Professional Documents
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Conflict Case Digest
Conflict Case Digest
Conflict Case Digest
Aglubay
G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967
JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitionerappellant,
vs.
LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, respondent-appellee.
Facts:
Refusal of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to record an Escritura de
Adopcion executed in Madrid, Spain, is now challenged before this
Court on appeal by registrant-adoptee from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila confirmatory of such refusal.
The disputed deed of adoption had its inception, thus: Prior to October
21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started before the Court of
First Instance of Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84
years of age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55
years, a citizen of the Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid,
Spain. On that date, October 21, 1958, the court granted the
application for adoption and gave the necessary judicial authority,
once the judgment becomes final, to execute the corresponding
adoption document. In compliance, on November 29, 1958, the
notarial document of adoption which embodies the court order of
adoption whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau formally adopted
petitioner, was executed in Madrid.
In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion was, on
December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez, Philippine
Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued the
corresponding certificate of authentication.1
The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila on January 15, 1959. The Registrar, however,
refused to register that document upon the ground that under
Philippine law, adoption can only be had through judicial proceeding.
And since the notarial document of adoption is not a judicial
proceeding, it is not entitled to registration.
Issue:
Is the trial court correct in concluding that what is registrable is only
adoption obtained through a judgment rendered by a Philippine court?
Ruling:
Tenchavez vs Escano
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino
Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before
Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in
the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their matchmaker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with
Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and
Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their
vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents.
However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her
parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and
when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a
complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and
issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then
sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu.
Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has
begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he
alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts
cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce
Republic vs Orbecido
Posted by kaye lee on 9:15 AM
CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No.
186571 August 11, 2010
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner
Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married
respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for
Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he
returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was
already romantically involved with another man. This brought about
the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was
eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz
has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He
went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian
divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However,
despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office
informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the
Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view of NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution
of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the
proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article
26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry
in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11 August
2010
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the
foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondents marriage
certificate without judicial order recognizing the said decree. The
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is void.
Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC decision, a petition for
review on certiorari
Facts:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the
respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He
went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.
Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the
divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the
foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where
respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the
petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this
case was filed before the Court.
Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.
Decision:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second
paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because the substantive right
it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest
to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by
the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree
with conformity to aliens national law.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or
alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or
requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment
has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in
the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed
and retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.
Ruling: Yes.
MARCOS V. MARCOS
Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they
had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material
support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and
void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.
Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the
respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show
psychological incapacity.
Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined
by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such
declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his
acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he
had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the
family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J.
Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children,
namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and
Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City,
a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36
of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged
that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: (a)
he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one
mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child
with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and (d)
he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San
Carlos University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently spending time
at her "Botica." Eventually, in1964 convinced that he loved her, she
agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most
celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter
Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for
her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while
Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her
earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the
habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children,
the entire family went to the United States. However, after three
months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her
return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and
other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent
a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted the municipal
government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge. His
act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the
last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that
after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn
Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee
Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased
daughter Cindy Rose Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He
maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he
and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before
the banks authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the
United States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months
present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls
short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage."
It ruled that Justos alleged defects or idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently
explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Courts factual
findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present
case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary
factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint
sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
1) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are
conclusive on the present case;
2) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert
testimony on the root cause of Justos alleged psychological
incapacity is necessary; and
3) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological
incapacity on the part of Justo
Held:
1) A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no
reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed
that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to
declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged
abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best
indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father.
However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the
marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These
grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly in