Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Manzano vs. Mercado
Manzano vs. Mercado
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO
BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
admittedthatheisregisteredasaforeignerwiththeBureauof
ImmigrationunderAlienCertificateofRegistrationNo.B31632and
allegedthatheisaFilipinocitizenbecausehewasbornin1955ofa
FilipinofatherandaFilipinomother.HewasbornintheUnitedStates,
SanFrancisco,California,onSeptember14,1955,andisconsideredan
AmericancitizenunderUSLaws.Butnotwithstandinghisregistration
asanAmericancitizen,hedidnotlosehisFilipinocitizenship.
Judgingfromtheforegoingfacts,itwouldappearthatrespondent
ManzanoisbothaFilipinoandaUScitizen.Inotherwords,heholds
dualcitizenship.
Thequestionpresentediswhetherunderourlaws,heisdisqualified
fromthepositionforwhichhefiledhiscertificateofcandidacy.Ishe
eligiblefortheofficeheseekstobeelected?
UnderSection40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode,thoseholdingdual
citizenshiparedisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition.
WHEREFORE,theCommissionherebydeclarestherespondent
EduardoBarriosManzanoDISQUALIFIEDascandidateforVice
MayorofMakatiCity.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] The motion remained pending even until
after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May
10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes
cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of
the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Petitioners motion was opposed by
private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one
commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of
its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. [if !
supportFootnotes][5][endif]
The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC
en banc read:
Asaforesaid,respondentEduardoBarriosManzanowasborninSan
Francisco,California,U.S.A.HeacquiredUScitizenshipbyoperation
oftheUnitedStatesConstitutionandlawsundertheprincipleofjussoli.
HewasalsoanaturalbornFilipinocitizenbyoperationofthe1935
PhilippineConstitution,ashisfatherandmotherwereFilipinosatthe
timeofhisbirth.Attheageofsix(6),hisparentsbroughthimtothe
PhilippinesusinganAmericanpassportastraveldocument.Hisparents
alsoregisteredhimasanalienwiththePhilippineBureauof
Immigration.Hewasissuedanaliencertificateofregistration.This,
however,didnotresultinthelossofhisPhilippinecitizenship,ashedid
notrenouncePhilippinecitizenshipanddidnottakeanoathof
allegiancetotheUnitedStates.
Itisanundisputedfactthatwhenrespondentattainedtheageof
majority,heregisteredhimselfasavoter,andvotedintheelectionsof
1992,1995and1998,whicheffectivelyrenouncedhisUScitizenship
underAmericanlaw.UnderPhilippinelaw,henolongerhadU.S.
citizenship.
AtthetimeoftheMay11,1998elections,theresolutionoftheSecond
Division,adoptedonMay7,1998,wasnotyetfinal.Respondent
Manzanoobtainedthehighestnumberofvotesamongthecandidatesfor
vicemayorofMakatiCity,garneringonehundredthreethousandeight
hundredfiftythree(103,853)votesoverhisclosestrival,ErnestoS.
Mercado,whoobtainedonehundredthousandeighthundredninetyfour
(100,894)votes,oramarginoftwothousandninehundredfiftynine
(2,959)votes.GabrielDazaIIIobtainedthirdplacewithfiftyfour
thousandtwohundredseventyfive(54,275)votes.Inapplyingelection
laws,itwouldbefarbettertoerrinfavorofthepopularchoicethanbe
embroiledincomplexlegalissuesinvolvingprivateinternationallaw
whichmaywellbesettledbeforethehighestcourt(Cf.Frivaldovs.
CommissiononElections,257SCRA727).
WHEREFORE,theCommissionenbancherebyREVERSESthe
resolutionoftheSecondDivision,adoptedonMay7,1998,orderingthe
cancellationoftherespondentscertificateofcandidacy.
WedeclarerespondentEduardoLuisBarriosManzanotobe
QUALIFIEDasacandidateforthepositionofvicemayorofMakati
CityintheMay11,1998,elections.
ACCORDINGLY,theCommissiondirectstheMakatiCityBoardof
Canvassers,uponpropernoticetotheparties,toreconveneandproclaim
therespondentEduardoLuisBarriosManzanoasthewinningcandidate
forvicemayorofMakatiCity.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of
canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private
respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid
resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent
disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner
contends that
[T]heCOMELECenbancERREDinholdingthat:
A.UnderPhilippinelaw,ManzanowasnolongeraU.S.citizenwhen
he:
1.HerenouncedhisU.S.citizenshipwhenheattainedtheageof
majoritywhenhewasalready37yearsold;and,
2.HerenouncedhisU.S.citizenshipwhenhe(merely)registered
himselfasavoterandvotedintheelectionsof1992,1995and1998.
B.Manzanoisqualifiedtorunforandorholdtheelectiveofficeof
ViceMayoroftheCityofMakati;
C.AtthetimeoftheMay11,1998elections,theresolutionofthe
SecondDivisionadoptedon7May1998wasnotyetfinalsothat,
effectively,petitionermaynotbedeclaredthewinnerevenassuming
thatManzanoisdisqualifiedtorunforandholdtheelectiveofficeof
ViceMayoroftheCityofMakati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private
respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to
bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case
for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners motion
for leave to intervene granted.
one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for
Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to
have private respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local
position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who
originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter
of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner
since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because
he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private
respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of
votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against
private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobe
disqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbe
counted.Ifforanyreasonacandidateisnotdeclaredbyfinaljudgment
beforeanelectiontobedisqualifiedandheisvotedforandreceivesthe
winningnumberofvotesinsuchelection,theCourtorCommission
shallcontinuewiththetrialandhearingoftheaction,inquiry,orprotest
and,uponmotionofthecomplainantoranyintervenor,mayduringthe
pendencythereoforderthesuspensionoftheproclamationofsuch
candidatewhenevertheevidenceofguiltisstrong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings
for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion
for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC
en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for
intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but
the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions
on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution
provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was included in the 1987
Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who
explained its necessity as follows:[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
...Iwanttodrawattentiontothefactthatdualallegianceisnotdual
citizenship.IhavecirculatedamemorandumtotheBernasCommittee
accordingtowhichadualallegianceandIreiterateadualallegiance
islargerandmorethreateningthanthatofmeredoublecitizenship
whichisseldomintentionaland,perhaps,neverinsidious.Thatisoftena
functionoftheaccidentofmixedmarriagesorofbirthonforeignsoil.
Andso,Idonotquestiondoublecitizenshipatall.
WhatwewouldliketheCommitteetoconsideristotakeconstitutional
cognizanceoftheproblemofdualallegiance.Forexample,weallknow
whathappensinthetriennialelectionsoftheFederationofFilipino
ChineseChambersofCommercewhichconsistsofabout600chapters
alloverthecountry.ThereisaPekingticket,aswellasaTaipeiticket.
NotwidelyknownisthefactthattheFilipinoChinesecommunityis
representedintheLegislativeYuanoftheRepublicofChinainTaiwan.
Anduntilrecently,thesponsormightrecall,inMainlandChinainthe
PeoplesRepublicofChina,theyhavetheAssociatedLegislative
CouncilforoverseasChinesewhereinallofSoutheastAsiaincluding
someEuropeanandLatincountrieswererepresented,whichwas
dissolvedafterseveralyearsbecauseofdiplomaticfriction.Atthattime,
theFilipinoChinesewerealsorepresentedinthatOverseasCouncil.
WhenIspeakofdoubleallegiance,therefore,Ispeakofthisunsettled
kindofallegianceofFilipinos,ofcitizenswhoarealreadyFilipinosbut
who,bytheiracts,maybesaidtobeboundbyasecondallegiance,
eithertoPekingorTaiwan.Ialsotookclosenoteoftheconcern
expressedbysomeCommissionersyesterday,includingCommissioner
Villacorta,whowereconcernedaboutthelackofguaranteesofthorough
assimilation,andespeciallyCommissionerConcepcionwhohasalways
beenworriedaboutminorityclaimsonournaturalresources.
DualallegiancecanactuallysiphonscarcenationalcapitaltoTaiwan,
Singapore,ChinaorMalaysia,andthisisalreadyhappening.Someof
thegreatcommercialplacesindowntownTaipeiareFilipinoowned,
ownedbyFilipinoChineseitisofcommonknowledgeinManila.Itcan
meanatragiccapitaloutflowwhenwehavetoendureacapitalfamine
whichalsomeanseconomicstagnation,worseningunemploymentand
socialunrest.
Andso,thisisexactlywhatweaskthattheCommitteekindlyconsider
incorporatinganewsection,probablySection5,inthearticleon
Citizenshipwhichwillreadasfollows:DUALALLEGIANCEIS
INIMICALTOCITIZENSHIPANDSHALLBEDEALTWITH
ACCORDINGTOLAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem
of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus:[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
...AsignificantnumberofCommissionersexpressedtheirconcern
aboutdualcitizenshipinthesensethatitimpliesadoubleallegiance
underadoublesovereigntywhichsomeofuswhospokethenina
freewheelingdebatethoughtwouldberepugnanttothesovereignty
whichpervadestheConstitutionandtocitizenshipitselfwhichimpliesa
uniquenessandwhichelsewhereintheConstitutionisdefinedinterms
ofrightsandobligationsexclusivetothatcitizenshipincluding,of
course,theobligationtorisetothedefenseoftheStatewhenitis
threatened,andbackofthis,CommissionerBernas,is,ofcourse,the
concernfornationalsecurity.Inthecourseofthosedebates,Ithink
somenotedthefactthatasaresultofthewaveofnaturalizationssince
thedecisiontoestablishdiplomaticrelationswiththePeoplesRepublic
ofChinawasmadein1975,agoodnumberofthesenaturalized
FilipinosstillroutinelygotoTaipeieveryOctober10;anditisasserted
thatsomeofthemdorenewtheiroathofallegiancetoaforeign
governmentmaybejusttoenterintothespiritoftheoccasionwhenthe
anniversaryoftheSunYatSenRepubliciscommemorated.Andso,I
havedetectedagenuineanddeepconcernaboutdoublecitizenship,with
itsattendantriskofdoubleallegiancewhichisrepugnanttoour
sovereigntyandnationalsecurity.IappreciatewhattheCommitteesaid
thatthiscouldbelefttothedeterminationofafuturelegislature.But
consideringthescaleoftheproblem,therealimpactonthesecurityof
thiscountry,arisingfrom,letussay,potentiallygreatnumbersofdouble
citizensprofessingdoubleallegiance,willtheCommitteeentertaina
proposedamendmentatthepropertimethatwillprohibit,ineffect,or
regulatedoublecitizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of
the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As
Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a
reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother.
But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens
and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from
the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual
has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile
and Pimentel clearly shows:[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line
41, page 17: Any person with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any
elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President,
someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a
foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement
that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect
or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging
to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one
of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the
country of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless,
as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public
office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as
a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim
the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under
the Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then
he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first
thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a
Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine
law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the
citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of
his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. DefensorSantiago,[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport
and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.
Pardo, J., no part.
[if!supportEndnotes]
[endif]
[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Petition, Rollo, p. 5.
Per Commissioner Amado M. Calderon and concurred in by
Commissioners Julio F. Desamito and Japal M. Guiani.
[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Id., Annex E, Rollo, pp. 50-63.
[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
Rollo, pp. 78-83.
[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Per Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and concurred in by Commissioners
Manolo B. Gorospe, Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, Japal M. Guiani, and Luzviminda G.
Tancangco. Commissioner Julio F. Desamito dissented.
[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
176 SCRA 1 (1989).
[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991); Benito v. COMELEC,
235 SCRA 436 (1994); Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400 (1995); Frivaldo v.
[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]