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IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY

DANNY HOMAN, RICH TAYLOR,
JERRY KEARNS, MARK SMITH,
THOMAS COURTNEY, JANET PETERSEN,
BRUCE HUNTER, CURT HANSON,
TONY BISIGNANO, HERMAN QUIRMBACH,
DICK DEARDEN, ART STAED,
AKO ABDUL-SAMAD, JO OLDSON,
RUTH ANN GAINES, SHARON STECKMAN,
TODD TAYLOR, MARY GASKILL,
KIRSTEN RUNNING-MARQUARDT,
TIMI BROWN-POWERS, and DAVE JACOBY,

CASE NO. CVCV050143

RULING GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
TERRY E. BRANSTAD, GOVERNOR, STATE
OF IOWA,
Defendant.
This case was before the court on October 8, 2015 for hearing on the parties cross
motions for summary judgment. Attorneys Mark Hedberg, Nathaniel Boulton and Sarah Wolfe
represented the plaintiffs (collectively, the Legislators). Iowa Solicitor General Jeffrey
Thompson and Iowa Assistant Attorney General Meghan Gavin represented the defendant (the
Governor). Having considered the motions, the resistances, and the written and oral
arguments of counsel, the court makes the following ruling.
Synopsis
The president of a public employee union and a group of State Legislators challenge the
Governors veto of legislative appropriations for the operation of two mental health institutes,
arguing that a statute mandating the existence of the institutes operates as a limitation on the

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Governors constitutional veto power. The court concludes that a statute cannot operate to
limit the Governors constitutional item veto authority. Therefore, the court grants the
Governors motion for summary judgment, dismissing the petition.
Background Facts and Proceedings
During its 2015 session, the Iowa Legislature approved Senate File 505 and House File
666 which, among other things, appropriated funding for operation of the States mental health
institutes. On July 2, 2015, the Governor approved the two bills; however, he used his item veto
power to strike those provisions of the bills that provided funding for the mental health
institutes at Mount Pleasant and Clarinda. In his letters to the Secretary of State explaining the
vetoes, the Governor stated that, in light of modern best practices for providing mental
health services to Iowans, it was not in the best interests of patients, the taxpayers or the
mental health system to continue operating the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda facilities.
The Legislators filed their petition on July 9, 2015 naming the Governor and the Director
of the Iowa Department of Human Services (the Director) as defendants. On September 16,
2015, the court granted the Directors and denied the Governors motions to dismiss. The
Directors motion was granted because the Legislators challenge the Governors exercise of his
veto power, a matter not involving the Director.
On September 21, 2015, both sides filed motions for summary judgment. The parties
also filed a Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts and a Joint Appendix. The court heard oral
arguments on October 8, 2015, as noted, and the matter is now fully submitted.
Summary Judgment Standard
Iowa R. of Civ. P. 1.981 governs motions for summary judgment. Rule 1.981(3) directs

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the court to grant such a motion if the movant shows there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the [movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.981(3); Luana Sav. Bank v. Pro-Build Holdings, Inc., 856 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Iowa 2014).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the dispute is over the legal consequences of undisputed
facts. Wallace v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs., 754 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa
2008).
As evidenced by their submission of a joint statement of undisputed facts and joint
appendix, both sides agree that the only issue in this case is one of law. The case is, therefore,
appropriately decided on summary judgment.1
Discussion and Analysis
The Legislators argue that Iowa law mandates the continued existence and operation of
the mental health institutes at Mount Pleasant and Clarinda, thereby placing an implicit
limitation on the Governors authority to effectively close those facilities by vetoing the entire
appropriation of money to support their continued operation. The Governor disagrees that the
law mandates the continued operation of the facilities at Mount Pleasant and Clarinda but
argues that, even if it does, he acted within his constitutional authority in vetoing the
appropriations at issue.
A. The Governors Item Veto Authority.
The Iowa Constitution establishes the Governors item veto authority as follows:
[t]he governor may approve appropriation bills in whole or in part, and may disapprove any

The parties approach is consistent with the Iowa Supreme Courts observation that the limits of the Governors
item veto power is an issue of constitutional analysis which presents a question of law for the courts. Junkins v.
Branstad, 448 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Iowa 1989).
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item of an appropriation bill; and the part approved shall become a law. Any item of an
appropriation bill disapproved by the governor shall be returned . . . . Iowa Const. Art. III, 16.
The language of this provision imposes only two limitations on the Governors item veto
authority: (1) the bill with respect to which the Governor exercises a veto must be an
appropriations bill; and (2) the part of any such bill that the Governor vetoes must be an
item. Rants v. Vilsack, 684 N.W.2d 193, 20206 (Iowa 2004). These limitations arise both
from the language of the constitutional provision and from the Courts precedent interpreting
and construing that provision. Id. at 202203.
The appropriations bill requirement places a limitation on the type of bill which is
subject to the Governors item veto power. Id. at 203. In Rants v. Vilsack, the court recognized
that there are two types of appropriations bills. Id. at 204205. The first type includes at least
one allocation of money on its face. Id. The second type is marked by the allocation of funds by
either the direct ordering of an expenditure or the commanded alteration to standing
allocations within sections of the Iowa Code resulting in the expenditure of funds absent
subsequent legislation to stop the expenditure or somehow redirect it. Id. at 205.
The item requirement is a limitation on the scope of the Governors item veto power.
Id. The Court has had some difficulty defining item but has noted that the Iowa Constitution
does not specifically limit the item-veto power to appropriations of money. Id. Consequently,
the Court has acknowledged that the governor may constitutionally veto nearly any item in an
appropriation bill even if that item is not a monetary allocation. Id.
However, the Court has outlined a corollary to the item limitation which prevents the
Governor from vetoing a condition on an appropriation without vetoing the entire

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appropriation. See Homan v. Branstad, 812 N.W.2d 623, 630 (Iowa 2012) (hereinafter Homan I)
(The point is this: when the legislature makes a specific appropriation for a specific purpose,
the Governor can veto the appropriation as an item, but cannot veto the purpose and use the
appropriation for a different purpose.); Colton v. Branstad, 372 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1985)
(defining a condition as a provision in a bill that limits the use to which an appropriation may
be put); Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 713 (Iowa 1975) ([I]f the Governor desires to veto a
legislatively-imposed qualification upon an appropriation, he must veto the accompanying
appropriation as well.). Thus, the Governor may not veto a condition to an appropriation
without vetoing the entire appropriation.
When a court is asked to review the propriety of the Governors exercise of his veto
authority, the courts opinion of the wisdom of the vetoed legislation or of the Governors veto
is completely irrelevant. Homan I, 812 N.W.2d at 629.
B. The vetoes at issue were vetoes of items in appropriation bills.
The two bills at issue are unquestionably appropriation bills because they include
allocations of money on their faces. They are, therefore, the types of bills which are subject to
the Governors item veto power.
Likewise putting aside for a moment the Legislators argument that an existing statute
operates as a condition on the appropriations at issue there is no question that the vetoes
operated on items in that they vetoed entire appropriations and all conditions associated
with those appropriations.
C. The Legislators arguments.
All of the Legislators arguments are premised on the contention that Iowa Code

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Sections 218 and 226 mandate the continued operation of the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda
facilities. The Governor disputes the legitimacy of this premise. Because it does not make a
difference in the outcome, the court assumes for the sake of argument that Iowa law does
mandate the continued operation of the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda facilities.
The Legislators argument is twofold: (1) the statutory mandate of sections 218 and 226
operate in the same way as would a condition placed on a legislative appropriation; and (2) the
statutory mandate of sections 218 and 226 operates as an independent limitation on the
Governors item veto authority. The court addresses these arguments in turn.
1. Existing statutes are not conditions on appropriations.
The Legislators argue that sections 218 and 226 are essentially [conditions] that
[require] at least some funding for the institutes at Clarinda and Mount Pleasant. In order to
eliminate all funding, as outlined statutorily, the Governor would be required to call a special
session which would either change the Iowa Code or change the amount of funding provided to
the operation of the mental health institutes. Reply brief, p.2.
As stated earlier, the Iowa Supreme Court most recently discussed the meaning of
conditions as it relates to item veto jurisprudence in Homan I. After noting that it had used
several terms to describe what is meant by a condition on an appropriation, the Court stated
that, regardless of terminology, a condition on an appropriation is a provision in a bill that
limits the use to which an appropriation may be put. Id. at 630, (emphasis added by this
court)(citing and quoting from Rants, 684 N.W.2d at 205, n.3).
Thus, a condition on an appropriation is an explicit limitation on the appropriation
itself. Sections 218 and 226 are not in the appropriation bills that the Governor vetoed, they are

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not themselves bills and they do not explicitly limit any appropriation. They cannot,
therefore, be conditions on the appropriations included in those bills.
2. Existing statutes cannot limit the Governors item veto authority.
Relying primarily on the Courts decision in AFSCME/Iowa Council 61 v. State, 484
N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1992), the Legislators argue that Sections 218 and 226 are independent,
external to the constitution, limitations on the Governors item veto power. AFSCME involved a
dispute between the State and the labor unions representing a substantial number of state
employees. The parties arbitrated a wage dispute, in accordance with Iowa law. The arbitration
decision favored the employees, and the legislature passed an appropriations bill to fund the
wage increase awarded. The Governor vetoed that appropriation. The employees brought an
action to enforce the [arbitration] awards. Id. The Court held that the arbitration award was
binding on the State. Id.
The Legislators assert that the Courts holding in AFSCME demonstrates that there are
independent, extra-constitution limitations on the Governors item veto authority. They liken
the mandate of sections 218 and 226 to the arbitration award that was at issue in AFSCME and
argue that an existing statutory mandate is at least as powerful a counterweight to the
Governors item veto authority as is the contractual award of an arbitrator in a labor dispute.
AFSCME does not support the Legislators argument because it is not an item veto case
and it does not hold what the Legislators suggest. The Court framed the issue in AFSCME and its
answer as follows:

The question is: Can the government be made to perform in accordance with its
contracts, or is the other party, by reason of constitutional and statutory rules
intended to protect the public treasury, left to the vagaries of the political
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process? We think the State can indeed be required to comply.

AFSCME/Iowa Council 61 v. State, 484 N.W.2d 390, 391 (Iowa 1992)
Thus, the issue in AFSCME was whether an arbitration award amounted to a binding
contract with the State. The validity of the Governors veto was not at issue. On that point, the
Court stated:
We do not hold that the governor's veto was invalid. Our holding is only that the
trial court was correct in its determination that the arbitration decisions
amounted to binding obligations of the State, a matter that was not adjudicated
at the time of the veto. The governor had the power to veto the particular
appropriation bill in question. We affirm the trial court finding that the governor
did not act in bad faith in exercising it. See Iowa Const. art. IV, 9.2
Id. at 395
There is some later language in the AFSCME decision that, it could be argued, implies
that the Court would have found the veto to be improper if a court had adjudicated the
enforceability of the arbitration award before the Governor exercised the veto. Id. (It was
entirely appropriate for the governor to secure a judicial determination of the validity or
enforceability of the arbitration decisions before acting to fund the awards.). From this, one
could argue that the veto at issue in this case cannot be justified because the enforceability of
sections 218 and 226 is not up in the air no Court decision is required to know that those
sections are existing, enforceable statutes. But, even assuming that the implication of the
quoted language is correct, one cannot legitimately make the equation necessary to support
the Legislators argument. Quoting Alexander Hamilton, the AFSCME court makes clear that the
right at issue in that case (the States obligation to honor its contracts) was justly considered as
2

This provision of the Iowa Constitution requires the executive branch to faithfully execute the laws. There is no
contention in this case that the Governor acted in bad faith in vetoing the appropriations at issue. This, and the
courts conclusion that the veto was otherwise within the Governors authority, disposes of the Legislators
argument that the veto violated Iowa Const. art. IV, 9.
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excepted out of [the States] power to legislate unless in aid of [the obligation]. Id. So, if the
States obligation to honor a contract is a limit on the Governors authority to veto legislation
intended to carry out the obligation, it is likewise a limit on the power of the legislature either
to take action to interfere with the obligation or, perhaps, even to refuse to take action in aid
of it.3

No similar right or interest places the dispute in this case outside the scope of the
constitutionally-intended manner of operation of the legislative and executive branches of
government. The Governors veto was clearly legitimate by the well-established standards
already discussed. The veto does not interfere with or contravene any contractual obligation of
the State. And the legislature has the constitutional authority, as it would with any other veto,
to override it. Iowa Const. Art. III, 16.
Moreover, when the issue here is reduced to resolving a conflict between the
Governors authority and the operation of a statute, the Governors authority must prevail. The
Governors item veto authority is of constitutional magnitude. The only limitations that have
been placed on that authority have been derived from the language of the constitution itself.
Rants, 684 N.W.2d at 203. And, there is no language in the item veto provision which suggests a
statutory limitation on the power it creates. It is elementary that, to the extent there is conflict
between a constitutional provision and a statute, the constitution prevails. See Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862, 87576 (Iowa 2009) (discussing constitutional supremacy).
3

The AFSCME Court left open what action it would take if the other two branches refused to take action, or were
deadlocked over taking action, to satisfy the States contract obligation, trusting that the goodwill and respect for
the rule of law of the other two branches would obviate the need for any such action, which, apparently, it did. Id.
at 396.
.
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Additionally, adopting the Legislators position would create fundamental separation of

power problems.
First, if the scope of one branchs constitutional authority is to be curtailed at the point
at which it interferes with an existing statute, the legislature could completely eliminate the
Governors item veto authority by placing language in any statute prohibiting the Governor
from vetoing any appropriation associated with carrying out that statute. Further, the judicial
branchs constitutional authority of judicial review would be meaningless since it could not be
exercised whenever it resulted in invalidating an existing statute.
Second, under the Legislators argument, the entire Iowa Code would become a limit on
the executive branchs item veto authority. The courts would be embroiled in endless litigation
over the legitimacy of a veto that arguably interfered with the operation of an existing statute.
In support of their argument that there must be external limits on the Governors item
veto power, the Legislators posited the hypothetical of the Governor vetoing the entire
appropriation for the judicial branch, thereby eliminating an entire branch of government.
While this is an interesting scenario to ponder, it is not the scenario at issue. The Governors
veto does not conflict with any other provision of the constitution. This would likely be a
different case if the veto at issue placed two constitutional provisions at loggerheads.
In summary, the Iowa Constitution gives the Governor the power to use the item veto.
The only limitations on that power are that the veto be of an item in an appropriation bill.
When the Governor acts within those limitations in exercising his item veto power, he acts
within constitutional bounds. The vetoes at issue in this case were of items within
appropriation bills. The vetoes were, therefore, constitutional and must be upheld.

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RULING AND ORDER

For all of the reasons just stated, the Governors Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED and the Legislators Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The petition is
dismissed and the costs of this action are assessed to the plaintiffs.

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State of Iowa Courts

Type:

OTHER ORDER

Case Number
CVCV050143

Case Title
HOMAN, TAYLOR, ET AL VS BRANSTAD AND PALMER
So Ordered

Electronically signed on 2015-11-03 08:03:21

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