StatCon Principles

1) Construction defined
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law.

2) Legislative Intent/Ratio Legis (The reason of the law)

Dura Lex Sed Lex (The law is harsh but it is the law) - when the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation
We need only apply the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.
Plain meaning rule or verba legis - rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by
the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute.
Index animi sermo est - speech is the index of intention
Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
GENERAL RULE:
Statute must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation regardless
of who may be affected, even if it may be harsh or onerous.
-RCBC
Examples:
RCBC
1.) Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately clear that suspension of claims against a
corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a
management committee or a rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a petition
for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may to some, be more logical and wise but unfortunately,
such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how
practical and noble would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of
the law --- plainly judicial legislation.

2.) Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is

ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may
be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded
or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be
ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or
restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that
the word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may

be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.

3.) Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to

the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section
4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against
the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.

4.) From these provisions, it is clear that a "public company," as contemplated by the SRC, is
not limited to a company whose shares of stock are publicly listed; even companies like the
Bank, whose shares are offered only to a specific group of people, are considered a public
company, provided they meet the requirements enumerated above.
The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation
come only after a demonstration that the application of the law is impossible or inadequate
unless interpretation is resorted to. In this case, the law is very clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity; thus, no room exists for construction or interpretation.
5.) Petitioner cites Section 74 (b) of the Local Government Code, which states that no recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being
construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
It is also a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in
this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

6. Statcon Principle
The proposi*on that Republic Act No. 623 protects only the containers of the so; drinks
enumerated by pe**oner (CAGAYAN) and those similar thereto, is unwarranted and specious.
The rule of ejusdem generi s cannot be applied in this case. To limit the coverage of the law only
to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specically men*oned will defeat the
very purpose of the law. (We have to go back to the inten*on of the framers when they created
RA 623)

Ejusdem generis - Latin for "of the same kind," used to interpret loosely written statutes.
Where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in
general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things
specifically listed. Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles
and other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the list
was of land-based transportation.

Republic Act No. 623

Purpose= the protec*on of the health of the general public and the preven*on of the
spread of contagious diseases.
Seeks to safeguard the property rights of an important sector of Philippine industry
Aord a person a means of iden*fying the containers he uses in the manufacture,
preserva*on, packing or sale of his products so that he may secure their registra*on
with the Bureau of Commerce and Industry and thus prevent other persons from using
them.
> this is the same with common law marriages
7.) It is abundantly clear from the aforequoted laws, executive orders and decrees
that the legislative practice is that a franchise to operate jai-alai is granted solely
for that purpose and the terms and conditions of the grant are unequivocably
defined by the grantor.
In fine, PD 1869 does not have the standard marks of a law granting a franchise to operate jaialai as those found under PD 810 or EO 135. PD 1869 deals with details pertinent alone to the
operation of gambling casinos. PD 1869 does not have the usual provisions with regards to jaialai. The logical inference is that PAGCOR was not given a franchise to operate jai-alai frontons.
Acts of incorporation, and statutes granting other franchises or special benefits or privileges to
corporations, are to be construed strictly against the corporations; and whatever is not given in
unequivocal terms is understood to be withheld.
The fact that the statute admits of different interpretations is the best evidence that the statute
is vague and ambiguous. It is widely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is
capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more
senses.
The term jai-ail was never used and is nowhere found in the law. The conclusion that it is
included in the franchise granted to PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory perusal of

and a blind reliance on the ordinary and plain meaning of the statutory terms used such as
gaming pools and lotteries.

8. But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned."
The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the
previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his
conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. The accused must have
been unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then
imprisoned ... if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than
the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

9. In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when
Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When
Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no crime committed
punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so
when no such evil was produced by Ursuas act, said law need not be applied.

10. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored

all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified.

3) Ut res magis valeat quam pereat (that the thing may rather have effect than be
destroyed)

- A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.
- It is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this
case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodgepodge of conflicting provisions.

The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash
and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary
award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.

4) Review of law in its entirety and its intendment must be given effect
In interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a review of the whole law must
be made, and its intendment must be given effect. The various provisions of PD No. 1144 show
its consistent intent to apply the term pesticides only to agricultural use, Thus, urban pest
control operators and their urban pesticides are excluded from its coverage.
Generally, a word or phrase used in a statute may have an ordinary, generic, restricted,
technical, legal, commercial or trade meaning.
Which meaning should be given depends upon what the legislature intended. As a general rule
in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole
law involved, as well as the intendment of law, ascertained from a consideration of the statute
as a whole an not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone, must be made to determine
the real intent of the law.
P.D. No. 1144 sets the parameters of the powers and duties of the FPA. First, the FPA is
designated as an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture. Urban pest control or
pesticide use in households, offices, hotels and other commercial establishments has nothing to
do with agriculture. Second, it spells out the purposes for which the FPA was created, viz: for
the purpose of assuring the agricultural sector of adequate supplies of fertilizer and pesticide at
reasonable prices, rationalizing the manufacture and marketing of fertilizer, protecting the public
from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides, and educating the agricultural sector in the use
of these inputs. All these purposes limit the jurisdiction of the FPA to agricultural pesticides.

5) Wisdom/Practicality of Law
- court merely applies the law
The Courts are convinced that our interpretation and application of the laws involved is correct.
If said laws are deemed unwise and detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of detectives in
Manila and other chartered cities, proper representations and requests may be made to the
Legislature. As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Court merely
interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.
same as RCBC case. even if law seems impractical or it is more wise to do otherwise, we
simply have to apply the law BECAUSE THE LAW IS CLEAR!!
Votation

6) Executive/Administrative Interpretation
Executive and administrative officers are generally the very first official to interpret the law.
Since it must be presumed that the President was cognizant of the administrative disciplinary
powers, particularly that of removal, vested by law (the UP Charter) upon its Board of Regents
and President, the act of the Chief Executive in transferring the Philippine General Hospital from
the Office of the President to the University of the Philippines clearly evinced the intention to

place the Hospital employees under the administrative power of the University in matter of their
discipline, suspension or removal, on par with the other employees of the University.

7) Literal Interpretation
8) Valid in part, void in part.
GENERAL RULE:
Where part of a statute is void, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced.