The presidency as an institution

The Roman emperor, some scholars claim, was the first executive, not necessarily
because he embodied power like Machiavellis prince, but because the very evolution
of Rome from an empire into a republican regime put him in a compromise position in a
state that was neither wholly republican nor wholly imperial (Liebert 2012). The republic,
or at least as how the Romans conceived it, paved the way for an individual whose power
borders on tyranny yet rules in the noble mantle of popular service. History tells of how
in the early first century Romes provinces were infested with pirates which at that time
was considered boldly atypical since the attacks were directed against what would be an
equivalent of a superpower in modern times. Fed up with escalating grain prices that the
pirate raids had caused, the Roman public, in a tone that is eerily familiar in our time,
demanded that the senate declare a global war on piracy. Waging war on such a
widespread and elusive enemy, however, required a leader far more potent than provincial
governors or republican dictators. Piracy has become both a social problem and a
universal evil,1 and as such, required a solution that altered the political form of the
Roman republic. Success at these campaigns, however, also changed the image of the one
at the forefront as citizens began to praise leaders in worshipful tones as the Roman
territorial reach further expanded in the aftermath of the anti-piracy campaigns. It is said
that Roman emperors such as Augustus were able to radically consolidate formal power
by posing as the executor of popular will rather than the executioner of republican
government.
American presidents
The question of whom to entrust power and to what extent, which preoccupied the
Roman senate of old, interestingly also became a hotly debated question among the
framers of the US Constitution in 1787. Critics saw the grant of executive to a single
individual as dangerous in the light of abuses by past executivesparticularly, British
monarchs and colonial governors (Edwards and Wayne 1999). In the end, the early
framers chose to check the powers they deemed most dangerous such as the power of
appointment, the power to declare war, and the power to make treaties. Responsible
exercise of power was encouraged by providing reelection. Abuse, meanwhile, would be
check by the clause on impeachment.
In fact, throughout most of the nineteenth century, it was Congress, not the
president who dominated the administration of government. Statutes pretty much
provided the organizational details of departments, their jurisdiction, and even operating
procedures. This began to change at the outset of the twentieth century, however, as a
consequence of the presidents growing influence in Congress. With growing influence
came a change of expectations, creating for the president roles and criteria for which his
leadership is judged. In the past people did not look to the president to solve most of
societys problems. Nowadays, however, it is commonplace for the president to be the
chief architect of the nations fate during the years he is elected to office.
The notion of a dominant president who moves the country and the government
through effective leadership has deep roots in American political culture. This view, in
fact, shapes the expectations and evaluation of the individuals who have occupied the
1

Hostis humani generis.

oval office. But what if presidential leadership is not really as preeminent as people
think? What if in reality it is not as powerful as conventional wisdom would have us
believe?
Latin American presidents
The chief executive is typically regarded as dominant in many scholarly studies
on Latin America, even those that focus on the legislatures. Part of the reason, according
to Siavelis (2012), is the way in which these studies measured legislative power. Studies
typically emphasize balance of power, positing a direct zero sum game between the
legislative and the executive branches, overlooking the real potential that the legislatures
have. The focus on the static powers of the two branches also creates a static view of
legislative power and ignores the reality of shifting influence and the true nature and
extent of presidential support in Congress.
Using data consisting of congressional initiatives in Chile, Siavelis argues that
contrary to the strong temptation to conclude the legislature as a rubber stamp to the
executive, they are actually more influential than what a concrete reading of the
constitutional guarantees of power suggests.
Presidency in Latin America
Even though personal qualities, ideology, history and cultural factors can shape
the way presidents govern, institutions remain to be as important in explaining why
presidents pursue a certain incentive or behavior. There are those that are driven by the
pursuit of the common good while taking into account the broad interests of the majority.
There are also those who are driven by personal and political goals. Either way, the
powers of the president as laid down by institutional structures and rules determine the
strategic actions he may take and the type of transactions he or she may engage in with
respect to legislatures, both allies and opponents alike.
Presidential powers may either be constitutional or partisan (see Shugart and
Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). Constitutional powers make it easirer for
the president to take decisive action when necessary (say, in an emergency or economic
shock) but exposes policymaking to whims and accommodation. Constitutional powers
may be legislative or non-legislative. In Latin American countries, a presidents
legislative power typically includes the package veto, the partial (line item veto, the
power to issue decrees or declare a bill urgent, the exclusive initiative of legislation,
budgetary powers and the power to call a plebiscite or referendum. Its exercise may be
reactive or proactive. The president, for instance, may obtain policies closest to his
preferences by threatening to veto the legislature, issuing decrees to bypass the
legislature, or by resorting to consult the citizenry through referendums particularly to
bypass legislative opposition to bills that have wide popular support. Non-legislative
powers include the power to nominate, appoint and dismiss officials. The rules for
cabinet formation and dismissal also have an effect on the relationship between the
executive and the legislative. For instance, if the legislature exercises power in the
appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers they can use it as a bargaining mechanism
with the executive. Another bargaining chip is the power to impeach the president.

Partisan powers relate to the degree of support of the president in Congress. This
is typically measured in terms of the size of the presidents legislative contingent (allies)
and the strength of party discipline (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997).
Legislative structure
Scholars have mentioned the advantages of having a bicameral legislature such as
its propensity to avoid bad decisions made in haste and being able to represent different
interests. However, a two-chamber legislature can be its own pitfall such as when it
renders the government slow in responding to crisis, or increases the cost of reaching a
decision. The constitutional powers vested in the two houses also determine their
relevance (e.g. order of voting on a measure, impeachment powers, specific powers).
Committees
In a context where the legislature has an impact on policymaking, practices and
regulations governing legislative activities matter because they can alter the number of
players and their allegiance (Scartascini 2008). They may serve as tools for agenda
setting by facilitating the distribution of power in the chamber. It also gives insight on
how the majority coalitions control the flow of legislation and, in effect, legislative
outcome. In Latin America, committees serve not only as repositories of policy expertise
but gatekeepers and the point of origin of policies, practically exercising a strong control
over the agenda (Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988). In case whre
committees are important in policymaking, party leaders filter committee nomination and
use it to ensure party discipline. As such committees have gained prominence in countries
such as the United States where party leaders determine access to committee
memberships. This may not be the case in countries where party discipline and loyalty are
weak to begin with, such as the Philippines.
But other than parties, legislators themselves can find beneficial uses for
committees. Legislators typically choose to belong to committees that can yield the most
such as ensuring the passage of laws for his constituencies or increasing the chance of
reelection. What is apparent is that in Latin America, as in the Philippines, much of the
negotiation and bargaining over policies behind close doors (Morgenstern and Nacif
2002). In both Latin American and Philippine context, there appears to be a deliberate
effort to keep the disagreements, as well as the concessions, between the two branches,
away from the public as much as possible (Scartascini 2008)
Presidential legislative
power
Package veto
Line item veto
Declare a bill urgent
Exclusive initiative of
legislation
Budgetary powers
Power to call plebiscite or
referendum

Latin American
presidential system
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Philippines

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Philippines
Former colonies of what once were Mercantilist monarchies like Spain and
Portugal opted for presidential regimes instead of parliamentary systems which are more
popular in Europe. This has been the case in many Latin American countries, which like
the Philippines, had been former colonies of the Spanish crown. In fact, the Philippines
share many things in common with its Latin American counterparts in terms of culture.
Ferdinand Magellans arrival in March 16, 1521 in what is now part of Samar province is
typically regarded as the Philippiness first recorded visit from the West, although it was
not necessarily the first. Spanish settlement and colonization, however, began with the
arrival of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi in 1565 who established the first permanent Spanish
settlement in Cebu. Legazpis expedition pushed northward reaching Luzon, establishing
a new town in Manila, and eventually paved the way for the colonization of the
archipelago for three centuries. Spanish rule somehow was able to unify most of the
archipelago previously composed of independent sultanates and communities. Ruy Lopez
de Villalobos who preceded Legazpi named the islands Las Islas Filipinas in honor of
Prince Philip of Asturias, who would later become King Philip II. Spain introduced not
just its religion but its legal system and for a time the archipelago served as an important
and strategic territory for the Spanish crown. However, even prior to the advent of the
West, the people were already organized into a system with their own set of laws and
forms of government. The barangay, the basic unit of governance in the Philippines, in
fact, was a reinvention of the ancient system of government prevalent in Filipino preHispanic communities.
Although our focus is on legislative dynamics under a presidential system, it is
important to make a distinction between a presidential and parliamentary system to
introduce the literature. A presidential system is typically regarded to be more stable than
parliamentary systems where government can change more frequently. Scartascini (2008)
argues, however, that presidential systems are actually more unstable because when
changes occur they usually involve either a democratic breakdown or a major reshuffling
of government. Some even consider this as one of the main factors for the breakdown of
democratic regimes in many Latin American countries (Linz and Valenzuela 2004). The
choice between presidential and parliamentary systems apparently have important
consequences for policymaking not only because it can determine the stability of
institutions involved in the policy process, but also the type of exchanges between the
executive and the legislative and their bargaining prerogatives.
Philippine case
A brief review of the powers of Congress provided in the Constitution readily
shows its independence as a co-equal and separate branch. The president, by
constitutional structure, cannot dissolve the legislature nor compel its action. However, in
the Philippines there is also a lingering perception of dominance by the executive, partly
due to a history of having been under authoritarian regime, and partly because the public
has widely regarded the office of the president as the center of government decision
making.
It is worth mentioning that the constitution as an organic law providing for the
constitutional structures and powers of government had undergone several overhauls
primarily targeted to expand (as in the 1973 Constitution) or curtail (as in the present

1987 Constitution) the powers of the president. In paper, it must be pointed out, the
president under the current constitution is not extraordinarily strong compared to the
legislative.
Philippine presidents
Corazon Aquino (8th Congress; February 25, 1986 to June 30, 1992)
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino was the first woman to hold the highest office in the
Philippines. Though married to Sen. Benigno Aquino Jr, who at that time was presidents
Marcos staunchest critic, Aquino was obscure and occasionally described herself as a
plain housewife until her husbands assassination in August 21, 1983 and the events that
later followed.
With former Senator Salvador Laurer as vice presidential running mate, Aquino
challenged Marcos for the presidency but lost in the 1985 snap election. She then called
for massive civil disobedience and protests, a cause which found the support of a number
of Filipinos who felt they had had enough of the dictatorship. The scores of public
protests eventually led to the so called People Power Revolution of 1986 (February 25,
1986) which ousted Marcos and ended two decades of authoritarian regime.2
Aquino was instrumental in the promulgation of the 1987 constitution, arguably
among the most notable of her legacies.3 The constitution reestablished a bicameral
legislature and curtailed the powers of the presidency presumably to keep history under
dictatorship from ever repeating itself.
Aquino embodied hope, at least at the beginning of her term. She was known to
be simple and modest, quite unlike the publics typical perception of one who wields the
nations highest political office. But her modesty was not enough to guarantee a strong
government. Her six years in office was marked by coups and destabilization efforts
coming from factions within her own military as well as insurgent groups operating in the
countryside. People also began to feel disenchanted, particularly those who perceived her
as ill-equipped for the position. Aquino, for instance, started with +53 satisfaction rating
in May 1986 (based on the index by the Social Weather Stations) and even got as high as
+72 in public approval (October 1986) but saw her approval rating plummet and left her
office with just +7 net satisfaction. This figure is lower than Estradas net satisfaction
rating of +9 during his exit, or rather his resignation, after massive public clamor for the
latters ouster in December 2000.
2

On February 25, 1986, Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and her
vice presidential running mate Laurel were taking power. Since Aquino was technically sworn not through
formal institutions means but through the direct will of the people (people power), the legitimacy of her
presidency was contested. One notable opposition, in fact, came from no less than a group of lawyers,
albeit loyal to the former strongman (Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, Oliver Lozano, v. Aquino,
GR 73748, May 22, 1986; see also In Re: Saturnino Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986). In May
1986 the reorganized Supreme Court declared that Aquinos government was not just a de facto but a de
jure government whose legitimacy had been recognized the community of nations. In the words of the high
court, the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter, but one that belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge.
3
Immediately after assuming the presidency, Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 establishing a
revolutionary government and abolishing the 1973 Constitution. The proclamation allowed her both
executive and legislative power but only until the ratification of the new constitution and the establishment
of a bicameral congress.

The 1987 Constitution affords the incumbent president only a single term, an
apparent safeguard to ensure that the presidency does not once more turn into an
autocracy. Corazon Aquino, however, was prompted by advisers and friends to seek
reelection as she was technically not inaugurated under the Constitution and, hence,
free of its restriction. She strongly declined and instead endorsed then House Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra as her candidate for the 1992 presidential race. She later on withdrew her
support and campaigned instead for Fidel V. Ramos who as chief of staff defended her
from the coups and rebellions which hounded her administration.
Many landmark legislations where promulgated during Aquinos administration
such as the Family Code of 1987, which reformed civil law on marriage and family
relations, and the Administrative Code of 1987 which restructured the executive branch.
The Local Government Code, which provided fiscal autonomy and decentralization to
local government units, was also enacted in 1991. Land reform also became a major
centerpiece of her legislative agenda. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was
passed in 1988 which provided for the compensable redistribution of agricultural land to
tenant-farmers.4
Fidel V. Ramos (9th and 10th Congress)
Fidel V. Ramos, a graduate of the US Military Academy, served as Aquinos chief
of staff, and later as secretary of national defense during her tumultuous presidency. The
former general was among the icons of the People Power revolution and was credited for
thwarting the various coup attempts that rocked Aquinos six years in office.
In December 1991, Ramos filed his candidacy for the presidency but lost the
nomination of his party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) to then House Speaker
Ramon Mitra Jr. This caused him to bolt his former party and establish the Partido Lakas
Tao. Ramos new party joined forces with the National Union of Christian Democrats
(NUCD) led by former Senator Raul Manglapus, and the United Muslim Democrats of
the Philippines (UMDP) headed by Ambassador Sanchez Ali, forming the Lakas-NUCDCMD coalition. Ramos narrowly defeated then former Agrarian Reform Secretary
Miriam Defensor Santiago and, in fact, garnered only 23.58 of the electorates vote, the
lowest plurality in the history of the presidency. It did not help that Corazon Aquino
shifted his support from Mitra to Ramos at the last minute during the campaign. Aquinos
change of heart was said to have isolated the Catholic Church which found it
unconceivable to support a non-Catholic presidential candidate. Ramos, in fact, became
the first non-Catholic to hold the nations highest elective office.5
Unlike the plain housewife in Aquino, however, Ramos hailed from a politically
influential family. His father, Narciso Ramos, was a five-term legislator of the House of
Representatives and among the founders of the Liberal Party. Her mother was a scion of
the Valdez clan of Batac, Ilocos Norte. He and former strongman Marcos were, in fact,
4

The CARP arguably was full of loopholes (see Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v
Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform, GR 78742, July 14, 1989). And, as scion of one of Tarlacs
wealthiest sugar plantation owners, Aquino herself was not spared from the controversy surrounding the
program. The same controversy would later haunt her son, Benigno Aquino III, when the latter assumed the
presidency. Corporate landowners, for instance, were allowed under the law to divest capital stock or to
qualified beneficiaries in lieu land redistribution. Hacienda Luisita, which Aquinos family owns,
reorganized itself into a corporation upon the CARPs promulgation, and opted to give its tenant farmers
shares of stock as the law provided.
5
Ramos, a protestant, is a member of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines.

second cousins. He was head of the now defunct Philippine Constabulary when martial
law was declared in 1972. Thereafter, he served as vice chief of staff, a post he was to
hold until the collapse of Marcos regime in 1986.
Ramos early years in Malacanang had been a period of political stability and
economic growth. As a former military officer he had the support of the highly politicized
military. He was also able to forge peace agreements with Moro separatists and
communist insurgents. The deregulation of major industries and the privatization on
public non-performing assets became a centerpiece platform. Economic indicators were
performing well and for the first time the country showed promise of becoming Asias
next economic tiger. It can be said that the economic gains during the Ramos
administration somehow cushioned the effects of the 1997 financial crisis which struck
the region.
Economic achievements notwithstanding, Ramos also figured in a number of
controversies that were to hound him years after his administration. His closest rival, Sen.
Miriam Defensor Santiago, accused him of massive electoral fraud and cheating her of
the true voice of the electorate.6 Some groups also thought that his penchant for
liberalizing the economy, deregulating the industries, opening the country to free trade as
an economic management approach were actually compromising the economy. His
administration was criticized in its handling of the case of Flor Contemplacion, the
Filipina house worker who was convicted of killing a co-worker in Singapore.7 Midway
during his term, he was accused of orchestrating a grand scam involving the sale of 158
hectares of reclaimed land on Manila Bay in favor of real estate developer Amari below
the market price.8 As he was nearing the end of his term, he was accused of massive
corruption and misuse of funds over the Clark Centennial Exposition project, which was
intended as a centerpiece of the 100th anniversary of Philippine independence. The Clark
Centennial Expo was supposedly Ramos pet project but there were reports that not only
were the construction projects for the expo extravagantly inefficient but served as a
convenient vehicle for election fund raising for the presidents ruling party.9
There were numerous legislative achievements attached to the Ramos presidency.
During his first state of the nation address in July 27, 1992, Ramos called to Congress to
enact a law to aid the country resolve the power crisis in the wake of eight-hour
brownouts and the decommissioning of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. Congress
responded by enacting the Electric Power Crisis Act of 1993 (RA 7648) and giving the
president emergency powers to negotiate Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts
thought and fast-track governments approval process based on take-or-pay system.
Ramos also saw through the passage of the amended Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law
of 1994 (RA 7718), expanding the scope of private sector participation in government
projects and providing for direct negotiation of contracts and investment incentives in
certain cases. Ramos also instituted the Legislative-Executive Development Advisory
6

Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, February 13, 1996.

Ramos was on a foreign trip when the Filipina maid was meted the death sentence. His last minute
attempt to negotiate with Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong proved futile. The unfortunate outcome caused
the resignation of Foreign Affiars Secretary Roberto Romulo and Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor.
8
The deal between the Philippine Estates Authority (PEA) and Amari, dubbed by former Sen. Ernesto
Maceda as the grandmother of all scams in a Nov. 29 1996 privilege speech, was later voided by the
Supreme Court in 2003 (Chavez v. PEA and Amari, GR 133250, May 6, 2003)
9
See for instance, Chay Florentino-Hofilena and Ian Sayson, 1999, Centennial Expo: Convenient Cover
for Election Fundraising, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, June 14-16.
7

Council (LEDAC) as a forum for consultation and exchange between the executive and
Congress on important bills such as those that relate to economic policy reform.10 Ramos
signed the New Central Bank Act into law on June 14, 1993 providing for an independent
monetary authority (the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) that enjoys fiscal and administrative
autonomy. A year before the end of his term, he signed the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act into law on October 29, 1997 recognizing and protecting the right to ancestral
domains by indigenous cultural communities.
Joseph E. Estrada (11th Congress)
Joseph E. Estrada enjoyed a wide margin of vote when he was elected in 1998. An
accomplished actor, Estrada starred in more than 100 films spanning almost 33 years of a
stunning career in the silver screen. He typically portrayed the role of a poor antihero or a
modern-day Robin Hood who is forced to take the cudgel in behalf of the weak and the
powerless.
Estrada, however, is not just another actor. He served as mayor of San Juan,
Metro Manila for 17 years, before embarking on a political career at the Senate. His
movie star glitter may have catapulted him into office but as mayor Estrada was known
for unparalleled infrastructure development. He also ran for the Senate and served for one
term, then as Vice President during Ramos presidency. As senator, he was among the 12
who voted for the termination of the RP-US Military Bases lease agreement, which
eventually brought the withdrawal of American forces from Philippine soil.
Estrada assumed the presidency in the wake of the Asian financial crisis but had a
solid economic team that included former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and
Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno. Power was handed down smoothly from Ramos to
Estrada even though Estrada campaigned against Ramos move to revise the 1987
Constitution. In fact, Estradas economic team adopted the revised macroeconomic
targets set by Ramos near the end of his administration.11
Estrada was best known for launching an all-out war against Moro Islamic
Liberation Front secessionists and managed to capture the camps of the Muslim
separatists. Whether this could have brought the elusive peace in this war-torn region
south of the Philippines is debatable, as Estradas efforts were cut short by a series of
controversies.
Barely halfway through his term, Ilocos Sur governor Chavit Singson who was a
close friend of Estrada, alleged that he had given the president P400 million as payoff
from an illegal grassroots numbers game known as jueteng. Singsons expos prompted
the filing of an impeachment complaint by the House and a full blown trial by the Senate.
In the course of the trial, 11 senators voted not to open an envelope allegedly containing
evidence incriminating the president but were never alleged in the impeachment
complaint. The final vote barred the impeachment court from opening the envelope,
causing some members of the prosecution to walk out, and a multitude of anti-Estrada
10

The Legislative Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC) was enacted hrough RA 7640 on
December 9, 1992. LEDAC serves as a consultative and advisory body to the president as the head of the
national economic and planning agency, mandated to advice the chief executive on certain programs and
policies essential to the realization of the goals of the national economy.
11
For instance, see Doris Dumlao, 1998, Estrada team adopts FVR economic targets, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, July 20, B4.

demonstrators to gather in front of the EDSA shrine in a show of protest dubbed as EDSA
II. Seeing the political turmoil, Estradas chief of staff Gen. Angelo Reyes withdraw his
support in favor of then Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo who is slated to succeed
under the constitution in the event of the presidents incompetency or disability. The
Supreme Court declared the office of the president vacant the following day after Estrada
and his family left Malacanang palace. Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was
immediately sworn into office.
Estrada was eventually tried and convicted for plunder, but was later pardoned by
Pres. Gloria Arroyo.
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, PhD (12th, 13th , and 14th Congress)
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is the youngest daughter of erstwhile president
Diosdado Macapagal in his first marriage. Although hailing from a political family
Arroyo, who holds a PhD in economics from the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
spent the early part of her career in the academe. She taught economics at the Ateneo de
Manila University, where current President Benigno Aquino III was said to have been one
of her students, until her appointment as assistant secretary of trade and industry during
the Aquino administration.
Arroyo entered politics in 1992 running as senator, and then got reelected in 1995
topping the election. Arroyo again won by landslide when she ran for vice president in
1998. Arroyo resigned from the cabinet in late October at the time when Estradas
popularity was tainted with corruption scandals. She was eventually sworn into office
when Estrada vacated the presidency in January 2001.
Arroyo ran in the presidential election of 2004 despite announcing previously that
she would no longer seek the presidency after her term as Estradas successor. And
though she won by a margin of over a million votes against her closest rival actor
Fernando Poe Jr, the allegations of election rigging were thrown against her. In 2005 a
former deputy director of the National Bureau of Investigation revealed hearing
wiretapped conversations between Arroyo and a high ranking official of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC).12 The recordings suggest some manipulation was done to
secure Arroyos electoral victory and triggered massive protests from interest groups and
former Estrada allies. The controversy also became the basis of an impeachment
complaint filed against her in 2005.13
As an economist, Arroyo put the economy at the center of her legislative agenda.
In fact, during her term the Philippines was among the few countries that managed to
minimize the impact if the 2008 global financial crisis. Arroyo was also the most
productive in terms of the quality and quantity of programs translated into legislative
output.

12

COMELEC commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. The fiasco would later be dubbed the Hello Garci
controversy.
13
Three impeachment complaints have been filed against Arroyo since 2005 none of which actually
materialized. Under the Constitution, the power to initiate an impeachment complaint lies with the House
of Representatives but a complaint cannot be filed more than once against the same official. An
impeachment complaint requires at least one-third of the vote of all members of the House. Hence, it is
absolutely possible to exhaust the one complaint per year limit simply by filing a weak, flawed, or
unconstitutional complaint that can be dismissed for lack of merit.

Things to consider when studying legislative balance of power

a. time (passage)
b. legislative success
c. substance of legislation
Research questions that are related to my study
1. What determines the greater likelihood of having his initiatives converted into
law? In Siavelis study, although urgency powers may be significant in
constitutional terms, they had less of an effect in certain administrations (e.g.
Aylwin) than one might expect.
NOTE:
a. test to compare the significance of urgency powers
- passage rate of urgent measures
- in my case, length of time of passing urgent measures.
b. When the date comparing legislative success and speed of consideration
for executive and legislative initiatives are considered separately, it
appears that urgency helps the president secure passage. However, when
only executive initiatives are considered it appears that urgency powers
have little global effect, until they are disaggregated by type (Siavelis
2004).
c. The underrated role of the Judicial Legislative division (in the case of the
Philippines, LEDAC), which is commonly referred to as the kitchen of
the legislative process and the clearinghouse of official requests sent by
legislators. In the case of the Philippines, the LEDAC does more.
d. Again, in the case of the Philippines, urgency measures are not purely
executive initiatives as legislators can also ask the president to certify
specific measures as urgent.
e. Focus: coalition, pro-government support, lacking: discussion on the role
of sponsors and their personal and political circumstances
Case of Mexico
Casar (2004): there is a gap between formal and informal powers of the president, not
necessarily because of executive usurpation of powers but from party and electoral
systems and incentives institutions have created.
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Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Shugart. 1997. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin
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