1NC

The 1AC is a criticism of the capitalist structures of violence

in pursuit of integrating the Black into Western systems of
ethics. This politics of humanism relies upon an anti-Black
paradigm of inclusion based on exclusion that turns the
thesis of affirmative solvency
Gordon 13 (Lewis R., s an American philosopher who works in the areas

of Africana philosophy, philosophy of human and life sciences, phenomenology,

philosophy of existence, social and political theory, postcolonial thought, theories
of race and racism, philosophies of liberation, aesthetics, philosophy of
education, and philosophy of religion. Race, Theodicy, and Emancipatory
Challenges South Atlantic Quarterly pgs. 732-4)

Csaire identified a problem later echoed by Fanon in his encomium

for people of what is today called the global South to look beyond
Europe for inspiration, develop new concepts, and set afoot a new
humanity. The conceptual question alerts us to the epistemic
challenge, but Fanons praxis demand (set afoot a new humanity)
speaks to a task at the level of lived reality. Even more, Fanon earlier in
the same passage encouraged going beyond the Greco-Latin pedestal of
European values (see Fanon 1991: ch. 1 and conclusion; for discussion, see
Gordon 2010a). While proponents of those values might

attempt to defend them as human values or

universal values, this normative critique questions
such an assertion on a par with that of double
consciousness and potentiated double
consciousness. Is it not another case of

European particularity asserting itself as

human universality? And even more, as we
saw in the philosophical anthropological
question, isnt part of a radical critique the
question of privileging one group of human
beings as the human in the first place? We are
on familiar terrain. For as with the theological and epistemic
questions, the normative one faces the problem of theodicean grammar as well.
Are the norms for which many of us are fighting in the name of, say, racial justice
or liberation from anti-Black racism free of normative colonization even where

they may be so at an epistemic level? Isnt it presumptuous to think that the

decolonization of knowledge has the same norms as its consequence? We do
already have a clue on this potentially vexing problem. Blackness, after all, as the
underside of theory, is a relational concept (see Gordon 2010b). To think of
blackness means always to imagine it in relation to some- thing else, since to do
so is to establish at least a phenomenological relation- ship of thought to its
object or subject (Gordon 2010b; see also Gordon 2011b). This basic relationship
offers the critique of the theodicean one, where the role of a god in effect
eliminates the rest of the world by becoming an exclusive domain. It requires
being without an outside and thus being outside of relations with anything else.
The distinction of being-in-relations versus nonrelationality raises a normative
difference since blackness, and its relationship not only to the included but also
the excluded, promises an ever- widening normative range. An example of this
difference is what we could call justice talk. This activity is often done as if it is
all-encompassing but insufficiently addressed. Thus, there is always the search
for justice as though every normative arrangement of social institutions has
simply fallen short of its virtue, as John Rawls (1971: introduction) espoused
through his claim of justice as the primary virtue of institutions. This
presumption works, of course, if justice were simply a term already present in
every human community and simply standing within the northern European
tradition of thought as a term translatable into its correlate in other languages.
But translatability often begs many important questions of human difference. It
could not only be the case that justice was not translated but in fact imposed
but also that its scope, even where translatable, is part of a smaller normative
field within the frame- work of the non-European group to which it is posed. If
this is correct, then the proponent of justice has the task not only of
understanding what is common about justice across human communities but also
what could be learned beyond justice across them as well. Where justice is
asserted in a theodicean way, this is a terrifying thought, as it requires looking at
the underside of justice only as injustice instead of what may be right or
good beyond justice.11 Race, theodicy, and normativity, then, pose special
questions for our age, especially in terms of challenges raised by blackness. The
last, for instance, has a bad habit of demonstrating societal, scientific, and
normative contradictions. Blackness, constantly posed as

illicit appearance, means that hopes for justice in a

system premised on licit appearance leads not only
to contradictions but also to the maintenance of
exclusion in the name of justice.

There is no inherent time frame for the impacts of the plan.

There is no future in a world scripted by the past, the
colonized Black exist within dead time, their advocacy
is nothing more than a piecemeal reformist
suggestion that cant redress anti-Black violence
Nielsen '13 (Cynthia, Villanova University Ethics Program " Fanon on the
Irreciprocity and Fixed Difference of Colonized Space"
http://percaritatem.com/2013/02/24/fanon-on-the-irreciprocity-and-fixeddifference-of-colonized-space/#sthash.OyGWwiTN.dpuf)
Both philosophers of race and sociologists have explained how the
racialization of phenotypic differences and negative socio-political
narratives of race such as equating blackness with criminality
detrimentally affects economically disadvantaged African Americans,
especially young, black males. However the stigmatization of places

such as ghettos and particular urban areas also reinforces

an us/them divide and negatively impacts the life chances of
its residents. Along these lines, Ato Sekyi-Otu, in his work,
Fanons Dialectic of Experience, analyzes how the colonized
suffer violence in fixed, segregated space , or as Frantz
Fanon might put it, Manichean regions of (non)being and
mere subsistence. As Sekyi-Otu argues, spatiality takes center stage in Fanons
descriptions of colonized existence, where separate quarters and fixed social
(im)mobility constantly confront the colonized person.[1] This is not to suggest
that temporality has no place in Fanons theorizing. Fanon, for example, speaks
of the colonized existing in dead time and makes multiple
references to the fact that the black persons past and future, because

already negatively scripted by dominant white narratives,

constantly threatens his or her present .[2] It is, however, to claim
that Fanons thematizing metaphors of spatiality and the primacy, analytically
speaking, that he gives them, is part of a larger critique of classical Marxism (and
certain currents in existentialism.)[3] Rather than explicate inequality

in terms of social relations of production and time or

unfree, alienated labor, which involves a qualitative loss
and distortion of our experience of time, Fanon unmasks
the logic of social hierarchy which parcels out the world
by virtue of a politics of space founded on race.[4] In other
words, for Fanon, that spatiality, like temporality functions
as a primordial or basic component of human experience is
granted and uncontroversial. However, the controversy
instigating Fanons protests arises when spatiality is
transformed into an extraordinary state of coercion.[5]
Thus, to accurately portray the character of the colonial

experience, Fanon thematizes or, as Sekyi-Otu puts it,

dramatizes the ursurpation and coercive structuring of
space as the defining reality of social domination, indeed of
social being.[6] With Fanons insights concerning the connection between
race and the politics of space in mind, let us examine select passages from his
book, The Wretched of the Earth. Fanons analyses focus on the

compartmentalized world of the colonized and the

ways in which the colonized experience
psychological harm and collective injury as a result
of being forced to live as a dishonored group in a
sequestered and fixed physical and social region.
For example, Fanon describes the colonized world as a world divided in two. The
dividing line, the border, is represented by the barracks and the police stations.
[7] The divide is of course drawn along racial lines where the white folks sector
(colonists) and the colonized constitute a Manichean space whose darker regions
are kept under close scrutiny, and contained by rifle butts and other explicitly
violent measures.[8] Fanon goes on to highlight the stark differencespolitically,
economically, and sociologicallybetween the colonized and the European
sectors. The colonists sector is a sector built to last, all stone and steel. Its a
sector of lights and paved roads [] the streets are clean and smooth, without a
pothole, without a stone. The colonists sector is sated, [] its belly is
permanently full of good things.[9] In contrast, the colonized live in dilapidated
structures signaling transience, stagnation, subjugation, and dishonor. Its a
world with no space, people are piled one on top of the other.[10] From the
architectural structures to the lack of human goods to the constant police
surveillance and threat of violence, the colonized are engulfed in a

geopolitically carved nether-region that constantly

communicates their alleged inferiority and status as social
refuse. The native sector signifies a disreputable place inhabited by
disreputable people.[11] Living in such confined, stigmatized, and coercively
instituted spaces adversely impacts a groups self-perception. Given the
economic, political, and legal differential between the colonized and the colonists,
it is unsurprising that the colonizeds sector is a sector that crouches and cowers,
a sector on its knees, a sector that is prostrate.[12] In addition to his
emphasis on the politics of space to describe the structure of
domination in the colonial world, Fanon also examines the colonists
racialized discourses, highlighting their role in vilifying and
dehumanizing the colonized. Similar to the contemporary racist
narratives prevalent in the U. S. that equate black males with
criminals and deviants, Fanon observes that the Manichean world of
the colonists backed by its agents of law and order is not satisfied
with enacting physical, spatial constraints to restrict and keep the
colonized under its surveilling gaze. To these already violent and
coercive measures, its public discourses transmute the colonized

into a kind of quintessence of evil. [13] According to this narrative, it

is not that the colonized possess weak values or lack certain values,
rather, as Fanon explains: The native is declared impervious

to ethics, representing not only the absence of values but

also the negation of values. He is, dare we say it, the enemy of

values. In other words, the absolute evil. A corrosive element, destroying

everything which involves aesthetics or morals, an agent of malevolent powers,
an unconscious and incurable element of blind forces.[14] Here the native is
judged not only a social reject but also a dangerous corrosive element, which
thus must be coercively sequestered so as not to harm or contaminate the alleged
moral, aesthetic, and intellectual superiority of the European colonizers.
Although I do not develop this connection herebut I am presently working on a
chapter for a book project where I discuss this link extensivelyLoic Wacquants
work on Americas northern ghettos (191568), the subsequent post-1968
hyperghetto, and the hyperghetto-carceral continuum similarly serve to
forcibly contain, restrain, and stigmatize dishonored populations. As
time warrants, I hope to post more on these and other Wacquant-Fanon areas of
overlap.

The absence of the military within the horn of Africa doesnt

give any freedom to the slave body. The inalienability
problem cannot be theorized through an anti-capitalist
analysis; the act of freeing slaves is legally, economically,
and conceptually illegible
Cacho '12 Lisa Marie, Lisa Marie Cacho is an Associate Professor at the
University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign in Latina/Latino Studies and Asian
American Studies. Her book, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the
Criminalization of the Unprotected (NYU press, 2012) won the John Hope
Franklin award in 2013 for best book in American Studies "Social Death:
Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected (Nation of
Newcomers: Immigrant History As American History)" Introduction, p. 33-34
To say that some groups form the foundation for law is to say that law
is dependent upon the permanence of certain groups'
criminalization . These permanently criminalized people are the
groups to whom I refer as ineligibible for personhood-as populations
subjected to laws but refused the legal means to contest those laws as
well as denied both the political legitimacy and moral credibility
necessary to question them. These populations are excluded from the
ostensibly democratic processes that legitimate U.S. law, yet they are expected to
unambiguously accept and unequivocally uphold a legal and political system that
depends on the unquestioned permanency of their rightlessness . As I will argue,
targeted populations do not need to break laws to be criminalized. Their
behaviors are criminalized even if their crimes are victimless (using street drugs),

even if their actual activities are not illegal at all (using health care), and even if
the evidence is not actually evidence ("looking like a terrorist").
Criminalization can operate through instituting laws that cannot be
followed. People subjected to laws based on their (il)legal
status-"illegal aliens;' "gang members;' "terrorist suspects" -are
unable to comply with the "rule of law" because U.S. law targets their
being and their bodies, not their behavior. They are denied not only the
illusion of authorship but even the possibility of compliance.9 Certain
populations' very humanity is represented as something that one becomes or
achieves, that one must earn because it cannot just be.10 These populations are
denied what political philosopher Hannah Arendt calls "the right to have rights.
The bodies and localities of poor, crirninalized people of color are signifiers for
those who are ineligible for personhood, for those contemporary (il)legal statuses
within U.S. law that are legally illegible. These statuses are legally illegible
because they engender populations not just ractaltzed but rightless, living
nonbeings, or, in Judith Butler's words, as "something living that is other than
life."12 To be ineligible for personhood is a form of social death;13 it not only
defines who does not matter it also makes mattering meaningful. For different
reasons, undocumented migrants, the racialized poor of the global South, and
criminalized U.S. residents of color in both inner cities and rural areas are
populations who "never achieve, in the eyes of others, the status of 'living.' "14 In
her study of death, race, sexuality, and subjectivity, Sharon Holland

observes that in the space of social death, "there is no full

embrace of the margin here, only the chance to struggle
against both a killing abstraction and a life-in-death;
neither choice is an appealing option.''15 The killing
abstraction is not itself abstract It references the ways in which
racialized populations are made unduly vulnerable by global
capitalism and neoliberal restructuring, and it refers to the way they
are positioned absolutely and necessarily beyond legal recourse.
Urban geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore names these killing, abstracting
practices and pro cesses "racism": Racism is a practice of abstraction, a deathdealing displacement of difference into hierarchies that organize relations within
and between the planet's sovereign political territories . ... Indeed, the process of
abstraction that signifies racism produces effects at the most intimately
"sovereign" scale, insofar as particular kinds of bodies, one by one, are materially
(if not always visibly) configured by racism into a hierarchy of human and
inhuman persons that in sum form the category ofhuman being."16 Racism is a

killing abstraction. It creates spaces of living death and populations

"dead-to-others.''17 It ensures that certain people will live an
"abstract existence" where "living [is] something to be achieved and
not experienced."18 Engendered by corporate capital and the
neoliberal state, ineligibility to personhood refers to the state of being
legally recognized as rightless, located in the spaces of social death
where demands for humanity are ultimately disempowering because

they can be interpreted only as asking to be given something sacred in

return for nothing at all.19 By definition an inalienable right cannot
be taken or given away, and, therefore, it cannot really be reconferred.
Regardless of citizenship status, whether people of color deserve
rights and resources is often questioned because those with social
privilege often still interpret economic, social, political, and/or legal
integration as a (conditional) "gift."20 Ineligibility to

personhood is the contemporary

manifestation of what Orlando Patterson
refers to as the "inalienability problem." 21 In his

the act
of freeing slaves, specifically their
transformation from possession to
personhood, was legally,
economically, and conceptually
illegible. Because the master already owned anything a slave could
seminal work on slavery and social death, Patterson explains that

give, freedom could only be conceived of as granted, never actually purchased, so

"even though slaves paid dearly in one way or another for their freedom ...
freedom itself was still regarded as a gift from the master or mistress. When
slaves bought their freedom, the transaction did not give them what their master
possessed by owning them, "for the master does not convey dominion or power
over the slave, he merely releases him from his dominion." Buying "freedom"
did not transmit empowerment, it reconfigured the slave's
relationship to the master's power. Current examples of the
"inalienability problem" can be found in popular arguments over
extending welfare benefits to the unemployed of color be- cause all
sides of both debates accept the premise that working (or
independently wealthy) U.S. citizens have something to lose and
nothing to gain. This is why such debates-over welfare, deportation: d
etentionn, etc.-frequently revolve around questions of morality and ethicalitywhether Amencans should or shouldn't "freely give" rights and resources to the
destitute and undeserving. To extend legal recognition to those already
recognized as ineligible for such rights is also about the em powered population's
"sacrifice;' as if legal recognition was a contract between unequals that formalizes
the dominant populations' willingness to share their power and privileges.
Whether marginalized and aggrieved groups have access to legal
recourse becomes a moral and ethical question for the privileged
population. Hence, the transformation from nonbeing to legal
personhood is always and already framed as someone else's "freely

given decision" to relinquish power and privilege in exchange for

nothing at all. 24 To use the term "ineligibility" underscores that legal
recognition is not and cannot be a viable solution for racialized
exploitation, violence, and poverty. For all legally uncertain populations,
the law punishes but does not protect, disciplines but does not defend. Because
the state renders criminalized populations of color ineligible for personhood and,
consequently, ineligible for the right to ask for rights, they cannot be
incorporated in rights-based politics. Another way to think about populations
"dead-to-others" is to think about those populations whom a politics of
misrecognition needs to bracket, disavow, and/or repudiate because they are
either self-evidently undeserving, politically illegible, or (and usually) both. As
criminal by being, unlawful by presence, and illegal by status, they do not have
the op tion to be law abiding, which is always the absolute prerequisite for
political rights, legal recognitiOn, and resource redistribution in the United
States. When subjugation is engendered, justified, and maintained by the law,
legal recognition cannot be a permanent or meaningful solution to subjugation.
Criminalization justifies people's

The alternative is to embrace Black Nihilism, instead of the feelgood notions of hope that the affirmative embraces
Warren 15 (Calvin, . Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope CR: The New Centennial Review,
Volume 15, Number 1 pgs. 221-23

The politics of hope, then, constitutes what Lauren Berlant would call
cruel optimism for blacks (Berlant 2011). It bundles certain promises

about redress, equality, freedom, justice, and progress into a political

object that always lies beyond reach. The objective of the Political is
to keep blacks in a relation to this political objectin an unending
pursuit of it. This pursuit, however, is detrimental because it
strengthens the very anti-black system that would pulverize black
being. The pursuit native from rigorous historical/philosophical
critique by placing it in an un- known future, 3) delimiting the field of
action to include only activity recognized and legitimated by the
Political, and 4) demonizing critiques or different philosophical
perspectives. The politics of hope masks a particular cruelty under the
auspices of happiness and life. It terrifies with the dread of no
alternative. Life itself needs the security of the alternative, and,
through this logic, life becomes untenable without it. Political hope
promises to provide this alternativea discursive and political organization
beyond extant structures of violence and destruction. The construction of
the binary alternative/no-alternative ensures the hegemony and
dominance of political hope within the onto- existential horizon. The

terror of the no alternativethe ultimate space of

decay, suffering, and deathdepends on two of the

object certainly has an irrational aspect to it, as

Farred details, but it is not mere means without
expectation; instead, it is a means that undermines
the attainment of the impossible object desired. In
other words, the pursuit marks a cruel attachment
to the means of subjugation and the continued
widening of the gap between historical reality and
fantastical ideal. Black nihilism is a demythifying
practice, in the Nietzschean vein, that uncovers the
subjugating strategies of political hope and deidealizes its fantastical object. Once we denude political
hope of its axiological and ethical veneer, we see that it operates through
certain strategies: 1) positing itself as the only alternative to the problem of
anti-blackness, 2) shielding this alter-additional binaries: problem/
solution and action/inaction. According to this politics, all
problems have solutions, and hope provides the accessibility
and realization of these solutions. The solution establishes itself
as the elimination of the problem; the solution, in fact,
transcends the problem and realizes Hegels aufheben in its
constant attempt to sublate the dirtiness of the problem with
the pristine being of the solution. No problem is outside the
reach of hopes solution every problem is connected to the
kernel of its own eradication. The politics of hope must actively refuse
the possibility that the solution is, in fact, another problem in disguised
form; the idea of a solution is nothing more than the repetition and
disavowal of the problem itself. The solution relies on what we might call
the trick of time to fortify itself from the deconstruction of its binary.
Because the temporality of hope is a time not-yet-realized, a future tense
unmoored from present-tense justifications and pragmatist evidence, the
politics of hope cleverly shields its solutions from critiques of
impossibility or repetition. Each insistence that these solutions stand up
against the lessons of history or the rigors of analysis is met with the
rationale that these solutions are not subject to history or analysis because
they do not reside within the horizon of the past or present. Put
differently, we can never ascertain the efficacy of the proposed solutions
because they escape the temporality of the moment, always retreating to a
not-yet and could-be temporality. This trick of time offers a
promise of possibility that can only be realized in an indefinite
future, and this promise is a bond of uncertainty that can never
be redeemed, only imagined. In this sense, the politics of hope is an
instance of the psychoanalytic notion of desire: its sole purpose is to

reproduce its very condition of possibility, never to satiate or bring

fulfillment. This politics secures its hegemony through time by claiming the
future as its unassailable property and excluding (and devaluing) any other
conception of time that challenges this temporal ordering. The

politics of hope, then, depends on the

incessant (re) production and proliferation of
problems to justify its existence. Solutions
cannot really exist within the politics of hope,
just the illusion of a different order in a future
tense. The trick of time and political
solution converge on the site of action. In
critiquing the politics of hope, one encounters the rejoinder of the dangers
of inaction. But we cant just do nothing! We have to do something. The
field of permissible action is delimited and an unrelenting binary between
action/ inaction silences critical engagement with political hope. These
exclusionary operations rigorously reinforce the binary between action and
inaction and discredit certain forms of engagement, critique, and protest.
Legitimate action takes place in the politicalthe political not only claims
futurity but also action as its property. To do something means that this
doing must translate into recognizable political activity; something is a
stand-in for the word politicsone must do politics to address any
problem. A refusal to do politics is equivalent to doing nothingthis
nothingness is constructed as the antithesis of life, possibility, time, ethics,
and morality (a zero-state as Julia Kristeva [1982] might call it).

Black nihilism rejects this trick of

time and the lure of emancipatory
solutions. To refuse to do politics
and to reject the fantastical object of
politics is the only hope for
blackness in an anti- black world.

Our alternative is irreconcilable -- the Negro body as

phobogenic object remains in permanent
concealment from the White gaze The 1AC makes
Black humanity dependent on White recognition and
recreates the hierarchy of Slavery
Bhabha '86 Homi K. Anne F. Rothenberg Professor of English and American
Literature and Language, and the Director of the Humanities Center at Harvard
University. "FOREWORD TO THE 1986 EDITION Homi K. Bhabha
Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition", Black Skin,
White Masks [ebook]
No, there can be no reconciliation, no Hegelian recognition, no
simple, sentimental promise of a humanistic world of the You. Can
there be life without transcendence? Politics without the dream of
perfectibility? Unlike Fanon, I think the nondialectical moment of
Manicheanism suggests an answer. By following the trajectory of colonial desire
in the company of that bizarre colonial figure, the tethered shadowit becomes
possible to cross, even to shift the Manichean boundaries. Where there is no
human nature hope can hardly spring eternal; but it emerges surely and
surreptitiously in the strategic return of that difference that informs and deforms
the image of identity, in the margin of Otherness that displays identification.
There may be no Hegelian negation but Fanon must sometimes be reminded that
the disavowal of the Other always exacerbates the edge of identification, reveals
that dangerous place where identity and aggressivity are twinned. For denial is

always a retroactive process; a half acknowledgment of that

Otherness which has left its traumatic mark. In that
uncertainty lurks the white masked black man; and from
such ambivalent identificationblack skin, white masks it
is possible, I believe, to redeem the pathos of cultural
confusion into a strategy of political subversion. We cannot

agree with Fanon that since the racial drama is played out in the open the black
man has no time to make it unconscious, but that is a provocative thought. In
occupying two places at onceor three in Fanons casethe depersonalized,
dislocated colonial subject can become an incalculable object, quite
literally, difficult to place. The demand of authority cannot unify its
message nor simply identify its subjects. For the strategy of colonial desire
is to stage the drama of identity at the point at which the black mask slips to
reveal the white skin. At that edge, in between the black body and the white body,
there is a tension of meaning and being, or some would say demand and desire,
which is the psychic counterpart to that muscular tension that inhabits the
native body: The symbols of social orderthe police, the bugle calls in
the barracks, military parades and the waving flagsare at one and
the same time inhibitory and stimulating: for they do not convey the
message Dont dare to budge; rather, they cry out Get ready to
attack. It is from that tensionboth psychic and politicalthat a

strategy of subversion emerges. It is a mode of negation that seeks not

to unveil the fullness of Man but to manipulate his representation. It
is a form of power that is exercised at the very limits of identity and
authority, in the mocking spirit of mask and image; it is the lesson
taught by the veiled Algerian woman in the course of the Revolution
as she crossed the Manichean lines to claim her liberty. In Fanons essay
Algeria Unveiled the colonizers attempt to unveil the Algerian

woman does not simply turn the veil into a symbol of

resistance; it becomes a technique of camouflage, a means
of strugglethe veil conceals bombs. The veil that once
secured the boundary of the homethe limits of woman
now masks the woman in her revolutionary activity, linking
the Arab city and the French quarter, transgressing the
familial and colonial boundary. As the veil is liberated in the public
sphere, circulating between and beyond cultural and social norms and spaces, it
becomes the object of paranoid surveillance and interrogation. Every veiled
woman, writes Fanon, became suspect. And when the veil is shed in order to
penetrate deeper into the European quarter, the colonial police see everything
and nothing. An Algerian woman is only, after all, a woman. But the Algerian
fidai is an arsenal and in her handbag she carries her hand-grenades.
Remembering Fanon is a process of intense discovery and
disorientation. Remembering is never a quiet act of introspection or
retrospection. It is a painful remembering, a putting together of the
dismembered past to make sense of the trauma of the present. It is
such a memory of the history of race and racism, colonialism and the
question of cultural identity, that Fanon reveals with greater
profundity and poetry than any other writer. What he achieves, I
believe, is something far greater: for in seeing the phobic image of
the Negro, the native, the colonized, deeply woven into the psychic

pattern of the West, he offers the master and slave a deeper

reflection of their interpositions, as well as the hope of a
difficult, even dangerous, freedom: It is through the effort to
recapture the self and to scrutinize the self, it is through the lasting tension of
their freedom that men will be able to create the ideal conditions of existence for
a human world. Nobody writes with more honesty and insight of this
lasting tension of freedom in which the selfthe peremptory self of
the present disavows an image of itself as an orginary past or an
ideal future and confronts the paradox of its own making.