ANDREW O.

FORT

THE CONCEPT

OF SAKS. IN IN A D V A I T A

VED.~NTA

The nature of knowing and the knower are central concerns in many schools
of Indian thought. Several refer to an unchanging knower or seer "behind"
the ever-fluctuating intellect. Adherents of advaita Vedanta in particular
have examined the fundamental difference between the knowing self and
the intellect. In advaita, the knowing self is often called the s~ksin, commonly
rendered witness. 1
I propose to look at the use of this concept by various advaitin thinkers
from Safikara (c. 7 0 0 - 7 5 0 , following Nakamura (1983)) to Dharmar~ja
(c. seventeenth century), attending to persisting themes as well as varying
emphases. 2 My primary interest is to differentiate two conceptions of sgk.sin:
sak.sin as witness, an eternal, passive observer, and sgk.sin as field, the context
or "space" for all contents or form. The distinction between witness and
field should be of interest to students of advaita or other Indian schools
of thought and of philosophy of mind generally.
Almost all advaitin writers ascribe certain characteristics to the sgksin.
It is eternal, non-dual, and unchanging a ; moreover, it is particularly differentiated from the mind or intellect (antah.karana, dhi, buddhi) and the
perceiver, perceiving, perceived triad. 4 The s~k.sin is also linked with pure
consciousness (caitanya) and the self (gtman, versus the jiva or [gvara). It
is self-luminous and self-evidencing. The image of pure light is suggestive
here: like the s~k.sin, light immediately reveals all objects and is not dependent on them; the s~k.sin and light are pervasive and unconditioned.
The s~ksin is often described as a passive knower or observer (thus "witness"). From this point of view, a problem immediately arises: using such a
concept assumes something to be witnessed (sLk.sya), thus intrinsic differentiation or limitation. There must be some limitation for there to be witnessing
o f anything. If the s~k.sin is described as pure, pervasive consciousness, is
it then appropriate to call it a "witness"?
The advaitin consensus seems to be that this witnessing arises from the
self's merely adventitous connection with the intellect or antal!.karan.a
(internal instrument). This mental instrument, part of everyday appearance
Journal oflndian Philosophy 12 (1984) 277-290. 0022-1791/84/0123-0277 $01.40.
1984 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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ANDREW O. FORT

(vyavah~ra/sarfis~ra), relates the s~k.sin to "things" which arm seen. It performs

the active seeing of "objects". Ultimately, however, the ~tman, being all, is
merely observing itself (as appearance).
Another way of looking at the s~ksin may also prove illuminating, s This
way is focussed less on its knower/observer aspect. From this point of view,
the s~k.sin is the "field" of consciousness/being within which the knower/
knowing/known distinctions arise. By the term field, I am not suggesting a
physical area (k.setra), part of the objective realm, but rather the context for
contents, or "space" in which forms may appear (as an energy field in physics).
S~k.sin is the field of consciousness and "external" being.
In this conception, the falsely individualized ' T ' discriminates specific
contents (thoughts and "objects") within the pervasively illumined field
or context. This ' T ' identifies itself with a portion of the field (or takes a
specific point-of-view, depending on whether one wants to emphasize the
physical or mental aspect). The field is more extensive than, and the "ground"
of, the viewer.
In advaitin terms, the non-dual field consists of unmodified, eternally pure
consciousness (caitanya) within which specific, momentary modifications/
manifestations take place. What we call the known is that which a v.rtti (mental
modification) 6 is holding before the intellect or internal instrument.
Active seeing (observing or viewing a particular thing) thus arises in the
"localized" ant al3karan.a and its v.rttis, which are not intrinsic to the s~k.sin.
This conception therefore minimizes the witnesser/witnessed duality, emphasizing
that conditioned "things" appear within the unconditioned field. In the
conclusion, I will suggest that these two conceptions indicate two different
but related usages of sak.sin: ontologically, sgk.sin is essentially (svarfipa)
~tma-caitanya, and psychologically or empirically, s~ksin is the observer, the
first and last vestige of person-ality. In the writings considered below, we
shall see elements of both conceptions.
I now turn to a discussion of some advaitin thinkers who have analyzed
the concept of s~ksin, starting with Safikara, the main progenitor of this
school.
SAI~KARA ON THE SA_K.SIN
Saflkara refers to the sgksin in a number of texts, the most important of
which are the Brahmasfitra (BS) bh~sya and the Upadegas~hasrL Saflkara

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most commonly regards the s~k.sin as a facet of the self, calling it the eternal,
immediate, and self-luminous witness of the mind and senses. It observes and
illumines the internal instrument and its manifestations (vrtti), which, along
with the senses (indriya) and objects (vi.saya), are part of lower, everyday
seeing 0okad.r.s.ti). Saflkara does not give an elaborate explanation of the
perceptual process; the nature of the illuminer is his main interest. 7
The BSbh~.sya contains a number of references to the s~kiin, although
most are in passing. In the commentary on I. 1.4, the self is said to be the
witness of the I-notion (aharhpratyaya), and different from the actor. The
unchanging self is witness of the three states (waking, dream, and deep
sleep) according to the II. 1.9 commentary, 8 and brahman is said to possess
sak.sitva of all objects (dr~ya) in the remarks on III. 2.23.
In II. 2 . 2 8 - 3 0 , Safikara discusses the sak.sin in a bit more detail. Here,
Safikara is arguing against the Buddhist vijfi~nav~dins, asserting that there
is an unchanging consciousness beyond particular cognitions (pratyaya).
He states that the witness and cognitions are by nature different; from this
difference the apparent perceiver/perceived (upalabh) relation arises. The
witness, unlike particular cognitions, is self-established (svayariasiddha) and
undeniable (thus overcoming any problem with infinite regress, anavasth~).
Safikara concludes that all cognitions need a basis (adhis.t.hSna); here the basis
is the unchanging seer.
The discussion of perception in the commentary on BS II. 3.32 and 4 0 - 1
also illumines the role of the s~k.sin. At issue is the nature of the knower. The
purported knower is the internal instrument (also called manas or mind). To
Safikara, this "knower" is actually only an adventitious limitation (up~dhi)
of the self, the witness and true knower. The anta.hkara.na only registers
manifestations arising from the senses. The intellect's attention (avadh~na)
or non-attention to this sense data is what varies in perception (upalabdhi);
thus, the intellect is the cause of apparent change and diversity. The self is
the constant knower (cetayatr), or witness, of the intellect and is itself the
basis of perception (thus suggesting field as well).
It is surprising to note the absence of the term saksin in Safikara's
BrhadSranyaka Upani.sad (B~U) bh~sya. Of course, the term does not appear
in the B~U itself, and Saflkara is often reticent to use terms not present in
~ruti. However, the B~U does discuss perception and seeing in many places.
For example, the light of the self (~tma-jyotir, ~tma-caitanya) is discussed
in IV. 3 . 6 - 7 , but even when the illuminer of the buddhi is considered,

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the sgk.sin goes unmentioned. Similarly, when two types of seeing (lokaand ~tma- dr.s.ti) are analyzed in B~U I. 4. 10 and III. 4. 2, the eternal,
self-luminous seer is never called the s~ksin, just the self. 9 This would seem
to confirm the close relationship of the s~k.sin and the self, with the self
being the key term, and sgk.sin indicating one facet of the self.
Safikara gives us a clearer idea of the sgksin in the Upadegas~hasrL his
most important statement not in commentary form. The term s~k.sin is quite
common in the verse portion, unlike the BS and BfiU commentaries (or the
prose portion of the Upade~asahasr~ itself for that matter). Here the self is
repeatedly called the witness of the intellect (dhi, buddhi) and its notions.
The sgk.sin is pure, non-dual, and without quality (agu.na, here suggesting
the field conception). It is similar in some respects to the seer (dra.s.tr), but
the latter is more tied to the everyday seeing (of both thoughts and objects)
called d.rsti. Verse 15.4 states that the s~k.sin is different from all mental
activity as the seer is different from any particular object.
For Safikara, the s~k.sin is particularly the knower (boddh.r, cetr) and
observer as opposed to the actor. The witness' pure observation is unrelated
to change or action (akriya, avik~ra, ak~raka). The limited buddhi is what
changes. In fact, the intellect and the I-notion constantly vary.
To sum up, Safikara seems to be making three main points regarding the
s~ksin, emphasizing the witness conception. First, the s~k.sin is an aspect
of the eternal, unchanging self. Second, the s~ksin is different from and the
basis (adhi.s.thAna) of the mind/intellect (antahkarana, dhL buddhi). Third,
the s~ksin observes the notions or manifestations (pratyaya, vrtti) of the
intellect as well as so-called external objects. Thus, Safikara seems to be
arguing for the sgk.sin as passive observer, rather than field or context of
observation. However, by linking the sgk.sin to the self, the field aspect
must be present, for the ~tman is, in its essence, the unconditioned field
of consciousness/being.
SURESVARA ON THE S.~KSIN
Of Saflkara's immediate followers, only Sure~vara (c. 7 2 0 - 7 0 ) regularly
refers to the sak.sin. Both the field and witness ideas are evident. A number
of references appear in his Nai.skarmyasiddhi and Salfibandha-v~rttika. In
the latter text, verses 150-1 introduce one of Sure~vara's prominent themes,
that of the self as field which lies beyond the apparent pramfit.r/pram~n.a/

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prameya triad.l The witnesser-witnessed relation which appears to function

on the pramfin.a level does not exist in the pure field-like essence (sLk.si-vastu).
Witnessing is actually a splitting of the self's fundamental s~k.sin-s~ksya unity
(1087).
Also in the Sarhbandha-v~rttika, Suregvara points to the immediacy
(sgk.s~t) and unconditioned (avige.sa, avilupta) nature of the s~ksin's seeing
(793,796). Finally, he emphasizes the similarity of the self and the s~ksin.
The s~k.sin is called pratyag-fitman, fitmasvarOpa, and atma-anubhava in the
above-mentioned verses.
Like Safikara in the Upadegas~hasrL Suregvara in his Nai.skarmyasiddhi
emphasizes that the sak.sin is unchanging (avikriyg), unlike the intellect.
II. 6 6 - 7 and 7 6 - 7 assert that the witnessing self illumines and pervades the
intellect, unmoved by the latter's motions (v.rtti, vikriy~). The s~k.sin merely
observes sufferings (and joys) attached to the buddhi (II. 80).
In the above, Suregvara partially follows Safikara's understanding; passive
observation is the predominant theme. Yet the silk.sin as field conception is
evident: the unchanging sgk.sin is like the self (implicitly a context or field)
and unlike the intellect. Both conceptions appear in Suregvara's strong
emphasis on the difference between knower/known duality and the seeing
of the immediate, non-dual s~ksin.
PADMAPADA, V.~.CASPATI MISRA, AND SARVAJgT~tTMAN ON
THE S*K .SIN
Later advaitins such as Padmap~da, V~caspati Migra, and Sarvajfifitman 11
refer occasionally to the s~ksin, though it is not a major concept in advaitin
thought at this point.12 In Paficap~dika verse 41, Padmap~da says the s~k.sin
is unified, immediate consciousness.13 The s~k.sin is different from the
I-notion (aharnpratyaya, aharhkfira), which is superimposed on it. In fact,
the s~k.sin witnesses the transformations of the I-notion (121,316).
Vficaspati Migra, in his Bh~matf on Safikara's BS bh~.sya, mentions the s~ksin
briefly in his comments on I. 1.4 and II. 2.28. In the former, V~caspati writes
that the param~tman witnesses the jfv~tman (that is, the agent and object of
ahalfipratyaya). Ultimately, jiva- and parama- fitman are one, but jiva is the
conditioned form and silk.sin is the pure form. In II. 2.28, he adds that the
immediate and eternal sSk.sin seizes experience (upalabdhi). Above, both
V~caspati Migra and Padmap~da emphasize the witness conception of s~k.sin.

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In Sarvajfiitman's Samk.sepa~iririka, it is plainly stated that the concept

of witnessing implies duality between witnesser and what is witnessed (which
are mutually dependent). This idea of duality, Sarvajfiitman adds, is caused
by ignorance (III. 67,132,190). He also says the unchanging non-dual puru.sa
illumines and witnesses that which is imagined (parikalpita, II. 29-30).
Sarvaj~itman thus makes explicit the problem of duality in the concept
of the witness, although he does little beyond pointing it out. He simply
asserts that the witnesser/witnessed dualism is ignorance, and affirms that a
non-dual self (here called puru.sa) underlies all.
VIDY,~RA.NYA ON THE S.~.KSIN
Vidyira.nya (c. fourteenth century) is the next author for whom the siksin
plays a significant role. The sik.sin appears repeatedly in his Paficadagf
(although rarely in his Jgvanmuktiviveka). Vidy~ra.nya emphasizes that the
sgk.sin underlies the individual buddhi.
Vidyira.nya, like earlier advaitins, generally links the s~k.sin with the
itman, which is the witness of the world with all its forms, the mind with its
manifestations, and impermanence in general. The sgk.sin also witnesses sleep
and that which is empty (gfinya). Without an observer, sleep and emptiness
cannot be known (VI. 76). Further, as Saflkara says, the s~k.sin is not the doer
(kart.r); it reveals the doer, doing, and resulting objects (X. 9).
There are two passage where the sik.sin is particularly prominent. In the first
(VII. 215-42), the qualityless sik.sin is said to be beyond the enjoyer/enjoying/
enjoyed (bhuj) triad; duality and suffering are connected to the cidibhisa, or
mind-semblance.14 The mind-semblance superimposes the reality proper to the
silk.sin onto the enjoyer, and this superimposition causes delusion (bhrinti).
When this delusion is discriminated (vivic), even cidgbhgsa thinks on (cint)
the witnessing self (231-4). The mind-semblance then emulates (anukgri) the
s~k.sin, as a prince does a king (240), and ultimately destroys itself (sva-viniga)
to be absorbed into the sik.sin. The basic point is, of course, that the mindsemblance is deluded and ultimately longs to be merged into the self.
The second group of verses which discusses the siksin is X. 10-25; this
passage describes the sak.sin as a lamp in a theatre. The s~k.sin's self-luminous
(sva-prakiga) nature is emphasized. These verses state that the sik.sin shines
through (or en-light-ens, bh~) sense-experiences like a lamp illumines a theatre,
whether or not an audience (the visaya) or dancer (the ahariakira, dhi) are

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present (X. 10-12). The ever mobile intellect (dancer) goes in and out,
moving in time and space, while the unmoving sgk.sin (lamp) illumines all.
Vidygranya stresses that the intellect's movement (caficala) is falsely superimposed on the saksin. Ultimately, the intellect conceives (k!p, meaning
reveals a object's presence), while the saksin pervasively illumines (prakgg,
meaning reveals the field for the object's presence or absence). We see again
that the s~k.sin is prior to the intellect or mind; it passively illumines mental
movement and manifestation.
Vidygranya thus concurs with Safikara's main points regarding the sak.sin:
it is an aspect of the self, it underlies the intellect, and it is a passive observer.
However, with the lamp image, there is more emphasis on the concept of the
sgk.sin as luminous field, within which all activity takes place. The cid~bh~sa's
absorption (ava~i.s) into the s~k.sin also suggests the field idea.
MADHUSUDANA SARASVATI ON THE S~.K.SIN
We now turn to a later and exceptionally challenging thinker, Madhusfldana
Sarasvati (c. sixteenth century). His analysis of the saksin, and his thought
in general, is more refined than that of earlier thinkers. Below, I will briefly
explore some issues concerning the silk.sin in Madhustidana's Advaitasiddhi
(AS) and Siddhantabindu (SB), particularly the relationship between ignorance
(avidyL ajfi~na) and the sgk.sin. More research on this topic, and his thought
in general, would be welcome.IS
To Madhustidana, the s~k.sin is eternal, non-dual, and firmly fixed (kfLtastha)
It i~the knower and unseen seer 16 which illumines and is other than the
object-ive world. 17 The sgksin is also distinct from the three states of waking,
dream, and sleep. (SB 150, 172). 18
Like many earlier advaitins, Madhustidana emphasizes that the s~k.sin is
invariable (avyabhicara) as it observes the varying knower/knowing/k0~own
triad. This knower (pram~tr) cannot witness its own changes (vik~ra); it is
an object, subject to transformation (pari.n~ma, SB 59-60). According to
SB 169-170, the sak.sin becomes knower due to conditioning by up~dhis
(adventitious limitations). 19 In the Advaitasiddhi, Madhustadana adds that
the sfiksin is not dependent on the pram~nas and does not grasp objects with
particular marks (dharmin, 802). While sak.sin as witness is predominant here,
the sgk.sin as field concept can also be seen. The s~k.sin is the pervasive context
within which the knower and known arise.

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Madhusfidana elsewhere mentions the s~k.sin's relationship with the j Na and

igvara, particularly on SB 139. In the Advaitasiddhi, he writes that the s~k.sin
is different from, yet common among, all jivas (754). In the Siddh~ntabindu
passage, the jlva, lsvara, and s~k.sin are all called the self, seen as three due to
different up~dhis. Caitanya figures prominently here: there are references
to sgk.si-caitanya, jiva-caitanya, and i~vara-caitanya. Pure self-consciousness
(~tma-caitanya) pervades the others.
Madhustidana continues that i'svara is limited because it is the non-eternal
cause of entities and the jiva is limited in being tied to the antahkara.na and
its modifications. He also relates rvara and the s~k.sin as follows: either the
s~k.sin is the image (bimba) and igvara its reflection (pratibimba) or rgvara is
the image and the s~k.sin is the examiner (anusafiadMt.r) of the image. In this
context, the s~ksin is clearly used in the sense of witness/observer.
Madhusgdana commonly links the term caitanya (consciousness) with
the s~k.sin. In the SB, he differentiates two kinds of caitanya: s~ksi- and
buddhi-. Sgk.si-caitanya is non-different, underlying mental states and their
modifications. Knowledge of it gives direct rise to mok.sa (SB 104, 106).
Buddhi-caitanya makes consciousness appear to be different in different bodies,
for each person has her/his own buddhi (SB 88). In SB 115, Madhusfidana
adds that there are two kinds of concealing (~varana) .... one residingin the
s~k.sin when particularized (avachinna) in the internal instrument, the other
residing in buddhi-caitanya when particularized in objects.
In the Advaitasiddhi, emphasis is on the relationship among consciousness,
the s~k.sin, and ignorance. Madhustidana repeatedly defines the s~k.sin as
consciousness reflecting (pratiphalita) an avidyg-v.rtti, the mental modification
of ignorance (557,575,754). In other places, Madhusadana states that the
s~k.sin is associated (upahita)with ignorance ( 2 6 1 , 4 4 1 , 5 4 5 , 7 5 4 ) . The latter
two references explicitly differentiate the s~k.sin from pure cit or brahman.
Madhustidana fllrther writes on AS 395 that alt faults (do.sa) arise, not from
pure caitanya, but from the particularizing (avacchedika) avidyg-vrtti.
As Sanjukta Gupta (1966) points o u t , 2 Madhusfldana seems to be using
the s~k.sin in two senses: as metaphysical reality and as epistemological fact.
The s~ksin ultimately is atma-caitanya, metaphysically real and eternal, but
it is also essentially limited epistemologically by an avidy~-vrtti, that is, the
s~ksin arises and ceases only with this v.rtti.-The avidyg-vrtti is special in that
it is a mode of avidy~ and not of the anta.hkara.na, as are other v.rttis. The
avidy~-v.rtti, unlike anta.hkara.na-vrttis, never ceases (in sleep, swoon, etc.).

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The sak.sin, then, is fundamentally linked to a flawed, limiting avidyfiv.rtti (AS 397,410, SB t63). We can go further, saying that the s~k.sin does
not arise without ignorance, which returns us to Sarvajfiatman's point about
the intimate relation of witnesser-witnessed dualism and ignorance? 1
The Advaitasiddhi's references to what is known by, or object to, the
witness (s~ksi-vedya) also bear on this issue? ~ Madhust~dana repeatedly says
that ajfi~na/avidy~ is known by the s~ksin. 2a Further, the s~k.sin is not limited
by objects in any way; rather, it reveals all objects, including ignorance. What
is not entirely clear is how a witness can observe (or grasp) ignorance as an
object while being fundamentally linked with it.
In sum, then, we are told that the s~k.sin is not pure brahman or caitanya.
With pure or non-dual consciousness, a "witness" is superfluous. The s~ksin is
somehow modified by ignorance; there is no witness without avidyL Further,
the s~k.sin is primarily regarded as the observer/examiner, due to its tie to
avidyL Emphasis is on its difference from the ever-changing knower (pramgt.r),
rather than on the s~k.sin as field of knowing. An important question remains,
however: how exactly is the s~ksin associated with ignorance, especially when
it is often said that ignorance is known by (or an object to) the witness?

DHARMARA.JA ON THE SAKSIN

The final text considered here is Dharmar~jadhvarin's Ved~ntaparibha.sL
a seventeenth century discussion of advaitin epistemology. There are a
number of references to the sSk.sin in the first chapter, which is on perception
(pratyak.sa) as a means of knowledge. Apparently influenced by Madhusfidana,
this understanding of the s~ksin is even more refined than earlier conceptions.
Dharmar~ja even differentiates between a kevala-s~k.sin (field of consciousness/
being) and plain or simple s~k.sin (the witness).
We are introduced to the kevala-s~k.sin in I. 5 2 - 4 . The anta.hkara.na and
its marks (dharma) are objects (or contents) within the kevala-s~k.sin's field;
the contents rest there without any prama.na functioning. The kevala-s~k.sin
comes to know (vid) the internal instrument (and its marks) by vrttis, the
manifestors of mental activity. In fact, the v.rttis are indispensible for the
kevala-s~k.sin to know any "thing" or object. For example, VII. 9 states that
even absence (abh~va) is not known by the kevala-s~k.sin because it is not
known to ~(.rtti-jfi~na. Thus, the kevala-s~k.sin is the context of mental activity,
and its "knowing" arises through v.rtti-jfi~na.
A later twist is added in I. 89, where vi.saya-caitanya (object-consciousness)

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is equated with the plain or simple s~k.sin (see also I. 67) in that both manifest
things (here, silver) to be known by (or within) the kevala-s~k.sin. This again
suggests that the kevala-shk.sin is the illumining field and some manifestor (here
s~k.sin, not v.rtti) is needed to know objects.
The s~k.sin is specified further in I. 66-74, where ,*.hej~va and jNa-shk.sin,
f~vara and f~vara-s~k.sin, and the plain s~k.sin are mentioned. We learn that
the j fva is consciousness particularized (avachinna) in the internal instrument,
while the s~k.sin is consciousness associated with (upahita) the internal
instrument. Put another way, the anta.hkara.na is a vi~e.sana or basic constituent
of the j fva, whereas the anta.hkarana is an upfidhi or adventitious associate of
the saksin. Thus the jfva is fundamentally limited by one's internal instrument,
while the s~ksin is not. 24 A result is that the jfva-s~k.sin (versus simple s~k.sin)
essentially varies with each individual (pratyagStman) according to his/her
anta.hkara.na. Another implication is that the apparent differences in the
s~ksin are due merely to their adventitious connection with the jfva and the
anta.hkara.na's v.rttis. Thus, the plain s~k.sin is related to mental limitations, but
is not essentially tied to these limits.
The f~vara-s~k.sin is consciousness associated with single, eternal m~y~
(illusory appearance); this association is also adventitious. Finally (in I. 74),
Dharmar~ja introduces parame~vara, which is caitanya particularized in m~y~.
He elaborates by stating that ~varatva arises when m~y~ is particularized,
while s~ik.sitvais merely associated with m~y~. In the next line, Dharmar~ja
concludes that while ~varatva and s~k.sitva are different (because linked
with m~y~ differently), f~vara and s~k.sin (their bases) are not different.
In the above, Dharmar~ja makes two main points. First, the kevala-s~k.sin
(the field of consciousness/being) needs a manifestor (either v.rtti or plain
s~k.sin) for knowing particulars. Second, the jfva, f~vara, and s~k.sin are
interrelated but different, and the differences focus on their relationships
with the anta.hkara.na and m~yL All are somehow implicated in apparent
duality, which accounts for the simple sLksin being conceived as knower/
observer. A more extensive discussion of the witness by Dharmar~ja would
have been intriguing.
In this paper, I have shown some continuing themes and some divergent
emphases in the advaitin analysis of the sgksin. The s~ksin is consistently
regarded as eternal, non-dual, self-luminous, unvarying, and like consciousness
and the self. It is also particularly differentiated from the mind or intellect
and the knower/knowing/known triad. However, the sgk.sin is taken to be

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287

m o r e c o m p l e x in the t h o u g h t o f Madhusfidana Sarasvatf and Dharmar~ja:

t h e f o r m e r emphasizes its t w o f o l d relationship w i t h consciousness and
ignorance, while the latter introduces a variety o f witnesses (j fva-, f~vara-,
kevala-, and plain sgk.sin) which are similar b u t not the same.
I have also stressed the role o f two related (but n o t identical) c o n c e p t i o n s
o f the sgk.sin: one suggests the s~k.sin is a passive observer or witness, in some
w a y i m p l i c a t e d in duality; the o t h e r considers the sgk.sin as a l u m i n o u s field
or c o n t e x t o f consciousness/being. We can consider these related c o n c e p t i o n s
as t w o facets o f the s~k.sin, as Devabrata Sinha (1965) has suggested. 2s On
the highest level (param~rtha), or in essence (svanipa), the silk.sin is non-dual,
pure consciousness, and field or c o n t e x t t e r m i n o l o g y is appropriate. On the
psychological or empirical level, however, the sgk.sin is the first and last
vestige o f individuality, the evidencer o f all knowing. Here, to speak o f the
passive observer or witness is m o r e accurate. While these distinctions should
n o t be overdrawn, awareness o f these differing emphases should prove useful
in further s t u d y o f advaitin t h o u g h t .

Texas Christian University

Dept. of Religious Studies
Fort Worth, TX 76129, U.S.A.
NOTES
I would like to thank Wilhelm Halbfass of the University of Pennsylvania for looking
over a prior draft. I would also like to express my gratitude to Harvey P. Alper of
Southern Methodist University for his close reading and numerous useful suggestions.
The remaining flaws are, of course, my responsibility.
1 I would like to mention here Tara Chatterjee's (1982) recent article on the same topic
for this journal. While making some useful points, this essay showed a tendency to use
technical terms, in both English and Sanskrit, with insufficient precision. Textual support
for important points was also limited or lacking.
For example, the s~k.sin is termed the individual's "principle of consciousness...
which sees all our experiences" (p. 339). The precise meanings of "consciousness" and
"experience" are not discussed, nor are Sanskrit equivalents for these terms given. Such
is also the case for references to mental "state", "occurrent", and "mode" on p. 343.
Neither do we find textual evidence for assertions like "Advaita philosophy entertains
the concept of ahamk~ra side by side with the concept of s~k.sin." (p. 354), or "the
anta.hkarana is almost identical with mind" (pp. 350-1). Definitional clarity and textual
support would, I believe, have strengthened Chatterjee's case.
2 The source of s~ksin as a philosophical concept is obscure. It is virtually unattested
in the major Upanisads (one reference each in Svet~vatara 6. 11 and Maitri 6. 16.) It
is mentioned once in the S~fikhya kSrik~s (19), where the purusa is said to be the witness
of pralqti.

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The s~ksin becomes more prominent in relatively late disputes between advaitins and
the Ny~ya and Mfm~ms~ schools. Advaitins argue against the Ny~ya idea of anuvyavasgya
or retrospection which reveals the original cognition. Advaitins say that an unchanging
revealing subject is necessary to avoid the problem of infinite regress (anavasth~) with
such retrospection. For examples o f these discussions, see Devabrata Sinha's "The
Concept o f S~ksin in Advaita Vedanta." Our Heritage (1954): 3 2 5 - 3 2 .
3 As V~icaspati MiCra says in his Bhamati on Safikara's Brahmast~tra-bh~sya "asya
s~ksina.h sadg asarfidigdh~viparitasya nityas~ks~tk~rat~ an~gantuka prakg~atve gha.tate."
(Bh~matf II. 2 . 2 8 , quoted in Devabrata Sinha, The ldealist Standpoint, p. 82).
4 Pramgt.r, pram~.na, and prameya are commonly used. Forms of ~ , bhuj, and grab also
appear.
5 Both T. R. V. Murti (A]~dna, pp. 171 ff.) and Devabrata Sibha (The ldealist Standpoint,
pp. 7 2 - 9 ) have facilitated my understanding here.
6 The concept o f vrtti is complex and bears further investigation. In brief, a v.rtti is a
mental modification which is transformed into (or takes the shape of) an object (visaya)
and, upon entering the anta.hkarana, is passively illumined by the s~ksin. The anta.hkarana
is the unconscious and contingent mental instrument which connects the vrttis with
luminous consciousness. The perceptual process goes something like this: the object
appears (which does not mean it is ultimately real), the vrtti goes out and transports
the object back to the anta.hkarana after taking its shape, and the anta.hkarana then
presents the v.rtti to the s~k.sin, which illumines it.
7 It is interesting to note that N. K. Devaraja, in his book on Safikara's epistemology,
repeatedly refers to the advaitin distinction o f s~k.si- versus v.rtti- jfi~na, despite the fact
that Safikara himself never directly uses these terms. Such a distinction comes much later,
with Madhust~dana Sarasvatr and Dharmar~ja. (See An Introduction to Sankara's Theory
of Knowledge [Delhi: Mofilal Banarsidass, 2nd rev. ed., 1972], pp. 9 4 - 5 ) .
8 I would like to mention briefly here Tara Chatterjee's (1982) discussion of the advaitin
conception of deep sleep (susupti) as pure, unvarying Self-manifestation. She writes
that this idea "fails to impress me. For a theory which attaches more importance to
a sleeping individual rather than a waking one fails to attract me." (p. 353) First, rather
than focussing on one's personal feeling about this idea, one might ask why advaitins
would argue for this apparently strange position. Second, an advaitin could argue that
Chatterjee's position is based on the waking perspective, which is the most deluded and
nonself-like condition. Finally, advaitins do not say that the sleeping individual is more
important than a waking one - they argue that the sleeping condition is more like the
self.
9 In IV. 10.4, however, there is a passing mention of the par~tman as witness to the
notions o f all beings (sarva-pr~nita-pratyaya-s~ksi). A similar phrase, substituting buddhi
for pr~nita, appears in the commentary on Mund.aka Upanisad II. 2. 4 and 9.
10 The Naiskarmyasiddhi also refers to the s~ksin's freedom from apparent seizer/seizing/
seized (grah) differences (II, 1 0 7 - 8 ) .
11 According to Hajime Nakamura, their dates are: Padmap~da ( 7 2 0 - 7 0 ) ; Sarvajfigtman
( 7 5 0 - 8 0 0 ) ; V~caspati MiCra (c. 840). See A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy (Delhi:
Motilal Benarsidass, 1983), p. 88.
12 Many so-called minor Upani.sads were also written during this time, and the term
s~k.sin israre in them as well. Sometimes there are brief references to the witness o f
senses, mind, or world (Annapfir.na, Mah~, Tejobindu), but these references are not
elaborated or analyzed. The largest number o f references are in the Nrsirhhottarat~panfya,

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289

where the sgk.sin is a synonym for seer (drast.r.), but still merely One term in a list of
epithets for the self.
13 Aviesa, kti.tastha, aparoksa, and ekarasa caitanya.
14 Cidhbhgsa is a key term in the Paficada'sf. I translate it as mind-semblance, i.e. the
apparent individual conscious element in the jfva which "enjoys".
1s The best available current resource is Sanjukta Gupta's Studies in the Philosophy o f
Madhusadana Sarasvatf (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bandar, 1966).
16 Referring to the BaU III. 7 - 8 ; he elsewhere calls the Upanisads th e "king of pram~pas".
17 SB 62, 172, AS 276. There are many different editions of both the SB and AS.
My references are to the page numbers in the following editions: Siddhdntabindu. S.
Subrahma.nya SgstrL ed. (Varanasi: Mahesh Research Institute, 1978);Advaitasiddhi.
Ananthak.rsna Sgstrf, ed. (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1917).
18 In this context, the s~k.sin is called tur~ya, the fourth beyond the three ever-varying
states which are subject to ignorance. The Advaitasiddhi adds that the s~ksin's avidygv rtti is different from that of susupta (AS 559).
19 Quoting Sure~vara's B~U vfirttika here, Madhusfidana says the witnessing self observes
the seer, which then perceives object-ive changes. Sure~vara is also mentioned on 139
as identifying f~vara with the s~ksin, unlike Madhusgdana's examiner/mirror concept (see
following note). Also, mention of cid~bhfisa (SB 88) could refer back to Vidy~ra.nya
(p. 282).
20 See Gupta (1966), pp. 134-38.
21 Surendranath Dasgupta, in his useful account of Madhusfidana's thought, states
explicitly that there is no sfiksin without an avidya-v.rtti. According to Dasgupta,
Madhustidana also says that s~ksi-caitanya, rising above the buddhi and its vrttis, reveals
objects and ignorance, unlike v.rtti-jfign a, which opposes ignorance. See A History o f
Indian Philosophy, Vol. IV: 263-75, 2 9 0 - 4 , 3 0 7 .
22 The most extended account of the essential nature (svarapa) of s~k.si-vedya is on AS
5 5 7 - 8 , and contains an elaborate series of pt~rvapak.sin and siddh~ntin exchanges.
2a AS 410, 548, 550, 575, 650, 876.
24 Jadunath Sinha emphasizes this point in his History oflndian Philosophy (Calcutta:
Sinha Publishing House, 1952), Vol. II: 4 9 3 - 5 .
25 See D. Sinha, The Idealist Standpoint, pp. 7 3 - 7 9 .
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary texts
Safikara (1980). Brahmas~tra-~ahkarabhds.yam. Edited by J. L. Sastri. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
Safikara (1977). Brahmas~tra Bhd.sya. Translated by Swami Gambhirananda. 3rd edition.
Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama.
Safikara (1964). ]~ddida~opani.sad-~ahkarabhd.syam. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Safikara (1973). UpadekasdhasrL Edited by Sengaku Mayada. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press.
Surevara (1906). Nai.skarmyasiddhi. Edited by G. A. Jacob. Bombay Sanskrit Series
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Surevara (1958). Sainbandhavdrttika. Edited and translated by T. M. P. Mahadevan.
Madras: Univ. of Madras Press.
Padmap~da (1948). Pa~capddika. Edited and translated by D. Venkataramiah. Baroda:
Oriental Institute (Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 107).

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Sarvajfi~tman (1972). Safnk.sepa~drrrika. Edited and translated by N. Veezinathan.

Madras: Univ. of Madras Press.
V~caspati Migra (1933). The Bhdmatf of Vdcaspati on Sankara"sBrahmasatra Bhd.sya.
Edited and translated by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja. Madras:
Theosophical Publ. House.
Vidyfiranya (1965). PanchadashL Edited and translated by H. P. Shastri. 2nd edition.
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MadhustXdana Sarasvaff (1917). Advaitasiddhi. Edited by Ananthakrsna Sastri. Bombay:
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Madhust~dana Sarasvaff (1978). Siddhdntabindu. Edited by S. S. Subrahmanya Sastri.
Varanasi: Mahesh Research Institute.
Dharmarfijfidhvarin (1942). Veddntaparibhd.sa. Edited and translated by S. S.
Suryanarayana Sastri. Madras: Adyar Library.

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Dasgupta, Surendranath (1922). A History oflndian Philosophy. Vol. IV. Cambridge:
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Devaraja, N. K. (1972). An Introduction to Sankara's Theory of Knowledge. 2nd revised
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Malkani, G. K. (1933). Editor.A]adna. London: Luzac.
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Articles
Chatterjee, Tara (1982). 'The Concept of S~ksin', Journal of Indian Philosophy 10:
339-56.
Chaudhuri, A. K. R. (1953). 'The Concept of S~ksin in Advaita Vedfinta', Our Heritage
(1953): 6 9 - 7 6 .
Sinha, Devabrata (1954a). 'The Concept of S~ksin in Advaita Vedanta', Our Heritage
325-32.
Sinha, Devabrata (1954b). 'An Inquiry into Self-Consciousness', Calcutta Review
105-14.