Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34428 December 29, 1930
BALTAZAR MORALES, petitioner,
vs.
ISIDRO PAREDES, Judge of First Instance of Pangasinan, ET AL., respondents.
Nicolas Belmonte for petitioner.
The respondent Judge in his own behalf.
Turner, Rheberg & Sanchez for respondents P. Gavino, R. Gavino and Prudencio Gavino.

OSTRAND, J.
Pedro, Rosendo, and Prudencio Gavino applied for the registration of a parcel of land situated in the poblacion of
the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, and on June 23, 1930, the application was granted and a decision to
that effect rendered. Baltazar Morales now claims to be the owner of the land, but he was not advised to the
registration proceedings and was not informed thereof until the early part of the month of September, 1930. He
thereupon filed a motion on September 18 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the reconsideration of the
decision of June 23 and as far as the record shows the motion may still be pending. Without dismissal of the motion
mentioned, the movant brought the present action praying that the aforesaid decision be set aside and that a new
trial be granted in accordance with section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiff has unfortunately mistaken his remedy. Assuming without deciding that he allegations of fraud in his
complaint are true, the proper remedy is to petition for a review under section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The
plaintiff's contention that such review cannot be had until the final decree has been issued is not in accordance with
the view adopted by this court. In the case of Rivera vs. Moran (48 Phil., 836), the court said:
It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act
provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year
after entry of the decree." Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the
petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further reflection, it is
obvious that such could not have been the intention of the Legislature and that what it meant would have
been better expressed by stating that such petitions must be presented before the expiration of one year
from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible
reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of
fraud. We therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time after the
rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of
registration.
lawphi1>net

In the case of Plurad vs. Alcaide, G. R. No. 27545, 1 their is an indication that there can no be no review until the
final decree has been issued. This indication is only obiter dictum and was not voted upon by the court; the
determination of the case rested on other grounds and the dictum was not taken into consideration by the court as a
whole. A dictum not necessarily involved in the case, lacks the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be
regarded as such.
The plaintiff's view of the extent of actions under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is erroneous. This court
had no jurisdiction to reopen judgments under that section if other adequate remedies are available, and such
remedies are not lacking in the present case.
The case is therefore dismissed with the costs against the plaintiff. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Promulgated December 24, 1927, not reported

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121075. July 24, 1997]
DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROBERTO M. LAGMAN, and STATE
INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.,respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 dated 5 January 1995 [2] and 14 July 1995.[3] The former denied the Omnibus Motion filed by
petitioner Delta Motors Corporation (hereinafter DELTA), while the latter amended the earlier Resolution.
The pleadings and annexes in the record of CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 disclose the following material operative facts:
Private respondent State Investment House, Inc. (hereinafter, SIHI) brought an action for a sum of money against DELTA in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch VI. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 84-23019. DELTA was declared in default, and
on 5 December 1984, the RTC, per Judge Ernesto Tengco, rendered a decision [4] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay unto plaintiff the
amount of P20,061,898.97 as its total outstanding obligation and to pay 25% of the total obligation as and for attorney's fees, plus
cost of suit.
The decision could not be served on DELTA, either personally or by registered mail, due to its earlier dissolution. However, Delta
had been taken over by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the meantime. This notwithstanding, SIHI moved, on 4 November 1986,
for service of the decision by way of publication, which the trial court allowed in its order of 6 December 1986. The decision was
published in the Thunderer, a weekly newspaper published in Manila. After publication, SIHI moved for execution of the judgment,
which the trial court granted in its order of 11 March 1987 on the ground that no appeal had been taken by DELTA despite publication
of the decision. The writ of execution was issued and pursuant thereto certain properties of DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod City were
levied upon and sold. The sheriff likewise levied on some other properties of DELTA.
DELTA then commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
23068, wherein DELTA insisted that: (a) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (DELTA) since
there was no valid/proper service of summons, thus rendering the decision null and void; and (b) the void decision never became final
and executory.
In its decision of 22 January 1991 [5] the Court of Appeals ruled against DELTA on the first ground, but found that the record
before it "is bereft of any showing that a copy of the assailed judgment had been properly served on P.N.B. which assumed DELTA's
operation upon the latter's dissolution." Accordingly the Court of Appeals ruled that:
[T]he [decision] did not become executory (Vda. de Espiritu v. CFI, L-30486, Oct. 31, 1972; Tuazon v. Molina, L-55697, Feb.
26, 1981).
It further opined that service by publication did not cure the fatal defect and thus decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, while the assailed decision was validly rendered by the respondent court, nonetheless it has not attained
finality pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner DELTA, which may appeal therefore within the reglementary period. [6]
In a motion for reconsideration, DELTA insisted that there was no valid service of summons and the decision of the RTC was not
in accordance with the Rules, hence, void. [7] SIHI also filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that DELTA was not dissolved, and
even if it were, its corporate personality to receive service of processes subsisted; moreover, its right to appeal had been lost. [8] These
motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 27 May 1991. [9] Unsatisfied, DELTA filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari (G.R. No. 100366) which was denied in the resolution of 16 September 1991 for non-compliance with Circular No.
1-88. A motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution of 9 October 1991, a copy of which was received by DELTA on 31
October 1991.[10]
On 12 November 1991, DELTA filed a Notice of Appeal [11] with the RTC in Civil Case No. 84-23019, indicating therein that it was
appealing from the 5 December 1984 decision, and prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that this Notice of Appeal be noted and the records of
this case be elevated to the Court of Appeals.
SIHI filed on 2 December 1991 a motion to dismiss DELTA's appeal [12] on the ground that it was filed out of time, since DELTA
obtained a certified true copy of the decision from the RTC on 21 September 1990, hence it had only fifteen days therefrom within
which to appeal from the decision. Despite DELTA's opposition, [13] the trial court dismissed the Notice of Appeal. [14] DELTA moved to
reconsider,[15] which SIHI opposed.[16] In its order[17] of 14 September 1992 the trial court denied Deltas motion.
DELTA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP NO. 29147. [18] In its petition, Delta prayed for the: (a) annulment of the order of the trial court dated 3 June 1992
dismissing the Notice of Appeal dated 6 November 1991; (b) annulment of the order of the trial court dated 14 September 1992
denying the motion for reconsideration of the former; and (c) elevation of the original records of Civil Case No. 84-23019 to the Court
of Appeals.
On 30 October 1992 the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 a restraining order enjoining respondents and any and
all other persons acting on their behalf "from enforcing or directing the enforcement of the Decision, subject of the
petition."[19] Thereafter, in its resolution promulgated on 22 December 1992, [20] the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition in
said case, considered the comments of private respondents therein as its answer and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
On 17 June 1993 the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision [21] in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, the dispositive portion providing:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the respondent court dated June 3, 1992, dismissing the notice of appeal dated November 6,
1991; and the order dated September 14, 1992 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner,
through counsel, are hereby SET ASIDE; and respondent court hereby ordered to ELEVATE the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals, on appeal.
On 18 January 1993, the RTC elevated the record of Civil Case No. 84-23019 to the Court of Appeals.
SIHI appealed to this Court from the decision by way of a petition for review. [22] It contended that DELTA had lost the right to
appeal in view of the lapse of more than 15 days from DELTAs receipt of a certified true copy of the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 8423019. This petition for review was docketed as G.R. No. 110677. [23]
While SIHI's petition in G.R. No. 110677 was pending before this Court, DELTA filed on 14 February 1994, in CA G.R. SP No. 29147
of the Court of Appeals, an Omnibus Motion[24] to:
1) DECLARE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT ANY FORCE AND EFFECT THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT COURT
DATED MARCH 11, 1987 ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION;
2) DECLARE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT ANY FORCE AND EFFECT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED
PURSUANT TO THE ORDER DATED MARCH 11, 1987;
3) ALL OTHER PROCEEDINGS HELD, CONDUCTED AND EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT SHERIFF IMPLEMENTING THE
AFORESAID WRIT OF EXECUTION.
SIHI opposed the motion [25] on grounds that: a) there was a pending appeal by certiorari with this Court, thus the Court of
Appeals was without jurisdiction to entertain the Omnibus Motion; b) the Omnibus Motion was barred by res judicata; and c) the filing
of the Omnibus Motion was a clear act of forum-shopping and should then be denied outright.

In its resolution of 7 June 1994, the Court of Appeals merely noted the Omnibus Motion and stated:
It appearing that there is a pending petition for review with the Supreme Court of this Court's Decision dated June 17, 1993,
it would be improper for this Court to act on the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner Delta Motor Corporation x x x. [26]
On 18 July 1994 this Courts Second Division issued a resolution [27] in G.R. No. 110677 denying the petition therein for failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in the questioned judgment. SIHI's motion for reconsideration
was denied in the resolution of this Court of 21 September 1994. [28]
On 26 October 1994 DELTA filed a manifestation and motion [29] to resolve its Omnibus Motion of February 10, 1994.
In its resolution of 5 January 1995,[30] the Court of Appeals denied DELTA's Omnibus Motion, holding:
[T]he matters prayed for in the Omnibus Motion of petitioner Delta Motor Corporation dated February 10, 1994 and
abovequoted are matters which were not raised as issues by petitioner in the instant petition and, therefore, not within the
jurisdiction and power of this Court in the instant petition to decide. [31]
On 27 January 1995 DELTA filed a motion for reconsideration and/or clarification [32] wherein it alleged that: (a) while it was true
that the matters prayed for in the Omnibus Motion of petitioner were not raised in the instant petition, they were, nevertheless,
included in the general prayer in the petition for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises; (b) it could not
file the Omnibus Motion with the RTC since the records of Civil Case No. 84-23019 had already been elevated to the Court of Appeals
and upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case; and (c) the matters raised in the Omnibus Motion
were incidental to and included in the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, on 2 February 1995, SIHI filed a motion for clarification [33] wherein it asked for the deletion, for being
mere obiter dictum, the following paragraph in the Resolution of 5 January 1995, to wit:
While it is true that as a necessary consequence the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 22, 1991 ruling that the
decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 "has not attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner Delta, which
may appeal therefrom within the reglementary period", all proceedings and/or orders arising from the trial court's decision
in Civil Case No. 84-23019 are null and void x x x .
SIHI argued that this paragraph was not necessary to the decision of the case before it [34] and cannot be considered binding for
the purpose of establishing precedent; [35] likewise, the Resolution itself did not decide the incident on its merits or consider and
dispose of the issues, nor determine the respective rights of the parties concerned.
In its resolution of 14 July 1995,[36] the Court of Appeals granted SIHI's motion for clarification and denied DELTA's motion for
reconsideration. As to the latter, it ruled that:
[P]etitioner DELTA is not without remedy, especially considering the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the first petition for
certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 23068) which ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, while the assailed decision was validly rendered by the respondent court, nonetheless it has not
attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner DELTA, which may appeal therefrom within the
reglementary period."
Clearly, the only issue in this petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 29147) is as to the validity of the questioned orders of respondent
court dated June 3, 1992 (dismissing the notice of appeal dated November 6, 1991) and the Order dated September 14,
1992 of the same court (denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner through counsel). [37]
It then decreed to amend its Resolution of 5 January 1995 by deleting the assailed paragraph.
DELTA then filed the instant petition, insisting that the matters raised in the Omnibus Motion were incidental to and included in
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; hence, it had jurisdiction to rule on said motion. As regards the grant of SIHI's
motion to strike out a paragraph in the resolution of 5 January 1995 for being obiter dictum, DELTA submitted that the latter contained
a finding or affirmation of fact, thus could not have constituted obiter dictum.
After SIHI filed its comment, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. DELTA and SIHI did so on 16 April 1996 and on 13 May 1996, respectively.
After a painstaking review of the record in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, we are more than convinced that respondent Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in denying DELTAs Omnibus Motion. The decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 June 1993 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 29147 had long become final insofar as DELTA was concerned, and it very well knew that the only issues raised therein concerned
the trial courts orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. As a matter of fact, at the time Delta filed the petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 29147, the orders sought to be declared null and void in the Omnibus Motion had already been issued, they having been so
issued at the commencement of CA-G.R. SP No. 23068. In short, if DELTA intended such orders to be challenged in CA-G.R. SP No.
29147, it could have explicitly alleged them as sources of additional causes of action and prayed for the corresponding affirmative
relief therefrom, and if this course of action initially proved unavailing then DELTA could and should have moved for reconsideration
on that aspect. After the finality of the decision in said case, any attempt to introduce or revive the issue had become procedurally
impermissible. Plainly, the issues raised in the Omnibus Motion could have been allowed during the pendency of said case by way of
amendments to the petition.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner's Omnibus Motion in keeping with jurisprudence [38] concerning Section
7 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court on the Procedure in the Court of Appeals, which mandates that:
Sec. 7. Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option, may
notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors.
Clearly then, the Court of Appeals could only consider errors raised by petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, which were limited to
the trial court's orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. These were the only errors Delta argued extensively in its brief. To
allow DELTA's Omnibus Motion which it filed more than eight months from promulgation of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, or
long after finality of said case, would result in abandonment of sound judicial process.
In light of the dispositive portions of the Court of Appeals decisions of 22 January 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23068, and of 17 June
1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, we cannot agree with SIHI that DELTA is barred by res judicata. This conclusion is further fortified by
the unequivocal statements of the Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 14 July 1995 that:
[P]etitioner DELTA is not without remedy, especially considering the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the first petition
for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 23068) ...
xxx
Clearly, the only issue in this petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 29147) is as to the validity of the questioned orders of respondent
court dated June 3, 1992 (dismissing the notice of appeal dated November 6, 1991) and the Order dated September 14,
1992 of the same court (denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner through counsel).
The Court of Appeals likewise did not commit reversible error in deleting the phrase SIHI protested as obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the
decision of the case before it.[39] It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way,"
that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.[40]
The assailed phrase was indeed obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter not raised by petitioner expressly in its petition
assailing the dismissal of its notice of appeal. It was not a prerequisite in disposing of the aforementioned issue. The body of the
resolution did not contain any discussion on such matter nor mention any principle of law to support such statement.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the challenged resolutions of 5 January 1995 and 14 July 1995 in C.A. G.R.SP. NO. 29147 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman,) Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28126 November 28, 1975
VITA UY LEE and HENRY LEE, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALBERTA VICENCIO VDA. DE SIMEON, in her own behalf, as substituting heir of former
deceased co-plaintiff Emiliano Simeon, and as guardian ad litem of the other substituting heir, minor Emiliano V.
Simeon, respondents.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioners.
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap and Associates for private respondents.
ESGUERRA, J.:
On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to
compel spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee to resell to them a parcel of land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose, Antipolo,
Rizal. The land, a homestead with an area of about 2.7342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279
issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of defendants (now petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee (p. 3, Rollo).
Defendants (now petitioners) filed in due time their answer with affirmative defenses. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a
decision on January 6, 1964, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Ordering the defendants to execute the proper deed of reconveyance of the homestead land in question, free of
all liens and encumbrances, in favor of the plaintiffs, upon the payment by the latter to them of the repurchase
price of P16,000.00;
(2) Directing the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs the possession of said land;
(3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal upon presentation to him of the deed of reconveyance and payment of
his legal fees, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 issued to defendant Vita Uy Lee and to issue a new
one in lieu thereof in the name of the plaintiff Emiliano Simeon, married to plaintiff Alberta Vicencio; and
(4) For defendants to pay the costs of the action.
The counterclaim of the defendants are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 56-57, Record on Appeal)
Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion for new trial (pp. 60-96, Ibid) and later an urgent motion for reconsideration (pp. 114116, Ibid), which were both denied by the trial court in its orders of March 23, 1964 (pp. 113-114, Ibid) and June 25, 1964 (pp. 119124, Ibid).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal was affirmed in toto. (Annex A to Petition, pp. 2745, Rollo). A timely motion for reconsideration (Annex B to Petition, pp. 66-85, Ibid) was filed by defendants-appellants (now
petitioners) to no avail. (Annex C to Petition, p. 87, Ibid)
The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee.
The land in question, together with another parcel denominated as Lot No. 732 in the name of Ignacio Simeon, deceased father of
Emiliano Simeon, issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal by virtue of Free Patent No. 187771 which Ignacio had obtained from the
government way back in 1935. (p. 28, Ibid)
After the death of Ignacio Simeon and his wife, plaintiff (now substituted by his spouse, Alberta Vicencia Vda. de Simeon as private
respondent) Emiliano Simeon and his brother Deogracias Simeon, as the only surviving heirs, executed on March 27, 1947 a deed of
extrajudicial partition of the properties left by their parents (Exh. 2) whereby Lot No. 1 was adjudicated to Deogracias and Lot No. 2 to
Emiliano. Because the certificate of title covering the said lots could not be found, they were simply described as "Homestead No.
82945." (Ibid)
On January 30, 1957, following some negotiation, plaintiffs (now private respondents) agreed to sell the land in question to Vita Uy
Lee (Exh. 1). Upon request of Henry Lee, Vita's husband, plaintiffs (now private respondents) furnished him with a copy of the deed of
extrajudicial partition (Exh. 2) and a certification (Exh. 1) issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal that "there is no certificate of title
issued for Lots Nos. 1 and 2 located at Antipolo covered by Plan F-54569". Defendants (now petitioners) likewise verified the status of
the property from the Land Registration Commission and the Bureau of Lands (pp. 48-49, Ibid).
On February 14, 1957, plaintiffs (now private respondents) executed a deed of sale of Lot No. 2 in favor of defendants (now
Petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. The document prepared by defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer, Atty. Leonardo M. Guzman,
described the property as "Lot 2 of Plan F-954569," instead of a homestead as stated in the deed of extrajudicial partition (Exh. 2). (p.
29, Ibid)
The day following the sale, defendant (now petitioner) Vita Uy Lee filed her own application for free patent over Lot No. 2 with the
Bureau of Lands (Exh. G.), in which application she expressly acknowledged that said property is a public land previously occupied by
Ignacio Simeon and his heirs. The application was denied (p. 50, Ibid).
Defendants (now petitioners) then sought registration of the lot in question in their names under the provisions of Act No. 496. The
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, acting as a land court, favorably acted upon their application in a decision dated December
7, 1957 (Exh. 5). However, before the final decree and the corresponding certificate of title could be issued, it was discovered that the
land in which defendants (now petitioners) sought to register in their names, "has already been patented and is covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.)." Acting upon this information, the Court of First Instance of Rizal set aside on February 11, 1958, its
decision of December 7, 1957 (Exh. 7). (pp. 30-31, Ibid)
Meanwhile, on February 5, 1958, Emiliano and Deogracias Simeon filed a motion praying for the issuance of a substitute owner's
duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.) which was "irretrievably lost during the early period of the American
liberation ..." (Exh. 8). The motion was granted. (p. 31, Ibid)

On March 4, 1958, defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer prepared a document entitled "Declaration of Heirs and Extrajudicial Partition
With Partial Sale" (Exh. B), wherein the adjudication of Lots Nos. 1 and 2 to Deogracias Simeon and Emiliano Simeon, respectively,
and the sale by the latter of his share to Vita Uy Lee for a consideration of P16,000.00 were affirmed. On that day, Original Certificate
of Title No. 732 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57272 (Exh. 11) covering Lot No. 2 issued in the name of Emiliano
Simeon. Later that day, the new Transfer Certificate was cancelled and replaced by the present Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279
(Exh. 14) in the name of Vita Uy Lee, married to Henry Lee, "subject to the provisions of ... the Public Land
Act ... " (Exh. H). (Ibid)
What transpired next is the crux of this controversy as plaintiff (now substituted by surviving spouse Alberta Vicencio as private
respondent) Emiliano Simeon tried to repurchase the property sold to the spouses Lee. The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as
follows:
"On June 14, 1960, Emiliano Simeon, through plaintiffs' former counsel Atty. Valeriano Santos, sent a letter of demand (Exh. C) to Vita
Uy Lee, advising her that he desires to repurchase the parcel of land situated at Antipolo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 57279 in your name' and requesting that he be informed of her "conformity on the matter within five days from receipt hereof."
Notwithstanding receipt of this letter, defendants did not bother to make any reply thereto. Hence, on November 3, 1960, Atty. Santos
wrote another letter (Exh. J) reiterating the demand of Emiliano Simeon to repurchase the land. This letter was received by defendant
Vita Uy Lee on November 5, 1960 (Exh. J-1), but as in the case of the first letter, the defendants did not reply to the second letter.
Consequently, for the third time, on June 24, 1961, Atty. Santos wrote another letter (Exh. D) to Vita Uy Lee repeating the same
demand, with a warning that if nothing is heard from her within five days from receipt, the matter would be brought to court. Still the
defendants did not answer. However, despite this failure of the defendants, Atty. Santos did not take any court action and apparently
because of this indifference of their former counsel, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Narciso
Pea (p. 32, Ibid).
"On March 2, 1962, Atty. Pea addressed a letter (Exh. E) to Vita Uy Lee reiterating that Emiliano Simeon "is ready to repurchase from
you the land" in question. After receipt of this letter, Vita Uy Lee broke her silence and through her counsel Atty. Guzman, she wrote
Atty. Pea on March 12, 1962, that she cannot agree to the repurchase of the lot in question, because even assuming that your client
had the right to repurchase the land, the period of five (5) years within which to do so, had already expired". (Exh. 12) In view of this
flat refusal of the defendants to resell the lot in controversy to the plaintiffs, the latter filed this action in the court below." (p. 33, Ibid)
Plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought the redemption of Lot No. 2 from defendants (now petitioners) pursuant to Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act 141 which provides as follows:
Section 119. Every reconveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper,
shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date
of conveyance.
There is no dispute that the land under litigation was acquired under a free patent (p. 36, Ibid), and that its sale is subject to
redemption within five (5) years from the execution of the deed of sale (Galasiano, et al. vs. Austria and Cardenas, 97 Phil. 82;
Abogado vs. Aquino, et al., 53 O.G. 5187; Bayaua vs. Suguitan, et al., 53 O.G. 8832; Reyes vs. Manas, L-27755, Oct. 4, 1969, 29 SCRA
736; Lazo vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., L-27365, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 329) on February 14, 1957. (p. 29, Ibid)
Likewise, there is no question that private respondents instituted the action to compel petitioners to resell the land to them only on
June 25, 1965 when the redemption period had already elapsed. (p. 27, Ibid) The main issue to be resolved is whether the three
letters sent by respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the
five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of private respondents to repurchase the property.
Before passing, however, upon said issue, We find it logical, considering their nature, to first examine the other questions raised
herein.
Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not making "sufficient and complete findings of fact on all issues properly
raised as to fully conserve petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law." (p. 32, Brief for Petitioners)
Petitioners based this assignment of error on the requirement embodied in Section 4, Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court which
states:
Sec. 4. Findings of the court. Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all
issues properly raised before it."
More specifically, petitioners assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to include in its decision the complete text of the three letters
sent by respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the expiration of the
period within which redemption could be made (p. 35, Brief for Petitioners), petitioners intimating that such omission has impaired
their position on appeal as another question is raised by them on the basis of the "terminology of those three letters". (Ibid).
We find no merit in this contention.
At the outset, it should be stressed that provisions of the Rules of Court like the one invoked by petitioner are to be given liberal
construction. (Rule 1, Sec. 2, Rules of Court) As this Court had the occasion to rule, the findings of facts which as found by the court
and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon. (Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966, 18
SCRA 155, 157, citing Braga vs. Millora, 3 Phil. 458, 465) It is not necessary that the appellate court reproduce in their entirety the
exhibits presented by the parties during the trial. To require the Court to do so would be to clutter the pages of the decision with
wordy texts of documents when reference to the gist thereof would just as adequately, if not better, serve the purpose of the rule.
The respondent Court did not disregard the three letters in question. Neither did it dismiss their evidentiary value. Each letter was
properly referred to in the decision and its message clearly reflected thereon. Indeed, it is not alleged that respondent Court
misunderstood the communication.
Another point raised concerns questions of fact, relating particularly to the testimonies of Henry Lee, his witness Valeriano Santos and
respondent Alberta Simeon (pp. 39-45, Brief for Petitioners). Suffice it to state here that these matters cannot be inquired into a
review on certiorari. (Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court; De Vera vs. Fernandez, 88 Phil. 668; Velasco vs. Court of Appeals, 90 Phil. 688;
Tan vs. Court of Appeals, L-22793, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 54; Lucero vs. Loot, L-16995, October 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 687; Ramirez
Telephone Corporation vs. Bank of America, L-22614, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 191; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, L-27488, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 737; People vs. Perido, L-28248, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 97)
Going now to the main issue to be resolved, petitioner, assign as error the Court of Appeals' finding that the right of private
respondents to repurchase the land in question still subsists. It was respondent court's thinking that the first three letters sent by
private respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the five-year
period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of private respondents to redeem the property (pp. 58-59, rollo).
The first letter dated June 14, 1960 (Exh. C) advised petitioner Vita Uy Lee of Emiliano Simeon's "desire to repurchase" the land and
requested that the latter be informed of Lee's conformity on the matter within five days from receipt (t)hereof". (p. 32, Ibid) The
second letter sent on November 3, 1960 (Exh. J) reiterated Simeon's demand to repurchase the land (Ibid). The third letter dated June
24, 1961, expressed the same demand, this time with a warning that if nothing is heard from petitioner Vita Uy Lee within five days
from receipt, respondent Simeon would seek judicial intervention (Ibid). In no instance was it shown that private respondent offered
or tendered the repurchase price.
Petitioners maintain that the sending of letters advising of private respondents' desire to repurchase the property and demanding its
resale did not constitute a proper exercise of the right of legal redemption, absent an actual and simultaneous tender of payment (p.

17, Brief for Petitioners). Petitioners argue that it is not sufficient for the vendor to inform the vendee that the former intends to
redeem the property sold, but he must at the same time offer to repay the price. (p. 21, Ibid).
This view deserves consideration.
The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to exercise the right of redemption finds support in civil law.
Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in the absence of an applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the
guide, to wit: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the vendee the price of the sale ...".
Thus, in the case of Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152, it was held that "it is not sufficient for the vendor to intimate or to state to the
vendee that the former desires to redeem the thing sold, but he must immediately thereupon offer to repay the price ...". Likewise, in
several other cases decided by the Supreme Court (Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil. 394; Rosales vs. Reyes,
et al., 25 Phil. 495; Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840; De la Cruz, et al. vs. Resurreccion, et al., .98 Phil. 975; and other cases) where
the right to repurchase was held to have been properly exercised, there was a definite finding of tender of payment having been
made by the vendor.
Private respondent points out, however, that the statement in Angao cited above is an obiter dictum because in that case, the period
of redemption had prescribed thereby rendering immaterial the question of whether or not a tender of payment was made. This might
be so; nevertheless, a dictum which generally is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule (21 C.J.S. 309) may
be followed if sufficiently persuasive (Ibid, citing Karameros vs. Luther, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 508).
Accordingly, the Angao ruling was cited with approval in the case of Laserna vs. Javier and Cruz, 110 Phil. 172, where the appellant
failed to tender payment of the repurchase price within 30 days after the court below had decided by final judgment that the contract
sue upon was a pacto de retro and not a mortgage. (Article 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines gives a vendor a retro "the right
to repurchase within thirty days from the time final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the basis that the contract was a true
sale with right to repurchase". It was invoked in the subsequent case of Torrijos vs. Crisologo, L-17734, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 184. In
that case, Crisologo offered the return to Torrijos of P2,000.00, representing a part of the repurchase price of P19,313.95. Holding that
the vendor who desires to redeem the property should offer to repay the price, the Court went further and declared that the full
amount of the repurchase price should be tendered.
It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his desire to repurchase the property without an
accompanying tender of redemption price fell short of the requirements of law. Having failed to properly exercise his right of
redemption within the statutory five-year period, the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of an action to
compel redemption after the lapse of the period.
Private respondents also argue, on the assumption that tender of payment was ordinarily required, that the same was not necessary
in the instant case because petitioner Vita Uy Lee refused their demands for reconveyance.
It may indeed be recalled that before the period for redemption expired, respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano
Simeon sent petitioner Vita Uy Lee three letters one in June 1960, the other in November of the same year, and the third in June
1961 demanding the resale to him of the homestead. (p. 52, Rollo) Despite Lee's receipt of the letters, she did not send any reply.
It was only when Simeon wrote her a fourth letter, this time after the redemption period had elapsed, that petitioner Lee expressly
signified her refusal to resell the land in question on the ground that the 5-year period had already expired (pp. 52-53, Ibid).
The appellate court considered appellants' (now petitioners) failure to reply to Simeon's first letters as refusal on petitioners' part to
resell the property in question and held that such refusal rendered tender of payment unnecessary (pp. 61-63, Ibid).
This position is untenable.
Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignoring the letters sent her by respondent Emiliano Simeon because the mere mention therein
of respondent's intention to redeem the property, without making tender of payment, did not constitute a bona fide offer of
repurchase. The rule that tender of the repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has refused to permit the repurchase, as
enunciated in at least two cases (Gonzaga vs. Go, 69 Phil. 678 and Laserna vs. Javier, 110 Phil. 172), is premised on the ground that
under such circumstance the vendee will also refuse the tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence which we have shown
above to be justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a flat refusal, her silence did not close the door to respondent Simeon's
subsequent tender of payment, had he wished to do so, provided that the same was made within five-year period. Yet he neglected to
tender payment and, instead, merely filed an action to compel reconveyance after the expiration of the period.
WHEREFORE, finding private respondents' right of redemption to have lapsed, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one entered dismissing the complaint.
No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Aquino J, took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13954
August 12, 1959
GENARO GERONA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
K.V. Felon and Hayed C. Cavington for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Petitioners are Appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Masbate dismissing their complaint. Acting upon the "Urgent
Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" filed on behalf of petitioners of December 12, 1958, and without objection on the part of the
Solicitor General, by resolution of this Court of December 16, we issued the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction restraining
respondents from excluding or banning petitioners-appellants, their children and all other of Jehovah's Witnesses for whom this action
has been brought, from admission to public schools, particularly the Buenavista Community School, solely on account of their refusal
to salute the flag or preventing their return to school should they have already been banned, until further orders from this Court.
The facts involved are not disputed. On June 11, 1955, Republic Act No. 1265 was approved and went into effect. Acting upon section
2 of said Act authorizing and directing the Secretary of Education to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper
conduct of the flag ceremony, said Secretary issued Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 on July 21, 1955 which Department Order
quoting Republic Act No. 1265 in its entirety, we reproduce below for purpose of reference:
"Republic of the Philippines
Department of Education
Office of the Secretary
Manila
Department Order
No. 8, s. 1955
July 21, 1955

COMPULSORY DAILY FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS

To the Director of Public Schools and the Director of Private Schools:
1. Quoted below is Republic Act No. 1265 entitled "An Act making Flag Ceremony Compulsory in all Educational Institutions,"
which is self-explanatory.
SECTION 1. All educational institutions henceforth observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified
and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem.
SECTION 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued rules and
regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provided.
SECTION 3. Failure of refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in accordance with rules and
regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational
institution concerned and its head to public censure as an administrative punishment which shall be published at
least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after
proper notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational institution
responsible for such failure.
SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 11, 1955.
2. As provided in Section 2 of the Act, the rules and regulations governing the proper conduct of the required flag ceremony,
given in the in closure to this Order, are hereby promulgated. These rules and regulations should be made known to all
teachers and school officials, public and private. The patriotic objective or significance of the Act should be explained to all
pupils and students in the schools and to all communities through the purok organizations and community assemblies.
(Sgd.) G. HERNANDEZ, JR.
Secretary of Education
Incl.:
As stated
(Inclosure of Department order No. 8, s. 1955)
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public and private, every school day throughout the
year. It shall be raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flag staff must be straight, slightly and gently tapering at the
end, and of such height as would give the Flag a commanding position in front of the building or within the compound.
2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony every morning except when it is raining,
in which event the ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of
the same day.
The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be conducted in the following manner:
a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school and its premises shall assemble in formation
facing the flag. At command, books shall be put away or held in the left hand and everybody shall come to attention. Those
with hats shall uncover. No one shall enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony.
b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the school band or without the accompaniment if
it has none; or the anthem may be played by the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be raised
briskly. While the flag is being raised, all persons present shall stand at attention and execute a salute. Boys and men with
hats shall salute by placing that hat over the heart. Those without hats may stand with their arms and hands downed and
straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed by their regulations. The salute
shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon last note of the anthem.
c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison of following patriotic pledge (English
or vernacular version 0, which may bring the ceremony to a close. This is required of all public schools and of private schools
which are intended for Filipino students or whose population is predominantly Filipino.
ENGLISH VERSION
I Love the Philippines.
It is the land of my birth,
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
3. The retreat shall be observed as follows:
a. Teachers and pupils or faculty members and students whose classes and after the last school period in the afternoon
before sun down shall assemble facing the flag. At command, the Philippine National Anthem shall be sung with
accompaniment of the school band. If the school has no band, the assembly will only sing the Anthem. Boys who have been
taking part in preparatory military training or Boy Scout activities shall attend the retreat in formation and execute the salute
prescribed for them. Others shall execute the same salute and observe the same deportment as required of them in the flagraising ceremony. The flag should be lowered slowly so that it will be in the hands of the color detail at the sound of the last
note of the Anthem.
b. If the school so prefers, it may have its bugle corp play "To the Colors", instead of the singing of the National Anthem, for
the retreat. At the sound of the first note, the assembly shall stand at attention facing the flag and observe the same
deportment as required in the flag-raising ceremony. Or, it may have its bugle corp play "To the Colors" and at the sound of
the first note everybody within hearing distance shall stand at attention, face the flag, and observe the same deportment as
required in the flag-raising ceremony.
4. The flag should be handled reverently in raising or lowering it and not allowed to touch the ground. This can be insured by
having one pupil hold the flag while another pupil fastening it to or unfasten it from the halyard.
5. To display the National Flag at half-mast when necessary, it must be hoisted to full-mast, allowing it to fly there for a
moment, and then brought down to half-mast. To lower the flag, it must again be hoisted to full-mast before bringing it
down."
In his turn the Director of Public Schools issued Circular No. 22, series of 1955, on July 30, 1955 addressed to Division
Superintendents of Schools, enclosing a copy of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 and enjoining strict compliance therewith.
It would appear that pursuant to the Department Order in question, the flag ceremony contemplated therein was held daily in every
school, public and private. Petitioners' children attending the Buenavista Community School, Uson, Masbate, refused to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement of Department Order No. 8; as a result they

were expelled from school sometime in September, 1955. It is said that other children similarly situated who refused or failed to
comply with the requirement about saluting the flag are under threats of being also expelled from all public schools in the Philippines.
Petitioners thru counsel wrote to the Secretary of Education petitioning that in the implementation of this flag ceremony, they and
their children attending school be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the
sides and that they be exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic
pledge, giving their reason for the same. On December 16, 1955 the Secretary of Education wrote to counsel for petitioner denying
the petition, making it clear that the denial was the final and absolute stand of the Department of Education on the matter and that
counsel may thereafter feel free to seek a judicial determination of the constitutionality or interpretation of Republic Act No. 1265 as
construed and applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. The letter also informed petitioners' counsel that with reference to his letter of
December 1, 1955 relative to the request for reinstatement of petitioners' children who had been expelled from school for noncompliance with Department Order No. 8, no favorable action could be taken thereon. So, on March 27, 1957 petitioners commenced
the present action asking that a writ of preliminary injunction issue to restrain the Secretary of Education and the Director of Public
Schools from enforcing Department Order No. 8 "as applied to petitioners and all others of Jehovah's Witnesses for whom this action
is brought and to restrain them from excluding from the public schools the children of the petitioners on account of their refusal to
execute a formal salute to the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, and that after hearing, the trial court
declare Department Order No. 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights and that the preliminary injunction prayed for be made
permanent.
Petitioners-appellants belong to what is called the JEHOVAH'S WITNESS, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed
by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by the State. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20,
verses 4 and 5, which say: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or
that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them." They
consider that the flag is an "image within this command. For this reason they refuse to salute it.
To further make clear the stand of petitioners as to the relative position and priority of religious teaching on the one hand and laws
promulgated by the State on the other, we quote from appellant's brief on page 50 thereof:
In Halter vs. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41, 27 S. Ct. 419, 51 L. Ed. 696 (1907), the United States Supreme Court held that the
flag `is an emblem of National sovereignty,
To many persons the saluting of a national flag means nothing. To a sincere person who believed in God and the Bible as his
Word, and who is in a covenant with Almighty God to do his will exclusively, it means much. To such person "sovereignty"
means the supreme authority or power. Many believe that "the higher powers," mentioned in the Bible at Romans 13:1,
means the "sovereign state"; but to the Christian this means Jehovah God and his son, Christ Jesus, Jehovah's anointed King.
They, Father and Son are the higher powers, to whom all must be subject and joyfully obey. (Emphasis supplied)
The question involved in this appeal is a highly important one. We are called upon to determine the right of a citizen as guaranteed
by the Constitution about freedom of religious belief and the right to practice it as against the power and authority of the State to
limit or restrain the same. Our task is lessened by the fact that petitioners do not challenge the legality or constitutionality of Republic
Act 1265. All that they question is the legality or constitutionality of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 of the Department of
Education implementing said Republic Act.
The realm of belief and creed is infinitive and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and though. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious
belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The
Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.
One may believe in polygamy because it is permitted by his religious, but the moment he translates said religious belief into an overt
act, such as engaging or practising plural marriages, he may be prosecuted for bigamy and he may not plead or involve his religious
belief as a defense or as matter of exemption from the operation of the law.
In the case of Reynolds vs. U.S. (98 U.S. 145) the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law prohibiting and punishing polygamy
even as against the claim of religious belief of the Mormons. Said the Court:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural
marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstance. (emphasis supplied)
Again, one may not believe in the payment of taxes because he may claim that according to his religious belief, the payment of taxes
means service to one other than God. As long as he confines himself to mere belief, well and good. But when he puts said belief into
practice and he actually refuses to pay taxes on his property or on his business, then the States steps in, compels payment, and
enforces it either by court action or levy and distraint.
One of the important questions to determine here is the true meaning and significance of the Filipino flag. Petitioners believe and
maintain that it is an image and therefore to salute the same is to go against their religious belief. "Thou shalt not make unto thee
any graven . . . thou shalt not bow down thyself to them or serve them." They also claim that the flag salute is a religious ceremony,
participation in which is forbidden by their religious belief. We disagree. Appellants themselves (page 51 of their brief) concede that
the flag is a symbol of the State. They give the meaning of the word "image" on page 51 of their brief as follows:
Under the word "image" this comment is given by Webster: "Image, in modern usage, commonly suggestsreligious
veneration." (Emphasis supplied)
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and
cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of
church and state in our system of governments, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently
does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute, particularly the recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious
ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar. In said oath, taken while
his right hand is raised, he swears allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, promise to defend the Constitution and even invokes
the help of God; and it is to be doubted whether a member of Jehovah's Witness who is a candidate for admission to the Philippine
Bar would object to taking the oath on the ground that is religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a
a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for
there might be as many interpretations and meaning to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects
or followers, all depending upon the meaning which they, though in all sincerity and good faith, may want to give to such ritual or
ceremony.
We understand that petitioners, during the flag ceremony, are willing to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and
hands down straight at the sides, and they agree that boys, members of Jehovah's Witness who have been taking part in military
training or Boy Scout activities, and are in uniform, may execute the salute to the flag prescribed by the Circular for them. So, the
requirement contained in Department Order No. 8 that during the flag ceremony those without hats may stand with their arms and
hands down and straight at the sides, including the formal salute by boys in military and boy Scout uniform, meets with the

conformity of petitioners. Of course, there is the other requirement that boys and men with hats shall salute the flag by placing their
hats over the heart, but petitioners and other members of the Jehovah's Witness could well solve this requirements or avoid it by
putting away their hats just as pupils books, may put them away, at command (Rules and Regulations, Sec. 2, par. [a]). Consequently,
the opposition of petitioners to the flag salute may be reduced to their objection to singing the National Anthem and reciting the
patriotic pledge.
After a careful and conscientious examination of the patriotic pledge as reproduced at the beginning of this decision, frankly we find
nothing, absolutely nothing, objectionable, even from the point of view of religious belief. The school child or student is simply made
to say that he loves the Philippines because it is the land of his birth and the home of his people; that because it protects him, in
return he will heed the counsel of his parents, obey the rules and regulations of his school, perform the duties of a patriotic and lawabiding citizen; and serve his country unselfishly and faithly, and that he would be a true Filipino in thought, in word, and in deed. He
is not even made to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic for which it stands. So that even if we assume for a moment that
the flag were an image, connoting religious and veneration instead of a mere symbol of the State and of national unity, the religious
scruples of appellants against bowing to and venerating an image are not interfered with or otherwise jeopardized.
And as to the singing of the National Anthem, which we reproduce below:
Land of the morning,
Child of the sun returning.
With fervor burning,
Thee do our souls adore.
Land dear and holy,
Cradle of noble heroes,
Ne'er shall invaders,
Trample thy sacred shores.
Ever within thy skies and thy clouds,
and o'er thy hills and sea,
Do we behold the radiance, feel the throb
of glorious liberty.
Thy banner, dear to all our hearts,
Its sun and stars alight.
Onever shall its shining field
Be dimmed by tyrant's might.
Beautiful land of love,
Olandoflight,
In thine embrace `tis rapture to lie.
But is glory ever, when thou art wronged,
For us, they sons to suffer and die.
the same thing may be said; that it speaks only of love of country, of patriotism, liberty and the glory of suffering and dying for it. It
does not even speak of resorting to force and engaging in military service or duty to defend the country, which service might meet
with objection on the part of conscientious objectors. Surely, petitioners do not disclaim or disavow these noble and sacred feelings of
patriotism, respect, even veneration for the flag and love of coutnry for which the flag stands.
Men may differ and do differ on religous beliefs and creeds, government policies, the wisdom and legality of laws, even the
correctness of judicial decisions and decrees; but in the field of love of country, reverence for the flag, national unity and patriotism,
they can hardly afford to differ, for these are matters in which they are mutually and viatlly interested, for to them, they mean
national existence and survival as a nation or national extinction.
In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey
school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat
of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being
maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it.
Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.
In the case of Hamilton vs. University of California, 293 U.S. 243, 79 L. ed. 343, quite similar to the present case, appellants therein
were taxpayers and citizens of the United States and of California. The University of California received endowment and support from
the State legislature under certain conditions such as that any resident of California of the age of 14 years or upward of approved
moral character shall have the right to enter the University as a student and receive instructions therein. The University as part of its
cirriculum and instruction required military science and tactics in the Reserve Officers Training Corps. Appellants conformed to all
requirements of the University except taking the course in military science and tactics and for this the regents of the University
suspended them. Appellants were members of the Methodist Espiscopal Church and of the Epworth League. For many years their
fathers have been ordained ministers of that church. They believed that war and preparation for war is a violation of their religious
belief. In other words, they were conscientious objectors to war. They believed that war, training for war, and military training were
immoral, wrong and contrary to the letter and spirit of the teaching of God and precepts of the Christian religion. They petitioned for
exemption from the military science and tactics course but the regents refused to make military training optional or to exempt them
and they were suspended. So they initiated court action with a California Supreme Court to compel the regents of the University to
admit them. In that action they assailed the validity of the State law providing for military training in the University. The petition was
denied by the State Supreme Court. In affirming the decision of the State Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that:
. . . California has not drafted or called them to attend the University. They are seeking education offered by the State and at
the same time insisting that they be excluded from the prescribed course solely upon grounds of their religious beliefs and
consicientious objections to war, preparation for war and military education. Taken on the basis of the facts alleged in the
petition, appellants' contentions amount to no more than an assertion that the due process clause of the Fourtheenth
Amendment as a safeguard of liberty' confers the right to be students in the state university free from obligation to take
military training as one of the conditions of attendance.
Viewed in the light of our decisions that proposition must at once be put aside as untenable . . .
In United States vs. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 75 L. ed. 1302, 51 S. Ct. 570, a later naturalization case, the applicant was
unwilling, because of conscientious objections, to take unqualifiedly the statutory oath of allegiance which contains this
statement: "That he will support and defend the constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same." U.S.C. title 8, Sec. 381. His petition stated that he was willing if
necessary to take up arms in defense of this country, "but I should want to be free to judge of the necessity." In amplification
he said: "I do not undertake to support "my country, right or wrong" in any dispute which may arise, and I am not willing to
poromise beforehand, and without knowing the cause for which my country may go to war, either that I will or that I will not
"take up arms in defense of this country," however "necessary" the war may seem to be to the government of the day." The
opinion of this court quotes from petitioner's brief a statement to the effect that it is a fixed principle of our Constitution,
zealously guarded by our laws, that a citizen cannot be forced and need not bear arms in a war if he has conscientious

religious scruples against doing so." And, referring to that part of the argument in behalf of the applicant this court said (p.
623): "This, if it means what it seems to say, is an astonishing statement. Of course, there is no such principle of the
Constitution, fixed or otherwise. The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedience to no
constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus
to relieve him . . . The previlege of the native-born conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not from the
Constitution but from the acts of Congress. That body may grant or withhold the exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and if
it be withheld, the native-born conscientious objector cannot successfully assert the privilege. No other conclusion is
compatible with the well-nigh limitless extent of the war power as above illustrated, which include by necessary implication,
the power, inthe last extremity, to compel armed serviced of any citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or his
views in respect of the justice or morality of the particular war or of war in general. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 29, 49 L. ed. 643, 651, 25 S. Ct. 358, 3 Ann. Cas, 765, this Court (upholding a state compulsory vaccination law)
speaking of the liberties guaranteed to the individual by the Fourteenth Amendment, said: "... and yet he may be compelled,
by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary intersts, or even his religious
or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country and risk the chance of being shot down in its
defense.
And see University of Maryland v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 A. 54, a case, similar to that now before us, decided against the
contention of a student in the University of Maryland who on conscientious grounds objected to military training there
required. His appeal to this Court was dismissed for the want of a substantial federal questions. 290 U.S. 597, 78 L. ed. 525,
54 S. Ct. 131.
Plainly there is no ground for the contention that the regents' order, requiring able-bodied male students under the age of
twenty-four as a condition of their enrollment to take the prescribed instruction in military science and tactics, transgresses
any constitutional right asserted by these appellants.
Mr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opinion said:
I assume for present purposes that religious liberty protected by the First Amendment against invasion by the nation is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the states.
Accepting that premise, I cannot find in the respondents' ordinance an obstruction by the state to "the free exercise" of
religion as the phrase was understood by the foundrs of hte nation, and by the generations that have followed. Davis vs.
Beasin, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 33 L. ed. 637, 10 s.Ct. 299.
There is no occasion at this time to mark the limits of governmental power in the exaction of military service when the
nation is at peace. The petitioners have not been required to bear arms for any hostile purpose, offensive or defensive,
either now or in the future. They have not even been required in any absolute or peremptory way to join courses of
instruction that will fit them to bear arms. If they elect to resort to an institution for higher education maintained with the
state's moneys, then they are comanded to follow courses of instruction believed by the state to be vital to its welfare. This
may be condemned by some unwise or illiberal or unfair when there is violence to conscientious scruples, either religious or
merely ethical. More must be shown to set the ordinance at naught. In controversies of this order courts do not concern
themselves with matters of legislative policy, unrelated to privileges or liberties secured by the organic law. The first
Amendment, if it be read into the Fourteenth, makes invalid any state law `respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' Instruction in military science is not instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion.
Neither directly nor indirectly is government establishing a state religion when it insists upon such training. Instruction in
military science, unaccompanied here by any pledge of military service, is not an interference by the state with the free
exercise of religion when the liberties of the constitution are read in the light of a century and a half of history during days of
peace and war . . .
Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have never yet been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if
his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether for attack or for
defense, or in furtherance of any other end, condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private
judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government. One who is a
martyr to a principlewhich may turn out in the end to be a delusion or an errordoes not prove by his martyrdom that he
has kept within the law."
We are not unmindful of the decision of the United States Federal Supreme Court on similar set of facts. In the case of Minersville
School District vs. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 84 L. ed. 1375, two Jehovah Witnesses children were expelled from the public school of
Minersville for refusing to salute the national flag in accordance with the regulations poromulgated by the school board for the daily
flag ceremony. Their father Gobitsi on behalf of his two children and in his own behalf brought suit to enjoin the school authorities
from continuing to exact the execution of the flag ceremony as a condition of his children's admittance in school. After trial, the
District Court gave him relief and this decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Federal Supreme Court,
the decrees of both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals were reversed with the lone dissent of Chief Justice Stone, on
the ground that the requirement of participation of all pupils in the public schools in the flag ceremony did not infringe the due
process law and liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly the one referring to religious freedom and belief. Three years
later, that is, on June 14, 1943, the ruling laid down in the Minersville School District vs. Gobitis case, was in the case of West Virginia
State Board of Education vs. Bernette, 319 U.S. 624-671 reversed by a sharply divided court, the majority opinion being penned by
Mr. Justice Jackson in which Justice Black, Douglas and Murphy concurred; while Mr. Justice Frankfurter who wrote the opinion in the
Gobitis case, filed a long dissenting opinion, and Justices Roberts and Reed adhered to the views expressed in the Gobitis case.
Neither attempting to justify the ruling laid down in the Minersville vs. Gobitis case nor desiring to criticize the doctrine of the West
Virginia vs. Barnette case, frankly, we are more inclined to favor the former as more in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and
the government policy as laid down in Republic Act No. 1265 entitles "An Act Making Flag Ceremony Compulsory In All Educational
Institutions".
We cannot help thinking that one reason that may have possibly influenced the decision in the West Virginia State Board of
Education vs. Barnette case, was that the children involved in said case and their parents found themselves in a serious dilemma for
refusing to salute the flag as required by the regulations of the School Board. They were expelled by the School Board and their
absence was considered unlawful and because of the law of compulsory school atendance of all children of school age, they were
considered as truants and the school officials threatened to send them to reformatories maintained for criminially inclinded juveniles.
Parents of such children have been prosecuted or were threatened with prosecution for cause such as alleged delinquency and if
convicted, were subject to fine not exceeding $50.00 and a jail term not exceeding 30 days. That is why in the majority opinion it was
stated:
. . . The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. The state asserts power to conditions access to public
education on making a prescribed sign and profession and at the same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent
and child . . .
Such a grave and embarrassing situation, however, does not obtain in the Philippines. True, we have a law (Republic Act 896)
requiring compulsory enrollment of children of shcool age, but said law contains so many exceptions and exemptions that it can be
said that a child of school age is very seldom compelled to attend school, let alone the fact that almost invariably, there is school
crisis every year wherein the pupils applying for admission in public schools could not be accommodated, and what is equally

important is that there is no punishment or penal sanction either for the pupil who fail to attend school or is expelled for failure to
comply with school regulations such as the compulsory flag salute ceremony, or his parents.
In the case of re Summers, 325 U.S. 561-578, decided on June 11, 1945, that is, two years after the decision in the case of West
Virginia, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court refusing admission of petitioner
Clyde Wilson Summers to the Illinois Bar. Summers had complied with tall the prerequisites to admission to the Bar of that state, but
he was a conscientious objector who did not believe in the use of force or war because of his religious belief. He described this
attitude of his as follows:
The so-called "misconduct" for which petitioner could be reproached for is his taking the New Testament too seriously.
Instead of merely reading or preaching the Sermon on the Mount, he tries to practice it. The only fault of the petitioner
consists in his attempt to act as a good Christian in accordance with his interpreation of the Bible, and according to the
dictates of his conscience. We respectfully submit that the profession of law does nt shut its gates to persons who have
qualified in all other respects even when they follow in the footsteps of that Great Teacher of mankind who delivered the
Sermon on the Mount. We respectfully submit that under our Constitutional guarantees even good Christians who have met
all the requirements for the admission to the bar may be admitted to practice law
The Constitution of Illinois required service in the militia in time of war of men of petitioner's age group. The Federal Supreme Court
defined the position of Summers as a conscientious objector in the following words:
. . . without detailing petitioner's testimony before the Committee or his subsequent statments in the record, his position
may be compendiously stated as one of non-violence. Petitioner will not serve in the armed forces. While he recognizes a
difference between the military and police forces, he would not act in the latter to coerce threatened violations. Petitioner
would not use force to meet aggression against himself or his family, no matter how aggravated or whether or not carrying a
danger of bodily harm to himself or others. He is a believer in passive resistance. We need to consider only his attitude
toward service in the armed forces.
It was not denied that Summers was unwilling to serve in the militia of Illinois because of his religious belief. In affirming the decision
of the Illinois Supreme Court excluding Summers from the practice of law in that state, the Federal Supreme Court held that the
action of the State Supreme Court did not violate the principle of religious freedom contained in the Constitution.
If a man lived, say on an island, alone and all by himself without neighbors, he would normally have complete and absolute rights as
to the way he lives, his religion, incuding the manners he practices his religious beliefs. There would be no laws to obey, no rules and
regulations to follow. He would be subject only to Nature's physical laws. But man iis gregarious by nature and instinct and he
gravitates toward community life, to receive and enjoy the benefits of society and of social and political organization. The moment he
does this and he becomes a member of a community or nation, he has to give rights for the benefit of his fellow citizens and for the
general welfare, just as his fellow men and companions also agree to a limitation of their rights in his favor. So, with his religion. He
may retain retain his freedom or religious belief, but as to practising the same, he would have to give up some of those practices
repugnant to the general welfare and subordinate them to the laws and sovereignty of the State. In order words, the practice of
religion or religious belief is subject to reasonable and non-discrminatory laws and regulations by the state.
In the case of Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 88 L. ed. 645, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision
convicting Sarah Prince of a violation of the Child Labor Law of Massachusetts. Mr. Justice Rutledge who wrote the opinion tersely
described the case thus:
The case brings for review another episode in the conflict between Jehovah's Witneses and state authority. This time Sarah
Prince appeals from convictions for violating Massachusetts' child labor laws, by acts said to be a rightful exercise of her
religious convictions.
When the offenses where committed she was the aunt and custodian of Betty M. Simmons, a girl nine years of age. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The defendant in this case allowed Betty, under here legal cutody who was at the same time niece, to distribute religious pamphlets
intended to propagate the religion of Johovah Wiitness. The question involved was whether or not the law in question contravened the
Fourtheenth Amendment by denying appellant freedom of religion and denying to her the equal protection of the law. Defendant
claimed that the child was exercising her God given right and her constitutional right to preach the gospel and that no preacher of
God's commands shold be interfered with. She rested her case squarely on freedom of religion. In affirming the judgment of
conviction and upholding the law as agains the claiim of relgion and the exercise of religious belief, the court said:
. . . And neither rights of religion nor lights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in
youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring shcool attendance, regulating or
prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his
claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory
vaccination for the child more than for himself on relgious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. . . . It is too late
now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is withinthe state's police power, whether against
the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
Incidentally, it must be noted that this case was decided after that of West Virginia vs. Barnette, supra.
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education was not imposing a religion or
religious belief or a religious test on said students. It was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all
alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State was merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the
Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete
and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and
teach the duties of citizenship. (Art. XIV, section 5 of the Constitution). It does nothing more than try to inculcate in the minds of the
school population during the formative period of their life, love of country and love of the flag, all of which make for united and
patriotic citizenry, so that later in after years they may be ready and willing to serve, fight, even die for it. It is well known that
whatever is taught to the youth during this period, such as love of God, of parents, respect for elders, love of the truth, loyalty,
honoring one's word and respecting the rights of other, becomes a habit or second nature that will remain with them always. School
children of kingdoms and empires are taught early to respect and love the king or the emperor for these rulers and sovereigns
symbolize the nation, and the children as future citizens or subjects will come to love their country.
Petitioners do not question the right of public schools to conduct the flag salute ceremony regularly but they do "question the attempt
to compel conscientious objectors guided by the word of God to salute the flag or participate in the ceremony to specific
commandment of Jehovah God. It is perfectly proper and lawful for one nt bound by a covenant with Jehovah to salute the flag when
that person desires to salute it. It is entirely wrong to interfere with that right or prevent such one from saluting the flag. Conversely,
it is also true that it is wrong and illegal to compel one who, for concience' sake, cannot participate in the ceremony." (p. 85,
Appellant's Brief)
The trouble with exempting petitioners from participation in the flag ceremony aside from the fact that they have no valid right to
such exemption is that the latter would disrupt shcool discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far
constitutes the great majority. If the children of Jehovah Witnesses are exempted, then the other pupils, especially the young ones
seeing no reason for such exemption, would naturlly ask for the same privilege because they might want to do something else such
as play or study, instead of standing at attention saluting the flag and singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge,

all of which consume considerable time; and if to avoid odions discrimination this exemption is extended to others, then the flag
ceremony would soon be a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the time will come when we would
have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national
heroes, and patriotism a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the shcool population imposed its will,
demanded and was granted an exemption. In a way that might be regarded as tyranny of the minority, and a small minority at that.
In a few cases, such exemptions in a limited way have been afforded members of a religious group. Conscientious objectors in the
United States who because of their religion were unwilling to serve in the war particularly as regards actual fighting or field duty, were
allowed to do some work in relation to the war, but not involving combat duty or the use of force. But that was by special legislation.
If that is possible here as regards exemption from participation in the flag ceremony, then petitioners would have to look to the
Legislature, not the courts for relief.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with
reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. As was said by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in h is dissent in West Virginia vs. Barnette, supra:
The constitutional protection of religious freedom ... gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from
conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. Religious loyalties may be
exercised without hindrance from the State, not the State may not exercise that which except by leave of religious loyalties
is within the domain of temporal power. Otherwise, each individual could set up his own censor against obedience to laws
conscientiously deemed for the public good by those whose business it is to make laws. (West Virginia State Board vs.
Barnette, supra, at p. 653; emphasis supplied)
In conclusion we find and hold that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is nt a religious
ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by
authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955;
that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the
Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and
reasonable rules and regulations and school disicipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in
public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed
from the public shcool they were attending.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is ordered dissolved.
No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
BARRERA, J., concurring:
I am in substantial accord with teh well-thought and well-expressed opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor.
As much reliacne has been place by appellants on the Barnette case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States (West
Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 87 L. ed. 1628), two fundamental features distinguishing that case from
the one before us, bear some stressing.
The underlying and, I belive, compelling consideration that impelled the majority in the Barnette case to overrule the Gobitis decision
(Minersville School District vs. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 84 L. ed 1375) was the compulsory nature of the order of the State Board of
Education making non-compliance therewith virtually unlawful in the sense that under the West Virginia Code, upon expulsion of the
disobeying pupil, his parents or guardian become liable to criminal prosecution 1 for such absence due to expulsion and if convicted
are subjected to fine not exceeding $50 and jail term not exceeding thirty days. 2 The delinquent pupil may be proceeded against and
sent to reformatories maintained for ciminally inclined juveniles. 3 Hence, the Court treated the case as one where "the sole conflict is
between authority and rights of the individual. The State asserts power to condition access to public education on making a
prescribed sign and profession, and at the same time to coerce attendance (in school) by punishing both parent and child". As thus
presented, really the conflict there between authority and liberty become deeply sharpened and has attained the proportion of
repugnance to a degree that left no choice to the Court except to apply the rationale of the grave-and-imminent-danger rule and to
enjoin, under the circumstances, the enforcement of the West Virginia School Regulation.
Fortunately the problem the instant case presents to us is unaccompanied by such dire consequences. Non-compliance with our
prescribed flag ceremony does not result in criminal prosecution either of the pupil or of the parent. All that the unwilling pupil suffers
is inability to continue his studies in a public school. If this and nothing else is the consequence, as it presently appears to be the
complaint of appellants in this case, then I perceive no clear offense is done to the Constitution.
One other significant distinction between the Barnette case and the one before us is the substnatial difference in the manner the flag
salute is to be executed under the two laws, and of course, the varying reaction and attitude taken by the Jehovah's Witnesses in
relation thereto. In West Virginia, the law requires the "Stiff-arm" salute, the saluter to keep the right hand raised with palm turned up
while the following is repeated: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it
stands; one Nations, indivisible with liberty and justice for all." The Jehovah's Witnesses considered this posture of raising the hand at
the same time reciting the pledge as an act of obeisance contrary to their religious beliefs.
Here, what is required of all persons present during the flag ceremony is to stand at attention while the flag is being raised and the
National Anthem is being played or sung. Boys and men with hats shall place the hat over the heart. Those without hats may stand
with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed by
their regulations.
Appellants here have manifested through counsel, both in their brief and, I understand, in the course of the oral argument, that they
do not object to this requirement of standing at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides. Consequently,
there seems to be no irreconciliable fundamental conflict, except perhaps as regards the singing of the National Anthem and the
recital (unaccompanied by any particular physical position) of the patriotic pledge near the close of the ceremony. As to the import of
the National Anthem and the Patriotic Pledge, I can add nothing to the very sober and well-considered opinion of Justice Montemayor.
As I see the issuance, disentangled as it should and could be from the stress and strain of counsels' doctrinal discussion and
argumentation on the fundamentals of the freedom of religion about which there could be no serious disagreement, and if viewed and
interpreted rationally in a spirit of harmony, goodwill and in keeping with an appropriate sense of nationalism I find no
reasonable consideration making the flag ceremony executed in the manner prescribed by the questioned Department order and
regulation, clearly repugnant to the Constitution.

Footnotes
1
Section 1851 (1) West Virginia Code.
2
Section 1847, 1851, Idem.
3
Section 4904 (4), Idem.

Gerona v. Secretary of Education

The Secretary of Education released a department order directing all pupils and teachers regarding what they should do during the
flag ceremony. Petitioners are members of the Jehovahs Witnesses who sought that they be exempted from performing the acts
contemplated by the said department order.
Facts: 1.
Republic Act No. 1265 took effect on June 11, 1955. The Secretary of Education, acting upon Section 2 of said Act authorizing and
directing him to issue or cause to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony, issued Department Order
No. 8 on July 21 of the same year. 2.
Pertinent portions of the said department order include the directive that pupils and teachers or students and faculty who are in
school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. And, said assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem with
everyone standing at attention and execute a salute. Moreover, immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall
recite in unison the patriotic pledge (in English or vernacular version). 3.
Petitioners who are members of the Jehovahs Witnesses wrote to the Secretary of Education allowing their children to remain silent
and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides and that they be exempted from executing the
formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic pledge. Said petition was denied by the Secretary. 4.
Petitioners religious beliefs, which served as bases for this action, state that: *t+hou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or
any likeness ofanything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under earth; thou shalt not bow
down thyself to them, norserve them. They consider that the flag is an image within this command.
Ruling: 1.
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by ones imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however, strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercises of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious
belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The
Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it. 2. The flag is not an image but a
symbol of the Republic,of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete
separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute, particularly the recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a
religious ceremony. 3.The determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It
cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to its followers; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for
there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or
sects or followers. 4. The Court finds nothing objectionable even from the point of view of religious belief. The school child or student
is simply made to say that he loves the Philippines because it is the land of his birth and the home of his people. He is not even made
to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic for which it stands. So even if the Court assumes for a moment that the flag were in
image, connoting religious and veneration instead of a mere symbol of the State and of national unity, the religious scruples of
petitioners against bowing to and venerating an image are not interfered with or otherwise jeopardized. 5. In requiring school pupils
to participate in the flag salute, the State through the Secretary of Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a
religious test on said students. It was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike. The state was
merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution. 6. The children of Jehovah witnesses cannot be exempted from
participation in the flag ceremony for they have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, an exemption to the requirement will
disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. 7. The freedom
of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and
non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LEONARDO EBRALINAG, JUSTINIANA
TANTOG, represented by her father AMOS TANTOG; JEMILOYAO & JOEL OYAO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
ELIEZER OYAO; JANETH DIAMOS & JEREMIAS DIAMOS, represented by parents MR. & MRS. GODOFREDO DIAMOS; SARA
OSTIA & JONATHAN OSTIA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FAUTO OSTIA; IRVIN SEQUINO & RENAN SEQUINO,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LYDIO SEQUINO; NAPTHALE TANACAO, represented by his parents MR. &
MRS. MANUEL TANACAO; PRECILA PINO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. FELIPE PINO; MARICRIS ALFAR,
RUWINA ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. HERMINIGILDO ALFAR; FREDESMINDA ALFAR & GUMERSINDO
ALFAR, represented by their parents ABDON ALFAR; ALBERTO ALFAR & ARISTIO ALFAR, represented by their parents
MR. & MRS. GENEROSO ALFAR; MARTINO VILLAR, represented by his parents MR. & MRS. GENARO VILLAR; PERGEBRIEL
GUINITA & CHAREN GUINITA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. CESAR GUINITA; ALVIN DOOP, represented by
his parents MR. & MRS. LEONIDES DOOP; RHILYN LAUDE, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. RENE LAUDE;
LEOREMINDA MONARES, represented by her parents, MR. & MRS. FLORENCIO MONARES; MERCY MONTECILLO,
represented by her parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL MONTECILLO; ROBERTO TANGAHA, represented by his parent
ILUMINADA TANGAHA; EVELYN, MARIA & FLORA TANGAHA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ALBERTO
TANGAHA; MAXIMO EBRALINAG, represented by his parents, MR. & MRS. PAQUITO EBRALINAG; JUTA CUMON, GIDEON
CUMON & JONATHAN CUMON, represented by their father RAFAEL CUMON; EVIE LUMAKANG & JUNAR LUMAKANG,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LUMAKANG; EMILIO SARSOZO, PAZ AMOR SARSOZO & IGNA MARIE SARSOZO,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. VIRGILIO SARSOZO; MICHAEL JOSEPH & HENRY JOSEPH, represented by
parent ANNIE JOSEPH; EMERSON TABLASON & MASTERLOU TABLASON, represented by their parent EMERLITO
TABLASON, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, respondent.
G.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993
MAY AMOLO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. ISAIAS AMOLO; REDFORD ALSADO, JOEBERT ALSADO & RUDYARD
ALSADO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ABELARDO ALSADO; NELIA ALSADO, REU ALSADO & LILIBETH
ALSADO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ROLANDO ALSADO; SUZETTE NAPOLES, represented by her parents
ISMAILITO NAPOLES & OPHELIA NAPOLES; JESICA CARMELOTES, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. SERGIO
CARMELOTES; BABY JEAN MACAPAS, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. TORIBIO MACAPAS; GERALDINE ALSADO,
represented by her parents MR. & MRS. JOEL ALSADO; RAQUEL DEMOTOR & LEAH DEMOTOR, represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. LEONARDO DEMOTOR; JURELL VILLA & MELONEY VILLA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.

JOVENIANO VILLA; JONELL HOPE MAHINAY, MARY GRACE MAHINAY and MAGDALENE MAHINAY, represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. FELIX MAHINAY; JONALYN ANTIOLA and JERWIN ANTIOLA, represented by their parents FELIFE
ANTIOLA and ANECITA ANTIOLA; MARIA CONCEPCION CABUYAO, represented by her parents WENIFREDO CABUYAO and
ESTRELLITA CABUYAO, NOEMI TURNO represented by her parents MANUEL TURNO and VEVENCIA TURNO; SOLOMON
PALATULON, SALMERO PALATULON and ROSALINDA PALATULON, represented by their parents MARTILLANO PALATULON
and CARMILA PALATULON, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and ANTONIO A. SANGUTAN, respondents.
Felino M. Ganal for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
These two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were consolidated because they raise
essentially the same issue: whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to
take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting
the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu
District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan Bantayan,
Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the
religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims some 100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Philippines.
In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the
petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents
are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No.
1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Republic Act No. 1265 provides:
Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple
and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National anthem.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued
rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provided.
Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in accordance with
rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall
subject the educational institution concerned and its head to public censure as an administrative
punishment which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag-ceremony provided by this Act, the Secretary
of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit
of the private educational institution responsible for such failure.
The implementing rules and regulations in Department Order No. 8 provide:
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.
1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public and private, every school
day throughout the year. It shall be raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flag-staff must be
straight, slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of such height as would give the Flag a
commanding position in front of the building or within the compound.
2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony every morning
except when it is raining, in which event the ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way
possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of the same day. The flag-raising ceremony in the
morning shall be conducted in the following manner:
a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school and its
premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. At command, books shall be put
away or held in the left hand and everybody shall come to attention. Those with hats
shall uncover. No one shall enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony.
b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the school
band or without the accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem may be played by
the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be raised briskly.
While the flag is being raised, all persons present shall stand at attention and execute
a salute. Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing the hat over the heart. Those
without hat may stand with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides.
Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed by their
regulations. The salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon last
note of the anthem.
c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison
the following patriotic pledge (English or vernacular version), which may bring the
ceremony to a close. This is required of all public schools and of private schools which
are intended for Filipino students or whose population is predominantly Filipino.
English Version
I love the Philippines.
It is the land of my birth;
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be, strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true, Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
xxx xxx xxx
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" (p. 10, Rollo) which they
"cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God" (p. 8, Rollo). They feel bound by the Bible's

command to "guard ourselves from

idols 1 John 5:21" (p. 9, Rollo). They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They
think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations
on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official
control (p. 10, Rollo).
This is not the first time that the question, of whether the children of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from
school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, has been raised before this
Court.
The same issue was raised in 1959 in Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna,
et al. vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960). This Court in the Gerona case upheld the expulsion of the
students, thus:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution
guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the government,
the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious
ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a
public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar.
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is
not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a
non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or
Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution
which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and
maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to
develop, among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship.
The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They
have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school
discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption
from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations
promulgated by competent authority. (pp. 2-3).
Gerona was reiterated in Balbuna, as follows:
The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by the Legislature thru Republic Act 1265 to
promulgate said Department Order, and its provisions requiring the observance of the flag salute, not
being a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to
the fatherland which the flag stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of
religion. (Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150).
Republic Act No. 1265 and the ruling in Gerona have been incorporated in Section 28, Title VI, Chapter 9 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which took effect on September 21, 1988 (one year after its
publication in the Official Gazette, Vol. 63, No. 38 of September 21, 1987). Paragraph 5 of Section 28 gives legislative
cachet to the ruling in Gerona, thus:
5. Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be
dismissed after due investigation.
However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the constitutionality of the above provision of the new
Administrative Code of 1987. They have targeted only Republic Act No. 1265 and the implementing orders of the
DECS.
In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's
Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem,
salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge. Division Superintendent of Schools, Susana B. Cabahug of
the Cebu Division of DECS, and Dr. Atty. Marcelo M. Bacalso, Assistant Division Superintendent, recalling this Court's
decision in Gerona, issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated November 17, 1989 (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No.
95770) directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions as follows:
1. Reports reaching this Office disclose that there are a number of teachers, pupils, students, and
school employees in public schools who refuse to salute the Philippine flag or participate in the daily
flag ceremony because of some religious belief.
2. Such refusal not only undermines Republic Act No. 1265 and the DECS Department Order No. 8,
Series of 1955 (Implementing Rules and Regulations) but also strikes at the heart of the DECS
sustained effort to inculcate patriotism and nationalism.
3. Let it be stressed that any belief that considers the flag as an image is not in any manner whatever
a justification for not saluting the Philippine flag or not participating in flag ceremony. Thus, the
Supreme Court of the Philippine says:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and freedom and liberty which it
and the Constitution guarantee and protect. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et
al., 106 Phil. 11.)
4. As regards the claim for freedom of belief, which an objectionist may advance, the Supreme Court
asserts:
But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the
established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and
give way to the latter. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.)
5. Accordingly, teachers and school employees who choose not to participate in the daily flag
ceremony or to obey the flag salute regulation spelled out in Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955,
shall be considered removed from the service after due process.
6. In strong language about pupils and students who do the same the Supreme Court has this to say:
If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of
public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow Citizens, nothing
more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it! Having elected
not to comply with the regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to
attend public schools. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 15.)

7. School administrators shall therefore submit to this Office a report on those who choose not to
participate in flag ceremony or salute the Philippine flag. (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770;
Emphasis supplied).
Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the
memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School, the children were asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the
Cebuano dialect promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their breast until the end of the song
and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag (Annex D, p. 46, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770 and p. 48, Rollo of G.R. No.
95887), but they refused to sign the "Kasabutan" (p. 20, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770).
In Tubigmanok Elementary School, the Teacher-In-Charge, Antonio A. Sangutan, met with the Jehovah's Witnesses'
parents, as disclosed in his letter of October 17, 1990, excerpts from which reveal the following:
After two (2) fruitless confrontation meetings with the Jehovah's Witnesses' parents on October 2,
1990 and yesterday due to their firm stand not to salute the flag of the Republic of the Philippines
during Flag Ceremony and other occasions, as mandated by law specifically Republic Act No. 1265, this
Office hereby orders the dropping from the list in the School Register (BPS Form I) of all teachers, all
Jehovah Witness pupils from Grade I up to Grade VI effective today.
xxx xxx xxx
This order is in compliance with Division Memorandum No. 108 s. 1989 dated November 17, 1989 by
virtue of Department Order No. 8 s. 1955 dated July 21, 1955 in accordance with Republic Act No. 1265
and Supreme Court Decision of a case "Genaro Gerona, et al., Petitioners and Appellants vs. The
Honorable Secretary of Education, et al., Respondents and Appellees' dated August 12, 1959 against
their favor. (p. 149, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of
students who "opted to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they
forfeited their right to attend public schools." (p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
1st Indorsement
DAANBANTAYAN DISTRICT II
Daanbantayan, Cebu, July 24, 1990.
Respectfully returned to Mrs. Alicia A. Diaz, School In Charge [sic], Agujo Elementary School with the
information that this office is sad to order the dropping of Jeremias Diamos and Jeaneth Diamos,
Grades III and IV pupils respectively from the roll since they opted to follow their religious belief which
is against the Flag Salute Law (R.A. 1265) and DECS Order No. 8, series of 1955, having elected not to
comply with the regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools
(Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Philippines 15). However, should they change their
mind to respect and follow the Flag Salute Law they may be re-accepted.
(Sgd.) MANUEL F. BIONGCOG
District Supervisor
(p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students of the Daanbantayan National High School, Agujo
Elementary School, Calape Barangay National High School, Pinamungajan Provincial High School, Tabuelan Central
School, Canasojan Elementary School, Liboron Elementary School, Tagaytay Primary School, San Juan Primary School
and Northern Central Elementary School of San Fernando, Cebu, upon order of then Acting Division Superintendent
Marcelo Bacalso, prompted some Jehovah's Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the Secretary of Education Isidro Cario
but the latter did not answer their letter. (p. 21, Rollo.)
The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who
succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his
predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of Jehovah's Witnesses.
On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil actions for Mandamus,Certiorari and
Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due
process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship (p. 23, Rollo).
The petitioners pray that:
c. Judgment be rendered:
i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of herein petitioners
from their respective schools;
ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the petitioners from their
classes or otherwise implementing the expulsion ordered on petitioners; and
iii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the readmission of petitioners to their respective schools. (p. 41, Rollo.)
and that pending the determination of the merits of these cases, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining
the respondents from enforcing the expulsion of the petitioners and to re-admit them to their respective classes.
On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders
from this Court (p. 57, Rollo).
The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and Cebu District Supervisor Manuel F. Biongcog to be impleaded as
respondents in these cases.
On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions (p. 98, Rollo) defending the
expulsion orders issued by the public respondents on the grounds that:
1. Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce rebellious and anti-social school
children and consequently disloyal and mutant Filipino citizens.
2. There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the Jehovah's Witnesses that the
DECS' rules and regulations on the flag salute ceremonies are violative of their freedom of religion and
worship.
3. The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates respect and love of
country, for which the flag stands.
4. The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful regulations in question do not
warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies
on the basis of their own self-perceived religious convictions.
5. The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and jurisprudence.
6. State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices justified, besides having
scriptural basis.

7. The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment of Executive Order No. 292
(The Administrative Code of 1987).
Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year old decision of this court in Gerona upholding the flag salute law
and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.
It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its in corporation in the
Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to re-examine it. The idea that one
may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony
on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the
free exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973
Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate
opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
"external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their
respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings (Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887,
p. 50 and Rollo of G.R. No. 95770, p. 48). Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their
expulsion.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according
to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA
514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that
the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the
petitioners from the schools is not justified.
The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that:
The flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants,
and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued
with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism a
pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school population imposed its
will, demanded and was granted an exemption. (Gerona, p. 24.)
has not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag,
singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a
"small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught
and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national
heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the
flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of
life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive
training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation
for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987
Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the
very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law,
to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect
for dully constituted authorities.
As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):
. . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous
instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to
free minds. . . . When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with
here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things
that touch the heart of the existing order.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, . . . assuming that
such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion is not a goal that is constitutionally
obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited
means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.)
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their
right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to
"protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all
(Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate
the teaching of their church not to join any labor group:
. . . It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when
general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some
"compelling state interests" intervenes. (Sherbert vs. Berner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 970, 83 S.
Ct. 1790.)
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the
flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others.
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court inNon vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest
regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school
authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do
not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to

public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty)
to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
Before we close this decision, it is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when
every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before
every Japanese soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not
quibble now about saluting the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and our own flag was proudly hoisted
aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to behold that made our hearts pound with pride and joy over the newly-regained
freedom and sovereignty of our nation.
Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution to refuse to salute the
Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our
country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public
respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order which was
issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quiason, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I am happy to concur with Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino in her quietly eloquent affirmation of a vital postulate of
freedom. I would only add my brief observations concerning Gerona v. Secretary of Education.
In my humble view, Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that promulgated it was apparently
laboring under the conviction that the State had the right to determine what was religious and what was not and to
dictate to the individual what he could and could not worship. In pronouncing that the flag was not a religious image
but a symbol of the nation, it
was implying that no one had the right to worship it or as the petitioners insisted not to worship it. This was no
different from saying that the cult that reveres Rizal as a divinity should not and cannot do so because he is only a
civic figure deserving honor but not veneration.
It seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what to worship or whether to worship
at all. This is a personal decision he alone can make. The individual may worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a
tree (or a flag), and the State cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can it compel him to do so.
As long as his beliefs are not externalized in acts that offend the public interest, he cannot be prohibited from
harboring them or punished for doing so.
In requiring the herein petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony, the State has declared ex cathedra that they
are not violating the Bible by saluting the flag. This is to me an unwarranted intrusion into their religious beliefs,
which tell them the opposite. The State cannot interpret the Bible for them; only they can read it as they see fit. Right
or wrong, the meaning they derive from it cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps by their own acknowledged
superiors. But certainly not the State. It has no competence in this matter. Religion is forbidden territory that the
State, for all its power and authority, cannot invade.
I am not unaware of Justice Frankfurter's admonition that "the constitutional protection of religious freedom
terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma."
But in the case at bar, the law to which the petitioners are made to conform clashes with their own understanding of
their religious obligations. Significantly, as the ponencia notes, their intransigence does not disturb the peaceful
atmosphere of the school or otherwise prejudice the public order. Their refusal to salute the flag and recite the
patriotic pledge does not disrupt the flag ceremony. They neither mock nor disdain it. The petitioners simply stand at
attention and keep quiet "to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings." It is for this innocuous conduct that, pursuant to the challenged law and regulations, the teachers have
been dismissed and the students excelled.
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the
individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken
word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid
religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to
speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the
bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by
rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this case. The conscientious
objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are protected by the
Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within rebels.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's decision penned by Madame Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino that school teachers and students
who cannot salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the country, on grounds of
religious belief or conviction, may not on this ground alone be dismissed from the service or expelled from the school.
At the same time, I am really concerned with what could be the
far-reaching consequences of our ruling in that, we may in effect be sanctioning a privileged or eliteclass of teachers
and students who will hereafter be exempt from participating, even when they are in the school premises, in the flag
ceremony in deference to their religious scruples. What happens, for instance, if some citizens, based also on their
religious beliefs, were to refuse to pay taxes and license fees to the government? Perhaps problems of this nature
should not be anticipated. They will be resolved when and if they ever arise. But with today's decision, we may have
created more problems than we have solved.
It cannot also be denied that the State has the right and even the duty to promote among its citizens, especially the
youth, love and country, respect for the flag and reverence for its national heroes. It cannot also be disputed that the
State has the right to adopt reasonable means by which these laudable objectives can be effectively pursued and

achieved. The flag ceremony is one such device intended to inspire patriotism and evoke the finest sentiments of love
of country and people.
In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitimate means to achieve legitimate (and noble) ends. For a select fewto be exempt
from the flag ceremony and all that it represent seven if the exemption is predicated on respect for religious scruples,
could be divisive in its impact on the school population or community.
I would therefore submit that, henceforth, teachers and students who because of religious scruples or beliefs cannot
actively participate in the flag ceremony conducted in the school premises should be excluded beforehand from such
ceremony. Instead of allowing the religious objector to attend the flag ceremony and display therein his inability to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the Republic, he or she should remain in
the classroom while honors to the flag are conducted and manifested in the "quadrangle" or equivalent place within
school premises; or if the flag ceremony must be held in a hall, the religious objector must take his or her place at the
rear of (or outside) the hall while those who actively participate in the ceremony must take the front places. This
arrangement can, in my view, achieve an accommodation and, to a certain extent, harmonization of a citizen's
constitutional right to freedom of religion and a valid exercise of the State's fundamental and legitimate authority to
require homage and honor to the flag as the symbol of the Nation.
# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I am happy to concur with Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino in her quietly eloquent affirmation of a vital postulate of
freedom. I would only add my brief observations concerning Gerona v. Secretary of Education.
In my humble view, Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that promulgated it was apparently
laboring under the conviction that the State had the right to determine what was religious and what was not and to
dictate to the individual what he could and could not worship. In pronouncing that the flag was not a religious image
but a symbol of the nation, it
was implying that no one had the right to worship it or as the petitioners insisted not to worship it. This was no
different from saying that the cult that reveres Rizal as a divinity should not and cannot do so because he is only a
civic figure deserving honor but not veneration.
It seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what to worship or whether to worship
at all. This is a personal decision he alone can make. The individual may worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a
tree (or a flag), and the State cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can it compel him to do so.
As long as his beliefs are not externalized in acts that offend the public interest, he cannot be prohibited from
harboring them or punished for doing so.
In requiring the herein petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony, the State has declared ex cathedra that they
are not violating the Bible by saluting the flag. This is to me an unwarranted intrusion into their religious beliefs,
which tell them the opposite. The State cannot interpret the Bible for them; only they can read it as they see fit. Right
or wrong, the meaning they derive from it cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps by their own acknowledged
superiors. But certainly not the State. It has no competence in this matter. Religion is forbidden territory that the
State, for all its power and authority, cannot invade.
I am not unaware of Justice Frankfurter's admonition that "the constitutional protection of religious freedom
terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma."
But in the case at bar, the law to which the petitioners are made to conform clashes with their own understanding of
their religious obligations. Significantly, as the ponencia notes, their intransigence does not disturb the peaceful
atmosphere of the school or otherwise prejudice the public order. Their refusal to salute the flag and recite the
patriotic pledge does not disrupt the flag ceremony. They neither mock nor disdain it. The petitioners simply stand at
attention and keep quiet "to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings." It is for this innocuous conduct that, pursuant to the challenged law and regulations, the teachers have
been dismissed and the students excelled.
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the
individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken
word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid
religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to
speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the
bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by
rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this case. The conscientious
objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are protected by the
Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within rebels.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's decision penned by Madame Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino that school teachers and students
who cannot salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the country, on grounds of
religious belief or conviction, may not on this ground alone be dismissed from the service or expelled from the school.
At the same time, I am really concerned with what could be the
far-reaching consequences of our ruling in that, we may in effect be sanctioning a privileged or eliteclass of teachers
and students who will hereafter be exempt from participating, even when they are in the school premises, in the flag
ceremony in deference to their religious scruples. What happens, for instance, if some citizens, based also on their
religious beliefs, were to refuse to pay taxes and license fees to the government? Perhaps problems of this nature
should not be anticipated. They will be resolved when and if they ever arise. But with today's decision, we may have
created more problems than we have solved.
It cannot also be denied that the State has the right and even the duty to promote among its citizens, especially the
youth, love and country, respect for the flag and reverence for its national heroes. It cannot also be disputed that the
State has the right to adopt reasonable means by which these laudable objectives can be effectively pursued and
achieved. The flag ceremony is one such device intended to inspire patriotism and evoke the finest sentiments of love
of country and people.
In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitimate means to achieve legitimate (and noble) ends. For a select fewto be exempt
from the flag ceremony and all that it represent seven if the exemption is predicated on respect for religious scruples,
could be divisive in its impact on the school population or community.
I would therefore submit that, henceforth, teachers and students who because of religious scruples or beliefs cannot
actively participate in the flag ceremony conducted in the school premises should be excluded beforehand from such

ceremony. Instead of allowing the religious objector to attend the flag ceremony and display therein his inability to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the Republic, he or she should remain in
the classroom while honors to the flag are conducted and manifested in the "quadrangle" or equivalent place within
school premises; or if the flag ceremony must be held in a hall, the religious objector must take his or her place at the
rear of (or outside) the hall while those who actively participate in the ceremony must take the front places. This
arrangement can, in my view, achieve an accommodation and, to a certain extent, harmonization of a citizen's
constitutional right to freedom of religion and a valid exercise of the State's fundamental and legitimate authority to
require homage and honor to the flag as the symbol of the Nation.
# Footnotes
** The flag salute, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge are all forms of
utterances.
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Cebu
For refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, petitioners were expelled from their classes
by the public school authorities in Cebu.
Facts: 1. Petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1264 and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the
DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. 2. There were a total of 68 students who were expelled
from various public schools in Cebu. 3. According to petitioners, while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they
do not engage in external acts or behaviour that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the
right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceeding. Since they do not engage in disruptive behaviour, there is no
warrant for their expulsion.
Ruling: 1. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, during a
flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of
religious profession and worship. 2. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. 3. The Court is not persuaded that by exempting
the Jehovahs Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group
which admittedly comprises a small portion of the school population will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a
nation untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for
national heroes. After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from public schools
where they may learn and be trained. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation
that this Court had feared in Gerona case. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a
ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. 4.
While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, this should not be taken to mean that
school authorities are powerless to discipline them if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, the Court does not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right and duty to prevent.
Kennedy v. Louisiana
Argued: April 16, 2008
Decided: June 25, 2008
Facts
Although the Eighth Amendments ban on cruel and unusual punishment does not mean that the death penalty is unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court has placed limits on when the death penalty can be used. Over the past 30 years, for example, the Court has
ruled that kidnappers and those who rape adult women cannot be executed. Despite these rulings, some states permit the death
penalty for other crimes that do not involve murder, like aircraft hijacking, treason, and drug trafficking of large quantities. In
addition, five states allow the death penalty as punishment for another non-homicide crime the rape of a child. This case is about
whether or not a person can be executed for that crime.
In 2003, Patrick Kennedy was convicted of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter in an assault so brutal that the girl required surgery.
Under Louisiana law, the death penalty is available for defendants who rape a child under twelve years of age. After the jury decided
that Kennedy should be sentenced to death, Kennedy appealed the judgment to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Louisianas highest
court ruled in favor of the state, and Kennedy appealed his case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Issue
Does the Eighth Amendment prohibit the death penalty for the rape of a child?
Constitutional Amendment and Precedents

The Eighth Amendment

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Coker v. Georgia (1977)

While serving several sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault, Erlich Anthony Coker escaped from
prison. He broke into a couples Georgia home, raped the woman, and stole the familys vehicle. Coker was convicted of
rape, armed robbery, and other offenses. The jury sentenced Coker to death, but he argued that the death penalty for rape
violated the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court ruled in Cokers favor and struck down the death sentence for the rape of an adult woman on Eighth
Amendment grounds. The Court held that imposing the death penalty for a rapist that does not take human life was grossly
excessive and disproportionate, and therefore, cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. It observed
that Georgia was the only state that allowed execution for the rape of an adult woman and explained that [t]he murderer
kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murder; for the rape victim, life may not be
nearly so happy as it was, but is not over and normally is not beyond all repair.

Roper v. Simmons (2005)

In 1993, seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death for murder. He argued that executing a minor
violated the Eighth Amendments ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court agreed. It examined what it calls evolving standards of decency to determine whether executing a
minor was cruel and unusual. One way to determine these standards, the Court explained, is to consider what laws state
legislatures (as elected representatives of the people) have passed. Where there is a strong trend around either permitting
or prohibiting a certain capital-punishment practice, then the Court is more likely to rule in a way that is consistent with the

trend. In Simmons case, the Court found that there was a national consensus against executing minors, in part, because
30 states prohibited the juvenile death penalty and only three states had executed juveniles in the previous 10 years.
Arguments for Kennedy

According to the Courts precedent in Coker, the death penalty is an excessive punishment for the rapist who does not take
human life. Therefore, to permit capital punishment in Kennedys case would be inconsistent with the prior ruling in Coker.

Applying Ropers evolving standards of decency test, it is clear that there is a national consensus against using the death

penalty to punish someone who rapes a child. In Roper, 20 states allowed minors to be executed, but the Supreme Court
still concluded that there was a national trend against executing minors. In this case, only five states permit the death
penalty for those who rape children. Moreover, Louisianas policy is out of sync with the rest of the nation: of the 3,300
inmates on death row across the country, only two are there for a crime other than murder and both were convicted under
Louisiana's child rape statute. The United States has not executed anyone for a crime other than murder since 1964.

Allowing the death penalty for the rape of a child could result in two unintended consequences: family members might be
less likely to report sexual assaults by family members, and there could be an incentive for the rapist to kill the victim, since
the punishment is the same either way.

In these cases, child victims will be put on the stand to testify against the defendant. Historically, children do not make good
witnesses, and their testimony may lead to wrongful convictions.

Louisianas death penalty for child rape is the broadest capital punishment law in the nation. While other states only permit
the death penalty for child rapists with prior convictions or where other special circumstances are present, Louisiana allows
the death penalty for any rape of a child under the age of twelve.
Arguments for Louisiana

The Coker decision prohibits capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman. Thus, permitting capital punishment for
the rape of a child is not contrary to the Coker precedent.

The evolving standards of decency test in Roper favors Louisiana because there is an emerging national consensus in

favor of using the death penalty in non-homicide crimes. Currently, 14 of the 38 states with the death penalty allow its use
for some non-homicidal crimes, like treason and aircraft hijacking. If legislation currently pending in other states is enacted,
nearly half of capital punishment jurisdictions will permit the imposition of death for non-homicide crimes. Moreover,
Louisianas use of the death penalty for child rape is supported by four other states that also use capital punishment for this
crime.

The state has a special interest in protecting its most vulnerable people (young children) and this justifies the death penalty
for rape of a child. Sexual abuse causes long-term harm to victims, who often suffer physical and psychological disorders.

Each state's legislature should be allowed to reflect its citizens' current moral judgment regarding the appropriate
punishment for capital crimes. Therefore, it is for Louisiana (and not the federal courts) to determine whether the death
penalty is a fitting punishment for child rape.

Louisianas death penalty law for those convicted of child rape is not overly broad, because it is limited to cases where the
victims are under twelve years of age.
Decision
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice Alito wrote the
dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.
Majority
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the 8th Amendment prohibits capital punishment for crimes against individuals which do not
result in death, including the rape of a child.
The majority examined the history of the death penalty, contemporary norms, and current state laws to determine whether the use of
the death penalty for child rapists fits within the evolving standards of decency in American society. The justices found that while
36 states and the federal government currently impose capital punishment for some crimes, only six states allow it for child rape.
Louisiana is the only state to sentence a person to death for child rape in over 40 years; currently, Kennedy and another Louisiana
man are the only two people on death row for a non-homicidal crime. No state has executed a person for rape since 1964. According
to the Court, these figures demonstrate a national consensus against capital punishment for child rape.
The justices also considered their own understanding and interpretation of the purpose and meaning of the Eighth Amendment. They
held that punishments must fall within the limits of civilized standards, and that the use of the death penalty for child rapists is not
within these limits. According to the Court, there is an important distinction between the crimes of murder and rape because of their
severity and permanence of damage, though the justices acknowledged that both crimes are heinous. The justices believe that
imposing the death penalty for a crime that does not result in the death of the victim is disproportionate and constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.
Dissent
According to the dissent, the death penalty is not a disproportionate penalty for child rapists. Justice Alito, writing for the dissent,
argues that the severe and long-term physical, psychological and emotional trauma experienced by the victim, as well as the injury to
society as a whole, make capital punishment no less appropriate for child rape than for murder.
In addition, the dissenting justices disagreed with the Courts evaluation of the national consensus. They argued that more states
would have allowed the death penalty for child rape if they had thought that it was permissible. They believe that many state
legislatures interpreted the ruling in Coker v. Georgia, in which the Court prohibited the death penalty for the rape of an adult, as
prohibiting the death penalty for all rape, not just when the victim is an adult. This is why only six states have laws that allow the
death penalty for child rape. Justice Alito, writing for the dissent, insisted that these six states reflect a growing concern over child
rape among state legislatures, and represent the beginning of a trend toward instituting capital punishment for child rape in more
states.
EN BANC
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Digest:

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to
cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic
because of the latters advertisements which contain the following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of
Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein
Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a clients problem no matter how
complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors, are specialists in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs
The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal
Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement
may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed
mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the
services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The
standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyers advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of
his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements
of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts
can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result
of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:
Advertisement in a reputable law list
Use of ordinary simple professional card
Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization
EN BANC
A.C. No. 350
August 7, 1959
In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Emerito M. Salva for the Government.
Dalmacio de los Angeles and Luis F. Gabinete for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, and one (1) day of destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with
subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required
to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of his profession.
In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court considering that he has six children to support the
eldest being 16 years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if disciplinary action be taken against him.
He made manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of judgment which
he honestly and sincerely deplores.
Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude the reason behind this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for
the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment
(Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628). And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S.,

p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as
ordained by section 25 of Rule 127.
It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as attorney and that his name be stricken out from the Roll of
Attorneys. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21601
December 17, 1966
NIELSON & COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
W. H. Quasha and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion-Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for defendant-appellee.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
DIGEST
FACTS:
On January 30, 1937, Nielson & Co. executed an agreement with Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. Lepanto owned the mining properties. Nielson
operated and maintained the said properties for Php 2,500.00 / month as management fee plus 10% participation in the net profits for 5 years.
In 1940, the 10% share was disputed. Lepantos Board of Directors authorized C.A. De Witt, president to enter with an agreement with Nielson modifying
same provisions effective January 1, 1940 such that Nielson shall receive :
1. 10% of the dividends paid during the contract period and every end of the year;
2. 10% of any depletion reserve that may be set up;
3. 10% of any amount expended during the year out of surplus earnings for capital account.
In 1941, the parties renewed their contract for another 5 years but the Pacific War broke out in December 1941. In January 1942, the operation was
disrupted. The U.S. Army ordered that the mill, power plant, supplies, equipment, concentrates on hand and mines be destroyed to prevent the
Japanese from using. Thereafter, the Japanese army occupied the mining properties and was ousted only in August 1945.
Lepanto then rebuilt the mines and mills including setting up new organizations, repairs, clearings, salvages, etc. The reconstruction was completed until
1948. On June 26, 1948 the mines resumed the operation under the exclusive management of Lepanto. However, after the mines were liberated in
1945, a disagreement arose between Nielson and Lepanto over the status of the operating contract which expired in 1947. Under the terms thereof the
management contract shall remain in suspension in case of fortuitous event or force majeure such as war, which adversely affects the work of the
mining and milling.
On February 6, 1958, Nielson brought an action against Lepanto before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila to recover damages suffered in view
of the refusal of Lepanto to comply with the terms of a management contract entered into between them on January 30, 1937.
In its answer, Lepanto denied the allegations and set up certain defenses, prescription and laches as bars against the institution of the action.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing the complaint with costs. The court stated that it did not find sufficient evidence to establish the
counterclaim of Lepanto therefore, dismissed the same. Nielson appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered
Lepanto to pay:
1. 10% Share of cash dividends of December 1941 in the amount of Php 17,500.00 with legal interest thereon from the date of
the filling of the complaint;
2. Management fee for January 1942 in the amount of Php 2,500.00 with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the
complaint;
3. Management fees for the 60-month period of extension amounting to Php 150,000.00 with legal interest;
4. 10% Share in the cash dividends during the period of extension;
5. 10% of the depletion reserve amounting to Php 53,928.88 with legal interest;
6. 10% of the expenses of the capital account amounting to Php 694,364.76 with legal interest;
7. To issue and deliver to Nielson shares of stock at a par value equivalent to the total of Nielsons 10% share in the stock
dividends declared on November 28, 1948 and August 22, 1950; and
8. The sum of Php 50,000.00 as attorneys fee and the cost that Lepanto seeks for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the management contract is a contract of agency?
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the management contract is not a contract of agency as defined in Article 1709 of the Old Civil Code, but as a
contract of lease of services as defined in Article 1544 of the same Code. Article 1709 defines the contract of agency as one person binds himself to
render some service or to do something for the account or at the request of another. While Article 1544 defines contract of lease of service as in a
lease of work or services, one of the parties binds himself to make or construct something or to render a service to the other for a price certain. The
court determined the nature of the management contract in question wherein there was agreement for Nielson for 5 years had the right to renew, to
explore, to develop, and to operate the mining claims of Lepanto. In the performance of this principal undertaking Nielson was not acting as an agent but
one as performing material acts for an employer, for a compensation.