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55. See New York v. United States, 505 US 144 (1992).

56. Lee Tien identifies other important problems with architectural regulation in Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, International Journal of Communications Law and Policy 9 (2004): 1.
57. Aida Torres, The Effects of Federal Funding Cuts on Family Planning Services,
19801983, Family Planning Perspectives 16 (1984): 134, 135, 136.
58. Rust v. Sullivan, USNY (1990) WL 505726, reply brief, *7: The doctor cannot explain
the medical safety of the procedure, its legal availability, or its pressing importance to the
patients health.
59. See Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc., 512 US 753, 785 (1994) (Justice Antonin
Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part: Todays decision . . . makes
it painfully clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this Court
when an occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion
[quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 US 747, 814
(1986) (Justice Sandra Day OConnor dissenting)]).
60. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948).
61. See Herman H. Long and Charles S. Johnson, People Versus Property: Race-Restrictive
Covenants in Housing (Nashville: Fisk University Press, 1947), 3233. Douglas S. Massey and
Nancy A. Denton point out that the National Association of Real Estate Brokers adopted an
article in its 1924 code of ethics stating that a Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood . . . members of any race or nationality . . . whose presence will
clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood (citing Rose Helper, Racial
Policies and Practices of Real Estate Brokers [1969], 201); they also note that the Fair Housing
Authority advocated the use of race-restrictive covenants until 1950 (citing Kenneth T. Jackson,
Crabgrass Frontier: the Suburbanization of the United States [1985], 208); American Apartheid:
Segregation and the Making of the Under Class (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1993), 37, 54.
62. See Massey and Denton, American Apartheid.
63. Michael Froomkin points to the Clipper chip regulations as another example. By
using the standards-setting process for government purchases, the federal government could
try to achieve a standard for encryption without adhering to the Administrative Procedure
Act. A stroke of bureaucratic genius lay at the heart of the Clipper strategy. Congress had not,
and to this date has not, given the executive branch the power to control the private use of
encryption. Congress has not even given the executive the power to set up an escrow system
for keys. In the absence of any formal authority to prevent the adoption of unescrowed cryptography, Clippers proponents hit upon the idea of using the governments power as a major
consumer of cryptographic products to rig the market. If the government could not prevent
the public from using nonconforming products, perhaps it could set the standard by purchasing and deploying large numbers of escrowed products; It Came from Planet Clipper, 15,
24, 133.
64. See The Industry Standard, available at link #51.
65. See Legal Eagle (letter to the editor), The Industry Standard, April 26, 1999 (emphasis
added).

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Castronova, Synthetic Worlds, 207.

2. Declan McCullagh, Its Time for the Carnivore to Spin, Wired News, July 7, 2000,
available at link #52.