Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rev Lo No Pinion
Rev Lo No Pinion
Transaction ID 30084492
Case No. 4578-VCL
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN RE REVLON, INC.
Consol. C.A. No. 4578-VCL
SHAREHOLDERS LITIGATION
OPINION
Seth D. Rigrodsky and Brian D. Long, RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware; Robert M. Kornreich and Carl L. Stine, WOLF POPPER LLP, New York,
New York, Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel and Members of Plaintiffs’ Committee of the
Whole; Joseph A. Rosenthal and Norman M. Monhait, ROSENTHAL, MONHAIT &
GODDESS, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Plaintiffs’ Delaware Liaison Counsel and
Member of Plaintiffs’ Committee of the Whole; ABBEY SPANIER RODD & ABRAMS,
LLP, New York, New York; GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG LLP, Los Angeles,
California; WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP, New York,
New York; LAW OFFICE OF JACOB FOGEL, P.C., Brooklyn, New York;
CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; LAW OFFICE OF BRUCE G.
MURPHY, Vero Beach, Florida, Members of Plaintiffs’ Committee of the Whole.
David A. Jenkins and Michele C. Gott, SMITH KATZENSTEIN & FURLOW, LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Curtis V. Trinko, LAW OFFICES OF CURTIS V. TRINKO,
LLP, New York, New York; Samuel K. Rosen, HARWOOD FEFFER LLP, New York,
New York, Attorneys for Plaintiffs Edward S. Gutman and Lawrence Corneck.
already was the subject of this proceeding, the new plaintiffs and their counsel asked me
to revisit the leadership structure governing the various law firms representing the
putative class. Having reviewed the record in the case to date, I conclude that the original
plaintiffs’ counsel failed to litigate the case adequately. Indeed, their advocacy has been
questions about whether they focused foremost on the interests of the class, or instead
settled on terms that would be easy gives for the defendants while still arguably sufficient
understanding appear inaccurate. When the defendants later wanted to amend a non-
plaintiffs’ counsel readily signed off. Then, when forced to defend their conduct and
leadership role, original plaintiffs’ counsel approached the concept of candor to the
tribunal as if attempting to sell me a used car. Taken as a whole, their actions have
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The record for purposes of this decision is relatively limited, largely because
original plaintiffs’ counsel never actually litigated. The competing plaintiffs’ factions
have submitted briefing on the request to revise the leadership structure, including two
affidavits from Robert M. Kornreich of Wolf Popper LLP. The defendants say they take
no position on the dispute, but their body language suggests they would like to see
1
original plaintiffs’ counsel, who served up the settlement, remain in control of the case. I
have reviewed all of the docket entries in each of the representative actions. I also have
reviewed public filings made by the defendants in connection with the transaction that is
the subject of the litigation. I regard this record as fully adequate to assess the
necessarily preliminary, because confirmatory discovery has not yet taken place, and the
On April 13, 2009, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc. (“MacAndrews &
Forbes”) submitted a written proposal to Revlon, Inc. for a merger that would result in
MacAndrews & Forbes acquiring 100% of Revlon’s publicly traded Class A Common
Stock. The public stockholders would not receive cash. They instead would receive a
new Series A Preferred Stock, whose terms I describe below. The Series A Preferred
would not be listed on any securities exchange. In connection with the merger,
MacAndrews & Forbes would modify the terms of a $170 million Senior Subordinated
Term Loan between Revlon’s operating subsidiary (as borrower) and MacAndrews &
Forbes (as lender) (the “Senior Subordinated Term Loan”) and contribute a portion of the
loan to Revlon. The loan was scheduled to mature in August 2010. Revlon’s public
filings state that liquidity issues resulting from the Senior Subordinated Term Loan
provided the impetus for the transaction. I will refer to this proposal as the “Original
Merger.”
2
MacAndrews & Forbes is Revlon’s controlling stockholder. Prior to the events
giving rise to this litigation, Revlon had two classes of stock outstanding. Revlon’s Class
A Common Stock was (and remains) listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Revlon
had issued 48,250,163 shares of Class A Common, of which 20,042,428 were owned by
the public and the balance by MacAndrews & Forbes (directly or through affiliates).
Revlon had issued 3,125,000 shares of Class B Common, all owned by MacAndrews &
Forbes. As a result of its equity ownership, MacAndrews & Forbes controlled 75% of
MacAndrews & Forbes and eight directors whom Revlon describes as independent under
the NYSE listing standards. I need not evaluate their independence for purposes of this
motion, and I will refer to the eight as the “Outside Directors.” On April 20, 2009, the
Board decided to form a special committee to evaluate and negotiate the proposal for the
Original Merger (the “Special Committee”). It was populated with five of the Outside
Directors. Also on April 20, Revlon issued a press release announcing the receipt of the
Original Merger.
During the three weeks following the announcement of the Original Merger, four
representative actions were filed by familiar repeat players who regularly bring
3
representative actions on behalf of stockholders with small ownership stakes. 1 The
number of actions and pace of filing were noteworthy only because similar
numerous filings within a much shorter period. As this Court has previously observed,
the first cases often appear minutes or hours after the announcement with others
following within a matter of days.2 But although the four complaints in this case were
filed on a marginally more moderate schedule, the work product did not reflect any
First to arrive, on April 24, 2009, was a complaint styled Mercier v. Perelman,
C.A. No. 4532. 3 Filed by Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A., it was a cursory 13-page
1
I characterize certain law firms as frequent filers based on my personal experience,
which happily accords with an empirical analysis of the plaintiffs’ firms who file most frequently
in the Court of Chancery. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of
Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133, 186-87
(2004) (identifying firms and number of representative actions filed during a two-year period).
2
See, e.g., In re Cox Comm’ns, Inc., 879 A.2d 604, 608 (Del. Ch. 2005) (describing the
“hastily-filed, first-day complaints that serve no purpose other than for a particular law firm and
its client to get into the medal round of the filing speed (also formerly known as the lead counsel
selection) Olympics”); TCW Technology Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Comm’ns, Inc., 2000 WL
1654504, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (“Too often judges of this Court face complaints filed
hastily, minutes or hours after a transaction is announced, based on snippets from the print or
electronic media. Such pleadings are remarkable, but only because of the speed with which they
are filed in reaction to an announced transaction”).
3
Albeit not yet counted among quasi-mythical figures like Harry Lewis or Alan Russell
Kahn, Vern Mercier has been carving out a role for himself as stockholder champion. He
appeared in 2006 as the named plaintiff in Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Incorporated, C.A. No. 2226-
VCS, a case that led to Vice Chancellor Strine’s decision in Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware),
Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007). In 2008, he was the named plaintiff in Mercier v. Yahoo!,
C.A. No. 3579-CC, an action that was consolidated with In re Yahoo! Shareholders Litigation,
C.A. No. 3561-CC. An institution served as lead plaintiff in the consolidated Yahoo! case.
Outside of Delaware, he served as the named plaintiff in Mercier v. Blankenship, 662 F. Supp.2d
4
effort that largely quoted from Revlon public filings and advanced the generic theory that
MacAndrews & Forbes was trying to capture the benefits of an internal Revlon
restructuring before they were recognized by the market. The complaint listed two firms
as co-counsel: Abbey Spanier Rodd & Abrams, LLP of New York, New York, a
frequent filer in this Court, and Glancy & Binkow LLP of Los Angeles, California, a firm
that appears on only one prior decision, see In re Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.
Eight days after the Mercier filing, on May 1, 2009, the Rosenthal firm filed a
second complaint. Styled Jurkowitz v. Perelman, C.A. No. 4557, it was a 12-page effort
not substantively distinguishable from the Mercier complaint. The Rosenthal firm’s co-
counsel in this action was Wolf Popper LLP of New York, New York, another frequent
filer.
On May 5, 2009, Chimicles & Tikellis LLP joined the party with a 14-page
pleading styled Lefkowitz v. Perelman, C.A. No. 4563. Chimicles & Tikellis’ co-counsel
was Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman Herz of New York, New York, also a frequent
filer, and the Law Office of Jacob Fogel, P.C. of Brooklyn, New York, an apparent
Delaware neophyte. Despite the additional time since the Original Merger was
announced and the involvement of three different firms, the complaint was not
562 (S.D. W.Va. 2009). None of the other individuals who filed actions as named plaintiffs
appear to have a prior history in that role.
5
On May 12, 2009, Rigrodsky & Long LLP filed a complaint styled Heiser v.
Revlon, Inc., C.A. No. 4578. Rigrodsky & Long’s co-counsel was the Law Offices of
pages, it was not substantively distinguishable from any of the prior three complaints.
A brief struggle then ensued for control of the litigation. Chimicles & Tikellis and
Wolf Hadlerstein moved to have the four cases consolidated with Lefkowitz as the named
plaintiff and themselves as co-lead counsel. Their motion claimed that their 14-page
In response to the Chimicles and Wolf Hadlerstein motion, the Rosenthal firm and
Rigrodsky & Long joined forces. They cross moved to have the four cases consolidated
with Heiser and Jurkawitz as named plaintiffs and themselves and Wolf Popper in
leadership roles. In a strange twist, the Rosenthal firm attacked not only Lefkowitz but
also its own client Mercier. After arguing that Heiser and Jurkawitz owned the most
shares, the cross motion stated: “Movants understand that plaintiff Mercier owns 43
shares of Revlon common stock and plaintiff Lefkowitz owns even less.” I would expect
the Rosenthal firm to know exactly how many shares Mercier held, having filed C.A. No.
4532 on his behalf. I take this comment as additional evidence of the care with which
this case has been litigated. None of the named plaintiffs in fact held a significant stake.
By letter dated May 29, 2009, Chancellor Chandler (to whom the case was then-
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I have the cross-motions to consolidate and appoint lead counsel in the
above cases. Because I am unpersuaded by either motion, I will not grant
any motion to consolidate or appoint lead counsel. I strongly urge you to
make further attempts to resolve this dispute in a manner that will enable
the cases to be prosecuted efficiently.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Within two weeks, the plaintiffs had agreed on a form of consolidation order establishing
a leadership structure.
Under the plaintiffs’ agreed-upon structure, everyone had a role. All of the law
firms who filed complaints as Delaware counsel or forwarding counsel were designated
as the Plaintiffs’ Committee of the Whole. Wolf Popper and Rigrodsky & Long were
appointed Co-Lead Counsel. The Rosenthal firm was appointed Delaware Liaison
Counsel. I will refer to these firms collectively as “Old Counsel.” The proposed form of
order designated the Heiser action as the operative consolidated action. The Rosenthal
firm represented to Chancellor Chandler that the leadership structure was agreed upon
Firms who are early filers are frequently early settlers, leading some wags in the
defense bar to label them “Pilgrims.” 4 This case would follow form.
4
Empirical evidence again supports this experiential insight. Professors Thompson and
Thomas found that lawsuits brought by their list of frequent filers “settle more quickly on
average than suits filed by other attorneys.” Thompson & Thomas, supra, at 186.
7
Although having a leadership structure in place gave Old Counsel the authority to
go forward and litigate the consolidated action, no one actually litigated anything. The
next item on the docket after the June 24, 2009, consolidation order is an August 14,
2009, letter advising the Court that the parties had entered into a memorandum of
understanding (“MOU”).
Old Counsel did not even bother to serve discovery. Back on May 4, 2009, the
Rosenthal firm served a document request in the Mercier action and another in the
Jurkowitz action. On May 19, Rigrodsky & Long served a document request in the
Heiser action. Chimicles & Tikellis never served a request in the Lefkowitz action.
When the cases were consolidated into the Heiser action, the Heiser complaint was
designated as the operative complaint and the Heiser document request was designated as
the operative document request. The defendants never responded to the complaint. They
also never responded to the document request. There is no indication that the plaintiffs
ever sought a response. They also did not serve interrogatories or any other discovery
requests. I regard the initial document requests as symbolic totems that the then-
competing plaintiffs’ firms could point to when jousting over control of the litigation.
None of the Old Counsel firms appears to have intended to use its request to get
documents.
Knowledgeable readers will by this time have recognized the opening steps in the
actions were filed with a brief flurry of activity until the leadership structure was settled.
8
Real litigation activity then ceased. With repeat players in place, events were set to
unfold on cue.
D. Along The Transactional Track, The Original Merger Morphs Into The
Exchange Offer.
The Cox Communications ritual involves two tracks. While Old Counsel did
nothing along the litigation track, MacAndrews & Forbes and the Special Committee
were moving forward along the transactional track. In May 2009, the Special Committee
hired Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP as its legal advisor and Barclays Capital Inc. as its
financial advisor. On May 6, 2009, the Special Committee was formally constituted by
resolution with a mandate to evaluate the Original Merger, negotiate its terms, and
During May 2009, the Special Committee and its advisors undertook these tasks.
Under the MacAndrews & Forbes proposal, the Class A stockholders would receive
shares of the unlisted Series A Preferred in exchange for their publicly traded shares. As
originally proposed, each share of the Series A Preferred would (a) carry a liquidation
preference of $3.74 per share, (b) pay quarterly cash dividends equal to 12.5% of the
liquidation preference per year, (c) be entitled to mandatory redemption four years after
issuance at a price equal to the liquidation preference plus accrued but unpaid dividends,
(d) be entitled a contingent payment if a sale of Revlon was consummated within certain
parameters not later than two years after the merger, (e) receive $1 if a sale of Revlon
was not consummated within two years, and (e) carry voting rights comparable to the
9
Class A Common but without the right to vote on any merger, combination or similar
Barclays expressed concern about the Original Proposal. On May 22, 2009, the Special
strong preference for an all-cash transaction. On May 26, MacAndrews & Forbes stood
firm on its proposed transaction structure, but offered to raise the dividend on the Series
A Preferred from 12.5% to 12.75% and increase the liquidation preference from $3.71 to
$4.75 per share. In return for these changes, the Series A Preferred no longer would
entitle the holder to a contingent payment in the event of a sale of the company or a $1.00
per share special dividend in the event no change of control was consummated within two
years.
On May 28, 2009, in a development one would expect to have piqued the interest
of a properly motivated plaintiffs’ lawyer, Barclays indicated that it would not be able to
render a fairness opinion for the Original Merger, either under the initial terms or as
improved on May 26. Later that day, the Special Committee advised MacAndrews &
Forbes that the Special Committee could not recommend either alternative.
Meanwhile, starting on May 27, 2009, Gibson Dunn and Wachtell Lipton Rosen &
Katz, counsel to MacAndrews & Forbes, began discussing how MacAndrews & Forbes
might proceed without the bothersome impediment of the Special Committee and its
uncooperative financial advisor. They hit upon the idea of Revlon launching a tender
offer in which Class A holders could exchange their shares for the same Series A
10
Preferred on which Barclays had been unable to opine and that the Special Committee
had been unable to recommend. I refer to this transaction as the “Exchange Offer.”
On June 1, 2009, Gibson Dunn informed the Special Committee of the new
proposal. Gibson Dunn advised the Special Committee that the Exchange Offer would be
presented for consideration by the entire Board, and not by the Special Committee. The
It was now up to the full Board to consider the Exchange Offer. The Outside
Directors decided they would like Gibson Dunn to continue representing them. They
decided that Barclays’ assistance was no longer needed. No other financial advisor was
retained. According to the Schedule TO, the Outside Directors believed they could not
Between June 10 and July 22, 2009, MacAndrews & Forbes and Revlon
negotiated the terms of the Exchange Offer. It was agreed that the Series A Preferred
would have the same terms contemplated for the Original Merger but would pay a
dividend of 12.75%. Other terms of the transaction were also negotiated, including
All of this happened before the leadership structure for the plaintiffs counsel was
determined by the consolidation order entered on June 24, 2009. Yet as I will describe
below, the memorandum of understanding and the parties’ filings loudly credit plaintiffs’
11
counsel with a meaningful role in restructuring the Original Merger as the Exchange
Offer.
On July 29, 2009, the Board authorized Revlon to proceed with the Exchange
Offer. The Board declined to make any recommendation to the Class A stockholders on
E. The Litigation Track Restarts, And The Parties Enter Into The MOU.
According to the Cox Communications ritual, once the corporation and the
controller reach unofficial agreement on the terms of a transaction, the plaintiffs are
brought in to bless the deal. The transaction thus provides the consideration for a
settlement, the payment of an attorneys’ fee award, and a broad, transaction-wide release
Here, the parties followed the traditional choreography, but with one
embellishment. Rather than signing off on exactly the same deal that Revlon and
MacAndrews & Forbes agreed to, Old Counsel obtained minor tweaks to the transaction.
Frequent filers like the firms in this case have perfected this technique as a basis for
after a merger agreement has been executed. A classic example of a transactional tweak
is to lower the termination fee, which is a contingent aspect of a transaction that only
becomes operative in the event of a topping bid. Lowering the termination fee and
deal that already has been exposed to the market for some time, by which point it is
12
Here, the settlement technology used in third-party deals was applied to the Cox
commencing in late July 2009, counsel for Revlon, the [Outside] Directors, and
MacAndrews & Forbes had discussions with counsel for parties in the Delaware actions
settling the litigation . . . .” The Schedule TO further recounts that “[c]ertain changes to
the structure of the transaction were agreed during daily discussions during the week of
The changes that Old Counsel obtained were three. First, the special dividend
payable to holders of the Series A Preferred in the event there was no change of control
within two years was increased from $1.00 to $1.50. Whether there would be a change of
Second, the change of control payment was modified so that at the end of the
second year, if a change in control had not taken place, the holders of Series A Preferred
could waive their entitlement to a special dividend of $1.50 per share and opt to convert
their Series A Preferred into a new Series B Preferred. The new Series B Preferred
would offer the contingent change in control payment for another year, with the amount
capped at $12.50 instead of $12. The original change of control payment was structured
to give the holders of the Series A Preferred their proportionate share of any amount over
approximately $240 million of equity value generated from a sale of Revlon during the
two years following the Exchange Offer, up to a total value of $617 million. The original
cap yielded total payments per share to the Series A Preferred of $12, inclusive of its
13
liquidation preference and any unpaid dividends. Old Counsel thus obtained an extra
slice of value if MacAndrews & Forbes signed off on a change of control during the third
year and if the equity value provided by the transaction exceeded $617 million. If both
events occurred, then the holders of Series A Preferred who opted to give up their special
dividend of $1.50 per share and exchange their Series A Preferred for Series B Preferred
at the end of year two could receive another 50 cents of their proportionate share of
Third, MacAndrews & Forbes agreed that if enough shares were tendered in the
Exchange Offer such that MacAndrews & Forbes could eliminate the remaining holders
The first two events were contingent and only would become operative based on
variables subject to MacAndrews & Forbes control. The third element is required by Cox
offer non-coercive. I am confident the defendants would have put it in anyway, just as
stockholder tender offer be conditioned upon tenders from a majority of the outstanding
unaffiliated shares. Old Counsel also obtained the right to review and comment on
On August 10, 2009, the changes were presented to the Outside Directors.
According to the Schedule TO, “none of the [Outside] Directors raised any objections to
14
proceeding with the Exchange Offer as previously approved and as revised to reflect the
discussions with the Plaintiffs’ Counsel.” There is no reference in the Schedule TO to the
Board actually approving the changes, which logically would have been required had the
Based on the changes, the parties agreed to the MOU that was submitted to the
Court on August 14, 2009. As is customary, the MOU was not merely a settlement
document, but also contained recitations of fact. In making arguments to me about how
this case should proceed, both Old Counsel and defense counsel have relied on the
exaggerate the contributions of Old Counsel. The MOU recites that “during the months
of June 2009 and July 2009, co-lead counsel for Plaintiffs in the Delaware Actions
(‘Delaware Lead Counsel’) had numerous discussions with counsel for Defendants
concerning the status of the Proposal and the negotiations thereon.” This is contrary to
the Schedule TO, which states that the discussion occurred “[f]rom time to time
[O]n July 22, 2009, Delaware Lead Counsel met with counsel for
Defendants concerning a potential resolution of the Actions, at which
meeting counsel discussed certain modifications to the Proposal being
negotiated with MacAndrews & Forbes[.]
[F]ollowing the July 22, 2009 meeting, Delaware Lead Counsel and
counsel for Defendants continued arms’-length negotiations concerning a
potential resolution of the Delaware Actions on the terms set forth herein,
certain of which terms reflect improvements in the terms agreed to with
15
MacAndrews & Forbes. In connection therewith, following the July 22,
2209 [sic.] meeting, Defendants provided drafts of the Exchange Offer, the
banker book of the Special Committee’s financial advisor, Barclays Capital
Inc. (“Barclays”), and a draft of the Schedule TO/13E-3.
The Schedule TO fails to mention these meetings. According to the Schedule TO, the
changes to the Exchange Offer were “agreed during daily discussions during the week of
In another case, inconsistencies of this nature might be overlooked. But here they
appear to be part of a pattern in which each of the MOU’s departures from the Schedule
TO serves to enhance the significance of the role played by Old Counsel. With Old
Counsel having bargained for the right to review and comment on the Schedule TO, and
with defense counsel’s transactional colleagues controlling the document, the parties
were well situated to ensure that both the MOU and the Schedule TO were accurate.
Leaving aside these inconsistencies, the recitals to the MOU indicate that Old
Counsel proposed terms for settling the litigation before receiving “drafts of the
Exchange Offer, the banker book of the Special Committee’s financial advisor, Barclays
Capital Inc. (‘Barclays’), and a draft of the Schedule TO/13E-3.” The docket establishes
that at the time, Old Counsel had done nothing whatsoever to prosecute the case. Old
Counsel admitted at oral argument that at the time of the July 22, 2009 meeting, when the
MOU suggests that Old Counsel proposed settlement terms, Old Counsel only had
16
Next, the first paragraph of the MOU identifies as the primary basis for the
settlement that “[i]n lieu of the transactions contemplated by the Proposal, Revlon
appears on this preliminary record that the shift to the Exchange Offer had nothing to do
with the litigation efforts of Old Counsel. It resulted from Barclays’ refusal to render a
the Original Merger. Yet in the very next paragraph of the MOU, MacAndrews & Forbes
“acknowledges that the pendency of the Delaware actions was a substantial contributing
factor in its decision to pursue the Revised Transaction in lieu of the transactions
these statements, which appear designed to lead the Court to believe that Old Counsel
played a “substantial” role in changes that seem to have had very little to do with Old
Counsel. This is another issue that I will resolve after confirmatory discovery.
Other aspects of the MOU raise further questions. Old Counsel claims to have
determined that “[the settlement] terms are fair, reasonable and adequate and in the best
apparently concluded that the terms of the Series A Preferred were fair, even though
Barclays declined to render a fairness opinion on the Series A Preferred when it appeared
as part the Original Merger, even though the Special Committee declined to recommend
the Original Merger, and even though the Revlon Board courageously declined to make a
17
The MOU also contains the following representations regarding actions taken by
Old Counsel prior to reaching their fairness determination and entering into the MOU:
I am quite interested in the particulars of the “investigation,” the consultation with the
financial advisor, and the basis for the fairness determination made by Old Counsel.
As noted, Old Counsel ostensibly determined, prior to entering into the MOU, that
the Exchange Offer offered a basis for settling the litigation that was “fair, reasonable and
adequate and in the best interests of Revlon’s stockholders as well as Revlon.” MOU at
5
The only reference to “additional discovery” appears in paragraph 4 of the MOU, which
states: “Defendants will provide (and request the cooperation of Barclays to prove) to counsel
for Plaintiffs in the Delaware Actions such reasonable discovery, including document discovery
and depositions, as is necessary for Plaintiffs in the Delaware Actions and their counsel to
confirm the fairness and reasonableness of the Settlement.”
18
Revlon commenced the Exchange Offer on August 10, 2009. The Exchange Offer
was subject to “a non-waivable condition that at least a majority of the Class A Common
Stock not beneficially owned by MacAndrews & Forbes . . . and its affiliates are tendered
and not withdrawn in the Exchange Offer.” The Schedule TO referred to this as the
“Minimum Condition.” On September 11, the original deadline for the Exchange Offer,
only 8,436,516 shares were tendered, representing approximately 41.7% of the Class A
Common not held by MacAndrews & Forbes. Revlon extended the offer until September
17. On that date, only 8,583,238 shares of Class A Common were tendered, still
representing only 41.7% of the unaffiliated shares. Revlon extended the offer again to
September 24. Old Counsel’s handiwork was thus twice rejected by a majority of the
class for whose benefit Old Counsel ostensibly negotiated. None of the original named
plaintiffs thought enough of the Exchange Offer to tender their Class A shares.
Yet so confident was Old Counsel in the fairness of the Exchange Offer that they
Schedule TO, during the week of September 14, 2009, Old Counsel began to discuss with
defense counsel revising the non-waivable Minimum Condition so that it would be met if
7,500,000 shares were tendered. With 8,583,238 shares already tendered, Old Counsel
was discussing the de facto waiver of a non-waivable condition designed to protect the
MOU by which Old Counsel later blessed the waiver, the discussions began “on or
around September 10,” not during the week of September 14. This is another minor
19
inconsistency where the MOU appears shaded to enhance the involvement and efforts of
Old Counsel.
And what was the basis for Old Counsel’s decision? On the present record, the
only insight comes from the amended MOU, which states that “counsel for defendants
approximately 3 million shares of Revlon Class A Common Stock were unable to hold
preferred stock generally, and therefore cannot hold the Series A Preferred Stock and
have not accepted the Exchange Offer.” Assuming 3 million shares were deducted from
the public float of 20,042,428, this would leave 17,021,214 unaffiliated Class A shares.
The 8,436,516 shares tendered still would not constitute a majority of the outstanding
minority shares who were able to tender. This fact is not discussed in the amended
MOU.
I am keenly interested in the factual basis for these stipulated averments. The absence of
any activity on the docket makes clear that Old Counsel did not use traditional discovery
20
On September 21, 2009, the Board preliminarily approved the concept of a de
& Forbes proposed to modify the Series A Preferred by increasing the liquidation
preference from $3.71 per share to $5.21 per share. Ostensibly because of this increase,
the Series A Preferred no longer would be entitled to the contingent payment of $1.50 per
share if there was no change of control within two years. Increasing this payment from
$1.00 to $1.50 was one of the three changes on which Old Counsel settled. MacAndrews
& Forbes also eliminated the Series B Preferred concept—a second change on which Old
Counsel settled—and provided simply that the Series A Preferred would receive up to
$12.50 per share in a qualifying change of control transaction in the third year after
issuance. On September 23, as part of the proposed package of changes, Revlon and
MacAndrews & Forbes agreed that the interest rate that MacAndrews & Forbes would
receive on the Senior Subordinated Term Loan would increase from 11% to 12% per
annum and the maturity date would be pushed out by four years.
On September 23, 2009, the Revlon Board signed off on the new terms. On the
Understanding (the “Amended MOU”), blessing all defendants with a broad, transaction-
wide release and keeping in place the settlement that would entitle Old Counsel to apply
for a fee. After a further extension, Revlon closed the Exchange Offer on October 8,
2009, with a total of 9,336,905 shares of Class A Common tendered—still fewer than
21
G. The New Actions Are Filed.
On October 29, 2009, Revlon announced third quarter financial results that
exceeded market expectations. I am told the results were consistent with the financial
projections disclosed in the Exchange Offer. Revlon’s stock price increased as a result.
On December 21, 2009, the law firm of Smith Katzenstein & Furlow LLP filed
two new representative actions challenging the Exchange Offer. Smith Katzenstein is a
Delaware firm that has litigated representative actions successfully. The firm is not,
however, one of the usual Delaware conduits for the traditional plaintiffs’ bar.
The first of the December 21, 2009, cases was styled Gutman v. Perelman, C.A.
No. 5158. Smith Katzenstein’s co-counsel was the Law Firm of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP of
New York, New York, a frequent filer of representative litigation in this Court. The 20-
page complaint asserted that the Exchange Offer was substantively unfair and that the
disclosure documents were false and misleading. Unlike the original four actions, which
Otherwise it was not significantly different from the initial four efforts.
The second of the December 21, 2009, cases was styled Corneck v. Perelman,
C.A. No. 5160. Smith Katzenstein’s co-counsel was Harwood Feffer LLP of New York,
New York. Harwood Feffer’s predecessor firms have appeared in numerous Delaware
cases, including another matter involving MacAndrews & Forbes’ affiliates. See In re
M&F Worldwide Corp. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 1164 (Del. Ch. 2002). The 9-page
Corneck complaint was the shortest of the six and resembled a hastily drafted first-day
filing.
22
With the two cases on file, the new plaintiffs moved to consolidate their actions, to
have the Trinko firm and Harwood Feffer appointed co-lead counsel, and to have Smith
Katzenstein appointed as Delaware liaison counsel. I will refer to these firms together as
“New Counsel.” In their motion, New Counsel referred to the four prior filed actions and
asserted that those cases were “consolidated on behalf of a class of Revlon Shareholders
who did not tender their common stock to Revlon.” New Counsel argued that “there is a
substantial conflict between the current positions of the tendering and non-tendering
stockholders.” New Counsel asserted that their consolidated action therefore should be
H. Old Counsel Defends Its Turf, While The Defendants Defend The Settlement.
2010, Old Counsel filed a 32-page amended complaint (the “Amended Complaint” or
“AC”). Because none of the named plaintiffs had found the terms of the Exchange Offer
sufficiently attractive to merit tendering their shares, Old Counsel rustled up a new
plaintiff, Earl Gallegos, who allegedly tendered. The Amended Complaint purported to
bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of a class of tendering stockholders
based on Revlon’s failure to disclose material information about its improved financial
condition prior to its third quarter results. The bulk of the Amended Complaint described
which Old Counsel certified for purposes of Court of Chancery Rule 11. The Amended
Complaint led off, for example, with the following claim: “After vigorous litigation on
23
behalf of plaintiffs and negotiations with the respective legal counsel of Revlon, the
action was entered into, subject to certain conditions, pursuant to which Revlon would
litigation was anything but vigorous. It was non-existent. And at least on this
preliminary record, the shift to the Exchange Offer had nothing to do with Old Counsel
Other aspects of the Amended Complaint similarly give me pause. The Amended
Complaint repeated verbatim recitals from the MOU that I have already questioned. See
AC ¶¶ 51-54, 67-72. In a particularly ironic foible, the Amended Complaint stated: “As
alleged herein, in recommending the Exchange Offer, the Company and its directors
failed to disclose the fact that Revlon would have a substantial profit for the third
Exchange Offer. It was Old Counsel who endorsed the Exchange Offer as “fair,
reasonable and adequate and in the best interests of Revlon’s stockholders as well as
Revlon.” MOU at 5.
After filing the Amended Complaint, Old Counsel moved to consolidate the two
new actions with the prior consolidated action and to confirm the existing leadership
structure. In their eagerness to protect their turf, Old Counsel resorted to hyperbole,
claiming that they “vigorously prosecuted the claims asserted in the Action,” caused
Revlon to shift to the Exchange Offer “[i]n lieu of the initial proposal,” and had been
24
“operating efficiently and to great effect for months.” According to them, “The
consistent quality of the pleadings, motions, and efforts of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in the
Action, and the vigor with which Plaintiffs’ Counsel has litigated the Action warrants the
Court’s approval of the organizational structure that originally was approved in the Order
of Consolidation entered on June 24, 2009.” I could quote more from the motion, but
Meanwhile defense counsel sprung into action to defend the MOU. I find this
unsurprising, because the contemplated settlement will grant all of the defendants a
global release for what appears to be a highly problematic transaction otherwise subject
to entire fairness review. Like Old Counsel, defense counsel made representations in
their papers that do not appear borne out by the record. Thus the defendants represented
that “[a]s part of the settlement, it was agreed that instead of the merger transaction
contemplated in the [Original Merger] Proposal, Revlon stockholders would have the
defendants reinforced this claim in the following paragraph by representing that the MOU
provided other benefits “[i]n addition to providing that the proposed transaction would
As I have now observed on several occasions, the suggestion that Old Counsel played a
causal role in the change in transactional structure does not appear well-founded, no
Faced with the competing motions, I instructed the parties to consolidate the cases
and to present the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement and the dispute over the
25
leadership structure. Rather than complying, Old Counsel and defense counsel submitted
a proposed stipulation and order contemplating that the defendants would withdraw their
motion to enforce the settlement and Old Counsel would proceed with confirmatory
discovery. I denied the order, reiterated my instruction that the parties submit a form of
order consolidating the proceeding, and directed that “[t]he parties will not proceed with
confirmatory discovery or the presentation of the settlement until the leadership structure
has been addressed.” The parties subsequently submitted a stipulated order consolidating
the actions and setting a briefing schedule for the dispute over the leadership structure,
which I approved.
March 10, Old Counsel moved to supplement the record with a second affidavit from Mr.
Kornreich. Although Old Counsel should have submitted any information in support of
their position prior to the March 5 hearing, I granted the motion. According to the
affidavit, Mr. Kornreich determined after reviewing the transcript of the March 5 hearing
that “[he] did not explain with sufficient clarity … the chronology of events” surrounding
the settlement. His supplemental affidavit stated that no settlement proposal was made
during the meeting with defense counsel on July 22, 2009. The supplemental affidavit
further stated that Old Counsel made their first settlement proposal on July 31, after
seeing the Barclay’s banker book and a draft of the Schedule TO, knowing that Barclay’s
declined to opine that the Series A Preferred was fair, and knowing that the Special
Committee declined to recommend the Original Merger. The MOU did not describe the
26
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
This Court has the power and obligation to revisit and alter the leadership structure
trial court has a continuing duty in a class action case to scrutinize the class attorney to
see that he or she is adequately protecting the interests of the class, and if at any time the
trial court realizes that class counsel should be disqualified, the court is required to take
appropriate action.” 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions §
Guerine v. J & W Investment, Inc., 544 F.2d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1977); accord In re
General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 (7th Cir. 1979);
Meek v. Gem Boat Serv., Inc., 620 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). “Just what
set of circumstances.” Guerine, 544 F.2d at 864. If adequate representation is not being
provided, the Court “is required to take appropriate action [and] must either enter orders
eliminating the problem or decertify the class.” In re N. Am. Acceptance Corp. Sec.
The sparse Court of Chancery case law on lead counsel selection strongly supports
a requirement that lead counsel provide adequate litigation in fact, not merely in
27
appearance. On those occasions when this Court has been forced to choose among
competing candidates for lead counsel, our decisions have stressed the importance of
Ɣ The “quality of the pleading that appears best able to represent the interests
of the shareholder class and derivative plaintiffs.” Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands
Serv. Co., 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2002); accord Wiehl
v. Eon Labs, 2005 WL 696764, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2005); TCW
Technology, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4.
Likewise, the weight given to the size of a plaintiffs’ holding is not used to generate a
formalistic ranking, but rather comes into play when a plaintiff owns a sufficient stake to
conducting the case. See Wiehl, 2005 WL 696764, at *3 (“If every difference in
economic stakes were given great weight, the court could simply add up the number of
shares and select the law firm with the largest absolute representation. This is not
Delaware law.”).
In this action, there has not been a prior class certification determination. Instead
consistent with this Court’s traditional practice, an unopposed consolidation order was
entered that implemented a leadership structure the plaintiffs’ firms negotiated among
28
depends on the Court’s confidence in the law firms and practitioners who appear
frequently before us. It depends in particular on our confidence in the Delaware lawyers
who build (and sometimes burn) reputational capital with the Court.
I find that Old Counsel has not provided adequate representation in this case.
After the initial skirmish over consolidation and lead counsel status, Old Counsel fell
blithely into Cox Communications mode. They literally did nothing. To put the best spin
on it, Old Counsel seemingly recognized that they filed their complaints prematurely and
that the consolidated case was subject to a motion to dismiss. I infer that the defendants
did not challenge the premature litigation because they wanted the case to stay alive to
But at some point, Old Counsel should have woken up and conducted a
meaningful assessment of their claims. This was a case in which the financial advisor to
the Special Committee refused to render a fairness opinion on the same Series A
Preferred that, with one change, would be offered in the Exchange Offer. This was a case
where the Special Committee declined to recommend the Original Merger. This was a
case where the Schedule TO indicated that counsel to MacAndrews & Forbes and
counsel to the Special Committee then cooked up the Exchange Offer as an alternative.
The Special Committee promptly declared its work done and disbanded. The full Board
Offer, and the Outside Directors believed that a fairness opinion could not be obtained.
29
This was not the type of voluntary, non-coercive tender offer that has provided a
mechanism for avoiding entire fairness review since In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders
Litigation, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001). MacAndrews & Forbes was not
offering its own shares or cash in a transaction that did not require any corporate action
by the Revlon Board. It was Revlon that made the Exchange Offer and offered the Series
the non-involvement of the target board from a Delaware corporate law perspective, id. at
*7-9, a distinction that does not apply in this context. A series of cases have noted that
corporate action by the target board takes a transaction out of the Siliconix framework.
See Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 195 n.30 (Del. Ch. 2000); In re Unocal Exploration
Corp. S’holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 338 n.26 (Del. Ch. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Glassman
v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001); Hartley v. Peapod, Inc., C.A.
No. 19025 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2002) (TRANSCRIPT); see generally 1 R. Franklin Balotti
& Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Delaware Law of Corporations & Business Organizations §
Moreover, if there were ever a test case for applying entire fairness review to a
tender offer, this one would fit the bill. Under a doctrinal framework outlined by Vice
Chancellor Strine, a Delaware court should treat a controller’s exchange offer as non-
coercive and not subject to entire fairness review if, among other things, it receives an
tender and there is a commitment by the controller to effect a prompt back-end merger.
30
See Cox Comm’ns, 879 A.2d at 624, 646; In re Pure Resources Inc. S’holders Litig., 808
A.2d 421, 444-46 (Del. Ch. 2002). The Exchange Offer did not receive a
declined to recommend the Exchange Offer to Revlon’s stockholders, and the Schedule
TO disclosed that the Outside Directors’ believed they could not obtain a fairness opinion
for the deal. The majority-of-the-minority condition would later disappear as well.
It does not appear that Old Counsel conducted a meaningful assessment of the
claims before offering to settle. During the hearing on the leadership structure, Old
Counsel could not recall conducting any legal research, although he later suggested that
available information going into the July 22 meeting. The MOU indicates that settlement
discussions began during that meeting. In his supplemental affidavit, Mr. Kornreich
avers that the first settlement proposal was made on July 31, after Old Counsel learned
about Barclay’s refusal to issue a fairness opinion and the Special Committee’s inability
to recommend the Original Merger. I have trouble deciding which scenario is worse:
Old Counsel making their settlement proposal based on no information, or Old Counsel
doing so after learning about the serious problems with the contemplated transaction.
Fate then bestowed upon Old Counsel an opportunity to recover. When the
defendants proposed the de facto waiver of the Minimum Condition, the Exchange Offer
had twice failed to obtain tenders from a majority of the class of stockholders whom Old
Counsel purported to represent. This was true even if Old Counsel accepted the
defendants’ representation that funds holding approximately three million shares (and
31
were the defendants rounding up?) could not tender because they could not hold preferred
stock. Rather than treating this as powerful evidence of the unfairness of the transaction
and using it as grounds to terminate the MOU and commence real litigation, Old Counsel
signed off on the Amended MOU and the de facto waiver of the non-waivable Minimum
Condition. When handed a chance to stand up for the class, Old Counsel lay down.
The docket establishes that Old Counsel has acted only when there was a dispute
over control of the case and Old Counsel’s path to a fee. Hence there was a flurry of
activity at the outset of the case. Hence Old Counsel reacted vigorously when New
Counsel emerged. This behavior and the overall conduct of the litigation fits with self-
Taking this conduct as a whole, I conclude that Old Counsel has not provided
Counsel. Cf. In re TD BankNorth S’holders Litig., 938 A.2d 654, 668 (Del. Ch. 2007)
viable claims before consenting to settlement); In re SS&C Tech. Inc. S’holders Litig.,
911 A.2d 816, 818 (Del. Ch. 2006) (declining to approve settlement where plaintiffs’
counsel entered into a disclosure-only settlement after a document demand was served
but before any discovery was taken; finding that plaintiffs’ counsel failed to establish that
“the potential claims belonging to the class were adequately or diligently investigated or
pursued”).
credibility with the Court. When New Counsel emerged and challenged Old Counsel’s
32
turf, Old Counsel responded with hyperbolic and self-aggrandizing descriptions of their
performance and achievements. I have been told repeatedly, in various permutations, that
Old Counsel “vigorously prosecuted the claims asserted in the Action” and engaged in
“arduous arm’s-length negotiations.” These assertions were supported by little more than
punctuation. It is true that they were repeated in Mr. Kornreich’s original affidavit. But
Old Counsel has not provided me with a single letter, email, or other contemporaneous
document that might suggest vigor, ardor, or any other form of vibrant activity.
Lest I be accused of fixating on adverbs, I note that the firms who comprise the
Old Counsel group have demonstrated their acute sensitivity to the criticality of accurate
modifiers. Thus the Rosenthal firm and a predecessor of the Abbey Spanier firm
successfully defeated a motion for summary judgment where a proxy statement disclosed
according to the plaintiffs’ firms, the directors had not acted “carefully.” In re Tele-
Communications, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2005 WL 3642727, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21,
2005). In another case, the Rosenthal firm argued successfully on appeal that they had
stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where a proxy statement disclosed that “[a]fter
there had been little or no deliberation. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 710-11 (Del.
2009). It does no disservice to Old Counsel to expect them, as fiduciaries for a class, to
adhere to the same standards that they expect from fiduciaries for a corporation. Old
Counsel has not hesitated to assert that disclosures of a similar tenor by corporate
fiduciaries were false and misleading. While I decline as-yet to use the adjectives “false”
33
and “misleading,” I regard Old Counsel’s representations as sufficiently inconsistent with
Equally important, I have serious concerns about the accuracy of the MOU,
including its factual recitations and assertions about the basis for the settlement. As I
have discussed in the Factual Background, the MOU’s recitations appear exaggerated (at
best). The errors are not distributed evenly, with some counting in favor Old Counsel
and the settlement and others counting against. All of the MOU’s questionable elements
expand the role of Old Counsel, the importance of the litigation, and the lawsuit’s role in
the decision to restructure the merger as an exchange offer. I am forced to wonder if this
connection was envisioned after the fact as a basis for the settlement. Cf. Off v. Ross,
2008 WL 5053448, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2008) (“[A]n event that is a fait accompli,
i.e., one that would have occurred notwithstanding the settlement, cannot serve as valid
consideration for the release of class claims.”); TD Banknorth, 938 A.2d at 669 (same);
In re Cellular Commc’ns Int’l, 752 A.2d 1185, 1186-87 (Del. Ch. 2000) (same).
settlement, the recitations from the MOU appear in the settlement stipulation and form
part of the record that the Court considers when evaluating the settlement. The
recitations also form the basis for the factual disclosures about the litigation that are
provided to stockholders in the notice of settlement. All parties—not just the plaintiffs—
sign off on the recitations, and their accuracy is critical to the integrity of the settlement
process. In advocating positions to me, Old Counsel and defense counsel have treated the
34
Given Old Counsel’s hyperbolic representations and my concerns about the MOU,
I cannot in good conscience permit Old Counsel to take charge of the confirmatory
discovery process and the presentation of the settlement. Were I generally cynical about
the motives and capabilities of the plaintiffs’ bar, I might well dismiss what happened
here as simply another example of business as usual. But I share our law’s premise that
See In re Fuqua Indus. S’holders Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 133 (Del. Ch. 1999). Stockholder
plaintiffs can and do achieve meaningful results. But it requires effort, something absent
There are sound policy reasons for this Court to police against shirking by
representative counsel. Traditional plaintiffs’ law firms who bring class and derivative
returns through attorneys’ fees. 6 That entrepreneurial litigators are the driving force
behind representative litigation does not itself carry positive or negative normative
6
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs’ Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986) (hereinafter, “Understanding the Plaintiffs’ Attorney”).
Professor Coffee has written extensively on representative actions, and his 1986 article is
foundational and oft-cited. For examples from the mountain of academic literature addressing
entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ counsel, see Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding The Class
Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev,
101 (2006); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 Va. L. Rev. 925 (1999); James D. Cox, The Social
Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 Brook. L. Rev. 3 (1999); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
35
content. Entrepreneurial litigators create case-specific benefits by obtaining monetary
over-enforcement, and agency costs. Whether the traditional plaintiffs’ bar generates net
a prudent strategy, and a plaintiffs' lawyer cannot expect to win every case. But a
large number of actions, investing relatively little time or energy in any single case, and
settling the cases early to minimize case-specific investment and maximize net profit.
See Understanding the Plaintiffs’ Attorney at 687-90, 711-12. Once a pattern for
settlement is established, entrepreneurial litigators have less reason to evaluate and screen
individual cases, because their maximal returns are generated through volume. See id. at
718. Scholars have observed that the litigation practices of the traditional plaintiffs’ bar
in this Court suggest the use of this business model. See Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J.
White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class
Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1797 (2004). The resulting system involves little real litigation
releases for defendants, and offers a good living for the traditional plaintiffs’ bar. In a
36
legal system that values representative litigation as a positive force, the business model of
actions on the pleadings, whether for compliance with Rule 23.1 or by invoking the
protections of the business judgment rule, helps limit the degree to which entrepreneurial
plaintiffs can litigate on a volume basis. Cox Comm’ns, 879 A.2d at 644. The limiting
function of the defendants’ ability to seek dismissal, however, operates imperfectly when
plaintiffs’ fees, and when defendants rationally prefer to do so. Brinckerhoff v. Texas
Eastern Products Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 384-86 (Del. Ch. 2010). Addressing this
problem requires other meaningful checks on the representative litigation process. One is
the historic willingness of this Court to reject inadequate settlements, including cases
where the plaintiffs have filed prematurely and have not contributed meaningfully, or
where the settlement appears to be little more than a vehicle for purchasing a transaction-
wide release through the payment of an attorneys’ fee. Another is the ability and
7
By contrast, a policymaker who believed that representative actions impose a net social
cost might regard rote quasi-litigation as the next best alternative to eliminating representative
litigation entirely. Delaware does not endorse the negative assessment of representative
litigation that would undergird such a view. See, e.g., Cox Comm’ns, 879 A.2d at 643 (noting
importance of representative litigation in protecting stockholders against fiduciary wrongdoing);
Fuqua, 752 A.2d at 133 (noting that as a result of private enforcement, “corporations are
safeguarded from fiduciary breaches and shareholders thereby benefit”); Bird v. Lida, 681 A.2d
399, 403 (Del. Ch. 1996) (Allen, C.) (providing economic analysis of benefits to corporation and
stockholders that are generated by the monitoring and deterrence provided by representative
litigation).
37
shirking, who appear to be doing little more than prematurely harvesting a case as part of
their overall inventory, or who otherwise are not providing adequate representation.
All else equal, the threat of replacement should cause representative counsel to
invest more significantly in individual cases, which in turn should lead representative
counsel to analyze cases to identify actions whose potential merit justifies the investment.
The threat of mid-case replacement thus should inhibit shirking. Other consequences,
both foreseeable and unforeseeable, are certainly possible. Perhaps greater judicial
oversight of frequent filers will accelerate their efforts to populate their portfolios by
filing in other jurisdictions. See Anywhere But Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm
and Suggests Some Solutions, M&A J., May 2007, at 17. If they do, and if boards of
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and
value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with
8
8 Del. C. § 102(b)(1) (authorizing certificate to contain “[a]ny provision for the
management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any
provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors,
and the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders . . ., if such provisions are not contrary to
the laws of this State.”); see Elf Atochem N. Am. Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999)
(approving provision in LLC agreement requiring that all intra-entity disputes be resolved
exclusively by arbitration or court proceedings in California); Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of
Shipping, Inc., 888 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2006) (enforcing provision in LLC agreement
requiring that all intra-entity disputes be resolved by arbitration); Sara Lewis, Note,
Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery”
Solution, 14 Stanford J. L. Bus. & Fin. 199 (2008) (analyzing validity of Delaware forum
selection provision for intra-entity disputes); see also Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition,
Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 57, 133-35
(2009) (discussing potential availability of forum selection provision for intra-corporate
disputes). Both Stevelman and Lewis note that one public company, NetSuite, Inc., has a
Delaware forum selection provision in its charter. See Lewis, supra, at 202; Stevelman, supra, at
38
while in the short run policing frequent filers may cost some members of the bar
financially, in the long run it enhances the legitimacy of our State and its law not to
This is a case in which multiple factors cause me to conclude that Old Counsel has
Rigrodsky & Long from their positions as Co-Lead Counsel and the Rosenthal firm from
its position as Delaware Liaison Counsel. They will remain members of the Plaintiffs’
determine who should take over the case. The logical candidate is New Counsel.
This potential solution has difficulties of its own. First, New Counsel did not ask
to take over the litigation. They only sought to represent a class of stockholders who
exchanged their Class A Common for Series A Preferred. During the March 5 hearing, I
asked New Counsel if they were willing to represent the same class as Old Counsel for
133 n.294. Lewis notes that Oracle Corporation has a Delaware forum selection provision for
derivative actions in its bylaws. See Lewis, supra, at 202-03. As Elf Atochem and Douzinas
demonstrate, a provision selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes need not choose
the Delaware courts. For example, business principals who all live in the same distant locale
might form a Delaware entity to gain the many benefits conferred by Delaware law, yet prefer to
litigate intra-entity disputes in their local jurisdiction. I can envision that the Delaware courts
would retain some measure of inherent residual authority so that entities created under the
authority of Delaware law could not wholly exempt themselves from Delaware oversight. The
issues implicated by an exclusive forum selection provision must await resolution in an
appropriate case.
39
purposes of conducting confirmatory discovery and determining whether to proceed with
But although this solved one difficulty, New Counsel identified another. As New
Counsel pointed out, their clients tendered their Class A shares in the Exchange Offer and
now hold Series A Preferred. New Counsel does not represent a holder of Class A
shares. New Counsel expressed concern that they could not replace Old Counsel because
Although I commend New Counsel for making this disclosure and raising the
concern, I do not view the holdings of New Counsel’s clients as an impediment to lead
counsel status. The next step in this proceeding will be to conduct confirmatory
discovery as contemplated by the MOU and Amended MOU. That agreement purports to
bind and release all claims held by class consisting of the following:
MOU at 9-10. New Counsel’s named plaintiffs were “stockholders … during the period
from the close of business on April 20, 2009, through the consummation of the Exchange
Offer.” They are thus part of the class and purportedly are bound by the MOU and
Amended MOU. Because the claims of New Counsel’s named plaintiffs will be
foreclosed by the settlement contemplated by the MOU and Amended MOU, New
40
Counsel can appropriately conduct confirmatory discovery, evaluate the fairness of the
One of the disputed issues briefed by Old and New Counsel was whether there is a
conflict of interest between continuing Class A holders and Series A Preferred holders.
For purposes of the settlement proceedings, I do not believe there is a conflict that would
preclude New Counsel from serving as lead counsel. The Delaware Supreme Court has
held that in litigation challenging a corporate transaction, this Court has discretion to
certify a class that includes holders, buyers and sellers. In re Philadelphia Stock
Exchange, Inc., 945 A.2d 1123, 1141 (Del. 2008). In the Philadelphia Stock Exchange
case, the consideration in the settlement was fixed. Vice Chancellor Noble approved the
fairness of the settlement as a whole, postponing until later any potential allocation of
settlement consideration among competing class members. Id. The Supreme Court
approved this approach, noting that (i) conflicts might never arise, (ii) any conflicts that
did arise could be dealt with later through sub-classes, and (iii) all that remained in the
In its present posture, this case resembles Philadelphia Stock Exchange. The
settlement involves changes to the Exchange Offer and other non-monetary consideration
that already have been provided to the class. Thus if I approve the settlement, no
conflicts will arise, and all that remains will be settlement implementation. If, by
contrast, I disapprove the settlement, then I can determine at that point on a fuller record
41
I therefore find that New Counsel can take over as lead counsel in the case. I will
not, however, adopt the leadership structure that New Counsel proposed, in which the
Harwood Feffer firm and the Trinko firm would serve as co-lead counsel with Smith
Katzenstein as Delaware liaison counsel. The qualifications and modus operandi of the
Harwood Feffer and Trinko firms closely resemble those of Old Counsel. As relatively
small firms managing a portfolio of representative litigation, the Harwood Feffer and
Trinko firms have similar economic incentives to settle early to maximize the net benefit
to themselves, rather than expending resources to press litigation further for the benefit of
The Smith Katzenstein firm, by contrast, is a Delaware law firm that is well-
known to the Court. The firm frequently represents paying clients and does not appear to
litigate plaintiffs’ cases using a portfolio strategy. The members of that firm, including
the lead lawyer in this case, have built up reputational capital with the Court and have
designate Smith Katzenstein, the Harwood Feffer firm, and the Trinko firm as co-lead
counsel. In the event the co-lead firms disagree about any aspect of the litigation,
including the allocation of any potential fee award, the Smith Katzenstein firm will have
decision-making authority.
evaluate the settlement, and (if appropriate) present the settlement to the Court. Because
42
Old Counsel did not take any discovery, New Counsel will need to conduct relatively
As part of the confirmatory discovery process, New Counsel will explore the
conduct of the negotiations that led to the MOU and Amended MOU. See General
Motors, 594 F.2d at 1124 (“We think that the conduct of the negotiations was relevant to
the fairness of the settlement and that the trial court’s refusal to permit discovery or
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc., 2007 WL 2982238, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2007)
(noting that objectors generally may take discovery into “how negotiations were initiated,
how they proceeded, when various aspects of the settlement were reached” and “the
competence of the settlement (the timing of the settlement in the context of the litigation,
the soundness of the judgment to settle the case)”). At a minimum, New Counsel should
explore the following issues using traditional written discovery methods and through
depositions:
Ɣ The degree of factual and legal investigation conducted by Old Counsel prior to
filing the litigation, commencing settlement discussions, agreeing to the MOU,
and agreeing to the Amended MOU;
Ɣ The number of hours expended by Old Counsel during the various phases of the
case;
Ɣ The course of the negotiations giving rise to the MOU and Amended MOU;
Ɣ The accuracy of the factual recitals and causal stipulations in the MOU and the
Amended MOU;
Ɣ The identity and qualifications of Old Counsel’s financial advisor, the terms of the
business arrangement with the financial advisor, the amount and nature of the
work performed by the financial advisor in this matter and the timing of
43
compensation to the financial advisor, and the substance of the financial advisor’s
views, and
Ɣ The basis for Old Counsel’s determination that the settlement was fair and
adequate.
New Counsel of course remains free to explore whatever additional topics New Counsel
The members of the Plaintiffs’ Committee of the Whole will cooperate with New
Counsel during the confirmatory discovery process. I expect the firms to respond to
written discovery and notices of deposition. Any discovery disputes should be brought to
my attention promptly.
circumstances as conferring a benefit on Revlon and the putative class. New Counsel
should keep careful track of their time and expenses so that I may evaluate the
reasonableness of any fee application they wish to make. There also may be cause to
shift fees, particularly if it turns out that statements in the MOU were false. See SS&C
Tech., 948 A.2d at 1151-52 (requiring counsel to bear fees based on, among other things,
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Wolf Popper and Rigrodsky & Long are no longer Co-
Lead Counsel. The Rosenthal firm is no longer Delaware Liaison Counsel. The Smith
Katzenstein firm, Harwood Feffer, and the Trinko firm are added to the Plaintiffs’
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