ELECTRONICALLY FILED

3/22/2010 3:35 PM
CV-2010-000015.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MACON COUNTY, ALABAMA
DAVID LOVE, JR., CLERK
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MACON COUNTY, ALABAMA

E. PAUL JONES, et al., )

ex rel. THE STATE OF ALABAMA, )
)
Petitioners, )
)
v. ) Case No.: CV-2010-15
)
JOHN M. TYSON, JR., )
)
Respondent. )

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This matter came before the Court on Petitioner’s Verified Complaint for Writ of Quo

Warranto, Temporary Restraining Order, Declaratory Judgment, and Preliminary and Permanent

Injunction ("Verified Complaint"). A hearing was conducted on the Petitioners' request for a

preliminary injunction on March 19, 2010, which was continued on March 22, 2010.

At issue in this case is whether John M. Tyson, Jr., the sitting District Attorney for

Mobile County, has exceeded his authority and usurped or intruded into the office and the role of

E. Paul Jones, the elected and sitting District Attorney for Macon County. Petitioners

specifically requested relief to (i) prevent Mr. Tyson from serving as the "Commander" of the

Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling ("Task Force"); and (ii) prevent Mr. Tyson and Task

Force agents under his direction and control from usurping the authority and prosecutorial

discretion vested in the Sheriff and District Attorney for Macon County and the Attorney

General for the State of Alabama. This Verified Complaint does not contain any request that this

Court make a determination whether electronic bingo is legal in Macon County or whether any

particular machines are "slot machines." This action presents the Court with a dispute over the

scope of authority of law enforcement officials which may well implicate the constitutional
rights of Macon County residents, as well as the statutory division of duties among members of

Alabama's executive branch.

A party seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden of demonstrating the

following:(1) that without the injunction the plaintiff would suffer immediate and irreparable

injury; (2) that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that the plaintiff has at least a

reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of his case; and (4) that the hardship

imposed on the defendant by the injunction would not unreasonably outweigh the benefit

accruing to the plaintiff.

A. Reasonable Chance of Success on the Ultimate Merits of Petitioners’ Case

While the Petitioners are not required to prove their case at a hearing on a request for

preliminary injunction, the Court must determine whether the Petitioners have established a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their Verified Complaint, and their entitlement

to a writ of quo warranto under Alabama Code Section 6-6-591 . First, Executive Order No. 44

states, in pertinent part, that the Task Force:

shall serve as a resource for local prosecutors and law enforcement officials
who request assistance in the investigation and prosecution of gambling-related
crimes. The Task Force may provide technical assistance, investigative support,
law enforcement personnel, and any other assistance requested by local
authorities reasonably necessary to enforce Alabama’s anti-gambling laws.

Executive Order No. 44, Dec. 29, 2008 (emphasis added).

Both the affidavit and live testimony establishes that neither Jones nor Warren have

requested Mr. Tyson's assistance in conducting any investigation or criminal prosecution. See

Affidavits of District Attorney Jones and Sheriff Warren which were submitted by Petitioners.

The evidence contained in these affidavits has not been controverted. Mr. Tyson also confirmed
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that neither District Attorney Jones nor Sheriff Warren requested his assistance or that of the

Task Force.1

Next, while not ruling on the ultimate issue at this time, based upon a review of

Executive Order No. 44, Amendment No. 1 to Executive Order No. 44, construction of the

statutes referenced therein, and the testimony presented, it does not appear that Mr. Tyson, as the

active district attorney of Mobile County, is authorized to conduct any investigations in Macon

County. This Court may properly enjoin a state official when that official is acting beyond the

scope of his authority or acting illegally, in bad faith or fraudulently or under a mistaken

interpretation of the law.

According to the testimony of Mr. Tyson, Executive Order No. 44 and its Amendment

gave Riley the authority to appoint any district attorney or assistant district attorney to the Task

Force pursuant to the provisions of Alabama Code Section 12-17-184(10), which permits such

district attorney to:

go to any place in the State of Alabama and prosecute any case or

cases, or work with any grand jury, when called upon to do so by
the Attorney General or the Governor of the State of Alabama, and
to attend sessions of courts and transact all of the duties of the
district attorney in the courts whenever called upon by the
Attorney General or the Governor to do so.

Ala. Code §12-17-184(10)(emphasis added).

However, section 12-17-184(10) does not give a district attorney elected to serve Mobile

County the authority to initiate criminal investigations in Macon County. Section 12-17-184(10)

must also be read in pari materia with Ala. Code §12-17-184(11) as he is acting outside of

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The evidence also shows that Jones and Warren have filed a separate declaratory judgment action in which the
legality of electronic bingo operations in Macon County pursuant to Constitutional Amendment 744 is squarely in
issue as part of their ongoing investigations.
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Mobile County and exerting control over officers and agencies outside of his jurisdiction. Ala.

Code §12-17-184(11) states:

All district attorneys and all full-time assistant district attorneys

shall devote their entire time to the discharge of the duties of
their respective offices, and each and every one of the officers are
prohibited from practicing law, directly or indirectly, in any court
of this state or of the United States, or in any other manner or form
whatsoever, except in the discharge of the official duties of their
offices.

Ala. Code §12-17-184(11)(emphasis added).

Evidence submitted during the hearing establish that District Attorney Jones has

exercised his prosecutorial discretion to determine the best course of action for the citizens of

Macon County in the investigation and prosecution of any case related to electronic bingo in

Macon County. There has been no evidence that District Attorney Jones has exercised his

discretion in bad faith or for corrupt motives. Mr. Tyson testified that the reason the Task Force

has entered Macon County is because Mr. Tyson and Governor Riley believe that District

Attorney Jones has failed or refused to prosecute electronic bingo cases.

While Governor Riley and Mr. Tyson may not agree with the investigatory or

prosecutorial discretion District Attorney Jones has exercised, neither Mr. Tyson nor Governor

Riley have the authority to substitute their judgment for the judgment of District Attorney Jones.

The office of District Attorney, like the Governor and the Attorney General, is a constitutional

office. Along with the Attorney General, it is the obligation of the District Attorney to expose

and prosecute crimes. "The district attorney is a public officer representing the sovereign power

of the people and has been defined as the foremost representative of the executive branch of

government in the enforcement of the criminal law in his county." State v. Anderson, 8 So.3d

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1033, 1036 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008). To allow Mr. Tyson and the Task Force to enter Macon

County for the purpose of investigating a matter which is the subject of an ongoing investigation

by the duly elected district attorney for the Fifth Judicial Circuit would constitute an invasion

and interference with said ongoing investigation and would result in constitutional chaos.

The District Attorney is vested with broad prosecutorial discretion to perform his duties

of exposing and prosecuting crimes. Indeed, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what

charge to file or bring before a grand jury, rests entirely in [the District Attorney's] discretion. In

other words, the duty to prosecute is not absolute, but qualified, requiring of the prosecuting

attorney only the exercise of a sound discretion, which permits him to refrain from prosecuting

whenever he, in good faith and without corrupt motives or influences, thinks that a prosecution

would not serve the best interests of the state, or that, under the circumstances, a conviction

could not be had, or that the guilt of the accused is doubtful or not capable of adequate proof.

According to the evidence presented, District Attorney Jones has determined what he

considers to be the best way to proceed in this matter and his discretion is not subject to second-

guessing by Mr. Tyson or Governor Riley. The statutory authority to direct and control litigation

when representing the State has been exclusively delegated to Alabama Attorney General -- not

the Governor or a special prosecutor: “[a]ll litigation concerning the interest of the state, or any

department of the state, shall be under the direction and control of the Attorney General. . . .”

Ala. Code § 36-15-21. In fact, the authority to superintend litigation is left in the sole discretion

of the Attorney General because the Attorney General is the chief law officer of the State.

Alabama Code § 36-15-14 provides that the Attorney General -- not the Governor or a special

prosecutor appointed by him -- “may at any time he sees proper, either before or after indictment,

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superintend and direct the prosecution of any criminal case in any of the courts of this state.”

Mr. Tyson testified that he and the Governor had no confidence that District Attorney

Jones would enforce the rule of law in Macon County and that District Attorney Jones was

refusing to act. While no evidence was presented to support the contention that District Attorney

Jones has refused to perform the duties of his office, Alabama Code §12-17-186(a) provides the

mechanism for when a district attorney refuses to act:

The presiding judge of the circuit court, the district court or the
municipal court, when the district attorney or assistant district
attorney regularly required by law to prosecute criminal cases in
such court is absent, or connected with the party against whom it is
his duty to appear . . . or when there is a vacancy in the office from
any cause, or when the district attorney refuses to act, may appoint
a competent attorney to act in such district attorney’s place. . .

Ala. Code §12-17-186(a). In fact evidence presented which established that District Attorney

Jones has an ongoing investigation into these matters. Under the law, then, if District Attorney

Jones had failed to perform the duties of his office, the proper course of action would have been

to have a judge appoint an attorney to act in his place. The Code does not permit Mr. Tyson to

assume District Attorney Jones' duties even if he failed to perform them, and it certainly does not

authorize Tyson to usurp them because he and the Governor do not agree with the manner in

which Jones has chosen to conduct his investigation and litigation strategy. Therefore,

Petitioners have met their burden at the preliminary injunction stage of establishing a reasonable

chance of success on the ultimate merits of their case.

B. No Adequate Remedy at Law and Without the Injunction the Petitioners Would

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 Suffer Immediate and Irreparable Injury.

The Petitioners do not have an adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable harm if

the preliminary injunction is not issued. Under Alabama law, if Jones is rendered unable to

perform the official duties and obligations of his position as District Attorney for Macon County

because Mr. Tyson acts outside his powers or otherwise exceeds his authority, irreparable harm

will have been caused.

Petitioners' irreparable injury cannot be adequately compensated for by damages at law.

Indeed, the Alabama Supreme Court has found that where a petitioner establishes that he or she

will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue, the petitioner does not have an

adequate remedy at law.

C. The Hardship Imposed On The Defendant By The Injunction Would Not

Unreasonably Outweigh The Benefit Accruing To The Plaintiff

Based upon the evidence presented, the scales are weighted heavily on the side of

Petitioners. Mr. Tyson is not harmed by an order precluding him from taking unlawful actions,

while the residents of Macon County will be deprived of constitutional rights and the services of

their duly-elected elected law enforcement officials if the injunction does not issue. The

executive branch had notice of the nature of the machines which underlay the investigation at

issue in this case five years ago. Therefore, the executive branch cannot claim that it is somehow

suffering immediate harm.

It cannot be disputed that the public interest is served when public officials act within

their authority and follow the rule of law. It is just as evident that it would be contrary to the

public interest if Mr. Tyson, who was not elected by the residents of Macon County to serve as

their district attorney, is able to overrule the prosecutorial discretion being exercised by Jones

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and to interfere with the lawful investigations being conducted by Jones and Warren. Mr.

Tyson’s actions are in direct conflict with Jones’s express instructions not to act in Macon

County. Moreover, Mr. Tyson presented no evidence establishing that he is acting at the behest

of the Attorney General in this matter.

The injunctive relief is narrowly tailored to preserve the status quo by precluding Mr.

Tyson and those acting on his behalf or in concert with him from usurping the role of the District

Attorney for Macon County, without restricting the ability of other law enforcement officials

from performing their authorized duties, until the Court has ruled on the important issues raised

in this action.

Accordingly, after having heard testimony from Mr. Tyson, heard arguments from

counsel, reviewed the affidavits and briefs submitted by the parties and considered the evidence

presented, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Court specifically finds that without the entry of an injunction, Petitioners

will suffer immediate and irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law and that

the requirements for granting a preliminary injunction have been established by Petitioners: (a)

Petitioners have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims; (b) Mr. Tyson's

usurpation of the powers vested in Jones, as the District Attorney of Macon County, constitutes

irreparable injury to Petitioners; (c) the harm Petitioners will suffer if the preliminary injunction

is not granted far outweighs any harm Mr. Tyson might possibly suffer; and (d) Petititioners have

no adequate remedy at law. In addition, the Court finds that the granting of the preliminary

injunction furthers the public interest by ensuring that public officials act within their authority

and follow the rule of law.

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 2. The Court finds that a preliminary injunction is necessary in the instant case to

prevent Mr. Tyson from taking actions for which he lacks authority; from his efforts to usurp the

authority and prosecutorial discretion vested in Jones, the duly-elected and qualified District

Attorney for Macon County; and from efforts to usurp the authority of the Sheriff of Macon

County, or the Attorney General of the State of Alabama.

3. The Court finds that Mr. Tyson has not initiated any criminal proceedings in

Macon County pursuant to Alabama Code 1975 § 15-3-7 and Rule 2.1 of the Alabama Rules of

Criminal Procedure, and that this Order does not enjoin any valid or authorized criminal

proceedings.

4. Effective at 3:30 p.m. on the 22nd day of March, 2010, and until further Order of

this Court:

Respondent, his agents, servants, employees, attorneys, members of the Governor's Task

Force on Illegal Gambling established pursuant to Executive Order No. 44 ("Task Force"), and

anyone acting in concert with any of the foregoing, shall not take any actions in or directed to

Macon County on behalf of the Task Force, pursuant to Executive Order No. 44, as amended, or

in furtherance of the objectives of Executive Order No. 44, as amended, absent a specific request

for such actions from the duly-elected District Attorney or Sheriff for Macon County or a

specific directive from the Attorney General of the State of Alabama.

5. This Order does not prohibit Respondent from defending himself in this action or

any other action filed against him in the courts in and for Macon County.

6. This Order does not prohibit agents of the Alabama Beverage Control Board or

agents of the Department of Public Safety from conducting authorized law enforcement

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operations (i) that are not performed in concert with, in connection with, or at the request or

direction of Mr. Tyson or the Task Force in Macon County; or (ii) that do not otherwise impinge

upon or interfere with the investigations into electronic bingo in Macon County being undertaken

by Jones and Warren, or that are contrary to the prosecutorial discretion exercised by Jones.

7. Respondent is directed to provide a copy of this Order to his agents, servants,

employees, attorneys, and members of the Task Force and anyone acting in concert with any of

the foregoing,

8. The security previously posted by Petitioners in the amount of $10,000 shall

remain posted with the Clerk of the Court as security for this injunction. The Court also takes

notice that the Petitioners filed security for costs at the time of the filing of the instant action and

previously posted security for costs shall remain posted with the Clerk of the Court.

DONE AND ORDERED this the 22nd day of March, 2010, at 3:30 p.m.

/s/ Tom F. Young, Jr.

TOM F. YOUNG, JR.
Circuit Judge – 5th Judicial Circuit of Alabama

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