Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation As Failure

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge
and Negation as Failure

FRANCESCO M. DONINI
Politecnico di Bari
and
DANIELE NARDI
Universita` di Roma La Sapienza
and
RICCARDO ROSATI
Universita` di Roma La Sapienza
We present description logics of minimal knowledge and negation as failure (MKNF-DLs), which
augment description logics with modal operators interpreted according to Lifschitzs nonmonotonic
logic MKNF. We show the usefulness of MKNF-DLs for a formal characterization of a wide variety
of nonmonotonic features that are both commonly available in frame-based systems, and needed
in the development of practical knowledge-based applications: defaults, integrity constraints, role,
and concept closure. In addition, we provide a correct and terminating calculus for query answering
in a very expressive MKNF-DL.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: I.2.3 [Artificial Intelligence]: Deduction and Theorem
ProvingNonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision; I.2.4 [Artificial Intelligence]: Knowledge
Representations Formalisms and MethodsModal logic; F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic and Formal
Languages]: Mathematical LogicComputational logic
General Terms: Theory
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Description Logics, frame-based systems, nonmonotonic modal
logics, tableau calculi
1. INTRODUCTION
Frame-based systems constitute one of the main tools for the development
of knowledge-based applications [Fikes and Kehler 1985]. The main feature
This research has been funded by Italian MURST, Tecniche di ragionamento non monotono and
Linguaggi per la modellizzazione concetualle dei requisiti, by EC Esprit LTR Project, Foundations
of Data Warehouse Quality, by ASI (Italian Space Agency), and by Italian CNR, Description Logics
per la Modellazione e lAnalisi di Dominio.
Authors addresses: F. M. Donini, Departimento di Elettrotecnica ed Elettronica, Politecnico di
Bari, Via G. Re David 200, I-70125 Bari, Italy; email: donini@poliba.it; D. Nardi and R. Rosati,
Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica, Universita` di Roma La Sapienza, Via Salaria 113,
I-00198 Roma, Italy; email: {nardi,rosati}@dis.uniroma1.it.
Permission to make digital/hard copy of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is
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that copying is by permission of the ACM, Inc. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers,
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C 2002 ACM 1529-3785/02/04000177 $5.00

ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 2002, Pages 177225.
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F. M. Donini et al.
provided by such systems is the ability to characterize the knowledge about

a specific domain by means of a hierarchical structure (taxonomy or terminology), which provides the basis for a number of deductive services, such as
classification of objects, inheritance of properties and rules, and so on.
Hierarchical representation in frame-based systems was formally characterized using first-order logic in Hayes [1979]. Later, description logics (DLs)
were developed to provide a precise account of the computational properties of
reasoning (see for example Donini et al. [1996]). In particular, the fragment of
first-order logic which characterizes the most popular constructs of these languages has been clearly identified (see for example Woods and Schmolze [1992]).
However, frame-based systems that are used in practice (see Karp [1992] for
an overview) provide the user with several constructs that cannot be given a
precise semantic characterization within the framework of first-order logic. In
particular, the notion of defaults, which has been extensively studied in the
field of nonmonotonic reasoning, aimed at explaining defaults in frame-based
systems and semantic networks [Reiter and Criscuolo 1981; Etherington and
Reiter 1983; Nado and Fikes 1987].
It is not sufficient to provide a semantics to defaults in order to obtain a
full semantic account of frame-based systems. Frame-based systems include
procedural rules as well as other forms of closure and epistemic reasoning that
need to be covered by the semantics as well as by the reasoning algorithms. If
one looks at the most widely used systems based on DL [Patel-Schneider et al.
1991; MacGregor 1988], such features are still present, possibly in new flavors,
while their semantics is given informally, and the consequences of reasoning
not adequately characterized. In addition, the work on description logics has
shown a very close relationship between DLs and semantic and object-oriented
data models [Borgida 1995; Calvanese et al. 1994]. In the context of data
modeling, the need arises for expressing constraints on the knowledge base
that cannot be directly expressed as sentences of the knowledge base, but
require a separate treatment.
In the literature there has been much work on the treatment of defaults
in frame and DL-based systems [Nado and Fikes 1987; Padgham and Zhang
1993; Straccia 1993; Quantz and Royer 1992; Baader and Hollunder 1995;
Donini et al. 1995], where several formal tools borrowed from nonmonotonic
logics have been adapted to the framework of description logics. Such an adaptation is not trivial, because description logics are not, in general, propositional languages, therefore it gives rise to both representational and reasoning problems. The above cited works are focused on defaults, thus not taking
into account several other non-first-order features, that are typical of framebased systems. An epistemic extension of DLs with a modal operator K, interpreted in terms of minimal knowledge, has been proposed in Donini et al.
[1992, 1998b]. In that formalism one can express epistemic queries and, by
admitting a simple form of epistemic sentences in the knowledge base, one
can formalize the so-called procedural rules. However, a unified framework
where all non-first-order features of frame-based systems can be provided a
semantic account and can be adequately treated in the reasoning process, is
still missing.
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 2002.
Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure
179
In this paperwhich is an extension of Donini et al. [1997b]we propose

a new framework of description logics of minimal knowledge and negation as
failure (MKNF-DLs), and show that such a framework allows us to express all
the above mentioned non-first-order features. MKNF-DLs take an epistemic approach to the modeling of non-first-order features of frame-based systems using
an epistemic modal operator as in Donini et al. [1992; 1998b], but combines it
with default reasoning. This is achieved by relying on the nonmonotonic modal
logic, MKNF [Lifschitz 1991]. With MKNF we can naturally extend the previous
approach to modal DLs, by introducing a second modal operator A interpreted
as autoepistemic assumption. In MKNF one can formalize default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, and logic programming, many of the best
known formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. By adopting MKNF we show
that one is able to also account for the nonmonotonic features of frame-based
systems. One of the most important consequences of adopting MKNF is that
all nonmonotonic features we consider can be uniformly treated as epistemic
sentences in the knowledge base, without giving them a special statusas is
the case for procedural rules, defaults, and epistemic constraints on a knowledge base.
More specifically, we show that MKNF-DLs are able to capture a large variety
of features that are used in practical knowledge-based applications:
procedural rules, which are normally described as if-then statements and are
used to infer new facts about known individuals; the meaning of procedural
rules, that are very often present in DL-based and frame-based systems, is
captured by epistemic sentences;
default rules, which are used for default reasoning; default rules are expressed in MKNF-DLs as epistemic sentences that are more general than
procedural rules;
epistemic queries, which allow for querying the knowledge base about its
knowledge of the world, thus enriching the expressiveness of the query
language;
integrity constraints, which provide consistency restrictions on admissible
states of a knowledge base; while such constraints are usually regarded as
queries [Reiter 1990], in MKNF-DLs they can be simply expressed as epistemic sentences;
role closure, which limits the reasoning involving role restrictions to the
individuals in the knowledge base; such a restriction is very often used,
either implicitly or explicitly, by DL-based systems, whose object-centered
implementation performs efficient reasoning on the individuals known to
the knowledge base;
concept closure, which extends the above notion of closure to concepts.
Moreover, the whole representational power of MKNF becomes available, thus
making it feasible to consider new features, like autoepistemic reasoning, that
are not implemented in current DL-based systems.
Enhanced expressive power does not come without computational complexity. Even though reasoning methods are available for deduction in propositional
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F. M. Donini et al.
MKNF [Rosati 1999a], their extension to the fragment of first-order logic captured by description logics is necessary.
To this end, we first characterize epistemic interpretations as sets of denumerable DL assertions. This is a new and original characterization for firstorder MKNF. Then, we present a calculus for answering queries posed to
MKNF-DL knowledge bases, which provides a sound and complete reasoning
method. The proposed deduction method proves the decidability of a significant
first-order extension of propositional MKNF.
The paper is organized as follows. We first present DLs, then MKNF-DLs
(obtained by adding to DLs the epistemic operators of MKNF). We then discuss
the representational features of MKNF-DLs by considering several forms of
nonmonotonic reasoning and integrity constraints. Subsequently, we address
reasoning in these logics by providing a calculus for checking satisfiability of
MKNF-DL knowledge bases. To this end we first extend the characterization
of preferred models in propositional MKNF to MKNF-DLs; then we present a
tableau-based calculus for computing preferred models; finally we show termination and correctness of the calculus. We conclude the paper with a discussion
comparing nonmonotonic reasoning in logic programming with MKNF-DLs.
2. SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF MKNF-DLS
In this section we first briefly recall description logicsin particular, the basic
DL ALCthen define syntax and semantics of modal extensions with operators
from MKNF.
2.1 Description Logics
In frame-based systems, knowledge is represented by defining frames [Fikes
and Kehler 1985; Karp 1992], which can be regarded as intensional descriptions
of classes of objects. Frames are related to each other through super-classes and
slot specifications, the latter requiring that the values of a slot belong to the
class of objects represented by another frame.
Description logics (DLs) were developed with the aim of capturing the firstorder semantics of frame systems in a piecewise syntax: each possible property
about frames is expressed by a distinguished syntactic construct; then each set
of constructs identifies a different DL.
Using DLs, frames are represented as concept expressions, which are interpreted as unary predicates. A frame structure, containing super-classes and
slot specifications is represented by a conjunctive concept expression, where
there is a conjunct for each superclass and a conjunct for each slot.
For example, the concept expression manager u female describes the class of
individuals that are (i.e. the concept of) female managers, female, manager being its super-classes. Other boolean connectives can be used, as in the concept
mathematician t engineer which expresses a class formed by merging mathematicians and engineers, or as in UScitizen which describes non-US citizens.
Also, the concept expression employee u MANAGES.employee describes the class
of individuals that are employees, and that can manage employees only. The expression MANAGES.employee is a universal role restriction, which corresponds to
181
a restriction on the admissible values of a slot. MANAGES, in the DL terminology, is

an atomic role, which corresponds to a binary relationship concerning managers
and employees. Moreover, the concept expression employeeuMANAGES.employee
describes the class of individuals that are employees and who are managers of
at least one employee. MANAGES.employee is an existential role restriction, which
imposes the existence of at least one slot filler.
The constructs mentioned so far can be combined and arbitrarily nested
to form more complex concept expressions. This yields a language having the
following syntax:
C ::= > | | Ca | C1 u C2 | C1 t C2 | C | Ra .C | Ra .C
where Ca denotes an atomic concept, Ra denotes an atomic role, and C1 , C2
denote concept expressions. The above description logic is called ALC [SchmidtSchau and Smolka 1991] and we shall refer to it throughout the paper, since
it captures the most relevant features that are in the scope of the present work.
In particular, ALC provides the basis for representing the basic relationships
among frames. Since some of the results we present in the paper apply to any
DL, it is worth mentioning that several other constructs have been addressed
in DLs. Among them: number restrictions, which impose numeric restrictions
on the cardinality of slots, as well as role forming constructs, which allow for
defining complex role expressions by intersecting roles, taking the inverse of a
role, and so forth. For a systematic discussion of DL constructs see Woods and
Schmolze [1992]; Donini et al. [1996].
We denote with DL a generic description logic. Thus, we say that C is a DLconcept if C is a concept expression of DL. Similarly, a DL-role refers to a role
expression of DL; in ALC role expressions are formed simply by atomic roles.
Concepts are interpreted as subsets of a nonempty interpretation domain,
while roles are interpreted as binary relations over such a domain. Formally,
an interpretation I = (1, I ) consists of a domain of interpretation 1, and an
interpretation function I mapping every concept to a subset of 1 and every
role to a subset of 1 1. Atomic concepts are given an interpretation by the
interpretation function CaI 1. Analogously, the interpretation of the atomic
roles is defined according to I: Ra I 1 1. For the other concept expressions
of ALC, the interpretation is defined as follows:
>I =
I =
(C)I =
(C1 u C2 )I =
(C1 t C2 )I =
(Ra .C)I =
1 \ CI
C1I C2I
C1I C2I
d 1 | d 0 .(d, d 0 ) Ra I and d 0 C I
(Ra .C)I = d 1 | d 0 .(d, d 0 ) Ra I implies d 0 C I
A concept is satisfiable if there exists an interpretation I such that C I 6= ,

otherwise the concept is unsatisfiable. An interpretation I is a model of a concept C if I satisfies C.
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A DL knowledge base (KB) 6 is defined as a pair 6 = hT , Ai, where T , called

the TBox, is a finite set of inclusion statements of the form C v D, where C, D
are DL-concepts, and A, called the ABox, is a finite set of membership assertions
either of the form C(a) or R(a, b), where C is a DL-concept, R is a DL-role, and
a, b are names of individuals. We assume that different names denote different
individuals, hence we generally do not distinguish between individuals and
their names. In the following, O6 stands for the set of individuals explicitly
mentioned in the ABox of 6.
An interpretation I satisfies an inclusion C v D (denoted as I |= C v D)
if C I D I . Assertions are interpreted in terms of set membership: C(a) is
satisfied by I (denoted as I |= C(a)) iff a C I and R(a, b) is satisfied by I
(denoted as I |= R(a, b)) iff (a, b) R I .
An interpretation I is a model of a DL knowledge base 6 (denoted as I |= 6)
iff every sentence (inclusion or assertion) of 6 is satisfied in I. 6 is satisfiable
iff there exists an interpretation I which is a model for 6.
A concept C is subsumed by a concept D in a DL knowledge base 6, written
6 |= C v D, iff C v D is satisfied by every model of 6. Analogously, instance
checking in 6 of a membership assertion C(a) (where a O6 ) is defined as
follows: 6 |= C(a) iff C(a) is satisfied by every model of 6.
Finally, we say that two DL knowledge bases 61 , 62 are equivalent if, for
each interpretation I, I is a model for 61 iff I is a model for 62 .
Example 2.1.
sions:
As a simple example of TBox, consider the following inclu-
manager v employee
managers are employees
manager v MANAGES.employee every manager manages at least one employee
MANAGES.> v manager
only managers can manage
> v MANAGES.employee
only employees are managed
Observe that, intuitively, the last two axioms constrain the two arguments of
the role MANAGES to be in manager and employee, respectively (see Buchheit
et al. [1993]). More precisely, for every model I of the TBox, it holds MANAGESI
managerI employeeI .
Assertions regarding such a TBox could be:
manager(Bob) employee(Paula) MANAGES(Ann,Marc)
manager(Ann) employee(Marc)
Observe that employee(Ann) and employee(Bob) follow from the TBox. Observe
also that the assertions manager(Ann) and employee(Marc) are redundant, since
they follow from the TBox and the assertion MANAGES(Ann, Marc). Moreover, it
follows that there is at least one employee managed by Bobbut we do not
know who; it could also be an individual not mentioned in the above ABox. If
we instead would like to impose that the managed employee appears explicitly
in the ABox, we would need to express constraints about the possible states of
an ABox. These constraints are not expressible in DLs.
We now show how to capture the intuition underlying the last remark by
extending description logics with two epistemic operators.
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2.2 MKNF Description Logics

Description logics of minimal knowledge and negation as failure (MKNF-DLs)
are defined as an extension of DLs, in which the modal operators K and A are
allowed in concept and role expressions of a given DL. As already mentioned,
in this paper we focus on ALC [Schmidt-Schau and Smolka 1991], a DL which
accounts for the basic features of frame systems; in addition, we briefly address
properties of other MKNF-DLs at the end of Section 4.
We call ALCKN F the extension of ALC with the modal operators of the logic
MKNF, whose syntax is defined as follows:
C ::= > | | Ca | C1 u C2 | C1 t C2 | C |
R.C | R.C | KC | AC
R ::= Ra | KRa | ARa
where Ca denotes an atomic concept, C1 , C2 denote concept expressions, Ra
denotes an atomic role, and R denotes a role (either epistemic or not).
The semantics of ALCKN F is obtained by interpreting concepts and roles on
MKNF structures, based on the following assumptions:
the set of names of individuals in the language is a countable-infinite set;
the domain of interpretation 1 is the same in every interpretation, and coincides with the countable-infinite set of names of individuals in the language.
This corresponds to impose that all interpretations are defined over the same
domain, and that the name of an individual corresponds to the same domain
element in every interpretation.
Such assumptions restrict the semantics of first-order MKNF [Lifschitz
1991], making it more suitable to model frame systems and the associated
reasoning methods.1 The proposed approach follows the one of Levesque [1984]
and Reiter [1990], also adopted in Donini et al. [1992].
We define an epistemic interpretation as a triple (I, M, N ) where I is an
interpretation and M, N are sets of interpretations such that I = (1, I ) and
all interpretations in M and N are defined over the domain 1. Non-epistemic
atomic concepts are interpreted in I, i.e. (Ca ) I,M,N = CaI , and analogously nonepistemic atomic roles, that is (Ra ) I,M,N = Ra I . Non-atomic concept expressions of ALCKN F and epistemic expressions are interpreted on epistemic interpretations, as follows.
(>) I,M,N
() I,M,N
(C) I,M,N
(C1 u C2 ) I,M,N
(C1 t C2 ) I,M,N
(R.C) I,M,N
=
=
=
=
=
=
1 \ (C) I,M,N
(C1 ) I,M,N (C2 ) I,M,N
(C1 ) I,M,N (C2 ) I,M,N
{d 1 | d 0 .(d, d 0 ) (R) I,M,N and d 0 (C) I,M,N }
1 Recall that Lifschitz [1994] introduced MBNF, slightly extending the MKNF framework. However,
we refer to the original MKNF, since it is sufficient for our goal of representing non-first-order
features of frame systems.
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F. M. Donini et al.
(R.C) I,M,N = {d 1 | d 0 .(d, d 0 ) (R) I,M,N implies d 0 (C) I,M,N }

\
(KC) I,M,N =
(C)J ,M,N
J M
(AC)
I,M,N
(KRa )
I,M,N
(ARa )
I,M,N
(C)J ,M,N
J N
(Ra )J ,M,N
J M
(Ra )J ,M,N
J N
Notice that, if one considers non-epistemic expressions, the semantics is defined as for ordinary DLs on I. Conversely, epistemic expressions are defined
on epistemic interpretations. More precisely, an individual d 1 is an instance
of a concept C in a given interpretation I iff d (C) I,M,N . An individual d 1
is an instance of a concept KC (i.e. d (KC) I,M,N ) iff d C J ,M,N for all interpretations J M. In other words, an individual is known to be an instance
of a concept if it belongs to the concept interpretation of every possible world in
M. Similarly, an individual d 1 is an instance of a concept KR.> iff there
is an individual d 0 1 such that (d, d 0 ) R J ,M,N for all J M.
The interpretation of A is analogous: an individual d 1 is an instance
of a concept AC (i.e. d (AC) I,M,N ) iff d C J ,M,N for all interpretations
J N . At this point the definitions of A and K are indeed symmetrical. Later,
the preference criterion will provide different meanings to the operators, by
introducing minimality for K and default assumption for A.
In principle, for every DL one can define its MKNF extension. In general,
given a particular description logic DL, we denote with DLKN F its extension
with the modal operators of MKNF, and define it analogously to ALCKN F . The
following definitions are valid for every MKNF-DL, and they obviously apply
to ALCKN F .
A DLKN F knowledge base 6 is defined as a pair 6 = hT , Ai, where the TBox
T is a finite set of inclusion statements of the form C v D, where C, D are
DLKN F -concepts, and the ABox A is a finite set of membership assertions of
the form C(a) or R(a, b), where C is a DLKN F -concept, R is a DLKN F -role, and
a, b are names of individuals.
The truth of inclusion statements in an epistemic interpretation (I, M, N )
is defined in terms of set inclusion: C v D is satisfied in (I, M, N ) iff
(C) I,M,N (D) I,M,N . Assertions are interpreted in terms of set membership:
C(a) is satisfied in (I, M, N ) iff a (C) I,M,N and R(a, b) is satisfied in (I, M, N )
iff (a, b) (R) I,M,N .
An inclusion C v D is satisfied by a structure (M, N ) (which is denoted
as (M, N ) |= C v D) iff each interpretation I M is such that (I, M, N )
satisfies C v D. An assertion C(a) (resp. R(a, b)) is satisfied by (M, N ) (denoted
respectively as (M, N ) |= C(a), (M, N ) |= R(a, b)) iff each interpretation I M
is such that (I, M, N ) satisfies C(a) (resp. R(a, b)).
Analogously, a DLKN F knowledge base 6 is satisfied by a structure (M, N )
(denoted as (M, N ) |= 6) iff each interpretation I M is such that every
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sentence (inclusion or membership assertion) of 6 is satisfied in the epistemic

interpretation (I, M, N ).
Definition 2.2. A set of interpretations M is a model for 6 iff the structure
(M, M) satisfies 6 and, for each set of interpretations M0 , if M M0 then
(M0 , M) does not satisfy 6. Two KBs 6, 6 0 are equivalent when for every set of
interpretations M, M is a model for 6 iff it is a model for 6 0 .
By this definition the sentence KC t C(a) has one model containing all possible interpretations and thus corresponding to complete lack of knowledge. On
the other hand, the sentence AC t C(a) has two models: one as before, and another containing all the interpretations satisfying C(a), intuitively interpreted
as the self-supporting justification of C(a) of autoepistemic logic. Notice that
by negating the A operator one obtains a default assumptionas shown in
Section 3.
The DLKN F knowledge base 6 is satisfiable if there exists a model for 6,
unsatisfiable otherwise. Given two DLKN F -concepts C, D, and a knowledge
base 6, we say that C is subsumed by D in 6, written 6 |= C v D, if C v D is
true in every model for 6. Analogously, instance checking in 6 of a membership
assertion C(a) (where C is a DLKN F -concept and a O6 ) is defined as follows:
6 |= C(a) iff C(a) is satisfied by every model of 6.
Observe that, due to the above semantics, each ALCKN F model corresponds
to a structure (M, M). Therefore, in the right-hand side of the logical implication symbol |=, the operator A is interpreted in the same way as the operator K.
Hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict to instance checking problems
6 |= C(a) and subsumption problems 6 |= C v D in which C, D do not contain occurrences of the operator A. In the following, we call ALCK concept an
ALCKN F concept expression which contains no occurrences of the operator A.
3. RECONSTRUCTION OF FRAME-BASED SYSTEMS
In this section, we illustrate how the modal operators can be used to model,
in a declarative way, and with a uniform semantics, several features that appeared in frame-based systems. In particular, we focus on: defaults, integrity
constraints, role, and concept closure.
3.1 Defaults
Some studies on formalizing defaults in frame-based systems in DLs [Baader
and Hollunder 1995; Quantz and Royer 1992; Straccia 1993] propose the extension of DLs through the use of default logic. We argue that, in order to provide
a unified framework to the formalization of several forms of KB closure, it is
more convenient to treat defaults as epistemic sentences. A first attempt in
this direction is presented in Donini et al. [1995], where it is shown that one
can translate defaults in a logic of minimal knowledge, but based on a different
(and less intuitive) semantics for the modal operator K.
We call DL-default a default rule of the form
: 1 , . . . , n
d=
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F. M. Donini et al.
where , i , are DL-concepts and n 0. The semantics proposed in Baader

and Hollunder [1995] for defaults in DL KBs restricts the application of defaults
only to the individuals explicitly mentioned in the ABox (closed defaults).
Since there is still no consensus on a semantics for open defaults, we do not
propose a semantics for such defaults, but follow Baader and Hollunder and
concentrate just on closed defaults. Besides, semantics proposed so far may
lead to counterintuitive results when applied to Description Logics (see Baader
and Hollunder [1992]).
Note that this closed semantics can be viewed as the natural extension of
the semantics for procedural rules given in Donini et al. [1992, 1998b], where
rules are applied only to the individuals explicitly mentioned in the KB. Under this restriction, we are able to translate default rules in terms of DLKN F
inclusions in the framework of MKNF-DLs. For this purpose, an adaptation
of Lifschitzs [1994] translation of defaults into MKNF provides a modular and
faithful translation of default rules into DLKN F . More specifically, we translate
a DL-default d into the inclusion DK (d ) defined as:
.
(1)
DK (d ) = KI u K u A1 u u An v K
where I is an atomic concept not appearing in the KB, whose presence is motivated below. Notice that the result of the above translation is an inclusion between concepts, hence it is a universal closure over the fixed universe 1. When
is not equivalent to the universal concept >, the condition K forces DK (d ) to
be applicable only to individuals in the KB. However, both prerequisite-free defaults (no ) and defaults where >, would be potentially applicable to each
individual of 1resulting in a non-closed semanticsif KI were not present.
Instead, we assume that for each individual a O6 , the assertion I (a) is added
to 6. Then, the new prerequisite KI corresponds to adding an extra condition
for the application of the default, namely, the individual must be in O6 . So the
prerequisite KI , along with the assertions {I (a)|a O6 }, realizes the closed
semantics also for prerequisite-free defaults.
As an example, consider the default statement: If you know an employee who
belongs to the programming department, then it is likely that (s)he is either
an engineer, or a mathematician, unless (s)he is a manager. This default rule
could be translated as the following ALC-default:
KI u K(employee u belongsTo.programmingDept) u Amanager
v K(engineer t mathematician)
In what follows, we present the particular case of defaults using ALCconcepts, although the results apply to other DLs without effort.
Let h6, Di be a pair such that 6 = hT , Ai is an ALC KB, and D is a set
of ALC-defaults. We refer to Baader and Hollunder [1995] for the (standard)
definition of the skeptical consequences of h6, Di. We write h6, Di |= C(a) to
mean that C(a) is a skeptical consequence of the default KB h6, Di.
Let DK (6, D) = hT 0 , A0 i, where T 0 = T { DK (d ) : d D}, A0 = A {I (a) :
a O6 }, that is for each individual a O6 , the assertion I (a) is added to A.
From the fact that the resulting modular translation DK is faithful, the following property holds.
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THEOREM 3.1. Let h6, Di be an ALC KB with defaults, where 6 is a ALC

KB and D is a set of ALC-defaults. The ALCKN F KB DK (6, D) is such that, for
every ALC-concept C and every individual a O6 , it holds h6, Di |= C(a) iff
DK (6, D) |= C(a).
PROOF. Consider the ALCKN F KB DK (6, D). For each default translation
DK (d ), consider its instance on individual a:
0 (d, a) = KI t K t A1 t t An t K (a)
Because of the presence of the disjunct KI , if a 6 O6 then 0 (d, a) is vacuously
.
true. Hence, DK (6, D) is equivalent to 6 0 = hT , A0 { 0 (d, a)|d D and a
O6 }i. Therefore, DK (6, D) |= C(a) iff 6 0 |= C(a).
Now formulae in 6 0 have exactly the form of translations from first-order
closed default theories into MKNF, presented in Lifschitz [1994, p.63] (except
for the disjunct KI , which is false for a O6 and can be safely deleted). Since
that translation is faithful, and ALC is a fragment of first-order logic, the claim
immediately follows.
We note that the same proof would apply for every description logic DL which
is a fragment of first-order logic, as long as we restrict our attention to closed
defaults.
3.2 Integrity Constraints
We now study the problem of representing integrity constraints (IC) in MKNFDLs. Reiter [1990] pointed out the epistemic nature of ICs : they are not statements about the world, they are statements about what the KB is required
to know. Generally speaking, the satisfaction of ICs in Reiters approach is
checked in the following way: let P be a property that the KB must satisfy.
Find a suitable epistemic query QP formalizing P. Then, check whether the KB
(interpreted under a closure assumption) entails QP .
Previous work [Donini et al. 1992, 1998b] has shown that Reiters approach
can be realized in DL KBs by endowing the query language with epistemic
abilities. Nevertheless, if ICs could be expressed as any other piece of information about the domain of interestas sentences inside the KBreasoning
could take them into account. For instance, for query optimization: parts of a
query which contradict ICs can be safely simplified, constraints implied by ICs
can be added to increase selectivity, and so on. [Bergamaschi and Sartori 1992].
Also KB design validation could benefit in the same way: if the interaction of
inclusion statements in the TBox and ICs yields an inconsistent concept, this
could be detected before the knowledge base is actually built, and ICs violations are detected in entering individuals. But more importantly, including ICs
as sentences inside the KB implies that they can all be checked together by a
single satisfiability check, which is made anyway upon updates on the KB.
The difficulty that arises is precisely in the formalization of the notions of
closure underlying these forms of integrity constraints. Notably, ICs do not
add objective information: rather, they impose conditions on the consistency
of the KB. This is true in the case of first-order, non-modal KBs, which can
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F. M. Donini et al.
be viewed as KBs with a single epistemic model. In the more general case of
epistemic KBs with multiple models, ICs can be viewed as an a fortiori check
which establishes which of the models are actually allowed. In particular, many
forms of ICs impose properties that must hold for the individuals mentioned
explicitly in the KB. The modal operator K appears as an appropriate way to
distinguish such individuals from the others. Moreover, conditions imposed by
ICs are consistency conditions which cannot change the content of the KB. In
other words, augmenting the KB with ICs can only eliminate the models which
do not satisfy the ICs. As we shall see, the modal operator A turns out to be
well-suited for this purpose.
We now show that the combination of the modalities K and A provides for the
formalization in MKNF-DLs of sophisticated constraints on the KB content.
Example 3.2. Let us consider the IC each known employee must be known
to be either male or female, which is meant to avoid any situation where an
employee has been added to the KB without specifying her/his sex.
The solution to the above problem lies in the use of the autoepistemic belief
operator A. Indeed, if we add to a KB the DLKN F inclusion
I1 = Kemployee v (A male t Afemale)
we formalize the intended meaning of the IC.
In fact, suppose 61 contains only one assertion, employee(Bob). Of course,
61 does not satisfy the IC. A model M for 61 {I1 } should satisfy the assertion
A male t Afemale(Bob),
that is, it should be such that either Bob
T
T
J ,M,M
J ,M,M
male
or
Bob
. Suppose M satisfies the former

J M
J M female
0
condition, and consider another interpretation I 0 , such that both Bob 6 maleI
0
and Bob 6 femaleI . Let M0 = M {I 0 }, and observe that
(M0 , M)
T the structure
J ,M0 ,M
satisfies 61 {I1 }, since the interpretation of Amale is J M male
, which
is equal to the interpretation in the structure (M, M)recall that the epistemic concept Amale is interpreted by intersecting interpretations of M, not of
M0 . Therefore, M is not a model for 61 {I1 }, and since an analogous reasoning
can be done for female, we conclude that 61 {I1 } has no model, as it should be
since it violates the IC.
Observe that one might attempt to formalize the IC through the DLKN F
inclusion
I10 = Kemployee v (Kmale t Kfemale)
However, this formalization is incorrect, since such an assertion forces in the
KB, the knowledge about the sex of each known employee. Instead, the meaning
of the IC is to check whether the sex of each known employee is known to the KB.
This difference can be better explained as follows. Suppose again 61 contains
only the assertion employee(Bob), violating the IC. Now, if we add I10 to 61 , we
obtain two models for 61 {I10 }: one in which male(Bob) holds, and another in
which female(Bob) holds.
The difference between I1 and I10 lies in the different interpretation of the
two modalities, namely between minimal knowledge and autoepistemic belief. I1 does not force any new knowledge on known employees. In 61 {I1 },
189
since employee(Bob) holds, the assertion A male t Afemale(Bob) must hold. Now,
since there is no reason to conclude either male(Bob) or female(Bob) from 61 ,
the autoepistemic beliefs A male(Bob) and Afemale(Bob) are not consistent with
the objective knowledge of 61 , therefore A male t Afemale(Bob) is inconsistent
with 61 .
We remark that, for propositional logics, a precise correspondence between
the A operator and Moores L operator of Autoepistemic Logic (AEL) has been
proved [Rosati 1999a, Theorem 3.5]. Namely, given an AEL propositional formula , its models are exactly the models of the MKNF formula K([L/A]),
where [L/A] denotes the substitution of L with A everywhere. From this correspondence, the above assertion A male t Afemale(Bob) can also be understood
as a variation of the classical inconsistent autoepistemic theory {L}. This remark may further clarify our formalization of ICs as believed sentences: if such
a belief is not supported by the objective knowledge, then an inconsistency
arises. We now show a more sophisticated form of IC.
Example 3.3. The IC Each known employee has a known social security
number, which is known to be valid can be correctly formalized by the ALCKN F
inclusion
I2 = Kemployee v ASSN.Avalid
In factas we show belowan ALCKN F ABox 62 does not satisfy the IC iff
62 {I2 } is inconsistent.
Suppose in 62 there is the assertion employee(Bob), but there is no SSN for
Bob. A model M for 62 should satisfy ASSN.Avalid(Bob), that is, there is an
individual x 1 such that M |= ASSN(Bob, x) and M |= Avalid(x). Now con0
sider another interpretation I 0 , such that x 6 validI , and let M0 = M I 0 .
Observe that T
the structure (M0 , M) satisfies 62 {I2 }, since the interpretation
0
of Avalid is J M validJ ,M ,M , same as the interpretation in the structure
(M, M). Therefore, M is not a model for 62 {I2 }, and from the generality of
M we conclude that 62 {I2 } has no models.
A similar reasoning applies in case there is at least one valid x, which is not
known to be Bobs SSN.
To summarize the intuitions of the previous examples, we can state a general
theorem in MKNF-DLs, relating ICs as epistemic queries a` la Reiter and ICs
as epistemic assertions in our setting. We recall that an ICs as epistemic query
is an ALCK-concept CC uses only the modal operator Ksuch that for every
individual a in a KB 6, it must be 6 |= C(a) (otherwise, the IC is violated). In
our setting, we can replace every K in C with A, and use the concept A(C[K/A]),
where C[K/A] is the concept expression obtained from C by replacing each occurrence of K with A, inside the KB, in an inclusion whose antecedent holds for
every individual in O6 . If the IC is violated in a model M of the initial KB, then
M is not a model of the new KB. This ability of MKNF-DLs to embed ICs is formalized in the following theorem. From now on, we call subjective A-assertion
any ALCKN F assertion in which there are no occurrences of the modality K and
all occurrences of atomic concepts lie within the scope of the modality A.
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F. M. Donini et al.
THEOREM 3.4. Let 60 = hT , Ai be an ALCKN F KB, let I be a concept name

not appearing in 60 , let C be an ALCK concept, and let
6 = hT , A {I (a) : a O60 }i
6 0 = hT {KI v A(C[K/A])}, A {I (a) : a O60 }i
A set of interpretations M is a model for 6 0 iff the following conditions hold:
(1) M is a model for 6;
(2) for every individual a O6 , (M, M) satisfies C(a).
PROOF. (:) Let a O6 . Let M be a model for 6 0 . We first prove that (M, M)
satisfies C(a) for each a O6 . Since (M, M) satisfies 6 0 and since O6 = O60 ,
each interpretation in M satisfies I (a), therefore (M, M) satisfies KI (a). Moreover, (M, M) satisfies KI v A(C[K/A]), therefore, for each a O6 , (M, M)
satisfies A(C[K/A])(a). Since (M, M) interprets each concept expression of the
form AD in the same way it interprets the concept expression KD, it follows
that (M, M) satisfies A(C[K/A])(a) iff (M, M) satisfies KC(a). Consequently,
for each model M for 6 and for each a O6 , (M, M) satisfies KC(a), which
implies that (M, M) satisfies C(a).
Then, we prove that M is a model for 6. Since (M, M) satisfies 6 0 , (M, M)
satisfies 6. Now let M0 be a set of interpretations such that M0 M. Since M is
a model for 6 0 , by Definition 2.2, (M0 , M) does not satisfy 6 0 , which implies that
either (M0 , M) does not satisfy 6 or (M0 , M) does not satisfy the inclusion KI v
A(C[K/A]). Suppose (M0 , M) does not satisfy the inclusion KI v A(C[K/A]).
Then, there exists a 1 such that (M0 , M) satisfies KI (a) and (M0 , M) does not
satisfy A(C[K/A])(a). Now, if a O6 , then, since (M, M) satisfies A(C[K/A])(a)
and AC[K/A](a) is a subjective A-assertion, and since (M0 , M) and (M, M) interpret subjective A-assertions in the same way, it follows that (M0 , M) satisfies
A(C[K/A])(a). Conversely, let a 1 O6 , and suppose (M0 , M) satisfies KI (a);
then, each interpretation in M0 satisfies the assertion I (a), hence each interpretation in M satisfies such an assertion. Let I be an interpretation in M and
let I 0 be the interpretation obtained from I by only changing the evaluation of
0
I (a), i.e., I I = I I {a}. Then, since the concept name I does not occur in 60 , it
follows that the structure (M {I 0 }, M) satisfies 6 0 , thus contradicting the hypothesis that M is a model for 6 0 . Consequently, for each a 1 O6 , (M0 , M)
does not satisfy KI (a). Therefore, there exists no a 1 such that (M0 , M) satisfies KI (a) and (M0 , M) does not satisfy A(C[K/A])(a), thus contradicting the
hypothesis. Hence, (M0 , M) satisfies the inclusion KI v A(C[K/A]). Since, as
shown above, either (M0 , M) does not satisfy 6 or (M0 , M) does not satisfy the
inclusion KI v A(C[K/A]), it follows that (M0 , M) does not satisfy 6. Since
(M, M) satisfies 6, it follows that M is a model for 6.
(:) Suppose M is a model for 6 and (M, M) |= C(a) for each a O6 . Then,
(M, M) satisfies KC(a), and from the definition of satisfiability in Section 2.2
it follows that (M, M) satisfies A(C[K/A])(a) for each a O6 . Moreover, let
a 1 O6 , and suppose (M, M) satisfies KI (a); then, each interpretation in
M satisfies the assertion I (a). Let I be an interpretation in M and let I 0 be the
interpretation obtained from I by only changing the evaluation of I (a), that is,
191
I I = I I {a}. Then, since the concept name I does not occur in 60 , it follows
that the structure (M {I 0 }, M) satisfies 6, thus contradicting the hypothesis
that M is a model for 6. Consequently, for each a 1 O6 , (M, M) does not
satisfy KI (a). Thus, (M, M) satisfies the inclusion KI v A(C[K/A]), which
implies that (M, M) satisfies 6 0 . Moreover, by Definition 2.2, for each set of
interpretations M0 such that M0 M, (M0 , M) does not satisfy 6, and since
6 0 contains every inclusion and every assertion in 6, it follows that (M0 , M)
does not satisfy 6 0 , which implies that M is a model for 6 0 .
We note that when the IC must hold only for the individuals that belong
to a particular conceptemployee in the previous examplesone can use this
concept as an antecedent in the inclusions.
3.3 Role and Concept Closure
Finally, we show how two particular forms of closed-world reasoning, namely
role closure and concept closure, can be nicely formalized with a combination of minimal knowledge and autoepistemic belief (that is, bimodal DLKN F concepts). These kinds of closure appear as very useful tools in knowledge
representation.
Closure on roles is available both in CLASSIC [Patel-Schneider et al. 1991]
and in LOOM [MacGregor 1988]. The idea is to state that all fillers for a role
about an individual have been inserted in the knowledge basefor example,
all subparts of a given object, all children of a person. This enables one to
conclude universal role quantifications, restricted to the individuals explicitly
filling the role in the KB. We believe that reasoning enabled by role closure can
be more correctly captured by epistemic concepts. To introduce the problem, we
adapt from Donini et al. [1998b, Sect. 4.2] the following example.
Example 3.5 Role closure, 1.
Let 63 be the ALC KB
h, MANAGES(Ann, Marc), engineer(Marc)i

That is, Ann manages Marc who is an engineer. A conclusion about the current
state of 63 , is that All employees managed by Ann are engineers. The knowledge representation system CLASSIC obtains this result by closing role MANAGES
for the individual Annthere are no other fillers of MANAGES for Ann. Then the
system counts the number of existing fillers (1 in this case) and commits to the
assertion (1 MANAGES)(Ann), stating that there is at most one filler related to Ann
through the role MANAGES. This yields the conclusion (MANAGES.engineer)(Ann),
which is non-monotonic in nature [Brachman 1992]as soon as some nonengineers managed by Ann are added, it should be retracted. But closing a role
is an operation on the whole knowledge baseonce closed, no more fillers can
be added to a role.
We instead propose to express this conclusion as the epistemic sentence
(KMANAGES.Kengineer)(Ann)
entailed by 63 which (more correctly) bounds the universal quantification
to individuals explicitly appearing in the KB.
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When epistemic sentences can also appear inside the knowledge base, role
closure may yield more subtle results, as shown by the following example.
Example 3.6 Role closure, 2. Let 64 = hT , Ai be the following ALC KB:
v programmingSkills
engineer
T = mathematician v programmingSkills
mathematician v
engineer
A = {MANAGES(Ann, Marc), MANAGES(Ann, Paula)}
where the three axioms in T express that both engineers and mathematicians
have programming abilities, and the same employee cannot be both a mathematician and an engineer. Now, suppose we want to formalize the property:
one of the known employees managed by Ann is known to be an engineer,
and another (different) one is known to be a mathematician. One would like
to conclude that all known employees managed by Ann are known to have
programming abilities.
It turns out that the correct formalization is provided by the use of both
modalities A and K. Formally: let
I4 = AMANAGES.Kengineer u AMANAGES.Kmathematician(Ann)
Then, hT , A {I4 }i |= KMANAGES.KprogrammingSkills(Ann).
Epistemic operators make it natural to extend the notion of closure to concept
expressions.
Example 3.7 Concept closure. Let 65 be the following ALC KB:
UScitizen(Paula)
65 = UScitizen(Carl) MANAGES(Ann, Marc)
UScitizen(Marc)
Observe that, following the previous examples for role closure, closing the role
MANAGES for Ann in 65 leads to the non-monotonic conclusion that All employees
that are known to be managed by Ann are known to be US citizens. In formulae,
65 |= KMANAGES.KUScitizen(Ann)
(2)
Suppose now we add to 65 the information I5 , informally stated as: Ann manages one of the already known non-US-citizens of the company. (Here already
means that you should not infer from I5 that there can be another non-UScitizen you dont know about.) Now, since Paula and Carl are the only non-UScitizens in 65 , we should conclude that either Paula is managed by Ann, or Carl
is. Now what about the non-monotonic conclusion (2)? Intuitively, it should be
false, either because of Paula, or because of Carl.
This intuitive behavior can be formally obtained by letting
I5 = KMANAGES.AUScitizen(Ann)
sinceas we now show65 {I5 } has only two epistemic models, one in which
Paula is one of Anns employees, and the other in which Carl is.
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We first prove that in every model either Paula or Carl is managed by Ann.
In fact, suppose there is a model N such that in N neither Paula nor Carl are
managed by Ann, i.e. N 6|= MANAGES(Ann, Paula) and N 6|= MANAGES(Ann, Carl).
Since N models I5 , there should be another individual x 1 such that N |=
KMANAGES(Ann, x) and N |= AUScitizen(x), with x 6= Paula and x 6= Carl.
However, N |= AUScitizen(x) means that, for every interpretation I N ,
it is x (UScitizen)I . Now consider the interpretation I 0 in which x
0
(UScitizen)I , and let M = N {I 0 }. Observe that (M, N ) still satisfies 65 {I5 },
since for every interpretation I M, it is
\
(UScitizen)J ,M,N
x (AUScitizen)I,M,N =
J N
Therefore, N is not a model for 65 {I5 }, contradicting the initial hypothesis.

The above argument cannot be used for a model in which KMANAGES
(Ann, Paula) holds. Indeed, now let
N = {I | I |= 65 and (Ann, Paula) MANAGESI }
Clearly, N also satisfies I5 . We now show that N is maximal. Let M
N {J }, where J is any interpretation still satisfying 65 , but for which
(Ann, Paula) 6 (MANAGES)J . Now M 6|= KMANAGES(Ann, Paula), and every other
individual x 6= Marc does not satisfy KMANAGES(Ann, x), since N contains by
definition some interpretations in which MANAGES(Ann, x) is false. For x = Marc,
the KB imposes M |= UScitizen(Marc), hence it can be concluded that M 6|= I5 .
This proves that N is indeed maximal. The same argument shows that there
is a model in which KMANAGES(Ann, Carl) holds.
In conclusion, in every model for 65 {I5 } either KMANAGES(Ann, Paula) holds,
or KMANAGES(Ann, Carl) holds, also implying that (2) is false.
To gain more intuition on the use of modal operators, observe that using the
assertion AMANAGES.AUScitizen(Ann) instead of I5 , would lead to an inconsistent knowledge base. In fact, applying the same arguments as Example 3.3,
it would impose the (unfulfilled) integrity constraint Ann is known to manage
a known non-US-citizen.
On the other hand, using the above arguments, the reader can verify that
adding to 65 the (partly epistemic) assertion MANAGES.AUScitizen(Ann)
results in a KB in which there is just one model M, formed by all interpretations satisfying 65 , and either MANAGES(Ann, Paula) or MANAGES(Ann, Carl).
Consequently, in such a KB, the conclusion (2) would unexpectedly hold. This is
because the interpretation of the role KMANAGES in M contains only (Ann, Marc),
thus it is not influenced by the assertion MANAGES.AUScitizen(Ann).
This behavior of partly epistemic quantified expressions may suggest
favoring quantified expressions in which both the role and the concept are
epistemicas I5 above. We give formal details about this point in Section 4.1.
As it can be seen from the reasoning arguments in the examples, reasoning
in MKNF-DL KBs is a very sophisticated task. In the next section, we present
a method to automate deduction in a suitable restriction of the general framework. All examples presented above are solved by our method.
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4. REASONING IN MKNF-DLS
In this section we study reasoning in MKNF-DL knowledge bases. Specifically,
we address satisfiability of ALCKN F knowledge bases, containing both a TBox
and an ABox. We then show that instance checking can be reduced to satisfiability, and discuss the problem of subsumption.
We develop our reasoning method for a subset of ALCKN F , which allows one
to express all the nonmonotonic features described in the previous section
defaults, rules, integrity constraints, epistemic queries, and role and concept
closure. The resulting language amounts to a large first-order fragment of
MKNF, and it represents a significant extension over previous results on reasoning in nonmonotonic modal logics. In fact, previous work on reasoning
in first-order autoepistemic logic [Niemela 1993] does not allow any form of
quantifying-in. Another proposal for reasoning on a first-order fragment of nonmonotonic modal logic is Lakemeyer [1996], which is based on a formal model
of limited reasoning which makes it difficult to compare with our work.
Our strategy, which we inherit from several approaches to reasoning in
propositional modal nonmonotonic logics (e.g., Gottlob [1992]; Marek and
Truszczynski
[1993]; Niemela [1992]), aims at reducing the reasoning problem
in ALCKN F to a number of reasoning problems in the underlying non-modal
logic ALC. The basis for such a technique is the characterization of each model
of an ALCKN F KB 6 by means of an ALC KB: in this way, the set of ALC
KBs representing all the models of 6 constitutes a non-modal representation
of 6, and allows for using classical reasoning techniques in order to solve the
reasoning problem in ALCKN F .
Formally, we say that a set of interpretations M is first-order representable
(resp. ALC representable) if there exists a first-order theory (resp. an ALC KB)
6M such that
M = {I : I satisfies 6M }
In other words, we want to characterize the interpretations belonging to M by
means of a first-order theory (or an ALC KB). Of course, since ALC corresponds
to a fragment of first-order logic, if M is ALC representable then M is also
first-order representable. Notice that the theory 6M may be either finite or
infinite.
In the following, we study both first-order representability and ALC representability of the models of ALCKN F KBs. We first prove that, in the general
case, the models of an ALCKN F KB are not first-order representable. Then,
we define the subset of subjectively quantified ALCKN F KBs, and show that
such KBs constitute a maximal subset of ALCKN F KBs whose models are both
first-order and ALC representable. While an ALC-based characterization of
subjectively quantified KBs is an interesting result in itself, it is not sufficient for obtaining an effective procedure for ALCKN F based on an ALC reasoner. Therefore, we define the class of simple ALCKN F KBs, a subset of subjectively quantified ALCKN F KBs whose models admit a characterization in
terms of finite ALC KBs, and prove decidability of reasoning in such a class of
ALCKN F KBs.
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4.1 Subjectively Quantified KBs

We first prove that, in general, the models of ALCKN F KBs cannot be characterized by first-order theories. In order to show such a property, we elaborate
on the proof of an analogous result, due to Levesque [1990, Theorem 3.6], for
modal first-order logic.
THEOREM 4.1.
PROOF.
The models of ALCKN F KBs are not first-order representable.
Let 6 = hT , Ai be the following ALCKN F KB:

T =
A = {KR.D(d 1 ), P .KC(d 1 ), R.(C u KC)(d 1 )}
In order to prove the thesis, we show the existence of a model M for 6 such
that there exists no first-order theory 9 such that
M = {I : I satisfies 9}
The proof is organized in the following way. First, we define a set of interpretations M, and prove that M is a model for 6. Then, we show that M cannot
be characterized in terms of a first-order theory.
We start by defining M. First, since there are no occurrences of the operator
A in 6, from the semantic definition of ALCKN F in Section 2.2, the evaluation
of 6 in a structure (M, M0 ) does not depend on M0 . Therefore, in the following
we say that a set of interpretations M satisfies 6 (or any assertion without
occurrences of the operator A) iff every interpretation I M is such that
(I, M, M0 ) satisfies 6 (for any choice of the set M0 ). Let d 1 , d 2 , . . . be an ordering
of the elements in 1, let Odd be the set of odd-positioned elements in such an
ordering, and let S be the infinite set of formulas
^
S=
R(d 1 , d ) C(d )
d Odd
Moreover, given the positive integers i, j, l , let f (i, j, l ) be the formula

f (i, j, l ) = D(d j ) P (d 1 , dl ) R(d 1 , d 2i ) C(d 2i )
Finally, for each i 0, let Wi, j,l be the following set of first-order interpretations:
Wi, j,l = {I : I satisfies S { f (i, j, l )}}
and let M be the following set of first-order interpretations:
[ [ [
M=
Wi, j,l
i>0 j Odd l Odd
We now show that M is a model for 6. From Definition 2.2, we have to prove
that M is a model for 6 and that there is no set of interpretations M0 such that
M0 M and M0 satisfies 6. First, we prove that M satisfies 6. From the above
definition of M it follows that M satisfies an assertion of the form KR(d 1 , d ) iff
d Odd, and M satisfies an assertion of the form KC(d ) iff d Odd. Moreover,
each I M is such that I satisfies D(d ) and P (d 1 , d 0 ) for some d , d 0 Odd.
Consequently, for each I M, (I, M) satisfies the assertions KR.D(d 1 ) and
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P .KC(d 1 ). Finally, for each I M there exists d 1 Odd such that I satisfies
R(d 1 , d ) and I satisfies C(d ). Since, for such a d , M does not satisfy KC(d ), it
follows that, for each I M, (I, M) satisfies the assertion R.(C u KC)(d 1 ).
Therefore, M satisfies 6.
Then we prove that there is no set of interpretations M0 such that M0 M
and M0 satisfies 6. Let M0 be a set of interpretations, and suppose that M0 M
and M0 satisfies 6. Furthermore, let I be an interpretation such that I
M0 M. From the above definition of M it follows that either I does not
satisfy S or I does not satisfy any formula of the form f (i, j, l ) such that i 0,
j Odd, l Odd, which implies that at least one of the following conditions
holds:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
I does not satisfy R(d 1 , d ), for some d Odd;

I does not satisfy C(d ), for some d Odd;
I does not satisfy D(d ), for each d Odd;
I does not satisfy P (d 1 , d ), for each d Odd;
for each d 1 Odd, either I does not satisfy R(d 1 , d ) or I does not satisfy
C(d ).
First, suppose Condition 1 holds. Then, there exists d k Odd such that M0
does not satisfy KR(d 1 , d k ). Now, all interpretations J contained in M and
satisfying one of the formulas f (i, k , l ) such that i > 0 and l Odd are such
that (J , M0 ) does not satisfy KR.D(d 1 ). Consequently, M0 does not satisfy 6.
Contradiction. Hence, Condition 1 does not hold.
Now suppose Condition 2 holds. Then there exists d k Odd such that M0 does
not satisfy KC(d k ). Now, all interpretations J contained in M and satisfying
one of the formulas f (i, j, k ) such that i > 0 and j Odd are such that (J , M0 )
does not satisfy P .KC(d 1 ). Consequently, M0 does not satisfy 6. Contradiction.
Hence, Condition 2 does not hold.
Then suppose Condition 3 holds. Then (I, M0 ) does not satisfy the assertion
KR.D(d 1 ), since for each d 0 1, M0 satisfies KR(d 1 , d 0 ) only if M satisfies
KR(d 1 , d 0 ), and M satisfies KR(d 1 , d 0 ) only if d 0 Odd. Consequently, M0 does
not satisfy 6. Contradiction. Hence, Condition 3 does not hold.
Suppose now that Condition 4 holds. Then (I, M0 ) does not satisfy the assertion P .KC(d 1 ), since for each d 0 1, M0 satisfies KC(d 0 ) only if M satisfies
KC(d 0 ), and M satisfies KC(d 0 ) only if d 0 Odd. Consequently, M0 does not
satisfy 6. Contradiction. Hence, Condition 4 does not hold.
Finally, suppose Condition 5 holds. Since Condition 2 does not hold, it follows
that each I 0 M0 M satisfies C(d ) for each d Odd. Hence, M0 satisfies KC(d )
iff d Odd. Now suppose (I, M0 ) satisfies the assertion R.(C u KC)(d 1 ). Then
there exists d 1 such that I satisfies both R(d 1 , d ) and C(d ), and M0 does
not satisfy KC(d ). There are two possible cases:
(1) d Odd: in this case, M0 does not satisfy KC(d ), thus contradicting the
hypothesis. Hence, Condition 5 does not hold;
(2) d 1 Odd: in this case, since Condition 5 holds, either R(d 1 , d ) or C(d )
are not satisfied by I. Contradiction. Hence, Condition 5 does not hold.
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Therefore, I does not satisfy any of the 5 conditions above, which implies that
I M, which contradicts the hypothesis that M0 M. Consequently, there
is no set of interpretations M0 such that M0 M and M0 satisfies 6, which
implies that M is a model for 6.
Then, we prove that the above defined set of interpretations M cannot be
characterized in terms of a first-order theory. Let I be the first-order interpretation such that
RI
CI
PI
DI
=
=
=
=
{(x, y) : x = d 1 y Odd}
{x : x Odd}
{(d 1 , d 1 )}
{d 1 }
and let M0 be the following set of first-order interpretations:

M0 = M {I}
Of course, M0 M, since I 6 M. We prove that M and M0 agree on all
first-order sentences, that is, for each first-order sentence , is satisfied by
all interpretations in M iff is satisfied by all interpretations in M0 . First,
suppose is satisfied by all interpretations in M0 . Since M M0 , it follows
that is satisfied by all interpretations in M. Conversely, suppose there exists
an interpretation I 0 M such that I 0 does not satisfy . If I 0 M, it follows
that is not satisfied by all interpretations in M. Otherwise, if I 0 6 M, then
I 0 = I. By the above definition of the set M, it follows that, for each i > 0, there
exists an interpretation Ii in Wi,1,1 (and thus in M) such that I and Ii agree on
the evaluation of all predicates, with the exception of R(d 1 , d 2i ) and C(d 2i )
such sentences are both true in Ii and are both false in I. Now, suppose the
first-order sentence does not use d 2i as a constant name: then, the truth value
of is the same at I and Ii [Levesque 1990, Lemma 3.6.1]. Therefore, since
is finite, there exists i > 0 such that the truth value of is the same at I and Ii .
Consequently, since hypothesis I does not satisfy , Ii does not satisfy , and
since Ii M, it follows that is not satisfied by all interpretations in M. Thus,
for each first-order sentence , is satisfied by all interpretations in M iff is
satisfied by all interpretations in M0 , which implies that there exists no firstorder theory 9 such that M = {I : I satisfies 9}, which proves the thesis.
In order to identify a maximal subset of ALCKN F KBs whose models are
first-order representable, we now define the notion of subjectively quantified
ALCKN F KBs.
Definition 4.2. A subjectively quantified ALCKN F KB is an ALCKN F KB
6 in which each concept expression C occurring in an inclusion or instance
assertion of 6 is such that each quantified subexpression of C of the form R.D,
R.D satisfies one of the following conditions:
(1) R is an atomic role and D is an ALC-concept;
(2) R is an epistemic role of the form KR 0 or A R 0 , and D is of one of the forms
K D 0 , K D 0 , A D 0 or A D 0 .
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For instance, the ALCKN F KB

h, {R.KC(a)}i
is not subjectively quantified, since the concept expression R.KC does not
satisfy any of the above conditions; analogously, the ALCKN F KB
h, {R.(C t KC)(a)}i
is not subjectively quantified. Conversely, the ALCKN F KB
h, {AR.KC(a)}i
is subjectively quantified.
In the rest of this subsection, we show that the above notion of subjectively
quantified KB is sufficient in order to guarantee that the models of an ALCKN F
KB can be characterized by means of (either finite or infinite) first-order theories. More precisely, each model of such a KB can be characterized in terms of an
ALC KB. The characterization is based on previous results obtained for propositional MKNF theories [Rosati 1999a], which we extend to the first-order case.
In particular, the characterization relies on the notion of modal atom: we will
show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between certain sets of modal
atoms and the models of a subjectively quantified ALCKN F KB.
From now on, we denote with 6, the subjectively quantified ALCKN F KB
of the form hT , Ai, where in T we distinguish between epistemic and nonepistemic inclusions, that is, T = (T 0 , 0), where T 0 represents the set of inclusions in T of the form C v D such that both C and D are ALC-concepts, while
0 = T T 0 represents the set of epistemic inclusions in T . Moreover, each
of the symbols M, M1 , M2 stands for a generic occurrence of a modal operator:
M, M1 , M2 {K, A}, while N stands for a possibly negated occurrence of a modal
operator: N {K, A, K, A}. Moreover, when we mention roles we always
make it explicit whether we consider epistemic roles KRa , ARa or non-modal
atomic roles Ra . For convenience, we drop the subscript in Ra and assume that
R is always an atomic, non-modal role.
Following Gottlob [1995], we say that a concept expression D occurs strictly
in C if there is an occurrence of D in C which lies outside the scope of both
modalities and quantifiers.
Given the domain 1the countable-infinite set of names of individuals in
the languagethe set of Modal Atoms MA1 (6) of 6 is defined inductively as
follows:
(1) if C(a) A, then KC(a) MA1 (6);
(2) if R(a, b) A, then KR(a, b) MA1 (6);
(3) if KR(a, b) A (resp. AR(a, b) A), then KR(a, b) MA1 (6) (resp.
AR(a, b) MA1 (6));
(4) if KC v D 0, then KC(x), KD(x) MA1 (6), for each x 1;
(5) if KD (resp. AD) occurs strictly in C, and there exists a modal atom of the
form KC(x) or AC(x) contained in MA1 (6), then KD(x) MA1 (6) (resp.
AD(x) MA1 (6));
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(6) if M1 R.M2 D (resp. M1 R.M2 D) occurs strictly in C, and there exists a

modal atom of the form KC(x) or AC(x) in MA1 (6), then M1 R.M2 D(x)
MA1 (6) (resp. M1 R.M2 D(x) MA1 (6)), and M1 R(x, y), M2 D( y)
MA1 (6), for each y 1;
(7) if M1 R.M2 D (resp. M1 R.M2 D) occurs strictly in C, and there exists a
modal atom of the form KC(x) or AC(x) in MA1 (6), then M1 R.M2 D(x)
MA1 (6) (resp. M1 R.M2 D(x) MA1 (6)), and M1 R(x, y), M2 D( y)
MA1 (6), for each y 1;
(8) nothing else belongs to MA1 (6).
Notice that, since 1 is infinite, the set MA1 (6) is infinite either if 0 is not
empty or at least one concept expression of either of the above forms 6 or
7 appears as a concept subexpression in A.
The set of models of 6 can be associated with a set of partitions of MA1 (6)
satisfying some properties. Let C(x) be any ALCKN F assertion; let 6 be a subjectively quantified ALCKN F KB; let (P, N ) be a partition of MA1 (6): P is
called the set of positive modal atoms (i.e., the set of modal atoms which are
assumed to hold), while N is called the set of negative modal atoms (i.e., the
modal atoms which are assumed not to hold). We denote with C(x)(P, N ) the
assertion obtained from C(x) in the following way:
replace each strict occurrence of a concept expression KD (resp. AD) in C
with > if KD(x) P (resp. AD(x) P ) and with otherwise;
replace each strict occurrence of a concept expression MR.ND in C with >
if MR.ND(x) P and with otherwise;
replace each strict occurrence of a concept expression MR.ND in C with >
if MR.ND(x) P and with otherwise.
We are now ready to define the objective knowledge induced by a partition
of MA1 (6).
Definition 4.3. Let (P, N ) be a partition of MA1 (6). We denote with
ObK (P, N ) and ObA (P, N ) the following ALC KBs:
ObK (P, N ) = hT 0 , {C(x)(P, N ) : KC(x) P } {R(x, y) : KR(x, y) P }i
ObA (P, N ) = hT 0 , {C(x)(P, N ) : AC(x) P } {R(x, y) : AR(x, y) P }i
With a slight abuse of notation, in the following we say that an assertion
belongs to an ALC KB hT , Ai if it belongs to A.
Definition 4.4. We say that a partition (P, N ) of MA1 (6) is consistent with
6 if the following conditions hold:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
if C(a) A, then KC(a) P and, if R(a, b) A, then KR(a, b) P ;

the ALC KB ObK (P, N ) is satisfiable;
the ALC KB ObA (P, N ) is satisfiable;
ObK (P, N ) 6|= C(x)(P, N ), for each KC(x) N ;
ObK (P, N ) 6|= R(x, y), for each KR(x, y) N ;
ObA (P, N ) 6|= C(x)(P, N ), for each AC(x) N ;
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(7) ObA (P, N ) 6|= R(x, y), for each AR(x, y) N ;

(8) for each M1 R.M2 D(x) P , there exists y such that M1 R(x, y) P and
M2 D( y) P , and for each M1 R.M2 D(x) P , there exists y such that
M1 R(x, y) P and M2 D( y) N ;
(9) for each M1 R.M2 D(x) P and for each y such that M1 R(x, y) P ,
M2 D( y) P. Moreover, for each M1 R.M2 D(x) P and for each y such
that M1 R(x, y) P , M2 D( y) N ;
(10) for each KC v D 0 and for each x 1, if KC(x) P then KD(x) P .
We recall that, in general, MA1 (6) is infinite; hence the above definition specifies an infinite set of conditions for the consistency of a partition.
Roughly speaking, the idea behind the use of partitions of the set MA1 (6) is
that a guess (P, N ) of the formulas in MA1 (6) identifies an (infinite) ALC KB
ObK (P, N ). When (P, N ) is consistent with 6, then the set of all interpretations
over 1 satisfying ObK (P, N ) represents a candidate model for 6.
Definition 4.5. Let (M1 , M2 ) be a pair of sets of interpretations over 1. We
say that (M1 , M2 ) induces the following partition (P, N ) of MA1 (6):
P = {C(x) : C(x) MA1 (6) and (M1 , M2 ) |= C(x)}
{KR(x, y) : KR(x, y) MA1 (6) and (M1 , M2 ) |= KR(x, y)}
{AR(x, y) : AR(x, y) MA1 (6) and (M1 , M2 ) |= AR(x, y)}
N = {C(x) : C(x) MA1 (6) and (M1 , M2 ) 6|= C(x)}
{KR(x, y) : KR(x, y) MA1 (6) and (M1 , M2 ) 6|= KR(x, y)}
{AR(x, y) : AR(x, y) MA1 (6) and (M1 , M2 ) 6|= AR(x, y)}
We say that a modal atom of the form KC(x), AC(x) (with C ALC-concept)
or KR(x, y), AR(x, y) has (modal) depth 1. A modal atom of the form KC(x) or
AC(x) has depth i + 1, where i is the maximum depth of a modal atom D(x)
such that D is a subconcept expression occurring in C. Finally, a modal atom of
the form MR.NC(x), MR.NC(x), has depth i + 1, where i is the depth of the
modal atom NC(x).
We now prove some properties about partitions of MA1 (6) induced by sets
of interpretations, which show how they are closely related.
LEMMA 4.6. Let (M1 , M2 ) be a pair of sets of interpretations over 1, and let
(P, N ) be the partition of MA1 (6) induced by (M1 , M2 ). Then, for each modal
atom of the form KC(x) in MA1 (6), KC(x) P iff (M1 , M2 ) |= KC(x)(P, N ),
and for each modal atom of the form AC(x) in MA1 (6), AC(x) P iff
(M1 , M2 ) |= AC(x)(P, N )
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the modal depth of the modal atoms
in MA1 (6). Let (P, N ) be the partition of MA1 (6) induced by (M1 , M2 ). For a
modal atom of MA1 (6) of modal depth 1, the claim follows from Definition 4.5
and Definition 4.3. Now assume that the claim holds for each modal atom of
MA1 (6) of modal depth i, and let KC(x) be a modal atom of MA1 (6) of modal
depth i + 1. Suppose KC(x) P : then, by Definition 4.5, (M1 , M2 ) |= KC(x),
thus, from the induction hypothesis and the definition of satisfiability in
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Section 2.2, it follows that (M1 , M2 ) |= KC(x)(P, N ). Analogously, it follows

that, if KC(x) 6 P , then KC(x) N , hence by Definition 4.5 (M1 , M2 ) 6|= C(x),
which implies that (M1 , M2 ) 6|= KC(x)(P, N ). In the same way, it can be shown
that AC(x) P iff (M1 , M2 ) |= AC(x)(P, N ).
LEMMA 4.7. Let (M1 , M2 ) be a pair of sets of interpretations over 1 such that
M1 M2 and (M1 , M2 ) satisfies 6, and let (P, N ) be the partition of MA1 (6)
induced by (M1 , M2 ). Then, each interpretation in M1 satisfies ObK (P, N ).
Moreover, each interpretation in M2 satisfies ObA (P, N ).
PROOF. Let (P, N ) be the partition of MA1 (6) induced by (M1 , M2 ), and
suppose that (M1 , M2 ) satisfies 6. Then, each interpretation in M1 satisfies all axioms of T 0 , and since M1 M2 , each interpretation in M2 satisfies all axioms of T 0 . Moreover, by Lemma 4.6, it follows that, for each modal
atom of the form KC(x) (resp. AC(x)) in P , (M1 , M2 ) |= KC(x)(P, N ) (resp.
(M1 , M2 ) |= AC(x)(P, N )), therefore each interpretation in M1 (resp. M2 )
satisfies C(x)(P, N ). Finally, for each modal atom of the form KR(x, y) (resp.
AR(x, y)) in P , (M1 , M2 ) |= AR(x, y)(P, N ) (resp. (M1 , M2 ) |= AR(x, y)(P, N ))
by Definition 4.5, therefore each interpretation in M1 (resp. M2 ) satisfies
R(x, y). Consequently, each interpretation in M1 satisfies ObK (P, N ), and each
interpretation in M2 satisfies ObA (P, N ).
LEMMA 4.8. Let (M1 , M2 ) be a pair of sets of interpretations over 1 such that
M1 M2 and (M1 , M2 ) satisfies 6, and let (P, N ) be the partition of MA1 (6)
induced by (M1 , M2 ). Then, (P, N ) is consistent with 6.
PROOF. Let (P, N ) be the partition of MA1 (6) induced by (M1 , M2 ). By
Definition 4.5, it follows that (P, N ) satisfies Condition 1 of Definition 4.4.
Moreover, since (M1 , M2 ) satisfies 6 and M1 M2 , by Lemma 4.7 it follows
that (M1 , M2 ) satisfies ObK (P, N ) and ObA (P, N ), hence both ObK (P, N ) and
ObA (P, N ) are satisfiable. Consequently, (P, N ) satisfies both Condition 2 and
Condition 3 of Definition 4.4.
Then let KC(x) be a modal atom in N . Then, by Lemma 4.6, (M1 , M2 ) 6|=
KC(x)(P, N ), which in turn implies that (M1 , M2 ) 6|= C(x)(P, N ). Now, since
by Lemma 4.7 (M1 , M2 ) satisfies ObK (P, N ), it follows that there exists an
interpretation in M1 that satisfies ObK (P, N ) and does not satisfy C(x)(P, N ).
Consequently, (P, N ) satisfies Condition 4 of Definition 4.4. In an analogous
way, it can be shown that (P, N ) satisfies Condition 5, Condition 6 and Condition 7 of Definition 4.4.
Now, suppose M1 R.M2 D(x) (resp. M1 R.M2 D(x)) is a modal atom in P .
Then, (M1 , M2 ) |= M1 R.M2 D(x) (resp. (M1 , M2 ) |= M1 R.M2 D(x)), thus,
by the definition of satisfiability in Section 2.2, there exists an individual y
in 1 such that both (M1 , M2 ) |= M1 R(x, y) and (M1 , M2 ) |= M2 D( y) (resp.
(M1 , M2 ) |= M2 D( y)). Now, since both M1 R(x, y) and M2 D( y) belong to
MA1 (6), it follows that both such modal atoms belong to P (resp. M1 R(x, y) P
and M2 D( y) N ): therefore, (P, N ) satisfies Condition 8 of Definition 4.4. In
the same way, it can be shown that (P, N ) satisfies Condition 9 of Definition 4.4.
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Finally, suppose KC v D 0 and suppose KC(x) is a modal atom in P .

Then, since (M1 , M2 ) satisfies 6, it follows that (M1 , M2 ) |= D(x), therefore
KD(x) P . Hence, (P, N ) satisfies Condition 10 of Definition 4.4. Consequently,
(P, N ) is consistent with 6.
Analogously, it can be shown that, if a pair (M1 , M2 ) induces a partition
(P, N ) of MA1 (6) consistent with 6, then (M1 , M2 ) satisfies 6; moreover, if
M1 = {I : I |= ObK (P, N )} and M2 = {I : I |= ObA (P, N )}, then (M1 , M2 )
induces the partition (P, N ) of MA1 (6).
We now prove the main theorem of this section, namely that there is a oneto-one correspondence between each model M of 6 and the partition of MA1 (6)
induced by (M, M), and satisfying certain properties.
THEOREM 4.9. A set M of interpretations over 1 is a model for 6 iff the
partition (P, N ) of MA1 (6) induced by (M, M) satisfies the following conditions:
(1) (P, N ) is consistent with 6;
(2) M = {I : I |= ObK (P, N )};
(3) for each AC(x) N , ObK (P, N ) 6|= C(x)(P, N ), and for each AR(x, y) N ,
ObK (P, N ) 6|= R(x, y);
(4) ObK (P, N ) |= ObA (P, N );
(5) for each partition (P 0 , N 0 ) of MA1 (6 0 ), where
6 0 = hT , A {AC(x) : C(x) ObK (P, N )}
{AR(x, y) : R(x, y) ObK (P, N )}i,
at least one of the following conditions does not hold:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(P 0 , N 0 ) is consistent with 6 0 ;
ObK (P, N ) |= ObK (P 0 , N 0 );
ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) 6|= ObK (P, N );
ObK (P, N ) |= ObA (P 0 , N 0 ).
PROOF. (): Suppose (P, N ) is the partition of MA1 (6) induced by M and
satisfying the above conditions, and suppose that M is not a model for 6. Then
there exists a set M0 M such that the pair (M0 , M) satisfies 6. Now consider the KB 6 0 as in the above Condition 5, and let (P 0 , N 0 ) be the partition of MA1 (6 0 ) induced by (M0 , M). Since (M0 , M) satisfies 6 and M0 M,
from Lemma 4.8 it follows that (P 0 , N 0 ) is consistent with 6; moreover, let
AC(x) (resp. AR(x, y)) be a modal atom such that C(x) ObK (P, N ) (resp.
R(x, y) ObK (P, N )): since (M, M) |= C(x) (resp. (M, M) |= R(x, y)), it follows that (M0 , M) |= AC(x) (resp. (M, M) |= AR(x, y)), and since (P 0 , N 0 ) is
the partition of MA1 (6) induced by (M0 , M), AC(x) (resp. AR(x, y)) belongs to
P 0 . Consequently, (P 0 , N 0 ) is consistent with 6 0 , hence Condition (a) holds.
Then, since M0 M, M0 = {I : I |= ObK (P, N )}, and since by Definition 4.5
and Definition 4.3 M0 {I : I |= ObK (P 0 , N 0 )}, it follows that ObK (P, N ) |=
ObK (P 0 , N 0 ), hence Condition (b) holds.
Moreover, by hypothesis (Condition 2) M contains exactly the interpretations satisfying ObK (P, N ), hence there is at least one assertion in ObK (P, N )
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which is not satisfied by (M0 , M), that is, which is not in ObK (P 0 , N 0 ): therefore,
ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) 6|= ObK (P, N ), hence Condition (c) holds.
Finally, ObK (P, N ) |= ObA (P 0 , N 0 ), since any assertion of the form
AC(x)(P 0 , N 0 ) or AR(x, y) satisfied in (M0 , M) is also satisfied in (M, M) (since
the second element of the two pairs is the same): hence, Condition (d) holds.
In conclusion, (P 0 , N 0 ) satisfies Conditions (a), (b), (c), (d), which implies
that (P, N ) does not satisfy Condition 5, thus contradicting the hypothesis.
Consequently, M is a model for 6.
(): Suppose M is a model for 6. Let (P, N ) be the partition of MA1 (6)
induced by (M, M). We prove that (P, N ) satisfies each one of the conditions
15 of the claim.
Since M satisfies 6, from Lemma 4.8 it follows that (P, N ) is consistent with
6, hence Condition 1 holds.
Now suppose M 6= {I : I |= ObK (P, N )}: since, by Definition 4.3 and
Definition 4.5, each interpretation in M satisfies ObK (P, N ), it follows that
there exists at least one interpretation J which does not belong to M and such
that J |= ObK (P, N ). It can be immediately seen that the pair (M {J }, M)
induces the same partition (P, N ), hence (M {J }, M) satisfies 6, thus contradicting the hypothesis that M is a model for 6. Therefore, M = {I : I |=
ObK (P, N )}, hence Condition 2 holds.
Moreover, since (P, N ) is the partition induced by (M, M), by Definition 4.5 it
follows that, if AC(x) N (resp. AR(x, y) N ), then ObK (P, N ) 6|= C(x)(P, N )
(resp. ObK (P, N ) 6|= R(x, y)), hence Condition 3 holds.
Now suppose that ObK (P, N ) 6|= ObA (P, N ); then, there exists an assertion AC(x) (or AR(x, y)) in P such that ObK (P, N ) 6|= C(x)(P, N ) (resp.
ObK (P, N ) 6|= R(x, y)). As shown above, M = {I : I |= ObK (P, N )}, hence
M 6|= C(x)(P, N ) (resp. M 6|= R(x, y)): on the other hand, since (P, N ) is the partition induced by (M, M), it follows that M |= C(x)(P, N ) (resp. M |= R(x, y)).
Contradiction. Therefore, ObK (P, N ) |= ObA (P, N ), hence Condition 4 holds.
Finally, suppose there exists a partition (P 0 , N 0 ) of MA1 (6 0 ) which satisfies
conditions (a), (b), (c), (d). Consider the pair (M0 , M), where M0 = {I : I |=
ObK (P 0 , N 0 )}. Since ObK (P, N ) |= ObA (P 0 , N 0 ) and (P 0 , N 0 ) is consistent with
6 0 , from Definition 4.4 (Condition 1 and Conditions 5, 6) it follows that P 0 contains the set {AC(x) : C(x) ObK (P, N )} {AR(x, y) : R(x, y) ObK (P, N )},
hence ObK (P, N ) is equivalent to ObA (P 0 , N 0 ): therefore, (M0 , M) induces the
partition (P 0 , N 0 ) of 6 0 , and since (P 0 , N 0 ) is consistent with 6 0 , it follows
that (M0 , M) satisfies 6 0 , which implies that (M0 , M) satisfies 6. Moreover,
since ObK (P, N ) |= ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) and ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) 6|= ObK (P, N ), it follows that
M0 M. Consequently, M is not a model for 6, thus contradicting the hypothesis. Therefore, Condition 5 holds, which proves the thesis.
As a corollary of the above theorem, we obtain that the models of any subjectively quantified ALCKN F KB are ALC representable. In fact, let M be a
model of the subjectively quantified ALCKN F KB 6, and let (P, N ) be the
partition of MA1 (6) induced by (M, M). By the above theorem, each such
model M is constituted by the set of interpretations satisfying the ALC KB
ObK (P, N ).
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Therefore, the above property extends the characterization of models of

propositional MKNF theories presented in Rosati [1999a, Theorem 15]. The
main difference from the propositional case lies in the fact that both the number of partitions identifying a model for 6 and the number of modal atoms in
each of such partitions is, in general, infinite, even if 6 is finite.
4.2 Simple ALCKN F KBs
As previously shown, the restriction to subjectively quantified ALCKN F KBs
is necessary and sufficient in order to characterize each model M of an
ALCKN F KB in terms of an ALC KB 6M . Based on such a characterization,
it is possible to reduce reasoning in ALCKN F to a number of reasoning problems in ALC, as stated by Theorem 4.9. However, since we are interested in
decidable reasoning methods, we want to satisfy the condition that each 6M is
a finite ALC KB, and that the set of models of 6 is finite: in this way, the above
characterization provides a decidable reasoning method for ALCKN F .
First, we can relax the restriction concerning the number of models of 6:
indeed, we can just impose the fact that there is a finite number of models
for 6 which can be distinguished up to the names of individuals not explicitly
mentioned in 6, in the way explained below.
Given an interpretation I over 1 and a bijection : 1 O6 1 O6 , we
denote with (I) the interpretation that satisfies the following conditions:
(1) for each ALC-concept C and for each x 1, (x) C (I) iff x C I ;
(2) for each role R, ((x), ( y)) R (I) iff (x, y) R I .
Then, given a set of interpretations M over 1 and a bijection : 1 O6
1 O6 , we denote as (M) the set
{(I) : I M}
We say that two models, M1 , M2 , are equivalent up to renaming of individuals, if there exists a bijection : 1 O6 1 O6 such that M1 = (M2 ),
otherwise we say that M1 , M2 are different up to renaming of individuals. Consequently, an ALCKN F KB 6 has an infinite number of models up to renaming
of individuals if there exists an infinite number of models for 6 which are pairwise different up to renaming of individuals; otherwise, we say that 6 has a
finite number of models up to renaming of individuals.
Intuitively, if the KB 6 has infinite models, but it has only a finite number
of models up to renaming of individuals not explicitly mentioned in 6, then it
is possible to represent all its models by means of a finite number of ALC KBs
(one for each equivalence class induced by re naming of such individuals). Otherwise, we are forced to use an infinite number of different ALC KBs.
Therefore, we want an ALCKN F KB 6 to satisfy the following two conditions:
(a) each 6M must be a finite ALC KB;
(b) the set of models of 6 must be finite up to renaming of individuals.
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Then, we prove that the restriction to subjectively quantified KBs is not

sufficient to guarantee that an ALCKN F KB has a finite number of models up
to renaming of individuals: also, such a restriction does not even imply that
each model of the KB can be represented by a finite ALC KB.
THEOREM 4.10. Subjectively quantified ALCKN F KBs may have an infinite
number of models up to renaming of individuals.
PROOF.
Consider the following subjectively quantified KB 6:

6 = h{KC v KR.KC}, {C(a)}i
Consider now any (either finite or infinite) sequence S = x1 , . . . , xn such that

each xi in S is an individual in 1, x1 = xn = a, and xi 6= x j for each i, j such
that i 6= j and 1 i, j n 1. Let M S be the following set of interpretations:
M S = { I : I |= C(xi ) for each xi in S
I |= R(xi , xi+1 ) for each xi , xi+1 in S}
We first prove that M S is a model for 6. For each x 1, (M S , M S ) |=
KC(x) iff x S. Moreover, for each x, y 1, (M S , M S ) |= KR(x, y) iff x =
xi S, y = xi+1 S for some i. Therefore, (M S , M S ) satisfies the inclusion
KC v KR.KC, and since (M S , M S ) satisfies KC(a), it follows that (M S , M S )
satisfies 6. Moreover, let M0 M S and suppose (M0 , M S ) satisfies 6. By
the above definition of M S , there exists xi S such that either (M0 , M S ) 6|=
KC(xi ) or (M0 , M S ) 6|= KR(xi , xi+1 ). In the second case, since y = xi+1 is the
only individual y such that (M S , M S ) |= KR(xi , y), and since M0 M S , it
follows that there is no y 1 such that (M0 , M S ) |= KR(xi , y), and since by
hypothesis (M0 , M S ) |= KC v KR.KC, it follows that (M0 , M S ) 6|= KC(xi ).
Therefore, in both the above cases we have that (M0 , M S ) 6|= KC(xi ). Now,
since y = xi is the only individual y such that (M S , M S ) |= KR(xi1 , y),
and since M0 M S , there is no y 1 such that both (M0 , M S ) |= KC(xi1 )
and (M0 , M S ) |= KR(xi1 , y): since by hypothesis (M0 , M S ) satisfies KC v
KR.KC, it follows that (M0 , M S ) 6|= KC(xi1 ). By iteration, we arrive at the
conclusion that (M0 , M S ) 6|= KC(x1 ), but since x1 = a, it follows that (M0 , M S )
does not satisfy 6, thus contradicting the hypothesis. Consequently, for each
set of interpretations M0 such that M0 M S , (M0 , M S ) does not satisfy 6,
which implies that M S is a model for 6.
Moreover, it is easy to see that, given two such models M S1 , M S2 such that
the cardinalities of M S1 and M S2 are different, there exists no bijection :
1{a} 1{a} such that M S1 = (M S2 ). And since 1 is infinite, it follows that
there is an infinite number of models for 6 up to renaming of individuals.
In order to obtain the desired finite characterization, we define the notion
of simple ALCKN F KB. In the following, we say that an ALCKN F concept C is
simple if C is subjectively quantified and each quantified concept subexpression
of the form AR.ND, AR.ND, where N {K, K, A, A}, occurring in C is such
that in D there are no occurrences of role expressions of the form KR.
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Definition 4.11. A simple ALCKN F KB hT , Ai, where T is a pair (T 0 , 0), is

an ALCKN F KB that satisfies the following conditions:
1. T 0 is an ALC TBox;
2. 0 is a set of ALCKN F simple inclusions, that is, inclusion assertions of the
form KC v D, where C is an ALC-concept such that T 0 6|= > v C, and
D is a subjectively quantified concept expression in which there are no
occurrences of the operator K within the scope of quantifiers.
3. A is a set of instance assertions such that all concept subexpressions occurring in A are simple.
Informally, the above Condition 2 does not allow occurrences of the role expression KR in the right-hand side of epistemic inclusions. Indeed, as shown by
Theorem 4.10, the presence in the KB of inclusions containing such role expressions may give rise to an infinite number of models for such a KB. Moreover,
Condition 3 imposes an analogous, although weaker, restriction on the form of
assertions in the KB.
While the above restriction is motivated by the need for a finite representation, it turns out that all the KBs presented in the previous section are simple
ALCKN F KBs. For instance, the ALCKN F KB made of the TBox with the only
inclusion I1 = Kemployee v (Amale t Afemale) in Example 3.2, and of an
empty ABox, is an ALCKN F simple KB. Also, the KB in Example 3.3 containing
the integrity constraint
Kemployee v ASSN.Avalid
is simple, since the above inclusion is a simple epistemic inclusion; moreover,
the assertion I4 = AMANAGES.Kengineer u AMANAGES.Kmathematician(Ann) in
Example 3.6, and the assertion I5 = KMANAGES.AUScitizen(Ann) in Example 3.7 satisfy the third condition of the above definition.
Conversely, an ALCKN F KB of the form
h, {AR.(KD t KR.KC)(a)}i
is not simple, since the concept expression AR.(KD t KR.KC) violates the
above Condition 3the role expression KR lies within the scope of the quantifier of the form AR. Moreover, an ALCKN F KB of the form
h{KC v KR.KD}, i
is not simple, since the role expression KR appears in the right-hand side of an
inclusion.
4.3 ALCKN F tableau
We now present a method for reasoning in ALCKN F which exploits the possibility of characterizing the models of a simple ALCKN F KB 6 by means of a finite
subset of the set of modal atoms MA1 (6). This in turn allows for identifying
a finite set of finite ALC KBs, which represents the (generally infinite) set of
models of a simple ALCKN F KB 6.
207
The method (in the following denoted as ALCKN F tableau) is based on a

tableau calculus in which special closure conditions are defined to enforce the
preference criterion on the models represented by the branches of the tableau.
The tableau rules include the standard rules of an S5 tableau [Fitting 1983]
for handling propositional connectives and epistemic expressions of the form
KC, AC and KC, AC. The rules for handling concept and role expressions
involving quantifiers are based on the usual rules of a tableau for ALC (see
e.g. Donini et al. [1996]). Moreover, the effect of simple epistemic inclusions is
taken into account by a rule that instantiates each simple inclusion on each
individual which appears in the tableau branch.
The most significant features of the method are the following;
(1) each tableau rule is applied only to epistemic formulasnon-modal ALC
assertions are not further decomposed in the tableau. In this way, only the
epistemic level of the ALCKN F KB is analyzed;
(2) a modal cut rule is applied: roughly, if KC (AC) is a concept expression
occurring in the KB and a is an individual mentioned in the KB, then one
of the epistemic assertions KC(a), KC(a) (respectively AC(a), AC(a)) is
added. As shown in the following, such a rule is needed in order to isolate
only one possible preferred model of the ALCKN F KB;
(3) the implicit use of an ALC reasoner (see e.g. Buchheit et al. [1993]), which
is invoked both in the application of one of the expansion rules and in the
verification of the closure conditions.
We now formally define the ALCKN F tableau method. A branch B of the
tableau is a set of prefixed membership assertions of the form hw : C(x)i,
where w is a world, denoted by a natural number. The tableau for a simple
ALCKN F KB 6 = (T , A) (where T = (T 0 , 0)) starts with the set of prefixed
formulas {h1 : Ki such that A}. We denote with OB the set of individuals
mentioned in B. We remark that formulas with different prefixes may appear
in the same branch of the tableau, therefore, a single branch does not represent
a single world, but a set of worlds (i.e., an epistemic model).
In Figure 1 we present the rules of the ALCKN F tableau. We recall that
the symbol M stands for an occurrence of a modal operator: M {K, A}, while
the symbol N stands for a possibly negated occurrence of a modal operator:
N {K, A, K, A}. Moreover, NNF () stands for the Negation Normal Form
of . We assume that
NNF (M1 R.M2 D(x)) = M1 R.M2 D(x)
NNF (M1 R.M2 D(x)) = M1 R.M2 D(x)
Without loss of generality, we assume that the assertions in 6 are in Negation Normal Form: however, since negation of a modality cannot in general be
propagated within the scope of the modality, when the M-rule is applied to
an assertion of the form MC(x), we have to add to the branch the Negation
Normal Form of the assertion C(x). Finally, the set of modal subconcepts of a
subjectively quantified ALCKN F concept expression C, denoted as MS(C) (used
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u-rule
if hw : C u D(x)i B, C u D contains at least one occurrence of a modality, and either
h1 : C(x)i 6 B or h1 : D(x)i 6 B
then add h1 : C(x)i and h1 : D(x)i to B.
t-rule
if hw : C t D(x)i B, C t D contains at least one occurrence of a modality, and neither
h1 : C(x)i B nor h1 : D(x)i B
then add h1 : C(x)i or h1 : D(x)i to B.
M-rule-1
if hw : MC(x)i B and h1 : MC(x)i 6 B
then add h1 : MC(x)i to B.
M-rule-2
if h1 : MC(x)i B and C contains at least one occurrence of a modality,
then add hw : C(x)i to B, for each w present in the branch.
M-rule-1
if hw : MC(x)i B and h1 : MC(x)i 6 B
then add h1 : MC(x)i to B.
M-rule-2
if h1 : MC(x)i B and there exists no w such that hw : NNF (C(x))i B
then add hw0 : NNF (C(x))i to B, where w0 is new in the branch.
-rule
if hw : MR.NC(x)i B
then for each h1 : MR(x, y)i B add h1 : NC( y)i to B.
-rule
if hw : MR.NC(x)i B and there is no y such that both h1 : MR(x, y)i and
h1 : NC( y)i B
then add h1 : MR(x, z)i and h1 : NC(z)i to B, for some z such that z OB {} and
6 OB .
KR-rule
if h1 : KR(x, y)i B and h1 : AR(x, y)i 6 B,
then add h1 : AR(x, y)i to B.
trigger-rule
if B is weakly completed, KC v D 0, x OB , h1 : KD(x)i 6 B, and ObK (B) |= C(x)
then add h1 : KD(x)i to B.
mcut-rule
if h1 : C(x)i B, D M S(C), and neither h1 : D(x)i B nor h1 : NNF (D(x))i B
then add h1 : D(x)i or h1 : NNF (D(x))i to B.
Fig. 1. ALCKN F tableau rules.
in the mcut-rule), is defined as the set of concept expressions of the form

= MD | MR.ND | MR.ND
where is a subexpression of C that occurs strictly in C.
Let us now briefly describe the tableau rules:
(1) the u-rule and the t-rule are analogous to the usual rules for handling
conjunction and disjunction in tableau methods;
209
(2) the M-rules and M-rules are analogous to the usual rules for handling
modalities in tableau methods for the logic S5 [Fitting 1983];
(3) the -rule and -rule are analogous to the rules for handling quantified
concept expressions in tableau methods for epistemic Description Logics
(see Donini et al. [1998b]). In particular, the -rule either chooses, in a
nondeterministic way, an individual among the ones already appearing in
the branch, or generates a new individual;
(4) the KR-rule is a special rule which enforces the presence of the assertion
A R(x, y) for each assertion of the form KR(x, y) appearing in the branch;
roughly speaking, such a constraint is needed due to the preference semantics of ALCKN F ;
(5) the mcut-rule is applied by generating assertions on individuals based on
the set of modal subconcepts and modal role expressions appearing in 6.
However, if the modal atoms were applied to all individuals in 1, the method
would not terminate. Moreover, termination would not be guaranteed even
if such an application were restricted to the individuals already present in
the branch, due to the possibility of creating (as a consequence of an application of the mcut-rule) a new world, which in turn (due to the presence of
a modal atom of the form MR.NC) causes the creation of a new individual
to which the mcut-rule can again be applied, thus giving rise to an infinite
branch. Consequently, the mcut-rule is applied to a certain individual only
for the modal atoms which are within the scope of the existing assertions
about such an individual, and which do not occur inside a quantifier. As
we shall see, this restriction on the application of the mcut-rule is correct
under the assumption that the KB is simple. In particular, the semantics
of ALCKN F guarantees that it is safe to ignore all the occurrences of modal
atoms that do not appear in a completed branchsuch modal atoms are
assumed to be implicitly decided according to a minimal knowledge criterion, that will be explained later;
(6) the trigger-rule is only applied when B is weakly completed, that is, no other
rule is applicable in B (see below). Such a rule is needed in order to take
into account the effect of simple epistemic inclusions: specifically, the rule
applies each simple inclusion in 6 to each individual which appears in the
tableau branch and such that the left-hand side of the inclusion holds for
that individual. Notice that this last property is verified by means of the
ALC KB ObK (B) associated with the weakly completed branch B, which is
formally defined below. As already mentioned, we consider this part of the
reasoning process (which can be done by an ALC reasoner) for granted, and
do not develop it through an auxiliary tableau.
We now define the notions of closure and completeness of a branch. To
this aim, we give the following preliminary definitions. We say that a branch
is weakly completed if no rule different from the trigger-rule is applicable
to it, and say that a branch is completed if no rule is applicable to it. Of
course, if a branch is a completed branch then it is also weakly completed.
We define the partition (PB , NB ) associated with a weakly completed branch B
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as follows:
PB = {MC(x) : h1 : MC(x)i B} {MR(x, y) : h1 : MR(x, y)i B}
{MR.ND(x) : hw : MR.ND(x)i B for some prefix w}
NB
{MR.ND(x) : hw : MR.ND(x)i B for some prefix w}

= {MC(x) : h1 : MC(x)i B}
where M {K, A}.

We now prove that each completed branch B of the tableau for a finite simple
ALCKN F KB 6 is a finite set of prefixed formulas. The key property is the fact
that each rule only introduces subformulas of formulas already present in the
branch, with the exception of the trigger-rule, which instantiates the righthand side of an inclusion to an individual. Moreover, observe that the only rule
introducing new individuals, is the -rule.
First, it can be shown that the maximum number of new individuals that
can be introduced by the set of formulas in A is bounded by k = 2|Q(A)| + O6 ,
where Q(A) is the number of occurrences of quantified expressions of the form
MR.NC(x) or MR.NC(x) in A. Obviously, k is in turn bounded by the size of 6.
Then, Let B be a weakly completed branch of the tableau for 6, let x be
an individual in the branch, and let KC v D be an inclusion in 6. Then, the
trigger-rule adds the formula h1 : KD(x)i to the branch. Since in D there are
no occurrences of the operator K within the scope of quantifiers, for each new
individual y which is generated from a subformula of h1 : KD(x)i, there is
no inclusion in 6 of the form KC v D such that ObK (B) |= C(x), since every
subformula for y in B is an A-formula. Therefore, the trigger-rule cannot apply
to any formula for y in B, which implies that the maximum number of new
individuals that can be introduced in any completed branch B0 obtained as
an expansion of B is bounded by the number of new individuals generated
by the set of assertions obtained by instantiating each right-hand side of an
inclusion in 6 with an element of OB . Since the cardinality of OB is bounded
by the above defined k, it follows that the cardinality of OB0 is bounded by
2k(|Q(T )|) + k, where Q(T ) is the number of occurrences of quantified expressions
of the form MR.NC(x) or MR.NC(x) in T , which in turn is bounded by the size
of 6. Summarizing, we obtain an upper bound for the number of individuals
in any completed branch of the tableau for 6 which is double exponential in
the size of 6. Analogously, it can be shown that the number of individuals in
a completed branch of an auxiliary tableau for 6 is triple exponential in the
size of 6.
By the above results, we can conclude that our method terminates and uses
triple exponential space in the size of 6, which constitutes a first upper bound
for the complexity of reasoning in simple ALCKN F KBs. A more refined analysis
is outside the scope of the present paper.
In order to define the notion of preferred branch, we need some auxiliary
definitions.
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Definition 4.12. Let 6 = (T , A) (where T = (T 0 , 0)) be a simple

ALCKN F KB, and let B be a weakly completed branch of the tableau for 6.
(1) We denote as ABOXK (B) the following ALC ABox:
{C(x)(PB , NB ) : h1 : KC(x)i B} {R(x, y) : h1 : KR(x, y)i B}
(2) We denote as ObK (B) the ALC KB hT 0 , ABOXK (B)i.
(3) We denote as ABOXA (B) the following ALC ABox:
{C(x)(PB , NB ) : h1 : AC(x)i B} {R(x, y) : h1 : AR(x, y)i B}
(4) We denote as ObA (B) the ALC KB hT 0 , ABOXA (B)i.
We also say that an ALC KB 6 = hT , Ai entails an ALC KB 6 0 = hT 0 , A0 i
(and write 6 |= 6 0 ) iff: (i) 6 |= C v D for each C v D in T 0 ; (ii) 6 |= C(a) for
each C(a) A0 ; (iii) 6 |= R(a, b) for each R(a, b) A0 .
We can now define the notion of preferred branch.
Definition 4.13.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
A branch is open if each of the following conditions holds:
ObK (B) is satisfiable;

ObA (B) is satisfiable;
for each h1 : KC(x)i B, ObK (B) 6|= C(x)(PB , NB );
for each h1 : AC(x)i B, ObA (B) 6|= C(x)(PB , NB ).
Informally, every branch B is compatible with a set of structures of the form

(M, N ). The above Condition 1 corresponds to check whether the objective
knowledge represented by the ALC KB ObK (B), which must be satisfied by every world in M, is a consistent set of formulas, otherwise there is no structure
(M, N ) compatible with the formulas in B such that M is non-empty. Analogously, Condition 2 checks whether the ALC KB ObA (B), which must be satisfied
by every world in N , is a consistent set of formulas. Moreover, Condition 3 (respectively Condition 4) checks whether a formula in B imposes the presence of a
world in M (respectively in N ) that must satisfy a formula which contradicts the
set of formulas that must be satisfied by every world in M (respectively in N ):
in such a case, there is no structure (M, N ) compatible with the formulas in B.
Notice that the above conditions for an open branch take into account the
possible inconsistencies between the guess on modal assertions in the branch
and the knowledge implied by the TBox.
An open and completed branch B does not always represent a model. To select
models according to the semantic preference criterion, one needs to characterize the objective knowledge associated with B. In particular, one has to distinguish between the objective knowledge implied by K-prefixed and A-prefixed
assertions.
Definition 4.14. A branch B of the tableau for a simple ALCKN F KB 6 =
hT , Ai is preferred iff:
(1) B is open and completed;
(2) ObK (B) |= ObA (B);
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(3) for each h1 : AC(x)i N , ObK (B) 6|= C(x)(PB , NB );

(4) for each open and completed branch B 0 of the tableau for hT , A {AC(x) :
C(x) ABOXK (B)} {AR(x, y) : R(x, y) ABOXK (B)}i, at least one of the
following conditions holds:
(a) ObK (B) 6|= ObK (B 0 );
(b) ObK (B 0 ) |= ObK (B);
(c) ObK (B) |6 = ObA (B 0 ).
Informally, the above conditions verify whether the set of interpretations
M = {I : I |= ObK (B)} represents a model for 6. In particular, if both
Condition (a) and Condition (b) do not hold, then the set of interpretations
M0 = {I : I |= ObK (B 0 )} is such that M0 M. Moreover, if Condition (c) does
not hold, then the structure (M0 , M) is compatible with the branch B0 . Therefore, if Condition 4 does not hold, there exists a structure (M0 , M) such that
M0 M and (M0 , M) satisfies 6, which implies that M is not a model for 6
according to Definition 2.2.
4.4 Correctness
In order to prove correctness of the tableau calculus, we make use of the characterization, presented in Section 4.1, of the models of a simple ALCKN F KB 6
in terms of partitions of a (generally infinite) set of ALC assertions. In the following, we assume without loss of generality, that each new individual name
introduced in a branch by the -rule belongs to 1.
First, we associate a partition of MA1 (6) with each completed branch of the
ALCKN F tableau for 6. In the following, given two sets of modal atoms P, N
such that P N = and a modal atom (x), we say that (x) can be decided
by (P, N ) if (x) MA1 (6) and one of the following conditions holds:
(1) (x) is of the form MC(x) and C(x)(P, N ) is an ALC assertion;
(2) (x) is of one of the forms M1 R.M2 C(x), M1 R.M2 C(x), M1 R.M2 C(x),
M1 R.M2 C(x) and, for each y 1, the modal atom M2 C( y) belongs to
P N.
Moreover, we denote with MA1 (6)(P , N ) , the set of modal atoms from MA1 (6)
that can be decided by (P, N ).
Definition 4.15. Let B be a completed branch of the ALCKN F tableau for
the simple ALCKN F KB 6. Then, the partition (PB1 , NB1 ) of MA1 (6) is defined
inductively as follows:
P 0 = PB
N 0 = NB {KR(x, y) : KR(x, y) MA1 (6) and KR(x, y) 6 PB }
{AR(x, y) : AR(x, y) MA1 (6) and AR(x, y) 6 PB }
P i+1 = {KC(x) : KC(x) MA1 (6)(P i, N i ) and ObK (P i , N i ) |= C(x)(P i , N i )}
{AC(x) : AC(x) MA1 (6)(P i, N i ) and ObA (P i , N i ) |= C(x)(P i , N i )}
{M1 R.M2 C(x) : M1 R.M2 C(x) MA1 (6)(P i , N i )
and for each M1 R(x, y) P i, M2 C( y) P i }
N i+1
PB1
213

and for each M1 R(x, y) P i, M2 C( y) N i }
and there exists y 1 such that M1 R(x, y) P i and M2 C( y) P i }
and there exists y 1 such that M1 R(x, y) P i and M2 C( y) N i }
= MA1 (6)(P i , N i ) P i+1
[
=
Pi
NB1 =
i=0
Ni
i=0
Intuitively, each completed branch B is interpreted by evaluating all the

modal atoms in MA1 (6) which do not appear in B according to an empty knowledge criterion: no further objective knowledge is added in the branch by the
guess on such modal atoms, which is formally stated by the following lemma.
LEMMA 4.16. Let B be a completed branch of the tableau for 6. Then, ObK (B)
is equivalent to ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) and ObA (B) is equivalent to ObA (PB1 , NB1 ).
PROOF. First, observe that ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) = ObK (PB , NB ). Then, since a modal
atom of the form KC(x) is added to P i+1 only if ObK (P i, N i ) |= C(x)(P i , N i ),
it follows that ObK (P i+1 , N i+1 ) is equivalent to ObK (P i, N i ) for each i 0.
Consequently, ObK (B) is equivalent to ObK (PB1 , NB1 ). In the same way, it can be
proven that ObA (B) is equivalent to ObA (PB1 , NB1 ).
Notice that the completion (PB1 , NB1 ) of a partition (PB , NB ) associated with
the tableau branch B, provided by the above definition, cannot introduce any
inconsistency, if (PB , NB ) is not self-contradictory. From the above observation,
and by definition of the tableau rules, we can now prove that a completed branch
B is open if, and only if, (PB1 , NB1 ) is consistent.
LEMMA 4.17. Let B be a completed branch of the tableau for the simple
ALCKN F KB 6. Then, B is open if, and only if, the partition (PB1 , NB1 ) is consistent with 6.
PROOF. (): Suppose B is an open and completed branch of the tableau
for 6. Condition 1 of Definition 4.4 follows from the definition of the tableau
method. Conditions 2 and 3 of the same definition follow from Lemma 4.16
and, respectively, from Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 4.13. Condition 4 of
Definition 4.4 follows from Condition 3 of Definition 4.13 and from Lemma 4.16.
Condition 5 of Definition 4.4 follows from the fact that, by Definition 4.15, if
KR(x, y) NB1 then ObK (B) 6|= R(x, y), consequently, by Lemma 4.16,
ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) 6|= R(x, y). In the same way as the last two conditions, it follows
that both Condition 6 and Condition 7 of Definition 4.4 hold. Condition 8 and
Condition 9 of Definition 4.4 follow from the fact that branch B is completed
and from the definition of the -rule and -rule of the tableau method. Finally,
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Condition 10 of Definition 4.4 follows from the definition of the trigger-rule

of the tableau method. Therefore, by Definition 4.4, the partition (PB1 , NB1 ) is
consistent with 6.
(): Suppose the partition (PB1 , NB1 ) is consistent with 6, and suppose B is a
completed branch of the tableau for 6. Then, Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Definition 4.13 follow from Lemma 4.16 and, respectively, from Conditions 2, 3, 4, and
5 of Definition 4.4. Consequently, by Definition 4.13, B is an open branch.
Given a branch B and a partition (P, N ) of MA1 (6), we say that (P, N ) agrees
with B if PB P and NB N . From Definition 4.12 it follows that, if (P, N )
agrees with B, then ObK (P, N ) |= ObK (B) and ObA (P, N ) |= ObA (B).
LEMMA 4.18. Let B be a completed branch of the tableau for the simple
ALCKN F KB 6, and let (P, N ) be a partition of MA1 (6). If (P, N ) is consistent with 6 and (P, N ) agrees with B, then B is an open branch.
PROOF. Since (P, N ) is consistent with 6, by Definition 4.4 ObK (P, N ) is
satisfiable, and since ObK (P, N ) |= ObK (B), it follows that ObK (B) is satisfiable, thus satisfying Condition 1 of Definition 4.13. Then, by Definition 4.4
ObA (P, N ) is satisfiable, and since ObA (P, N ) |= ObA (B), it follows that ObA (B)
is satisfiable, thus satisfying Condition 2 of Definition 4.13. Now, let the formula h1 : KC(x)i belong to B: since (P, N ) agrees with B, KC(x) N , therefore ObK (P, N ) 6|= C(x)(P, N ), and since ObK (P, N ) |= ObK (B), it follows that
ObK (B) 6|= C(x)(P, N ). Since (P, N ) agrees with B, C(x)(P, N ) = C(x)(PB , NB ),
therefore
ObK (B) 6|= C(x)(PB , NB ),
thus satisfying Condition 3 of Definition 4.13. In the same way, it follows that,
if the formula h1 : AC(x)i belongs to B, then ObA (B) 6|= C(x)(PB , NB ), thus
Condition 4 of Definition 4.13 is satisfied. Consequently, by Definition 4.13, B
is an open branch.
In order to prove soundness and completeness of the tableau method, we
observe that the individuals introduced in a completed branch B by the -rule
(i.e., the individuals in the set OB O6 ) actually represent an arbitrary choice of
the individuals in the set 1 O6 . Intuitively, if we replace in B such individuals,
say x1 , . . . , xn , with another choice y 1 , . . . , y n , of individuals in 1 O6 , such
that yi 6= yj for i 6= j , the branch B 0 thus obtained has the same properties of
B: in particular, it is immediately verifiable that B is open if, and only if, B0 is
open. In the following, given an injective function f : OB O6 1 O6 , we
denote with f (B) the branch obtained from B by replacing each occurrence of
x with f (x), for each x OB O6 .
We now prove that for each guess of the modal atoms of MA1 (6), there
exists a completed branch which agrees with such a guess, up to renaming of
the individuals in OB O6 .
LEMMA 4.19. Let 6 be a simple ALCKN F KB and let (P, N ) be a partition of
MA1 (6) consistent with 6, such that, if KR(x, y) P , then AR(x, y) P . Then
there exists an open completed branch B of the tableau for 6 and an injective
function f: OB O6 1 O6 , such that (P, N ) agrees with f (B).
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PROOF. Let C(x) A and let B0 be the initial branch of the tableau for 6,
that is, the initial, unexpanded set of formulas for the tableau for 6. Then,
KC(x) PB0 and, since (P, N ) is consistent with 6 and KC(x) MA1 (6),
KC(x) P . Analogously, if R(x, y) A (or KR(x, y) A), then KR(x, y) PB0
and, since (P, N ) is consistent with 6 and KR(x, y) MA1 (6), KR(x, y) P ,
and if AR(x, y) A, then AR(x, y) PB0 and, since (P, N ) is consistent with
6 and AR(x, y) MA1 (6), KR(x, y) P .
Now we prove that, given a branch B0 and an injective function f 0: OB0
O6 1 O6 such that, for each modal atom 9 MA1 (6), if 9 Pf 0 (B0 ) then
9 P and if 9 N f 0 (B0 ) then 9 N , for each application of a tableau rule to
B 0 there exists an expansion B of B0 , obtained by such a rule, and an injective
function f: OB O6 1 O6 such that, for each modal atom 9 MA1 (6),
if 9 P f (B) , then 9 P and if 9 N f (B) , then 9 N . The proof of such a
property is immediate for most rules, due to the fact that (P, N ) is consistent
with 6. The only non-trivial cases concern the KR-rule, the -rule, the -rule
and the trigger-rule.
As for the KR-rule, suppose KR(x, y) PB0 . Then, KR(x, y) P and PB =
PB0 {AR(x, y)}. Since by hypothesis, if KR(x, y) P , then AR(x, y) P , it
follows that the above property holds.
As for the -rule, suppose M1 R.M2 D(x) PB0 . Then, M1 R.M2 D(x) P
(or equivalently M1 R.M2 D(x) N ), and since (P, N ) is consistent with 6,
there exists y 1 such that both M1 R(x, y) P and M2 D( y) P . Now, if B is
an expansion of B 0 obtained by the application of such a rule, then PB = PB0
{M1 R(x, z), M2 D(z)} where z is either an individual name already appearing
in B or a new individual name i. Consequently, if y = f (t) for some t already
present in B 0 , then the expansion B of B0 that chooses z = t satisfies the above
property, while if there is no t present in B0 such that y = f (t), then, the function
f such that f (i) = y and f (x) = f 0 (x) for each x OB0 , and the expansion B
of B 0 that chooses z = i, satisfy the above property. In the same way, it follows
that the above property also holds when the -rule is applied to a modal atom
of the form M1 R.M2 D(x) PB0 .
As for the -rule, suppose M1 R.M2 D(x) PB0 . Then, M1 R.M2 D(x) P
(or equivalently M1 R.M2 D(x) N ), and since (P, N ) is consistent with
6, for each y 1 such that M1 R(x, y) P , M2 D( y) P . Now observe
that the only rules that introduce modal atoms of the form M1 R(x, y) in
a branch are the KR-rule and the -rule: therefore, as shown above, if
M1 R( f 0 (x), f 0 ( y)) Pf 0 (B0 ) , then M1 R(x, y) P . Consequently, for each modal
atom M2 D( f 0 ( y)) introduced by the application of the -rule, the modal atom
M2 D( y) belongs to P . Therefore, the expansion B obtained by B0 satisfies the
above property. In the same way, it follows that the above property also holds
when the -rule is applied to a modal atom of the form M1 R.M2 D(x) PB0 .
Finally, as for the trigger-rule, suppose B 0 is a weakly completed branch
and suppose there exists x such that ObK (B 0 ) |= KC(x). Then, since P Pf 0 (B0 ) ,
N N f 0 (B0 ) , it follows that ObK (P, N ) |= ObK ( f 0 (B 0 )), therefore ObK (P, N ) |=
C( f 0 (x)). Since (P, N ) is consistent with 6 and KC( f 0 (x)) MA1 (6), it follows
that KC( f 0 (x)) P , and by Definition 4.4, KD( f 0 (x)) P . Therefore, the expansion B obtained by B 0 through the trigger-rule satisfies the above property.
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Consequently, there exists a completed branch B and an injective function f:

OB O6 1O6 such that, for each modal atom 9 MA1 (6), if 9 Pf (B) then
9 P and if 9 Pf (B) then 9 P , which implies that (P, N ) agrees with f (B).
Then, since (P, N ) is consistent with 6 and (P, N ) agrees with f (B),
Lemma 4.18 implies that f (B) is open, which in turn implies that B is open.
We are now ready to show completeness of the method, namely we prove
that the existence of a preferred branch of the tableau for 6 implies that 6 is
satisfiable.
LEMMA 4.20. Let B be a preferred branch of the tableau for the simple
ALCKN F KB 6 = hT , Ai (where T = (T 0 , 0)). Then, the set of interpretations
M = {I : I |= ObK (PB1 , NB1 )} is a model for 6.
PROOF. Let M be as in the thesis. Then, (PB1 , NB1 ) is the partition of MA1 (6)
induced by (M, M). Since B is an open branch, by Lemma 4.17 (PB1 , NB1 )
is consistent with 6, and by Definition 4.15 it follows that ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) |=
ObA (PB1 , NB1 ) and, for each assertion of the form AC(x) (resp. AR(x, y)) in PB1 ,
ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) |= C(x) (ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) |= R(x, y)). Suppose now that M is not a
model for 6. Thus, by the above properties and by Theorem 4.9, it follows that
there exists a partition (P 0 , N 0 ) of M A1 (6 0 ), where 6 0 = hT , A {AC(x) : C(x)
ObK (PB1 , NB1 )}{AR(x, y) : R(x, y) ObK (PB1 , NB1 )}i, which is consistent with
6 0 and satisfies the following conditions:
(1) ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) 6|= ObK (PB1 , NB1 );
(2) ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) |= ObK (P 0 , N 0 );
(3) ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) |= ObA (P 0 , N 0 ).
Now, if (P 0 , N 0 ) agrees with B, then ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) |= ObK (B), and since,
due to Lemma 4.16, ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) is equivalent to ObK (B), it follows that
ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) |= ObK (PB1 , NB1 ), thus contradicting the first condition above.
Therefore, (P 0 , N 0 ) does not agree with B, that is, there exists a modal atom
appearing in B which is evaluated differently in (P 0 , N 0 ). Since (P 0 , N 0 ) is consistent with 6 0 , it follows that P 0 contains the set {AC(x) : C(x) ObK (PB1 , NB1 )}
{AR(x, y) : R(x, y) ObK (PB1 , NB1 )}, which implies that ObA (P 0 , N 0 ) |=
ObK (PB1 , NB1 ), hence, by the above Condition 3, the ALC KB ObK (PB1 , NB1 )
is equivalent to the ALC KB ObA (P 0 , N 0 ). Then, let 6 00 = hT , A {AC(x) : C(x)
ABOXK (B)} {AR(x, y) : R(x, y) ABOXK (B)}i. Observe that each inclusion
and each assertion belonging to 6 00 also belongs to 6 0 , therefore (P 0 , N 0 ) is
consistent with 6 00 . Moreover, by the above properties, if KR(x, y) P 0 then
AR(x, y) P 0 , consequently, by Lemma 4.19, there exists a completed branch
B 0 of the tableau for 6 00 and an injective function f: OB O6 00 1 O6 00 such
that (P 0 , N 0 ) agrees with f (B0 ). Moreover, suppose there exists y O f (B0 ) such
that y 6 OB . Then, there exists a modal atom of the form KR(x, y) (or AR(x, y))
in Pf (B0 ) , and since (P 0 , N 0 ) agrees with f (B), ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) 6|= ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) (or
ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) 6|= ObA (P 0 , N 0 )), thus contradicting either Condition 2 or Condition 3 above. Therefore, there exists no y O f (B0 ) such that y 6 OB , which
implies that B 0 does not need renaming of individuals, i.e., (P 0 , N 0 ) agrees with
B 0 . Now, since (P 0 , N 0 ) is consistent with 6 0 , (P 0 , N 0 ) is also consistent with
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6 00 , because all the inclusion and instance assertions appearing in 6 00 also

appear in 6 0 , hence by Lemma 4.18 it follows that B0 is open. Let us now
consider the partition (PB10 , NB10 ) of MA1 (6) associated with B 0. Since (P 0 , N 0 )
is consistent with 6 0 , (P 0 , N 0 ) is also consistent with 6, hence (PB10 , NB10 ) is consistent with 6 as well. Moreover, since (P 0 , N 0 ) agrees with B 0 , ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) |=
ObK (B 0 ), and since by Lemma 4.16 ObK (PB10 , NB10 ) is equivalent to ObK (B 0 ), it
follows that ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) |= ObK (PB10 , NB10 ). Now, by Condition 1 ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) 6|=
ObK (PB1 , NB1 ), therefore ObK (PB10 , NB10 ) 6|= ObK (PB1 , NB1 ). Furthermore, since
ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) |= ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) and ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) |= ObK (PB10 , NB10 ), it follows
that ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) |= ObK (PB10 , NB10 ). Now, by construction B0 is such that
ObK (PB1 , NB1 ) |= ObA (PB10 , NB10 ) and ObA (PB10 , NB10 ) |= ObK (PB1 , NB1 ). Therefore,
B 0 satisfies all the closure conditions for branch B of Definition 4.14, which implies that B is not a preferred branch of the tableau for 6, thus contradicting
the hypothesis. Consequently, M is a model for 6.
Then, we prove soundness of the tableau method, namely we prove that the
existence of a preferred branch of the tableau for 6 implies that, for each model
M for a simple ALCKN F KB 6, there exists a preferred branch of the tableau
for 6 whose objective knowledge corresponds to the ALC KB characterizing the
interpretations in M, up to renaming of the individuals not explicitly mentioned
in 6.
LEMMA 4.21. Let M be a model for the simple ALCKN F KB 6, and let (P, N )
be the partition of MA1 (6) induced by (M, M). Then, there exists a preferred
branch B of the tableau for 6 and a function f: OB O6 1 O6 such that
(P, N ) = (Pf1(B) , N f1(B) ).
PROOF. First, since (P, N ) is the partition of MA1 (6) induced by (M, M),
if KR(x, y) P then AR(x, y) P , and since M is a model for 6, (P, N ) is
consistent with 6. Therefore, by Lemma 4.19, there exists an injective function
f : OB O6 1 O6 and an open completed branch B of the tableau for 6
such that (P, N ) agrees with f (B). Hence, by Lemma 4.17, (Pf1(B) , N f1(B) ) is consistent with 6. We prove the claim by first showing that (P, N ) = (Pf1(B) , N f1(B) ),
and then proving that B is a preferred branch.
Let us suppose that there exists a modal atom of the form KR(x, y) such
that KR(x, y) P and KR(x, y) 6 Pf (B) . Then, let (P 0 , N 0 ) be the partition of
modal atoms (P 0 , N 0 ) obtained from (P, N ) by eliminating from P all modal
atoms of the form KR(x, y) which do not appear in Pf (B) , and let M0 = {I : I |=
ObK (P 0 , N 0 )}. By hypothesis, there exists a modal atom of the form KR(x, y)
such that KR(x, y) P and KR(x, y) 6 P 0 , hence M0 M. We now prove that
(M0 , M) satisfies 6.
Let 6 = hT , Ai, where T = (T 0 , 0). We prove that each modal atom belonging
to Pf (B) is satisfied by (M0 , M), and each modal atom belonging to N f (B) is not
satisfied by (M0 , M). First, every modal atom of the form KR(x, y) such that
KR(x, y) A by construction belongs to Pf (B) , hence it belongs to P and is satisfied by (M0 , M). Then, for each modal atom of the form AR(x, y), AR(x, y) P
iff (M0 , M) satisfies AR(x, y). Therefore, every modal atom of the form AR(x, y)
such that AR(x, y) A by construction belongs to Pf (B) , hence it belongs to P
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and is satisfied by (M0 , M). Now, consider a modal atom of the form KC(x) or
AC(x). If such a modal atom does not contain occurrences of subjectively quantified concept expressions, then it follows immediately that if such a modal atom
belongs to Pf (B) , then it is satisfied by (M0 , M), and if it belongs to N f (B) , then
it is not satisfied by (M0 , M). Then, since in MA1 (6) each quantified concept
subexpression of the form AR.ND, AR.ND, is such that in D there are no
occurrences of role expressions of the form KR, and since P and P 0 only differ
for modal atoms of the form KR(x, y), it follows that, since for each y 1
AR(x, y) belongs to P iff (M0 , M) satisfies AR(x, y) and MD( y) belongs to P
iff (M0 , M) satisfies MD( y), AR.ND(x) (respectively AR.ND(x)) belongs to
P iff (M0 , M) satisfies AR.ND(x) (respectively AR.ND(x)). And since (P, N )
agrees with f (B), it follows that, if AR.ND(x) (respectively AR.ND(x)) belongs to Pf (B) then (M0 , M) satisfies AR.ND(x) (respectively AR.ND(x)) and
if AR.ND(x) (respectively AR.ND(x)) belongs to N f (B) then (M0 , M) does
not satisfy AR.ND(x) (respectively AR.ND(x)). Moreover, since by definition of M0 , if KR(x, y) belongs to Pf (B) then (M0 , M) satisfies KR(x, y) and if
KR(x, y) belongs to N f (B) then (M0 , M) does not satisfy KR(x, y), and since
(P, N ) agrees with f (B) it follows that if KR.ND(x) (respectively KR.ND(x))
belongs to Pf (B) then (M0 , M) satisfies KR.ND(x) (respectively KR.ND(x))
and if KR.ND(x) (respectively KR.ND(x)) belongs to N f (B) then (M0 , M) does
not satisfy KR.ND(x). Therefore, if a modal atom belongs to Pf (B) then such a
modal atom is satisfied by (M0 , M), and if a modal atom belongs to N f (B) , then
such a modal atom is not satisfied by (M0 , M). Since Pf (B) contains all assertions
in A, it follows that each assertion in A is satisfied by (M0 , M). Moreover, by
definition, each interpretation in M and M0 satisfies each inclusion in T , hence
(M0 , M) satisfies T . Finally, since there are no occurrences of role expressions
of the form KR in 0, for each inclusion in 0 of the form KC v D and for each
x 1, KC(x) P iff KC(x) is satisfied by (M0 , M) KD(x) P iff KD(x) is
satisfied by (M0 , M). Since (P, N ) is consistent with 6, it follows that for each
inclusion in 0 of the form KC v D and for each x 1, if KC(x) is satisfied
by (M0 , M), then D(x) is satisfied by (M0 , M). Consequently, (M0 , M) satisfies
each inclusion in 0, which implies that (M0 , M) satisfies 6.
Now, since (M0 , M) satisfies 6 and M0 M, it follows that M is not a model
for 6, thus contradicting the hypothesis. Therefore, there is no modal atom of
the form KR(x, y) such that KR(x, y) P and KR(x, y) 6 Pf (B) . Since by hypothesis ObK (P, N ) |= ObA (P, N ), if AR(x, y) P , then KR(x, y) P , thus
KR(x, y) Pf (B) , and by the KR-rule of the tableau, AR(x, y) Pf (B) . Conversely, since (P, N ) agrees with f (B), if KR(x, y) Pf (B) , then KR(x, y) P ,
and if AR(x, y) Pf (B) then AR(x, y) P . Therefore, for each modal atom of
the form KR(x, y), KR(x, y) P iff KR(x, y) Pf (B) and for each modal
atom of the form AR(x, y), AR(x, y) P iff AR(x, y) Pf (B) . Now, let
M00 = {I : I |= ObK ( f (B))}. By the last property, in a way analogous to the
case of (M0 , M), it follows that, if a modal atom belongs to Pf (B) , then such
a modal atom is satisfied by (M00 , M), and if a modal atom belongs to N f (B) ,
then such a modal atom is not satisfied by (M00 , M). Since Pf (B) contains all
assertions in A, it follows that each assertion in A is satisfied by (M00 , M).
219
Moreover, by definition, each interpretation in M and M00 satisfies each

inclusion in T , hence (M00 , M) satisfies T . Finally, since for each inclusion in 0
of the form KC v D and for each x 1, KC(x) Pf B) iff KC(x) is satisfied by
(M00 , M), and since, if KC(x) Pf (B) then KD(x) Pf (B) and (P, N ) agrees with
f (B), it follows that, if KC(x) is satisfied by (M00 , M) then D(x) is satisfied by
(M00 , M), therefore (M00 , M) satisfies each inclusion in 0, which implies that
(M00 , M) satisfies 6. Since, by hypothesis, M is a model for 6, by Definition 2.2
it follows that it cannot be the case that M00 M, and since ObK (P, N ) |=
ObK ( f (B)), M00 M. Consequently, M00 = M, which implies that (P, N ) =
(Pf1(B) , N f1(B) ).
Finally, we prove that B is preferred. Since (P, N ) is induced by (M, M) and
M is a model for 6, by Theorem 4.9 for each partition (P 0 , N 0 ) of MA1 (6 0 ) at
least one of the following conditions does not hold:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(P 0 , N 0 ) is consistent with 6 0 ;
ObK (P, N ) |= ObK (P 0 , N 0 );
ObK (P 0 , N 0 ) 6|= ObK (P, N );
ObK (P, N ) |= ObA (P 0 , N 0 ).
Suppose B is not a preferred branch. Then, by Definition 4.14 and by the properties shown above, it follows that there exists an open and completed branch
B 0 of the tableau for 6 00 such that the conditions (a), (b) and (c) in Definition 4.14
do not hold, which implies that the following conditions hold for f (B) and f (B0 ):
(1) ObK ( f (B)) |= ObK ( f (B 0 ));
(2) ObK ( f (B 0 )) 6|= ObK ( f (B));
(3) ObK ( f (B)) |= ObA ( f (B 0 )).
Since (P, N ) = (Pf1(B) , N f1(B) ) and, by Definition 4.15,
1
0
1
ObK ( f (B 0 ) = ObK P 1
f 0 (B 0 ) , N f 0 (B 0 ) and ObA ( f (B )) = ObA P f 0 (B 0 ) , N f 0 (B 0 ) ,
by the above conditions it follows that the partition (Pf1(B0 ) , N f1(B0 ) ) is such that
1
(1) ObK (P, N ) |= ObK (P 1
f 0 (B 0 ) , N f 0 (B 0 ) );
1
(2) ObK (P 1
f 0 (B 0 ) , N f 0 (B 0 ) ) 6|= ObK (P, N );
1
(3) ObK (P, N ) |= ObA (P 1
f 0 (B 0 ) , N f 0 (B 0 ) ).
Furthermore, since B 0 is open and completed, by Lemma 4.17 it follows that

(Pf1(B0 ) , N f1(B0 ) ) is consistent with 6 00 . Therefore, (Pf1(B0 ) , N f1(B0 ) ) satisfies the above
conditions (a), (b), (c), (d), therefore Condition 5 of Theorem 4.9 does not hold,
thus contradicting the hypothesis that M is a model for 6. Consequently, B is
a preferred branch.
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 4.20 and Lemma 4.21, we obtain
the following property.
THEOREM 4.22. Let 6 = hT , Ai be a simple ALCKN F KB. Then, 6 is satisfiable if and only if there exists a preferred branch B of the ALCKN F tableau
for 6.
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The above theorem states correctness of the tableau method with respect to
satisfiability of a simple ALCKN F KB. This fact and termination of the tableau
method imply the following property.
THEOREM 4.23. Let 6 be a simple ALCKN F KB. Then, the problem of establishing satisfiability of 6 is decidable.
With regards to instance checking of an epistemic assertion C(a) with respect
to a simple ALCKN F KB 6, we remark that, due to the preference semantics of
ALCKN F , the deduction theorem does not hold for this logic, as in the vast majority of nonmonotonic logics. Hence, it is not possible to directly reduce logical
implication to unsatisfiability. However, in Rosati [1998] it has been shown that
in propositional MKNF, such a reduction is possible by means of a simple transformation of the query. We now extend such a result to the case of ALCKN F . As
in the previous section, we denote as C[K/A] the concept expression obtained
from C by replacing each occurrence of K with A.
THEOREM 4.24. Let 6 = hT , Ai be an arbitrary ALCKN F KB, and let C be
an ALCK concept. Then, 6 |= C(a) iff the ALCKN F KB
6 0 = hT , A {A(C)[K/A](a)}i
is unsatisfiable.
PROOF. (): Let 6 0 be unsatisfiable, and suppose 6 6|= C(a). Then, there exists a model M for 6 such that (M, M) 6|= C(a), which implies that (M, M) |=
KC(a). Then, since (M, M) interprets each concept expression of the form
AD in the same way it interprets the concept expression KD, it follows that
(M, M) |= AC[K/A](a), and since (M, M) |= 6, (M, M) |= 6 0 . Since by hypothesis M is a model for 6, it follows that, for each M0 such that M0 M,
(M0 , M) 6|= 6, therefore, for each M0 such that M0 M, (M0 , M) 6|= 6 0 , which
implies that M is a model for 6 0 , thus contradicting the hypothesis that 6 0 is
unsatisfiable. Therefore, 6 |= C(a).
(): Let 6 |= C(a), and suppose 6 0 is satisfiable. Then, there exists a cluster M0 which is a model for 6 0 . Hence, (M0 , M0 ) |= AC[K/A](a), and since
AC[K/A](a) is a subjective A-assertion and for every cluster M00 , (M0 , M0 )
and (M00 , M0 ) interpret subjective A-assertions in the same way, it follows that
(M00 , M0 ) 6|= C(a) for every cluster M00 . Since M0 is a model for 6 0 , it follows
that there is no cluster M00 such that both M00 M0 and (M00 , M0 ) |= 6 0 . As
shown above, for every cluster M00 , (M00 , M0 ) |= AC[K/A](a), hence, for each
M00 such that M00 M0 , (M00 , M0 ) 6|= 6. Consequently, from Definition 2.2 it
follows that M0 is a model for 6, and since (M0 , M0 ) 6|= C(a), it follows that
6 6|= C(a), which contradicts the hypothesis. Therefore, 6 0 is unsatisfiable.
The above theorem allows for using our tableau method for computing instance checking of subjectively quantified assertions against simple
ALCKN F KBs.
THEOREM 4.25. Let 6 = hT , Ai be a simple ALCKN F KB, and let C be a
subjectively quantified ALCK concept. Then, 6 |= C(a) if, and only if, there is
221
no preferred branch in the ALCKN F tableau for the simple ALCKN F KB hT , A

{AC[K/A](a)}i.
PROOF. From Theorem 4.24 it follows that 6 |= C(a) iff hT , A
{AC[K/A](a)}i is unsatisfiable. Now, since C is a subjectively quantified
ALCK concept, the concept C[K/A] is subjectively quantified, hence the concept AC[K/A] is subjectively quantified as well. Consequently, the KB
hT , A {AC[K/A](a)}i is a simple ALCKN F KB satisfying the condition of
Theorem 4.22, which proves the claim.
Notice that, in the above theorem, the hypothesis that the concept expression
C is subjectively quantified is necessary in order to transform the query into
an assertion which can be handled by our tableau method.
As a direct consequence of the above theorem and of the fact that the tableau
method always terminates, we obtain that instance checking of subjectively
quantified assertions in simple ALCKN F KBs is decidable.
COROLLARY 4.26. Let 6 be a simple ALCKN F KB, and let C be a subjectively
quantified ALCK concept. Then, the problem 6 |= C(a) is decidable.
We now consider subsumption, which is the problem of verifying whether an
inclusion assertion C v D is implied by an ALCKN F KB 6 = h(T 0 , 0), Ai.
First of all, we consider the case where C, D are ALC-concepts. It can be
shown that, if 6 is satisfiable, then 6 |= C v D iff hT 0 , i |= C v D. The
proof follows from the fact that, from Theorem 4.22, the models of 6 can be
represented through a finite set of satisfiable ALC KBs of the form hT 0 , A0 i,
where A0 is different for each such KB, while T 0 is the same; moreover, it has
been shown [Nebel 1990] that a satisfiable ALC KB hT 0 , A0 i implies an ALC
inclusion assertion C v D iff the ALC KB hT 0 , i implies C v D. Then, it is
known [Baader et al. 1990; Buchheit et al. 1993] that hT 0 , i |= C v D iff
the ALC KB hT 0 , {C u D(a)}i is unsatisfiable. Hence, if C v D is an ALC
inclusion assertion, then subsumption in ALCKN F of such an inclusion reduces
to unsatisfiability in ALC.
Now consider the case when C, D are subjectively quantified epistemic concepts. First of all, the equivalence between the two modalities K and A in the
right-hand side of the logical implication symbol (see Section 2.2) implies that
the meaning of an epistemic inclusion assertion in the KB is different from its
meaning in the right-hand side of the logical consequence symbol. Then, observe that our tableau method allows for computing a finite number of finite
ALC KBs representing the set of models of a simple ALCKN F KB 6. For each
model M of 6 represented by the ALC KB 6i , only a finite number of individuals
can be distinguished by epistemic concepts, that is, the individuals explicitly
mentioned in the ABox of 6i : all the other individuals in the interpretation
domain verify exactly the same epistemic concepts. Consequently, it is possible
to verify whether C v D is satisfied in M by verifying whether all the individuals in O6i plus one individual in 1 O6i satisfy the epistemic concept C t D in
M. More precisely: M satisfies C v D iff M satisfies the finite set of epistemic
assertions C t D(d ), for each individual d in O6i {d 0 }, where d 0 1 O6i .
Therefore, we can reduce subsumption of epistemic concepts in M to a finite
222
F. M. Donini et al.
number of epistemic instance checking problems in 6i , and since the set of ALC
KBs representing all the models of 6 is finite, it follows that subsumption in
a simple ALCKN F KB can be reduced to a finite number of instance checking
problems in simple ALCKN F KBs.
Finally, let us remark the fact that, without quantifying-in, it is possible to
define much simpler reasoning methods for MKNF-DLs. Like in the case of subjectively quantified ALCKN F , the key property is the possibility of identifying
a finite subset of the set of modal atoms MA1 (6) of a KB 6. Furthermore, in
this case it is possible to completely decouple the monotonic and nonmonotonic aspects of reasoning, which allows for defining a method which is independent of the particular non-modal DL used in the formalization of the KB.
Specifically, in Donini et al. [1997a] a general deductive method for MKNFDLs without quantifying-in is defined, which is parametric with respect to
the DL used, since it uses as an auxiliary procedure a deduction method for
the non-modal DL adopted. Such a method also allows for proving that the
MKNF extension without quantifying-in of DLs preserves decidability of reasoning. The interested reader is also referred to Rosati [1999b] for a more general discussion of reasoning in modal first-order fragments of MKNF without
quantifying-in.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a formalism called description logics of minimal knowledge and
negation as failure (MKNF-DLs) with the aim of filling the gap existing between
description logics (DLs), which characterize the fragment of monotonic firstorder logic of frame-based systems, and implemented systems, which provide
in practice several nonmonotonic features that cannot be formally captured
by DLs.
We proved the usefulness of MKNF-DLs as a formal tool, by showing some of
the representational features of the proposed formalism: defaults, procedural
rules, integrity constraints, role and concept closure. The enhanced expressiveness of MKNF-DLs required the extension of reasoning techniques developed
for propositional MKNF to an interesting class of assertions that we have characterized as subjectively quantified. This extension, which is based on a fixed,
infinite domain of interpretation, has been achieved by presenting a correct and
terminating tableau calculus for query answering in MKNF-DLs.
It is worth noticing that the expressiveness of MKNF in representing forms of
nonmonotonic reasoning can be exploited by extending frame-based systems
formalized through MKNF-DLswith other nonmonotonic reasoning features,
as well as forms of abductive reasoning, due to the known correspondences
between abduction and autoepistemic logic (see e.g. Kakas and Mancarella
[1990]; Niemela [1993]).
More interesting, however, is the fact that MKNF has proved to be adequate
for characterizing the features of both frame-based systems and of logic programming languages. In fact, it is well-known that the logic MKNF is able to
formally reconstruct logic programs with negation as failure, interpreted under
the stable model (or answer set) semantics [Lifschitz 1991]. This indicates that
223
the same formal tools used in the logical reconstruction of logic programs and
deductive databases (i.e., the notions of minimal knowledge and autoepistemic
belief) can also be used to capture not simply defaults, but several nonmonotonic features of frame-based systems that do not have a counterpart in logic
programming. Hence, our proposal for MKNF-DLs shows that MKNF provides
a common ground for giving a precise semantics of two different families of KR
systems: logic programming/deductive database systems, and systems based
on structured representation of information.
However, Datalog (and its extensionssee e.g., Eiter et al. [1997]) and subjectively quantified ALCKN F , represent two rather different frameworks, since
they are obtained from first-order MKNF by imposing different kinds of restrictions. Roughly speaking, the restrictions imposed by Datalog are the form
of function-free, definite Horn clauses and the safeness of the clauseswhich
leads to the interpretation of a Datalog program over a finite interpretation domain (the Herbrand universe of the program, namely the constants appearing
in the program). On the other hand, MKNF-DLs impose a variable-free syntax (as every DL), which is constrained by the language constructs provided in
the DL, not admitting n-ary relationships, but are interpreted on an infinite
interpretation domain. Such differences make it difficult to provide a precise
comparison of the expressiveness of the two formalisms.
Languages integrating description logics and Datalog have already been proposed: notably, AL-log [Donini et al. 1998a] and CARIN [Levy and Rousset
1998]. However, both proposals keep the extensional, open-world semantics of
DLs and the fixpoint, closed-world semantics of Datalog separated. A more thorough integration of frame-like structures and logic programming has been proposed in F-Logic [Kifer et al. 1995]. F-Logic is a general-purpose logic programming language, with a frame-like language for the types of objects. A unified
proof-theoretic semantics is given in terms of inference rules. However, F-logic
treats the nonmonotonic aspects of frames in an admittedly procedural way
[Kifer et al. 1995, p.806]: nonmonotonic inheritance is given a fixpoint semantics, much in the spirit of overriding mechanisms of object-oriented languages,
and negation in clauses is given a perfect model semantics.
Instead, MKNF-DLs open the possibility to combine logic programming and
frame-based languages in one expressive, decidable fragment of first-order
MKNF, with a single, model-theoretic semantics. This approach becomes feasible after recent proposals that overcome the restriction imposed by classical
DLs of dealing with unary and binary predicates only [Calvanese et al. 1988].
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Francesco Donini acknowledges the Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica,

Universita` di Roma La Sapienza, and in particular the research project
CNR-LAICO, for supporting this research.
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Received June 1999; revised October 2000; accepted January 2001

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Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge

and Negation as Failure

C 2002 ACM 1529-3785/02/04000177 $5.00

provided by such systems is the ability to characterize the knowledge about

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

In this paperwhich is an extension of Donini et al. [1997b]we propose

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

a restriction on the admissible values of a slot. MANAGES, in the DL terminology, is

(Ra .C)I = d 1 | d 0 .(d, d 0 ) Ra I implies d 0 C I

A concept is satisfiable if there exists an interpretation I such that C I 6= ,

A DL knowledge base (KB) 6 is defined as a pair 6 = hT , Ai, where T , called

As a simple example of TBox, consider the following inclu-

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

2.2 MKNF Description Logics

(R.C) I,M,N = {d 1 | d 0 .(d, d 0 ) (R) I,M,N implies d 0 (C) I,M,N }

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

sentence (inclusion or membership assertion) of 6 is satisfied in the epistemic

ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 2002.

where , i , are DL-concepts and n 0. The semantics proposed in Baader

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

THEOREM 3.1. Let h6, Di be an ALC KB with defaults, where 6 is a ALC

. Suppose M satisfies the former

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

THEOREM 3.4. Let 60 = hT , Ai be an ALCKN F KB, let I be a concept name

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

Let 63 be the ALC KB

h, MANAGES(Ann, Marc), engineer(Marc)i

65 = UScitizen(Carl) MANAGES(Ann, Marc)

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

Therefore, N is not a model for 65 {I5 }, contradicting the initial hypothesis.

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

4.1 Subjectively Quantified KBs

The models of ALCKN F KBs are not first-order representable.

Let 6 = hT , Ai be the following ALCKN F KB:

Moreover, given the positive integers i, j, l , let f (i, j, l ) be the formula

I does not satisfy R(d 1 , d ), for some d Odd;

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

and let M0 be the following set of first-order interpretations:

For instance, the ALCKN F KB

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

(6) if M1 R.M2 D (resp. M1 R.M2 D) occurs strictly in C, and there exists a

if C(a) A, then KC(a) P and, if R(a, b) A, then KR(a, b) P ;

(7) ObA (P, N ) 6|= R(x, y), for each AR(x, y) N ;

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

Section 2.2, it follows that (M1 , M2 ) |= KC(x)(P, N ). Analogously, it follows

Finally, suppose KC v D 0 and suppose KC(x) is a modal atom in P .

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

Therefore, the above property extends the characterization of models of

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

Then, we prove that the restriction to subjectively quantified KBs is not

Consider the following subjectively quantified KB 6:

Consider now any (either finite or infinite) sequence S = x1 , . . . , xn such that

Definition 4.11. A simple ALCKN F KB hT , Ai, where T is a pair (T 0 , 0), is

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

The method (in the following denoted as ALCKN F tableau) is based on a

in the mcut-rule), is defined as the set of concept expressions of the form

Description Logics of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure

{MR.ND(x) : hw : MR.ND(x)i B for some prefix w}