Divergence in Moral Reasoning

About Sport and Everyday Life

Brenda Jo Bredemeier and David L. Shields
University of California, Berkeley
The observation that sport represents a unique context has been widely discussed, but
social scientists have done little to empirically examine the moral adaptations of sport
participants. In the present study, the divergence between levels of moral reasoning
used to discuss hypothetical dilemmas set in sport and in everyday life contexts was
investigated among 120 high school and collegiate basketball players, swimmers, and
nonathletes. Protocols were scored according to Haan's interactional model of moral
development. It was found that levels of moral reasoning used to discuss sport dilemmas were lower than levels characterizing reasoning about issues within an everyday
life context. Findings were discussed in terms of the specific social and moral context
of sport experience.
Sport has been described as a "world within a world" (Huizinga, 1955) in which
the normal restraints of everyday life are temporarily set aside in favor of a conventionalized
structure which allows typical moral norms to be transgressed. For example, in a sport
setting it may be permissible or even necessary to strike another person or to deliberately
deceive someone. Perhaps paradoxically, a popular cultural adage promotes the view that
"sport builds character" by providing a setting for teamwork, persistent goal seeking,
and fair play. While the uniqueness of the sport context has been widely acknowledged,
few have conducted empirical studies of the moral adaptations required of sport participants
(Bredemeier & Shields, 1984; Hall, 1981).
In the present study a structural developmental approach was employed to study
moral reasoning. This approach has only recently been used to study the psychological
dimensions of sport experience. Structural developmental theory posits that individuals
bring to situations an innate tendency to organize or structure their experience into coherent
patterns of meaning. However, in contrast to the Kantian assumption of inborn organizing categories, structural developmentalists propose that fully differentiated structures of
thought are products of an individual's development. In the classic Piagetian (1932, 1954)
This research project was supported by funding awarded to the principle investigator by the
Institute of Human Development and the Faculty Research Program at the University of California,
Berkeley. Appreciation is extended to the research assistants who served as interviewers and scorers,
particularly Flo DeLaney for her work as interview coordinator, and to Barbara Worthing-Jones for
her contributions in data analyses.
Direct all correspondenceto Brenda Jo Bredemeier, Department of Physical Education, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.
348

SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT JOURNAL, 1984, 1, 348-357

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349

approach to structural developmental theory, development involves a progression through

an invariant series of stages, each stage reflecting qualitatively different organizing properties. Stages are thought to be relatively stable across a variety of contexts or content
areas, though some theorists (Haan, 1984; Turiel, 1983) have examined how qualitatively
different forms of person-context interaction promote the development of situationally appropriate reasoning patterns. The purpose of the present study was to investigate the
possibility that sport contexts are sufficiently distinct from everyday life contexts to elicit
a situational adaptation of moral reasoning patterns about hypothetical dilemmas.
The stage of moral reasoning employed by an individual in any given testing situation may vary somewhat in accordance with manipulations of the hypothetical dilemmas
used to stimulate moral reasoning (Davidson, Turiel, & Black, 1981; Ferguson & Rule,
1982; Fischer, 1980; Garwood, Levine, & Ewing, 1980; Moran & Joniak, 1979; Sobesky,
1983; Surber, 1982). The social context of moral issues, and experiences within that particular context, may also significantly influence moral reasoning. Research conducted in
prisons (Kohlberg, Kauffman, Scharf, & Hickey, 1972), for example, has demonstrated
that inmates use lower stages of reasoning in response to prison dilemmas than when they
attempt to resolve standard hypothetical dilemmas. It may be that the highly structured
and authoritarian nature of prison environments discourages the adoption of moral principles based on autonomy and equality.
The sport setting shares a number of properties of social organization with other
cultural institutions. For instance, Coakley (1981) has observed that prisons and sport training camps share common features, including reduced liberty, autonomy, and security.
Sport is highly regulated, hierarchically structured, and heteronomous in its rule orientation. While these features are not unique to sport, they may combine to discourage high
level moral reasoning in competitive sport settings.
The present study was designed to explore the differential effects of sport and
everyday life contexts on the moral reasoning of athletes and nonathletes. Sport is clearly
"framed" (Goffrnan, 1974) differently than everyday life. To explore the divergence in
moral reasoning about hypothetical dilemmas set in sport and life contexts, we utilized
Haan's (1977, 1978, 1983) structural developmental model of morality. Her interactional
model consists of a 5-level characterization of moral growth, and focuses on processes
which are utilized when people seek intersubjective "moral balances" concerning respective
rights and obligations. A brief synopsis of this theory will function to outline our normative perspective and further elucidate ways in which sport is a moral context.

Interactional Morality
Haan maintains that morality is socially constructed. It involves the negotiation of
moral balances, or mutually acknowledged agreements (usually informal), through processes of moral dialogue. Mature dialogue is guided by an effort to give all people's moral
desires and perspectives equivalent consideration over time. However, because people differ
in their interests, needs, resources, and abilities, morality cannot be guided by a strict
model of equality. Any given moral balance may not reflect all people's interests equally.
Within our contemporary society, affirmative action programs and a progressively structured tax system are examples of the tendency to seek equalization rather than a strict
equality.
Different levels of moral development involve varying understandings of appropriate moral balances. Haan's model portrays development as moving from an assimilative,

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Bredemeier and Shields

egocentric perspective (Levels 1 and 2) to an accommodative, other-oriented perspective

(Levels 3 and 4) until an equilibration is reached at Level 5. A brief description of the
levels of moral development follows:

Levels of Interactional Morality

Assimilation Phase
Level I : Power Balancing. The person is unable to sustain a view of others' interests apart from self-interest, and vacillates between compliance with others when forced and thwarting others when able to do so. Balances reflect self-interest except for situations where the self is indifferent or forced to compromise.
Level 2: Egocentric Balancing. The person is able to differentiate others' interests
from self-interest, but does not understand that both may coincide in a mutual interest.
People are viewed as essentially self-interested and out for their own good. To get what
the self wants, trade-offs or compromises are made.

Accommodation Phase
Level 3: Harmony Balancing. The person differentiates others' interest from selfinterest, but assumes that a harmony of these interests can be found since most people
are believed to possess essentially altruistic motives. Balances are sought which rest on
the good faith of all. People of bad faith are considered odd and dismissed from moral
consideration.
Level 4: Common Interest Balancing. The person differentiates all parties' selfinterests from the common interest of the group. Balances of compromise are sought which
conform to the system-maintenance requirements of the group. Because the moral culpability
of all is recognized, externally regulated patterns of exchange are sought which benefit
all while limiting personal vulnerability.

Equilibration Phase
Level 5: Mutual Interest Balancing. The person coordinates all parties' self-interests
and the common interest of the group, searching for a situationally specific moral balance
which will optimize everyone's interest. In such a search, the person recognizes the need
to consider specific values and desires, strengths and vulnerabilities, of all parties involved. Solutions may achieve harmony of interests or may represent compromises of interest,
whatever the particularities of the situation and participants allow.

Moral dialogues are not all equally effective. Moral balances may be called into
question because they are based on inadequately structured dialogues. Haan maintains that
people share common understandings about the processes of dialogue which lead to
legitimate moral agreement. "Truth identifying dialogues" must meet the following conditions: dialogues must include all who will be affected by the agreements reached, the
agreements must be reached consensually and without domination, and all participants
must have equal access to pertinent information.

MORAL REASONING

351

Many aspects of the sport setting systematically constrain moral dialogue: Power
is concentrated in the hands of a few (e.g., coaches and officials), the competitive, highly
conventionalized structure discourages dialogue among relevant parties (e.g., team members
seldom converse with opponents), and relevant information about risks, rights, and responsibilities is often lacking or withheld (e.g., athletes may be encouraged to sacrifice their
personal welfare for the good of the team).
In addition to systematically constraining moral dialogue, the sport structure is
characterized by a strategic competitive orientation which may be dysfunctional for the
formulation of high-level moral responses. Within the clearly demarcated spatial and temporal boundaries of competitive sport, participants are offered incentives to seek their own
gain, or the gain of their team, to the relative neglect of the interests and needs of opponents.
Sport may differ from everyday life in its simplified and idealized structure, its
play spirit, and its nonconsequential nature. These contextually specific properties may
create a unique moral setting in which participants and nonparticipants alike consensually
legitimate the temporary bracketing of typical moral concerns. Thus, in contrast to other
heteronomous or authority-centered institutions, sport may foster a lower level of moral
reasoning that is less a grudging necessity dictated by contextual constaints than a positive
and legitimated feature of the context. Sport may represent an "institution of release"
(Emis, 1976) in which the suspension of everyday life moral obligations in favor of a
more egocentric style of moral engagement may be an enjoyable and nonserious moral
deviation.
The hypothesis in the present study was that levels of moral reasoning about sport
dilemmas would be significantly lower than levels of reasoning about life dilemmas. If
the competitive sport structure is understood in our culture to encourage context-specific
self-interests while discouraging moral dialogue, sport dilemmas may elicit lower levels
of moral reasoning as contextually appropriate responses.

Method
Subjects
The 120 subjects far this study included 50 high school students (20 nonathletes
and 30 basketball players) and 70 college students (20 nonathletes, 30 basketball players,
and 20 swimmers). There was an equal distribution of females and males in each subgroup.
Although the majority of subjects were white caucasians (62%), a variety of ethnicities
were represented, including black (14%) Asian (10%) and Chicano (8%). Together the
subjects represented two high schools and five colleges or universities.
The 80 athletes were juniors or seniors in high school or college and had competed
in organized basketball or swimming for at least 6 years. Of the 80 athletes, 46 began
competing in their respective sport areas before the fifth grade, 21 became involved in
grades five and six, and the remaining 13 started participating in grades seven, eight, or
nine. The athletic subjects were recruited from randomly selected schools, colleges, and
universities in a large urban area in Northern California. All team members who were
juniors or seniors and who met the length of participation requirement were invited to
participate. The 40 nonathletes, also juniors or seniors in higher school or college,
represented the same institutions as the athletes. All students enrolled in randomly selected
required academic courses who described themselves as having never participated in organized, competitive sport were invited to participate.

Bredemeier and Shields

352

Procedures

After responding to a brief biographical questionnaire, each subject was interviewed individually for about 60 minutes. The interview consisted of four hypothetical
moral dilemmas: two standard Haanian stories and two stories constructed by the present
investigators which focus on moral situations set in a sport context.' One life and one
sport story involved male protagonists, and the other life and sport stories involved female
protagonists. Sport and life stories were alternated. (Later, subjects were debriefed and
thanked for their participation in the project.)
The eight research assistants who interviewed subjects and scored protocols had
previously completed an intensive 8-week training program on Haan's interactional model
of moral development. Interviewers never scored their own protocols and each protocol
was evaluated independently by two raterrs.

Scoring
Predominant and secondary scores were assigned to each story by each of the two
raters. These scores reflected raters' evaluations of the most prevalent moral reasoning
levels employed by a subject to resolve a particular dilemma. Scores were combined by
weighting the major score 2 and the minor score 1. Subjects were assigned a "life score,"
representing an average level of moral reasoning about the two life dilemmas, and a "sport
score," representing an average reasoning score on the two sport dilemmas. Profiles of
moral reasoning were also established for various groups by determining the percentage
of reasoning employed at each moral level for life and sport dilemmas.
An additional rater was recruited if the original two raters did not agree on their
scoring. To determine rater agreement, modal designations for each story were transformed
to continuous scores on a 19-point scale through use of a conversion chart which took
into account both the major and minor scor6 designations. Agreement was defined as scores
which were within 4 scale points. Agreement among original raters for the 480 stories
was 90%, reflecting comparatively high reliability (Haan, 1978). A fourth rater was never
required.

Data Analyses
To test the main hypothesis that moral reasoning about sport would be significantly
lower than used to resolve everyday life dilemmas, paired t-tests for correlated samples
(life and sport scores) were employed. The t-tests were used to make two types of comparisons. First, group means for moral reasoning about life and sport dilemmas (life reasoning and sport reasoning) were compared. Second, moral profiles were examined by using
t-tests at each moral level to determine whether significant differences existed between
the percentage of life and sport reasoning. Follow-up tests of differences between groups'
life-sport reasoning divergence were conducted for the high school and college samples
separately. The developmental nature of Haan's model justifies this strategy, and t-tests
indicated significant school rank reasoning differences in life, t(118) = 3.94, p < .001,
and sport t(118) = 3.58, p < .001, with college students demonstrating significantly more
mature reasoning.
Two analyses of variance were employed to examine between-group differences
for the high school and college samples, each utilizing a 3-factor design (athletic standing
'Copies of the four hypothetical dilemmas may be secured by contacting the first author.

MORAL REASONING

353

x sex x moral reasoning) with a repeated measure on the moral reasoning factor reflecting the life and sport scores. Athletic standing for high school students referred to a distinction between nonathletes and basketball players; the college sample included nonathletes,
basketball players, and swimmers.

Results and Discussion

Results generally supported the hypothesis that moral reasoning about hypothetical
sport dilemmas would be lower than moral reasoning about dilemmas set in the context
of everyday life. The relationship between life and sport reasoning may be more fully
elaborated by examining differences within and between groups.
Life-Sport Divergence: Differences Within Groups
The main hypothesis was subdivided into three component theses: (a) sport reasoning will be significantly lower than life reasoning for the total population; (b) this lifesport reasoning relationship will be found for athlete and nonahtlete, male and female,
and high school and college groups; and (c) the same relationship will be found for all
subgroups within the sample.
The first two components of the hypothesis were strongly supported (Table 1).
Reasoning about sport was significantly lower than reasoning about life for our total samTable 1
Life-Sport Divergence: Paired T-Test Results
of Differences Within Main Factor Groups

Group

High school

50

College

70

Moral reasoning score

Life
Sport
M
SD

M
SD

Female

60

M
SD

Male

60

M
SD

Nonathlete

40

M
SD

Athlete*

80

M
SD

Total

120

M
SD

2.86
.35
3.14
.40
3.09
.36
2.96
.44
3.05
.48
3.01
.37
3.02
.41

T-Test summary
t Ratio
df
P

2.66
.34
2.96
.44
2.91
.36
2.71
.45
2.91
.49
2.76
.37
2.81
.42

*This category includes high school basketball players and college basketball players and
swimmers.

Bredemeier and Shields

354

ple, as indicated by a paired t-test, t(119) = 7.01, p < .001. Also, within groups representing
different sex, athletic standing, and school rank distinctions, sport reasoning was significantly
lower than life reasoning.
When further analyses were conducted for each subgroup within the sample, the
means continued to reflect lower sport than life reasoning, but results reached statistical
significance only for basketball players and high school female nonathletes (Table 2). Thus,
the third component of the hypothesis was supported only in part.
A comparison between the life reasoning profile and the sport reasoning profile
for the total sample helped to underscore the distinction between life and sport moral reasoning. Level 1 reasoning was not represented among participants in this study, but paired
t-tests demonstrated that the profile of reasoning about life differed significantly from the
profile of reasoning about sport at the other four levels. Level 2 reasoning was used
significantly more to resolve sport dilemmas than life dilemmas, t(119) = 6.91, p < .001.
The reverse was true for reasoning at the accommodative and equilibrative levels; levels
3, t(119) = 3 . 1 3 , ~< .002, 4, t(119) = 2 . 4 8 , <
~ .014, and 5 t(119) = 2 . 7 5 , <
~ .001
were used significantly more to resolve life dilemmas than sport dilemmas.
The results of these analyses may reflect the hypothesized differential effects of
sport and life contexts on moral reasoning. Among the subgroups, sport reasoning was
always lower than life reasoning, but this clear trend was only statistically significant for

Table 2
Life-Sport Divergence: Paired T-Test Results
of Differences Within Subgroups

Subgroup
High school female
nonathlete
High school female
basketball
High school male
nonathlete
High school male
basketball
College female
nonathlete
College female
basketball
College female
swimming
College male
nonathlete
College male
basketball
College male
swimming

Moral reasoning score

Life
Sport

T-Test summary
t-Ratio
df
P

MORAL REASONING

355

basketball players and high school female nonathletes. These results, with the exception
of the female nonathletes, may suggest that stimulus familiarity contributes to the contextual adaptation of moral reasoning. Athletes are more likely than nonathletes to be familiar
with the nature of competitive sport, a context in which strategic patterns of thought may
require an assimilative style of moral reasoning. Competitive sport experience may
familiarize participants with consensually legitimated forms of sport reasoning, but it may
also encourage and reinforce assimilative reasoning patterns.
Sport, however, is not a uniform context. When swimmers' responses were analyzed separately, the difference between their life and sport reasoning did not reach
significance. Two factors may have contributed to this finding: (a) the hypothetical sport
dilemmas used to assess sport moral reasoning both involved contact team sports (basketball and football) with which swimmers were probably less familiar; and @) swimming
involves a parallel, individualistic structure of competition which does not necessitate direct
interaction among competitors and, consequently, may require less adaptation of moral
reasoning than the interactive team sport of basketball, a sport involving body contact and
other forms of nonverbal communication.
A significant divergence in life-sport reasoning also characterized the high school
female nonathlete subgroup. This finding was something of an anomaly, for it was inconsistent with the life-sport reasoning pattern of other nonathletes.

Life-Sport Divergence: Differences Between Groups

To investigate the possibility that different groups diverged to greater or lesser
extents in their life and sport moral reasoning, two analyses of variance were conducted.
For the high school population a 2 X 2 (athletic standing X gender) ANOVA was done
with sport and life scores as dependent repeated measures. No significant athletic standing or gender differences were found.
To test for differences between groups in the college population, a 3 x 2 (athletic
standing x gender) repeated measures ANOVA was employed. A borderline main effect
for athletic standing was evident F(2, 64) = 2.82; p < .07. Duncan's multiple comparison
procedure was used to identify the group means between which significant differences
existed. It was found that basketball players diverged significantly more in their life-sport
reasoning than nonathletes, but the basketball players did not differ significantly from swimmers, and swimmers and nonathletes did not differ from each other. No significant gender
or interaction effects were evident.
In general, between-group results provide weak support for the view that life-sport
reasoning divergence is greater for those collegiate athletes who are most familiar with
and involved in competitive, interactive team sports. Further investigation is needed,
however, to determine why this pattern was not evident among high school students and
to clarify the relationship between involvement in a particular sport area and moral reasoning
about various sport and everyday life contexts.

Conclusions
In summary, results generally confirmed the hypothesis that hypothetical sport
dilemmas would elicit lower levels of moral reasoning than dilemmas presented within
an everyday life coritext. The conclusion that sport contexts elicit lower level moral reasoning
than everyday life contexts must be qualified, however, by noting that this relationship

Bredemeier and Shields

356

was statistically significant only for the high school female nonathletes and the basketball
subgroups.
The need for a developmental approach to the question of life-sport moral reasoning divergence is underscored by the combination of (a) the significant difference between collegiate basketball players and nonathletes and (b) the nonsignificant athletic standing effect for high school students. Also, the finding that collegiate swimmers did not
differ significantly from either collegiate basketball players or nonathletes highlights the
diversity of sociomoral dynamics involved in various sport settings.
The relatively lower level of sport moral reasoning identified in the present study
may reflect consensually legitimated and contextually limited moral regression, a temporary deviation from typical patterns of processing moral information. Haan's (1983)
model of moral development presupposes the influence of person-context interactions, so
variations from the normative form of moral balancing are not inconsistent with her model.
As an illustration, Haan has noted that power differentials between participants in moral
exchange create special forms of moral balance. When a moral dialogue is dominated by
one party using force to achieve a resolution, then the result is an illegitimate imbalance.
In contrast, legitimate imbalances occur, for example, between parent and child. Perhaps
there are also forms of bracketed morality in which the usual moral obligations of everyday life are temporarily set aside. Game reasoning may reflect a special form of bracketed
morality in which the competitive strategic setting of sport encourages the temporary adoption of egocentric morality. A detailed understanding of the psychological dynamics of
game reasoning may provide insight into the sociomoral reasoning patterns operative in
other contexts (e.g., war) which are framed as distinct from everyday life.
Future empirical research and philosophical reflection is required to determine the
legitimate boundaries for bracketed morality. Haan would argue that the legitimation is
to be viewed as a social process in which tentative conclusions are dialogically and
pragmatically tested by participants and nonparticipants alike. Social scientists may contribute to an understanding of legitimate bracketed morality by carefully investigating patterns of reasoning exhibited by morally mature individuals who reason about issues set
in contexts that are framed differently than everyday life.
A closely related issue for sport social scientists involves the relationship between
life-sport reasoning divergence and the structural characteristics of specific sport areas.
A typology of sport structures-such as that developed by Schneider and Eitzen (1983)
to examine sport violence-may reveal important information regarding contextual dynamics
that encourage moral adaptations in reasoning about sport.

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