The First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813) and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Eastern

Question
Author(s): Lawrence P. Meriage
Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Sep., 1978), pp. 421-439
Published by: Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
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LAWRENCE

P.

MERIAGE

The First Serbian Uprising(1804-1813) and the

Nineteenth-Century
Originsof the Eastern Question

Throughoutthe nineteenth
centurya major international
issue facingthe Great
Powers of Europe was the volatile "Eastern Question." As the OttomanEmpire grew steadilyweaker,the questionof the futuredispositionof its extensive
territories(some 238,000 square miles in Europe alone in 1800) provokedan
intenseand prolongedrivalryamongthose European stateswithvestedpolitical
and economicinterestsin the Near East. With its militarypower in declineand
its frontiers
menacedby powerfulneighbors,the OttomanEmpire seemedon the
vergeof collapseat the beginningof the nineteenth
centurydespiteits imposing
imperialedifice.Moreover,a new dimensionwas added to the dangersalready
the territorial
of the empirewhen a militantmovementfor
threatening
integrity
provincialreformamong the Serbian populationof the pashalik (province) of
Belgrade evolved into an armed insurrectionagainst the imperialgovernment.
This challengeto Ottomanauthorityby indigenousBalkan forcestouched in
varyingways and degreesthe interestsof the several powers-France, Russia,
Austria,and Britain-directlyinvolvedin the affairsof the Near East. Indeed,
the reactionsof these powers towardthe "First Serbian Uprising" (1804-13)
revealedforthefirsttimethe broad outlinesof the classic patternsof nineteenthcenturyGreat-Powerdiplomacyin the Near East. In this regard,the uprising
foretoldthe openingof a new era in the historyof the Eastern Question.
Westernscholars,however,have failedto appreciatethissignificant
development.1Historicalinvestigation
of the nineteenth-century
originsof the Eastern
Question has, for the most part,focusedon the Greek Revolution (1821-30),
whilein turntreatingthe Serbianuprisingprimarily
as a symnptom
of the internal
ofthe OttomanEmpire.The commentsby L. S. Stavrianoson the
disintegration
relativeimportanceof the Serbianuprisingvis-'a-visthatof the Greekrevoltare
a case in point:
The revoltof the Greeksin 1821 followedthatof the Serbs in timebut not
in importance.The Greekrevolutionwas a muchmore significant
affairfor
Europe as well as forthe Balkan Peninsula.The Serbianrevolutioninvolved
simplythe controlof the Belgrade pashalik.But the Greek revolution,be1. The failure of Western scholars to recognize some of the ramificationsof the Serbian
revolt can be ascribed in part to the paucity of moniographicliterature on the subject in
Western languages. Until very recently,the only study to deal with the revolt in its entirety
was writtenby the great German historian Leopold Ranke, The History of Servia an1dthe
Servian Revolution, trans. Mrs. Alexander Kerr (London, 1853). A newly published work
by Michael Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918 (New York, 1976), was unavailable for thisstudy.

The author would like to express his appreciation to the General Research Fund at the
Universityof Kansas for support which was instrumentalin the completion of this article.

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422

Slavic Review
cause of the strategiclocationof the Greek lands, raised basic questionsof
Near Eastern strategyand broughtthe great powers into sharp and open
conflict.Likewise, the Serbian uprisingwas essentiallya local movement
withlittleeffecton the rest of the empire.But the Greek insurrection
had
widespreadand lastingrepercussions,
the reason beingthatthe Greekshad
playeda muchmore importantrole in imperialaffairsthan had the Serbs.2

This viewpointis shared by otherdistinguishedauthoritieson miodernBalkan

history.Charlesand Barbara Jelavichwrite: "The Serbian revolt,carriedout in
a remotesectionof Europe, had no significant
internationalrepercussions;the
second Balkan revolution,that of the Greeks,dominatedthe diplomacyof the
period."3Althoughthe importanceof the Greekrevoltin the historyof the Balkans and thatof the Eastern Questionis beyonddispute,the significance
of the
Serbianinsurrection
has beenunderestimated.
In February1804, the Serbian peasantryof the Belgrade pashalik,aroused
bythecorruptand despoticruleoflocal Ottolman
tyrants,rose in armedrebellion.
The usurpationof power in Belgradeby the commandersof mutinousOttoman
forces(Janissaries)was thepreambleto a three-year
reignof terrorthatvictimized the Muslimas well as the Serbiancommunity.4
Led by the illiteratepeasant
livestockdealer Djordje Petrovic(betterknownas Karadjordje), Serbiandissidents,withthe connivanceof provincialMuslim landowners(sipahis) and merchants,acted in the name of Sultan Selim III to break the power of the Janissaries. Thus, initially,the Serbian uprisingwas no more than a desperatereaction against intolerablelocal conditions,accompaniedby Serbian demands for
the restorationof the relativelyenlightenedprovincialadministrative
practices
thatprevailedbefore1801.5
As the firstrebelmilitaryoperationsachievedsuccess,the uprisingevolved
intoa movement
forpoliticalautonomyin searchof international
guarantees.AlthoughwaningSerbianconfidencein the willingnessand abilityof the sultanto
restoreand to maintainorder in the Belgrade pashalikwas furtherreducedby
his failureto imposehis will on theJanissariesby force,the attitudeof the insurgentstowardthe imperialgovernmentremainedconciliatoryprior to 1807. In
orderto eliminatethepossibilityof the repetitionof the currentabuses,the rebel
leadershipconcludedthatthe rightsexercisedby the Serbiansbefore1801 must
be expandedand safeguardedby a foreignprotector-namely,
Austriaor Russia.
From the Serbianpointof view thesetwo powerswere logical choices,not
only on the basis of geography,politics,and culture,but also because of their
in Balkan affairs.However,althoughthe Serbians had reason
long involvement
2. L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York, 1958), p. 269.
3. Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Balka-nis(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), p. 48.
4. Dusan Pantelic, Beogradski Pasalck posle svistovskog mira, 1791-1794 (Belgrade,
1927); Dusan Pantelic, Beogradski Pawaluk pred prvi srpski ustantak (Belgrade, 1949);
Stojan Novakovic, Ustanak na dahije (Belgrade, 1904); Miroslav Djordjevic, Poiiticka
istorija Srbije XIX i XX veka, vol. 1: 1804-1813 (Belgrade, 1956), pp. 25-54; Matija
Nenadovic, The Memoirs of Prota Matija Nenadovic, ed. and trans. Lovett F. Edwards
(London, 1969), pp. 55-59; Ranke, The History of Servia, pp. 66-71.
5. Dragoslav Jankovic, ed., Francuska stampa o prvom srpskom ustanku (Belgrade,
1959), pp. 23-24, 40-41; Stojan Novakovic, Vaskrs drzave srpske (Belgrade, 1904), p. 34;
Novakovic, Ustanak na dahije, pp. 203-5; Grgur Jaksic, Evropa i vaskrs Srbije, 1804-1834
(Belgrade, 1963), pp. 28-29; Milenko Vukicevic, Karadjordje, vol. 2 (Belgrade, 1912),
pp. 240-42, 305-7.

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First Serbian Uprising

423

hearingin Vienna and St. Petersburg,theirpleas were

to expecta sympathetic
not well received.In respondingto a Serbian petitionfor Austrianmilitaryaid
in mid-March1804,6Emperor Francis I declared his neutralityin the affair,
orderedtheborderbetweenAustriaand the Belgradepashalikclosedto all traffic,
with the Janissariesthrough
and urged the rebels to resolve theirdifferences
In November1804,Russia's foreignminister,Prince Adam
Austrianmediation.7
respondedto a similarappeal by the SerbiansforRussian assistance
Czartoryski,
by tellinga Serbiandeputationthat"Serbia and Russia are veryfarapartand we
are at peace withthe Turks."8Both Austriaand Russia were intenton avoiding
on checking
in the Near East whiletheyconcentrated
complications
international
Frenchexpansionin Europe.
neitherAustrianor Russia was able, in the long run,to avoid
Nevertheless,
in the Serbian revolt.The penetrationof the Balkans by European
involvement
political
drewthe Serbiansintothe international
Great-Powerrivalriesultimately
arena. The appearanceof the Serbianquestionon the European diplomaticscene
designson the eastwas in parta directconsequenceof Napoleon's imperialistic
ernMediterranean.
The firsttangibleevidenceof such designswas apparentwiththe collapseof
the VenetianRepublic and the partitionof its territoriesbetweenFrance and
Austria.In theTreatyof Campo Formio (October 17, 1797), France recognized
been Venetian Istria and Dalmatia,
Austria's annexationof what had formerly
whilein turnacquiringpossessionofthe Ionian Islands and theadjacentAlbanian
coastline.9But thisstateof affairsdid not endureforverylong. FollowingNapoleon's victoriesover the combinedAustro-Russianarmiesat Ulm (October 17,
1805) and Austerlitz(December 2, 1805), France became a powerfulfactor
in the Balkans. While the Russians retreated,the Austrians,who had hastily
sued forpeace,were forcedby the Treatyof Pressburg(December 26, 1805) to
cede all of VenetianIstria and Dalmatia to the newlycreatedKingdomof Italy,
of which Napoleon was acknowledgedas king. Above all, Bonaparte's daring
Egyptianexpeditionof 1798-99 signaledthe abandonmentof an old principleof
of the Ottoman
Frenchforeignpolicy,namely,the preservationof the integrity
Empire. Napoleon's Near Eastern policy now pointedtowardthe eventualdismemberment
oftheOttomanEmpire,withFrance takingthe largestshare.Partitionwas, however,a long-rangeobjective.In the meantime,Napoleon managed
6. Sergeant-Major Johann Wittanovitch to the General Command in Temesvar, March
11, 1804, in Spisi be3kih arhiva o prvomt srpskom.ustanku,5 vols., ed. Aleksa Ivic (Subotica,
1935-39), 1:34 (hereafter cited as SBA); Karadjordje, Janko Katic, and others to Colonel
G. Tomerlin, March 19, 1804, ibid., p. 56; Jakov Nenadovic and Karadjordje to Stevan
Stratimirovic,March 23, 1804, ibid., p. 69; Jakov Nenadovic and Karadjordje to General
G. Geneyne,March 23, 1804, ibid.; copy of a report to Francis I regarding the Serbian uprising,May 24, 1804, in Valtazar Bogishich, ed., Raczborsochineniia N. A. Popova "Rossiia
i Serbiia" (St. Petersburg, 1872), pp. 34-35; Adolph Beer, Die orientalische Politik
Oesterreichs seit 1774 (Prague, 1883), pp. 183-84, 188.
7. General G. Geneyne to the Serbian insurgents,April 1804, SBA, 1:85-86; memorandum,Vienna, May 25, 1804, ibid., pp. 154-60; Beer, Die orientalischePolitik Oesterreichs,
pp. 189-90, 196.
8. Quoted in Nenadovic, The Memnoirsof Prota Matija Nentadovic,p. 114.
9. Referring to the Treaty of Campo Formio, Bernard Lewis writes: "France, the
traditional ally of the Ottoman Empire, had become her neighbor and ancient friendship
could not stand the shock" (Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modert Turkey [Oxford
and London, 1961], p. 65).

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424

Slavic Review

to concealhis trueambitionswhiledirectinghis attentionto the more immediate

problemof solicitingthe sultan'ssupportin the continuingbattleagainstBritain
and Russia.
To tsaristofficials,
FrenchNear Eastern-policyposed a challengeto Russia's
traditionalgoal of establishingan exclusivesphereof influencein the regionof
the Straitsof the Bosporusand the Dardanelles.Tsar AlexanderI counteredthe
traditionalRussian
threatof Frenchexpansionin the Balkans by strengthening
ties withtinyMontenegroin orderto securea naval base forRussia's Mediterraneansquadronon the southeasterncoast of the Adriatic Sea.10 Moreover,on
September23, 1805 the Russians obtaineda renewalof the Russo-Turkishalliance of 1799,whichostensibly
broughtthe OttomanEmpireintotheThird Coaliwhileacknowlof theother'sterritories
tion; each powerguaranteedtheintegrity
forthedefenseoftheStraits."
edgingjointresponsibility
Napoleon's star,however,was thenapproachingits zenith.Tlhe resounding
Frenchtriumphsat Ulm and AusterlitzbroughtFrance into diplomaticascendancyat the SublimePorte. These victoriesconvincedSelim thatin joiningthe
anti-Frenchcoalitionhe had allied withthe losingside, and he thereuponrefused
to ratifythe September23 agreementwith Russia. Napoleon,actingquicklyto
diplomatic
capitalizeon his increasedstaturein Istanbul,launcheda two-pronged
offensive,
the primaryobjectiveof whichwas the formationof an anti-Russian
alliancewiththe Porte. GeneralHorace Sebastiani,the newlyappointedFrench
ambassadorat the Sublime Porte, was instructedto secure the closure of the
to reassertits absoStraitsto Russian vessels,to urge the Ottomangovernment
luteauthority
over the Danubian Principalities(Moldavia and Wallachia) which
to persuade
had been underRussian protectionsince 1774, and, mostimportant,
the stultan
to join withFrance and Persia in forminga coalitionagainstRussia.12
French agentswere dispatchedto various regionsof the Balkans
Concurrently,
withinstructions
to undermineRussian influenceamong the Balkan Christians,
and the French consulatesin the capitals of Moldavia (Jassy) and Wallachia
(Bucharest) becamethe principalcentersof anti-Russianintriguein the area.13
Moreover,Sebastianiintimatedthat France was preparedto back an Ottoman
effort
to recoverthe northerncoast of the Black Sea (particularlythe Crimea)
recently
seizedbyCatherinetheGreatofRussia.
In his efforts
to inflameRusso-Turkishrelations,Napoleon made considerable use of the Serbianquestion.Indeed, Napoleon consideredthe Serbian revolt
as
to be the mnost
the Ottomangovernment
seriousinternalproblemconfronting
well as a major obstacleto the consolidationof an effective
anti-Russiancoalition.14Napoleon's agentsat the Porte accusedthe Russians of incitingthe rebel10. Norman E. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807 (Chicago, 1970), pp.
196-202.
11. For the completetext of the treaty,see Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX
veka, ed. A. L. Narochnitskii (Moscow, 1960- ), 2: 584-94 (hereafter cited as VPR).
12. V. G. Sirotkin, "Franko-russkaia diplomaticheskaia bor'ba na Balkanakh i plary
sozdaniia Slaviano-Serbskogo gosudarstva v 1806-1807 gg," Uchenye zapiski Instituta
Slavianovedeniia,25 (1962): 175.
13. Paul F. Shupp, The Eutropean Powers and the Near Eastern Question, 1806-1807
(New York, 1931), pp. 51-52; A. M. Stanislavskaia, Rtssko-antgliiskieotnoshetniia
i problemty
Sredizeinnomior'ia,1798-1807 (Moscow, 1962), p. 435; Saul, Russia and the Mediterraneat,
p. 212.
14. Shupp, The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question, pp. 73-74.

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First Serbian Uprising

425

lion in orderto promotetsaristdesignson the OttomanEmpire.15In a personal

note addressedto Selim on June20, 1806, Napoleon characterizedthe Serbian
revoltas a productof Russian diplomacyand accordinglyadvised the sultan
againstallowingRussia to participatein any subsequentSerbo-Turkishnegotiations.16In the eventthatthe Serbiansof the Belgradepashalikmanaged,under
Russian tutelage,to gain autonomousstatusakin to thatof the Danubian Principalities,otherBalkan Christians,Napoleon warned,would be encouragedto seek
thedownfallofthe OttomanEmpire.17
similarconcessionsand therebyprecipitate
no evidenceexiststo suggestthatRussia was directlyinvolvedin the
Althoughi
Serbianrevoltpriorto the summerof 1806,18Napoleon firmlybelievedits suppressionwould lead to diminishedRussian influencein the OttomanEmpire.19
in the Ottomancapitaland on the Balkan mainThe riseofFrenchinfluence
land in 1805-6 was a sourceof growingconcernto statesmenin Vienna and St.
Petersburg.For thatreason,earlyin 1806,a major Serbiandiplomaticinitiative
to solicitsupportfromAustria and Russia produceda more favorablereaction
thanhad been the case in the precedingtwo years.20Because of the diminution
of Habsburgprestigeanidinfluencein the Balkans afterthe Treatyof Pressburg,
feltconstrainedto modifyits earlierstanceon the Serthe Austriangovernment
bian questionin the hope of reassertingAustria's Balkan interests.2'Fearful
thatanotherrebuffmightforcethe Serbiansto turneitherto France or to Russia, Francis I offeredthe servicesof his brother,ArchdukeKarl, as a mediator
in the wideningconflictbetweenthe Serbian rebels and the Ottoman Porte.22
in OttomandomesticafSelimnrefusedto countenanceany foreigninterference
rejectedthe Austrianproposal for mediafairs,however,and correspondingly
tion.23The rejectionof Francis's overtureswas an indicationof the diplomatic
forNapoleon had urgedthe sultanto
at the Porte afterAusterlitz,24
realignment
subduethe Serbiansby forceof arms withoutany foreigninvolvement.
On theRussian side,PrinceCzartoryski
was also reevaluatingRussia's position on the Serbian revolt.The anti-Russianintriguesof French agents in the
Balkans convincedCzartoryskiof the necessityof adoptinga more activepolicy
towardthe Serbians so that theywould not be inclinedto look to France for
15. Vernon J. Puryear, Napoleont antd the Dardanelles (Berkeley and Los Aingeles,
1951), p. 90.
16. Sirotkin, "Franko-russkaia diplomaticheskaiabor'ba na Balkaniakh," p. 176; Stanislavskaia, Russko-antgliiskie
otnoshenjiia,
p. 446.
17. Shupp, The EutropeanPozwers and the Near EasterntQuestion, p. 74.
18. Ibid., p. 63; Benjamin Kallay, Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstantdes,1807-1810
(Vienna, 1910), p. 14.
19. Shupp, The Eutropean.Powers and the Near Eastern Questiont,p. 74.
20. Karadjordje to Emperor Francis I, January 24, 1806, SBA, 3:16-19; Karadjordje
to Baroni Stiirmer,January 24, 1806, ibid., pp. 14-15; Vuki6evi6, Karadjordje, pp. 305-9,
315-16; Karadjordje and Matija Nenadovic to Alexander I, December 12, 1805, VPR,
3:666, n. 70; 0. M. Bodiainskii,"Predstavlenie serbskoi deputatsii k russkomu iniperatoru,
v fevrale1806 v Ven," in Chteniia v itnperatorskonobshchestveistorii i drevntostei
rossiiskikh
pri Moskovskomn
no. 3 (1871), pp. 122-29.
uniiversitete,
21. Shupp, Th.e European Powers and the Near Eastern Questiow,pp. 34-35.
22. Francis I to Selim III, March 12, 1806, SBA, 3:69-71; Beer, Die orientalische
Politik Oesterreichs,p. 194.
23. SelimnIII to Francis I, April 25, 1806,SBA, 3:120-21.
24. A. D. Novichev, Istoriia Turtsii, part 2, vol. 1 (Leningrad, 1968), pp. 78-79; Saul,
Russia antdthe Mediterranean,pp. 211-16; Vuki6evic, Karadjordje, pp. 337-40.

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426

Slavic Review

support.25
Moreover,Czartoryski
had cometo believethatifthe steadydeteriorationin Russo-Turkishrelationsled to war the OttomanEmpirewas doomedand
facedimminent
partition.Withthispossibilityin mind,Czartoryskirecommended
to thetsarthe creationof a South Slavic Balkan statethatwould enjoy internal
autonomywhilebeing subordinateto Russia in externalmatters.This proposed
statewould serve as a bufferzone betweenany remainingOttomanterritory
in
the easternBalkans and the Frenchbastionin Dalmatia to the west. In anticipationof continuedRusso-Frenchhostilities,Czartoryskialso suggestedthe possibilityof utilizingsuch a stateas an advancebase fromwhichRussian troopsand
South Slavic auxiliary units, particularlythe battle-hardenedSerbians, could
strikea diversionary
blow againstFrenchforcesdefendingDalmatia and Italy.26
While Czartoryskiwas thus contemplating
several options in the event of a
rupturein Russo-Turkishrelations,he providedthe Serbianrebelswithmonetary
supportand advised themto seek a negotiatedsettlement
withthe Porte under
the auspices of the Russian ministerin Istanbul.But as long as the possibility
existedfora peacefuldenouement
of thedeepeningcrisisbetweenRussia and the
OttomanEmpire, Tsar Alexander maintainedcorrectrelationswith the Porte
and refusedto becomeinvolvedin theturbulent
affairsofthe Belgradepashalik.27
Napoleon also appreciatedthe geographicaland strategicimplicationsof
possibleSerbo-Russianmilitarycollaboration
forhis own positionin the Balkans.
Britishnavalhegemony
in theMediterranean
had forcedFranceto establishtransBalkan lines of communication
and trade linkingParis withIstanbulby way of
Salonika, Bosnia, and French-dominated
Dalmatia. Moreover,this communications axis also served French economicinterestsby functioningas a conduit
throughwhichNear Eastern cottonboundfor Frenchmillswas transported.If
Russia succeededin establishinga footholdon the southbank of the Danube in
theBelgradepashalik,thisimportant
and commercial
communication
arterywould
be endangered.28
Of thepowersinvolvedin theaffairsofthe Near East onlyGreatBritainhad
no abidinginterestin the Serbian question.The primaryobjectivesof Britain's
Near Eastern policy were the maintenanceof naval masteryover the eastern
Mediterraneanand the preservationof the British-Russian-Turkish
coalition
againstFrance. Britainevincedconcernover the eventstranspiringin the Belgradepashalikonlyinsofaras Ottomansuspicionsof Russian intrigueamongthe
Serbiansweregeneratingconsiderablefriction
betweenSt. Petersburgand Istanbul. The Britishambassadorat thePorte,Sir CharlesArbuthnot,
believedin 1806
that a peacefulsettlementof the Serbian problemwould ease Russo-Turkish
tensionand possiblyavertwar.29However,Arbuthnot'shopes for an early reconciliationbetween the Porte and its disenchantedSerbian subjects proved
illusory.
In the winterand springof 1806,withassurancesof Frenchsupport,Selim
mobilizedhis armedforcesfora majoroffensive
againstthe Serbians; he also took
25. Shupp, The European Powversand the Near Eastern Question, p. 21.

bor'ba na Balkanakh,"p. 177.

diplomaticheskaia
26. Sirotkin,"Franko-russkaia
27. A. Ia. Budbergto I. I. Michelson,September24, 1806,in V. N. Avtokratovand
R. E. Al'tshuller,eds., "Iz istoriipomoshchiRossii serbskomunarodu v period pervogo
narodnogovosstaniia,"Istoricheskiiarkhiv,1960,no. 1-6, p. 119; Shupp, The European

Powers and the Near Eastern Question, pp. 252-53.

28. J. E. Driault, Napoleon en Italie, 1801-1812 (Paris, 1900), pp. 644-50.
29. Shupp, The European Powers and the Near Eastert Question, pp. 183-84.

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First Serbian Uprising

427

in Bessarabia
stepsto bolsterOttomandefensesalong theRusso-Turkishfrontier
as well as those along the Danube againstpossiblehostilemoves on the part of
the Russians or their British allies.30Moreover, Selim imposed sanctionson
Russian importsand closedthe Straitsto all Russian naval and commercialtraffic.31In August 1806, Russo-Turkishrelationswere furtherstrainedby Selim's
dismissalof the pro-Russianhospodars(governors) of the Danubian Principalities withoutthe consentof the tsar,in open violationof a prioragreementwith
Russia.32The sultandefendedhis actionson thegroundsthatthe hospodarswere
abettingthe Serbianrebelsat thebehestoftheirRussian sponsors.In theirplace,
Selimappointedmenofpronouncedpro-Frenchsympathies.
of Frenchdiplomacyat the Porte seemedto augura fundaThe preeminence
mentalalterationin the balance of powerin the Near East. Tsar Alexanderwas
especiallyalarmedby the growthof French influencein the Principalities(beof southernRussia) and by the sultan's
to the frontiers
cause of theirproximity
thatOttosuggestedto tsaristofficials
Both developments
closureofthe Straits.33
man foreignpolicywas beingdictatedby Napoleon. Vigorous Russian protests,
supportedby GreatBritain,overthe removaloftheformerhospodarsled to their
reinstatement
in mid-October1806.34But Selim's refusalto yieldto Russian demands for the expulsionof Sebastiani fromIstanbul and the free passage of
Russianvesselsthroughthe StraitspromptedRussia's invasionand occupationof
the Principalitiesin late October and early November 1806.36These Russian
to forcethe Straits
military
measuresweresupportedby an abortiveBritisheffort
withnaval gunfire.36
The Ottomangovernment
respondedto theseacts of aggression witha declarationof war againstRussia and Great Britainon January5,
1807.
When the war brokeout the situationin the Belgradepashalikseemedideal
A chainof Serbian militaryvictories,culminatingin the
forRussian interests.37
captureofthecitadelsat Belgrade (December29, 1806) and Sabac (February6,
1807) thatleftthe rebelsin completecontrolof the Belgrade pashalik,made a
pronouncedimpressionin St. Petersburg.38Russian strategistshoped to use
Karadjordje's cadres, now some 30,000 strong,as the connectinglink joining
unitsof Russia's Moldavianarmyoperatingin the Principalitieswithcontingents
of Vice-AdmiralS. N. Seniavin's Mediterraneanfleetstationedin Montenegro,
J. Shaw,BetweentheOld and theNew: The OttomanEmpireunderSelim
30. Stanford
Mass.,1971),p. 335.
III, 1789-1807(Cambridge,
31. Shupp,The EstropeanPowers and theNear EasternQuestion,p. 55; Boris Mouraau milieu des guerresNapoleonnes (Neuchatel, 1954),
vieff,L'Alliance Russo-Turqutie
pp.205-6.
32. AndreiIa. Italinskiito Budberg,August23, 1806,VPR, 3:263-69.
ruisskagoistori33. AlexanderI to Italinskii,March 8, 1806,SbornikImnperatorskago
148 vols. (St. Petersburg,1867-1916),82:325-28 (hereaftercited
cheskagoobshchestva,
as SIRIO).
34. Italinskiito AlexanderI, October18,1806,VPR, 3:713,n. 247.
35. AlexanderI to GeneralI. I. Michelson,November4, 1806,in A. N. Petrov,Voina
Rossii s Turtsiei,1806-1812,3 vols. (St. Petersburg,1885-87), 1:380-81; AlexanderI to
December27,1806,VPR, 3:439-42.
GeneralM. F. Kamenskii,
36. Shupp,The EuropeanPowers and theNear Eastern Question,pp. 364-91.
des serbischen
December4, 1806,in Kallay,Die Geschichte
37. AlexanderI to Michelson,
p. 15.
Aufstandes,
ratsrpskihustanika,1804-1806(Belgrade,1967),
38. MiroslavDjordjevic,Oslobodilaciki
pp.372-75.

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therebyforminga continuousfrontstretchingfromthe Dniester River to the

AdriaticSea. This strategywas intendedto serve the dual purpose of holding
the Ottomansat bay in theeast whilesimultaneously
guardingagainsta possible
Frenchincursionintothe Balkans fromthewest.39In orderto lure the Serbians
into militaryalliance with Russia, tsaristagents informedKaradjordje and his
cohortsofthetsar'sreadinessto promotetheirindependence
fromOttomanrule.40
Russian appeals to the Serbians were repletewith referencesto the common
spiritualand racialbondsthatlinkedRussiansand Serbians.
As relationsbetweenRussia and the Ottoman Porte deterioratedat an
acceleratingrate throughout1806, Selim hastenedto make an accommodation
withthe Serbiansin orderto blockpossible Serbo-Russianmilitarycooperation
duringthe impendingconflictwithRussia.41The termsof a settlement
proposed
by the sultanwould have been acceptableto the Serbiansin 1804, but the mood
in the Serbiancamp had becomeless amenableto compromiseby the beginning
of 1807. The Russian offerto supporta Serbianeffort
to eliminateall vestigesof
Ottomanauthorityover the Belgradepashalik,togetherwiththe Serbian victories over the local Janissariesand over two formidableOttomanexpeditionary
forcesdispatchedby the sultan in 1805 and 1806, stimulatedSerbian political
aspirations.The rebel leaders accordinglyrejected the conciliatoryOttoman
peace offering,
declaredthe Belgrade pashalik independentfromOttomanrule
in March 1807, and joined withRussia in wagingwar againstthe Porte.42
The promiseto supportSerbian independencefromOttomanrule notwithstanding,the Russian government
viewedSerbianaspirationsas beingincompatible withits interests.So long as the Russo-TurkishWar (1806-12) continued,
however,Russia regardedthe Belgrade pashalik as an advantageousmilitary
outpostin the Balkans and the Serbianarmyas a usefulauxiliaryforceforthe
furtherance
ofRussianpolicyin theNear East. Duringtheconflict,
tsaristofficials
consistently
endeavoredto exertsome measureof controlover the domesticand
foreignpoliciesinitiatedby the Serbianleadersto assure theircontinuedmilitary
cooperation.Ideally, the Russian governmentfavoredretainingsome type of
patron-client
relationshipwiththe Serbians.Althoughthe optimumsolutionfor
St. Petersburgmightwell have been the creationof a dependentSerbianprincipalityruled by a Russian grand duke, the most realisticalternative,given the
prevailinginternational
climateof opinion,was the restorationof nominalOttoman sovereignty
over the BelgradepashalikunderRussian guardianship.43
And
in returnforadditionalconcessionsin the farmore strategically
eventually,
located Danubian Principalities,
Russia evinceda readinessto abandonthe Serbians
entirely.In the finalanalysis,Russian policytowardthe Serbian rebels in the
39. Vukicevi6, Karadjordje, pp. 457-58; Shupp, The European Powers and the Near
Eastert Qutestion,pp. 459-60.
40. Michelson to Karadjordje, January23, 1807, VPR, 3:378-79.
41. Vukicevic, Karadjordje, p. 418; Shaw, Betzw'eenthe Old and the Nezv, pp. 350-51;
Mittesser to General G. Geneyne, September 25, 1806, and Stevan Stratimirovi6'sobservations on the Serbian insurrection,November 1, 1806, SBA, 3:359-61; Report of Franz Klezl,
March 10, 1807, SBA, 4:257-59; Jankovic, Francuska stampa, pp. 187, 211-12.
42. Metropolitan Leontije to C. Ipsilanti, April 16, 1807, Milenko Vuki6evi6, "Pisma iz
prvog i drugog ustanka," Spoinienik,37 (1900): 136-37; Vuki6evi6, Ka-adjordje, p. 474;
Jankovi6,FranicuskaRtamipa,
p. 218.
43. N. P. Rumiantsevto General M. I. Kamenskii, February 19, 1810, VPR, 5:361-67.

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429

in Franco-Russian
periodfrom1807 to 1812 was determinedby the fluctuations
relations.
Defeatedonce again by the Frenchat the battleof Friedlandin mid-June,
Tsar Alexanderabandonedhis Britishallies and made peace with Napoleon at
Tilsit on July7-9, 1807.44As part of the Tilsit pact, Napoleon was obligedto
mediatepeace betweenRussia and the OttomanEmpire in returnfora commitIn the eventthat
mentbyAlexanderto promotea Franco-Britishrapprochement.
Frenchmediationfailedto end the Russo-TurkishWar, the two emperorsagreed
to act in concertto solve the Eastern Question.The actual termsforthe solution
of this problem,however,were leftto the futurebecauiseeach partyrefusedto
acknowledgethe other'sclaimsto Istanbuland the Straits.Under those circumstancestheyagreed in principleonlyto "liberate"the Balkans, withthe notable
to the west.
exceptionof Istanbuland the adjoiningRumelianhiinterland
On August24, 1807,Russia signeda truceagreementwiththe Porte under
French auspices in whichno mentionwas made of the Serbians.45During the
two yearsthatthe uneasyarmisticeremainedoperative,the Tilsit partnerstried
agreeand mutuallysatisfactory
unsuccessfully
to negotiatea morefundamental
mnent
on theNear East. The discussionsabouta possiblepartitionofthe Ottoman
1808 in St. Petersburgas bothsides attempted
to work
Empireresumedin M\arch
task
out the detailsfora finalresolutionof the Eastern Question. The difficult
facingRussia's new foreignminister,Count N. P. Rumiantsev,and the French
ambassador,A. 0. Caulaincourt,on the occasion of these negotiationswas accentuatedby theirawarenessthat no plan for partitioncould ignorelegitimate
in the Balkans. In recognitionof this factor
Austrian "geographic"initerests
Rumiantsevoffered
to concedethe Belgradepashalikto Austria,providedFrance
approvedRussia's proposal to annex Bessarabia, the Danubian Principalities,
and iBulgariain additionto Istanbul and the Straits. However, Caulaincourt's
refusalevento considertheRussian demandsforthe Straitsand Istanbulresulted
in thesuspensionofthetalks.46
The inabilityto resolvethe Straitsquestionrevealedseriousweaknessesin
the Tilsit partnership
and precludedgenuineand permanentcooperation.In late
alliancewithRussia
summer1808 Napoleon movedto bolsterthe disintegrating
duringhis meetingwithAlexanderat Erfurt.On thisoccasionNapoleon secretly
consentedto Alexander'splans to retainpermanentpossessionof the Principalities.47In the immediateaftermathof the ErfurtconferenceRussia moved to
legitimizeits de factodominationof the Principalitiesthroughdirectnegotiations
withthe Porte. The openingof a Russo-Turkishpeace conference,
delayedby a
series of bloodypalace revoltsin Istanbul which includedthe assassinationof
II to the imperialthrone,finally
and the elevationof his cousin Mahnmud
Selimn
44. For the entire text of the Treaty of Tilsit, see V7PR, 3:631-49; for analyses of the
impact of the treaty on the Ottoman Empire, see Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles,
pp. 191-95, and Shupp, The European. Powers antdthe Near EasterntQuestion, pp. 545-46.
45. Petrov, Voina Rossii s Tutrtsiei,2:405-8; Stiirmer to Stadion, August 25, 1807,
SBA, 4:776-78; Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, pp. 213-14; Shupp, The Eutropean
Powers and the Near EasterntQtuestion,pp. 555-56.
46. Serge Tatistcheff,Alexander Ie et Napoleon: D'apres leutrcorrespondenceinedite,
1801-1812 (Plaris, 1891), pp. 303-78; Puryear, Napoleonl anid the Dardanelles, pp. 281-305.
47. Articles 8 and 9 of the Erfurt Convention relate to the transfer of the Danubian
Principalities to Russia, while article 11 guarantees the integrity of all other Ottoman
see VPR, 4:359-63.
territories.For the fulltext of the conventioni,

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took place in March 1809 in the cityof Jassy.The negotiationsfounderedimmediatelyoverthe new sultan'sadamantrefusalto yieldto the Russian sine qua
non forthe restoration
of peace, namely,the cessionof the Principalitiesto Russia.48The Russians respondedby abruptlyterminating
the talks, declaringthe
armisticeat an end,and resumingmilitaryoperationsalong the Danube in early
autumn.
The resumptionof Russo-Turkishhostilitiesbroughtimmediatereliefto
the Serbianarmywhichhad been underintenseOttomanmilitarypressuresince
the late springof 1809. Afterthe collapseof the Jassynegotiationsthe Russians
had movedslowlyin mobilizingfor the summercampaign.The Ottomanstook
advantageof this respiteby launchinga massive offensiveagainstthe Serbians
in an effort
to crushthe revoltbeforethe Moldavian armytook the field.49The
Serbianshad managedto withstandthe initialassault,but resistancewas crumbling rapidlywhen the anticipatedRussian offensivefinallybegan in September
1809. The capitulationoftheOttomanfortresses
of Braila and Ismail,major links
in thechainof OttomanDanubiainfortifications,
forcedtheTurks to breakoffthe
battlewiththe Serbiansand to retireto the lower Danube in orderto stemthe
Russian advance.50The Serbians used the opportunity
providedby the withdrawal of the Ottomaninvasionforceto restoretheirbattereddefensesand to
consolidatetheir positions.By mid-Julyof the followingyear 3,500 Russian
regularshad joined withelementsof the Serbian armyto conductjoint military
operationsagainst Ottomanauxiliaryforcesstationedin the adjoiningNis and
Vidin pashaliks.51
Meanwhilethe Austriangovernmentobservedwith mountinganxietythe
success of Russia's armed forcesalonigthe Danube in 1809 and 1810. Indeed,
throughout
the Russo-TurkishWar, Austrianpolicywas stronglyinfluencedby
theapprehension
arousedbytheexplosivesituationwhichRussian militaryoperationsin the Balkanshad created.Tnparticular,the appearanceof Russian troops
in and aroundthe Belgradepashalikin 1810 caused graveconcernin Vienna. To
Habsburgofficials
thepresenceof Russian militaryunitsamongthe Serbiansnot
only threatenedthe securityof Austria's southernfrontiersbut also disrupted
Austria's lucrativeLevant trade. The Treaty of Pressburghad precipitateda
major shiftin Austriantrade patternsin the Near East. AfterNapoleon had
strippedAustriaof its maritimeprovincesalong the Adriaticcoast, the bulk of
Austria's Levant trade was divertedoverlandacross the Balkan mainlandvia
Belgradeand Nis to Salonika.52Concurrently
the volumeof Austriancomnmerce
on theDanube inicreased
sharply.This basic shiftin Austria'sNear Easterntrade
routesplaced the troubledBelgrade pashalikin a key positionas the principal
arterythroughwhichAustriangoods weretransported
to Near Easternmarkets;
thepashalikbecamea major tradingpartnerof the Habsburg Monfurthermore,
archy.53
December6, 1808,ibid.,pp. 367-68; see
to GeneralI. I. Prozorovskii,
48. Rumiantsev
also two dispatchesfromRumiantsevto AlexanderI, December27, 1808,and January8,
1809,ibid.,pp.439-40,456-58.
49. C. Rodofiuiikin
to Prozorovskii,
Junie16, 1809,in Petrov,Voina Rossii s Turtsiei,
2:274.
Francuskastampa,pp.301-3.
50. Jankovic,
51. Jaksic,Evropai vaskrsSrbije,p. 149.
politikana bliskomistoku(Belgrade,1931), pp. 24-25.
52. Vasilj Popovic,Meternihova
53. Vasilj Popovic, "Trgovinai prometBosne u Napoleoniovodoba," Spomenik,68
(1929): 83-91.

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431

The armedstrugglebetweenthe Serbiansand the Ottomansdid not,howobstacleto theconductofAustriancommerce

ever,proveto be an insurmountable
in the Near East untiljoint Russo-Serbianmilitaryoperationsin 1810 impeded
alertedthe Austhe flowof tradethroughNis.54This new outbreakof fighting
to theadverseeffectwhichRussian dominationof the Danubian
triangovernment
Principalities
and theBelgradepashalikwouldhave upon Austria's Near Eastern
boththeseareas Russia would be in a positionto sever
commerce.By controlling
Austrianapprehensionoverthe
Near Easterntraderoutes.55
Austria'simportant
futurestatusofthe Belgradepashalikbecameespeciallyacute afteranotherdisasby Habsburgarmiesat the hands of Napoleon in the battle
trousdefeatsuffered
signedat Sch6nbrunn(October 14,
of Wagram.In the ensuingpeace settlement
1809), Austriawas obligedto surrenderto France all of its Istrian possessions
along withTriesteand Gorizia,westernCarinthia,Carniola,and part of Croatia
lyingsouthoftheSava River.
That the Serbian question had become an issue of major importancein
dated October10, 1809, addressedto
by a memorandum
Vienna was manifested
a meretwo
CountKlemensvon Metternich,
FrancisI byhisnewforeignminister,
Metternichsuggested
days afterhe had assumedhis office.In the memorandum,
forthe resolutionof the Serbianproblem:the Belgradepashalik
two alternatives
must eitherremainan Ottomanpossession or become an Austrian province.
Metternich's
concernover the futurestatusof the Belgradepashalikwas stimulated in partby rumorsthat France and Russia had reacheda secretaccord to
partitionthe OttomanEmpire betweenthem-withoutAustria's participation.
in the Balkans servedonlyto lendcredenceto such rumors.
Recentdevelopments
AftertheErfurtsummit,Tsar Alexanderhad issuedan imperialdecreeannouncFrance's failureto
ing his intentionof annexingthe Danubian Principalities.56
denouncethe proposedRussian action regardingthe Principalitiesor to protest
against Russian militaryoperationsin the immediatevicinityof the Belgrade
worstfears.
Metternich's
pashalikappearedto confirm
In July1809 Metternichjourneyedto Paris to confrontNapoleon directly
witliAustria'ssuspicionsof Franco-Russiancollusionin the Near East. During
thediscussionwithNapoleon,Metternich
came to realizethat,farfromintending
to exclude Austria fromexercisingan active role in the Balkans, the emperor
of France,whoseattentionwas focusedon Spain, wishedto use Austriato block
continuedRussian expansionin the area. In respondingto Metternich'sexpression of alarm over the growthof Russian influencein the Balkans, particularly
amongthe Serbians,Napoleon acknowledgedthatwhile he was bound by treaty
to acquiesce in Russia's annexationof the Principalities,he opposed additional
in southeastern
Russian territorial
Europe. On the possibilityof
aggrandizement
a footholdin theBelgradepashalikBonaparteexpressedthe
Russia's establishing
views:
following
Serbia mustbelongto you some day. Yet I do not believeit in my interest
to provokethe fall of the OttomanEmpire: its destructionwould be of no
advantageto you. If you wish to occupyBelgrade,I shall not oppose it; let
thePortemakepeace withthe Serbians,and give thema princeof theirown
54. Ibid.
55. Beer, Die orientalischePolitik Oesterreichs,p. 232.
56. See Popovic, Meternihova politika, pp. 11-12.

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Slavic Review
I shall not objectto it ifthisprinceis underyourguaranteeand
nationality.
protection.
However,I can neitheradmita hospodarunderRussian guarantee and protection,
nor the least usurpationof thatpower on the rightbank
oftheDanube. If she wishesto occupyeven one fortified
place,I shouldlook
upon that as upon the conquestof Constantinople.
The Danube is a great
obstacle;the barrierof the riverhas, up to the present,haltedthe progress
of the Russian armies; but a single inch of land on the rightbank in the
handsoftheRussianswouldbe, in myopinion,equal to thecompletedestructionoftheOttomanEmpire.57

AlthoughMetternichdoubtedthe sincerityof Napoleon's assertion.thatthe Belgradepashalikwouldeventuallycomeundertheexclusiveprotectionof Austria,58

he was convincedthatFrance wouldnotabide any attemptby Alexanderto bring
theSerbianrebelsintoRussia's politicalorbit.
In view of the sharp fluctuationson the internationalscene, Metternich
ascertainedthat the most effectivemeans of advancingAustria's politicaland
economicinterestsin the Balkans was to ensure the maintenanceof Ottoman
authorityover all the Balkan peoples as a bulwarkagainst competingFrench
and Russian interests.59
These considerations
convincedMetternichthatAustria
mustmake a renewedeffortto reconcilethe Ottomansand the Serbiansbefore
more serious internationalcomplicationsresulted.Afterreturningfrom Paris,
Metternich
initiateda seriesof diplomaticmovesaimed at securingthe approval
of bothpartiesforAustrianarbitration
of the variousquestionsat issue between
them.
Metternich'sdiplomaticinitiativewas ill-timed.Afterhaving been spared
fromimminent
disasterin 1809 by the intervention
of Rtussianarms,the Serbian
leadershipdid notwishto alienateRussia at thiscriticalmomentby collaborating
withAustria.When Austrianfrontier
officials
triedto arrangea conference
with
Karadjordjetheywereinformed
by a representative
ofthe rebelchieftain
thatthe
emperorshould dispatchtroopsat once, if Austria sincerelydesiredto aid the
Serbian cause.60While Austrian attemptsto persuade the Serbians to accept
Austria'smediationwere being rebuffedin Belgrade,the Austrianministerat
stiffresistancefromthe Ottoman
the Porte, Baron Stiirmer,was encountering
government.Stiirmerhad endeavoredto impressthe Porte with the argument
thattherestoration
ofpeace in theBelgradepashalikwould be mutuallybeneficial
to bothAustriaand the OttomanEmpire. However,he cautionedthe Ottomans
thatpeace withthe Serbiansmustbe accompaniedby modestconcessionsin order
to guaranteethefuturestability
oftheprovince:
The Ottomanministerwill perhapsflatterhimselfthat he can achieve this
end,peace withthe Serbs,by forceful
means.This reasoningis doubtfuland
dependson circumstances
and chance. But the divan should be aware that
byravagingthisprovince,whichis alreadyin sad condition,
and bykillingthe
people,and by makingit intoa vast desert,it will becomea refugeforbriged., The Memoirs of
to FrancisI, July28, 1810,in RichardMetternich,
57. Metternich
1773-1859, vol. 2 (New York, 1880), pp. 439-40.
Prince Metterntich,
58. Ibid.
Policy,vol. 1 (Princeton,N. J., 1963), p. 136.
59. EnnoE. Kraehe,Metternlich'sGermStan
21, 1810,in R. Krones,JosefFreiherrvon
60. Karadjordjeto StevanJevtic,September

Simbschen und die Stellung, Oesterreichs zur serbische Frage (Vienna, 1890), pp. 128-31.

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433

ands who are equally dangerousto the peace of the OttomanEmpire and
to thebordering
provincesofAustria.61
Stiirmeralso soughtvainlyto allay growingOttomandistrustof Austria.
The Ottomanshad neverbeen satisfiedwiththedeclarationofAustrianneutrality
towardthe Serbianrevolt.Ottomandoubtsas to thesincerityof Austria'spledge
to protectOttomanterritorial
integrity
seemedconfirmed
by reportsof the shipmentof large quantitiesof supplies fromsouthernHungary to the Belgrade
pashalik.62These suspicionswere exacerbatedby British allegationsthat the
Sch6nbrunnagreementcontainedsecretprovisionsguaranteeingAustria future
territorialcompensation,
at the expense of the OttomanEmpire,for losses incurredin centralEurope.63Warinessof Austria'sBalkan aims was a manifestation both of the Porte's disillusionment
with France afterNapoleon had made
peace with Russia at Tilsit and of improvedrelationsbetween London and
Istanbul afteran Anglo-Turkishrapprochement
was achieved on January5,
1809.64The Ottomangovernment
suspectedthat Franco-Russianchicanerywas
behindthe Austrianmediationproposal,and thereforeemphaticallydemanded
thatAustriadesistfromall meddlingin theSerbianquestion.65
Parallel to the setbackssustainedby Habsburg policy in Istanbul and in
Belgrade was the growthof dissensionbetweenAustria and Russia. Austrian
indignation
was highafterreportsreachedVienna of the occupationof Belgrade
in January1811 by Russian troops.66In Austrianmilitarycircles,where the
prevailingsentiment
favoredthe adoptionof an expansionistBalkan policy,the
RussianoccupationofBelgradewas viewedas a moredamagingblow to Austria's
international
positionthantheloss of the Netherlands.67
Metternich,
on the other
hand,was more concernedover the adverse effectswhichthe Russian presence
in Belgrade,in close proximityto "three millionGreek [Orthodox] subjects
scatteredthroughoutHungary and Croatia," would have upon the internal
stabilityof the Austrianempire.68
Because the Russian decisionto garrisonBelgrade did not appear to be dictatedby militaryexigenciesarising out of the
Russo-TurkishWar, the emperorinterpreted
it as a politicalact that provided
indisputabletestimonyof tsaristdesigns on the Belgrade pashalik. Metternich
demandedan immediateexplanationfromSt. Petersburg,while Francis took
61. Stiurmer
to StratfordCanning,n.d.,in Ceda Mijatovic,ed., "Prepisiiz zvanicnihi
poverljivihizvestaja engleskeambasadeu Carigraduod 1804-1814,"Spomenik,54 (1922):
82-83.

o prvom i drugom
62. Grgur Jaksic and Vojislav Vuckovic, eds., Francuski dokunmenti
ustanku,1804-1830 (Belgrade, 1959), p. 71.
63. Feodor von Demelitsch, Metternichund seine auswedrtigePolitik, vol. 1 (Stuttgart,

1898),pp.133-34.

64. See Robert Adair, Negotiations for the Peace of the Dardanelles, 2 vols. (London,

1845).
65. Canningto RichardWellesley,October4, 1810,in Mijatovic,"Prepisi,"pp. 80-82;

Jaksi6,Evropa i vaskrs Srbije, p. 160.

66. Otto to Maret,March 6, 1811,in Jaksicand Vuckovic,Francuskidokutmlenti,

pp.
72-73.
67. Beer, Die orientalischePolitik Oesterreichs,p. 254; as early as 1807 General F. M.

in the Balkansto encompasstheentire

Radetzkyhad proposedexpandingAustria'sfrontiers
area betweentheAdriaticSea andtheBlack Sea (ibid.,p. 226).
68. Ibid.

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to thefrontier
theprecautionary
measureoforderingreinforcements
regionacross
the Danube fromBelgrade.69
The Russians predictablydenied that their actions in Belgrade were poCount
liticallymotivatedor thattheyrepresenteda threatto Austrianintegrity.
P. A. Shuvalov,special Russian emissaryto Vienna, assured the Austriangovernmentthatthe stationingof Russian armed forcesin Belgrade was "undertakenby the high command[of the Moldavian army] for purelymilitarypurposes."70Notwithstanding
the lack of conclusivecontradictory
evidence,Shuvalov's justification
for the increasedscope of Russian involvementin the Belgrade pashalikcan be challengedon two counts.First, the likelihoodthat Tsar
Alexanderwould have allowed the commanderof the Moldavian armyto exerof deployingRussian troops
cise his own judgmentin determining
the feasibility
in Belgradeis remote.The Russian government
was well aware thatsuch action
was bound to arouse suspicionin Vienna. Policy decisionsof this importwere
made by tsariststatesmenin St. Petersburg,not by militarycommandersin the
field.Second, Russia's action in this mattercannotbe rationalizedby claims of
militarynecessity.Russo-Turkishbattle lines had become fixed by mid-spring
1810. Subsequentmilitaryactivityhas been describedby one contemporary
observeras "languid."'71By earlyautumnthe Serbianfronthad also been stabilized,
as rebel forces,with Russian militarybacking,succeeded in regainingcontrol
over practicallyall of the territory
yieldedduringthe fighting
of the preceding
year. With apparentcalm prevailingin the Belgrade pashalik,Russian forces
were evacuatedto winterquartersin Wallachia late in the year.72
Why,then,did the Russians returnto the Belgradepashalikseveralmonths
later in mid-winter?In view of the absence of documentaryevidence on this
matter,analysisof such a puzzlingdevelopmentis necessarilyspeculative.The
rapid deteriorationof Russo-French relations after the Erfurt conference
threatenedRussia with diplomaticisolation: Russia's only ally was once again
about to becomethe principalenemyof the tsaristregime.The only remedyfor
the deplorableconditionof Russian policywas an alliance with anotherpower,
and the mostlikelypartnerwas the Habsburg Monarchy.An alliance between
Vienna and St. Petersburgofferedthe advantage of providinga measure of
securityforRussia's vulnerablewesternbordersbecause it would neutralizethe
possibilityof an Austro-Frenchcombination.However, Russian expansion in
the Balkans had severelystrainedAustro-Russianrelations.The Austriangovernmentrefusedeven to considerthe questionof an alliance with Russia until
the tsar made peace withthe OttomanEmpire and withdrewall Russian forces
fromOttomanterritoriesseized in the Balkans duringthe conflict.73
Afterfive
yearsofwarfareAlexanderwas unwillingto renounceall territorial
claimsagainst
the Porte. Instead,he abandonedhope of achievingan alliance withAustria in
favoroftheseeminglymorerealisticalternativeof securinga promiseof Austrian
neutralityin the event of an open breach betweenRussia and France. When
February9, 1811,VPR, 6:44-48.
69. P. N. Shuvalovto Rumiantsev,
70. Ibid.
71. Adair to Wellesley,June8, 1810,in Mijatovic,"Prepisi,"p. 76.
72. MilenkoVukicevic,"Odnosi Rusije premaSrbiji u vremeprvogustankaod kraja
1808do kraja 1813godine,"Delo, 24 (1902): 67.
Rossieiu s
zakliuchennykh
73. Feodor F. Martens,ed., Sobranietraktatovi konventsii
vol. 3 (St. Petersburg,1876), pp. 76-79.
derzhavami,
inostrannymi

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435

Austriacontinuedto balk at Russia's latestovertures,Alexander attemptedto

on February8, 1811, to cede to Austria the
break the deadlockby offering,
Danubian Principalitiesup to the Sereth River, along with all of the Belgrade
pashalik,in returnforVienna's pledgeof neutrality.74
Under these circumstancesthe Russian occupationof Belgrade assumes
thisactionprecededby scarcelya monththe tsar's
specialmeaning.Significantly,
pashalikand a large portionof the Prinentire
Belgrade
proposalto cede the
cipalitiesto Austria. The timingof these two events does not appear to be
coincidental.In all likelihoodthe dispatchof Russian regularsto Belgrade was
intendedto pressureFrancis into declaringhis neutralityin the now imminent
conflictbetweenRussia and France, if for no otherreason than to ensure the
immediatedepartureof Russian troopsfromAustria's southernfrontier.Nevertheless,the emperordeclinedto participatein this schemefor the partial disof the OttomanEmpire.Approvalof the Russian conditionswould
memberment
to an Austriandeclarationof war againstthe Porte. Unhave been tantamount
Austrianleaders saw littleor no benefitin the Montherefore,
derstandably,
archy'sbecomingembroiledin a war withthe only neighborwho did not pose
a threatto its integrity.
Russia's apparentcontrolof a strongadvance post in the westernBalkans
"IllyrianProvinces,"a recent
also menacedthesecurityofthe French-dominated
creationof Napoleon (1809) whichcomprisedall of the territoriesacquiredby
France on the Balkan mainland since 1805. Napoleon fully appreciatedthe
of the Russian marchinto Belgrade,for he too had been
strategicsignificance
two years earlier. At the height of the
presentedwith a similaropportunity
profoundmilitarycrisis threateningthe Serbian insurgentmovementin the
summerof 1809, Karadjordje in a momentof despair appealed to Napoleon to
becomethe "augustdefenderand protectorof the Serbiannation."75Karadjordje
not onlyassuredBonaparteof the loyaltyof the Serbian rebels,but also implied
that the South Slavic peoples of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro,and the
Serbiansof southernHungary,as well as the Bulgariansand the Greeks,were
preparedto pledge their fealtyto the emperorof France. Accordingto the
Serbianchieftain,
"havingall thesepeoplesunderthe wingsof France will make
her enemies tremble." As an additional incentivefor French intervention,
Karadjordje called attentionto the economicresourcesof the Belgradepashalik,
Permissionwas also
includingmineraldeposits,timber,livestock,and foodstuffs.
grantedby the Serbian leader for the immediatedispatchof French forcesto
garrisonthe fortressesat Belgrade and Sabac.76Karadjordje's emissary,Rado
Vucinic,who presenteda Serbian petitionto French officialsin Vienna at the
receivedonly vague promisesof future
timeof the Schonbrunnnegotiations,77
Frenchassistance.78
AlthoughVu6inic,at Napoleon's request,traveledto Paris
in 1810 to serve as the officialliaison between Bonaparte and Karadjordje,
nothingof a substantivenatureever developed'fromthese contactsduringhis
74. Ibid.,pp.78-79.
75. Karadjordje to Ledoulx, August 16, 1809, in Ogist Bop [August Boppe], ed.,
"Karadjordjei Francuska:Dokumentio dogadjajimaSrbije sa Napoleonom(1809-1814),"
19 (1888): 118-20.
Otadzbine,
76. Ibid.
to Rado Vucinic,n.d.,ibid.,pp. 122-24.
77. Karadjordje'sinstructions
February21,1810,ibid.,pp.336-38.
78. ColonelA. Meriageto Champagny,

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Slavic Review

four-yeartenurein the French capital.79Napoleon's treatmentof the Serbian

questionthroughout
this periodwas expressiveof his equivocalattitudetoward
the affairsof the Near East afterTilsit. Preoccupiedwithproblemsbeyondthe
Balkans from1807 onward,Napoleon took littlemore than a cursoryinterest
intheSerbianovertures.
Meanwhile,as thelikelihoodof war betweenRussia and France grew,along
withAustrianoppositionto the extensionof Russia's southernfrontierto the
Danube, Alexander found his internationalposition becoming steadily more
difficult.
During the winterand springof 1811 Alexanderattemptedto use the
Serbianquestionas a bargaininginstrument
to inducethe Porteto acceptRussian
territorialdemands; the tsar agreed to sever all ties with the Serbians if the
Portewouldcede thePrincipalities
to Russia.80However,reportsof risingRussoFrench antagonismstrengthenedMahmud's determinationto resist Russian
demandsfor a major territorialadjustmentin the Balkans. Ottoman representativesaccordinglyinformedthe Russians that the sultan would consent
to the resumption
of peace talks onlyif a priorRussian announcement
acknowledgedthestatusquo ante bellum.8' The tsar refusedand the war continued.
By late October1811,the Porte's abilityto resistRussian demandsforthe
convocationofa peace conference
was impairedby a rapidsuccessionof Ottoman
militaryreversesalong the Danubian defenseperimeter.During the summer
and autumn of 1811, Russia's Moldavian army under its new commander,
General M. I. Kutuzov, won a series of brilliant,decisive victoriesover numericallysuperiorOttomanforces led by the grand vizier. Having failed to
protectits interestsby recourseto arms,the Porte then turnedto the devices
of diplomacy.Peace negotiationsfinallyresumedon October 31, 1811 aftera
lapse of two years.82The deliberationsthat followed dragged on for seven
months.

Duringthenegotiations
the Russiansinsistedthatthe Portegrantautonomy
to the Belgradepashalik.83Russian intentionsin introducing
this demandat the
peace conferenceare not entirelyclear. The tsar apparentlyintendedto use the
Serbian issue as a diplomaticploy to pressurethe Porte into ceding the Principalitiesby raisingthe specterof an even greaterdiminutionof Ottomanauthorityin the Balkans. Had the Porte agreed to abandonthe Principalities,the
Russianswouldno doubthave droppedall claimson behalfoftheSerbians.
The Russiangovernment
was forcedto reevaluateits positionon the Serbian
question,however,by the political crosscurrentsin Europe and in Istanbul.
Bonaparte's diplomaticsuccess in concludinganti-Russianpacts with Prussia
(February 24, 1812) and Austria (March 14, 1812) profoundlyalarmed St.
Petersburg.Moreover,Russian officials
learned,to theirdismay,of the combined
efforts
of the French,Austrian,and Prussian envoysat the Porte to undermine
the ongoingRusso-Turkishpeace negotiationsand to pressurethe Porte into
see
79. For a summaryof Serbo-Frenchrelationsduringthe Serbian insurrection,

Jaksic and Vuckovic, Francuski dokumenti,pp. 83-86.

80. Kamenskiito P. A. Fonton,February9, 1811,VPR, 6:48-50.

February17,1811,ibid.,pp.692-93.
81. Fontonto Kamenskii,
November10,
82. Petrov,VoinaRossii s Turtsiei,3:346; M. I. Kutuzovto Rumiantsev,

1811, in L. G. Beskrovnyi, M. I. Kuttzov: Sbornik dokumentov,vol. 3 (Moscow, 1956),

pp. 684-85.

to Kutuzov,October12, 1811,VPR, 6:181-82; Kutuzovto Barclayde

83. Rumiantsev
M. I. Kutuzov, pp. 687-88.
Tolly,November10, 1811,in Beskrovnyi,

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First Serbian Uprising

joining the anti-Russiancoalition.In the face of these threateningconditions

Alexanderdramaticallyreducedhis Balkan territorialclaims but hardenedhis
The reason for this shiftin emphasis
stand in favor of Serbian autonomy.84
can be ascribedin large measure to Alexander's resurrectionof Czartoryski's
1806 plan to use the Balkan Slavs for a diversionaryattack against French
possessionsin Dalmatia (that is, the IllyrianProvinces) and againstNapoleon's
Italian satellitekingdom.In fact,Alexander broadenedthe scope of the Czartoryskiplan to includean attackagainstAustria:
the underhandedbehaviorof Austria in allyingwith France forcesRussia
of thesetwo powers....
to use all meansat its disposalforthe destruction
of thesemeansare the Slavic peoples,likethe Serbians,
The mostimportant
Croatians,Illyrians,and those HunBosnians,Dalmatians,Montenegrins,
garians whose dissatisfactionwith their governmentwill present an exfor disturbingAustria.85
cellentinstrument
Since the tsar contemplatedemployingKaradjordje's cadres as the vanguard
of the militarydiversion,special attentionwas given to the maintenanceof
amicable relationswith Belgrade. Consequently,in the Treaty of Bucharest
the Russo-TurkishWar, the Russians
(May 28, 1812), whichfinallyterminated
secured the Porte's promise of completeamnestyfor the Serbian insurgents
and recognitionof the Belgrade pashalikas an autonomousprovincewithinthe
OttomanEmpire.86
Whateverimmediatebenefitsthe Russians or the Serbians may have derived fromthe provisionspertainingto the Belgrade pashalik were negated
by the invasionof Russia by Napoleon's GrandeArmee. Napoleon's marchinto
Russia relegatedthe Near East to a positionof secondaryimportancein Russian
policy.In July1812 Alexanderhastilyabandonedpreparationof his audacious
project for a militarydiversionand ordered the immediateevacuation of all
Russian forcesfromthe Balkans for the defenseof the realm.87Despite the
obligationsthatRussia had exactedfromthe Porte regardingthe futureregulationof theinternalaffairsof the Belgradepashalik,the Ottomanstook advantage
of Russia's preoccupationwith the Napoleonic menace to crush the Serbian
rebellionwith a massive display of militarypower. By November 1813 the
Ottomangovernmenthad reassertedits unchallengedmasteryover the entire
province.

In the years under considerationthe Serbian insurrectionfailed to attain

the dimensionof a dominantinternationalissue. Nevertheless,by threatening
the integrity
of the OttomanEmpire,the insurgencyraised fundamentalquestions of Near Eastern policy among the Great Powers. The reactionsof the
powers to the turbulentdevelopmentsin the Belgrade pashalik had important
M. I. Kutu2ov, pp. 850-52;
84. AlexanderI to Kutuzov,April 3, 1812,in Beskrovnyi,
April 30, 1812,VPR, 6:381-82.
to the Russianplenipotentiaries,
Kutuzov'sinstructions
85. AlexanderI to AdmiralP. V. Chichagov,May 14, 1812,SIRIO, 6:67-73.
86. Text of the Treaty of Bucharest,May 28, 1812, VPR, 6:406-17; Gabriel Noradounghian,ed., Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'EmnpireOttoman, vol. 3 (Paris, 1901),

pp.86-92.
87. AlexanderI to Chichagov,July 30, 1812, in S. M. Gorianov,1812 Dokumenty
Gosudarstvennogo i S. Peterburgskogo glavnogo arkhivov (St.

89-90.

Petersburg, 1912), pp.

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Slavic Review

repercussionsfor the evolutionof the Eastern Question and for the various
Balkan nationalliberationmovements.Indeed, the responsesof the powers to
the Serbianproblembroadlydelineatedthe classic patternsof nineteenth-century
Near Easterndiplomacy.
The Serbian rebellionintroducedan unsettlingelementinto the affairs
the
of
Balkan Peninsula that was ultimatelyto have a determininginfluence
on thefateof theHabsburgMonarchy.Austrianleaderssuch as Metternichperceived thatthe Serbian revolt,if successful,would threatenAustria's domestic
politicalcohesionbecause of its anticipatedcalamitouseffectson the Monarchy's
own "Greek" (Orthodox) minorities.Moreover, the Austrian government
fearedthatRussia intended,in the name of Orthodoxy,to exploit the Serbian
movementto extend still furtherits power and influencein the Balkans. The
twin dilemmasof possible internaldisruptionsand Russian expansionismconfrontedthe Habsburg Monarchyin everymajor Balkan crisisof the nineteenth
and the early twentiethcenturies.Since Austria could not hope to derive any
benefitfromthe Balkan provincialdisordersthat plagued the Ottoman Porte,
the Habsburg governmentdecided that its interestswould be best served by
preservingthe Ottomanstate intactas a bulwarkagainst both the encroachmentsof Austria's Near Eastern rivals and againstthe imminentthreatto the
stabilityof its own territories.The maintenanceof the Ottoman Empire thus
becamethecornerstone
of Habsburgpolicyin theNear East.
AlthoughGreat Britain shared Austria's concernfor the preservationof
Ottoman territorialintegrity,it had none of the diverse territorialinterests
whichlinkedAustria and the otherpowers with the Balkans. The overriding
aim of BritishNear Eastern policyforthe whole of the nineteenth
centurywas
protectionof its imperialcommunicationsnetworkby maintainingnaval supremacyin the easternMediterranean.Having no land forcesto employto safeguard its interestsin the area, Britainhad no alternativebut to tryto wield its
influencethroughits naval power and general prestige.The disorderin the
Belgradepashalik,hundredsof milesto thewest of the strategically
vital Straits,
was not a major factorin the actual formulation
of Britishpolicy.Nevertheless,
the Serbian uprisingappeared to forecastan alterationin the power configuration in the Near East by furtherweakeningthe OttomanEmpire at a time of
expandingFrench and Russian influencein the Balkans. The British assessmentof the possible consequencesof the Serbian revoltreveals a tendencyof
Britishpolicymakers
throughout
the nineteenth
centuryto evaluate disturbances
on the Balkan mainlandin termsof theirpossible disruptiveeffecton the prevailingbalance of power in the easternMediterranean.
As was the case with British policy, the long-rangeimplicationsof the
French reactionsto the Serbian revolt are not immediatelyapparent.French
policyfluctuated
accordingto Napoleon's ever-changing
priorities.The emperor
of France neitherknew preciselywhat he wished to achieve in the Balkans
nor how to accomplishhis objectives.FrenchNear Eastern policyof the period
was thusin a stateofconstantflux.Yet Napoleondid exploitOttomansuspicions
of Russian involvementin the Serbian insurgencyto help promotea rupture
in Russian-Ottomanrelations. Moreover, Napoleon's inclinationto consider
resolvingthe Eastern Question by tradingpopulationsand territoriesso that
increasesin powerand influence
the variouspowerswould receiveproportionate

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First Serbian Uprising

439

anticipatedthe attitudesof later generationsof European leaders toward the

Near East.
Tsarist interestsin the Serbian insurrectionwere determinedprimarily
bythemilitary
and diplomaticexigenciesarisingout of thewar withthe Ottoman
Empire. St. Petersburg,however,in pursuingits objectives,played upon the
commonethnoculturaland spiritualheritageof the Russian and the Serbian
peoples. Russia therebydonned the mantle of liberatorand protectorof the
Balkan Christiansfromforeignrule,a role thatcloaked imperialRussian policy
in the Balkans untilthe demise of the Russian Empire in 1917. On the basis
of geopoliticaland economicconsiderations,
the principalgoal of Russian policy
in the Near East was the establishment
of some measure of director indirect
controlover the Straitsand Istanbul. St. Petersburg'shandlingof the Serbian
questionbetween1806 and 1812 manifested
the tendencyof tsaristNear Eastern
policyto bargainaway the interestsof the populationsin the westernBalkan
territoriesin exchange for a permanentoutpost in the eastern Balkans (for
example,the Danubian Principalities).This propensityreflectedthe preoccupationof St. Petersburgwiththe Straits,a preoccupationwhichwas to persist
throughoutthe remainderof the tsaristera. Nevertheless,because of Russian
pressureon the Ottomangovernment
duringthe negotiationsleading up to the
signingoftheTreatyof Bucharest,the Serbiansof the Belgradepashalikbecame
the firstof the Balkan peoples to be specificallymentionedin an international
agreement;the treatylaid the politicaland territorialfoundationson whichthe
was erected.
modernSerbiannation-state

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