1978

CURRENTANTHROPOLOGYVol. 19, No. 4, December

Research0011-3204/78/1904-0003$01.75
? 1978by The Wenner-Gren
FoundationforAnthropological

Societies,and History'
Infrastructures,
by Maurice Godelier

THis ARTICLE is a translationof my responseto a requestfrom

the reviewDialectiquesformy opinionon two points fundamentalto the social sciences,namely,ideologyand class. For
want of space, I shall merelyoutline some provisionalconand as clearlyas possible.
clusionsthatI have reachedas briefly
I shall be dealingwithfourtopicsin turn: (1) the distinction
(2) the relationship
betweeninfrastructure
and superstructure;
betweenthedeterminant
roleoftheeconomyin thelast analysis
(3) the
and the dominantrole of any given superstructure;
ideel2aspect of social reality and the distinctionbetween
ideologicaland nonideologicalwhen dealing with ideel realities; (4) the roleofviolenceand consentin the workingsof the
powerofdominationofan orderora class,etc. (can we speak of
a paradox of "legitimacy"regardingthe emergenceof classes
and thestate?).
I shouldlike to emphasizemydebt
Beforegoingany farther,
to the ever-growing-andalready immense-body of fresh
materialbeing thrownup by anthropologicaland historical
research.As faras historyis concerned,I am a mereamateur.
My readinghas centeredmainlyon problemsofstateformation
and the transformation
of class relations.I am afraidI shall
probably disappointthose of my readers who would have
liked me to spell out morepreciselythe connectionsbetween
mygeneral,abstractpositionsand thiswealthofanthropological material

1 This article summarizesthe main themesof a book due to be

published by Gallimard under the title Infrastructures,
Societes,
Histoire.It is a translationof the paper "Infrastructures,
Societes,
Histoire,"whichappeared in the journal Dialectiquesno. 21, pp. 4153. The translation,by RupertSwyers,is by permissionof the editor
of Dialectiques.
2 The wordideelis a neologismused rarelyand almost exclusively
by modernFrenchphilosophersinfluencedby Germanphenomenology. Rather than coin a freshEnglish neologism,the translation
remainswiththe original.

MAURICE GODELIER is Professorof Anthropology

and Economics
and Directorof Studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (54, Boulevard Raspail, 75270 Paris Cedex 06,
France). Born in 1934, he was educated at the Ecole Normale
Superieurein Paris (Agregede Philosophie,1959). He has done
fieldwork
among the Baruya of New Guinea (1967-69) underthe
auspices of the CentreNationale de RechercheScientifique.His
research interests are Melanesia, economic systems, Marxist
analysis,processesof class formation,and ideology.His publicationsinclude Rationaliteet irrationalite
en economie(Paris: Maspero,1966; Englishtranslation,London,1973),Sur les socieiesprecapitalistes (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1970), Horizon, trajets
marxistesen anthropologie
(Paris: Maspero, 1973; Englishtranslation, Cambridge, 1977), and the edited volume Un domaine
conteste:L'anthropologie
economique(Paris: Mouton, 1974).
The presentpaper, submittedin finalform10 III 78, was sent
forcommentto 40 scholars.The responsesare printedbelow and
are followedby a replyby the author.

Vol. 19 * No. 4 * December1978

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE

AND SUPERSTRUCTURE
For a Marxist,surely,any examinationof the roleofideology,
and itstransformation,
itsformation
governing
oftheconditions
or of its impactupon the evolutionof societiesmust involve
superinvestigationinto the relationsbetweeninfrastructure,
Balibar,and
and ideology.Oughtwe, withAlthusser,
structure,
things "instances"?
Establet (1965), to call these different
Oughtwe to regardthemas "levels" ofsocial reality?as somekindsof social
how substantivedistinctionsbetweendifferent
ofits substance?
slicesor cross-sections
reality?as institutional
I don't thinkso. To my mind,a societydoes not have a top
and a bottom,or even levels. This is because the distinction
is not a distinction
and superstructure
betweeninfrastructure
Its principle,rather,is one ofa distinction
betweeninstitutions.
What,then,does thenotionofinfrastructure
betweenfunctions.
reallycover?
It designatesa combination-whichexistsin all societiesof at least threeseriesof social and materialconditionsthat
enable a society'smembersto produceand to reproducethe
materialconditionsof theirsocial existence.These sets are:
1. The specificecologicaland geographicalconditionswithin
whicha societyexistsand fromwhichit extractsits material
meansofexistence.
2. The productiveforces,i.e., the materialand intellectual
means that the membersof a societyimplement,withinthe
"labour" processes,in orderto workupon natureand
different
to extractfromit theirmeansofexistence,therebytransforming
it intoa "socialized"nature.
3. Social relationsof production,that is, relationsof any
kindthat assumeone or another(or all) of the followingthree
thesocialformofaccess to resources
functions:(a) determining
and to controlof the means of production;(b) allocatingthe
labour
labourforceof a society'smembersamongthe different
processes which produce its material base, and organizing
these different
processes; (c) determiningthe social formof
of the productof individualor collectivelabour
redistribution
of
theformsofcirculationor noncirculation
and, consequently,
theseproducts.
We shouldbear in mindthat,strictlyspeaking,what Marx
(1958:13) called the economic structureof a society was
merelythe social relationsof production:"These relationsof
productiontaken togetherform the economic structureof
society."3We should also bear in mind that, althoughproductive forcesand relationsof productionare distinctphenomena,theyneverexistseparately;theyalwaysexisttogether
in some specificcombination.What Marx calls "mode of
bildet die
3 "Der Gesamtheit dieser Produktions verhailtnisse
OkonomischeStrukturdes Gesellschaft."

763

production"or "social formof production"are in fact the

variousspecificformsof thesecombinations.These definitions
call fora certainnumberof remarks.
First,amongthe different
productiveforcesI includewhat
I have referredto as "intellectual"means of acting upon
nature.By thisI meanall the "knowledge"thata givensociety
may have ofnature,but also its bodyof technicalprocesses,of
rules governingthe manufactureof tools, of rules governing
theuse ofthebodyin work,etc. It willbe observed,then,that
withthe
rightat the heartofman's mostmaterialrelationship
materialnaturesurrounding
himlies a complexbody of representations,ideas, patterns,etc., which I call ideel realities;
theirpresenceand theiraction are essentialforany kind of
materialactivityto be able to occur. Contemporaryanthropologyhas started to take stock of the ideelrealitieswhich
formpart of the different
materialprocessesin the societies
investigated.It is this that constitutesthe vast fieldof ethnoscience,collectingnative taxonomiesof plants,animals,soils,
climates,rulesforthe manufactureof tools,etc. This is also
the purposeof Needham's (1954-76) studiesof Chinese technologyand scienceor oftheworkofHaudricourt(1962; Haudricourt and Brunhes-Delamarre1955,Haudricourtand Hedin
1943).
Now, these ideel realities may be grasped, in the first
place, in the speech of the peoples and social groupsthat use
them.They thus exist as linguisticrealities,as facts that are
indissociablefromlanguage and thought,and it is through
these that theymay be communicatedthroughoutthe social
body and transmitted
fromone generationto the next.
superClearly,then,the distinctionbetweeninfrastructure,
structure,and ideologymay be seen as a distinctionbetween
functionsand not betweeninstitutions.
As we have just seen,
thoughtand language may functionas componentsof the
infrastructure,
as part of a society'sforcesof production.The
distinction,then, is not between material and immaterial,
forI fail to see in what way thoughtcould be less material
than the rest of social life. Nor is it a distinctionbetween
tangibleand intangible.It is a distinctionof positionwithin
of social life.
thoseactivitiesnecessaryto the reproduction
The secondpointon whichI shouldlike to commentis the
notion of the labourprocess.First of all, it should be noted
thattheconceptofworkis notcommonto all societies.Ancient
Greek has two words,poiein and prattein,neitherof which
means to work:respectivelytheymean makingand doing.In
Latin, the word laboris used forany kind of heavy activity,
designates
like thewordponosin Greek,and thewordnegotium
an activitythatinterrupts
or counteractsthe otium,or leisure,
that is the markof a freeman as well as being the condition
him to conducthis politicaland culturalactivities.
permitting
It is extremely
rare,furthermore,
that the wordlabour,where
used,is used to connoteand containtheidea ofa "transformaform
tion" of nature and of man. All these representations
part of the labourprocess,and theyare joined by otherrepresentationswhichlegitimizethe presenceor absence of a given
social groupin a given labour process.These representations
may,forexample,serveto justifythefactthatit is thewomen
that are sent out to gatherwild plants,or to carryfirewood,
and they may moreoverpresentsuch activities'as being unworthyofmen,to whomare reserved-as ofright,we maysaynobler activities such as hunting,war, or the mastery of
rituals.But in touchingon thisquestionwe are in facttouching
on thepointsofcontact
betweenrelationsofproductionand the
divisionoflabour.
It is importantto bear in mind,on the questionof relations
ofproduction,that,dependingon thesocietyand thehistorical
epoch under consideration,relations of productiondo not
occupy the same locus, nor do theytake the same form;consequently,theydo nothave thesame effects
upon theevolution
ofsocieties.I shalloffertwoexamplesofwhatmightbe termed
764

the topology of economics-the comparative topology of

societiessuch as
relationsof production.In hunter-gatherer
that of the AustralianAborigines,it has been observedthat
the social relationsthat govern the huntingand gathering
determinethe compositionof the groupsdoingthe
territories,
huntingand gathering,and decide how the productof these
activitiesis sharedout are relationsofkinship,i.e., relationsof
descent,marriage,and residence.To be moreprecise,we may
conditionofappropriation
observethatthe (somewhat)abstract
group,whichinheritscomin a descent
ofnatureis membership
mon (though"nonexclusive")rightsover the undomesticated
fromgenerationto generation.
territories
resourcesof different
whathappens
appropriation,
In theeverydayprocessofconcrete
is thatconsanguinealand affinalrelationsformthe cooperative
forhuntingand gatheringand forthe distribution
framework
of produce.But we need to go fartherstill,forin practicean
Australianband-a unit of direct,everydayappropriationof
nature-is compositein structure.It is composedof a central
froma numberofcommon
coreof mendescendedpatrilineally
ancestorsand heirsto rightsover a givenportionof territory;
of
around this core is a clusterof allies, i.e., representatives
different
groupsthathave eithergivenor receivedwivesin the
courseof earliergenerations.This providesthe groupwiththe
shouldthe need
territories
possibilityof usingseveraldifferent
arise.The chieffeatureofthesystem,then,is thefactofshared
ownershipof resourcesby a numberof kinshipgroups;these
kinshipgroups,moreover,are not exclusiveownersof these
rights,since, in certain criticalcircumstances,allied groups
also have rightsto the same territory.
point,namely,the relationHere we arriveat a fundamental
ship betweenthe natureof the forcesof productionand the
thissystem
natureofsocial relationsofproduction.Underlying
ownershipofresources,we find
ofshared,thoughnonexclusive,
not only that the individualis unable to reproducehimself
exceptin groups,but also thatgroupscannotreproducethemselves if they are alone and requireothergroupsin orderto
be able to do so. This is whereproductiveforcesmesh with
social formsof relationsof production.We shall be coming
to escape the
back to thispointlater,but alreadyit is difficult
conclusionthat,here,relationsof kinshipfunctionas relations
The distinction
and that they do so internally.
of production
is not a distinction
and superstructure
betweeninfrastructure
functions
between
but a distinction
betweeninstitutions,
different
withina singleinstitution.
My secondexample-based on theworkofFrankfort(1948),
Oppenheim (1964), Adams (1966), and others-deals with
ancient Sumerianorganization.It would seem that, in the
city-statesof Mesopotamia,the land was originallyregarded
as belongingto a god,thegod whosetemplestoodin themiddle
of the city.The economyworkedas a vast centralizedsystem
of the cityand the surrounding
withinwhichthe communities
weresubjectto the authorityof the priestsof the
countryside
oweda portion
god whoownedtheland,and thesecommunities
of theirlabourand theirproduceto thesepriests.Here, it will
internally
be observed,it was religiousrelationsthatfunctioned
as relationsof production.The exampleof a Greekcity-state,
on the otherhand, would show that membership-bybirthin a polis gave the freecitizenboth privateand public rights
over the city's land. Here, politics,in the Greeksense of the
internallyas a relationofproduction.
word,functioned
Beforedrawingany generalconclusionsfromthis analysis,
I shouldliketo returnto one essentialpoint,one thathas given
riseto a good deal ofconfusionamongMarxists:thedistinction
between labour process and process of production.Certain
such as Terray (1969) and Rey (1971, 1973),
anthropologists,
formsof labour processthat they
have dubbed the different
have discoveredin the descriptionof a particularsociety-in
forms
ofthedifferent
thiscase, Meillassoux's(1964) description
of hunting,farming,and craftsto be foundamong the Ivory
CURRENT

ANTITHROPOLOGY

Coast Guro-"mode of production."Hence, we have hunting,

farming,
pastoral,etc., modesofproduction.This, however,is
to confuseforms
ofthedivisionoflabourwithmodesofproduction.
The practice,withinthe same relationsof production,of,for
example,farmingcombinedwithanimalhusbandryand smallscale domestichandicraftsdoes not imply the existenceof
modes of productionwith interconnections
several different
thatneedto be found.It is at thispointthatsomepeopleinvoke
the conceptof "economicand social formation."In fact,what
forms
basicallydefinesa mode of productionare the different
of appropriationof resources,of means of production,and of
be several different
the productitself.There may, therefore,
formsoflabourprocessand cooperationwhichcombineon the
basis of a singleformof property.One can imaginejust how
a rigorousreviewof the vast mass ofanthropological
profitable
and historicalmaterialnow available would be. But one can
thatoughtto be said has
also see thatby no meanseverything
beensaid regarding
abstractnotionssuchas forceofproduction,
and thatevenwithinthesenotionsthereremainvastunexplored
regionswaitingto be openedup by theoreticalanalysis.
We may alreadydraw one generalconclusion,at any rate.
This is that the distinctionbetweeninfrastructure
and superis not a distinction
betweeninstitutions,
or instances,
structure
but betweenfunctions.It is onlyin certainsocieties,and particularlyin capitalistsociety,thatthisdistinction
between
functionshappensto coincidewitha distinction
between
institutions.
This, in my view, is the real reasonforthe "epistemological
break" broughtabout by Marx's work;the primereasonsfor
this break are to be soughtnot in Marx's thoughtitself,but
in the natureof the capitalistmode of production,which,far
morethan manyothers,separatedeconomics,
politics,religion,
kinship,art,etc.,intoso manydistinctinstitutions.
Once thishas been grasped,a vast new fieldof investigation
opensup, namely,thesearchforthe reasonsand theconditions
which,in history,have broughtabout shiftsin the locus-and
hence changes in the forms-of relationsof production.To
carryout this investigation,though,it is firstnecessaryto
eschewattemptsto deduce the locus and formof a society's
economyfromsome dubiousabstracttheory.For a Marxistas foranyoneelse-the main thingis to go and take a close
look foroneself.This is not to say that Marxismis a kind of
empiricism,but of all theoreticalapproachesit is assuredly
the one that is obligedto submititselfmostthoroughly
to the
concretediversityof experience.
Marxistsare not entirelyunarmedin this respect;afterall,
Marx did suggestthat theremightbe some "correspondence"
betweenthe natureof the forcesof productionand the nature
of relationsofproduction.Nature heremeanslocus,form,and
effect.But I shall make no secretof the fact that I findthis
hypothesistrickyto handle, for several reasons. The term
"correspondence"is unclear. Does it referto a relationof
causalityor a relationof compatibility?
we lack
Furthermore,
reliableanalyses of forcesof productionand theirevolution.
Only this kind of investigationcould allow us to break out of
the currentimpasse,in whichall one can do is say that while
we have no difficulty
seeing what specificproductiveforces
it is impossibleto see exactlywhattheypermit,
prevent,
stillless
whattheyimpose.Whilethereis no questionof our beingable
to deduce social formsfromforcesof production,we must
nevertheless
seek to identifythe limitsof theirrangeof possibilitiesand themechanismswherebyone of thesepossibilities
is in factselected.I shall be returning
to theseproblemsat the
end of the secondsection,in whichI shall attemptto discuss
the controversybetween Marxists and non-Marxists(and
among Marxists themselves)concerningthe bases for the
domination,in any society,of what Marxistssee as a superstructure:kinshipin certainprimitivesocieties,the politicoreligiousspherein PharaonicEgypt,etc. I shall be discussing
this controversy,
moreover,in termsofwhat has alreadybeen
Vol. 19 * No. 4 * December1978

Godelier:INFRASTRUCTURES,

SOCIETIES,

AND HISTORY

How can Marxists

said hereabout the notionofinfrastructure.
whichis
reconcilethe hypothesisthat it is the infrastructure
in the last analysiswith the fact that in certain
determinant
historicalsocieties one finds a superstructureoccupyinga
dominantposition?
ECONOMIC DETERMINATION AND
SUPERSTRUCTUJRAL DOMINATION
comes across anthropologists
and hisOne not infrequently
toriansclaimingthat the facts fallingwithintheirspeciality
(1930-31),it was enough
refuteMarxism.For Radcliffe-Brown
to showthatkinshipwas thedominantfactoramongAustralian
Aboriginesto conclude this refutation.Dumont (1966) sees
as furnished
thisrefutation
by theblatantdominationofreligion
in India and by the factthat the caste systemtakes the form
of an ideologicaloppositionbetweenpure and impure.For the
historianWill (1972), the dominationof politics in ancient
Greece shows clearlythat economicsdid not play the determiningrole and did not even amountto a system.What are
we to make of this?
Reviewingthese examplesin the light of our definitionof
relationsofproduction,we findthatin each case the dominant
"superstructure"functionssimultaneouslyas a relation of
production.In each of the threesocietiesdealt with above,
descentand marriageare regulatedby kinship,as in all societies; yet kinshipis dominantin one case only, that of the
AustralianAboriginesIn all three,man's relationswith the
supernaturalare regulatedby religion,but onlyin one, Hindu
society,does religionpredominate.We may thus put forward
thehypothesisthattheexplicitfunctions
ofkinshipand religion,
which are to regulatesocially respectivelythe reproduction
of life itselfthroughthe regulationof marriageand descent
and the relationswiththe invisiblepowerssupposedto control
of the universe,are notin themselves
the reproduction
enough
to attain
to allow one or the otherof these "superstructures"
a dominantpositionwhereit in factdoes so. I shouldtherefore
like to put forwardan alternativeworkinghypothesis:
For a social activity-and with it its correspondingand
organizingideas and institutions-toplay a dominantrole in
the functioning
and evolutionof a society,and hence in the
thoughtand action of the groupsand individualscomposing
it, it is notenoutgh
forthis activityto fulfillseveralfunctions;
it must necessarily,in additionto its own ostensiblepurpose
as a
arndinternally
and its explicitfunctions,functiondirectly
relationofproduction.
This hypothesismakesno assumptionsregardingthe nature
ofsocial relationseligibleto functionas relationsofproduction.
It merelyassumessomethingabout the reasonsforthe relative
weightand the unequal importanceof the various formsof
and evolutionof societies;it
social activityin the functioning
assumesthatthisrelativeweightdependsless upon whatsocial
relationsare (kinship,religion,etc.) than on what theydo or,
better,make people do. If we managed to verifythat social
relationsdominatewhentheyfunctionas relationsof production, then we should have workedour way back to Marx's
role,in the last analysis,
hypothesisregardingthe determinant
of infrastructure.
This hypothesisshouldbe construedin the
to be
senseof theuniversalexistenceofa hierarchy
offunctions
assumedby social relationsin orderfora societyto be able to
but this hypothesis
existas suchand to carryon reproducing;
does not permitus to jump to any conclusionsregardingthe
natureand the formof relationsof productionin any given
society.It thusbecomesimpossibleto attemptto refuteMarxism by pointingto the dominanceof a superstructure.
This viewcontrastswiththeway Marxistssuchas Althusser,
765

in anthropology
and history
Balibar (1965), and theirfollowers
have conceivedthe causalityof economicsin the last analysis.
fromamongthe different
They view the economyas selecting
instancesthe one that is to occupythe dominantpositionand
thenplacingit in thatposition.This twofoldactionis regarded
causal mechanism.Unforthe infrastructure's
as constituting
tunately,this view is incapable of explaininghow a single
forexample-can act both as a relation
institution-kinship,
of productionand as a superstructure.
Whateverthe answer
to thisquestionmay be, we mustseek to explainhowit is that
kinship(or religion)comesto functionas a relationofproduction and hence to dominate. Concerningkinship,we may
imaginethat in primitivesocietieslivinglabour forcecounts
formorethanlabouraccumulatedin the formof tools,domesticatedresources,etc. We know that in all societiesthe reproformsof kinship.It
duction of life is governedby different
may be, then,that we shouldlook forthe ultimatereasonsfor
as relationsof production,and
kinshiprelations'functioning
henceforkinship'sdominance,in somegivenstate of the productiveforces,i.e., in somerelationbetween"living" (present)
labourand "dead" (past) labour.
we can now take a
Perhaps,on the basis of the foregoing,
look at the questionof the distinctionbetweenthe ideological
and the nonideological
spheres.
THE ID1EL IN REALITY AND THE PROBLEM
OF THE IDEOLOGICAL SPHERE
Does the foregoing
suggesta new approachto the problemof
differentiating,
among all the different
ideelrealitiesthat any
society contains,which are ideologicaland which are not?
Apparently,we have done nothingto alterthe view,generally
heldto be Marxist,ofideologiesand theirdomination.We may,
indeed, on the basis of the idea advanced above-namely,
that the dominantsocial relationswithina societyare those
which (regardlessof whichthey are) functionas relationsof
and legitimize
production-suggestthattheideas thatrepresent
thesedominantsocial relationsoughtto play a dominantrole
almostautomatically.Or, if we take social relationsforwhat
they are, namely,concreterelationsbetweendistinctsocial
groupsoccupyingdifferent
positionsin relations(functioning
as
relations)of production-whetherthese be relationsof men's
dominationover womenin classless societiesor relationsof
one caste's or class's dominationover the others-we may
guess that the ideas that legitimizethis dominationof a sex,
caste, or class will virtuallyor almost automaticallybe the
dominantideas in the societyin question.In the same vein,
we may also anticipatethat the developmentof the specific
contradictions
contained in differenttypes of relations of
productionand social relationswill bring about changes in
the relationsbetweendominantand dominatedand in power
relationsand ideologicalrelations;we may equally anticipate
that this will lead to the transformation
of the dominated
person'sconsciousnessof the realitydominatinghim.
Once we have taken these customaryMarxistpropositions
intoaccount,the difficulties
begin.First,theylack any precise
criterion
ofwhatturnsan idea intoan "ideological"representation.It wouldappear that whatis ideologicalis any idea that
an existingsocial order,along withthe relationsof
legitimizes
dominationand oppressionthat it contains withinit. One
mighteven go so faras to say that the idea's content,the fact
that it is trueor false,or moreor less true,is irrelevant,and
that any idea can becomeideologicalthe momentit entersthe
serviceofa dominantsocialgroupand presentsthisdomination
as a naturalphenomenon.At the same time,though,surely
an idea automaticallybecomes partlyfalse the momentits
presentsa social orderas the onlypossible,immutable,social
order?An historiclie thus turnsintoa theoreticalerror.
766

Further,ifwe assumethe existenceof dominantideas in the

serviceof dominantclasses,do we automaticallytherebyhave
to assumethe existenceof dominatedideas forthe dominated
classes? But then,are not dominantideas dominantprecisely
because they are widely shared by the dominated classes
themselves?Of course, experienceshows that in any social
systemmembersof the dominatedgroupentertainideas that
oppose themand that theythemselvesoppose to thoseof the
dominantgroup.Are we thento conclude,in reference
to the
foregoingdemonstration,
that these dominatedpeople's ideas
are what mightbe termedideas "against," a sort of counterideology,and hencea different
ideology?Or are we to say that
theycannotbe called an ideologysince theydo not legitimize
the existingorderand do notparticipatein its mendacity?But
are all legitimizing
ideas illusory?If so, illusoryforwhom?Not
forthose-dominantand dominated-who sharethem.Thereforeit mustbe forthosewho rejectthissocial orderand want
to changeit, or forus outsideobservers.As can be seen,then,
it is impossibleto definean idea as ideologicaleitherin termsof
a single criterion-truthor falsehood,legitimizationor nonlegitimization-orin termsof a combinationof the two. The
reasoningbreaksdownin each case. In fact,ifwe are to escape
thisdilemmaofformalor functionaldefinitions
of theideological sphere,we are going to have to develop a theoryof the
componentsof the power of dominationand oppression,a
theoryof relationsbetweenviolenceand consent.
We cannotdevelopsucha theory,however,ifwe continueto
considerideas merelyas a passive reflection,
in the mind,of
social relationsthat are themselvesregardedas being born
outside the mind, independentlyof it and prior to it. This
bringsus to a fundamental
problem-a strategiccrossroadsin
theinterpretation
ofsocialfactsand historyand also inpractice.
Indeed, we findourselvesat a partingof the ways,at a point
wherevariousways of beingmaterialist
diverge.Here we shall
returnto our earlieranalysisof theideelelementcontainedin
withthe materialnaturesurroundeverymaterialrelationship
ingus. As we have seen,any materialproductiveforcecontains
in it, rightfromthe outset,a complexideelelementwhichis
not a passive, a posteriori,representation
of this productive
forcein the mind, but, fromthe very beginning,an active
ingredient,an internalconditionof its very emergence.We
should have no difficulty
in showing,moreover,that this
analysiscan be extendedto all social relations.For example,it
is impossibleforkinshiprelationsto emergeand to reproduce
down the generationswithoutdefinitionof the rules and the
termsof descent,marriage,and residenceand the notionsof
kinshipand nonkinship;theserules,terms,and notionsare not
a posteriorireflectionsof kinship relations,but an integral
componentthat has to existrightfromthe wordgo. Needless
to say, kinshiprelationscannotbe reducedto these different
ideel components,but they cannot exist withoutthem.And
we can generalizefromthis and advance the idea that all
and
bothin thought
social relationsariseand existsimultaneously
outsideofit-that all social relationscontain,fromthe outset,
of it,
an ideelelementwhichis not an a posteriorireflection
but a conditionforits emergenceand ultimatelyan essential
component.The ideelelementexists not only in the formof
but in theformofall thoseaspects
thecontentofconsciousness,
and
ofsocial relationsthatmake themrelationsofsignification
make theirmeaningor meaningsmanifest.
A certaintype of Marxismhas all too oftenneglectedthe
fact that thoughtdoes not passively "reflect"reality,but
ratherinterpretsit actively.But this is not the most serious
point,forpeople have also tendedto forgetthat thoughtnot
only interpretsreality,but actually organizesevery kind of
social practiceon the basis of thisreality,therebycontributing
to theproductionofnewsocial realities.It is thiswhichmakes
all the difference
betweenthe severaldifferent
ways of being
materialistin scientificand politicalpractice.The differences
CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

becomeevenmoremarkedifwe startconfusing
man's relationship withnaturewithhis relationshipwithhistory,forwhile
natureexists,always has existed,and always will continueto
exist independently
of man and his thoughtand-where its
man'sintervennondomesticated
portionis concerned-without
tion,a social relationcan onlylead a doublelife,both outside
of man's thoughtand withinit. Social relations,therefore,
are
simultaneously
a materialand an ideelreality.
To conclude,I shall attemptto apply this analysis to the
problemsof the originsof class and of the state. I would take
to remindthe reader that, as Bonte (1975)
this opportunity
has shownfortheKel GressTuaregofNiger,class societiescan
exist withouttheirhaving to have a state as well-without
requiringa distinct,centralizedinstitutionthroughwhichthe
dominantclass may wieldits power.

Godelier:INFRASTRUCTURES,

SOCIETIES,

AND HISTORY

could onlyhave grownup in classlesssocietieslegitimately-or,

at least, that the processof transformation
must have been
slow and the legitimacyof theirformationmust long have
weighedmore heavily in the balance than such factorsas
violence,usurpation,betrayals,etc.
For example,among the So, a farmingtribe of 5,000 in
Uganda (Laughlinand Laughlin 1972), politicaland religious
powerwas concentrated
in thehandsof roughly50 elders,who
wereold menrepresenting
the different
patrilinealclans. These
elders belongedto an initiatorysociety called the Kenisan.
They alone had the powerto communicatewiththe ancestors
and, throughthem,with God, the masterof the rain and of
health and prosperity.When we examinetheiractivities,we
findtheminvolvedin all the ritualsrequiredforrainmaking,
forblessingthe sorghum,
fordrivingaway sickness,forhalting
enemiesat the frontiers-ina word,in everything
requiredto
VIOLENCE AND CONSENT: PARADOXES
preservepeace, justice, and prosperity.There was no police
UNDERLYING THE ORIGINS OF CLASSES AND
force,but each noninitiatelivedunderthepermanentthreatof
THE STATE
going mad and eating his own excrementshould he seek to
communicatewith the ancestorshimselfand to infringethe
The powerof dominationconsistsof two indissolubleelements
elders'monopoly.As we can see, here,consentis alwaysbacked
whose combinationconstitutesits strength:violence and
bythethreat
cf viole'ice,even thoughthe latter remainson the
consent.At the riskof shockinga certainnumberof readers,I
horizon,keepinga low profile.But it wouldbe equallyvain to
would go so far as to say that, of these two componentsof
tryto imaginea durablepowerof dominationand oppression
power,the strongeris not the violenceof the dominant,but
based solelyeitheron nakedviolenceand terroror on the total
theconsentofthedominatedto theirdomination.I am perfectly
consentof everymemberof society.These would be extreme
awareofthedifferences
betweenconsentobtainedunderduress,
cases, highlyephemeraland transitoryin the evolution of
passiveacceptance,lukewarmadherence,and sharedconviction.
history.Even societiesfoundedupon conquest,such as the
I realizethat in any society,even a classlessone, not all indiYatenga Mossi, so admirablydescribedby Izard (1975), end
vidualsor groupsare equallyconsentingin theiracceptanceof
up, aftera time,adoptingan institutional
patternthatdemands
the social order.Even whenactive,theirconsentis not always
at least some consenton the part of the dominatedto their
given withoutreservationsor contradictions.
The reasonlies
domination.We can see thisin the enthronement
ritualof the
beyond the realm of thought,in the fact that all societies,
newking,withhis famousringujourney:thenewking,selected
includingthe mostegalitarianclasslessones,containa mixture
by the dominantgroup,sets out dressedin rags to visit the
of commonand particularintereststhat are constantlyconvillagesofthedominatedand to be recognizedas kingby them.
and compromising.
flicting
Withoutthis,we wouldneverhave
At the end ofhis journey,he reentershis capital,but thistime
had any history.But althoughit is enormouslyimportantto
as king,clothedin the ornamentsof his functionand ridingon
the evolutionof a society-and to the individualor collective
a whitehorse.
fateofits members-whether
the dominatedpersonsor groups
I shouldnow like to formulatethe followinghypothesis:for
are deeply convinced,half-convinced,
or submissivelyconrelationsof dominationand exploitationto have arisen and
vincedof the legitimacyof theirsystemor latentlyopposedor
reproducedthemselvesdurablyin formerly
classlesssocieties,
even overtlyhostileto this system,the fact is that all these
such
relations
must
have
as an exchange
presented
themselves
are particularconfigurations
of a major historicalforcein the
and as an exchangeofservices.
how theymanagedto
This
was
preservationor transformation
of societies,namely,the force
get themselvesaccepted,and this was how they managed to
of ideas, of ideologies,and thisforceis bornnot merelyof the
obtain the consent-passive or active-of the dominated.I
contentoftheseideas,but also of thefactthat theyare shared.
should furtherbe inclined to hypothesizethat, among the
This poses a theoreticalproblem:underwhatconditionsdo
factors
leadingto internaldifferentiation
ofsocial statusand to
dominatedgroupscome to share interpretations
of the world
the moreor less gradualformation
based on
of
new
hierarchies
that legitimizethe existingsocial ordernot onlyin the eyes of
the
division
of
society
into
the
services
orders,
castes,
or
classes,
the dominantgroup, but also in their own eyes? Certain
renderedby the dominantindividualsor group must have
and anthropologists,
philosophers
suchas Deleuze and Guattari
involved,in the firstplace, invisiblerealitiesand forcescon(1972) in L'Anti-OEdipeand Clastres and Lefort (1977) in
of
trolling(in the thoughtof thesesocieties)the reproduction
theiranalysisofLa Boetie's Discourssur la servitude
volontaire, the universeand oflife,and that thisfactmusthave played a
referto a certainnumberof savage tribes-selectedarbitrarily
vital role.
but carefullyreinterpreted-inorderto arguethat classes and
To my way of thinking,the monopolyof the means (to us
thestate (althoughtheseare by no meansthesame thing)were
of reproductionof the universeand of life must
imaginary)
bornout of somepeople's reprehensible
wish to be servedand
have precededthe monopolyof the visiblematerialmeans of
theremainder's
reprehensible
wishto be enslaved.On thisview,
production,i.e., of thosemeanswhicheveryonecould and had
theemergenceofthe State, of theDespot, ofthe One above all
to producein orderto reproduce,
giventheirrelativesimplicity.
others,withinthe internalevolutionaryprocess of primitive
In the balance that emergedbetween services exchanged,
societiesremainsunaccountable.It doesn't seem to me that
however,those renderedby the dominantgroupappeared to
classes could be an avatar of desire,althoughI do not fora
be all the morefundamentalinasmuchas theytouchedupon
momentwishto denythepowerto desire,feelings,
or emotional the
invisiblepart of the world;the morematerialand visible
forcesin the lives ofindividualsor of societies.I am becoming the
tasks performed
by the dominatedgroups,the moretheir
increasinglypersuaded that we are in fact dealing with a
serviceswereregardedas trivial.We mayeven suggestthatthe
paradox that is diametrically
opposed to the viewsof Deleuze
formationof classes may have taken the formof an unequal
and Guattari,Lefortand Clastres,et al., namely,that classes
exchange,one thatlookedmoreadvantageousto thedominated
Vol. 19 * No. 4 * December1978

767

than to the dominant,and it is perhapsthis that we call an

extremecase of alienation.The dominantwere obliged,however, to provide "proof" that the lives of the dominated
depended upon them. For example,certain kings in Africa
wereput to death when theygrewold or fellsick, as it was
feared that their conditionplaced theirkingdomunder the
threatof bad harvests,epidemics,or some othercatastrophe.
I am preparedto suggest,moreover,that thesetransformations occurredunderveryprecisecircumstances,
namely,the
of hunter-gatherer
late sedentarization
populationsand, later,
offarming
and animalhusbandry.A newkind
thedevelopment
of dependencegrewup duringthe latterphase: here,we are
no longerdealingwithsavage man existingin savage nature
but,gradually,witha domesticatednatureand with"civilized"
man,whosetask it was to reproducethisdomesticatednature.
It was perhapsin this contextthat the religiousspheredeveloped in such a way as to bringabout the establishment
of
of aristocracies,thus creatingthe
stabilizedsocial hierarchies,
conditionsforthe extractionofsupplementary
labourfromthe
commonpeople.Firth's(1965) studyoftheTikopiacontainsan
importantexamplethat meritsconsideration.He shows that
the aristocracypossesseda monopolyof communication
with
thegodsand theancestors,but thatit enjoyed-wherematerial
rewardsand place in the productionprocesswereconcernedonlyminoradvantages.
In conclusion,I shouldlike to draw attentionto one final
problem:Oughtwe reallyto be usingwordssuch as class and
state when referring
to hierarchizedprecapitalistancient or
exoticsocieties?
Firstofall, I shouldpointout thatMarxistsoughtto reread
Marx's GermanIdeologyvery carefully,because he takes the
utmostpains to distinguishbetweenorder,or estate (as in the
expression"ThirdEstate"), and class,a socialgroupexclusively
definedby its place in relationto the means of production.
Such definition
was not the case, forexample,forhierarchies
ofstatusor rankin exoticaristocratic
societiesor fortheruling
ordersin the ancientRoman or Greek city. Capitalismhas
simplified
social relationsto the pointwherethe status of the
individualis defined,firstand foremost,
by economiccriteria.
So whatdid Marx mean whenhe used the termclass forwhat
he knew to be ordersin antiquityor in the Middle Ages?
Certainlynot thatwe oughtto starthuntingforclasses hiding
behindtheorders-classesthatMarxistsalonewouldbe able to
discoverand that the Greeksor the Romans,history'sactors,
could neverhave seen forthemselves.What Marx was really
sayingwas that we oughtto interpretthesesocial differences
by seekingthe reasons for them in materialfactorsand in
relationsofproductionand by sheddinglighton theoppressive
characterof relationsof exploitationofmenby men.
Now, how does this tie in withthe firsttwo sectionsof my
analysis?In otherwords,how does thisrelateto my definition
ofrelationsofproductionand to myexplanationofthedomination of superstructures?
In the example of Athens,we find
that the fact that politicalrelationsin the cityfunctionedas
relationsof productionand that theydominatedthe thought
and actionsof membersof society(both freemen and slaves)
preventedcontradictionsbetweenfree men and slaves from
directly
makingtheirappearancein thepoliticalarena.We may
say that the locus and the formof relationsof production,
and theirintimatelinkswithpolitics,made it unthinkableand
impossiblefor the slaves themselvesto acquire politicalconsciousnessof theirsituationand thus to wage directly
political
strugglesto put an end to theirslaveryand theiroppression.
Even so, little by little the slave systempiled up internal
blockageswhich,in thelongrun,wereto weakenit and slowly
to reduceit to stagnation.But it was to take a good deal more
than that,and barbarianinvasionsin particular,beforethese
slave relationsultimatelygave way to otherformsof domination. The thinkableand the do-able thus reach out beyond
768

thought,but theycannotescape the natureof the relationsof

productionand theproductiveforcesexistingin a givensociety.
It is perhapsthisthatis meantby "historicalnecessity."4

Comments
by MAURICE BLOCH
Departmentof Anthropology,
LondonSchool of Economics,
HoughtonSt., London WC2, England.9 vi 78
Godelier'spaper is an extremelyclear and powerfulpresentation of a point of view whichhas been of immensevalue to
Marxismand the social sciences.I findmyselfin agreement
withmost of it. However,because it is so wide-ranging
and
because it coverssomealreadyfamiliargroundI wantto commenton only one aspect of it: Godelier'sdiscussionof ideology. Behindthisdiscussion,and indeedthe wholepaper,is the
assumptionthat thereare two radicallydifferent
typesof societies:precapitalist
and capitalistsocieties,whichforGodelier
correspondwithnonclassand class societies.Onlyin thelatter
are thereideologicalinstitutions
or phenomena.In the former
ideologyis only to be thoughtof as a functionin a seamless
whole. Furthermore,
Godelierdistinguishes
betweenthe ideological,thatwhichlegitimates
and "naturalizes"power,and the
In preideational,whichis the processof conceptformation.
capitalistsocieties,the ideationalis organisedby the ideological, and,as a result,thetwodependon each otherso intimately
thatthe nonideological
becomesunthinkable;slaves in ancient
Rome could not have realisedthe exploitationto whichthey
were subjectedin a scientific
manner,and factorsexternalto
the slaves' consciousnesswere requiredto breakdownRoman
slavery.Only in capitalistsocieties,wherethe ideologicalhas
a specificlocation,can challengeoccur throughself-conscious
at theinception
action.Hence theoccurrenceof Marx's writing
of the capitalistsystem.
This argumentcontrastswithone I have recentlyput forward (Bloch 1977). My argumentconsistsof twomainpoints.
The firstis thatall societieshave somecompletely
nonideological concepts,formedthroughthe interactionof man and the
worldat a givenhistoricalconjuncture.The secondis thatin
all societiesconceptualisation
deformedby ideologyis to be
foundeitheronly,or at least especially,in certaintypes of
Thereis thereritualdiscourse,not spreadequallythroughout.
discourseand alwaysa potenforealwayssome nonideological
tial languagewithwhichto challengeideology.On this second
withGodelier,who sees this
pointI am in sharpdisagreement
social
state of affairsas possible only in capitalist-dominated
I am aware that thereare manyproblemsin this
formations.
position,but I have takenit because theproblemsin the counterview,that held by Godelier,seem to me even greater.
Firstly,we do have a lot of evidenceof fundamentalchallenge of the very natureof dominationby dominatedgroups
in the typesof societieswhichGodelierdescribesas nonclass
societies.I do not know about Roman slavery,but the continualpeasants' revoltswhichpunctuatedFrenchand English
feudalismare evidenceof this.The spokesmenforsuchrevolts
I On the subject of the thinkableand the do-able,I should like to
make one importantpoint clear. The fact that kinship,forexample,
is dominantin a givensocietymeans that everyproblemor eventis
goingto take the formof a problemof kinship;wherepoliticsdominates, every problemwill inevitablyassume a "political" formin
order to become thinkable.Thus, dependingon the locus and the
formof relationsof production,history'sactors, on each occasion,
develop a specificformof illusion regardingtheirown conditionsof
existence.Each mode of productionthus spontaneouslyengendersa
specificmode of screening,of occultation-in the spontaneousconsciousnessof the membersof a society-of the contentand foundationsof theirsocial relations.Far fromtakinga society'sownillusions
about itselffor reality,my theoreticalapproach seeks to lay these
bare and to explain theirexistence.

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

brokecompletelyfromthe ideologyof feudalismand did not

simplyrephraseit, as is evidencedby,forexample,JohnBall's
famous:"WhenAdam delvedand Eve span,whowas thenthe
gentleman?"Thereare manyotherexamples,perhapsthemost
striking
and elaboratebeingthe 17th-century
writingsof Winstanley,who said: "The bestlaws thatEnglandhathare yokes
and manaclestyingone sortof people to be slaves to another."
The secondpointis that,as Godelierrightly
pointsout,our
interestin ideologyis concernedwithits role in the reproducBut if we defineideologyfunctionally,
tionof domination.
anythingwe say about whatit does willbe meretautology,sinceit
In thiswaywe will
willderivefromour "functional"definition.
be unable to demonstrate
or explainits historicalsignificance.

Godelier:INFRASTRUCTURES,

SOCIETIES,

AND HISTORY

its lack of dogmatism,

its avoidanceof cantand
of expression,
jargon,its logic. Having been disappointedby much of the
workof theFrenchschoolin thepast becauseof its murkyand
obscurelanguage,I foundthisclear,incisivepapera revelation.
but I
Part of the creditmay go to the excellenttranslation,
thinkthat thispiece is as impressiveas it is because it is the
productof a profoundthinkerat the pinnacleof his powers,
givingus clearlyand directlythe best of his ideas.
The workis "revisionist"in the best sense of the word: it
lies in a
Marx. Its originality
revisesMarx by rediscovering
and the Philoreturnto origins,to the Marx of the Grundrisse
sophicalManuscripts,to the Marx of questionsand not just
insistthatMarxismbe "scientific,"
answers.Certaindogmatists
but theyforgetthatscienceby its verynaturemustalwaysbe
by HENRI J. M. CLAESSEN
itselfby elaboratingand developingquestionableelerefining
Instituteof CulturalantdSocial Studies,University
ofLeiden,
mentsof theory,by basingitselfon a dialecticof theoryand
Leiden,The Netherlands.2 vi 78
The recenttrendtoward
evidence,in short,by beingrevisionist.
It is no easy task to commentupon an articlewithwhichone
a moreflexibleMarxistapproachin thesocial sciencessuggests
cannotbut agree.The clearsynthesisGodelierpresentsis most
thata new era is dawningin Marxiststudies,a timeof "parawelcome,and the way in whichhe clarifiesseveralconceptual
digm"reevaluation.If so, thenGodeliermuststandas one of
problemsis outstanding.My comments,therefore,
are partly
the major intellectualmidwivesto thisnew era, if onlyon the
forthe sake of argumentand partlybecause the scope of an
basis of this short,brilliantpiece.
essay does not permitmakingeverything
as explicitas one
Godelierhas set forhimselfa formidabletask: reconciling
would wish.
(techno-economic
theMarxistidentification
of "infrastructure"
I wonderwhy Godelier,afterdiscussingthe infrastructure,
the primaryfactor in social dominationwith the
as
base)
the superstructure,
and the ideologyas "different
functions
(kinshipand relimountingevidencethat it is superstructure
withina singleinstitution,"
does not use the word cultureto
whicheffects
in manyprecapitalist
domination
specifically)
gion,
characterizethis "single institution."I have some problems
societies.He does this by arguingthat the conceptof infrawiththe way in whichhe summarizesTerray'spositionwith
and mustbe
structureitselfhas been too narrowlyinterpreted
regardto the concept"mode of production."It seems to me
all aspects of the relationsof production.
to
include
expanded
that he does not take into considerationthat Terray'sideas
the
incorporating
have undergonesome evolutionin the courseof time,so that, Here Godeliergoes beyondotherMarxistsby
values (whichhe calls "the ideel,"
ideals
and
of
ethical
realm
forinstance,his use of this conceptin his studyof the Abron
but whichmay be construedI thinkas consciousness).In this
(Terray1975) does notverywellfitGodelier'scharacterization.
of economic
the ideel is not simplya passive reflection
view,
Godeliercreatestheimpression
of notgivingmuchweightto
ideas are a "reality,"a "mathe ideas of a minority
whichdoes not accept the dominating forces,but an active contributor;
social force.This is a point which
ideology.As Wertheim(1970) has arguedat length,quiteoften terial,"in the sense of a
and whichcertaindisMarx himselfmade in theearlywritings
such a minorityis at the very centerof revolutionary
movein discussionsof falseconhave
like
emphasized
Lukaics
ciples
ments. Of course this is not to deny that agreementwith
(slowlydeveloping)dominating
ideas is characteristic
of most, sciousnessand mystification.
My onlycomplaintis thatGodelierstopstoo soon. He does
if not all, stablepoliticalsystems.This hypothesisfindsample
insightselsewhere.
not tellus howto applyhis ground-breaking
in the data of the Early State Project. It is not
confirmation
suitable
his
ideas
to
or ethnoethnographic
He
not
relate
does
theemployment
of force,but thehighdegreeof agreement
and
examcontemporary
there
are
many
although
data,
historical
acceptancethatappearsto be characteristic
The
here.
exchange
apfrom
the
which
would
benefit
domination
social
ples
of
basis of services-reciprocity-evencame to be includedin the
proach developedhere, for example,in the Middle East and
definition
of the earlystate (Claessen and Skalnik1978:640).
Mesoamerica.Perhapstheseare thingswhichare takenup in
the forthcoming
book fromwhichthispiece is extracted;and
I look forwardto readingit. In any case, Godelieris to be
by DAVID D. GILMORE
congratulatedfor makingus thinkabout these issues in the
Departmentof Anthropology,
State University
of New York
broachedthe most
mostprovocativeway. He has successfully
at StonyBrook,StonyBrook,N.Y. 11794,U.S.A. 16 vi 78
today: the
neglectedbut mostcrucialproblemin anthropology
Thoughtand beingare indeeddistinct,
buttheyalso forma unity. historicalrelationshipbetweenclass structureand social con[Marx1956:78]
sciousnessin theprocessof culturechange.
This is one of the moststimulating
and imaginative,
as well as
coherent,statementsto come fromthe FrenchMarxistgroup
in a long while.By goingback and questioningbasic elements by ORIOL PI-SUNYER
Universityof Massachusetts,
Departmentof Anthropology,
of theory,Godelierhas renderedan invaluableserviceto all of
Mass. 01003, U.S.A. 31 v 78
Amherst,
us who feelthatMarxismis notan inertor immutabledoctrine
The
This is notan articlethatlendsitselfto easy commentary.
of belief,but a living,self-correcting
scientific
methodof analfromthatutilizedby the maysis. I thinkthispaper shouldopen new vistas forresearchin
wholeapproachis verydifferent
The distinctionis
the areas of religion,kinship,class formation,
anthropologists.
social domina- jorityof American-trained
and gives
but also linguistic,
tion,"false consciousness,"
not onlyconceptualor theoretical,
and the originof thestate.It is an
authenticbreakthrough
in thatit revitalizesour understanding rise to a situationthatmay at timescall fora formof mental
of the role of consciousnessin the social behaviorswhichare
To getthemostout of thiscontribution,
translation.
interlinear
a taskwhichinvolves
traditionally
the focusof anthropological
inquiry.It is admira- thereadermusthave donehis homework,
withthe classicalMarxistcorpus,but also
ble not only forthe new lightit sheds on the questionof the
not onlyfamiliarity
"unity"of thoughtand being,but also forits refreshing
For
Marxistanthropology.
clarity some backgroundin contemporary
Vol. 19 * No. 4 * December1978

769

mypart,I have foundGodelier'sown Perspectivesin Marxist

Anthropology
(1977) well-nigh
indispensable.
It is also myimpressionthat the translatorwas too loyal to the originaltext
and thatthismay accountforsome passages of trulyimpenetrableprose.Finally,a highdegreeof abstractioncharacterizes
the whole article,a circumstancethat left me starved for
ethnographic
documentation.
I foundthesedifficulties
real enoughto warrantmention,but
the issues raisedby Godelierare criticallyimportantones and
deserveour carefulconsideration.
At the centerof his discussion is the natureof powerin humansocieties: the economic
determinants
of power; the degreeto whichmodes of social
organizationact to interpret
and channelpowerrelations;the
function
ofideologyinlegitimating
and exploitation.
domination
Some valid questionscan be raisedwithrespectto thesuperstructure/
infrastructure
model. Most anthropologists
would
agree that the forcesof productionare embeddedin the networkof social relationsand thattheresulting
structure
is maintained and supportedby ideology.Also, I findno difficulties
with the conceptthat institutions(kinship,politics,religion,
and so forth)are multifunctional
and thatthe organizationof
production-who gets what, when, and why-is in the last
analysisculturallydetermined.
On the otherhand,theissue of
causalities,sequences,and hierarchiesis more questionable.
Have we gainedmuchby hypothesizing
thatthe importanceof
kinshipin simplesocietiesmay be attributedto the fact that
livinglabor in such societiesmay count for more than the
productsof accumulatedlabor?
It also seems reasonableto ask whetherit is necessaryto
selecta givensuperstructural
formas the organizing
principle
in a particularsocietyor typeof society.One does not have to
denytheimportanceof kinshipin band-levelsocietiesto recognize thatkinshipis typicallyvalidatedby mythswhichare integralpartsof cosmologicalsystemsof orderand classification.
I am also uncomfortable
withsuperstructure
categoriesthat
to confirm
but are difficult
appear deceptivelystraightforward
by inspection.Godelierseemsto take forgrantedthe inferior
status of womenin band-levelsocieties,but a recentcrossculturalanalysisof thestatusof womenin 93 societies(Whyte
1978:214-15) notes that

of the hypothetical,
the originsof classes and the state might
be tracedto an exchangeof servicesor at least represented
in
this manner.The degree to which the stock-in-trade
of the
emergent
directing
classeswas "invisiblerealities"probablydependedgreatlyon conditionsand circumstances.
Such a system,once in being,has the capacityto maintain
itselffora longtime.As Harris (1971:406) has written:
The evolutionary
viabilityof the staterestsin largemeasureon
the perfection
of institutional
structures
that protectthe ruling
class fromconfrontation
withcoalitionsof alienatedcommoners.
Thesestructures
fallintotwobasiccategories:
(1) institutions
that
controlthe contentof ideology;and (2) institutions
thatphysicallysuppressthesubversive,
rebellious,
and revolutionary
actions
of alienatedindividuals
and groups.
It is such institutional
structures,
togetherwiththe idea systemsthatgive themlegitimacy,
thatmakeit especiallydifficult
forthe oppresseddirectlyto confrontthe conventionalorder.
Nevertheless,
even the Mandate of Heaven can be lost,given
the properconstellationof eventsand causes. At the root of
Marxisttheoryis the conceptthatwhat activatesthe process
of transformation
is the conflict
betweenthematerialforcesof
productionand the social relationswithinwhichthe forcesof
productionoperate.Anthropologists,
and for our purposesI
would includehistoriansand archaeologists,
have at theirdisposal a rangeof societiesand a body of data,on theprocesses
of changethatshouldpermitthe testingof hypotheseson conin humansocieties.Similarly,the
tinuitiesand transformations
conceptof exchange,so centralto the Marxistperspectiveof
economicrelations,
is groundthatanthropologists
asymmetrical
have cultivatedfor a long time.It is true that,'for the most
have studiednonmonetary
classless sopart, anthropologists
cieties,but even thisis changingfast,in part at least because
societiesof this typeare rapidlydisappearingfromthe scene.
It may thus be that the questionsGodelierasks will receive
the attentionthattheydeserve.

by ZOLTAN TAGANYI
Bogar u. 5, 1022 Budapest,Hungary.30 V 78
The authorof thisstudytriesto appeara Marxist,buthis work
it is perfectly
possibleforwomenin one societyto have impor- showsthe influenceof Frenchstructuralism,
of whichhe does
tantproperty
rightswhilebeingexcludedfromkeyreligious
posts not speak. His thesisdeals with "superstructure"
and "infraand ceremonies;
work structure."He sees the elementsof the formeras consisting
theymay also do mostof the productive
of
or havean important
rolein politicallifewhilesuffering
undera
theproducthe specificecologicaland geographicalconditions,
severedoublestandard.. . . Aspectsof whathas oftenbeen asand thesocial relationsof
tive forces,materialand intellectual,
sumedto be a unitaryphenomenon-the
statusof women-turn
out uponcloserexamination
to be largelydiscreteand unrelated. production.This analysiswouldbe Marxist,but he goes on to
includetheseelementsin his analysisas social factsverysimiLet me make it clear that I do not arguethatthe conceptof
lar to thoseof classicalFrenchsociologyand Emile Durkheim;
sex-baseddominationis invalid,but ratherthatthereare spefurther,he sees these facts as creatingconfigurations-the
cificmatrices,whichvary cross-culturally,
withinwhichsuch
of each societyis built by combiningthese
"superstructure"
dominationmanifestsitself.
because Levi-Strauss(1952) also
elements.This is noteworthy
Godelier'sconceptof ide'elrealitiesmightperhapsbe rensupposes,in discussingthe rules of the developmentof sociedered as "cognitivesystems"or "semanticstructures,"
and I
and sees the characteristic
t-ies,basic social building-elements
doubt that therewill be disagreement
of
withhis claim that all
featuresof societiesas being definedby the configuration
social relations-all culture,in fact-contain an ideel aspect.
theseelements.
My only cautionhere is that the quest fordeep or "hidden"
with
A distinction
maybe observedin Godelier'sformulation
structuresmay, in Geertz's (1973:30) words,tend to "lose
On the
regardto the structureand functionof institutions.
touchwiththehardsurfacesof life."
foreach instituit is characteristic
lowerlevel of development,
Godelier'sfinalsectionon violenceand consentis especially tionto have severalfunctions,
but on thehigherlevel of develstimulating.
In readingit I was remindedof Orwell's (1961:
opment,especiallyin capitalistsociety,institutions
may have
109) observationthat the greatappeal of colonialservicefor
onlyone function.This opinionis untenable,because informal
the Englishlower bourgeoisiewas that only in such contexts groups,such as the peer groupsof the slums of towns,exist
could they live the ideologythey shared with the directing alongsidethe formalgroupsin capitalistsociety(Gans 1967).
classes: "The people who went thereas soldiersand officials Further,we can observe,in additionto theunambiguous
strucdid not go thereto makemoney.... theywenttherebecause
ture and functionof industrialenterprise,informalgroups
in India, withcheap horses,freeshooting,and hordesof black
withinit, such as neighborhoods,
friendship
and visitingrelaservants,it was so easy to play at beinga gentleman."This,
tions,and cliques.These informalgroupsmayhave morefunctoo, was a exchangeof sorts-colonial serviceforstatusdeter- tionsthanthe formalones (Etzioni 1964).
minants-and,whileagain the issue is verymuchin the realm
Some terminological
mattersare as follows:A moreappro-

770

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

is social formation.
priate expressionthan "superstructure"
is unfortunate
because the socioThe term"superstructure"
logicalliteraturecontainsotherexpressionsforthesephenomena such as "outside world" or "global society"or "nation."
("Outside world"is used by the authorin the latterpart of
is also unfortunate,
bethisarticle.)The term"infrastructure"
cause it is already employedby economistsfor the service
sector.
Anotherquestionof detail: Godelierconnectstheappearance
of states with the rise of agricultureand animal husbandry,
emphasizing
thisphenomenon
withregardto the statesof the
ThirdWorld.If we examinethe questionof origins,however,
we findthat the appearance of agricultureand animal husbandryis followedby the rise of city-states
in Neolithictimes,
but not in the spread of these phenomenafromAsia Minor
throughthe Balkan peninsulato CentralEurope.

Godelier:INFRASTRUCTURES,

SOCIETIES,

AND HISTORY

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life of [talian Americans.New York: Free Press; London: Collier

Macmillan.
[ZT]
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qf cultures.New York:
Basic Books.
[OPS]
GODELIER, MAURICE. 1977. Perspectivesin Marxist anthropology.
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
[OPS]
HARRIS, MARVIN. 1971. Cuilture,
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Chicago Press.

Wanted
* Contributions
fromall countriesin which the problemis
being studied to a proposedreader entitledThe Politics of
PatriarchalViolence:A Systematicand IntegratedAnalysisof
ViolenceagainstWomen.Amongthe topicsto be includedare
sexualharassment,
wifebattering,
rape,maritalrape,and sexual abuse of femalechildren.The methodology
may be thatof
a case study,statisticalanalysis,or theoreticalformulation,
but
all manuscriptsmust examinethe problemin feministterms.
Whilepreviouslypublishedpaperswill be considered,the emphasis will be on new contributions.
Manuscriptsof 15-25
pages in length(double-spaced)or descriptions
of workto be
undertaken
or in progressshouldbe sentto Ruth A. Schwartz,
2509 AvenueK, Brooklyn,N.Y. 11210,U.S.A.
a Collaborationin researchon the cross-cultural
aspects of
tobaccouse and relatedbehavior.Social SystemsAnalystshas
prepareda fieldmanual forthe collectionof data on tobaccorelatedbehavior,includingreasonsforuse, personnelinvolved,
situationalcontext,boundarydefinition
staand maintenance,
tus differentiation,
and symbolicmeanings.We wish to distributethemanualto anthropologists
who are currently
or will

Vol. 19 * No. 4 * December1978

soon be doingfieldwork;our hope is to gatherrepresentative

and standardized
data on as manysocietiesas possible.We will
fullyacknowledgeall contributions
and will send a summary
of the findings
on request.We would also like to distributea
questionnaire
to interestedinvestigators
who have been in the
fieldand can recall relevantdata. For furtherinformation
please write:SherwinJ. Feinhandlerand Kjell I. Enge, Social
SystemsAnalysts,2 Calvin Rd., Watertown,Mass. 02172,
U.S.A.
* Information
relevantto a studyin progresson behaviorand
cognitivecategoriesin relationto energyuse in Americansociety.Until now Americanshave been subject to little more
than warningsregardingpossible energyshortagesand price
increases; no actual crisis has yet occurred.Other societies
have notbeen as fortunate.
We wouldlike to know,fromanyone currently
workingin an area in whichfuel is very scarce
expensivein relationto householdincome,
and/or prohibitively
how behavioris alteredand how economicchoicesare made.
We would also appreciatehearingfromanyonewho has conducted,or plans to conduct,similaror relatedstudiesin American society.Please write: SherwinJ. Feinhandler,Social SystemsAnalysts,2 Calvin Rd., Watertown,Mass. 02172, U.S.A.
771