Knott-A Relationship of Convenience

TRACEY KNOTT
A Relationship of Convenience: Examining the

Connection Between Latin American Drug
Traffickers and Hizballah
Tracey Knott
Tracey Knott is a Masters candidate in Security Policy Studies at the
Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington
University. She specializes in transnational organized crime, particularly
in Latin America and Africa. She received her B.A. in history from
Oberlin College.
Recent reports of growing Hezbollah involvement in Latin America
have the sparked concern of some American security analysts and
policy makers. In particular, some fear that Hezbollah is working
with local drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to threaten
American national security. This article explores the extent of the
Latin American DTO- Hezbollah collaboration by answering the
following questions: Who is involved? Where does the
collaboration take place? How do the organizations cooperate?
What are the threats such collaboration poses? Finally, what is
being done and what more can be done to tackle these threats? In
order to address these questions, this paper will examine several
related case studies. The evidence provided by such cases suggests
that there is an illicit connection between Latin American DTOs
and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. Although these
relationships may not pose a direct security threat to the U.S., they
nevertheless result in dangerous regional destabilization and the
financing of terrorist groups.
In recent years, newspaper articles and United States House committee
meetings alike have been filled with rumors about nefarious dealings
between Iranian officials, Hizballah agents, and Latin American drug
cartels. On January 31, 2012, former DEA Chief of Operations and
Intelligence Michael Braun testified at a House Foreign Affairs
49
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW
A RELATIONSHIP OF CONVENIENCE
Committee hearing, warning that if something was not done about the
growing collaboration between Latin American drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) and terrorist organizations like Quds Force and
Hizballah, theres gonna be hell to pay at some date in the probably not
too distant future.1 Revelations surrounding the bizarre 2011 arrest of
Mansour Arbabsiar raised fears about such illicit connections. Arbabsiar, a
used-car salesman from Texas, was accused of working on behalf of Irans
Quds Force to hire a Zetas operative to assassinate the Saudi ambassador
to the United States. 2 Such assertions have led congressional
representatives like Henry Cuellar and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to claim that
Iran will soon be using Americas backyard as a launching point for
attacks against the United States.3
There is significant evidence suggesting that Hizballah is using Latin
American criminals to help finance its operations. These criminals are not
terrorists bent on U.S. destruction, but rather profit-seeking opportunists
with Hizballah connections. Nevertheless, it would be imprudent for
security agencies to ignore the regions strategic importance for Hizballah.
Middle Eastern terrorist organizations like Hizballah can harness Latin
Americas illicit finances and burgeoning immigrant populations to
strengthen their operations, leading to regional destabilization by
increased terrorist attacks and criminal activity.
This paper will evaluate the extent of the Latin American DTO-Middle
Eastern terrorist collaboration by answering the following questions: Who
is involved? Where does the collaboration take place? How do the
organizations cooperate? What, if any, are the threats such collaboration
poses? If threats exist, what is being done and what more can be done to
tackle these threats? In order to address these questions, this paper will
examine several related cases. These include: the Joumaa drug trafficking
and money laundering network and its use of the Lebanese-Canadian
Bank; the Cheaitelly/El Khansa laundering network; and two other
Hizballah financers, Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kanan. The evidence
provided by such cases suggests that there is an established connection
between Latin American DTOs and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations.
Although these relationships may not pose a direct threat to the United
50
VOLUME XXII, NUMBER 2 SPRING 2014
TRACEY KNOTT
States, they nevertheless result in dangerous regional destabilization and
terrorist financing.
Debating the Threat
Various organizations and scholars disagree on the level of threat posed by
the collaboration between Latin American criminals and Hizballah.
Although it is generally accepted that there are Hizballah sympathizers in
South America, especially among the Lebanese diaspora, the extent of this
relationship is highly contested.4 For example, the United States State
Department insists:
There were no known operational cells of either al-Qa'ida or
Hizballah in the hemisphere, although ideological sympathizers in
South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial
and ideological support to those and other terrorist groups in the
Middle East and South Asia. The Tri-Border area of Argentina,
Brazil, and Paraguay continued to be an important regional nexus
of arms, narcotics, and human smuggling, counterfeiting, pirated
goods, and money laundering all potential funding sources for
terrorist organizations.5
Admiral Jim Stavridis, former commander of the U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM) appears to straddle the fence on the issue. He argues that
Hizballah appears to be the most prominent group active in the region,
and while much of their activity is currently linked to revenue generation,
there are indications of an operational presence and the potential for
attacks.6
Hizballahs intentions, some scholars claim, involve more than just
revenue generation. Matt Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, for example, notes that Hizballah has recently sought to weaken
the West. In a 2012 article, Levitt warns that beginning in 2010, the Quds
Force (a unit of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) allied with
Hizballah to initiate a shadow war against the West.7 Despite the lack of
current attacks, Levitt argues that these threats are quite real.8 Bearing
51
such threats in mind, Douglas Farah claimed at a 2011 Congressional
hearing that Hizballahs presence in the Western Hemisphere poses a
significant and growing threat to U.S. security.9
Background
The idea that groups such as Hizballah pose a danger in Latin America is
not new; Iranian-sponsored terrorism has threatened the region before.
Iran is believed to have been behind the 1994 bombing of a Jewish
community center in Buenos Aires, as well as an attack on the Israeli
Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992. Although it is generally believed that
Hizballahs actions in the region are largely driven by a need for resources
rather than a desire for localized violence, Ilan Berman, vice president of
the American Foreign Policy Council, warns that Hizballah has considered
attacks on U.S. and Jewish targets in the area, such as the Embassy of the
United States in Paraguay.10
Traditional studies of terrorist organizations often tend to overlook their
connections to drug traffickers. Historically, however, many terrorist
organizations have turned to drug traffickingeither through
collaboration with pre-existing organizations or independentlyin order
to be financially autonomous.11 For example, the Irish Republican Army
(IRA), Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the Taliban have traded in
heroin, while the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has
long relied on cocaine to fund its operations.12 There is evidence that
Hizballah engages in similar actions. According to Farah, Hizballah
became increasingly active in Latin America in 2006, when the
organization had a significant fallout with Iran over funding. 13
Moreover, Farah argued that Hizballah is more involved in the cocaine
trade than ever before, in large part due to Irans diplomatic ties to
countries like Venezuela and Bolivia.14
Latin America is not only a source of drug revenue for Hizballah, but also
a fundraising and recruiting center for new operatives. Hizballah has
reportedly relied heavily on funds from the Lebanese Shia diaspora,
especially those who live in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) in between
52
TRACEY KNOTT
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. 15 Venezuela also has a significant
population of Lebanese and Syrian immigrants. 16 In certain cases,
Hizballah has been able to draw upon this diaspora for new operatives.17
Immigrant communities play a key role in the illicit economies of their
adopted countries; migrants typically maintain contacts with their birth
country, facilitating the establishment of illicit networks.18
The TBA is a particular source of worry for security experts. Formed by
the intersection between Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; Foz do Iguau, Brazil,
and Puerto Iguazu, Argentina,19 the region is known as an historical center
for illicit activities like drug and human trafficking.20 The TBA was also
the starting point for Hizballah activities in the mid-1980s.21 Hizballah has
been able to bring in significant revenues from the region. A 2009 study
by the Rand Corporation estimated that Hizballah earned about 20 million
U.S. dollars a year from illicit activities in the region.22 Additionally, the
man behind the 1994 bombing of the Buenos Aires Jewish cultural center,
Assad Ahmad Mohamad Barakat, used the Galeria Page mall in Ciudad
del Este to fundraise for Hizballah.23 This mall served as a Hizballah
command post, with Barakat acting as the groups chief fundraiser and
military planner in the TBA.24
Combatting the nexus between criminal and terrorist organizations has
been difficult for local authorities. The illicit economy is a powerful force:
the so-called shadow economy is an estimated 40 to 50% of Paraguays
annual GDP, limiting the legal economys development. 25 Law
enforcement officials suffer from corruption, insufficient funding, poor
training, lack of motivation, and inadequate penal codes.26 Due in no small
part to such hindrances, law enforcement experiences difficulty
monitoring the remittances and money laundering schemes that fund
organizations like Hizballah.27 As of 2004, the TBA was home to 35 banks
and foreign exchange centers, any of which could be helping to launder
illicit profits.28
The TBA is also a source of recruitment for Hizballah, which often
recruits Shia immigrants at local mosques and Islamic community
centers. Some of these immigrants have struggled to assimilate into their
53
new homes. High levels of poverty and unemployment in the TBA make
them easier recruits for criminal and terrorist groups alike. 29 These
immigrants and their children may be drawn to a life of crime, especially
if they are expected to provide money for their struggling families back
home. As Melani Cammett of Brown University explains, sympathetic
views of Hizballah among Shia immigrants, as well as the paying of
religious taxes to Shia clerics, even those linked to Hezbollah, are not
commensurate to support for or participation in terrorist acts.30 Similarly,
Colonel John Cope of the U.S. National Defense University notes the
difficulty of determining whether the fundraising for organizations back in
the Middle East is intended for legitimate charities or terrorist groups: if
the money goes to Hizballahs general funds, even if it is meant for a
charitable cause, it could easily go to its military operations instead.31
Although it is impossible to know precisely why some Shia immigrants
have turned to crime in order to support Hizballah, the following case
studies help to elucidate the connection.
Case Studies
The Ayman Joumaa Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Network
Ayman Joumaa is one of the most notorious Lebanese criminals to operate
in Latin America in recent years. Based in Colombia, Joumaa is suspected
of overseeing a drug trafficking network that links South America to
Mexico, the United States, West Africa and Europe. Among his trafficking
operations, Joumaa is believed to have sold large quantities of cocaine to
the Zetas drug cartel.32
In order to hide his networks illicit profits, Joumaa launders money for
his Colombian and Venezuelan suppliers using bulk cash smuggling and
Lebanese exchange houses. 33 Two of these Lebanese exchange houses,
Hassan Ayash Exchange Company and the Ellissa Exchange Company,
were designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as Significant Foreign
Narcotics Traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation
Act. 34 The exchange houses have ties to Hizballah and the
Lebanese-Canadian Bank (LCB), another suspect institution. According to
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TRACEY KNOTT
the U.S. Department of Justice, the exchange houses provide significant
amounts of currency exchanges to and through LCB, without sufficient
oversight or disclosures about the sources and purpose of the cash.35 The
Justice Department estimates that the Joumaa network launders as much as
$200 million per month. Moreover, according to a civil indictment filed by
the Justice Department in December 2011, Joumaas organization uses
Hizballah couriers to transport and launder narcotics proceeds, and pays
fees to Hizballah operatives to facilitate the laundering of narcotics
proceeds.36
In addition to the civil indictment, the U.S. government has made other
attempts to target Joumaas drug trafficking and money laundering
network. The Drug Enforcement Administration led much of the
investigation against Joumaa, with important contributions from the
Treasury and State Departments, as well as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and Customs and Border Protection.37 One month before the
civil indictment, the Justice Department announced the federal criminal
indictment of Joumaa for his plans to sell cocaine to the Zetas.38 Joumaa
has been indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia for trafficking at least tens of kilograms of cocaine into the
United States via Central America and Mexico.39 This includes shipments
of at least 85,000 kilograms of cocaine to the Zetas from 2005 to 2007.40
Additionally, Joumaa has been indicted for laundering hundreds of
millions of dollars in drug money in the United States, and for helping to
launder drug money from traffickers around the world and returning it to
Colombia.41
Additionally, in January 2011 the U.S. Treasury Departments Office of
Foreign Assets Control designated Joumaa a drug kingpin under the
Kingpin Act. This designation sanctions Joumaa, making it illegal for
Americans and American companies to do business with him. The
designation also encourages banks in other countries, such as Colombia, to
freeze a designees accounts. Despite his indictment by the United States,
Joumaa remains at large.
55
The Treasury Department has also sanctioned Lebanese, Colombian and
Venezuelan individuals and businesses that laundered money for Joumaa,
including numerous front companies that hid the profits true destinations.
In 2012, the Treasury Department designated Kassem Mohamad Saleh,
Abbas Hussein Harb, Ibrahim Chibli, and three front companies owned or
controlled by Abbas Houssein Harb and/or Kassem Mohamad Saleh.42
According to the Treasury Department, Kassem Saleh is a dual citizen of
Lebanon and Venezuela and runs front companies for Joumaa. 43 His
brother, Ali Mohamad Saleh, a Lebanese Colombian national, was
designated at the same time a Specially Designated Global Terrorist due to
his Latin American fundraising activities for Hizballah. He will be
discussed in greater detail later. On the other hand, Abbas Harb is a dual
citizen of Venezuela and Lebanon. He runs a Colombia- and
Venezuela-based organization that launders money for Joumaa via the
Lebanese financial sector. His brother, Ali Houssein Harb, also a dual
citizen of Lebanon and Venezuela, was designated as well for his
connections to the Joumaa network.44 Finally, Chibli is a Lebanese citizen
who used his position as the manager of the Abbassieh branch of Fenicia
Bank in Lebanon to facilitate the movement of money for Joumaa and
Harb In 2010, Joumaa moved over a million dollars into an account
owned by Harb and managed by Chibli.45 Using accomplices connected
to Hizballah, Joumaa is able to successfully launder his illicit profits.
The Lebanese-Canadian Bank
One of the key entities that Joumaa used to launder his illicit assets was
the Lebanese-Canadian Bank, which was identified as a Primary Money
Laundering Concern by the Treasury Department in 2011, making it
illegal for U.S. financial institutions to interact with it. LCB is based in
Beirut, has 35 branches in Lebanon and a representative office in
Montreal. In 2009, LCBs assets were valued at more than $5 billion. LCB
allows numerous criminal organizations to launder money, which the
Treasury Department blames on management complicity, failure of
internal controls, and lack of application of prudent banking standards.46
One of the most interesting cases is that of an estimated $329 million
money-laundering scheme involving West Africa and American used
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TRACEY KNOTT
cars.47 As the civil suit announcement filed by the U.S. Attorneys Office
of the Southern District of New York explains, LCB laundered criminal
proceeds made from the illegal sale of American cars in West Africa and
facilitated the transfer of these funds to Hizballah.48 Channels for moving
the money included money couriers, cash smugglers, hawaladars, and
currency brokers.49 According to a New York Times investigation, one of
the exchange houses used was owned by Ayman Joumaas family, whose
members have also been sanctioned by the Treasury Department for their
involvement in his network. 50 The Treasury Departments Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network cooperated with the DEA to uncover this
scheme.
According to Derek Maltz, the DEA official who oversaw the agencys
investigation into LCB, this ability of terror groups like Hezbollah to tap
into the worldwide criminal funding streams is the new post-9/11
challenge.51 Similarly, DEA official Michele M. Leonhart has said in
regard to LCB, Drug trafficking profits and terror financing often grow
and flow together.52 In June 2013, LCB agreed to pay $102 million to
settle the U.S. governments civil lawsuit.53
The Cheaitelly/El Khansa Laundering Network
In 2011, OFAC designated Jorge Fadallah Cheaitelly and Mohammed
Zouheir El Khansatwo Lebanese-Colombian nationalsSpecially
Designated Narcotics Traffickers for their role in laundering drug
trafficking profits. The Cheatielly/El Khansa network of front companies
and money exchanges operates out of Panama and Colombia, and has ties
to Mexico, Lebanon and Hong Kong as well as to Mexican and
Colombian drug cartels. One of the import/export businesses located in
Panamas Colon Free Trade Zone, Junior International S.A, is connected
to Joumaa. Cheaitelly replaced Joumaa as the director of Junior
International S.A. and operates the company with Joumaas brothers, who
are also designated narcotics traffickers. 54 Cheaitelly family members
based in Colombia and El Khansa family based in Lebanon assist in the
money laundering and were also designated by OFAC.55 Both Cheaitelly
and El Khansa remain free.
57
Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kanan
OFAC has also designated several other Latin American Hizballah
fundraisers. In 2008, OFAC designated two Lebanese-Venezuelan
citizens, Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kanan, for providing support to
Hizballah. Nasr al Din is a Venezuelan diplomat and president of
Caracass Shia Islamic Center. Nasr al Din served as Venezuelas Charg
dAffaires in its embassy in Syria and as the Director of Political Aspects
at its embassy in Lebanon. He facilitated fundraising for Hizballah in
Latin America using his position at the Islamic Center. According to the
Treasury Department, Nasr al Din has counseled Hizballah donors on
fundraising efforts and has provided donors with specific information on
bank accounts where the donors deposits would go directly to
Hizballah. 56 In addition, Nasr al Din helped two Hizballah
representatives to the Lebanese Parliament travel to Caracas to solicit
donations for Hizballah. These operatives helped to open a
Hizballah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela.57 Nasr al
Din also helped Hizballah members travel to Iran for training. Lastly, the
diplomat held meetings with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon to
discuss the groups operations. 58
Fawzi Kanan, like Nasr al Din, facilitated the travel of Hizballah
members and raised money for Hizballah in Venezuela. Kanan often used
his two travel companies as a cover for trips and to transfer funds to
Lebanon. Moreover, Kanan held meetings with senior Hizballah officials
in Lebanon and has gone with other Hizballah members to train in Iran.59
Ali Mohamad Saleh
Ali Mohamad Saleh is one of the Cheatielly/El Khansa networks money
launderers, and is based in Maicao, Colombia. Saleh, a Lebanese
Colombian national, was designated under the Kingpin Act for laundering
funds for the network. He was designated by OFAC in 2012 as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist. Saleh is a former Hizballah fighter and
directed Hizballah financing in Colombia. According to the Treasury
Department, Saleh was the leader of a Hizballah support cell in Maicao
58
TRACEY KNOTT
that raised money for Hizballah: In this role, Saleh solicited donations for
Hizballah from business owners and residents. Saleh coordinated the
transfer of checks and U.S. dollars by courier from Maicao via Venezuela
to Hizballah in Lebanon.60 Saleh is an example of a Hizballah supporter
and financier with direct ties to the terrorist operations of Hizballah. While
most of his Latin American comrades appear to have worked strictly in
finance and recruiting, Saleh demonstrates the nexus between the
logistical and openly violent sides of Hizballah.
Evaluation of the Threat
Thus far, the threat from the DTO-Hizballah connection has stemmed
from fundraising and recruitment, not operational attempts. Nonetheless,
the criminal-terrorist nexus remains an important security concern that
should not be neglected by the United States and its hemispheric allies.
Even if Hizballah and its criminal allies are not planning to attack the
United States or other Western Hemisphere countries in the near future,
their financing efforts provide an important source of funding for terrorists
and criminals alike. Their criminal activities lead to regional
destabilization through corruption, violence and illicit trade. Moreover,
their profits increase their power, allowing criminals to expand their
networks and Hizballah to launch larger attacks, especially against Israel
and opposing regional forces. The DTO-terrorist connection subverts the
state and its monopoly on force.
As the previously mentioned case studies demonstrate, there are multiple
layers of threats stemming from Hizballahs involvement in Latin
America. Some Lebanese immigrants to Latin America, due to
marginalization and lack of opportunities or family ties, may be drawn
into organized crime. Those criminals, whether due to ideological belief or
greed, may turn to family and cultural connections to Hizballah for
assistance. These criminals may rely on Hizballah for help in expanding
their illicit network, laundering their illicit profits, or smuggling goods
into Hizballah-controlled territory. In these cases, the criminals may be
willing to pay a tax or make a contribution to the organization to ensure
continued good will. This type of Hizballah fundraising may be more
59
opportunistic than anything else. Such criminals act for their own profit
more than Hizballahs and are willing to donate to the cause only for
personal gain.
There are multiple examples of this type of opportunistic relationship
between Latin American DTOs and Hizballah. For example, the Justice
Department believes that Ayman Joumaa uses Hizballah operatives to
transport and launder the proceeds from his narcotics trafficking. 61
Additionally, some of the members of his organization have familial or
personal ties to Hizballah. Kassem Saleh, one of Joumaas money
launderers, is the brother of Ali Saleh, a designated narcotics trafficker
and terrorist. 62 Ali Saleh is a known Hizballah financier and former
Hizballah fighter; however, he also launders money for Jorge Cheaitelly
and Mohammed Harb, two Lebanese-Colombian citizens whose
laundering operation seems focused on profit more than on ideological
purposes.63 In Ali Salehs case, it is difficult to determine whether he is
motivated by profit or ideological convictions. It may be that he is
motivated by both and has been given the ability to pursue both angles
through Lebanese crime organizations connections to Hizballah.
In Joumaas case, the connections to Hizballah appear driven by his desire
for easy profit and assistance in laundering these profits more than
anything else. The money Joumaa has paid to Hizballah for help in his
schemes seem to be another aspect of his financial aspirations rather than a
desire to aid Hizballah in particular. In many ways, this interaction is just
as dangerous as that of a true believer. Criminals such as Joumaa are
opportunistic and will use any illicit connections to expand their empires,
even if it means working with a terrorist organization to achieve that goal.
Some of these immigrants, however, appear less motivated by profit and
more driven by belief in Hizballahs mission. These people may use crime
as one method of raising money for Hizballah, as in the case of the Buenos
Aires bomber Assad Ahmad Mohamad Barakat.64 However, they may also
turn to their immigrant community to exhort donations to the cause and to
recruit other believers. Both Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kanan used
their positions in their Venezuelan communities to facilitate Hizballah
60
TRACEY KNOTT
recruitment and fundraising. Moreover, the two used their access to
international travel companies to attend Hizballah meetings in Lebanon,
and in the case of Kanan, training sessions in Iran.65 Their examples fit
more with the expectations of terrorist cells that provide support to the
mother organization and could be expected to help organize an operation
if called upon.
Potential Solutions
The powerful networks of drug traffickers, money launderers, and
recruiters can contain important weaknesses for the organizations
involved. According to Douglas Farah, targeting specific operatives is
often an effective way of disrupting these networks.66 As many of the case
studies demonstrate, these facilitators often interact with numerous
networks, providing nodes at which law enforcement agencies can
interfere to hinder their operations.67 By targeting the men and women
who allow Hizballah to gain money and supporters in the region, officials
can deter the group from strengthening its foothold in Latin America and
limit its financial ability to carry out terrorist operations.
Sanctions are a powerful way of reducing criminal and terrorist
organizations ability to operate: without money, these organizations may
be less attractive to vulnerable immigrant populations. Moreover, without
financing, terrorist groups are unable to fund their attacks and criminals
have a reduced ability to subvert local governments and law enforcement
agencies. In this regard, countries in the region should look to OFACs
example as a model for targeting money launderers and terrorist financers.
Col. Cope also suggests looking at remittances as a method for controlling
the flow of money to Hizballah. The United States should encourage Latin
American countries and Lebanon to work together to develop a system to
regulate the exchange of money between immigrant communities and their
home countries. 68 Most of the money sent home by Lebanese immigrants
is no doubt intended for legitimate use, but governments must collaborate
to ensure that donations are not going to Hizballah-controlled
organizations.
61
It is also important to encourage cooperation among intelligence and law
enforcement agencies. In the past, cooperation between government
bodies like the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the
Treasury has been critical in targeting criminal networks like the LCB.69
One method of encouraging international cooperation would be a
recommitment to the ideals put forth by the 3+1 Group on Triborder Area
Security, which held anti-crime and anti-terrorism meetings between the
United States and the TBA countries. 70 Criminal and terrorist
organizations have worked successfully to overcome traditional
boundaries between states; governments must do the same if they have
any hope of countering such international illicit organizations. The Latin
American DTOs are not only operating in one country, but in multiple
regions. Their original crimes might begin in Latin America, but they
spread as far as the United States and Lebanon, especially with regard to
money laundering. 71 Furthermore, many countries affected by the
cooperation between criminals and terrorists lack the capacity to combat
them alone. By encouraging cooperation, intelligence sharing, and
exchanges of law enforcement techniques, these countries can overcome
their individual weaknesses. Finally, as Lieutenant Colonel Philip Abbott
noted in a 2004 article on the TBA, countries need to address the causes of
terrorism and criminality. They need to make a more committed effort to
improving the negative social conditions that have the potential to breed
instability.72 The effort to provide citizens, especially Shia immigrants at
risk of radicalization, with viable alternatives for economic and social
advancement needs to be driven by the international community as a
whole, and encouraged by countries like the United States who can
sponsor economic development projects.
Conclusion
Although Hizballah may not be establishing operational cells in Latin
America, the connection between Hizballah and regional DTOs is
nevertheless regionally destabilizing. The link profits a known terrorist
organization and many criminal networks, allowing them to spread their
area of influence through Latin America and abroad. Furthermore, the
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cooperation between Hizballah and DTOs breeds violence, criminality,
and corruption in both Latin America and in Lebanon.
States must cooperate to combat this governmental subversion. The
criminal-terrorist nexus will be stopped only when the flow of funds is
halted and those who facilitate this financing are stopped. Moreover,
countries need to prevent their marginalized communities from becoming
sources of criminal and terrorist recruits by expanding social outreach and
development programs to include these disenfranchised populations.
Hizballahs collaboration with Latin American DTOs is a serious threat,
not because of their potential to directly attack the United States, but
because of the relationships ability to help these violent groups prosper
and grow.
Endnotes
1
Guy Taylor, Hell to Pay if Terrorists Link to Drug Cartels Isnt Checked,
Washington Times, February 2, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/
2/hell-to-pay-if-terrorists-link-to-drug-cartels-isn
2
Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, Iranians accused of a plot to kill Saudis U.S. envoy,
New York Times, October 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accusesiranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html
3
Taylor; Stewart M. Powell, Border as Terror Route Worries U.S., Houston Chronicle,
August 11, 2012, http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/article/Border-as-terrorroute-worries-U-S-3781740.php
4
Arthur Brice, Iran, Hezbollah mine Latin America for revenue, recruits, analysts say,
CNN, June 3, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/world/americas/iran-latin-america/
index.html; Douglas Farah, Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for U.S.
Security, Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, July 7,
2011, 20, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20
Farah.pdf See also: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Targets Hizballah in
Venezuela, June 18, 2008, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/
hp1036.aspx
5
U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, May 30, 2013,
175-76, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf
6
John Barham, Hezbollahs Latin American home, Security Management: The
Magazine, accessed May 9, 2014, http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/
hezbollahs-latin-american-home
63
Matthew Levitt, Hizballah and the Qods Force in Irans Shadow War with the West,
Policy Focus, 123, January 2013, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus123.pdf
8
Levitt, 10.
9
Farah, Hezbollah in Latin America, 2.
10
Brice
11
Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda
(New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009), 17-18.
12
Ibid., 10-11.
13
Douglas Farah, in Brice, Iran, Hezbollah mine Latin America.
14
Ibid.
15
Rex Hudson, Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of
South America, The Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, December
2010, 26-27, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf
16
Brice.
17
U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network
Linked to Drug Trafficker Ayman Joumaa and a Key Hizballah Supporter in South
America, June 27, 2012, accessed May 9, 2014,
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1624.aspx; Treasury
Targets Hizballah in Venezuela.
18
Douglas Farah, Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Facilitators, in Convergence: Illicit
Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, eds. Michael Miklaucic and
Jacqueline Brewer (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, April 2013), 78.
19
Lt. Col. Philip K. Abbott, Terrorist Threat in Tri-Border Area: Myth or Reality?
Military Review, September-October 2004, 51, http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/
milreview/download/English/SepOct04/abbott.pdf; Mark P. Sulivan and June S. Beittel,
Latin America: Terrorism Issues, Congressional Research Service, April 5, 2013, 21,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf
20
George Ramsey, What is The Real Threat of Islamic Terrorism in Latin America?
Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0814/What-is-the-real-threat-of-Islamicterrorism-in-Latin-America; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism
2012, 176.
21
Roger F. Noriega and Jos R. Crdenas, The Mounting Hezbollah Threat in Latin
America, Latin American Outlook, 3, October 2011, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/10/06/UpdatedNo3LatinAmerican%202011g.pdf
22
Gregory F. Treverton, Carl Matthies, Karla J. Cunningham, Jeremiah Goulka, Greg
Ridgeway, and Anny Wong, Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism, RAND,
2009, xi, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/
RAND_MG742.pdf
64
TRACEY KNOTT
23
Treverton, et al., 79; Hudson, , 12.

Hudson, 12, 27.
25
L.I. Shelley and J. T. Picarelli, Methods and motives: exploring links between
transnational organized crime and international terrorism, Trends in Organized Crime
9.2 (Winter 2005), 61, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12117-005-1024-x
26
Hudson, 60.
27
Abbott, 52.
28
Ibid., 51.
29
Brice; Hudson, 9; Abbott, 52, 53.
30
Melani Cammett, in Brice, Iran, Hezbollah Mine Latin America.
31
Barham.
32
Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, CRS Report
RS21049 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April
5, 2013), 24, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf
33
Ibid.
34
U.S. Department of Justice, DEA News: Civil Suit Exposes Lebanese Money
Laundering Scheme for Hizballah, December 15, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/dea/
pubs/pressrel/pr121511.html
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury targets major money laundering network.
38
Sullivan and Beittel, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, 24.
39
U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Management, A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and
Terror at the Southwest Border, November 2012, 9.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Identifies Lebanese Canadian Bank Sal as a
Primary Money Laundering Concern, February 10, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1057.aspx
47
Christie Smythe, Lebanese Canadian Bank to Pay $102 Million to Settle Suit,
Bloomberg, June 25, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/lebanesecanadian-bank-to-pay-102-million-to-settle-suit.html
48
U.S. Department of Justice, DEA News.
49
Ibid.
50
Jo Becker, Beirut Bank Seen as Hub of Hezbollahs Financing, New York Times,
December 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/middleeast/beirut-bank24
65
seen-as-a-hub-of-hezbollahs-financing.html; U.S. Department of Treasury, Recent

OFAC Actions, January 26, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20110126.aspx
51
Becker, .
52
Smythe.
53
Ibid.
54
U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Key Panama-based Money
Laundering Operation Linked to Mexican and Colombian Drug Cartels, December 29,
2011, accessed May 9, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/tg1390.aspx
55
Ibid.
56
U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
61
62
63
Ibid.; U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Key Panama-based Money
Laundering Operation.
64
Treverton, et al, 12.
65
U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela.
66
Farah, Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Facilitators, 75-76.
67
Ibid.
68
Col. John Cope, E-mail correspondence with author, November 5, 2013.
69
70
Patricia Taft, David A. Poplack and Rita Grossman-Vermaas, The Crime-Terrorism
Nexus: Risks in the Tri-Border Area, The Fund for Peace, 2009, 11,
http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/ttcvr0905-threatconvergence-triborder-1204b.pdf
71
Sullivan and Beittel, 24.
72
Abbott, 53-54.
1
In Fall 2012 the Iranian rial hit record lows, and inflation hit 24%. Irans Inflation Rate
Rises by 1.4% in a month, The Tehran Times, November 8, 2012,
http://www.tehrantimes.com/
economy-and-business/103101-irans-inflation-rate-rises-by-14-in-month2
Here, The West signifies the United States and Europe participating in negotiations as
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TRACEY KNOTT

A Relationship of Convenience: Examining the

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