SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons:

RULE 73. Venue and Process
The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of
probate depends upon the GROSS VALUE of the estate of the decedent. (Lim
vs. CA, 323 SCRA 102 [2000])
Rule 73, Sec. 1 is deemed amended by BP 129, as amended by RA 7691.
RULE 74. Summary of Settlement of Estates
Respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to
Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a
person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
did, he failed to name an executor therein. (Portugal vs. PortugalBeltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005)
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could
not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1
of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir
to the estate. (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Delgado, G.R.
No. 155733, January 27, 2006)
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The
rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had
no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to
the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same
was notice after the fact of execution. (Cua vs. Vargas, G.R. No. 156536,
October 31, 2006)
RULE 76. Allowance or Disallowance of Will
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. [Sec. 3, Rule 76, Rules of Court]
A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of
the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are
neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the
probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to
mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of
the same. (Alaban vs. CA, G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005)
RULE

77. Allowance of Will Proved Outside

Administration of Estate thereunder

the

Phils.

And

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as
ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce in
evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
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Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the

State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the
presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and
totally disregarded the terms of Audreys will. The obvious result was that
there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious
appreciation of the evidence presented. (Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon,
G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006)
RULE 78. Letters Testammentary and of Administration, When and
to Whom Issued
On the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased,
the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. [Under
Sec. 6(b), Rule 78, Rules of Court, the administration of the estate of a
person who dies intestate shall be granted to the surviving husband or wife,
as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve.]
When the law speaks of next of kin, the reference is to those who are
entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedents property; one
whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether
an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the
decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the
issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits.
Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked
into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late
Francisco Angeles. (Angeles vs. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September 2,
2005)
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file
the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited
by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. (San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007)
RULE 86. Claims Against Estate
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of
money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased
debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is
extinguished is only the obligees action or suit filed before the court, which
is not then acting as a probate court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had
under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature,
by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the
extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to
his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out
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the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as

surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its
performance bond. (Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. RepublicAsahi Glass Corporation, G.R. No. 147561, June, 2006)
With regard to respondents monetary claim, the same shall be governed by
Section 20 (then Section 21), Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 20. Action on contractual money claims. When the action is for
recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the
action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed
but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced
in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against
the estate of a deceased person. (21a)
In relation to this, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, ... and judgment for money against the decedent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants
Thus, in accordance with the above Rules, the money claims of respondents
must be filed against the estate of petitioner Melencio Gabriel. (Gabriel vs.
Bilon, G.R. No. 146989, February 7, 2007)

General Guardians and Guardianship

RULE 102. Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or,
more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver
them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test
the circumstances under which a person is detained.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial
process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a post-conviction
remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding,
any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has
been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the
imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such
excess. (Go vs. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005)
From the foregoing, it is evident that Te is not entitled to bail. Respondent
judge contends that under Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, he has
the discretion to allow Te to be released on bail. However, the Court
reiterates its pronouncement in its Resolution of February 19, 2001 in G.R.
Nos. 145715-18 that Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only
to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by

virtue of a criminal charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case
involved in the present controversy, where the applicant is serving sentence
by reason of a final judgment. (Vicente vs. Majaducon, A.M. No. RTJ-021698 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 00-1024-RTJ), June 23, 2005)
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the
court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. The respondent
must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention. However,
this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive
matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of
Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety
of the remedy of habeas corpus. (In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Alejano vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25,
2005)
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus
extends to all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. The remedy of habeas corpus has
one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found
illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the
detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by
the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest
issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His
temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus
authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom
and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129,
3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section
4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since
he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals
holds that once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no
longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. (In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Kunting, G.R. No. 167193, April 19, 2006)
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld
from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code,
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental
authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the
couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated
by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both
parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case,
private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his
child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that
in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child,
his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. (Salientes vs. Abanilla,
G.R. No. 162734, August 29, 2006)
RULE 108. Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the CR

Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records

affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the
institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, with the
proper Regional Trial Court. Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not required in the
present case. It is enough that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the
publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila,
sufficiently complied with the requirement of due process, the essence of
which is an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, the publication of the order is
a notice to all indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor,
which binds the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the
petition. (Alba vs. CA, G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005)
The petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn,
alleging material entries in the certificate as having been falsified, is properly
considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ceruilas did not comply with the requirements of Rule 108. Under Sec. 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, not only the civil registrar but also all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by a proceeding
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must
be made parties thereto. As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito, unless all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the
same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
rules.
Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of
Rosilyns birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and
date of birth are at stake.
The lack of summons on Rosilyn was not cured by the publication of the
order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Summons must still be served,
not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with
the requirements of fair play and due process. (Ceruila vs. Delantar, G.R.
No. 140305, December 9, 2005)