Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS.
ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge
Advocate General of the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order)
filed by the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein
petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some
members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of
assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP mostly from the elite units of the Armys Scout Rangers and the Navys
Special Warfare Group entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on
Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices
around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with
the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast
media, announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition
to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military
assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their

Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also
called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state
of rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary
measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers
to surrender their weapons at five oclock in the afternoon of that same day.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the
soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several
hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms
and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually,
they returned to their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the
military personnel involved be charged with coup detat defined and penalized under Article
134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information
against them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General
Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved
in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an
Information for coup detat 2 against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and
eventually raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case
was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before
Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case
No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges
for violations of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against
the same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for
disrespect toward the President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article
64 for disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d)
violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of
Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners
herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court

assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) a
motion praying for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their
motion to assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP
Chief of Staff recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be
charged before a general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the
Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable
cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6
In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped
the charge of coup detat against the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final
Pre-Trial Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of
absorption," those charged with coup detat before the RTCshould not be charged before the
military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before the
court martial against the accusedare hereby declared not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup detat." The trial court then proceeded
to hear petitioners applications for bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO,
reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the
officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general
court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War.
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magnos recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The
AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge.
Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles
of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11,
2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup
detat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which
offenses covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54
to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles are properly
cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which,
under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the
court martial.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional
issue that the offense charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners
alleged therein that during the pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded with
the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel then referred the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two years since the
Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned,
and this was done under questionable circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005,
herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that they were not arraigned
within the prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of the alleged
offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed
on July 25, 2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period
shall end only at 12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was
approaching and it was becoming apparent that the accused could not be arraigned, the
prosecution suddenly changed its position and asserted that 23 of the accused have already been
arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the general
court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of
merit. He alleges that "contrary to petitioners pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on
July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29
accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the
Charges and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of
prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law.
Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the
Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2
provides:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to these articles and
shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons
subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of
the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to
active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all

other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said
service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military
law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes
or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local
government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or
offended parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil
court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is serviceconnected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President
of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment
that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or
local government ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the
general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general
rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be serviceconnected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an
exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice,
directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or
offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to
97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by court martial.
This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or
offenses committed by military personnel.
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of
military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The
military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline
in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military law is established not
merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of
the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety
than a licentious and undisciplined military body. 19 The administration of military justice has

been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the
world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means of
enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable
part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both
in peace and in war. 20
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City,
Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to
defend the Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and abused their
constitutional duty to protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust
the incumbent duly-elected and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing
the peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby causing
dishonor and disrespect to the military profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)
Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Any officer, member of the Nurse
Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring
ours)
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected.
This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing
that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as
officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.Such violation allegedly
caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing
on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the
"service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from
the service imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in
character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the
stringent standard of military discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before
the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been
declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup detat," hence, triable by said court
(RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests
in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law
has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows
jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action

which can do so. 22 And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment
that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law
"as they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in
the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the courtmartial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the
crime of coup detat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in
excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.
The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly
specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.

Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Articles 72 to 92:
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the
foregoing offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles
95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In
fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this
case is worth quoting, thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged
crime of coup detat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law
and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25 unlike here where different
statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over
both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over serviceconnected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption
of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military
personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline
separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel
carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience,

and the nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a
separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government
personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his
reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However,
a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military
commander reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military
discipline will collapse.
xxx
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed
forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops Military Law and
Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that
ensures the Presidents control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this
disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of courtsmartial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted).
xxx
While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so
sparingly and only to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons,
80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563
[1945]). The Court has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the
offense charged is absorbed and in furtherance of another criminal charge pending with the
civil courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the serviceconnected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present
case.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition,
suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as
to (a) who among the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment.
These are matters involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a
trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the
undisputed facts. 26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the
unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated differently,
prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. 28

In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial
and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ