American Association for Public Opinion Research

Polling on Watergate: The Battle for Public Opinion

Author(s): Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang
Source: The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 4, Polls and the News Media: A Symposium
(Winter, 1980), pp. 530-547
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public Opinion
Research

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Pollingon Watergate:
The Battle for
Public Opinion
GLADYS ENGEL LANG AND KURT LANG

over Watergate,
HROUGHOUT the long monthsof controversy
therewas constanttalkin and by thepressof a "nationtornapart."
and GeraldFord,on
as president,
BothRichardNixon,in resigning
as
of thenew administration
takingoffice,stressedthe firstpriority
political
"healingthe wounds" of a nationdividedby a shattering
scandal.A monthlaterPresidentFord citedtheneed forreconciling
divisionsas the mainreasonforhis pardonof Nixon.
has becomepartofour
Thisthemeofa nationdividedbyWatergate
folklore.Yet by the timeNixon,on the eveningof August8, 1974,
thenextday,mostpeople-about
effective
announcedhisresignation
his departurefromoffice.'
eightof everyten Americans-approved
Onlybetweenone and two out of ten were unhappywiththe out-

1 A special Gallup telephonepoll immediately

after Nixon's speech showed79
Nixondidthe"bestthing"byresigning
andjust
percentofa nationalsamplebelieving
13 percentthathe shouldhave "stayed." A telephonesurvey(N = 337) thatwe
conducted
in heavilyRepublicanSuffolk
County,New York,thenexttwonights
again
Nixonwas "right"and 11percentthathe was "not right"
found79 percentbelieving
itbestthatNixonhad
to resign.Roper,at theendofAugust,found67 percent
believing
resigned,26 percentpreferring
impeachment.

whichdecisions
AbstractHow do pollsbecomepartof thepoliticalprocessthrough
and outcomeof
are made and issues resolved?Case studiesof the development
of the
likeWatergate,
can go a longway towardclarification
politicalcontroversies,
directand indirectimpactsof thepolls.
at the State
GladysEngel Lang is Professorof Sociologyand Communications
of Sociologyat the
University
of New Yorkat StonyBrook.KurtLang is Professor
This paperis based on researchby the authorsas Fellowsat the
same university.
D.C. This supportis
CenterforScholars,Washington,
WoodrowWilsonInternational
as well as a smallgrantfromtheJohnand MaryR. Markle
gratefully
acknowledged,
Foundation.
Public Opinion QuarterlyVol. 44:530-547 ? 1980 by The Trustees of Columbia University
0033-362X/80/0044-530/$1.75
Published by Elsevier North-Holland,Inc.

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POLLING ON WATERGATE

531

come; even thisminority,

whilea bit disillusioned,
nevertheless
acceptedthenecessityofNixon'sleaving.Few werebitteror vengeful.
Seldom,indeed,had therebeen a greaterdisplayof nationalunity,
except in a nationalemergency,
thanwhen Nixon finallystepped
down.Whateverpoliticaldivisiontherehad been,thepublic,forthe
mostpart,agreedthatNixonwas guiltyof obstruction
ofjustice,of
abuse of power,of deceivingand lyingto thenation,and of abusing
theirtrust.2
Nor did Ford's successionto thepresidency
stirthecontroversy
it
mighthave. Not thatpeoplewereas unanimous
or enthusiastic
about
his accessionto poweras themediawerereporting.
Ford's approval
ratingin thepollsjust afterhe tookoffice-71percent,accordingto
Gallup-was below that of Johnson(79 percent)and Truman(87
percent)when similarlyelevated fromthe vice presidency.The
legitimacyof this changeoverwas open to question on several
grounds.Fordwas notonlythefirst"unelected"chiefexecutivebut
also Nixon's hand-picked
successor(albeitconfirmed
by Congress)
and one of his staunchest
defendersduringWatergatealmostto the
bitterend.
The Nixonpresidencynevertheless
ended "not witha bangbuta
whimper,"withoutany seriouspoliticalclashesor muchvisibledissent,withoutmuchjoyfuldemonstration
or dancingin the streets.
The publicresponsewas strangely
muted.Long monthsof apparent
polarization
had suddenlyendedwithminimal
massdisplayof affect.
wouldnothavetakenplace so quietlyhad itnotbeen
The transition
precededby a dramaticreversalof publicopinion.Who wouldhave
dared suggestat the beginning
of the second Nixon administration
and at thepeak of
thata president
reelectedwitha lopsidedmajority
his popularity
could be forcedout of office18 monthslater?Or that
thehighestsecularofficein theworldwouldbe turnedover,withthe
nation'sblessing,to a man withonly limitednationalrecognition?
RichardNixon himselfbelievedthatpublicopinionwas the critical
of [his]landslidemandate"
factorin whathe called the "overriding
His struggle
(Nixon,1978:905f).
to stayin office,especiallyafterthe
becamea
ofArchibald
Cox inOctober1973,whenimpeachment
firing
real possibility,
was forhima "race forpublicsupport,"whathe
called his "last campaign,"only this timeit was not forpolitical
officebutforhis "politicallife" (Nixon, 1978:972).
2 Our surveyon Long Island showedroughly
three-fourths
of those interviewed
ofjusticeand abuse of power,chargeson
judgedthepresident
guiltyof obstruction
whichhe wouldhave beentriedby theSenate.Abouttwo-thirds
judgedhimguiltyof
incometaxfraudandmisuseofthetaxpayers'moneyforprivatepurposes,chargeson
Committee
had failedto vote articlesof impeachment.
whichthe House Judiciary

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532

LANG AND LANG

As Nixonsaw it,themaindangerofbeingimpeachedresidedinthe
public'sbecomingconditionedto the idea thathe was goingto be
impeached.This was good enoughreason forNixon strategists
to
keep a close watch on all indicatorsof public sentiment-letters,
telegrams,
telephonecalls, editorials,televisioncommentaries,
press
reports,and especially,on whatthepollswereshowing.3
The presidentalso developeda mediastrategy
specifically
and directlyaimed
at winning
the"battleofthepolls" as a meansofrallying
supportfor
his firmstand againstfurther
probes. He did this while publicly
downgrading
theimportance
ofpolls.Resignation
becausea president
"happenedto be low in thepolls," he arguedin a televisedquestionand-answersessionheldon March15, 1974,"would foreverchange
ourformof government"
(PublicPapers, 1976:79).Yet by lateJune
he was despairing
thatdespitehisaccomplishments
abroad,"it seems
in thepolls" (Nixon,1978:101if).
almostimpossibleto breakthrough
It was his defeatin thisbattleforpublicopinion,as he saw it, that
lefthimno alternative
butto stepdown.We examine,first,
ultimately
theroleofthemediain thisbattleand, second,thatofpublicopinion
and of publicopinionassessment.
The MediaRole
werethebattlefield
on whichthe
The media,especiallytelevision,
majorconfrontations
tookplace, withtelevisionitselfsometimes
takingan activerole in theconflict.Let us briefly
illustrate
thecrucial
role of television,whichsimplyby beingavailableas a vehicleof
transmission
and by the way it chose to cover some developments
sentiment
helpedmove impeachment
along.
First,televisionserved as a means of communication
between
beelites,makingpublicwhatwereessentiallyesoterictransactions
All partiesto the
tweenofficials
theagenciestheyrepresented.
and/or
wereacutelyawareofthepresenceof "bystanders,"the
controversy
televisionaudience,and orientedtheirbehaviorpartlytowardthis
audience.
In no Watergatedevelopment
was this media role moreevident
than duringthatextraordinary
sequence of events,most of them
livetelevision,
as the
thatare remembered
playedouton and through
"SaturdayNightMassacre." In almost all the moves, the main
actors-on both sides-were consciouslyaddressingnot only one
I The sectionof the book on thislast crisis(Nixon,1978)containsfrequent
referencesto theGallupandHarrisPollsbutno references
to theSindlinger
orotherprivate
polls. Nixon also acknowledges
receivingadvancecopies of poll releases(see, for
example,p. 823).

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POLLING ON WATERGATE

533

anotherbut also a publicwhomtheyinvitedto intervenein their

favor.
It all beganon Fridayevening,October19, 1973-aftertheevening
news-when Nixon,in a radiostatement
orderedSpecial Watergate
ProsecutorArchibaldS. Cox to cease and desistfromhis "fishing
operation"forWatergateevidence,especiallythe tapes. The timing
of the announcement-onthe firstnightof a three-dayholiday
weekend-had been shrewdlycalculated.Morningdailies were on
deadlineand could scarcelyhave timeto get muchin the way of
response;Cronkiteand the othercommentators
would not be back
beforeMondayevening.But Cox scheduleda press conference
for
thenextday. On nationaltelevisionhe declaredthat,Nixonnotbeing
in compliancewiththe law, he would continuehis pursuitof evidence.
The nationwideaudienceto Cox's press conferenceincludedthe
representatives
and senators,in whose hands the crucialdecisions
wouldlie, as well as theverypeople whosenextstepsdependedon
whatCox was about to do-U.S. DistrictCourtJudgeJohnSirica,
AttorneyGeneral Elliot Richardson,Deputy AttorneyGeneral
WilliamRuckelshaus,the WhiteHouse staff,and, mostlikely,the
presidenthimself.4When the conferenceended with Clark Mollenhoff,
one of the reporters,
suggesting
thatan outpouring
of telegrams,calls,and mailmightapprisethepresident
ofthepublicmood,
thenationdid morethanrise to the occasion. Althoughit is almost
impossible
to arriveat an authentic
countofmessages,thedelugewas
as it was so oftensaid to have been, unprecedented.5
certainly,
Second,televisionnews has alwaysbeen betterat mobilizing
sentiment
thanat informing
opinion,and thisseemsto havebeentheend
resultof thevideo coveragethatweekend.Whathappenedafterthe
press conferenceis probablytoo well rememberedto need any
lengthyrecounting.
Richardson,directedby Nixon to fireCox, resigned.Ruckelshaus,nextin line,also resigned.The lastpersonwho
4 The "presence"of so manykeyfigures
is notconjecture.Documentation
can be
foundin Richardson
(1976),Doyle(1977),Sirica(1979),Dash (1976),Jaworski
(1976),
andMezvinsky
(1977)(see also Neustadt,1976:4-5).Nixonhas neverpublicly
admitted
to havingviewedthepressconference
on television;his staffdid watchbut,askedif
Nixon,too,was viewing,
declinedto say.TheMemoirs,however,leavelittledoubthe
watchedCox alongwithmuchof thenation-hisreactionscan be foundon p. 933.
5 We havecomeacrossestimates
ofa half-million
telegrams
havingbeendelivered
to
congressional
officesthatweekend,ofa million
callsandtelegrams
theWhite
engulfing
House. WesternUnionreported
30,000messagestransmitted
to government
officeson
Sunday,October20,anda tenfold
increase-300,000
telegrams-arriving
during
theten
days following
the "massacre." Sociologistswho analyzedthe responseto Nixon's
1952"Checkers"speechcounted302,000responses-130,000
letters,
38,000cards,and
134,000telegrams
(O'Brienand Jones,1976).

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534

LANG AND LANG

could succeedto theofficeof attorney

general,thesolicitorgeneral,
finallyfiredCox.
But matters
did notstopthere.ThatSaturdaynight,Nixon'spress
secretary
announcednotonlythatCox had been dismissedbutalso
thattheOfficeof Special Watergate
Prosecutorhad been abolished.
When FBI agentsoccupied the officesof the Special Prosecution
forceand sealed offtheirfiles,Cox's staffmade certainthatTV
camerasrecordedtheguardsbarringthemfromtheiroffices(Doyle,
1977:200f).Their televisedremarks,made in the heat of emotion,
alarmednot only the publicbut also JudgeSirica and otherswho
witnessedthesedevelopments
overtelevision,
alongwiththegeneral
public.Siricawrotethat"it beganto look as if some colonelsin a
Latin American countryhad-staged a coup.

. .

. As far as I was

concerned,the presidentwas breakingthe law" (Sirica, 1979:167).

Sirica's reactioncountedfarmorethantheopinionofjust one ordinaryviewer,but his responsewas not atypical.
Third,at severalcrucialpoints,television-andtheprintmediaactedto subvertNixon'sstrategy
of defining
thesituation
beforethe
mediacould redefineit to his disadvantage,so as to move public
responsein thedirection
he wishedit to go. One remarkable
example
was themediarole in countering
theimmediate
responseto Nixon's
April29, 1974,televisedspeechreleasingtheeditedtranscripts.
Part
of a calculatedmedia blitz,the speech was consideredone of the
mosteffective
potentially
and impressive
he evergave.6Deliberately,
no advancetextwas suppliedto thepressbut,to assurethe"right"
coverage,Nixon's lawyer,JamesSt. Clair,had providedan account
ofwhatthetranscripts
showedto guidethepressin reporting
on their
contentbeforethetranscripts
themselves
werereleasedthefollowing
day. Greatreliancewas also placed on the visual impression
to be
givenby theheightof thestackof volumesseen on television.Their
bulkwas meantto conveyto thepublicjust how muchhad
inflated
beendemandedofthepresident
and howfarhe hadgoneto accede to
thesedemands.
Mainly,the WhiteHouse countedon the factthatmostpeople
wouldnot read the transcripts
or certainly
not read muchof them.
This is wheretheymayhave miscalculated.
They certainly
did not
counton the interestthe copies of the editedtranscripts
and commade availableby government
mentary,
and privatepresseswithin
days,wouldstirup. TheNew YorkTimesnotonlyserializedthembut
6 Reactions
reported
nextdayon thefront
pagesofboththeNew YorkTimes andthe
WashingtonPost were sometimes
ecstatic,at leastgrudgingly
admiring.
See William
Greider'sreportinthePost andthatoftheTimes's R. W. Apple,whocalledthespeech

defensesincethe scandalbroke."
Nixon's "mostpowerful
Watergate

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POLLING ON WATERGATE

535

rusheda paperbackintoprint,as did the Washington

Post. They
becamebestsellers.
But theWhiteHouse also underestimated
theingenuity
withwhich
television
newsstaffs
proceededto gettheevidenceout.The problem
withthetranscript
story,so faras TV was concerned,
was thelackof
pictures.CBS produceda special,airedin primetimeMay 1. Its top
reportersread the transcripts,
"starring"as Dean, Nixon, and
Haldeman.On May4, aftertheevening
news,NBC broadcasta similar
90-minute
readingwithprofessional
actorsin theWhiteHouse roles.
Thus, even those who would neverhave read the transcripts
were
exposedto theircontent.
Threedays afterthe speechGallupconducteda telephonesurvey
fortheNew YorkTimes.7 Ofthosewhosaidtheyhadwatchedor read
about the speech,42 percentnow had a less favorableopinionof
Nixon,35 percentfeltas before,andonly17percenthad developeda
morefavorableopinion.Nixon's attemptto persuadethe people he
was notinvolvedin Watergate
had been no moreeffective
thanpast
attempts.People, accordingto Gallup,were as inclinedto believe
Dean's versionas theywere Nixon's. And a plurality
now believed
therewas enoughevidencefortheHouse to voteimpeachment.
Most
important,
thepublicbackedtheHouse Judiciary
Committee's
refusal
to accept the transcripts
in lieu of the tapes by a 62-24 percent
in makingits decision,could not have
margin.But the committee,
knownthatit had such wide backing.
The Role of Public Opinion

Broadlyspeaking,therewerethreeviewsoftherolepublicopinion
playedduringtheperiodbeginning
withtheCox firing
and endingthe
followingsummer,whenthe House Judiciary
Committeewas preparingto vote on articlesof impeachment.
The firstview moreor less echoed thattakenby Nixon and his
immediate
entourage,
who regardedpublicopinion,stirredup by the
mediaand trackedby publicopinionanalysts,as theforcethatdrove
himfromoffice.Manywho sharedthisview,unlikeNixon'ssupporters, regardedthisas "democracyat work,"a favoritemetaphorof
thenewsmedia.It was echoedby thenewpresident
in his inaugural
address."Here," he toldthenation,"thepeoplerule." The claimby
Louis Harristhat"our polls on impeachment
. . . had a profound
effect.I knowtheydid" (Wheeler,1976:172)carriedthe same message.
A second view was less widelyheld but morecommonthanthe
7Conducted May 2, thepollingresultswerepublishedMay 5.

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LANG AND LANG

536

publicrecordreveals.Some criticsofthepolls,likeMichaelWheeler
(1976) and TimothyCrouse (1976), and even some pollsters,like
PeterHartand PatrickCaddell,have arguedthatthepolls and other
assessmentsof public opinionexaggeratedthe oppositionto imon Congress,
influence
peachment
and therebyactedas a restraining
whosemembershesitatedto supportsucha moveuntiltheycouldbe
arguethat,
certainthepublicwouldback theiraction.Its proponents
polls,espeor design,the mostinfluential
whetherby inadvertence
ciallythose of Harrisbut also Gallup's, were slow to registerthe
pro-impeachment
groundswellduringthe crucial monthsafterthe
SaturdayNightMassacre,whenthecountryappearedreadyforimpeachment.Some ofthecritics(e.g., Crouse,1976)have accusedthe
askingthewrongquestions,of lettingthempollstersof persistently
by theWhiteHouse, and of playingup every
selvesbe manipulated
the
fromofficewhileignoring
signofoppositionto Nixon'sdeparture
evidence.In thisway,theyhelpedto prolongthecrisisand
contrary
to keep Nixonin officelongerthannecessary.
attributed
to the
Fromstilla thirdpointof view, the importance
roleof publicopinionand publicopinionpollingin Nixon's downfall
Continuous
misdirected.
was totallymisplacedand Nixon's strategy
pollingneitherhastenednor impededthe process. The "battlefor
theissue
publicopinion"was onlya sideshow.The mediain treating
as a politicalstruggle
forpublicsupport,theargument
runs,diverted
attention
fromthe one crucialelementin the downfallof President
Nixon: the accumulationof evidenceagainstthe president(Manwas a politicalcontest,
kiewicz,1975;Sussman,1974).If Watergate
The docas it obviouslywas, the stakesconsistedof information.
on whether
or
umentsandtapeswerenecessarybecausethejudgment
not to impeachwouldhave to be based on harderevidentiary
standards thanthe publicnormallyapplies in answeringthe pollsters'
questions.But thosepressingthecase againstNixonwouldstillhave
to be concernedoverpublicconfidence
inthefairnessand objectivity
of the process by whichhe was beingjudged (Mezvinsky,1977;
Jordan,1979; Dash, 1976).8Both the Senate WatergateCommittee
and the House JudiciaryCommitteeenjoyedhighratingson this
count.9

8 This concernwithnot onlybeingfairbut appearing,

fair,stressedin first-hand
withFrancis
forus inan interview
underlined
accountssuchas thosecited,was further
PeterRodino,ChairoftheHJC,Feb. 27,
O'Brien,politicalassistantto Representative
1976.
9 Whena nationalsamplewas askedwhichindividuals
andgroups"lookedgood" or
thelistof
lateinAugust1974,topping
affair,"
"lookedbad" inthe"whole(Watergate)
the
Leon Jaworski;
thosewho"lookedgood"-in thisorder-were:SpecialProsecutor
and the SenateWatergate
Committee;
FederalCourtstiedwiththe House Judiciary
Committee
(RoperReports74-8).

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POLLING ON WATERGATE

537

Our purposehereis to examinetherelativemeritsof theseviews

bylookingat theevidencefortheperiodfollowing
Cox's firing,
which
made impeachment
a respectabletopicof conversation.
Withintwo
days 84 congressmen,
includingone Republican,introduced
22 differentimpeachment
billsand resolutions
callingforimpeachment
or,
ofthepossibility
of impeachment.
When
at least,foran investigation
theHouse Judiciary
Committee,
granted
jurisdiction
overtheinquiry,
metforthefirsttimeon October30, ithad takenthefirstofficial
step
inover 100years.Theretowardpossibleimpeachment
ofa president
formass
after,bothsides to theimpeachment
questionmaneuvered
supportthatneithercould take forgranted,withNixon launching
such counteroffensives
as OperationCandor,his Stateof the Union
address("two yearsofWatergate
are enough"),andhisreleaseofthe
transcripts
insteadof the tapes-all withthe idea of turning
public
opinionaroundand winningthe battleof the polls.
The difference
betweenthe firsttwo views of publicopinionreflectsdiffering
assumptionsabout whetherimpeachment
sentiment
was "really" stronger
thanthatshownin thepolls. Our examination
of questionsand our interviews
withsome of thoseresponsiblefor
drafting
themturnedup nothing
to convinceus thatpublicpollsters
duringthisperioddeliberately
slantedtheirquestionsor even that
theirfindings
the actual speed withwhichthe tide
grosslydistorted
was turning
againstNixon.As tojust wherethepublic'actuallystood
at any point,muchdependson whatquestionsone selectsfromthe
thesevenmonthsin which
manythatwereasked. Thus,throughout
the House Judiciary
Committeelooked into the possibilityof impeachment,polls indicatedpublic supportfor its missionand approvedits quest for the tapes as well as otherspecificmoves.10
Perhapsquestionsabout the impeachment
inquiryprovideda more
forimpeachment
thanmoredirect
validmeasureof publicsentiment
questionsabout impeachingNixon. Nevertheless,the news media
on thechanging
trackedimpeachment
sentiment
by focusing
percentage who favoredNixon'simpeachment,
mainlybecause thequestion
reappearedin the same standardized
formin morepolls and more
oftenthanspecificquestionsabout executiveprivilege,who should
have controlover the evidence,and so forth.
The strength
of impeachment
sentiment
obtainedthroughvarious
questionsdid indeeddependon how the questionswere phrased.
Table 1 chartstheresponsesto eightquestionson the issue of Nixon's removalfromofficeduringfourkeymonths,all fromrespected
10 For example,responsesto Gallupquestions,coveringvariousperiods-August
3-6, 1973;November2-5, 1973;andMay31-June3, 1974-all showedlargepluralities
favoring
the releaseof tapesto properly
designated
persons/groups.

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538

LANG AND LANG

Table 1. ProportionsFavoringResignation/Impeachment
in Selected National Polls
Question
Harris (A) resignation
Gallup (A) impeachment
Harris (B) impeachment
(conditional)
Yankelovich
Resignation
Impeachment
Total removal
Roper-impeachment
With charges
Withoutcharges
Both versions
Gallup (B) impeachment
Gallup (C) conviction
Harris (C) impeachment
Range on impeachment
a
b

August
1973

November
1973

April
1974

28
26

43
35/37a

40

39

53

20
10
30

29
10
39

June
1974

64
38
17
55

(42)b
(47)b

44

10-39

10-44

53
52
46
42
17-53

50
44
52
44-64

Gallup took an early and a late November poll.

The differenceis not statisticallyreliable but may be real.

VERSIONS

OF IMPEACHMENT

QUESTION:

Harris (A): In view of what happenedin the Watergateaffair,do you thinkPresident

Nixon should resignor not? (June 1973-April 1974, asked 11 times)
Gallup (A): Do you thinkPresidentNixon shouldbe impeachedand compelledto leave
officeor not? (June 1973-February1974, asked 8 times)
Harris (B): If the Senate WatergateCommitteedecides that PresidentNixon was
involved in the coverup, do you thinkCongress should impeach him, or not? (August
1973-July1974, asked 7 times)
Yankelovich: Would you like to see Nixon continuein office,decide to resign,or be
impeached? (August 1973-April 1974, asked 3 times)
Roper: [Followinga list of possible criticismsor charges against Nixon about which
the respondentwas asked if "you thinkit is a serious offenseand . . . thinkhe may be
personallyresponsiblefor it"; the otherhalfof the sample was not given such a list.]
Actually, impeachmentof a presidentbegins with an investigationof charges made
against him by the House of Representativesand, if they thinkthe charges have a
sufficient
basis, a latertrialby the Senate. Because ofthe variouschargesthathave been
made againstPresidentNixon, do you thinkimpeachmentproceedingsshouldbe brought
against him or not? (November 1973-May 1974, asked 3 times)
Gallup (B): [Followingan explanationof the impeachmentprocess similarto Roper's]
Now let me ask you firstof all if you thinkthere is enough evidence of possible
wrongdoingin thecase of PresidentNixon to bringhimto trialbeforethe Senate, or not?
(April-August 1974, asked 5 times)
Gallup (C): Justfromthe way you feel now, do you thinkhis actions are serious
enough to warranthis beingremovedfromthe Presidency,or not? (April-August1974,
asked 5 times)
Harris(C): All in all, do you thinkPresidentNixon shouldor shouldnotbe impeached
by Congress and removed fromoffice?(March-June 1974, asked 4 times)

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POLLING ON WATERGATE

539

nationalpolls. The rangeof variationduringany one monthis quite

considerable.It averagesclose to 30 percentagepoints.
These data onlyunderlinethe observation,
familiar
to surveyresearchers,
thattheambiguities
ofa question,thealternatives
provided
therespondent,
and thecontextin whicha questionis askedinevitably makea difference.
As forambiguity,
the questionthatdrewmostfirefromWheeler
(1975) was Gallup's "Do you thinkPresidentNixon shouldbe impeachedand compelledto leave officeor not?" This phrasingcalled
on therespondent
to maketwojudgments
at once: ShouldNixonbe
forcedout? Shouldthisbe accomplishedthrough
the constitutional
impeachment
procedure?The question,firstintroduced
in June1973,
was repeatedin seven subsequentGalluppolls untilFebruary1974,
and thenchanged.In April,Gallup asked people, quite directly,
whethertheythought
therewas enoughevidenceto bringthepresidentto trialbeforetheSenate.The consequencewas a considerable
jumpin pro-impeachment
sentiment
betweentheFebruarypoll,when
theold or A versionwas last asked,and theone two monthslater,
whenthe revisedB versionwas introduced.
The alternatives
in a questioncan also influencethe response.
There is an obvious difference
betweenresignation
(HarrisA) and
removalby impeachment
(GallupA). To the extentthatthesetwo
pollsare trulycomparable,theyshowa slightbuthardlyoverwhelmingpreference
forresignation
overimpeachment.
Butwhenthesetwo
are posed as alternatives,
resignation
gains,as in the Yankelovich
question:"Would you liketo see Nixoncontinuein office,decideto
resign,or be impeached?"Late in November1973, given these
choices, the public opted for resignation;
the 10 percentfavoring
impeachment
is far below what any of the otherpolls were then
and surelytheone statisticthatmighthave bolsteredthe
registering
saggingspiritsof pro-administration
forces.The alternatives,
as offered,weremadeto appearless ambiguousthantheywerein fact.A
president
remainsin officewhilehe is impeached;he is removedonly
afterthe Senate has convicted.Giventhe wordingof the question,
mostrespondents
werenotreadyforan impeachment
thattheyprobas "forcedremovalfromoffice."Those awareofthe
ablyunderstood
tediousnatureof theimpeachment
processmighthave been content
to have himresign,immediately.
Questionsthatasked aboutimpeachment
and/orremovalfromofficeas conditional
on somefinding
of guiltalso drewquitedifferent
responsesfromthose that soughtsimplyto elicit what persons
thought"now." This is evidencedby responsesto two questions
askedin thesame 1973pollbeforetheCox firing.
One was theHarris

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540

LANG AND LANG

B version,withimpeachment
on an adversefinding
conditional
bythe
Ervin(Senate Watergate)Committee;
the othersimplyread, "Consideringall the developments
of the Watergatecase, do you think
Congressshouldbeginimpeachment
proceedingsagainstPresident
Nixon,or not?" The two questionsbrought
vastlydivergent
results.
The distribution
is just about reversed(see Table 2).
How thecontextof questioning
further
affectsresponsewas demonstratedby the Roper Organization.
A questionprefacedwithan
explanationof whatimpeachment
meant,asked in November1973,
thanotherpolls at the
foundthe publicless leeryof impeachment
theone by Yankelovichwiththetriplealternative,
time,in particular
citedabove. Onlythe conditional
question(HarrisB) gave a higher
readingon impeachment.
Thatdifferent
pollsgivedifferent
readingsof publicopinionat any
giventimeis probablyless surprising
and less seriousthanthe differentreadingsof trendsovertimeshownin Table 1. The Apriland
June1974Gallupresponsessuggesta declinein impeachment
sentiment,albeitof onlytwo pointsand possiblydue to samplingerror,
but the HarrisPoll recordeda 10-pointrise duringthe same twomonthperiod.Harrisalso showedsupportforimpeachment
finally
passingthe 50 percentpoint.
The wordingof some questionsleads one to believe thatsome
pollstersmay,to beginwith,have been as confusedas the public
abouttheimpeachment
process.Answersobtainedwerein goodpart
reactionsto a word that,forsome, stirredimagesof the ultimate
punishment
(removalfromoffice)and, forothers,theinitiation
of a
legal processthatcould as readilyexoneratethepresidentas prove
himguilty.
The GallupA question,whichclearlyled to an undulylow estimate
of impeachment
shouldhave been changedand clarified.
sentiment,
But once asked, it provideda month-by-month
recordof changeof
whateveritwas thatthequestionwas recording.
Sincetrenddata are
reluctantto rewordthe
valued, Gallup was, quite understandably,
evident.Some of
questionuntilthe need to do so becamepainfully
theriserecordedin Aprilreflectsthechangein thequestion(Gallup
B) ratherthanin publicsentiment.
Table 2. ImpeachmentAttitudesElicited by Two Types of Questionsin October 1973
Impeachment
For

Question
Conditionalversion
Unconditionalversioni
SOURCE:

52%
29

Against
34%
58

Louis Harris Associates, October 1973.

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Don't Know
14%
13

POLLING ON WATERGATE

541

Since the HarrisPoll as a ruleasks morepoliticalquestionsthan

Gallup,it also includedmorequestionson Watergate.
Initially,
questionsaboutNixon'sleavingofficemostoftenposedtheissueinterms
eitherof resignation
or of removalfromofficeundercertainconditions. It was not untilMarch 1974 thatHarrisfirstasked such a
questionwithoutany "ifs" attached.The new question(HarrisC)
was almostthe exact equivalentof the one Gallup was about to
abandonbecauseofgrowing
doubtsaboutitsvalidityas a measureof
impeachment
attitudes.This timinglentsome substanceto Wheelers's suspicionaboutthemotivebehindthechange.Did Harrisintend
to showless supportforimpeachment
thanthereactuallywas? Thisis
in viewofthemanyotherquestionsaskedconcurrently
doubtful
with
thisone. Thus,ifone looks at responsesto theconditional
question
(HarrisA), a case can be made that the Harris Poll had called
forimpeachment
towidesupport
attention
earlyon. Indeed,one ofthe
questionsused by Harrisshoweda plurality
as
favoring
impeachment
earlyas September1973. This had turnedintoa majorityby midOctober,even beforethe firingof ArchibaldCox. Let us cite the
exampleof a HarrisreleasedatedFebruary25, 1974.It began: "By
nearly3 to 1 the Americanpeople wantimpeachment
proceedings
but theyare in no rush. .
againstNixon carriedforward,
Given the manydisparatemeasures,no one can say withany
or how much
certainty
just how thepublicdividedon impeachment
supporttherewould have been for such a move had the House
Judiciary
Committeemovedmorerapidly.If polls did in any way
itwas in largepartbecauseof
misrepresent
supportforimpeachment,
thesignificance
thenewsmediaassignedto certainstatistics
thatwere
singledout. The publicitygiventhese measureshelpeddefinethe
opinionclimate.It does makea difference
whethera headlinereads
or "less thanhalfthe
"onlya slimmajority
opposedto impeachment"
U.S. favorsNixon's exit." Even syndicatedcolumnistslike Harris
and Gallupare at themercyofheadlinewriters
and editors,whomay
makecuts to conservespace. And theyhave even less controlover
interpretations
giventheirfindings-byCongress,the WhiteHouse,
commentators,
pressuregroups-oncethesehave enteredthepublic
domain.
Whatthedebateaboutpollingeffectsoftenoverlooksis thatpolls
do notspeakforthemselves
butare subjecttojournalistic
judgment.
News values help determineboth what questionsare asked by
are reportedand whenand how theyare
pollstersand whatfindings
reported.The maincustomersof the publicpolls are, afterall, the
newspapers,news magazines,and televisionnetworks.Gallup and
Harrisare syndicated.
Yankelovichis linkedto Timemagazine.Since
.

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LANG AND LANG

542

theirown pollingoperaWatergate,
thenetworkshave strengthened
withnewspapers,forexample,theNew
tions,usuallyin conjunction
PressPoll,which
News
Poll
or
theNBC/Associated
YorkTimes/CBS
Hence,thequestionsdeal with
also has manynewspapersubscribers.
Mainly,theyreflectwhat
issues consideredtimelyand newsworthy.
the news columnshave emphasizedor becomenews themselves.
of all releasesby thepollingorganizations
Onlya smallproportion
duringWatergateever became nationalnews. Of 38 Gallup press
releasesbetweenSeptember2, 1973and July28, 1974,10-just over
one out of everyfour-madethetelevisioneveningnewson at least
variedin theemphasistheygaveto
one network.News organizations
Watergate
pollsof everykind.NBC spentthemosttimeon tracking
withCBS second,and ABC a ratherdistantthird.More
sentiment,
timesand CBS twiceas much
precisely,NBC gave two-and-a-half
timeto itemsbased on polls as did ABC. Yet the timedevotedto
these itemson all threenetworksamountedto much less than 1
percentof news time.
on TV newswas thepresiThe one poll questionmostprominent
rating,whichservedas a kindof Dow-Jonesaverdentialpopularity
by whichthepress,politiage of theWatergatestory,thebarometer
cians, and publicjudged Nixon's changingfortunes.Because these
measuresraisedmorequestionsthantheyanswered,theplay given
intoaccusingthe press-or at least
themspurredNixon supporters
to
partof it-of beingin cahootswiththeDemocraticleft,of trying
undo a politicalmandate(for example,Safire,1973:47).This, of
made lateron by Wheeler.
course,is the oppositeof the argument
Pollstersare not alwaysinnocentvictims.In seekingto establish
therelevanceof theirratings,theymayexaggeratetheirimportance.
One findsexamplesof thisin the syndicatedcolumnswhichLouis
months.He was partialto phrases
HarriswroteduringtheWatergate
suchas, "Mr, Nixonhas gone a longway towardlosinghis trialby
publicopinion"(Jan.21, 1974),and "The key to Mr. Nixon's fate
... over the .. . months.. . he has been on trial" (Jan. 31, 1974).
The bigplayis reservedforthe"majority"whobelieve,agree,have
confidence
in, approve,and so forth.Thus Harriscouldwriteas late
closedthedoor
thatthepublichad "notentirely
as theendofJanuary
exoneration"(Jan.31, 1974).And
on possibleultimatepresidential
howdid he knowthis?Because thenumberwhoendorsedresignation
was stillshortof "the critical51 percent."It was big
or impeachment
news when Harris and Gallup found majorities in favor of
a Roper surveyhad crossed
impeachment-abarrier,incidentally,
some monthsbefore.
thereleasesby thepollsters
Insofaras the news media,including

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POLLING ON WATERGATE

53

themselves,
harpedon thesignificance
ofthe"magicmajority"forall
to itthebinding
forceofthe
itwas worth,theycameclose to imputing
all
their
inadequacies,
ballotbox.1"In thisrespectthepolls,despite
and less movablethanit
probablydepictedpublicopinionas firmer
actuallywas. Lack of attention
to whatthepublicmightsettleforif
givendecisiveleadershiptendedto exaggeratethe hardnessof the
oppositionto impeachment.
There is anotherway in which"precisionjournalists,"actingas
pollstersandplayingthenumbers
game,mightalso be seenas playing
the WhiteHouse game. In puttingthe emphasison whethermore
theidea of Watergate
people agreedthandisagreed,theyreinforced
as a purelypartisanissue. To makeit appearthisway was an essentialingredient
thatthe
oftheNixonstrategy,
basedon theexpectation
publicwouldtireofa politicalfight
and putpressureon Congressand
on themediato directtheirattention
to other,morepressingmatters
(Nixon, 1978:850).
Whatof the otherview, thatthe polls hastenedNixon's resignation?First,Congress,understandably
waryaboutthe 1974elections,
didnotwantto be too faroutofstepwithpublicopinion.Its members
did take the pulse of theirdistrictsthroughtripshome and other
contactsby mail and telephoneas well as throughquestionnaires
Most membersof
incorporated
into theirlettersto constituents.12
surveysbut
Congresslackedthe resourcesto commissionscientific
foundsome questionsin publishedpolls tailoredto theirneeds,for
would vote fora
example,the questionthatasked if respondents
or whether
they
congressman
whovotedforor againstimpeachment,
thought
Watergatewouldhave an impacton the Republicanparty's
chancesin 1974,etc. Nor did anyone,one assumes,failto notethat
Nixon'severyeffort
to turnthepolls around-in OperationCandor,
in his State of the Union message, throughthe release of the
in failure.Nixon,the mostavid poll watcherof
transcripts-ended
to assure
themall, wentout of his way bothpubliclyand privately
Congressthathe knewtheywereworriedby whattheyread(Nixon,
1978:948).His own viewwas confidedto hisDiary earlyin 1973:"I
don't give one damn what the polls say insofaras affecting
my
decisions.I onlycare aboutthembecause theyaffectmyabilityto
to them"(Nixon,1978:753).
lead, sincepoliticiansdo pay attention
I Harris,in a mid-April
1974release,triedto rightanywrongimpression
readers
might
havereceivedabouttheroleofpublicopinionintheimpeachment
process.While
publicreactionsto Watergate
disclosureswerean important
partof theprocess,the
representatives
of thepeople had to makethefinaljudgment,
he reminded
them.
12 We haveexamined
84 pollson impeachment,
collectedbyProfessor
JackOrwant
of AmericanUniversity,
sentout by congressmen
during1974; 14 of themwereby
membersof the House Judiciary
Committee.

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544

LANG AND LANG

Second,whatevertheireffecton Congress,thepublicity
giventhe
of Watergate,
polls, alongwithotherreporting
helpedthe publicto
becomeawarethatNixonmightbe impeachedand to acceptthisas a
real possibility.It also appearsthatdevelopingan understanding
of
impeachment
was relatedto its acceptance. As a Roper survey
of impeachment
elicshowed,a questionprefacedby an explanation
ited the strongestsupportfor impeachment
(Table 1), and people
whounderstood
themeaning
ofimpeachment
without
anyexplanation
favoredit somewhatmorethanthosewhohad to have itexplainedto
them(RoperReports,1974,no. 4). Furthermore,
therise in support
forimpeachment
thatfollowedthe Aprilrelease of the transcripts
reflected
mainlya decreasein theproportion
who had seen theprocess as "too destructive
forthe country,"while "the percentages
opposingimpeachment
because of a beliefthatthe charges[against
Nixonwere]eithernottrueor notseriousenoughremainedconstant"
(RoperReports,1974,no. 5). We further
suggestthatthecontinuous
questioning
aboutimpeachment
and thepublicity
givenpollingresults
and less
gave theidea extracurrency
and thusmadeit morefamiliar
threatening.
Third,polls documentedthe extentof suspicionabout Nixon
wheneverhe withheld
evidenceor soughtto explainhimself
by going
on televisionto appeal directly
to theAmericanpeople,as he did at
such criticalmomentsas afterthe Cox firingor in the speech explaining
whyonlythetranscripts,
andnottheactualtapes,werebeing
to anyoneinclinedto
released.The polls could have demonstrated,
readthemthisway,thata majority
was quitepreparedto acceptthe
judgmentof an impartialbody, providedthejudges provedthemselves fairand to be actingon the basis of evidence.By thefallof
1973,thepublicwanteda fullinvestigation
of Watergate.Thereafter
therewas too muchdistrust
of majorinstitutions
(Harris,1973;Miller
et al., 1975)forthe controversy
to be resolvedon faithalone.
The abilityto invokepublicopinioninpressingfordisclosureofthe
to yieldbecamea greatasset during
evidenceNixonwas so reluctant
the controversy.
The publishedrecordof the proceedingsof the
House Judiciary
Committee(U.S. House of Representatives,
1974)
containsmanyreferences
to thepublicdemandfora fullinvestigation
and the mandatethatthecommittee,
whetherforor against,appear
of
"just."913Appearancesmattered
and evenenteredthedeliberations
13 Somemembers
thought
thatinformation
on pollshadno placeinthedebate.Thus,
Representative
(now Senator)WilliamCohen,speakingon May 1, 1974:"I was interestedto hearone of mycolleaguesmention
thathe has beenpollinghis district
to
findoutwhatthepublicwants .... Frankly,
I do notthinkthatis a properconsideration .... Thegreatdecisionwhichfacesus cannotbe basedupontheshifting
sandsof
publicopinion"(U.S. House of Representatives:441).

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POLLING ON WATERGATE

545

theSupremeCourtin disposingofthetapesissue. In viewofNixon's

opinion,thejustices
challengethathe wouldonlyobeya "definitive"
JusticeLewis F. Powell,acfeltimpelledto speak withunanimity.
insiders'account,recomcordingto Woodwardand Armstrong's
Committee
mendeda delayuntilafterthevoteoftheHouse Judiciary
because, so Powell is said to have argued,those "opposed to impeachingcould makethepointthatwithoutthetapes theywouldbe
wouldbe actingprematurely
now authorized
to have,theCommittee
wouldbe
injudgingNixon." Othersbelievedthatanypostponement
playingintoNixon's strategy
ofdelaybutalso insistedthattheCourt
shouldnever adjust its timetableto promotewhateversecondary
politicaleffectsthejusticesmightprefer(Woodwardand Armstrong,
1979:345-46).
The manifestconcernsof the various actors and institutional
Nixonhimself,
agents,including
cast seriousdoubton thethirdview,
intheoutcome
namely,thatpublicopinionplayedno rolewhatsoever
of Watergate.
popularamongtheWashingThe view is nevertheless
It is reinforced
bymembers
of
tonpresscorpsandthelegalfraternity.
theHouse Judiciary
Committee
whoinsistthat,in decidingtheissue,
theywereguidedby nothing
buttheevidence.Even iftheydid poll
theirconstituents
on thequestion,theywerenotinanywayboundby
the majority;whatcountedwas the legal case againstNixon.14But
whileNixon'sresignation
on August8 was notthesimpleand direct
consequenceofa "battleforpublicopinion,"whichNixonfelthe had
lost,an "iffy"questionaboutwhichwe can onlyspeculateremains:
Committee
have pushedas hard
WouldtheHouse and theJudiciary
forimpeachment
afterOctober1973if Nixon had continuedto be
strongin thepolls and wouldtherehave been the same supportfor
role?No
theSpecialWatergate
Prosecutor
to pursuehis independent
one can possiblyknowtheanswer.It standsto reason,however,that
and
some politiciansand some editorswouldhave acted differently
thatWatergatewould not have ended as quietlyas it did. And the
wounds,reopenedby Ford's pardonof Nixon,wouldnothave been
so readilyhealed.
lies in
The majorroleofthenewsmediainanypoliticalcontroversy
theirabilityto createa by-stander
public(Lippmann,1925;Lang and
Lang,in press)which,as a thirdpartyto thedispute,has constantly
to be wooed by theothertwo. Whenthatpublichas no voice of its
of publicopinion,
own, the media,by projectingan interpretation
imageofhowthey
providethepoliticalactorswitha "looking-glass"
14
to this
havemade statements
Committee
Manymembersof theHouse Judiciary
theirviewthat
reaffirmed
forthepublicrecord.Severalofthosewe interviewed
effect
publicopinionhad playedno role in Nixon'sresignation.

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546

LANG AND LANG

appear to the public. The polls and how theyare reportedare an

important
element,but by no means the only one, in creatingthis
image.Theybecomeimportant
insofaras certainselected"opinions"
are communicated
to politicalactorsandassimilated
intotheirviewof
possiblereactionsto be takenintoaccount.
There has been much discussion,especiallyduringcampaigns,
aboutthepossibleinfluence
of publicopinionpollingon thepolitical
process. Much of the debate centerson whetheror not the polls
changevotingdecisionsand votingbehaviorand thushave an effect
on electionoutcomes.The basic question,however,it seemsto us, is
notwhetherscientific
polls and theirreporting
have any impact,but
how theybecome partof the politicalprocessthroughwhichdecisionsare madeand issuesresolved.Case studiesof thedevelopment
and outcomeof politicalcontroversies,
likeWatergate,
can go a long
way towardclarification
of thedirectand indirectimpactsof polls.
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