Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?

Author(s): Dru C. Gladney

Source: The China Quarterly, No. 174, Religion in China Today (Jun., 2003), pp. 451-467
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or

in China: Accommodation

Islam

Separatism?
Dru C. Gladney

Abstract

of the challenges
China's
Muslims
confront
Many
interaction
with
they have for the last 1,400 years of continuous
some are new as a result of China's
transformed
and increasingly

and

since

especially

the watershed

events

of

the subsequent
"war on terrorism." Muslims
such communities
have
but many
survived
a millennium.
over
This
article
examines
China,

not

but

it is where

because

only
because

a measure
dictates

of
of

that can be
unavoidably
a non-Muslim
Muslim
alternatives

the

extent

Islamic
found

culture

to which

This

analysts,
as minorities

The

of Islam
history
as between
as well

complete

and Muslim

has

groups

culture.

in the writings
of some
and that Muslims

community,
to either

as
but

in
minority
identity
most
of his research,

conducted

are
in East Asia,
China's Muslims
minority
and Islamic
I argue
self-preservation
identity.
can be seen to be
to minority
status in China

rebellious
state.

same

society,

globalized
society,
11 September
terrorist
attacks
and
in China
live as minority
communities,
in rather inhospitable
circumstances
for

Islam

Muslim

to their host

the

the

this author

with
also
the largest Muslim
the most
threatened
in terms of
clearly
that successful
Muslim
accommodation

remain
Chinese

accommodation

allow

the

of

the

the opposite
view
goes
against
that Islam in the region
is almost
are

inherently
problematic
that both within

in China

suggests

Muslim

nationalities,

or

reconciliation

there

to
each

are many

separatism.

are in the midst of the first decade of their second

China's Muslims
millennium
under Chinese
rule. Many
of the challenges
they confront
remain the same as they have for the last 1,400 years of continuous
interaction with Chinese
society, but some are new as a result of China's
transformed and increasingly globalized
the water
society, and especially
shed events of the 11 September terrorist attacks and the subsequent "war
on terrorism." Muslims
in China live as minority
communities
amid a sea
of people, in their view, who are largely pork-eating, polytheist,
secularist
and kafir ("heathen"). Nevertheless,
many of their small and isolated
communities
have survived in rather inhospitable circumstances
for over
a millennium.
small
in
2
(about
per cent in
Though
population percentage
their numbers are nevertheless
large in comparison with other
states (just over 20 million).
For example,
there are more
in China than Malaysia,
more
Muslims
and
than every Middle
Eastern
Muslim
nation except Iran, Turkey and Egypt. China is also increasingly
nations for energy and as an export market
dependent on mainly Muslim
(one recent estimate suggests that China will be as dependent on Middle
East oil as Japan by 2050 according
to current growth rates).1 As

China),
Muslim

1. Keith Bradsher,
4 September

Tribune,
?

The China

Quarterly,

"China wrestles
p. 1.

with

dependence

on foreign

oil," International

2002,

2003

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Herald

The China Quarterly

Jonathan Lipman2 noted, these long-term Muslim
communities
have often
the "familiar strangers" found in small enclaves
throughout Asia.
And if Kosovo
and Bosnia are to serve as lessons, failure to accommo
can lead to national dismemberment
date Muslim minorities
and inter
been

national

intervention.
to NATO
Indeed, China's
primary
objection
in Kosovo
centred on its fear that this might encourage
the
of
with
in
and
groups
aiding
abetting
separatists,
independence
Xinjiang,
concern. The US and
Tibet and perhaps Taiwan clearly a major Chinese
to include the ETIM group as a
China's pressure on the United Nations
terrorist organization
reflects this ongoing fear over Muslim
in
activism
involvement

China.3
This

seeks to examine
Islam as it relates to Muslim minority
not
in
because
it is where this author has conducted
China,
identity
only
most of his research, but also because with the largest Muslim minority
are clearly the most threatened in terms of
in East Asia, China's Muslims
and
Islamic
self-preservation
identity. Because of the history of Chinese
state integration and the recognition
of Muslims
along national minority
to examine
Islam from the perspective
of Muslim
lines, it is necessary
Indeed, as Islam makes no distinction
identity in the Chinese nation-state.
state and church, or politics and religion,
to discuss
between
it in the
abstract

article

to minority
without
reference
be to
identity would
in the daily lives of
it is experienced
and practised
I suggest, however,
that the wide variety of Islamic
in China indicates that there is no monolithic
Muslims
though there are many basic tenets of Islam upon which

in China

ignore the way

Muslims
today.
practice among
Islam in China,
all Muslims
and not just China, agree. Most relevant is the
everywhere,
to minority
status
accommodation
thesis put forth that successful Muslim
can
seen
a
measure
to
to be
in China
be
of the extent
which Muslim
of the dictates of Islamic culture to their
groups allow the reconciliation
host culture. This goes against the opposite view that can be found in the
Israeli and
writings of some analysts of Islam in China, such as Raphael
Michael Dillon,
that Islam in the region is almost unavoidably
rebellious
are inherently problematic
as minorities
to a non
and that Muslims
Muslim

Islam

state.4

in China

Islam in China has primarily been propagated over the last 1,300 years
among the people now known as "Hui," but many of the issues con
on
fronting them are relevant to the Turkic and Indo-European Muslims
A History
in Northwest
China
2. Jonathan Lipman,
Familiar
of Muslims
Strangers:
of Washington
Press,
1997), p. 2.
(Seattle: University
see Erik Eckholm,
over this unitary US-China
"US labeling
3. For the controversy
policy,
of group in China as terrorist is criticized," New York Times, 13 September
2002, p. 1 ;Charles
"US gesture to China raises crackdown
10 September
fears," The Wall Street Journal,
Hutzler,
2002, p. 3.
4. See Raphael
Humanities
Press,
Press,

1997),

in China
Curzon &
Israeli, Muslims
(London & Atlantic
Highlands:
in China
Dillon, Hui Muslims
(London: Curzon
p. 7; and Michael

1978),
pp. 2-8.

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Islam

in China

China's Inner Asian frontier. "Hui teaching" (Hui jiao) was the term once
to indicate "Islam" in general, and probably derives from
used in Chinese
an early Chinese
rendering of the term for the modern Uyghur people.
the official nationality figures from the 2000 census are not yet
Although
initial estimates
suggest that they do not differ substantially
published,
to the reasonably accurate 1990 national census of
from 1990. According
China,

the

(8,602,978),

total Muslim
Uyghur

is 17.6 million,
population
including Hui
Kazakh
(7,214,431),
(1,111,718),
Dongxiang

(373,872), Kyrgyz (373,872), Salar (87,697), Tajik (33,538), Uzbek

Bonan
and Tatar (4,873). The Hui
(14,502),
(12,212)
speak mainly
Sino-Tibetan
languages; Turkic-language
speakers include the Uyghur,
Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Tatar; combined Turkic-Mongolian
speakers
include the Dongxiang,
Salar and Bonan, concentrated
in Gansu's moun
tainous Hexi corridor; and the Tajik speak a variety of Indo-Persian
to note, however,
It is important
census
that the Chinese
so the actual
not religious affiliation,
registered people by nationality,
number of Muslims
is still unknown,
and all population
figures are
influenced by politics
in their use and interpretation.
dialects.

While
the Hui have been labelled the "Chinese-speaking
Muslims,"
"Chinese Muslims,"
and most recently, "Sino-Muslims,"5
this is mislead
ing, since by law all Muslims
living in China are "Chinese" by citizen
who
the
ship, and there are large Hui communities
speak primarily
non-Chinese
languages where they live, such as the Tibetan, Mongolian,
Thai and Hainan Muslims,
who are also classified by the State as Hui.
These "Hui" Muslims
and Thai as their first
speak Tibetan, Mongolian
the national
languages, with Han Chinese
language that they learn in
school (having to learn Arabic and Persian, of course, in the mosque).
since Tajik is not an official language in China, the Tajiks
Interestingly,
of Xinjiang
(who speak a Daric branch language, distantly related to old
Persian, and quite different from the Tajik languages
spoken in Tajik
at school.
istan), learn in either Turkic Uyghur or Han Chinese
it is true that compared to most other Muslim
nationali
Nevertheless,
ties in China, most Hui are closer to the Han Chinese
in terms of
and cultural accommodation,
demographic
proximity
adapting many of
their Islamic practices to Han ways of life, which often became the source
for many of the criticisms of the Muslim
reformers. In the past, this was
not as great a problem for the Turkish and Indo-European Muslim groups,
as they were traditionally more isolated from the Han and their identities
not as threatened, though this has begun to change in the last 40 years.
As a result of state-sponsored
over
identification
nationality
campaigns
the course of the last 30 years, these groups have begun to think of
more
as ethnic nationalities,
themselves
than just
something more
"Muslims." The Hui are unique among the 55 identified nationalities
in
China in that they are the only one for whom religion is the only unifying

5. For the debate

see Lipman, Familiar

over

the definition
p. xxiv

of Hui

and reference

to them as "Sino-Muslims,"

Strangers,

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454

The China Quarterly

of the Hui nationality
category of identity, even though many members
not
Islam.
may
practise
from a succession
of Islamic reform movements
that swept
Resulting
across China over the last 600 years, one finds among the Muslims
in
China today a wide spectrum of Islamic belief. Archaeological
discover
ies of large collections
of Islamic artefacts and epigraphy on the south
east coast suggest that the earliest Muslim
in China were
communities
descended
from Arab, Persian, Central Asian
and Mongolian
Muslim
militia
and
officials
who
settled
first
China's
south-east
merchants,
along
coast from the seventh to the tenth centuries, and then in larger migra
tions to the north from Central Asia under the Mongol-Yuan
dynasty in
the 13th and 14th centuries,
the local
with
gradually
intermarrying
as
and
Chinese
their
children
Muslims.
populations
raising
Practising
clustered
Sunni, Hanafi Islam, residing in independent small communities
were
around a central mosque,
these communities
characterized
by
relatively isolated, independent Islamic villages and urban enclaves, who
related with each other via trading networks and recognition of belonging
to the wider Islamic "Umma," headed by an Ahong
(from the Persian,
on
a
more
or
was
to
invited
less
who
teach
akhunfd])
temporary basis.
Sufism began to make a substantial impact in China proper in the late
17th century, arriving mainly
trade routes with
along the Central Asian
both
Chinese
who
and
saintly shaykhs,
brought new teachings
foreign,
from the pilgrimage
cities. These
charismatic
teachers and tradesmen
networks and brotherhood
established widespread
associations,
including
most prominently
the Naqshbandiyya,
and Kubrawiyya.
The
Qadariyya
in
hierarchical
of
these
Sufi
networks
the
mobiliza
organization
helped
and political crises in the
tion of large numbers of Hui during economic
17th to 19th centuries, assisting widespread Muslim-led
rebellions
and
in
late
and
rule
resistance movements
against
Ming
Qing
imperial
Gansu
and
The
nationalist
revolution
1912
Yunnan,
Shaanxi,
Xinjiang.
in Muslim
concentrated
allowed further autonomy
regions of the north
areas
came
Muslim
wide
under
virtual
warlord
and
west,
control, leading
to frequent intra-Muslim
and Muslim-Han
conflicts until the eventual
led to the reassertion of central control. In the late
communist
victory
reform movements,
19th and early 20th century, Wahhabi-inspired
rose
to
known as the Yihewani
(from Ikhwan),
popularity under National
were
for their critical stance
and
noted
ist and warlord
sponsorship,
to Chinese practices, and
towards traditionalist Islam as too acculturated
Sufism as too attached to saint and tomb veneration.
in China
of Islam influenced all Muslim
nationalities
These movements
most
found
their
they
political expression among the Hui
today; however,
the task of accommodating
who were
each new Islamic
faced with
com
movement
with Chinese culture. Among
the north-western Muslim
more
recent
the
into
Chi
their
munities,
integration
especially
Uyghur,
nese society as a result of Mongolian
into
Central
and Manchu
expansion
that
Asian has forced them to reach social and political accommodations
their identity. In terms of integration,
the Uyghur as a
have challenged
society, while the Hui
people are perhaps the least integrated into Chinese

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Islam in China
are at the other end of the spectrum, as a result of several historical
social factors that are discussed below.

Uyghur

Indigeneity

and

the Challenge

to Chinese

and

Sovereignty

In 1997, bombs exploded

in a city park in Beijing on 13 May
(killing
one) and on two buses on 7 March
(killing two), as well as in the
north-western
border city of Urumqi,
the capital of Xinjiang
Uyghur
on 25 February (killing nine), with over 30 other
Autonomous
Region,
six in Tibet alone. Most of these are thought to have been
bombings,
related to demands by Muslim
and Tibetan separatists. Eight members
of
the Uyghur Muslim minority were executed on 29 May
1997 for alleged
in north-west China, with hundreds arrested on suspicion of
bombings
in separatist activities. Though
taking part in ethnic riots and engaging
the
since
such incidents have been
1980s,
sporadically
reported
early
in a recent scathing
increasingly common since 1997 and are documented
in
the
Inter
report on Chinese
government
region by Amnesty
policy
national.6 A recent report in the Wall Street Journal of the arrest on 11
1999 of Rebiya Kadir, a well known Uyghur
businesswoman,
August
a
visit
the
United
States
Research
Service
during
by
Congressional
to the region, indicates that China's
random arrests have not
delegation
nor is China concerned with Western
criticism.7
diminished,
To consider the interaction of Uyghur Muslims
with Chinese
society,
three interrelated aspects of regional history, economy and politics must
be examined.
histories
First, Chinese
every Uyghur
notwithstanding,
were the indigenous people of the
believes
that
their
ancestors
firmly
Tarim basin, which did not become known
as "Xinjiang"
in Chinese
until the 18th century. Nevertheless,
I have argued
("new dominion")
elsewhere
the constructed
of the Uyghur,
in which
the
"ethnogenesis"
current understanding
of the indigeneity of the present people classified
as Uyghur by the Chinese
state is a quite recent phenomenon
related to
Great Game rivalries,
Sino-Soviet
and Chi
geopolitical
manoeuvrings,
nese nation-building.8
a collection
While
of nomadic
steppe peoples
known as the "Uyghur" has existed since before the eighth century, this
identity was lost from the 15th to the 20th centuries. It was not until the
fall of the Turkish

Khanate
(552-744
CE) to a people reported by the
historians as Hui-he or Hui-hu
that we find the beginnings
of the
Uyghur Empire. At this time the Uyghur were but one collection of nine
nomadic
in confederation
with other Basmil
and
tribes, who
initially,
Karlukh nomads, defeated
the Second Turkish Khanate and then domi
nated the federation under the leadership of Koli Beile in 742.
Gradual
sedentarization
of
the Uyghur,
and
their defeat
of
Chinese

6. Amnesty
International,
Peoples Republic
of China:
in the Xinjiang
21
(London,
Uighur Autonomous
Region
7. Ian Johnson,
"China arrests noted businesswoman
Wall Street Journal,
18 August
1999.
8. Dru C. Gladney,
"The ethnogenesis
of the Uighur,"
1 (1990), p. 3.

Gross

Violations

1999).
April
in crackdown
Central

Asian

of Human
inMuslim
Studies,

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Rights
region,"

Vol.

9, No.

456

The China Quarterly

as trade with the unified Tang
the Turkish Khanate, occurred precisely
state became
lucrative. This was
especially
accompanied
by socio
the traditional
shamanistic
religious
change:
Turkic-speaking
Uyghur
came increasingly
under the influence of Persian Manichaeanism,
Bud
dhism and eventually Nestorian Christianity. Extensive
trade and military
state developed
to the
alliances along the old Silk Road with the Chinese
extent that the Uyghur
gradually adopted the cultural, dress and even
of the Uyghur capital of
agricultural practices of the Chinese. Conquest
in 840, without
in Mongolia
by the nomadic Kyrgyz
Karabalghasun
rescue from the Tang, who may have become by then intimidated by the
and crystallization
wealthy Uyghur empire, led to further sedentarization
now Turpan took
that
in
is
of Uyghur
One
branch
ended
what
up
identity.
oases surround
of
the
of
the
advantage
unique socio-ecology
glacier-fed
were
to
merchant
the
Taklamakan
and
able
their
and limited
preserve
ing
or
Khocho
the great
establishing
Gaochang,
agrarian practices, gradually
city-state based in Turpan for four centuries (850-1250).
Uyghur
of the Uyghur
from the tenth to as late as the 17th
The Islamicization
Buddhist
while
their
century,
religion, did little to bridge these
displacing
From
time
the people of "Uyghuristan"
that
oases-based
on,
loyalties.
centred in Turpan who resisted Islamic conversion until the 17th century
were the last to be known as Uyghur. The others were known only by
the arrival of Islam,
their oasis or by the generic term of "Turki." With
the ethnonym "Uyghur" fades from the historical record. It was not until
1760 that the Manchu Qing dynasty exerted full and formal control over
an
it as their "new dominions"
the region, establishing
(Xinjiang),
that lasted barely 100 years when it fell to the Yakub Beg
administration
and expanding Russian
rebellion (1864-1877)
influence.9 The end of the
rivalries
between China, Russia
and
the
rise
of
Great
Game
Qing dynasty
and Britain saw the region torn by competing
loyalties and marked by
two short-lived and drastically different attempts at an independence:
the
an
in
in
and
of
1933
"East
Turkestan
Kashgar
Republic"
proclamations
another in Yining
(Ghulje) in 1944.10 As Andrew Forbes has noted, these
rebellions and attempts at self-rule did little to bridge competing political,
differences within the Turkic people who became
in 1934 under successive Chinese KMT warlord
recent work suggests there is persist
Justin Rudelson's
administrations.11
the
ent regional diversity along three, and perhaps four macro-regions:

religious and regional

known as the Uyghur

north-western Zungharia plateau, the southern Tarim basin, the south-west

Pamir region and the eastern Kumul-Turpan-Hami
corridor.12 The recog
as an official Chinese
nition of the Uyghur
(minzu) in the
"nationality"
see Kim Ho-dong,
"The Muslim
9. For the best treatment of the Yakub Beg rebellion,
PhD dissertation,
in Chinese
Central Asia,
of the Kashgar
Emirate
rebellion
1864-1877,"
1986
Harvard University,
to Chinese
in
The Moslem
The Hi Rebellion:
10. Linda Benson,
Authority
Challenge
1944-1949
1990).
(New York: M.E.
Sharpe,
Xinjiang,
in Chinese
and Muslims
Central Asia (Cambridge:
11. Andrew D. W., Forbes, Warlords
Press,
1986), p. 29.
Cambridge
University
Silk Road
Oasis
Identities:
12. Justin Jon Rudelson,
Along China's
Uyghur Nationalism
Press,
1997), pp. 40-45.
(New York: Columbia
University

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Islam in China
1930s in Xinjiang under a Soviet-influenced
policy of nationality recogni
tion contributed to a widespread
acceptance
today of continuity with the
as a bonafide
ancient Uyghur kingdom and their eventual "ethnogenesis"
The "nationality"
under the KMT
identified five
nationality.
policy
peoples of China, with the Han in the majority. This policy was continued
under the Communists,
who eventually
recognized 56 nationalities, with
a 91 per cent majority
the Han occupying
in 1990.
The "peaceful
liberation" by the Chinese Communists
of Xinjiang
in
as the Xinjiang Uyghur Auton
1949, and its subsequent establishment
omous Region on 1 October
the Nationalist
1955, perpetuated
policy of
the Uyghur as a minority nationality under Chinese rule. This
recognizing
nationality designation not only masks tremendous regional and linguistic
it also includes groups such as the Loplyk and Dolans who had
diversity,
very little to do with the oasis-based Turkic Muslims who became known
as the Uyghur. At the same time, contemporary Uyghur
separatists look
to the brief periods of independent
self-rule under Yakub Beg and
Turkestan Republics,
in addition to the earlier glories of the
as evidence
in Turpan and Karabalghasan,
of their
kingdoms
Uyghur
rightful claims to the region. Contemporary
Uyghur
separatist organiza
tions based in Istanbul, Ankara, Almaty, Munich, Amsterdam, Melbourne
and Washington,
DC, may differ on their political goals and strategies for
back

the Eastern

the region, but they all share a common vision of a unilineal Uyghur
claim on the region, disrupted by Chinese
and Soviet intervention. The
of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics
in 1991 has
independence
done much to encourage these Uyghur organizations
in their hopes for an
the fact the new, mainly Muslim
"Turkestan,"
independent
despite
Central Asian governments
all signed protocols with China in the spring
of 1996 that they would not harbour or support separatist groups.
Within

though many portray the Uyghur as united around

causes, they continue to be divided from within by
in this case competing
Sufi and non-Sufi
conflicts,
factions,
religious
territorial loyalties (whether they be oases or places of origin), linguistic
commoner-elite
alienation
and
discrepancies,
competing
political
loyalties. These divided
loyalties were evidenced
by the attack in May
1996 on the Imam of the Idgah Mosque
as
in Kashgar by other Uyghurs,
well as the assassination
of at least six Uyghur
officials
in September
2001. It is also important to note that Islam was only one of several
separatist

the region,
or Islamist

on those with whom

for Uyghur
unifying markers
identity, depending
at the time. For example,
to the Hui Muslim
they were in co-operation
the Uyghur
as
themselves
the
Chinese,
distinguish
legitimate
a
autochthonous
since
both
share
in
belief
Sunni
Islam.
minority,
In contrast to the nomadic Muslim
(Kazakh or Kyrgyz), Uyghur
peoples
stress
to
their
oases
attachment
land
and
the
of origin. In opposition
might
to the Han Chinese,
the Uyghur
will
their
generally
emphasize
in
the
This
that
Islamic
fundamentalist
long history
suggests
region.
as the Taliban
such
in Afghanistan
as
groups
(often
glossed
in
the
have
will
limited
the
"Wahhabiyya"
region)
only
appeal among
It is this contested understanding
of history that continues
to
Uyghur.

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458

The China Quarterly

influence much of the current debate over separatist and Chinese
claims
to the region.
International
has claimed
that the round-ups of so-called
Amnesty
terrorists and separatists have led to hurried public trials and immediate,
of possibly
thousands
of locals. One Amnesty
summary executions
International estimate suggested that in a country known for its frequent
had the highest number, averaging
1.8 per week,
executions,
Xinjiang
most of them Uyghur.
to the area, related to the
Troop movements
nation-wide
campaign against crime known as "Strike Hard" launched in
includes
the call to erect a "great wall of steel" against
in Xinjiang,
have reportedly been the largest since the sup
in April
insurrection
1990 (the first major
pression of the large Akto
that took place in the Southern Tarim region near
uprising in Xinjiang
Baren Township,
which
initiated a series of unrelated
and sporadic
1998

that

separatists

incursions of Taliban fighters

Alleged
through the Wakhan
into China where Xinjiang
shares a narrow border with
have led to the area being swamped with Chinese
security
Afghanistan
at least one month prior to
forces and large military exercises, beginning
concern
the 11 September
attack, and suggesting
growing government
about these border areas. Under US and Chinese
pressure, Pakistan
returned one Uyghur activist to China, apprehended
among hundreds of
Taliban detainees, which follows a pattern of repatriations of suspected
protests).
corridor

and Uzbekistan.
Uyghur
separatists in Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan
for Uyghur rights and possible
International campaigns
independence
on the
vocal and well organized,
have become
increasingly
especially
to
have
been
made
Abdulahat
internet. Repeated
public
appeals
in
Government
Chairman
of Xinjiang
the Uyghur People's
Abdurixit,
of
the
elected
chair
the
Nations
and
Unrepresented
Urumqi. Notably,
is a Uyghur, Erkin
(UNPO) based in the Hague
People's Organization
son of the separatist leader, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who is buried
Alptekin,
to his memory.
in Istanbul where
there is a park dedicated
Supporting
1million
expatriate Uyghurs
(yet
primarily an audience of approximately
in Central Asia and China have access to these internet
few Uyghurs
and websites
sites) there are at least 25 international
organizations
in
of "Eastern Turkestan,"
and based
for the independence
working
DC
and
New
Istanbul, Melbourne,
Amsterdam,
Munich,
Washington,
has disclaimed
each of these organizations
York. Since 11 September,
or
a
for
resolution
for
violence
terrorism,
any support
pressing
peaceful
in the region. The growing
influence of "cyber
of ongoing
conflicts
cause con
of the Uyghur
separatism" and international popularization
cerns Chinese
authorities, who
do
pose a real domestic
Uyghurs

hope to convince
and international

the world
that the
terrorist threat.
Since 1991, China has been a
of its
Muslims.
Mishandling

The second pressing issue is economic.

net oil importer. It also has 20 million
Muslim
problems will alienate trading partners in the Middle East, who
are primarily Muslims.
after an ethnic riot on 5 February
1997
Already,
at
nine
of
that
left
least
in the north-western Xinjiang
Uyghur
city
Yining
Muslims
dead and several hundreds arrested, the Saudi Arabian official

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Islam

in China

newspaper al-Bilad warned China about the "suffering of [its] Muslims

Turhan
whose human rights are violated." Turkey's Defence Minister,
of
the
China's
and
China
condemned
issue,
handling
Tayan, officially
to
not
in
internal
interfere
China's
affairs.
responded by telling Turkey
the new Central Asian
Muslim
nations on China's
borders,
including
and Afghanistan,
of
though officially
unsupportive
treatment
be
critical
of
harsh
separatists, may
Uyghur
increasingly
to fellow Turkic and/or Muslim
in China.
extended
co-religionists
Unrest
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
lead to a
Region may
decline in outside oil investment and revenues that are already operating
came up dry in
at a loss. Recently,
Exxon reported that its two wells
states,

Pakistan

China's
oil-rich Tarim basin of southern Xinjiang, with the
supposedly
tons of crude oil, much
entire region yielding only 3.15 million metric
tons. The World Bank
less than China's
overall output of 156 million
lends over $3 billion a year to China, investing over $780.5 million
in 15
in the Xinjiang Region alone, with some of that money allegedly
to
the Xinjiang
Production
and Construction
going
Corps (XPCC) that
human rights activist Harry Wu
has claimed
laogai
employs
prison
labour. International companies and organizations,
from theWorld Bank
to Exxon, may not wish to subject their employees
and investors to social
a
and political upheavals. As
result of these criticisms, many Bank and
projects

projects have been curtailed in recent years.

China's
trade with Central Asia is expanding at a rapid rate, with the
links since 1991. Energy
opening of direct rail, air and six overland
economist
James P. Dorian has noted that Xinjiang's
trade with Central
Asia increased from $463 million
in 1992 to $775 million
in 1996. The
end of 1992 saw an increase of 130 per cent in cross-border
trade, with
Kazakhstan
the most. China is now Kazakhstan's
fifth largest
benefiting
trade partner. Xinjiang's
top three trading partners are Kazakhstan,
ADB

and Hong Kong, with China-Kazakhstan

trade alone totalling
Xinjiang
more than Turkey's
trade with all of Central Asia.13 Additionally,
China
is hoping to increase revenues from tourism to the region, marketing
it as
an important link on the ancient Silk Road. It has been a tremendous draw
to foreign Muslim
South-East
tourists, as well as Japanese, Taiwanese,
Asian
and domestic
touristic development
the
tourists, with
assisting
of five-star hotels
establishment
the region,
the
throughout
including
Inn in Urumqi. Economic
in Urumqi
alone has
Holiday
development
witnessed
80 new skyscrapers
in the last ten years.
It is clear that Uyghur
separatism or Muslim
complaints
regarding
Chinese

for Chinas economic

policy will have important consequences
of the region. Tourists and foreign businessmen
will cer
development
tainly avoid areas with ethnic strife and terrorist activities. China will
continue to use its economic
leverage with its Central Asian neighbours
to prevent such disruptions.
and Russia

13. James P. Dorian, Brett Wigdortz

and Dru Gladney,
"Central Asia and Xinjiang,
China:
and ethnic relations,"
Central Asian Survey, Vol.
economic,
16, No. 4

energy,
emerging
(1997), p. 466.

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460

The China Quarterly

The

third aspect is political. China's

international
relations with its
as
and
nations
internal
such
and Tibet have
regions
Xinjiang
bordering
reasons dis
not
become
for
the
economic
increasingly
important
only
desire to participate
in international
but also for China's
as
the
such
World
Trade
and
Asia-Pacific
Organization
organizations
Economic
Council. Though Tibet is no longer of any real strategic or
substantial economic value to China, it is politically
important to China's
current leadership to indicate that they will not submit to foreign pressure
have begun to work
and withdraw
their iron hand from Tibet. Uyghurs
to
with
Tibetans
put political pressure on China in
closely
internationally
international fora. In an 7 April 1997 interview by this author in Istanbul
cussed

above

of the Eastern Turkestan Foundation

with Ahmet T?rk?z, vice-director
that works for an independent Uyghur homeland, Mr T?rk?z noted that
since 1981, meetings
had been taking place between the Dalai Lama and
initiated
Isa Yusup
leaders,
by the deceased Uyghur nationalist
Uyghur
cannot
to
force
These
international
fora
China
its
change
Alptekin.
over
more
in
the
US
the
of
than
the
annual
debate
renewal
policy, any
status. Nevertheless,
to
Nation
Most-Favoured
they continue
a
As
China
influence China's ability to co-operate
result,
internationally.
to domestic
ethnic
has sought to respond rapidly, and often militarily,
affairs that might have international
implications.
As China goes through the process of reintegrating Hong Kong since
residents of
1997 with the hope of eventually
reuniting with Taiwan,
deals
other
how
with
will
be
China
watching
problems of
Hong Kong
March
visit to
the
Dalai
Lama's
1998
national
integration. During
to
for
China
consider
he
renounced
Taiwan,
calling
independence,
again
Tibet under the same "two systems, one country" policy as Hong Kong,
to call him a "separatist."
continued
yet Renmin ribao (People's Daily)
China's

Taiwan will certainly be watching how well Hong Kong is integrated into
China as a Special Administrative
Region with a true separate system of
as so-called
as
to
and Xinjiang,
which
Tibet
government,
opposed
from
decision
have
little
actual
Autonomous
very
autonomy
Regions
issues in
in Beijing. China's handling of ethnic and integrationist
makers
a
on
direct
its
will
have
and
possible
bearing
Hong Kong
Xinjiang
reunification with Taiwan.
In addition, outside the official minorities,
China possesses
tremendous
in
Intolerance
towards
difference
and
ethnic, linguistic
regional diversity.
to
in
cultural
be
extended
Guangdong,
limiting
pluralism
Xinjiang might
are spoken and folk religious
where at least 15 dialects of Cantonese
are strong of the repressions
of the
is rampant. Memories
when all forms of diversity, political or
Revolution
(1966-76),
entails
If rising Chinese
nationalism
cultural, were
severely curtailed.
then anyone who is regarded as
reducing ethnic and cultural difference,
"other" in China will suffer, not just the Uyghurs.

practice
Cultural

Hui Muslims

and Islamic Accommodation

Islam in China

has primarily

to Chinese

been propagated

Society

over the last 1,300 years

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Islam

in China

among the people now known as Hui. Yet many of the issues confronting
on China's
them are relevant to the Turkic and Indo-European Muslims
Inner Asian frontier. Though Hui speak a number of non-Chinese
lan
are
most
to
than
Hui
Han
Chinese
Muslim
national
closer
other
guages,
and cultural accommodation.
ities in terms of demographic
proximity
The attempt to adapt many of their Muslim
practices to the Han way of
life has led to criticisms amongst Muslim
reformers. The Hui are unique
in China in that they are the only
among the 55 identified nationalities
one for whom religion (Islam) is the only unifying category of identity,
even though many members
of the Hui nationality may not practise
Islam. As a result of Islamic
reform movements
that have
swept
across China, the Hui continue to subscribe to a wide spectrum of Islamic
belief.
the earliest communist
call for equality,
Many Muslims
supported
freedom
of
and
status, and
autonomy,
religion
recognized
nationality
were active in the early establishment
of the People's Republic of China.
However, many became disenchanted
by growing critiques of religious
in 1957. During the
practice during several periods in the PRC beginning
Cultural Revolution
Muslims
became
the focus for both
(1966-76),
and anti-ethnic nationalism
anti-religious
critiques, leading to widespread
of 1,000
mosque
persecutions,
closings and at least one large massacre
a 1975 uprising
Hui following
in Yunnan province.
Since Deng Xiao
have sought to take advantage
of
reforms, Muslims
ping's post-1978
liberalized economic and religious policies, while keeping a watchful eye
on the ever-swinging
of Chinese
radical politics. There are
pendulum
now more mosques
open in China than there were prior to 1949, and
as well as engaging
Muslims
travel freely on the Hajj to Mecca,
in
cross-border
trade with co-religionists
in Central Asia,
the Middle
East
and increasingly
South-East Asia.
Increasing Muslim
political activism on a national scale and rapid state
response indicates the growing
importance Beijing attaches to Muslim
related issues. In 1986 Uygurs
in Xinjiang marched
through the streets of
Urumqi protesting against a wide range of issues, including the environ
mental degradation of the Zungharian plain, nuclear testing in the Takla
to Xinjiang
increased Han
and ethnic insults at
makan,
immigration
Muslims
Xinjiang
University.
throughout China protested
against the
of a Chinese
book Sexual Customs
in May
1989, and a
publication
children's
book in October
1993, that portrayed Muslims,
particularly
their restriction against pork, in a derogatory
fashion. In each case, the
demands,
responded quickly, meeting most of the Muslims'
the publications
and arresting the authors, and closing down
houses.
Islamic factional struggles continue to divide China's Muslims
intern
as increased travel to the Middle East prompts criticism
ally, especially

government

condemning
the printing

of Muslim

to new, often
practices at home and exposes China's Muslims
ideals.
In
Islamic
four
Sufi
radical,
1994,
politically
February
Naqshbandi
to long-term imprisonment
leaders were sentenced
for their support of
internal factional disputes in the southern Ningxia
region that had led to

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The China Quarterly

at least 60 deaths on both sides and People's Liberation Army interven
in
tion. Throughout
the summer and autumn of 1993 bombs exploded
several towns in Xinjiang,
indicating the growing demands of organiza
tions pressing for an "independent Turkestan."
In February 1997, a major
and the arrest of
uprising in Hi led to the deaths of at least 13 Uyghur
hundreds. Beijing has responded with increased military presence, partic
as well
as diplomatic
and Urumqi,
efforts
in the
ularly in Kashghar
Central Asian states and Turkey to discourage
foreign support for sepa
are critical of
It is clear that Hui and Kazakh Muslims
ratist movements.
but it is not yet clear how
these separatist actions among the Uyghur,
the Uyghur
there is for the violent
much
acts,
support even among
a
one
recent
to
assassinate
Imam
in
attempt
"collaborating"
especially
trade between Xinjiang
and
Kashgar. At the same time, cross-border
since the reopening
in
Central Asia has grown tremendously,
especially
and Alma Ata with
1991 of the Eurasian Railroad
linking Urumqi
travel between Xinjiang
markets
in China and Eastern Europe. Overland
and Kazakhstan
has also increased
Tajikstan, Kyrgyzstan
with
the
relaxation
of
travel
restrictions
based on Deng
dramatically
over
to
in the area. The
trade
interests
security
giving priority
Xiaoping's
to
the
of
government's
seeking
policy
buy support through stimulating
seems to be working
at the present.
Income levels in
local economy
are often far higher than those across the border, yet increased
Xinjiang
and Pakistan,

to participate
in the region's
lucrative oil and mining
Han migration
areas in north
industries continues to exacerbate ethnic tensions. Muslim
ern and central China, however,
to be left behind as China's
continue
rapid economic growth expands unevenly,
enriching the southern coastal
areas far beyond that of the interior.
While
further restricting Islamic freedoms in the border regions, at the
aware of the importance
same time China has become more keenly
on
treatment
of its Muslim minor
its
Muslim
governments
place
foreign
ities as a factor
of
establishment

The
in its lucrative
trade and military
agreements.
in 1991 and
ties with Saudi Arabia
full diplomatic
states
increasing military and technical trade with Middle Eastern Muslim
treatment of its
salience of China's
and political
enhances the economic
internal Muslim minority
signed with
population. The official protocols
in 1996 with the group
China's Central Asian border nations beginning
5" (China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
known as the "Shanghai
Kyrgyzstan,
(as the Shanghai
role in the
China's
growing
Organization),
Co-operative
concerns
over
The
increased
and
transnational
trade
and
security.
region
will be an important factor in their
of China's Muslims
transnationalism
as well as practised accommodation
to Chinese culture
ethnic expression
Tajikstan)

and expanded

in 2001

to include Uzbekistan

underlines

and state authority.

Islam and Chinese

Nationalism

in China cannot but be nationalistic,

activism
Increased Muslim
yet a
that may often transcend the boundaries of the contemporary

nationalism

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Islam

in China

via mass communications,

increased travel and the internet.
nation-state,
Earlier Islamic movements
in China were precipitated by China's open
leaders in the
ing to the outside world. No matter what conservative
a new
China's
Muslims
have
reached
government might wish,
politics
to
an
of
wants
If
China
in
international
openness.
stage
participate
this is unavoidable. With
the opening to
political sphere of nation-states,
in recent years, travel to and from the Islamic heartlands has
the West
increased in China. In 1984, over 1,400 Muslims
left China
dramatically
to go on the Hajj. This number
to over 2,000
increased
in 1987,
a return to pre-1949
levels, and in the late 1990s, official
representing
numbers
Hajj
regularly surpassed 6,000, with many others travelling in
Several Hui
students are
through third countries.
private
capacities
enrolled
in
and
Islamic
Arabic
at
studies
the
Al-Azhar
Univer
presently
in
with
others
Islamic
abroad.
many
sity
Egypt,
seeking
training
in China
state, relations between Muslims
by the Chinese
Encouraged
more
and the Middle
East are becoming
and
stronger
frequent, partly
from a desire to establish
and
trading partners for arms, commodities
and
as
a
China's
traditional
view
of
itself
currency exchanges,
partly by
leader of the Third World.
of
Muslims
Delegations
foreign
regularly
travel to prominent
Islamic sites in China, in a kind of state-sponsored
are encouraged. While
the state hopes
tourism, and donations
religious
that private Islamic investment will assist economic
the
development,
vast majority of grants by visiting foreign Muslims
have been donated to
the rebuilding of Islamic mosques,
schools and hospitals. As Hui in China
are further exposed
to Islamic internationalism,
and they return from
studies and pilgrimages
abroad, traditional Hui identities will once again
be reshaped and called into question, giving rise to new manifestations
of
Islam in China. Global
Islam is thus localized into Hui Islam, finding its
as a range of accommodations
between Chineseness
and
expression
as defined in each local community.
Muslimness
While
further restricting Islamic freedoms in the border regions, at the
same time the state has become more keenly aware of the
importance
treatment of its Muslim
governments
foreign Muslim
place on China's
as a factor in its lucrative trade and
minorities
agreements. The
military
of full diplomatic
establishment
ties with Saudi Arabia
in 1991 and
states
increasing military and technical trade with Middle Eastern Muslim
enhances the economic
and political
salience of China's
treatment of its
internal Muslim minority
of
population. The increased transnationalism
China's Muslims
will be an important factor in their ethnic expression as
well as in their accommodation
to Chinese
culture and state authority.
Internal

Conversion

While
are as confusing
Islamic associations
to the non-initiate
as are
the numerous
schools of Buddhist
thought in China, they differ in that
in them is hotly disputed in China. Unlike Middle Eastern or
membership
Central Asian
Islamic orders, where one might belong
to two or even
three brotherhoods
at once, the Hui belong to only one. Among
the Hui,

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464

The China Quarterly

one is generally born into one's Islamic order, or converts dramatically
to
I encountered
another. In fact, this is the only instance of conversion
among my sojourn among the Hui. I never met a Han who had converted
to Islam in China without having been married
to a Hui or adopted into
a Hui family, though I heard of a few isolated instances. Fletcher records
of 28 Tibetan tribes as well as their "Living Buddha" by
the conversion
in the mid 18th century.14 After the 1784
Ma Laichi in Xunhua, Qinghai
Ma Mingxin
the
forbade non-Muslims
from
uprising,
Qing government
some
on
to
which
have
had
influence
the
few
Islam,
may
converting
recorded Han conversions. This goes against the common assumption
that
Islam in China was
and
conversion.
spread through proselytization
Islamic preachers in China, including Ma Laichi, Ma Mingxin,
Qi Jingyi
and Ma Qixi, spent most of their time trying to convert other Muslims.
Islam in China for the most part has grown biologically
through birth and
intermarriage.

Hui

Islamic

Orders

and Chinese

Culture

tensions and conflicts that led to the rise and divisions of the Sufi
in north-west
and subsequent
non-Sufi
China,
reforms, are
to
enumerate
in
their
how
complexity.
They give evidence,
impossible
to
ever, of the ongoing struggles that continue to make Islam meaningful
The

menhuan

These tensions between

Islamic ideals and social realities
Hui Muslims.
are often left unresolved.
derives from the ques
Their very dynamism
tions they raise and the doubts they engender among people struggling
in the midst
of changing
social contexts.
with
traditional meanings
when
the Hui are
of
and
become
Questions
paramount
purity
legitimacy
and political
and
faced with radical internal socio-economic
change,
to
of
Islam
from
the
outside
Muslim
different
exposed
interpretations
world. These conflicts and reforms reflect an ongoing debate in China
an important disjunction
over Islamic orthodoxy,
between
revealing
interpretations.
"scripturalist" and "mystical"
In a similar fashion,
Islam has often
the study of South-East Asian
the native culture
and compromise
between
centred on the contradiction
and the shan a of orthodox
of the indigenous Muslims
Islam, the
The
and
the
the
real
and
ideal.15
supposed accommo
scriptural,
mystical
tenets to local cultural practices
has led
Islamic
dation of orthodox
as syncretism,
assimi
scholars to dismiss or explain such compromise
as has been described
the Hui. An
"sinification,"
among
more
one
tune
in
with
the
interests of
and
perhaps
approach,
as the basis for ongoing dialecti
sees this incongruence
Hui themselves,
and conflicts within
cal tensions that have often led to reform movements
lation

and

alternative

14. See Trippner,

groups and grave-cults
15. This distinction
on studies
reflections
(1985), pp. 8-10.

in Nordwest
und Graberkult
China"
"Islamische
("Muslim
Gruppe
in north-west
China"), Die Welt des Islams, No. 7 (1961), pp. 154-55.
was most fully articulated
"Islam obscured?
Some
Roff,
by William
en Indon?sie
in Asia," L'Islam
Vol.
of Islam and society
1, No. 29

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Islam in China
communities.16
Following Max Weber,17 one can see the wide
as reflecting
of local world
processes
variety of Islamic expression
a major re
for social conduct whereby
construction
and programmes
an
to
ligious tradition becomes meaningful
indigenous
society.
are also
In the competition
for scarce resources,
these conflicts
as
in
and
economic
such
the
concerns,
example of
prompted by
expressed
the non-Sufi Xi Dao Tang who were defeated by the Sufi Khufiyya
clearly a case of coveting his Muslim brother's wealth. Fletcher notes that
one of the criticisms of the Khufiyya was that their recitation of theMing
Sha Le took less time than the normal Quranic suras by non-Sufi clergy,
and therefore their Imams were cheaper to hire at ritual ceremonies. He

Muslim

that this assisted

their rise in popularity
and criticism by the
suggests
Gedimu
criticized both the Gedimus
leaders.18 The Yihewani
religious
and Sufis for only performing rituals in believers' homes for profit, and
advocated the practice, "If you recite, do not eat; if you eat, do not recite"
The Chinese state has generally found
(nianjing bu chi, chi bu nianjing).
reasons
for criticizing
economic
certain Islamic orders among the Hui.
the Land Reform
of the 1950s, which
During
campaigns
appropriate
and wagf (Islamic endowment)
mosque
holdings,
they met great resist
ance from the Sufi menhuan which had accumulated
a great deal due to
a
their hierarchical
centralized
1958 document
leadership. In
criticizing
Ma Zhenwu,
the Jahriyya Sufi shaykh, the following accusations are quite
revealing:
or
to these
Ma
Chen-wu
instituted
"A-mai-lis,"
many
According
representatives,
to which
to commemorate
ancestors
festival
the dead
must
the A-hungs
be
days
to chant
invited
the scriptures
and be treated with
big feasts,
thereby
squeezing
he has kept a record of the days
living for the dead. For example,
of all the family members
of his followers
and has seen to it that
services
be held on such days. These
include
"Grandmother's
"Wife's
religious
Day,"
"Aunt's
of such "A-mai-lis"
in a year. On
and others,
the
Day,"
Day,"
sixty-five
one
or
seven
are
seven
such
"A-mai-li"
is
held
six
which
average,
every
days, among

money

of birth

occasions
appointed
big sum
[tombs],

out

of

the

and death

of

big festival
by Ma Chen-wu.
... Ma
of money
squeezed

the Hui

... All

the A-hungs
of the Islamic mosques
been
have
a
the appointment
of A-hungs
he has squeezed
Through
has regularly,
in the name
of repairing
the "kung-peis"
for money.19
people

The tensions arising from the conflict of Chinese cultural practices and
Islamic
ideals have led to the rise and powerful
appeal of Islamic
movements
One way of looking at this tension
among Hui Muslims.
between
cultural practice and Islamic ideals I explored
in an earlier

16. See Dale F. Eickelman,

Moroccan
And Society
In A Pilgrimage
Islam: Tradition
Center
of Texas Press,
(Austin and London: University
1976), pp. 10-13.
17. Max Weber,
2 vols. (Berkeley: University
and Society,
of California
Press,
Economy

1978).
18. Joseph Fletcher,
Studies on Chinese
and Islamic Inner Asia (London: Varorum
1996), p. 21.
in Donald
19. Quoted
E. Maclnnis,
and Practice
in Communist
Religious
Policy
(New York: MacMillan,
1972), pp. 171-72.

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Press,
China

The China Quarterly

work.20 In China there were many attempts to reconcile Chinese
culture
with Islam, leading to a range of alternatives. At one extreme there are
those who reject any integration of Islam with Chinese
culture, such as
return to an Arabicized
at the
Ma Wanfu's
Islam.
"pure"
Conversely,
other extreme,
there are those leaders of the Gedimu,
such as Hu
so
who accepted more
Dengzhou,
integration with traditional Chinese
Xi
Dao
Ma
stressed
the
Qixi's
Tang
ciety. Likewise,
complete compati
Islamic
bility of Chinese and Islamic culture, the importance of Chinese
two
the
the
Confucian
of
and
the
texts,
systems,
harmony
reading of the
Quran in Chinese.
In between, one finds various attempts at changing Chinese
society to
or
"fit" a Muslim
transformationist
militant
world,
Islam, as
through
illustrated by the largely Naqshbandiyya-led
Hui
19th-century
uprisings.
The Jahriyya sought to implement an alternative vision of the world in
their society, and this posed a threat to the Qing as well as to other Hui
Muslims,
earning them the label of "heterodox" (xiejiao) and persecution
state. By contrast, other Hui reformers have attempted
the
Chinese
by
throughout history to make Islam "fit" Chinese
society, such as Liu Zhi's
to
demonstrate
the Confucian morality
monumental
effort
of Islam. The
alternative represents resolution of this tension through ascetic
Qadiriyya
an inner mystical
withdrawal
from the world. Qi Jingyi advocated
the dualism of Islam and the Chinese world is absolved
journey where
through grasping the oneness of Allah found inside every believer. These
various approaches
attempts to deal with the
represent socio-historical
relationship of relating the world religion of Islam to the local Chinese
realm.

to examine
this range of alternatives
is to generalize
Another way
themselves.
In
this
about the Muslim
nationalities
scheme, the Uyghur
can be seen to be much more
to
resistant
into
accepting
integration
in that they are the only
Chinese
groups,
society than other Muslim
in China expressing
Muslim minority
strong desires for a separate state
not
at
it
is
all clear that all Uyghur
desire
although
(Uyghuristan)
are
At
the
other
it
could
be
that
the
Hui
extreme,
independence.
argued
the most

into Chinese
integrated of all the Muslim minorities
society and
a
an
This
and
in
culture.
is both
that they often
advantage
disadvantage
have greater access to power and resources within Chinese
society, but at
same
or
time risk either the loss of their identity
the rejection of other
the
into Chinese
groups in China as being too assimilated
society, to
a
there is
nationali
the detriment of Islam. In between
range of Muslim
to the Uyghur
in resisting Chinese
culture and
ties who are closer
a distinct language and identity (Uzbeks, Kazakh, Kyrgyz
maintaining

Muslim

and Tajiks), and those who are much closer to the Hui in accommodation
to Chinese culture (Dongxiang
and Bonan). While much of this is due to
historical
interaction and locale, it can be a heuristic way of examining

Chinese:
Ethnic Nationalism
20. Gladney, Muslim
MA: Harvard University
Press,
1996), p. 75. This
Christ and Culture
Richard Niebuhr's
(New York:

in the People
'sRepublic
(Cambridge,
scheme
is influenced
by H.
interpretive
and Row,
1951).
Harper

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Islam in China
in their daily expression of
the challenges faced by each Muslim minority
it must be clearly noted,
society. Here,
identity and Islam in Chinese
are
to
this overly generalized
that there
however,
many
exceptions
(such as Party officials and secularists) who
pattern, for example Uyghur
are quite integrated
into Chinese
society, and Hui (such as religious
live their lives in strident
Imams and rebellious
youths) who might
resistance to Chinese
culture.

Ethnic Muslim

Nationalism

is not

of Globalization

to the new

tide of ethnic nationalism

and
"primordial politics" sweeping Europe, Africa and Asia in the post-Cold
War period. Much of it is clearly due to a response to globalization
in
terms of localization:
increasing nationalism arising from the organization
of the world into nation-states. No longer content to sit on the sidelines,
the nations within
these states are playing a greater role in the public
suggests is the defining characteristic of
sphere, which J?rgen Habermas
In most of these nationalist
civil society in the modern
nation-state.21
role in
movements,
religion, culture and racialization
play a privileged
China

immune

in an Age

the boundaries
of the nation. In China, Islam will continue to
defining
in countries
play an important role in debates about the nation, especially
is defined by a mix of religion and ethnicity. These
where nationality
are not unlike those made on a
accommodations
of China's Muslims
in Asia and in theWest. The
daily basis among other Muslim minorities
contraction of time
only difference may be the increasingly post-modern
and space: accommodations
that took over a millennia
in China are now
in a matter of hours or
required of Muslim
diasporic communities
in
For
Muslims
Pakistani
and
China,
days.
Bangladeshi workers in Tokyo
and Seoul, and the other wider diaspora, Muslims
may be becoming
"unfamiliar"
to
strangers. If the "war on terrorism" widens
increasingly
divide the West
and China against Muslim
in general, one
communities
can expect the Muslims
in China will be increasingly regarded as a threat
to state rule and social integration. This does not bode well for the future
into the Chinese
leviathan.
integration of Muslims

being

21. J?rgen
Transformation

tr. Thomas
Habermas,
of the Public
Sphere

Burger

and

(Cambridge,

Frederick
MA: MIT

The Structural
Lawrence,
1989 (1st ed. 1962).

Press,

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467