Undoubtedly a good article.

However, after much thought on this: I am not sure about the focus right
now, but priority wise it is ideal to study Naxals and their operating strategy (SWOT analysis rather)
first, then we could mull how to fight them, with or without military. The governments see this as law and
order problem, the intellectuals see this as governance issue and the tribal and Maoist see it as fight
against exploitation. Now we have three major attacks on the federal police or paramilitary in
Chhattisgarh only:

April 06: Dantewada Massacre where nearly 75 CRPF soldiers and a head constable of the
Chhattisgarh police were killed

May 08: Eight CRPF personnel were killed in Narayanpur when Naxals blew up their vehicle.

June 29: Again Narayanpur, 26 CRPF personnel were killed in ambush. The place of the ambush
is considered as the gateway to Abujhmad, a 4000-sq. km. jungle, declared a liberated zone by
the Naxals.

Plausibly, we should not lionize Naxalites movement in India. There is an ideological degeneration in the
movement in last one decade. Criminalization of the movement has affected peace and business in the
Naxalite affected districts. There are also reports that pseudo Naxalite outfits are operating in the mining
areas with purely monetary interest. Naxalites anti-MNC and anti-FDI policies and attacks on the
business houses will of course affect India's economy and how.
Also, there will be more takers if we study the transformation in their so called ideological struggle and
changing characteristics (e.g Criminalization).
I have inserted some inputsinside the text.
..
Exploring

the

Naxalite

Threat

in

India*

The
Indian
government
issued
a
warning
to
railroad
operators
and
users
July
6
after
a
militant
group
declared
a
two
day
"bandh"
(commonly
translated
to
"strike")
in
eastern
India.
Unlike
strikes
elsewhere
in
the
world,
where
workers
protest
low
wages
or
poor
working
conditions
by
refusing
to
work,
"bandhs"
in
eastern
India
tend
to
involve
much
more
violent
tactics.
Strikes
declared
by
the
militant
arm
of
the
Communist
Party
of
India
Maoists,*
*known
collectively
as
Naxalites
have
in
the
past
targeted
freight
trains
and
trains
carrying
police
forces
through
sabotage,
many
of
which
have
killed
dozens
of
people.
Civilians
are
typically
not
targeted
(militants
tend
to
focus
on
police
forces
and
commercial
development
instead)
but
plenty
of
civilians
are
still
affected
by
the
violence.
Because
through

of
on

the
their

general
threats,

perception
strike

that
the
naxalites
always
follow
warnings
are
generally
enough
to

dissuage
people
from
using
public
transportation.
Passengers
dont
see
it
as
worth
the
risk,
so
they
plan
around
the
strike
dates,
and
perators
are
the
same.
Its
a
tactic
that,
symbolically,
shows
just
how
powerful
Naxalites
have
become
in
eastern
India,
and
demonstrates
their
real
ability
to
affect
commercial
activity
in
the
region.
The
July
6
Force
(CRPF
senior
leader,
<Cherukuri

strike
comes

Indias
politbuereau

as
a
retaliation
for
a
Central
Reserve
Police
federal
police
force)
operation
that
killed
a
member
and
spokesman
of
the
Naxalites,
Rajkumar
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100702_brief_senior_naxalite_leader_killed>*
> (alias Azad) in Andhra Pradesh state July 2. The news was unexpected,
> as India has had little luck capturing or killing key Naxal leaders in
>
the
past.
Azads
absence
is
not
expected
to
seriously
hamper
the
>
Naxalites
capability
(they
are
a
very
large,
well
organized
force
that
> will be able to replace him(Already planned to replace him with Kisenjis Brother, Mallojula V
Rao)
but
it
was
bound
to
agitate
a
response
>
from
the
Naxalites
like
the
strike
declared
July
6.
>
>
Its
unclear
exactly
what
precipitated
the
CRPF
operation
that
killed
> Azad,
however
it
came
after
a
busy spring
in
Naxalite
territory.
On
> April
6,
Naxalites
mounted
a
textbook armed
ambush
that
*<killed 76
>
CRPF
members
conducting
a
patrol
in
Chhattisgarh
state
>
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100406_india_naxalite_tactics_and_deadly_ambush>*,
>
the
deadliest
attack
the
Naxalites
had
carried
out
in
their
43
year
>
history.
Then,
on
*<May
17,
militants
detonated
an
explosive
device
>
along
the
road
that
targeted
a
bus
>
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100517_brief_death_toll_rises_indian_bus_bombing>*
>
(again
in
Chhattisgarh
state)
that
killed
nearly
50
civilians
and
> police. The spokesman for the group at the time, Azad, issued several
>
statements
to
the
press
indicating
that
the
group
regretted
the
death
> of so many civilians, but blamed them for riding on the bus with
>
police
officers,
something
they
had
been
warned
against
multiple
> times. Indeed, police in this region are typically not allowed to ride
> on public transportation due to the threat of Naxalite attacks and the
>
possibility
of
collateral
damage.
Shortly
thereafter,
on
May
28,
*<an
>
act
of
sabotage
against
a
railway
line
in
West
Bengal
>
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100528_brief_indian_train_derailment_death_toll_hits_71>
>
*state
caused
a
train
carrying
only
civilians
to
derail.
It
was
>
subsequently
hit
by
a
freight
train,
resulting
in
the
death
of
nearly
>
150
people.
While
Naxalites
initially
denied
that
they
were
involved,
> they later admitted that a rogue gang trained by them had carried out
>
the
sabotage
without
permission
from
Naxalite
central
command.
However,
there
is
also
the
possibility
that
the
Naxals
were
attempting

to
derail
targeted

the

freight

train
the

(a

much

more

common
wrong

target)

but

mistakenly
track.**

Finally,
in
the
wake
of
these
very
deadly
(if
not
all
intentional)
attacks,
the
Naxalites
reiterated
on
June
24
their
intention
to
drive
out
Multi
National
Corporations
from
India
and
that
they
would
use
violence
to
do
so.
This
most
recent
rhetorical
threat
drives
at
the
heart
of
the
Naxals
primary
interest
and,
backed
up
with
*<a
proven
tactical
ability
to
strike
economic
targets
http://www.stratfor.com/threat_against_multinationals_indias_high_tech_center
<embodies
the
worst
nightmare
of
the
Indian
government
http://www.stratfor.com/india_escalating_naxalite_threat*>.
It
is
this
current situation in India that causes us at STRATFOR to take a look
at one of the worlds longest running insurgencies to see what makes
it
tick.
*BACKGROUND
*
The Naxalites get their name
from their starting point the village of
Naxalbari
in
West
Bengal
state
where,
in
May
1967,
a
local
communist
party
leader
promised
to
redistribute
land
to
the
peasants
who
worked,
but did not own any of, the land. This was not the first time such a
proclamation by a communist party member had been made before in eastern
India

many
other
attempts
at
fomenting
a
working
class
rebellion
had
been
started
but
faltered.
This
one,
however,
triggered
a
wave
of
violence
in
which
workers
killed
and
intimidated
land
owners,
in
many
cases
running
them
off
their
land
and
reclaiming
it
as
their
own.
The
actions
were
justified
by
a
sentiment
held
amongst
the
working
class
(which
was
largely
made
up
of
tribal
members)
that
they
were
merely
taking
back
what
they
had
been
forced
to
give
up
to
wealthier
businessmen
from
the
west
who
had
gained
the
land
from
the
locals
through debt schemes in which the newcomers took over possession of the
tribals'
land
as
collateral
for
outstanding
debts
the
tribals
owed
them.
Certainly
neither
side
was
innocent
in
all
this,
and
animosity
ran
deep
through
both
communities.
However,
on
a
grander,
geopolitical
level,
the
Naxalite
issue
can
be
looked
at
through
the
prism
of
the
*<Chinese-Indian
rivalry
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20090309_geopolitical_diary_geopolitics_tibet>*
.
The
Naxalites
adopted
the
ideology
of
Mao
Zedong,
the
Chinese
revolutionary
and leader who converted China to communism and who had
just
begun
the
cultural
revolution
there
in
1966.
During
the
beginning
of
the
Naxalite
movement,
there
was
much
rhetorical
support
between
the

Maoist
regime
in
China
and
the
Naxalites
in
India.
There
is
little
evidence
of
material
support
then
(and
there
is
no
indication
of
support
today) but the advent and growth of the Naxalite movement certainly did
serve
Chinas
goals
of
weakening
its
largest
neighbor
to
the
south.
Although
India
was
able
to
slow
down
**
the
Naxalite
movement
significantly
in
1971
and
reinstate
the
status
quo
ante,
but
the
belief
that
the
federal
government
in
New
Delhi
had
robbed
tribal
groups
of
their
land
in
eastern
India
persisted.
The
Naxalite
movement
continued
in
a
somewhat
dormant
phase,
through
the
1970s,
80s
and
early
1990s
before
violence
resumed
again
in the
late
1990s
and
has
been escalating
over
the
past
ten
yeas.
The
rise
in
violence
corresponds
with
Indias
economic
growth.
This
is
not
coincidental.
India
has
experienced
a
boom
in
economic
growth
over
the
past
twenty
years
that
saw
its
per
capita
income
rise
approximately
100%.
For
comparison,
it
took
India
40
years
to
complete
its
last
doubling of per capita income. This growth has been sustained by foreign
investors
who
have
invested
billions
into
Indias
economy.
However,
economic
growth
in
India
has
not
trickled
down,
a
political
liability
that
the
Naxalites
have
used as
a
key lever
they have
used
to
both
revive
their
movements
and
challenge
the
more
mainstream
political
parties
in
India.

*GEOGRAPHY
**<<INSERT

and
MAP:

Red

DEVELOPMENT
Corridor>>

*The
state
of
India
as
a
whole
has
a
very
dissperate
geography
that
contains
1.1
billion
inhabitants.
The
federal
government
in
New
Delhi
faces a huge challenge in exerting its policies across such a large and,
in
many
areas,
difficult
to
reach,
state.
Because
of
this,
the
Naxalites
are
not
the
only
militant
movement
in
India,
groups
in
northwest
and
northeast
India
also
take
advantage
of
the
terrain
they
inhabit
and
their
distance
from
New
Delhi
to
challenge
the
government
for
control
over
the
territory
they
inhabit.
The
Naxalites
specifically
inhabit
an
area
known
as
the
"Red
Corridor"
that
stretches
from
Bihar
state
in
India's northeast down to Karnataka state in the south (-west). The states that currently and historically
have
seen
the
most
violence
are
Chhattisgarh,
West Bengal, (Andhra Pradesh: Many top leaders/ideologues are from AP) and Orissa states. This
region
of
India
is
rough
terrain,
defined
by
rolling
hills
covered
in
dense
jungle
that
makes
central
control
over
the
region
extremely
difficult
to
accomplish.
Improved
roads
are
few
and
far
between,
meaning
that
Naxalites
can
more
easily

control
outside
access.
This
geographic
isolation
has
created
a
tribal
mentality
within
the
area.
So
while
the
government
lumps
the
militant
movement
in
the
area
under
the
umbrella
of
"Naxalism",
the
militant
movement
is
actually
quite
diffuse,
with
small
units
acting
with
varying
levels
of
autonomy
throughout
the
region.
There
is
little
indication
that, for example, a unit from Chattisgarh would also be able to conduct
operations
in
West
Bengal.
Transportation
is
expensive
and
dangerous,
so
people tend to stay close to home and defend it fiercely. This makes it
difficult
for
outsiders
to
gain
influence
in
the
area,
as
well.
It also means that the area is extremely poor. And although the region
holds
vast
raw
materials
within
its
hills
and
forests,
the
state
of
India
has
been
hard
pressed
to
exploit
those
economic
resources
because
they have
been unable to effectively control
them.
While Naxals call
for
the improvement of the lives of the people they claim to represent, they
certainly
have
shown
no
tolerance
for
letting
the
government
attempt
to
increase
economic
development
in
the
area.
This
is
partly
due
to
the
fact that there is a very low level of trust between the Naxals and New
Delhi.
It
raises
the
conundrum
of
how
the
government
can
possibly
provide
security
without
development,
and
how
development
can
possibly
take
place
without
security.
An
example
of
this
can
be
seen
in
the
Naxalites' constant sabotage of roads in the area by planting IEDs under
the surface or simply digging it up, making them unusable. Roads are
necessary for development, but, in the more immediate term, Naxals view
roads as a means for the government to send its forces into their territory.
[EXCELENT POINT. Also Schools at remote places can be added here where govt forces take
position to fight Naxal menace and Naxals always target those school beforehand]
Eager
to
stimulate
growth,
the
government
promised
foreign
investors
land
without
communicating,
much
less
negotiating
compensation,
with
locals
inhabiting
that
land.
This
has
led
to
disputes
between
the
locals,
the
foreign
companies
and
the
government.
A
famous
example
of
an
ongoing
dispute
is
the
*<South
Korean
steel
conglomerate,
POSCO
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/india_poscos_steel_investment_challenge>*,
which
is
in
the
process
of
acquiring
some
4,000
acres
in
Orissa
state
upon which it can build a $12 billion steel mill. The project has been
delayed
by
protests
and
acts
of
violence
by
locals
opposed
to
the
project
and
police
have
been
unable
to
secure
the
area
to
permit
building.
Compensation
to
locals
for
the
land
is
only
just
now
(some
five
years
after
the
land
was
promised
to
POSCO)
being
negotiated.
Indias
economic
success
has
meant
that
foreign
investors
(like
POSCO)
are
increasing
their
presence
in
India,
which
means
that
locals
like
the
Naxalites
are
faced
with
both
a
threat
and
an
opportunity.
Outside

business
interests
(whether
they
be
wealthy
farmers
from
central
India
or
South
Korea)
in
partnership
with
the
government
pose
the
greatest
threat
to
the
Naxalite
movement.
On
the
other
hand,
there
is
opportunity.
Outside
investment
could
potentially
bring
jobs
and
development to an area that is desperately poor. There are two ways for
the
Naxalites
to
capitalize
on
this
opportunity.
The
first
is
to
benefit
from the jobs that will be brought in by working at these manufacturing
sites.
However,
due
to
the
long
history
of
distrust
between
locals
and
outsiders,
Naxalites
are
skeptical
of
letting
the
government
control
anything
in
their
region.
Successful
economic
development
that
brings
steady
employment
would
have
a
calming
affect
on
the
radicalized
militants
that
the
Naxals
need
to
exert
their
influence.
Movements
like
the Naxals have an array of motivations for why they do what they do,
but
self-preservation
is
always
a
very
high
priority.
The
other
opportunity is
to
force
the
government
or
the
foreign
investor
to
pay
the
group
direct
compensation
for
their
land.
Naxalites
can
increase the amount that they can demand for the land by organizing a
militant
force
that
can
allow
or
deny
access
to
certain
areas,
sabotage
commercial
activity
and
mobilize
locals
to
make
up
its
cadres.
This
is
essentially
a
protection
racket
practiced.
This
model
has
been
implemented
and
followed
successfully
by
other
militant
groups,
most
notably
the
*<Movement
for
the
Emancipation
of
the
Niger
Delta
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090316_nigerias_mend_different_militant_movement>*
(MEND),
which
manages
to
extract
concessions
from
energy
giants
operation
in
the
oil
rich,
but
dismally
poor
Niger
delta
in
Nigera.
While maoist leaders in eastern India (we can add Central India which is also Naxal infested) do make
statements
on
how
commercial
projects
in the
area
need to provide
locals
with jobs,
it
is
clear
that
Naxalites
are
also
strengthening
their
capability
to
pursue
the
second
option,
as
well.
*
The
Threat
*
Naxalites
maintain
the
capability
to
construct
and
deploy
improvised
explosive
devices
(IED),
conduct
armed
raids
and
maintain
an
extensive,
agile
and
responsive
intelligence
network.
As
seen
in
the
examples
highlighted
above,
Naxal
fighters
have
the
ability
to
be
opportunistic
in their attacks. The April 6 raid on the soldiers in Dantewada and the
May 17 bus attack were both actions that took advantage of opportunities
to
target
and
kill
police
forces.
The
April
6
raid
was
the
culmination
of
2-3 days of stalking the CRPF unit in the forrest and waiting for an
opportune moment to strike. The May 17 bus attack was organized in a

matter
of
hours,
with
spotters
noticing
the
police
on
the
bus
and
alerting other cadres who planted the device further down the road. This
flexibility
and
autonomy
amongst
groups
makes
them
a
dangerous
force
to
a slower moving, more deliberate (and predictable) central police force.
[Also

similar

June

29

ambush

at

Narayanpur

should

be

mentioned]

New
Delhi
insists
that,
according
to
the
constitution,
the
Naxalite
issue is one of law and order and, thus, a responsibility for the states
to address. New Delhi had deployed the CRPF, but has not gone so far to
deploy
the
military,
something
that
many
Indian
politicians
have
called
for
as
the
only
solution
to
addressing
the
Naxalites.
While
military
advisors
have
been
sent
in
to
train
local
and
federal
police
forces,
they
have
not
engaged
in
any
known
anti-Naxalite
operations.
India
has
a
bad
memory
of
deploying
their
military
to
address
domestic
threats in the past, such as the Sikh threat posed in the 1980s in which
the
military
response
was
criticized
as
being
too
heavy
handed.
The
military
action
at
the
Golden
Temple
in
Amritsar,
which
was
codenamed
Operation
Blue
Star,
also
fanned
the
flames
of
Sikh
militancy
and
sparked
a
series
of
serious
Sikh
reprisal
attacks,
that
included
the
Assassination
of
Indian
Prime
Minister
Indira
Gandhiwho
had
ordered
the
operation.
Also,
the
military
insists
that
it
is
currently
focused
on
fighting
*<Islamist
and
separatist
forces
in
Jammu
&
Kashmir
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100630_brief_indian_administered_kashmir_violence_blamed_pakist
ani_militant_group>*
in
northwest
India
along
the
disputed
border
with
Pakistan
and
are
dealing
with
multiple
*<ethno-speratist
movements
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081030_india_explosions_assam>*
in
the
northeast
region
of
India
surrounded
by
China
and
Bangladesh
While
Indian
Prime
Minister
Manmohan
Singh
has
labeled
the
Naxalite
issue
the
biggest
threat
to
the
countrys
internal
security,
incidents
like
the
*<2008
Mumbai
attacks
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081127_india_update_mumbai >*
provide
evidence
to
most
Indians
that
Pakistan
and
the
militants
who
hide
there
pose
a
greater,
external
threat.
In
the
end,
Naxalism
is
fairly
contained.
Despite
threats
and
indications
from
*<Naxals
to
conduct
attacks
against
urban
targets
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20100222_brief_naxalite_arrested_plans_attack_delhi
>,
*the
group
has
not
yet
demonstrated
a
capability
to
pose
a
serious
militant
threat
outside
of
its
jungle
hideouts
in
the
urban
centers
of
eastern India. Though it is not
beyond
the realm of possibility for
the

groups leaders and bomb makers to develop such a capability. It will be

important
to
watch
for
indications
that
they
are
attempting
to
train
their cadre in the skills required for urban terrorism (what we refer to
as
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100526_failed_bombings_armed_jihadist_assaults>*<terrorist
tradecraft
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100526_failed_bombings_armed_jihadist_assaults**>*.).
However,
even
if
we
do
not
see
them
expanding
their
target
set
and
employing
more
terrorist
type
attacks,
that
does
not
mean
that
the
ability
for
Naxalites
to
challenge
the
state
will
not
materialize
in
other
forms.
The
Naxalites
have
a
very
sophisticated
organization
that
relies
not
only
upon
militant
tactics,
but
also
social
unrest
and
political
tactics
to
increase
its
power
vis--vis
the
central
government.
Naxalites
have
formed
student
groups
in
universities
that
are
sympathetic
to
their
cause,
they
have
human
rights
groups
and
interest
groups
advocating
in
New
Delhi
and
other
regional
capitals
for
local
tribal
inhabitants
in
rural
eastern
India.
These
groups
do
not
necessarily
use
violence,
but
do
stage
protests
and
incidents
of
"acting
out"
to
express
their
grievances
against
the
state.
This
ability
to
pressure
the
central
and
local
governments
with
hard,
militant
threats,
while
maintaining
a
subtle,
steady
pressure
from
social
groups
means
that even if the government did decide to deploy the military to combat
the
Naxalites,
it
would
face
a
well
organized
force
that
by
no
means
would be easy for the Indian military to defeat usuing conventional warfare.