EMBODIED COGNITION

5/2/12
Dr Pelham Carter

Where is my mind?
Cognitive Psychology is well known for theories and

models but they dont often seem situated anywhere.

Abstract models sometimes linked to brief neurological

processes.
Very little about the interaction between the body and the

mind at least in how cognition is embodied.

Aims
To consider:
- The impact of the body/physiology on cognitive processes

and architecture.
- Examples of the interaction between the two.

- The difference between embodied cognition and

distributed cognition. Is there any over lap?

Traditionally Separate
Cognitive processes quite abstract
Modelled often as Information Processing stages.
Traditionally seen as quite indirect (revealed through

behaviour) and as an internal process.

Little location or interaction.

 Atkinson & Schiffrin (1968)

Traditionally Separate
Gradual changes as biological evidence was added to the

mix.
Braining imaging allowed for neural correlates to be

connected to behaviour and processes.

Not just abstract internal processes processes now in a

specific location and level of activation.

 Kensinger & Schacter (2005)

Computer Metaphor
Still an information processing approach but with software

and hardware.
Hardware = the biological system, the brain

Software = the information processing stages, the models

More than that

Were not just a central processor.
Were not just an input/output
What we can and cant do is determined by our physiology
For years Cognitive Psychology (most in fact) has ignored the fact

that our behaviour is mediated by our physical characteristics.

These could feed backwards even further. If behaviour is constrained

by the body are cognitive processes and architecture.

Influence of emotional and physiological state.
We have more resources, and influences, than just the brain.

Embodied
Similar in style to the Whorfian Hypothesis (interaction

between thoughts and language).

Interaction between emotional state and cognition
Between physiological state and cognition

Between context/environment and cognition

Between anatomy and cognition.

Interaction of self, environment and mind

Our action is directed and has a purpose (Gibson 1966;

Tolman, 1947).
The body is more than just something for moving your

brain around.
The body is a (Wilson & Foglia, 2011):

- Constrainer
- Distributor
- Regulator

Use and Understanding of Metaphor

Lakoff & Johnson (1980) Metaphors we live by.

Commonality to some metaphors and language used that

stems from our physical involvement and characteristics.
To move forward is good, best foot forward, retrace

steps, to put something behind you, head and shoulders

above, etc.
Dichotomies (Up/Down, Forward/Backward)

Language
Glenbergss Indexical Hypothesis (Glenberg et al, 2009)

understanding of language established through relevant action

schemas.
Activation of the schemas might active the same underlying

neural correlates to the actual behaviour (links to mirror

neurons).
McNeil (1992) Gesturing can aid language processing and

communication.
Not just a case of pointing or demonstrating but processing.

Quicker to process.

Thought & Categorization

Slepian et al (2011) Gender perception can be

influenced by tactile feedback. Participants had to

squeeze a ball whilst judging faces.
Soft ball led to more judgements of neutral faces as being
female.
Miles et al (2010) the direction in which we sway is

determined by whether we are thinking ahead or behind

temporally.
Thought there is some debate over this(see link)

Morality and Cleanliness

Appears to be a connection between physical cleanliness and

moral dirtiness.

Lee & Schwarz (2010) participants had to lie via voicemail or

email, and then later rated various products.

Rated products that would cleanse the lying area more highly
and would pay more for them (mouthwash vs. hand sanitizer)
Zhong & Liljenquist (2006) had participants recall a

transgression. One group then offered a hand wipe, and the

other group was not.
Group with the hand wipe reported less guilt over past
transgression and were less likely to volunteer for further
studies.

Action
Gibsonian (1966) direct perception. We perceive not just

for the sake of it but to act.

Our actions are then guided, determined and constrained

by the actions possible, expected and needed.

Affordances when we perceive and object we can

perceive its uses directly.

What those uses are can be context driven.

Mirror System
Embodied Cognition can be demonstrated in how we use

mirroring to aid understanding.

Replicating the actions of another allows us to understand

intent and state (creating resonance).

If we see someone smile we can mimic the physical

action and in doing so are quicker to recognise the

expression and the implications.

Blocking Example
Niendthal et al (2001)
Oberman et al (2007)
Blocked mimicry using a pen biting, pen balancing or gum

chewing task.
This blocked facial mimicry as the facial muscles were
tasked.
Shown pictures or video of a face that transitioned from
one emotion to another (happy -> sad, sad-> happy).
Blocking led to slower recognition of related emotional
states, especially happiness which is usually the most
involved in regards to the facial muscles.

Mirror Neurons
Seems to be a neurological correlate. Certain neurones

involved in actions are activated by observing said action.

If you see someone reached for an item a similar level of

activation for the corresponding motor areas might be found

within your own brain.
Di Pellegrino et al (1992) found mirrored activity in the F5 area

in macaque monkeys.
Gallese et al (1996) found evidence to suggest this internal
activity of the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) is somatotopically
distributed.
For human understanding/mirroring of action Brodmann area
44 seems to be involved (Carr et al, 2003)

Theory of Mind
Theory of mind (Frith & Happe, 1995; Baron-Cohen,

1995) actually might be down to mirror neuron

involvement.

Understanding of action rather than an abstract cognitive

construct of intended behaviour.

If there is a fault or block with the resonance or mirror

neuron involvement for certain social actions and

behaviours then the understanding of them will be limited.
Broken Mirror theory of Autism (Ramachandran &

Oberman, 2006)

Off loaded into environment

Books, Computers, calculators, even our fingers to an

extent
This is arguably distributed cognition rather than purely

embodied cognition.
What we are likely to use in the environment is

determined by physiological need and ease, and is often

an extension of a normal physiological/embodied ability.
See early tool use

What about distributed cognition?

Similar in that it refers to cognition being more than just an

abstract internal process.

We can distribute cognitive load or processes throughout the

environment to help.
We use calculators, we write notes, we use computers to save

files, we visualise and use markers to help play games or solve

problems
Can see an interaction between distribution and embodied.
Using your fingers to count is a distribution using a base 10

system for the count is a potentially an influence of embodied

cognition (though this is debatable).

Body based when offline

Even without overt behaviour our cognition can remain

embodied (Wilson, 2002).

Mental and Spatial Imagery when remembering

locations and objects we tend to do so from an egocentric

point of view (Shelton & McNamara, 2007; Tlauka et al,
2011).
Episodic memory tend to be a reliving of an event from

a first person perspective.

Phantom Limb
Lets consider a working example Phantom Limb
When limbs are amputated or lost due to trauma some people

still feel and experience the limb as if it is still there (Sherman

et al, 1984).

Often this phantom of the limb can be uncomfortable (can itch)

or painful.
The limb can become paralyzed.
http://www.ted.com/talks/vilayanur_ramachandran_on_your_mi

nd.html (from 9:30 mark)

Phantom Limb
Interaction here between the experience of the limb and

the visual perception.

Vision provides feedback about the phantom limb which

then influences the perception and experience of the limb.

This is not something done solely from abstract cognition.
The patient knows the limb is not there and has always

known. But it is not until there is mediation from physical

feedback that a change occurs.

Paradigm shift or additional paradigm?

Is this an additional way of thinking about and

investigating psychology or is this an entirely new

framework which we should be working within?
Arguably it changes how we should view cognition no

longer abstract or brain centred, which much theory and

research currently is.
Does this mean there is little value in the previous

research? Do we have to start again?

Reading & Video

Wilson & Golonka (2013) Embodied cognition is not what you think it

is [on blackboard or here]

Wilson, R., A. and Foglia, L., "Embodied Cognition", The Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

[Link]
Slepian, M., L., Weslbuch, M., Rule, N.O, & Ambady, N. (2011) Tough

& Tender: Embodied Categorization of Gender. [blackboard]

Ramachandran & Oberman (2006) Broken Mirrors: A Theory of

Autism [blackboard or here]

Ramachandran, VS (2007) TED Talk: 3 clues to Understanding your

brain [link]