Compozitia DST

Special Drawing Rights

The SDR Fact Sheet

What is a Special Drawing Right (SDR), and what is

it used for?
The SDR (Special Drawing Right) is an artificial
"basket" currency used by the IMF (International
Monetary Fund) for internal accounting purposes. The
SDR is also used by some countries as a peg for their
own currency, and is used as an international reserve
asset.

What is the value of an SDR?

Initially, the value of the SDR was defined in terms of
one US-$, which in turn was defined in terms of an
ounce of gold: $35/oz until 18-Dec-1971; $38/oz
between 18-Dec-1971 and 11-Feb-1973; $42.22/oz
between 12-Feb-1973 and 30-Jun-1974.
Since July 1974 the SDR has been defined in terms of a
basekt of currencies. This basket consisted initially of 16
currencies and was reduced to 5 in 1981.
Every five years the IMF determines which five
currencies will enter the basket, and which weight will
be applied to each currency. The exchange rates used by
the IMF to calculate the official SDR are the noon rates
in the London foreign exchange market.
When the London market is closed, noon rates in the
New York market are used, and Frankfurt fixing rates are
employed when the New York market is also closed. The
tables on the right show the composition of the SDR.
Special drawing rights (XDR - aka: SDR) are
supplementary foreign exchange reserve assets defined
and maintained by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). The XDR is not a currency per se. It instead
represents a claim to currency held by IMF member
countries for which they may be exchanged.[1] As they
can only be exchanged for Euro, Japanese yen, pounds
sterling, or U.S. dollars,[2] XDRs may actually represent
a potential claim on IMF member countries' nongold
foreign exchange reserves, which are usually held in
those currencies. While they may appear to have a far
more important part to play or, perhaps, an important
future role, being the unit of account for the IMF has
long been the main function of the XDR.[3]

How can one calculate the value of an SDR?

To calculate the value of the SDR in national currency
(say, ABC), multiply the four exchange rates of the home
country vis--vis the basket-currency countries (i.e.,
ABC/USD, ABC/EUR, ABC/JPY, and ABC/GBP) with
the basket values indicated in the above table. Add these
four numbers together to obtain the ABC/SDR exchange
rate.

Ja
nu
ar
y
19
81
De
ce
m
be
r
19
85
IS
O
U
SD
D
EM
J
PY
F
RF
G
BP

Currency

Weight

Value

US Dollar

42%

$ 0.540

German Mark

19%

DM
0.460

Japanese Yen

13%

34.0

French Franc

13%

F 0.740

British Pound

13%

0.0710

Currency

Weight

Ja
nu
ar
y
19
86
De
ce
m
be
r
19
90
IS
O
U
SD
D
EM
J
PY
F
RF

Value

US Dollar

42%

$ 0.452

German Mark

19%

DM
0.527

Japanese Yen

15%

33.4

French Franc

12%

F 1.020

Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)

August 24, 2012

The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries' official
reserves. Its value is based on a basket of four key international currencies, and SDRs can be exchanged for freely
usable currencies. With a general SDR allocation that took effect on August 28 and a special allocation on September 9,
2009, the amount of SDRs increased from SDR 21.4 billion to around SDR 204 billion (equivalent to about $310 billion,
converted using the rate of August 20, 2012).

The role of the SDR

The SDR was created by the IMF in 1969 to support the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. A country
participating in this system needed official reservesgovernment or central bank holdings of gold and widely accepted
foreign currenciesthat could be used to purchase the domestic currency in foreign exchange markets, as required to
maintain its exchange rate. But the international supply of two key reserve assetsgold and the U.S. dollarproved
inadequate for supporting the expansion of world trade and financial development that was taking place. Therefore, the
international community decided to create a new international reserve asset under the auspices of the IMF.
However, only a few years later, the Bretton Woods system collapsed and the major currencies shifted to a floating
exchange rate regime. In addition, the growth in international capital markets facilitated borrowing by creditworthy
governments. Both of these developments lessened the need for SDRs.
The SDR is neither a currency, nor a claim on the IMF. Rather, it is a potential claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF
members. Holders of SDRs can obtain these currencies in exchange for their SDRs in two ways: first, through the
arrangement of voluntary exchanges between members; and second, by the IMF designating members with strong
external positions to purchase SDRs from members with weak external positions. In addition to its role as a
supplementary reserve asset, the SDR serves as the unit of account of the IMF and some other international
organizations.

Basket of currencies determines the value of the SDR

The value of the SDR was initially defined as equivalent to 0.888671 grams of fine goldwhich, at the time, was also
equivalent to one U.S. dollar. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, however, the SDR was redefined as
a basket of currencies,today consisting of the euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and U.S. dollar. The U.S. dollarequivalent of the SDR is posted dailyon the IMFs website. It is calculated as the sum of specific amounts of the four
basket currencies valued in U.S. dollars, on the basis of exchange rates quoted at noon each day in the London market.
The basket composition is reviewed every five years by the Executive Board, or earlier if the Fund finds changed
circumstances warrant an earlier review, to ensure that it reflects the relative importance of currencies in the worlds
trading and financial systems. In the most recent review (in November 2010), the weights of the currencies in the SDR
basket were revised based on the value of the exports of goods and services and the amount of reserves denominated in
the respective currencies that were held by other members of the IMF. These changes became effective on January 1,
2011. The next review will take place by 2015. In October 2011, the IMF Executive Board discussed clarifications and
possible reform options of the existing criteria for broadening the SDR currency basket. Most directors held the view that
the current criteria for SDR basket selection remained appropriate.

The SDR interest rate

The SDR interest rate provides the basis for calculating the interest charged to members on regular (nonconcessional) IMF loans, the interest paid to members on their SDR holdings and charged on their SDR allocation, and the
interest paid to members on a portion of their quota subscriptions. The SDR interest rate isdetermined weekly and is
based on a weighted average of representative interest rates on short-term debt in the money markets of the SDR basket
currencies.

SDR allocations to IMF members

Under its Articles of Agreement (Article XV, Section 1, and Article XVIII), the IMF may allocate SDRs to member countries
in proportion to their IMF quotas. Such an allocation provides each member with a costless, unconditional international
reserve asset on which interest is neither earned nor paid. However, if a member's SDR holdings rise above its allocation,
it earns interest on the excess. Conversely, if it holds fewer SDRs than allocated, it pays interest on the shortfall. The
Articles of Agreement also allow for cancellations of SDRs, but this provision has never been used. The IMF cannot
allocate SDRs to itself or to other prescribed holders.
General allocations of SDRs have to be based on a long-term global need to supplement existing reserve assets.
Decisions on general allocations are made for successive basic periods of up to five years, although general SDR
allocations have been made only three times. The first allocation was for a total amount of SDR 9.3 billion, distributed in
1970-72, and the second allocated SDR 12.1 billion, distributed in 1979-81. These two allocations resulted in cumulative
SDR allocations of SDR 21.4 billion. To help mitigate the effects of the financial crisis, a third general SDR allocation of
SDR 161.2 billion was made on August 28, 2009.
Separately, the Fourth Amendment to the Articles of Agreement became effective August 10, 2009 and provided for
a special one-time allocation of SDR 21.5 billion. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to enable all members
of the IMF to participate in the SDR system on an equitable basis and correct for the fact that countries that joined the
IMF after 1981more than one fifth of the current IMF membershipnever received an SDR allocation until 2009. The
2009 general and special SDR allocations together raised total cumulative SDR allocations to about SDR 204 billion.

Buying and selling SDRs

IMF members often need to buy SDRs to discharge obligations to the IMF, or they may wish to sell SDRs in order to
adjust the composition of their reserves. The IMF may act as an intermediary between members and prescribed holders
to ensure that SDRs can be exchanged for freely usable currencies. For more than two decades, the SDR market has
functioned through voluntary trading arrangements. Under these arrangements a number of members and one prescribed
holder have volunteered to buy or sell SDRs within limits defined by their respective arrangements. Following the 2009
SDR allocations, the number and size of the voluntary arrangements has been expanded to ensure continued liquidity of

the voluntary SDR market. The number of voluntary SDR trading arrangements now stands at 32, including 19 new
arrangements since the 2009 SDR allocations.
In the event that there is insufficient capacity under the voluntary trading arrangements, the Fund can activate the
designation mechanism. Under this mechanism, members with sufficiently strong external positions are designated by the
Fund to buy SDRs with freely usable currencies up to certain amounts from members with weak external positions. This
arrangement serves as a backstop to guarantee the liquidity and the reserve asset character of the SDR.

MF Governors Formally Approve US$250 Billion General SDR Allocation

Press Release No. 09/283
August 13, 2009

The Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has approved on August 7, 2009 a general allocation
of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) equivalent to US$250 billion to provide liquidity to the global economic system by
supplementing Funds member countries foreign exchange reserves.
The IMF Executive Board backed the general allocation on July 17, 2009 (see Press Release No 09/264), following the
commitment made by G20 leaders at their April summit to boost global liquidity and welcomed by the International Monetary
and Financial Committee (IMFC).
The equivalent of nearly US$100 billion of the general allocation will go to emerging markets and developing countries, of
which low-income countries will receive over US$18 billion.
The general SDR allocation will be made on August 28, 2009 to IMF members that are participants in the Special Drawing
Rights Department (currently all 186 members) in proportion to their existing quotas in the Fund, which are based broadly on
their relative size in the global economy. The allocation will provide each participating country with SDRs in amounts equivalent
to approximately 74 percent of its quota, and could increase Fund members total allocations to an amount equivalent to about
US$283 billion, from about US$33 billion (SDR 21.4 billion).
Separately, the Fourth Amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement providing for a special one-time allocation of SDRs has
now entered into force. The special allocation will be made to IMF members on September 9, 2009, 30 days after the effective
date of the Fourth Amendment, and will raise the ratios of members' cumulative SDR allocations to quota using a common
benchmark ratio as described in the Amendment. The total of SDRs created under the special allocation would amount to SDR
21.5 billion (about US$33 billion).
The special allocation will make the allocation of SDRs more equitable and correct for the fact that countries that joined the
Fund after 1981more than one fifth of the current IMF membershiphad never received an SDR allocation. The Fourth
Amendment, which was proposed in September 1997, required approval by three fifths of the IMF membership with 85 percent
of the total voting power. This threshold has been reached following the recent approval by the United States.
Members holdings of newly allocated SDRs, will count, as of the date of each of the general and special allocations, toward
their reserve assets. Some members may choose to sell part or all of their allocations to other members in exchange for hard
currencyfor example, to meet balance of payments needswhile other members may choose to buy more SDRs as a means
of reallocating their reserves.
The special and general allocations will bring Fund members cumulative total of SDR allocation to SDR 204 billion (about
US$316 billion).
The general SDR allocation is a key example of a cooperative multilateral response to the global crisis, offering significant
support to the Fund's members in this challenging period.

Q. What is an SDR?
A. The Special Drawing Right (SDR) is an interest-bearing international reserve asset created by the IMF in 1969 to
supplement other reserve assets of member countries.
The SDR is based on a basket of international currencies comprising the U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, euro and pound
sterling. It is not a currency, nor a claim on the IMF, but is potentially a claim on freely usable currencies of IMF
members. The value of the SDR is not directly determined by supply and demand in the market, but is set daily by the
IMF on the basis of market exchange rates between the currencies included in the SDR basket.
It can be held and used by member countries, the IMF, and certain designated official entities called "prescribed
holders"but it can not be held, for example, by private entities or individuals. Its status as a reserve asset derives from
the commitments of members to hold, accept, and honor obligations denominated in SDR. The SDR also serves as the
unit of account of the IMF and some other international organizations.

Q. What is a general SDR allocation?

A. An SDR allocation is a low cost way of adding to members' international reserves, allowing members to reduce their
reliance on more expensive domestic or external debt for building reserves.
The IMF has the authority under its Articles of Agreement to create unconditional liquidity through "general allocations"
of SDRs to participants in its SDR Department (currently, all members of the IMF) in proportion to their quotas in the IMF.
The IMF's Articles prescribe the conditions under which such allocations can be made, namely that general allocations of
SDRs should meet a long-term global need to supplement existing reserve assets in a manner that will promote the
attainment of the IMF's purposes and avoid economic stagnation and deflation, as well as excess demand and inflation;
and that these allocations should have the broad support of SDR Department participants.

Q. How many SDRs have been allocated?

A. The general SDR allocation of August 28, 2009 is by far the biggest allocation to date:
SDR 9.3 billion was allocated in yearly installments in 197072.
SDR 12.1 billion was allocated in yearly installments in 197981.
SDR 161.2 billion was allocated on August 28, 2009.
A special one-time allocation of SDR 21.5 billion took effect on September 9, 2009, bringing total cumulative allocations
to about SDR 204 billion (equivalent to about US$318 billion).

Q. What happens to the SDRs once they are allocated?

A. The IMF's SDR Department keeps records of members' SDR allocations and holdings; the SDR Department is also the
channel through which all transactions and operations involving SDRs are conducted.
Once allocated, members can hold their SDRs as part of their international reserves or sell part or all of their SDR
allocations. Members can exchange SDRs for freely usable currencies among themselves and with prescribed holders;
such exchange can take place under a voluntary arrangement or under designation by the Fund.
IMF members can also use SDRs in operations and transactions involving the IMF, such as the payment of interest on
and repayment of loans, or payment for future quota increases.

Q. Are there any costs involved in using the SDRs or returns from accumulating SDRs?

A. The Fund pays interest to each holder of SDRs, and it makes charges at the same rate on each participant's net
cumulative SDR allocations (i.e., the SDRs that were allocated to a member by the Fund in the past, net of any
cancellations, which in practice have not taken place to date). Therefore, in net terms, members receive interest at the
SDR interest rate on the amount that their holdings exceed their cumulative allocations. Conversely, if a member's SDR
holdings are below its allocation, it incurs a net interest obligation. Interest on SDR holdings and allocations are received
and paid quarterly.

Q. What is the SDR interest rate and how is it determined?

A. The SDR interest rate is determined weekly on each Friday and is based on a weighted average of representative
interest rates on 3-month debt in the money markets of the four SDR basket currencies (i.e., the U.S. dollar, Japanese
yen, euro, and pound sterling).

Q. Is there any other cost associated with holding SDRs?

A. The only other cost borne by members is a very small levy to cover the operational costs of the SDR Department. This
levy has recently amounted only to about one-hundredth of one percent of the cumulative allocation of each participant.

Q. How does the SDR market work?

A. For more than two decades, the SDR market has functioned purely on a voluntary basis.
Various Fund members and one prescribed SDR holder have agreed to stand ready to buy and sell SDRs on a voluntary
basis.
The Fund facilitates transactions between members seeking to sell or buy SDRs and these counterparties to the
voluntary agreements that effectively make a market in SDRs.
In the event that there are not enough voluntary buyers of SDRs, the IMF can designate members with strong balance
of payments positions to provide freely usable currency in exchange for SDRs. This so-called "designation mechanism"
ensures that a participant can use its SDRs to readily obtain an equivalent amount of currency if it has a need for such a
currency because of its balance of payments, its reserve position, or developments in its reserves.

The 2009 General SDR Allocation of US$250 Billion and Special Allocation of SDR 21.5 Billion

Q. Why was the 2009 general SDR allocation necessary?

A. The general allocation of US$250 billion implemented on August 28, 2009 was the response to the call by the G-20
Heads of State and the IMF's International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) at their respective meetings in April
2009.
It is a prime example of a cooperative monetary response to the global financial crisis: by providing significant
unconditional financial resources to liquidity constrained countries, it will smooth the need for adjustment and add to the
scope for expansionary policies, where needed in the face of deflation risks.
This is particularly important for emerging market and low-income countries that have been hit hard by the current
global economic crisis. Over the longer term, the allocation could also reduce the need for pursuing destabilizing and
costly reserve accumulation policies that could contribute to global imbalances.

Q. How is the general SDR allocation shared among members?

A. The general allocation is based on each country's existing IMF quota. The US$250 billion total equates to around 74.13
percent of eligible participants' quota. Emerging markets and developing countries as a group account for almost
US$100 billion of the total, including over US$18 billion for low-income countries.

Q. Will the voluntary market be liquid enough?

A. The SDR allocation is expected to result in an increased volume of transactions initiated by members seeking to
exchange SDRs for freely usable currencies. On the other hand, some members may wish to acquire more SDRs for
reserve management purposes.
The Fund is seeking agreement on the establishment of new voluntary arrangements and the enlargement of existing
agreements to ensure that increased demand for sales/purchases of SDRs will continue to be met fully through voluntary
transactions after the forthcoming allocations.
In any case, the designation mechanism remains a backstop and will ensure that a country that wishes to sell SDRs to
meet a balance of payments need can always obtain the requisite amount of freely usable currencies without delay.

Q. Will the SDR allocation be inflationary?

A. Not likely.
The size of the allocation is small relative to global GDP ( of 1 percent), trade (less than 1 percent), and reserves (3
percent).
With a global output gap projected to persist through 2014by which point any expansionary impact of early spending
of the SDR allocation should have dissipatedthe allocation is unlikely to generate significant inflationary pressure.

Q. How did the Fourth Amendment special allocation of SDRs come about?
A. A special one-time allocation of SDR 21.5 billion was proposed in 1997 under what is known as the Fourth Amendment
of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, to allow members to participate equitably in the SDR system, even if they joined after
previous SDR allocations.
The Fourth Amendment provided for a special allocation of SDRs to raise the ratios of members' cumulative SDR
allocations relative to quota to a common benchmark ratio as described in the amendment.
The Fourth Amendment became effective for all members on August 10, 2009 when the Fund certified that at least
three-fifths of the IMF membership (112 members) with 85 percent of the total voting power accepted it. On August 5,
2009, the United States joined 133 other members in supporting the Amendment. The special allocation of SDR 21.5
billion was implemented thirty days after the effective date, on September 9, 2009.

conomic data is sourced from the International Monetary Fund, current as of April 2013, and is given in US dollars.[1]

Country

GDP
(nominal)

HFCE
(2009)

Governme
nt
spending

Exports

Imports

GDP
per
capita
(PPP)

Literacy
rate

Life
expectancy(years,
avg.)

HDI

Brazil

201,046,886

$2,242.8 bn

$1,266.3
bn

$846.6 bn

$256.0 bn

$238.8 bn

$15,034

93.5%

76.2

.744 (high)

Russi

143,451,702

$2,118.0 bn

$671.6 bn

$414.0 bn

$542.5 bn

$358.1 bn

$24,120

99.6%

70.5

.778 (high)

India

1,210,193,422

$1,870.6 bn

$737.9 bn

$281.0 bn

$309.1 bn

$500.3 bn

$5,410

74.04%

65

.586 (medium)

China 1,354,040,000

$9,181.4 bn

$1,835.3
bn

$2,031.0 bn

$2,021.0
bn

$1,780.0
bn

$11,904

95.1% [37]

76

.719 (high)

$350.8 bn

$173.8 bn

$95.27 bn

$101.2 bn

$106.8 bn

$12,504

93%[38]

61

.658 (medium)

South
Africa

Population

51,770,560

Potential members[edit]
Indonesia and Turkey have been mentioned as candidates for full membership of the BRICS, while Egypt , Argentina, Iran, Nigeria, Syria and
most recentlyBangladesh have expressed interest in joining BRICS. [39][40]
Criza actual, nceput n 2008, impune o regndire a cadrului n care sistemul financiar i desfoar activitatea. n plan bancar, proiectul care
realizeaz aceste transformri profunde, la nivel european, este reprezentat de Uniunea Bancar.

Obiectivul principal al reformelor preconizate este ntrirea reglementrii i supravegherii sectorului financiar european n scopul oferirii unui rspuns
eficace la criza financiar, pentru creterea rezistenei instituiilor financiare la factorii de risc i asigurarea fluxului de fonduri pentru economie.

Intermedierea financiar sntoas n noua concepie european pornete de la urmtoarele principii: politici fr exuberan sau conservatorism
excesiv, care s fac bncile s pun capital deoparte pentru zile negre i s contribuie, totodat, la un fond comun pentru finanarea ieirii
ordonate de pe pia a instituiilor neviabile. Aceasta va minimiza costurile pe care le suport cetenii pentru eventuala rezoluie a bncilor n
dificultate major.

Aceste principii ale procesului de reform pornesc de la constarea c pltitorii de taxe au achitat o factur uria pentru salvarea bncilor dup cum
afirma Michel Barnier, Comisarul European pentru piaa intern i servicii n aprilie 2014 i de la ideea c reforma reglementrii i supravegherii
sistemului financiar european reprezint o parte esenial a strategiei UE de revenire pe drumul unei creteri economice inteligente, durabile i
incluzive, generatoare de locuri de munc i competitivitate ntrit. Totodat aceste principii au n vedere:

i. necesitatea ntririi cadrului instituional al Uniunii Economice i Monetare pentru rectigarea ncrederii i asigurarea stabilitii n zona
euro;
ii. necesitatea consolidrii Pieei Unice a serviciilor financiare prin aplicarea unui set unic de reguli n domeniu care s duc la competiie
sntoas i la o funcionare bun a intermedierii financiare.
n plus adncirea integrrii europene privind activitatea bancar este strict necesar pentru gestionarea riscului de contagiune regional.

Uniunea Bancar presupune un cadru unic de reglementare la nivel european (Single Rulebook care cuprinde legislaia viznd cerinele de capital
CRR/CRD IV, legislaia care reglementeaz redresarea i rezoluia bancar BRRD i legislaia privind schemele de garantare a depozitelor DGS).
Operaionalizarea uniunii bancare impune crearea: (i) unui mecanism unic de supraveghere (MUS); (ii) mecanismului unic de rezoluie (MUR); i (iii)
sistemului unitar de garantare a depozitelor.

Realizarea Uniunii Bancare, cu arhitectura instituional i legal prezentat anterior este o condiie fundamental pentru dezvoltarea unui sector
bancar european sigur, responsabil i generator de progres economic.

Pentru c actuala criz a demonstrat anumite limite ale metodelor utilizate pn acum pentru gestiunea riscului (pachetul Basel II), a fost propus un
nou pachet legislativ viznd cerinele de capital (CRD IV Capital Requirements Directive) care include: (i) introducerea unui indicator simplificat de
solvabilitate (leverage ratio), care asigur limitarea creterii nesustenabile a bilanului unei instituii de credit n raport cu capitalul acesteia; (ii)
recurgerea la provizionarea dinamic (dynamic provisioning), prin care provizioanele constituite n perioada de avnt economic sunt destinate
acoperirii pierderilor nregistrate n perioada de recesiune economic; (iii) impunerea unor standarde de lichiditate sub forma unui indicator de
lichiditate imediat (liquidity coverage ratio), ce reflect msura n care activele foarte lichide ale unei instituii de credit acoper ieirile de numerar
n condiii de stres pe parcursul unei luni i respectiv a unui indicator de finanare stabil ( net stable funding ratio), care semnalizeaz situaia n care
creterea bilanului se realizeaz ntr-o msur disproporionat pe seama unor pasive insuficient de stabile. Acest acord (denumit i Basel III)
urmrete reconfigurarea ntregului cadru de reglementare i supraveghere a activitii bancare, cu accentuarea componentei de avertizare timpurie
cnd riscurile sunt n cretere accelerat.

Pachetul legislativ aferent mecanismului unic de supraveghere cuprinde dou regulamente: (i) regulamentul privind conferirea unor atribuii specifice
Bncii Centrale Europene n ceea ce privete politicile privind supravegherea prudenial a instituiilor de credit; i (ii) regulament pentru modificarea
statutului de nfiinare a Autoritii Europene de Supraveghere (ABE) n ceea ce privete interaciunea instituiei cu BCE.

Din punct de vedere temporal introducerea MUS presupune o serie de etape ce au ca punct final data de 4 noiembrie 2014 cnd BCE i asum
integral noile prerogative de supraveghere. MUS prevede o mprire a competenelor de supraveghere ntre BCE i autoritile de supraveghere
naionale, criteriile ce fac aceast delimitare innd de: (i) dimensiunea instituiei de credit; (ii) importana acesteia pentru economia naional sau a
UE; (iii) importana activitilor transfrontaliere ale instituiei supravegheate; (iv) dac banca comercial respectiv a solicitat sau primit asisten
financiar public direct din partea Facilitii Europene pentru Stabilitate Financiar sau a Mecanismului European de Stabilitate; (v) cnd
supravegherea unor bnci mai puin semnificative este necesar pentru a asigura aplicarea consecvent a unor standarde nalte de supraveghere i
(vi) sunt incluse cele mai importante trei bnci din fiecare stat membru participant. n privina instituiilor pe care BCE nu le supravegheaz direct
acestea intr n cadrul procesului de supraveghere indirect exercitat de ctre autoritile naionale de supraveghere. rile nemembre ale zonei
euro, cum este i cazul Romniei, pot participa la MUS prin instituirea acordului de cooperare strns.

Mecanismul unic de rezoluie (MUR) i gsete justificarea n costul foarte ridicat al pachetelor de salvare a unor bnci, acordate din fonduri publice
(alocndu-se 592 mld. sau 4,6% din PIB UE 2012, ntre oct 2008 dec 2012 prin msuri de susinere a capitalizrii i alte 906 mld. sau 7,8 % din
PIB UE n 2012 prin msuri de garantare i alte forme de sprijinire a lichiditii). Utilizarea fondurilor publice n acest scop, dei a fost considerat
necesar, nu mai este sustenabil pe viitor din cauza poziiei fragile a sectorului public n majoritatea rilor din UE (datorie public ca procent n PIB
semnificativ i deficite bugetare la nivele relativ ridicate). De aceea se dorete crearea unui cadru legal comunitar unitar, integrat i coerent, privind
instrumente adecvate i msuri credibile de gestionare a crizelor financiare n scopul: (i) asigurrii continuitii funciilor critice ale instituiilor
financiare; (ii) minimizrii riscurilor de contaminare; (iii) reducerii hazardului moral; (iv) proteciei finanelor publice prin ntreruperea spiralei vicioase
dintre riscul suveran i costurile de finanare ale instituiilor de credit; (v) proteciei deponenilor i (vi) ieirii ordonate de pe pia a instituiilor n
dificultate, fr afectarea stabilitii financiare.

Din punct de vedere temporal, MUR presupune intrarea n vigoare parial la 1 ianuarie 2015 i intrarea n vigoare complet la 1 ianuarie 2016
(inclusiv prevederile de bail-in). Momentul la care o ar membr a UE intr n MUR este determinat fie de statutul de membru al zonei euro, fie de
momentul intrrii n MUS aderarea la acesta presupune adoptarea automat i a MUR.

Rezoluia presupune restructurarea unei bnci de ctre o autoritate de rezoluie, prin utilizarea instrumentelor specifice acestei proceduri. Scopurile
urmrite sunt: (i) asigurarea continuitii funciilor critice ale entitii; (ii) meninerea stabilitii financiare; (iii) revitalizarea entitii, n ntregime sau
n parte restul entitii urmeaz procedurile legale de insolven; (iv) evitarea hazardului moral.

n funcie de situaia concret a instituiei n dificultate, dac aceasta nregistreaz un declin al indicatorilor prudeniali, poate primi o solicitare de la
autoritatea competent pentru implementarea planului de redresare sau exist posibilitatea numirii de ctre autoritate a unui administrator temporar
la conducerea instituiei. Dac situaia este mai grav, instituia confruntndu-se cu dificulti majore, exist posibilitatea numirii unui administrator
special la conducerea instituiei, precum i de aplicare a instrumentelor de rezoluie (precum vnzarea activitii, banca-punte, separarea activelor,
recapitalizarea intern (bail-in) constnd n suportarea pierderilor de ctre acionari/creditori, cu meniunea c depozitele garantate sunt exceptate.

Sistemul de garantare a depozitelor urmrete crearea unui cadru unic de reglementare n domeniu, avnd ca obiective: (i) armonizarea la nivel UE a
categoriilor i nivelului depozitelor garantate; (ii) reducerea termenului de plat a compensaiilor; (iii) armonizarea informaiilor furnizate
deponenilor; (iv) instituirea de cerine de supraveghere a schemelor de garantare a depozitelor.

Criza financiar internaional ne-a reamintit c proiectul european este incomplet i c este necesar consolidarea cadrului instituional, precum i
continuarea reformei guvernanei economice a UE pentru realizarea sustenabil a obiectivelor fundamentale ale Uniunii. Revenirea UE pe drumul unei
creteri economice inteligente, durabile i incluzive, generatoare de locuri de munc i competitivitate ntrit, trebuie susinut de o reform
profund a reglementrii i supravegherii sistemului financiar european, n linie cu agenda internaional de profil.

Uniunea Bancar este unul dintre pilonii fundamentali ai noului cadru de guvernan economic la nivelul UE. Aceast construcie reprezint un pilon
n sine i nu alternativa suboptimal la crearea Uniunii Fiscale, iar soluia mecanismelor unice de supraveghere i, respectiv, de rezoluie nu va facilita
doar soluionarea cercului vicios dintre bnci i datoria public naional, ci mai ales, va contribui la dezvoltarea unui sector bancar european sigur,
responsabil i generator de progres economic.

Aderarea Romniei la Uniunea Bancar nainte de momentul adoptrii euro reprezint o opiune preferabil deoarece deciziile la nivelul MUS se vor
reflecta oricum la nivelul sistemului bancar romnesc, dat fiind prezena ridicat a capitalului din zona euro n structura instituiilor de credit cu
personalitate juridic romn.

Sistemul bancar autohton parcurge un proces ordonat de recalibrare a propriei activiti, n concordan cu noua viziune european privind realizarea
unei intermedieri financiare sntoase. Elementele principale ale acestui proces sunt:

eliberarea bilanurilor de creditele neperformante;

reorientarea surselor de finanare ctre economisirea intern;

consolidarea premiselor relansrii creditrii pe fundamente i destinaii sntoase, n scopul dezvoltrii economice durabile.
Aderarea Romniei la Uniunea Bancar reprezint un reper n parcursul ctre adoptarea monedei unice deoarece, consolideaz stabilitatea financiar,
inclusiv prin diminuarea riscului de contagiune regional i nlturarea unui stimulent al dezintermedierii din partea bncilor cu capital strin. Totodat
faciliteaz revenirea creditrii pe o traiectorie compatibil cu dezvoltarea durabil a activitii economice n tandem cu resursele economice eliberate
de reformele structurale ceea ce duce la o intensificare a procesului de convergen real de natur s realizeze o ndeplinire sustenabil a criteriilor
de aderare la zona euro.

mbuntirea disciplinei financiare n economie reprezint o premis important a valorificrii potenialului de convergen real al Romniei, n
acest sens fiind necesare:

mbuntirea transparenei: ru-platnicii trebuie s fie cunoscui n pia, pentru ca cei care intr n relaii de afaceri cu
acetia s o fac n cunotin de cauz;

Creterea rspunderii financiare a firmei: companiile se bazeaz semnificativ n derularea propriei activiti pe resursele
financiare ale partenerilor-creditori (furnizori, buget, bnci i ali creditori). n condiiile n care gradul de ndatorare a ajuns ridicat i poate fi
o surs important a indisciplinei la plat i a instabilitii financiare, capitalul minim al unei firme trebuie s creasc pentru a pstra un
raport datorie/capital conform cu normele internaionale (3/1);

Creterea rolului politicilor financiare macroprudeniale: abordarea anti-ciclic (LTD, LTV, DTI) produce pe termen mediu i
lung efecte favorabile pentru toi juctorii, chiar dac pe termen scurt poate fi considerat ca generatoare de costuri pentru operatorii
economici.
Referitor la competenele legale i aciunile BNR pe linia reglementrii prudeniale n vederea limitrii riscurilor, pe de o parte, i la obligaia
respectrii normelor prudeniale ale BNR de ctre bncile comerciale, pe de alt parte, considerm c, pe termen mediu i lung, n scopul evitrii
supra-reglementrii sectorului bancar, dar i al limitrii exceselor operatorilor bancari n dorina de a obine profituri cat mai mari, este necesar s ne
amintim dou cugetri, una din gndirea roman S uzezi, dar s nu abuzezi , iar cealalt aparinnd lui Pitagora n cumptare st fora
sufletului.