July 18, 1945 Brown wrote: "Although
I knew about the atomic bomb when I wrote these
notes, I dared not place it in writing in my book.
The degree to which the typed-up version reflects
the original is worth investigating. In any event,
historians have used information from the diary to The mushroom cloud over
support various interpretations. For example, Nagasaki shortly after the
Bernstein cites the entries for 20 and 24 July to bombing on August 9.
argue that American leaders did not view Soviet (Photo from U.S. National
entry as a substitute for the bomb but that the Archives, RG 77-AEC)
latter would be so powerful, and the Soviet
presence in Manchuria so militarily significant,
that there was no need for actual Soviet intervention in the war. Frank points to
the entry for 3 August, with its discussion of Japans interest in Soviet diplomatic
assistance, as crucial evidence that Admiral Leahy had been sharing MAGIC
information with President Truman. He also argues out that Truman and his
26
colleagues had no idea what was behind Japanese peace moves, only that Suzuki
had declared that he would ignore the Potsdam Declaration. Alperovitz,
however, treats the 3 August entry as evidence that strongly suggests that
Truman saw alternatives to using the bomb.[48]
This Magic summary includes messages from both Togo and Sato. In a long and
impassioned message, the latter argued why Japan must accept defeat: it is
meaningless to prove ones devotion [to the Emperor] by wrecking the State.
Togo rejected Satos advice that Japan could accept unconditional surrender with
one qualification: the preservation of the Imperial House. Probably unable or
unwilling to take a soft position in an official cable, Togo declared that the whole
country will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will as
long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender.
Document 51: Forrestal Diary Entry, July 24, 1945, Japanese Peace Feelers
Source: Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, James Forrestal Diaries
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was a regular recipient of Magic
intercept reports; this substantial entry reviews the dramatic Sato-Togo
exchanges covered in the 22 July Magic summary (although Forrestal misdated
Satos cable as first of July instead of the 21st). In contrast to Alperovitzs
argument that Forrestal tried to modify the terms of unconditional surrender to
give the Japanese an out, Frank sees Forrestals account of the Sato-Togo
exchange as additional evidence that senior U.S. officials understood that Tokyo
was not on the cusp of surrender. [49]
Document 52: Davies Diary entry for July 29, 1945
Source: Joseph E. Davies Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, box
19, 29 July 1945
Having been asked by Truman to join the delegation to the Potsdam conference,
former-Ambassador Davies sat at the table with the Big Three throughout the
discussions. This diary entry has figured in the argument that Byrnes believed
that the atomic bomb gave the United States a significant advantage in
negotiations with the Soviet Union. Plainly Davies thought otherwise.[50]
VII. Debates among the Japanese Late July/Early August 1945
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1221- July 29, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
In
the
Potsdam
Declaration http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/potsdam.htm the
governments of China, Great Britain, and the United States) demanded the
unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces. The alternative is prompt
27
and utter destruction. The next day, in response to questions from journalists
about the governments reaction to the ultimatum, Prime Minister Suzuki
apparently said that We can only ignore [mokusatsu] it. We will do our utmost to
complete the war to the bitter end. That, Bix argues, represents a missed
opportunity to end the war and spare the Japanese from continued U.S. aerial
attacks.[51]Togos private position was more nuanced than Suzukis; he told Sato
that we are adopting a policy of careful study. That Stalin had not signed the
declaration (Truman and Churchill did not ask him to) led to questions about the
Soviet attitude. Togo asked Sato to try to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister
Molotov as soon as possible to sound out the Russian attitude on the
declaration as well as Japans end-the-war initiative. Sato cabled Togo earlier that
he saw no point in approaching the Soviets on ending the war until Tokyo had
concrete proposals. Any aid from the Soviets has now become extremely
doubtful.
This report included an intercept of a message from Sato reporting that it was
impossible to see Molotov and that unless the Togo had a concrete and definite
plan for terminating the war he saw no point in attempting to meet with him.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1225 August 2, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
An intercepted message from Togo to Sato showed that Tokyo remained
interested in securing Moscows good office but that it is difficult to decide on
concrete peace conditions here at home all at once. [W]e are exerting
ourselves to collect the views of all quarters on the matter of concrete terms.
Barton Bernstein, Richard Frank, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, among others, have
argued that the Magic intercepts from the end of July and early August show
that the Japanese were far from ready to surrender. According to Herbert Bix, for
months Hirohito had believed that the outlook for a negotiated peace could be
improved if Japan fought and won one last decisive battle, thus, he delayed
surrender, continuing to procrastinate until the bomb was dropped and the
Soviets attacked.[52]
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1226 - August 3, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
This summary included intercepts of Japanese diplomatic reporting on the Soviet
buildup in the Far East as well as a naval intelligence report on Anglo-American
discussions of U.S. plans for the invasion of Japan. Part II of the summary
includes the rest of Togos 2 August cable which instructed Sato to do what he
could to arrange an interview with Molotov.
28
Document 57: Walter Brown Meeting Notes, August 3, 1945

Walter J. Brown Papers, box 10, folder 12, Byrnes, James F.: Potsdam, Minutes,
July-August 1945
Historians have used this item in the papers of Byrnes aide, Walter Brown, to
make a variety of points. Richard Frank sees this brief discussion of Japans
interest in Soviet diplomatic assistance as crucial evidence that Admiral Leahy
had been sharing MAGIC information with President Truman. He also points out
that Truman and his colleagues had no idea what was behind Japanese peace
moves, only that Suzuki had declared that he would ignore the Potsdam
Declaration. Alperovitz, however, treats it as additional evidence that strongly
suggests that Truman saw alternatives to using the bomb.[53]
Document 58: Magic Far East Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, no. 502, 4 August 1945
Source: RG 457, Summaries of Intercepted Japanese Messages (Magic Far East
Summary, March 20, 1942 October 2, 1945), box 7, SRS 491-547
This Far East Summary included reports on the Japanese Armys plans to
disperse fuel stocks to reduce vulnerability to bombing attacks, the text of a
directive by the commander of naval forces on Operation Homeland, the
preparations and planning to repel a U.S. invasion of Honshu, and the specific
identification of army divisions located in, or moving into, Kyushu. Both Richard
Frank and Barton Bernstein have used intelligence reporting and analysis of the
major buildup of Japanese forces on southern Kyushu to argue that U.S. military
planners were so concerned about this development that by early August 1945
they were reconsidering their invasion plans.[54]
This summary included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed
his despair and exasperation over what he saw as Tokyos inability to develop
terms for ending the war: [I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in
bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes. Sato
remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any interest in discussions with
Tokyo: it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power
Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our special envoy.
VIII. The Execution Order
Documents 60a-d: Framing the Directive for Nuclear Strikes:
60A. Cable VICTORY 213 from Marshall to Handy, July 22, 1945, Top Secret
60B. Memorandum from Colonel John Stone to General Arnold, Groves Project,
24 July 1945, Top Secret
60C. Cable WAR 37683 from General Handy to General Marshal, enclosing
directive to General Spatz, July 24, 1945, Top Secret
29
60D. Cable VICTORY 261 from Marshall to General Handy, July 25, 1945, 25 July
1945, Top Secret
60E. General Thomas T. Handy to General Carl Spaatz, July 26, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, Files no. 5b and 5e ((copies
from microfilm)
Top Army Air Force commanders may not have wanted to take responsibility for
the first use of nuclear weapons on urban targets and sought formal
authorization from Chief of Staff Marshall who was then in Potsdam.[55] On 22
July Marshall asked Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas Handy to prepare a draft;
General Groves wrote one which went to Potsdam for Marshalls approval.
Colonel John Stone, an assistant to commanding General of the Army Air Forces
Henry H. Hap Arnold, had just returned from Potsdam and updated his boss on
the plans as they had developed. On 25 July Marshall informed Handy that
Secretary of War Stimson had approved the text; that same day, Handy signed
off on a directive which ordered the use of atomic weapons on Japan, with the
first weapon assigned to one of four possible targetsHiroshima, Kokura, Niigata,
or Nagasaki. Additional bombs will be delivery on the [targets] as soon as made
ready by the project staff.
Document 61: Memorandum from Major General L. R. Groves to Chief of Staff,
July 30, 1945, Top Secret, Sanitized Copy
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5
With more information on the Alamogordo test available, Groves provided
Marshall with detail on the destructive power of atomic weapons. Barton J.
Bernstein has observed that Groves recommendation that troops could move
into the immediate explosion area within a half hour demonstrates the
prevalent lack of top-level knowledge of the dangers of nuclear weapons effects.
[56] Groves also provided the schedule for the delivery of the weapons: the
components of the gun-type bomb to be used on Hiroshima had arrived on
Tinian, while the parts of the second weapon to be dropped were leaving San
Francisco. By the end of November over ten weapons would be available,
presumably in the event the war had continued.
Documents 62A-C: Weather delays
62A. CG 313th Bomb Wing, Tinian cable APCOM 5112 to War Department, August
3, 1945, Top Secret
62B. CG 313th Bomb Wing, Tinian cable APCOM 5130 to War Department, August
4, 1945, Top Secret
62C. CG 313th Bomb Wing, Tinian cable APCOM 5155 to War Department, August
4, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 21 (copies courtesy of
Barton Bernstein)
The Hiroshima operation was originally slated to begin in early August
depending on local conditions. As these cables indicate, reports of unfavorable
weather delayed the plan. The second cable on 4 August shows that the
30
schedule advanced to late in the evening of 5 August. The handwritten

transcriptions are on the original archival copies.
IX. The First Nuclear Strikes and their Impact
Document 63: Memorandum from General L. R. Groves to the Chief of Staff,
August 6, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5b (copy from
microfilm)
Two days after the bombing of Hiroshima, Groves provided Chief of Staff Marshall
with a report which included messages from
Captain William S. Parsons and others about the
impact of the detonation which, through prompt
radiation effects, fire storms, and blast effects,
immediately killed at least 70,000, with many
dying later from radiation sickness and other
causes.[57]
How influential the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and later Nagasaki compared to the
impact of the Soviet declaration of war were to
the Japanese decision to surrender has been the
subject of controversy among historians. Sadao An
overview
of
the
Asada emphasizes the shock of the atomic destruction of Hiroshima
bombs, while Herbert Bix has suggested that [undated,
circa
AugustHiroshima and the Soviet declaration of war September 1945]. (Photo
made Hirohito and his court believe that failure from U.S. National Archives,
to end the war could lead to the destruction of RG 306-NT)
the imperial house. Frank and Hasegawa divide
over the impact of the Soviet declaration of war,
with Frank declaring that the Soviet intervention was significant but not
decisive and Hasegawa arguing that the two atomic bombs were not sufficient
to change the direction of Japanese diplomacy. The Soviet invasion was.[58]
Document 64: Walter Brown Diary Entry, 6 August 1945
Walter J. Brown Papers, box 68, folder 13, Transcript/Draft B
Returning from the Potsdam Conference, sailing on the U.S.S. Augusta, Truman
learned about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and announced it twice, first to
those in the wardroom (socializing/dining area for commissioned officers), and
then to the sailors mess. Still unaware of radiation effects, Truman emphasized
the explosive yield. Later, he met with Secretary of State Byrnes and they
discussed the Manhattan Projects secrecy and the huge expenditures. Truman,
who had been chair of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National
Defense Program, said that Stimson had appeal[ed] to him to refrain from
investigating the secret project, but the Secretary of War stonewalled and
refused to tell Truman anything.
Document 65: Directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East on the Start of Combat
31
Operations, No. 11122, Signed by [Communist Party General Secretary Joseph]

Stalin and [Chief of General Staff A.I.] Antonov, 7 August 1945 (translation by
Anna Melyaskova)
Source: V. A. Zolotarev, ed., Sovetsko-Iaponskaia Voina 1945 Goda: Istoriia
Voenno-Politicheskogo Protivoborstva Dvukh Derzhav v 3040e Gody (Moscow:
Terra, 1997 and 2000), Vol. 7 (1), 340-341.
To keep his pledge at Yalta to enter the war against Japan and to secure the
territorial concessions promised at the conference (e.g., Soviet annexation of the
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin and a Soviet naval base at Port Arthur, etc.) Stalin
considered various dates to schedule an attack. By early August he decided that
9-10 August 1945 would be the best dates for striking Japanese forces in
Manchuria. In light of Japans efforts to seek Soviet mediation, Stalin wanted to
enter the war quickly lest Tokyo reach a compromise peace with the Americans
and the British at Moscows expense. But on 7 August, Stalin changed the
instructions: the attack was to begin the next day. According to David Holloway,
it seems likely that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima the day before that
impelled [Stalin] to speed up Soviet entry into the war and secure the gains
promised at Yalta.[59]
Document 66: Memorandum of Conversation, Atomic Bomb, August 7, 1945
Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman,
box 181, Chron File Aug 5-9, 1945.
The Soviets already knew about the U.S. atomic project from espionage sources
in the United States and Britain so Molotovs comment to Ambassador Harriman
about the secrecy surrounding the U.S. atomic project can be taken with a grain
of salt, although the Soviets were probably unaware of specific plans for nuclear
use.
Documents 67A-B: Early High-level Reactions to the Hiroshima Bombing
67A: Cabinet Meeting and Togo's Meeting with the Emperor, August 7-8, 1945
Source: Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ed. Shusen Shiroku (The Historical
Records of the End of the War), annotated by Jun Eto, volume 4, 57-60 [Excerpts]
[Translation by Toshihiro Higuchi]
67B: Admiral Tagaki Diary Entry for Wednesday, August 8 , 1945
Tajima]
32
Excerpts
from
the
Foreign
Ministry's
compilation about the end of the war show
how news of the bombing reached Tokyo as
well as how Foreign Minister's Togo initially
reacted to reports about Hiroshima. When he
learned of the atomic bombing from the
Domei News Agency, Togo believed that it was
time to give up and advised the cabinet that
the atomic attack provided the occasion for
Japan to surrender on the basis of the Potsdam
Declaration. Togo could not persuade the
cabinet, however, and the Army wanted to
delay any decisions until it had learned what
had happened to Hiroshima. When the Foreign
Minister met with the Emperor, Hirohito
agreed with him; he declared that the top
priority was an early end to the war, although
it would be acceptable to seek better
surrender terms--probably U.S. acceptance of
a figure-head emperor--if it did not interfere
with that goal. In light of those instructions,
Togo and Prime Minister Suzuki agreed that
the Supreme War Council should meet the
next day. [59a]
Hiroshima - view of Hiroshima

Castle
and
surroundings;
Upper image - July 24, 1945,
photo
by
28th
Photo
Reconnaissance
Squadron
Lower image - August 11,
1945, photo by 6th Photo
Reconnaissance
Group
Source: U.S. National Archives,
College Park, MD, Record
Group
373,
Defense
Intelligence Agency, Aerial
Film, U.S., Army Air Force.
Courtesy of Tim Brown.
An entry from Admiral Tagaki's diary for

August 8 conveys more information on the
mood in elite Japanese circles after Hiroshima,
but before the Soviet declaration of war and
the bombing of Nagasaki. Seeing the bombing
of Hiroshima as a sign of a worsening situation
at home, Tagaki worried about further
deterioration. Nevertheless, his diary suggests
that military hard-liners were very much in
charge and that Prime Minister Suzuki was talking tough against surrender, by
evoking last ditch moments in Japanese history and warning of the danger that
subordinate commanders might not obey surrender orders. The last remark
aggravated Navy Minister Yonai who saw it as irresponsible. That the Soviets had
made no responses to Sato's request for a meeting was understood as a bad
sign; Yonai realized that the government had to prepare for the possibility that
Moscow might not help. One of the visitors mentioned at the beginning of the
entry was Iwao Yamazaki who became Minister of the Interior in the next cabinet.
Document 68: Navy Secretary James Forrestal to President Truman, August 8,
1945
Source: Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, James Forrestal Diaries
General Douglas MacArthur had been slated as commander for military
operations against Japans mainland, this letter to Truman from Forrestal shows
that the latter believed that the matter was not settled. Richard Frank sees this
as evidence of the uncertainty felt by senior officials about the situation in early
33
August; Forrestal would not have been so audacious to take an action that
could ignite a political firestorm if he seriously thought the end of the war was
near.
Document 69: Memorandum of Conversation, Far Eastern War and General
Situation, August 8, 1945, Top Secret
box 181, Chron File Aug 5-9, 1945
Shortly after the Soviets declared war on Japan, in line with commitments made
at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Ambassador Harriman met with Stalin,
with George Kennan keeping the U.S. record of the meeting. After Stalin reviewed
in considerable detail, Soviet military gains in the Far East, they discussed the
possible impact of the atomic bombing on Japans position (Nagasaki had not yet
been attacked) and the dangers and difficulty of an atomic weapons program.
According to Hasegawa, this was an important, even startling, conversation: it
showed that Stalin took the atomic bomb seriously; moreover, he disclosed
that the Soviets were working on their own atomic program.[60]
Document 70: Entries for 8-9 August, Robert P. Mieklejohn Diary
Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, box 211, Robert Pickens
Mieklejohn World War II Diary At London and Moscow March 10, 1941-February
14, 1946, Volume II (Privately printed, 1980 [Printed from hand-written originals])
(Reproduced with permission)
Robert P. Mieklejohn, who worked as Ambassador W. A. Harrimans administrative
assistant at the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and London during and after World
War II, kept a detailed diary of his experiences and observations. The entries for
8 and 9 August, prepared in light of the bombing of Hiroshima, include discussion
of the British contribution to the Manhattan Project, Harriman (his nibs) report
on his meeting with Molotov about the Soviet declaration of war, and speculation
about the impact of the bombing of Hiroshima on the Soviet decision. According
to Mieklejohn, None of us doubt that the atomic bomb speeded up the Soviets
declaration of war.
Document 71: Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 8, 1945 at
10:45 AM
At their first meeting after the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima, Stimson
briefed Truman on the scale of the destruction, with Truman recognizing the
terrible responsibility that was on his shoulder. Consistent with his earlier
attempts, Stimson encouraged Truman to find ways to expedite Japans
surrender by using kindness and tact and not treating them in the same way
as the Germans. They also discussed postwar legislation on the atom and the
pending Henry D. Smyth report on the scientific work underlying the Manhattan
project and postwar domestic controls of the atom.
Documents 72A-C: The Attack on Nagasaki:
34
72A. Cable APCOM 5445 from General Farrell to OLeary [Groves assistant],
72B. COMGENAAF 8 cable CMDW 576 to COMGENUSASTAF, for General Farrell,
August 9, 1945, Top secret
72C. COMGENAAF 20 Guam cable AIMCCR 5532 to COMGENUSASTAF Guam,
Source: RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 20, Envelope G Tinian
Files, Top Secret
The prime target for the second atomic attack was Kokura, which had a large
army arsenal and ordnance works, but various problems ruled that city out;
instead, the crew of the B-29 that carried Fat Man flew to an alternate target at
Nagasaki. These cables are the earliest reports of the mission; the bombing of
Nagasaki killed immediately at least 39,000 people, with more dying later.
According to Frank, the actual total of deaths due to the atomic bombs will
never be known, but the huge number ranges somewhere between 100,000
and 200,000 people. Barton J. Bernstein and Martin Sherwin have argued that if
top Washington policymakers had kept tight control of the delivery of the bomb
instead of delegating it to Groves the attack on Nagasaki could have been
avoided. The combination of the first bomb and the Soviet declaration of war
would have been enough to induce Tokyos surrender. By contrast, Maddox
argues that Nagasaki was necessary so that Japanese hardliners could not
minimize the first explosion or otherwise explain it away.[61]
Documents 73A-B: Ramsey Letter from Tinian Island
73A: Letter from Norman Ramsey to J. Robert Oppenheimer, undated [midAugust
1945],
Secret,
excerpts
Source: Library of Congress, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, box 60, Ramsey,
Norman
73B: Transcript of the letter prepared by editor.
Ramsey, a physicist, served as deputy director of the bomb delivery group,
Project Alberta. This personal account, written on Tinian, reports his fears about
the danger of a nuclear accident, the confusion surrounding the Nagasaki attack,
and early Air Force thinking about a nuclear strike force
X. Toward Surrender
Chief of Staff, G-2, no. 507, August 9, 1945
Within days after the bombing of Hiroshima, U.S. military intelligence intercepted
Japanese reports on the destruction of the city. According to an Eyewitness
Account (and Estimates Heard) In Regard to the Bombing of Hiroshima:
Casualties have been estimated at 100,000 persons.
Document 75: Hoshina Memorandum on the Emperors Sacred Decision [goseidan], 9-10 August, 1945
35
Source: Zenshiro Hoshina, Daitoa Senso Hishi: Hoshina Zenshiro Kaisoroku [Secret History of the Greater East Asia War: Memoir of Zenshiro Hoshina]
(Tokyo, Japan: Hara-Shobo, 1975), excerpts from Section 5, The Emperor
made go-seidan [= the sacred decision] the decision to terminate the war,
139-149 [translation by Hikaru Tajima]
Despite the bombing of Hiroshima, the Soviet declaration of war, and growing
worry about domestic instability, the Japanese cabinet (whose decisions required
unanimity) could not form a consensus to accept the Potsdam Declaration.
Members of the Supreme War Councilthe Big Six[62]wanted the reply to
Potsdam to include at least four conditions (e.g., no occupation, voluntary
disarmament); they were willing to fight to the finish. The peace party, however,
deftly maneuvered to break the stalemate by persuading a reluctant emperor to
intervene. According to Hasegawa, Hirohito had become convinced that the
preservation of the monarchy was at stake. Late in the evening of 9 August, the
emperor and his advisers met in the bomb shelter of the Imperial Palace.
Zenshiro Hoshina, a senior naval official, attended the conference and prepared a
detailed account. With Prime Minister Suzuki presiding, each of the ministers had
a chance to state their views directly to Hirohito. While Army Minister Anami
tacitly threatened a coup (civil war), the emperor accepted the majority view
that the reply to the Potsdam declaration should include only one condition not
the four urged by Big Six. Nevertheless, the condition that Hirohito accepted
was not the one that foreign minister Togo had brought to the conference. What
was at stake was the definition of the kokutai (national policy). Togos proposal
would have been generally consistent with a constitutional monarchy because it
defined the kokutai narrowly as the emperor and the imperial household. What
Hirohito accepted, however, was a proposal by the extreme nationalist Kiichiro
Hiranuma which drew upon prevailing understandings of the kokutai: the
mythical notion that the emperor was a living god. This was the affirmation of
the emperors theocratic powers, unencumbered by any law, based on Shinto
gods in antiquity, and totally incompatible with a constitutional monarchy. Thus,
the Japanese response to the Potsdam declaration opposed any demand which
prejudices the prerogatives of his Majesty as a sovereign ruler. This proved to be
unacceptable to the Truman administration.[63]
Document 76:Magic Far East Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant
More intercepted messages on the bombing of Hiroshima.
Documents 77A-B: The First Japanese Offer Intercepted
77A. Magic Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, No. 1233 August 10, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
77B. Translation of intercepted Japanese messages, circa 10 August 10, 1945,
Top Secret Ultra
36
The first Japanese surrender offer was intercepted shortly before Tokyo broadcast
it. This issue of the diplomatic summary also includes Togos account of his
notification of the Soviet declaration of war, reports of Soviet military operations
in the Far East, and intercepts of French diplomatic traffic. A full translation of the
surrender offer was circulated separately. The translations differ but they convey
the sticking point that prevented U.S. acceptance: Tokyos condition that the
allies not make any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as
a sovereign ruler.
Document 78: Diary Entry, Friday, August 10, 1945, Henry Wallace Diary
Source: Papers of Henry A. Wallace, Special Collections Department, University of
Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa (copy courtesy of Special Collections Department)
Note: The second page of the diary entry includes a newspaper clipping of the
Associated Presss transmission of the Byrnes note. Unfortunately, AP would not
authorize the Archive to reproduce this item without payment. Therefore, we are
publishing an excised version of the entry, with a link to the Byrnes note.
Secretary of Commerce (and former Vice President) Henry Wallace provided a
detailed report on the cabinet meeting where Truman and his advisers discussed
the Japanese surrender offer, Russian moves into Manchuria, and public opinion
on hard surrender terms. With Japan close to capitulation, Truman asserted
presidential control and ordered a halt to atomic bombings. Barton J. Bernstein
has suggested that Trumans comment about all those kids showed his belated
recognition that the bomb caused mass casualties and that the target was not
purely a military one.[64]
Document 79: Entries for 10-11 August, Robert P. Mieklejohn Diary
In these entries, Mieklejohn discussed how he and others in the Moscow Embassy
learned about the bombing of Nagasaki from the OWI Bulletin. Entries for 10
and 11 August cover discussion at the Embassy about the radio broadcast
announcing that Japan would surrender as long the Emperors status was not
affected. Harriman opined that surrender is in the bag because of the Potsdam
Declarations provision that the Japanese could choose their own form of
government, which would probably include the Emperor. Further, the only
alternative to the Emperor is Communism, implying that an official role for the
Emperor was necessary to preserve social stability and prevent social revolution.
Document 80: Stimson Diary Entries, Friday and Saturday, August 10 and 11,
1945
Stimsons account of the events of 10 August focused on the debate over the
reply to the Japanese note, especially the question of the Emperors status. The
U.S. reply, drafted during the course of the day, did not explicitly reject the note
but suggested that any notion about the prerogatives of the Emperor would be
37
superceded by the concept that all Japanese would be Subject to the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers. The language was ambiguous enough to
enable Japanese readers, upon Hirohitos urging, to believe that they could
decide for themselves the Emperors future role. Stimson accepted the language
believing that a speedy reply to the Japanese would allow the United States to
get the homeland into our hands before the Russians could put in any
substantial claim to occupy and help rule it. If the note had included specific
provision for a constitutional monarchy, Hasegawa argues, it would have taken
the wind out of the sails of the military faction and Japan might have
surrendered several days earlier, on August 11 or 12 instead of August 14.[65]
Document 81: Entries from Walter Brown Diary, 10-11 August 1945
Walter Brown Papers, box 68, folder 13, Transcript/Draft B
Brown recounted Byrnes debriefing of the 10 August White House meeting on
the Japanese peace offer, an account which differed somewhat from that in the
Stimson diary. According to what Byrnes told Brown, Truman, Stimson, and Leahy
favored accepting the Japanese note, but Byrnes objected that the United States
should go [no] further than we were willing to go at Potsdam. Stimsons
account of the meeting noted Byrnes concerns (troubled and anxious) about
the Japanese note and implied that he (Stimson) favored accepting it, but did not
picture the debate as starkly as Browns.
Document 82: General L. R. Groves to Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, August
Source: George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA
(copy courtesy of Barton J. Bernstein)
While Groves was making plans for the use of a third atomic weapon sometime
after 17 August, depending on the weather, Marshalls note on this memo
showed that he followed Trumans instructions to halt nuclear strikes: It is not to
be released over Japan without express authority from the President.
Document
83:
Memorandum
of
Conversation,
Negotiations, August 10, 1945, Top Secret
Japanese
Surrender

box 181, Chron File Aug 10-12, 1945
Japans prospective surrender was the subject of detailed discussion between
Harriman, British Ambassador Kerr, and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov during
the evening of August 10 (with a follow-up meeting occurring at 2 a.m.). In the
course of the conversation, Harriman received a message from Washington that
included the proposed U.S. reply and a request for Soviet support of the reply.
After considerable pressure from Harriman, the Soviets signed off on the reply
but not before tensions surfaced over the control of Japan--whether Moscow
would have a Supreme Commander there as well. This marked the beginning of a
U.S.-Soviet tug of war over occupation arrangements for Japan.[66]
Document 84: Admiral Tagaki Diary Entry for 12 August [1945]
38

Tajima]
As various factions in the government maneuvered on how to respond to the
Byrnes note, Navy Minister Yonai and Admiral Tagaki discussed the latest
developments. Yonai was upset that Chief of Staff Yoshijiro Umezu and naval
chief Suemu Toyada had sent the emperor a memorandum arguing that
acceptance of the Brynes note would desecrate the emperors dignity and turn
Japan into virtually a slave nation. The emperor chided Umezu and Toyoda for
drawing hasty conclusions; in this he had the support of Yonai, who also dressed
them down. As Yonai explained to Tagaki, he had also confronted naval vice Chief
Takijiro Onishi to make sure that he obeyed any decision by the Emperor. Yonai
made sure that Takagi understood his reasons for bringing the war to an end and
why he believed that the atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war had
made it easier for Japan to surrender.[67]
Document 85: Memorandum from Major General Clayton Bissell, Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, for the Chief of Staff, Estimate of Japanese Situation for Next 30
Days, August 12, 1945, Top Secret
Source: National Archives, RG 165, Army Operations OPD, Executive Files 19401945, box 12, Exec #2
Not altogether certain that surrender was imminent, Army intelligence did not
rule out the possibility that Tokyo would try to drag out the negotiations or
reject the Byrnes proposal and continue fighting. If the Japanese decided to keep
fighting, G-2 opined that Atomic bombs will not have a decisive effect in the
next 30 days. Richard Frank has pointed out that this and other documents
indicate that high level military figures remained unsure as to how close Japan
really was to surrender.
Document 86: The Cabinet Meeting over the Reply to the Four Powers (August
13)
Source: Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shusen Shiroku [Historical
Record of the End of the War] (Tokyo: Hokuyosha, 1977-1978), vol. 5, 27-35
[Translated by Toshihiro Higuchi]
The Byrnes Note did not break the stalemate at the cabinet level. An account of
the cabinet debates on August 13 prepared by Information Minister Toshiro
Shimamura showed the same divisions as before; Anami and a few other
ministers continued to argue that the Allies threatened the kokutai and that
setting the four conditions (no occupation, etc.) did not mean that the war would
continue. Nevertheless, Anami argued, We are still left with some power to
fight. Suzuki, who was working quietly with the peace party, declared that the
Allied terms were acceptable because they gave a dim hope in the dark of
preserving the emperor. At the end of the meeting, he announced that he would
report to Hirohito and ask him to make another Sacred Judgment. Meanwhile,
junior Army officers plotted a coup to thwart the plans for surrender.[68]
Document 87: Telephone conversation transcript, General Hull and Colonel
Seaman [sic] 1325 13 Aug 45, Top Secret
39
Source: George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA, George C. Marshall Papers

(copy courtesy of Barton J. Bernstein)
While Truman had rescinded the order to drop nuclear bombs, the war was not
yet over and uncertainty about Japans next step motivated war planner General
John E. Hull (assistant chief of staff for the War Departments Operations
Division), and one of Groves associates, Colonel L. E. Seeman, to continue
thinking about further nuclear use and its relationship to a possible invasion of
Japan. As Hull explained, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of
greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, etc.
Nearer the tactical use, Seaman agreed and they discussed the tactics that
could be used for beach landings. In 1991 articles, Barton Bernstein and Marc
Gallicchio used this and other evidence to develop the argument that concepts of
tactical nuclear weapons use first came to light at the close of World War II.[69]
That important elements in the Japanese Army were unwilling to surrender is
evident from intercepted messages dated 12 and 13 August. Willingness to
accept the destruction of the Army and Navy rather than surrender inspired
the military coup that unfolded and failed during the night of 14 August.
Document 89: The Second Sacred Judgment, August 14, 1945
Source: Hiroshi [Kaian) Shimomura, Shusenki [Account of the End of the
War] (Tokyo, Kamakura Bunko, [1948], 148-152 [Translated by Toshihiro Higuchi]
Frightened by the rapid movement of Soviet forces into Manchuria and worried
that the army might launch a coup, the peace party set in motion a plan to
persuade Hirohito to meet with the cabinet and the Big Six to resolve the
stalemate over the response to the Allies. Japan was already a day late in
responding to the Byrnes Note and Hirohito agreed to move quickly. At 10:50
a.m., he met with the leadership at the bomb shelter in his palace. This account,
prepared by Director of Information Shimomura, conveys the drama of the
occasion (as well as his interest in shifting the blame for the debacle to the
Army). After Suzuki gave the war party--Umeda, Toyoda, and Anami--an
opportunity to present their arguments against accepting the Byrnes Note, he
asked the emperor to speak. Asking the leadership to accept the Note, Hirohito
argued that continuing the war would reduce the nation to ashes. Hirohitos
language about bearing the unbearable and his sadness over wartime losses
and suffering prefigured the language he would use in his public announcement
the next day. According to Bix, Hirohito's language helped to transform him from
a war to a peace leader, from a cold, aloof monarch to a human being who cared
for his people but what chiefly motivated him was his desire to save a
politically empowered throne with himself on it.[70]
Hirohito said that he would make a recording of the surrender announcement so
that the nation could hear it. That evening army officers tried to seize the palace
and find Hirohitos recording, but the coup failed. Early the next day, General
Anami committed suicide. On the morning of August 15, Hirohito broadcast the
40
message to the nation (although he never used the word surrender). A few
weeks later, on September 2, 1945 Japanese representatives signed surrender
documents on the USS Missouri, in Tokyo harbor.[71]
This summary includes an intercepted account of the destruction of Nagasaki.
XI. Confronting the Problem of Radiation Poisoning
Document 91: P.L. Henshaw and R.R. Coveyou to H.J. Curtis and K. Z. Morgan,
Death from Radiation Burns, 24 August 1945, Confidential
Source: Department of Energy Open-Net
Two scientists at Oak Ridges Health Division, Henshaw and Coveyou, saw a
United Press report in the Knoxville News Sentinel about radiation sickness
caused by the bombings. Victims who looked healthy weakened, for unknown
reasons and many died. Lacking direct knowledge of conditions in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, Henshaw and Coveyou had their own data on the biological effects
of radiation and could make educated guesses. After reviewing the impact of
various atomic bomb effects--blast, heat, flash radiation (prompt effects from
gamma waves), and radiation from radioactive substances--they concluded that
it seems highly plausible that a great many persons were subjected to lethal
and sub-lethal dosages of radiation in areas where direct blast effects were
possibly non-lethal. It was probable, therefore, that radiation would produce
increments to the death rate and even more probable that a great number of
cases of sub-lethal exposures to radiation have been suffered.[72]
Document 92: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between General Groves
and Lt. Col. Rea, Oak Ridge Hospital, 9:00 a.m., August 28, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5b
Despite the reports pouring in from Japan about radiation sickness among the
victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, General Groves and Dr. Charles Rea, a
surgeon who was head of the base hospital at Oak Ridge (and had no specialized
knowledge about the biological effects of radiation) dismissed the reports as
propaganda. Unaware of the findings of Health Division scientists, Groves and
Rhea saw the injuries as nothing more than good thermal burns.[73]
Documents 93A-B: General Farrell Surveys the Destruction
93A. Cable CAX 51813 from USS Teton to Commander in Chief Army Forces
Pacific Administration, From Farrell to Groves, September 10, 1945, Secret
93B. Cable CAX 51948 from Commander in Chief Army Forces Pacific Advance
Yokohoma Japan to Commander in Chief Army Forces Pacific Administration,
September 14, 1945, Secret
Source: RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 17, Envelope B
41
A month after the attacks Groves deputy, General Farrell, traveled to Japan to
see for himself the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. His vivid account
shows that senior military officials in the Manhattan Project were no longer
dismissive of reports of radiation poisoning. As Farrell observed in his discussion
of Hiroshima, Summaries of Japanese reports previously sent are essentially
correct, as to clinical effects from single gamma radiation dose. Such findings
dismayed Groves, who worried that the bomb would fall into a taboo category
like chemical weapons, with all the fear and horror surrounding them. Thus,
Groves and others would try to suppress findings about radioactive effects,
although that was a losing proposition.[74]
XII. Eisenhower and McCloys Views on the Bombings and Atomic Weapons
Document 94: Entry for 4 October 1945, Robert P. Mieklejohn Diary
In this entry written several months later, Mieklejohn shed light on what much
later became an element of the controversy over the Hiroshima-Nagasaki
bombings: whether any high level civilian or military officials objected to nuclear
use. Mieklejohn recounted Harrimans visit in early October 1945 to the
Frankfurt-area residence of General Dwight Eisenhower, who was finishing up his
service as Commanding General, U.S. Army, European Theater. It was
Mieklejohns birthday and during the dinner party, Eisenhower and McCloy had
an interesting discussion of atomic weapons, which included comments alluding
to scientists statements about what appears to be the H-bomb project (a 20
megaton weapon), recollection of the early fear that an atomic detonation could
burn up the atmosphere, and the Navys reluctance to use its battleships to test
atomic weapons. At the beginning of the discussion, Eisenhower made a
significant statement: he mentioned how he had hoped that the war might have
ended without our having to use the atomic bomb. The general implication was
that prior to Hiroshima-Nagasaki, he had wanted to avoid using the bomb.
Some may associate this statement with one that Eisenhower later recalled
making to Stimson. In his 1948 memoirs (further amplified in his 1963 memoirs),
Eisenhower claimed that he had expressed the hope [to Stimson] that we would
never have to use such a thing against an enemy because I disliked seeing the
United States take the lead in introducing into war something as horrible and
destructive as this new weapon was described to be. That language may reflect
the underlying thinking behind Eisenhowers statement during the dinner party,
but whether Eisenhower used such language when speaking with Stimson has
been a matter of controversy. In later years, those who knew both thought it
unlikely that the general would have expressed misgivings about using the bomb
to a civilian superior. Eisenhowers son John cast doubts about the memoir
statements, although he attested that when the general first learned about the
bomb he was downcast.
Stimsons diary mentions meetings with Eisenhower twice in the weeks before
Hiroshima, but without any mention of a dissenting Eisenhower statement (and
Stimsons diaries are quite detailed on atomic matters). The entry from
42
Mieklejohns diary does not prove or disprove Eisenhowers recollection, but it

does confirm that he had doubts which he expressed only a few months after the
bombings. Whether Eisenhower expressed such reservations prior to Hiroshima
will remain a matter of controversy.[75]
The editor thanks Barton J. Bernstein, J. Samuel Walker, Gar Alperovitz, David
Holloway, and Alex Wellerstein for their advice and assistance, and Tsuyoshi
Hasegawa for kindly providing copies of some of the Japanese sources that were
translated for this compilation. Hasegawas book, Racing the Enemy: Stalin,
Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2005),
includes invaluable information on Japanese sources. David Clark, an archivist at
the Harry S. Truman Library, and James Cross, Manuscripts Archivist at Clemson
University Librarys Special Collections, kindly provided material from their
collections. The editor also thanks Kyle Hammond and Gregory Graves for
research assistance and Toshihiro Higuchi and Hikaru Tajima (who then were
graduate students in history at Georgetown University and the University of
Tokyo respectively), for translating documents and answering questions on the
Japanese sources. The editor thanks Anna Melyakova (National Security Archive)
for translating Russian language material.
Notes
[1]. The World Wide Web includes significant documentary resources on these
events. The Truman Library has published a helpful collection of archival
documents, some of which are included in the present collection,
see http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/index.
php. A collection of transcribed documents is Gene Dannens Atomic Bomb:
Decision. For a print collection of documents, see Dennis Merrill
ed., Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Volume I: The Decision to
Drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan (University Publications of America, 1995). A
more recent collection of documents, along with a bibliography, narrative, and
chronology, is Michael Korts The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the
Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). An important online collection focuses on the air-raids of Japanese cities and bases, providing
valuable context for the atomic attacks.
[2]. For the early criticisms and their impact on Stimson and other former
officials, see Barton J. Bernstein, Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear
History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic
Bomb, Diplomatic History 17 (1993): 35-72, and James Hershberg, James B.
Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (Stanford,
Stanford University Press, 1995), 291-301.
For Stimsons article, see The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, Harpers 194
(February 1947): 97-107. Social critic Dwight MacDonald published trenchant
criticisms immediately after Hiroshima-Nagasaki; see Politics Past: Essays in
Political Criticism (New York: Viking, 1972), 169-180.
[3] . The proposed script for the Smithsonian exhibition can be seen at Philipe
Nobile,
Judgment at the Smithsonian (New York: Matthews and Company, 1995), pp. 1127. For reviews of the controversy, see Barton J. Bernstein, The Struggle Over
History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative, ibid., 128-256, and Charles T. OReilly
43
and William A. Rooney, The Enola Gay and The Smithsonian (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland and Company, 2005).
[4] . For the extensive literature, see the references in J. Samuel Walker, Prompt
and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against
Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004) at 131-136, as well
as Walkers latest contribution, Recent Literature on Trumans Atomic Bomb
Decision: A Search for Middle Ground, Diplomatic History 29 (April 2005): 311334. For more recent contributions, see Sean Malloy, Atomic Tragedy: Henry L.
Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2008), Andrew Rotter, Hiroshima: The World's Bomb (New York:
Oxford, 2008), Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the
Origins of the Cold War (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008), Wilson D.
Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the
Defeat of Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Also important to
take into account is John Dowers extensive discussion of Hiroshima/Nagasaki in
context of the U.S. fire-bombings of Japanese cities in Cultures of War: Pearl
Harbor/Hiroshima/9-11/Iraq (New York, W. Norton, 2010), 163-285.
[5] . The editor particularly benefited from the source material cited in the
following works: Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie S. Groves,
The Manhattan Projects Indispensable Man (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press,
2002); Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Bomb and the Architecture of an
American Myth (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1995); Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The
End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999), Martin
Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins of the Arm Race (New
York, Vintage Books, 1987), and as already mentioned, Hasegawas Racing the
Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 2005). Barton J. Bernsteins numerous articles in scholarly
publications (many of them are listed in Walkers assessments of the literature)
constitute an invaluable guide to primary sources. An article that Bernstein
published in 1995, The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered, Foreign Affairs 74
(1995), 135-152, nicely summarizes his thinking on the key issues.
[6] . Malloy (2008), 49-50. For more on the Uranium Committee, the decision to
establish the S-1 Committee, and the overall context, see James G. Hershberg,
James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear
Age (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995), 140-154.
[7] . Sean Malloy, À Very Pleasant Way to Die: Radiation Effects and the
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb against Japan, Diplomatic History 36 (2012),
especially 523. For an important study of how contemporary officials and
scientists looked at the atomic bomb prior to first use in Japan, see Michael D.
Gordin, Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007).
[8] . Norris, 169.
[9] . Malloy (2008), 57-58.
[10] . See also Norris, 362.
[11] . For discussion of the importance of this memorandum, see Sherwin, 126127, and Hershberg, James B. Conant, 203-207.
44
[12] . Alperovitz, 662; Bernstein (1995), 139; Norris, 377.

[13]. Quotation and statistics from Thomas R. Searle, Ìt Made a Lot of Sense to
Kill Skilled Workers: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945, The Journal of
Military History 55 (2002):103. More statistics and a detailed account of the
raid is in Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War
II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 130-137.
[14]. Searle, Ìt Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers, 118. For detailed
background on the Army Air Forces incendiary bombing planning, see Schaffer
(1985) 107-127. On Stimson, see Schaffer (1985), 179-180 and Malloy (2008),
54.
[15] . See for example, Bernstein (1995), 140-141.
[16] . For useful discussion of this meeting and the other Target Committee
meetings, see Norris, 382-386.
[17] . Malloy, A Very Pleasant Way to Die, 531-534.
[18] . Schaffer, Wings of Judgment, 143-146.
[19] . Alperovitz argues that the possibility of atomic diplomacy was central to
the thinking of Truman and his advisers, while Bernstein, who argues that
Trumans primary objective was to end the quickly, suggests that the ability to
cow other nations, notably the Soviet Union was a bonus effect. See
Bernstein (1995), 142.
[20] . Alperovitz, 147; Robert James Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima
Decision Fifty Years Later (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 52;
Gabiel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy,
1943-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 421-422. As Alperovitz notes, the
Davies papers include variant diary entries and it is difficult to know which are
the most accurate.
[21] . Malloy (2008), 112
[22] . Bernstein (1995), 146.
[23] . Bernstein (1995), 144. See also Malloy (2008), at 116-117, including the
argument that 1) Stimson was deceiving himself by accepting the notion that a
vital war plant surrounded by workers houses was a legitimate military
target, and 2) that Groves was misleading Stimson by withholding the Target
Committees conclusions that the target would be a city center.
[24] . Walker (2005), 320.
[25] . Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since
World War II (New York, Twayne, 1992), 38-39.
[26] . Barton J. Bernstein, Introduction to Helen S. Hawkins et al. editors, Toward
a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms
Control (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), xxx-xxv; Sherwin, 210-215.
[27] . Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), 523.
45
[28] . Walker (2005), 319-320.

[29] . For a recent review of the debate on casualty estimates, see Walker
(2005), 315, 317-318, 321, 323, and 324-325.
[30] . Hasegawa, 105; Alperovitz, 67-72; Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall:
Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987), 18. Pogue only cites the JCS
transcript of the meeting; presumably, an interview with a participant was the
source of the McCloy quote.
[31] . Alperovitz, 226; Bernstein, Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the
Japanese Surrender, Diplomatic History 19 (1995), 237, note 22.
[32]. Malloy (2008), 123-124.
[33] . Alperovitz, 242, 245; Frank, 219.
[34] . Malloy (2008), 125-127.
[35] . Bernstein, introduction, Toward a Livable World, xxxvii-xxxviii.
[36] . Magic summaries for post-August 1945 remain classified at the National
Security Agency. Information from the late John Taylor, National Archives. For
background on Magic and the Purple code, see John Prados, Combined Fleet
Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in
World War II ( New York: Random House, 1995), 161-172 and David Kahn, The
Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York: Scribner, 1996), 1-67.
[37] . Alperovitz, 232-238.
[38] . Maddox, 83-84; Hasegawa, 126-128. See also Walker (2005), 316-317.
[39] . Hasegawa, 28, 121-122.
[40] . Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1994), 170-174, 248-249.
[41] . David Holloway, Barbarossa and the Bomb: Two Cases of Soviet
Intelligence in World War II, in Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach, eds., Secret
Intelligence in the European States System, 1918-1989(Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2014), 63-64. For the inception of the Soviet nuclear program
and the role of espionage in facilitating it, see Holloway, Stalin and the
Bomb (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994).
[42] . For the distances, see Norris, 407.
[43] .
For
on-line
resources
see www.trinityremembered.com/
on
the
first
atomic
test,
[44] . Bernsteins detailed commentary on Trumans diary has not been

reproduced here except for the opening pages where he provides context and
background.
[45] . Frank, 258; Bernstein (1995), 147; Walker (2005), 322. See also Alex
Wellersteins The Kyoto Misconception
[46] . Maddox, 102; Alperovitz, 269-270; Hasegawa, 152-153.
[47] . Hasegawa, 292.
46
[48]. Bernstein, Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese

Surrender, Diplomatic History 19 (1995), 146-147; Alperovitz, 415; Frank, 246.
[49] . Alperovitz, 392; Frank, 148.
[50] . Alperovitz, 281-282. For Davies at Potsdam, see Elizabeth Kimball
MacLean, Joseph E. Davies: Envoy to the Soviets (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992),
151-166
[51]. Hasegawa, 168; Bix, 518.
[52]. Bix, 490, 521.
[53] . Alperovitz, 415; Frank, 246.
[54] . Frank, 273-274; Bernstein, The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern
Kyushu, Growing U.S. Fears and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned
November 1945 Invasion of Southern Kyushu Have Occurred? Pacific Historical
Review 68 (1999): 561-609.
[55] . Maddox, 105.
[56] . Barton J. Bernstein, "'Reconsidering the 'Atomic General': Leslie R.
Groves," The Journal of Military History 67 (July 2003): 883-920. See also Malloy,
A Very Pleasant Way to Die, 539-540.
[57] . For casualty figures and the experience of people on the ground, see Frank,
264-268 and 285-286, among many other sources. Drawing on contemporary
documents and journals, Masuji Ibuses novel Black Rain(Tokyo, Kodansha, 1982)
provides an unforgettable account of the bombing and its aftermath. For early
U.S. planning to detonate the weapon at a height designed to maximize
destruction from mass fires and other effects, see Alex Wellerstein, The Height
of the Bomb.
[58] . Sadao Asada, The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japans Decision to
Surrender: A Reconsideration, Pacific Historical Review 67 (1998): 101-148; Bix,
523; Frank, 348; Hasegawa, 298. Bix appears to have moved toward a position
close to Hasegawas; see Bix, Japan's Surrender Decision and the Monarchy:
Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War, Japan Focus . For emphasis on the
shock of the atomic bomb, see also Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill,
Hiroshima: A Strategy of Shock, in Saki Dockrill, ed., From Pearl Harbor to
Hiroshima : the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-1945 (New York,
St. Martins Press, 1994), 191-214. For more on the debate over Japans
surrender, see Hasegawas important edited book, The End of the Pacific War: A
Reappraisal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), with major contributions
by Hasegawa, Holloway, Bernstein, and Hatano.
[59] . Melvyn P. Leffler, Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of
the Early Cold War, International Security 11 (1986): 107; Holloway, Barbarossa
and the Bomb, 65.
[59a] For more on these developments, see Asada, "The Shock of the Atomic
Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration," 486-488.
[60] . Hasegawa, 191-192.
47
[61]. Frank, 286-287; Sherwin, 233-237; Bernstein (1995), 150; Maddox, 148.
[62] . The Supreme War Council comprised the prime minister, foreign minister,
army and navy ministers, and army and navy chiefs of staff; see Hasegawa, 72.
[63] . For the maneuverings on August 9 and the role of the kokutai, see
Hasegawa, 3-4, 205-214
[64] . For Trumans recognition of mass civilian casualties, see also his letter to
Senator Richard Russell, 9 August 1945.
[65] . Hasegawa, 295.
[66] . For tug of war, see Hasegawa, 226-227.
[67] . Hasegawa, 228-229, 232.
[68] . Hasegawa, 235-238.
[69] . Barton J. Bernstein, Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking
about Tactical Nuclear Weapons, International Security 15 (Spring 1991): 149173; Marc Gallicchio, After Nagasaki: General Marshalls Plans for Tactical
Nuclear Weapons in Japan, Prologue 23 (Winter 1991): 396-404. Letters from
Robert Messer and Gar Alperovitz, with Bernsteins response, provide insight into
some of the interpretative issues. Correspondence, International Security 16
(Winter 1991/1992): 214-221.
[70] . Bix, Japan's Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in
an Unwinnable War, Japan Focus.
[71]. Hasegawa, 238-249, 285. Translations of Hirohitos speech are available; so
is the actual broadcast.
[72] . See Malloy, A Very Pleasant Way to Die, 541-542.
[73]. For Groves and the problem of radiation sickness, see Norris, 339-441,
Bernstein, Reconsidering the Atomic General: Leslie R. Groves, Journal of
Military History 67 (2003), 907-908, and Malloy, A Very Pleasant Way to Die,
513-518 and 539-542
[74] See Janet Farrell Brodie, Radiation Secrecy and Censorship after Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, The Journal of Social History 48 (2015): 842-864.
[75]. For Eisenhowers statements, see Crusade in Europe (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1948), 443, and Mandate for Change (Garden City: Doubleday,
1963), 312-313. Barton J. Bernsteins 1987 article, Ike and Hiroshima: Did He
Oppose It? The Journal of Strategic Studies 10 (1987): 377-389, makes a case
against relying on Eisenhowers memoirs and points to relevant circumstantial
evidence. For a slightly different perspective, see Malloy (2007), 138
48

The Atomic Bomb and The End of World War II

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

The Atomic Bomb and The End of World War II

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Atomic Bomb and The End of World War II

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II

A Collection of Primary Sources

August 4, 2015- A few months after the

Ever since the atomic bombs were exploded

Table of Contents for the Documents

implications of these enormously powerful weapons and the dangers of a global

Document 20: Memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, Interim Committee

Reminding Stimson about the objections of some Manhattan project scientists to

The possibility of modifying the concept of unconditional surrender so that it

Document 57: Walter Brown Meeting Notes, August 3, 1945

schedule advanced to late in the evening of 5 August. The handwritten

Operations, No. 11122, Signed by [Communist Party General Secretary Joseph]

Hiroshima - view of Hiroshima

An entry from Admiral Tagaki's diary for

Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman,

Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 926-927 [Translation by Hikaru

Source: George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA, George C. Marshall Papers

Mieklejohns diary does not prove or disprove Eisenhowers recollection, but it

[12] . Alperovitz, 662; Bernstein (1995), 139; Norris, 377.

[28] . Walker (2005), 319-320.

[44] . Bernsteins detailed commentary on Trumans diary has not been

[48]. Bernstein, Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese

You might also like