THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF MUTUAL OBLIGATION

jeremyMoss

Welfare schemes which require recipients of benefits to 'give something hack: are
often justified in terms of 'fairness' or fulfilling the 'social contract', The Australian
Governments recent and proposed changes to unemployment benefits through the
Mutual Obligation Scheme appeal to both justifications. However, insufficient attention

has been paid the underlying ethical and political assumptions _Q serious deficiency,
given their role in legitimating harsh new penalties. There are two broad reasons the
current trend to tie benefits to obligations is inappropriate. First, the unemployed
have little choice about their ~ontract. And second, there is insufficient mutuality
shown towards the unemployed/or the Scheme to be obligation-generating. Rather
than being a means a/encouraging panicipation or mutuality, the Scheme is essentially
punitive.

Introduction
Over the past decade there has been a considerable shift in Western governments'
treatment of unemployed welfare recipients. The post-World War IT system that placed

only minimal obligations on the unemployed has given way, especially in Australia,
Britain and the United States, to a system in which welfare benefits are made
conditional on the recipients' satisfying certain obligations to the state. It is now
commonplace for governments to claim that people are not straightforwardly entitled
to an unemployment benefit; rather, that benefits are conditional on their fulfilling an

ever expanding range of duties. The shift from a system of entitlement to one of
increased conditionality has been accompanied by a shift in the moral and political
assumptions underpinning those welfare systems. In Australia this has been
accompanied by the introduction of progressively harsher requirements which the
unemployed have to fulfil under the requirement that they 'give something back'.

This process has been justified by reference to the obligation supposedly generated
by the act of receiving an unemployment benefit. Yet. even though the idea of
Or Jeremy Moss is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics,
University of Melbourne.

Jeremy Moss: The Ethics and Politics of Muluo.l Obiigution

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obligation is clearly central to the Mutual Obligation Scheme, it has received far less
scrutiny than it deserves. The new range of enforceable obligations the unemployed
are now presumed to have to 'society' raises the question of the sort of obligations
citi~ens of a liberal democratic state have to it, and on what basis they owe such
obligations. This more general question of political obligation and its moral basis is
seldom discussed in the welfare debate. However, one of the costs of this omission is
that there is a risk the debate will lose sight of the rationale behind widely held notions
of political and mutual obligation at the very time practical obligations are being
significantly increased.
The shift towards greater conditionality of benefits has occurred without any
convincing justification. Indeed, other than (numerous) throwaway lines and slogans
- which in any case are often inconsistent - there is little but a general appeal to
'fairness': the argument being, roughly, that it is fair to impose obligations and
sanctions for breaches of those obligations because the state has supported someone
when they are in need and that person, -therefore, should do something in return.
The idea of fairness is one way of cashing out the Scheme's rationale, and a
superficially plausible source of justification for the obligation-generating nature of
welfare payments. However, it is apparent from the literature surrounding the Mutual
Obligation Scheme - the guidelines, tender documents, reports, Ministerial
Statements and so on - that there is often no direct appeal to the notion. The Scheme's
authors and administrators do not explicitly demonstrate how the value commitments
contained in the Scheme are obligation-generating. Their assumptions are left, if not
ambiguous, then at least not made clearly. It is therefore necessary, with caution and
disinterest, to do their job for them.
So, in a sense, what I am proposing to do is reconstruct a plausible account of obligation
and then subject it to scrutiny. It is, so to speak, an unauthorised moral biography. I
should note that mine is not the only possible justification, merely the one that I think
best accords with the Mutual Obligation Scheme .
. Through this reconstruction I want to question the idea that receiving a welfare paymem
is obligation-generating on at least two grounds. The first concerns whether or not
people who receive a welfare benefit actually have much choice in the matter. If they
do not, then it is a poor basis for an obligation-generating contract. Secondly, the
compulsory work and training requirements that surround Mutual Obligation are
justified in terms of the mutuality that is supposed to exist between the state and the
individual, the so-called 'social contract'. But what are we to make of the idea of a
social contract between citizens, especially those who are disadvantaged, and the
state? And, crucially, how is this contract obligation-generating? My suggestion is
2

Australian journal of Social/ssues Vol. 36 No. 1 February 2001

that, with few exceptions, the mutuality is predominantly on the part of the unemployed
and not of business and government. There is also little individual obvious benefit to
the unemployed who are forced to do compulsory work activities - thereby fulfilling
their obligation to give something back. I will also argue that there is an implied
sense of personal responsibility in the justification for the Scheme which unfairly
blames the unemployed for their situation.
What follows will be predominantly a critique of the idea that receiving a welfare
payment should generate the kind of obligations that are exemplified in the current
Mutual Obligation Scheme, especially the Work for the Dole program. I will argue
that as a result of the coercive nature of the Scheme the language of contract and
obligation is misplaced for discussion of unemployment and welfare benefits generally.
The trend in Australian welfare provision to seek to extract a benefit from the
unemployed can only properly be characterised as punitive. Rather than extend an
already punitive system to other disadvantaged sectors of the community, we need to
break the link between benefit and enforced obligation or participation, thus
undermining the idea that it is 'natural' for the unemployed to give something back.
In contrast, my approach .to the question of who should receive welfare payments
will be to 'work backwards' from examples where we typically think it appropriate
for people to receive their benefit with few or no conditions as an entitlement generated
through need. I will only briefly discuss a possible alternative moral basis for welfare.
I want now to characterise this appeal to fairness and try and connect it with some of
the sources of Mutual Obligation policy.

Mutual obligation and fairness

Those who support the concept of mutual obligation sometimes imply that it is right
to give something back because it is 'fair' to do so. On the face of it, this seems an
appealing principle, in accord with commonly held intuitions about fair play and
reciprocity. We typically think it fair to be prepared to consent to some fonn of
reciprocity when we accept something, even if it is only an attitude of 'gratefulness'.
In the case of the unemployed, what is given to them by the state is financial assistance
and possibly training. They, in turn, give back their labour and a willingness to look
for work. On this account, if an unemployed person accepts benefits others have
sacrificed to provide, then it is fair they should give something in exchange. By
appealing to fairness the rights the unemployed have are said to be balanced against
the responsibilities they owe. Such an arrangement fulfils the social contract which
putatively exists between the state and the individual.
The trend in the provision of welfare to focus on the obligations of the unemployed
to society (instead of society'S obligation to the unemployed) is moderated in the
Jeremy Moss: The Ethics mid Politics of Mutual Obligation

Final Report of the Welfare Refonn Group, but still prominent. The report makes it
abundantly clear that, all things being equal, welfare recipients should expect to
participate in some fonn of social or economic activity if they are to continue to
receive benefits. In fact, one of the key recommendations of the report is that mutual
obligations be extended to a range of people of workforce age. Part of the rationale is
that this is what the welfare recipient owes the rest of society for receiving a benefit.
By encouraging participation the report seeks to ensure that the bonds of society are
maintained and strengthened. These bonds, which confer obligations as well as rights,
should be exemplified in the Social Security System through such measures as the
Work for the Dole program. Participation is emphasised as a cure for social and
economic exclusion.
Though some, like the Prime Minister, also put an emphasis on boosting jobs (Howard
2000), the major focus of the Scheme is that of giving something back. As a recent
media release from Department of Employment Workplace Relations and Small
Business puts it, Mutual Obligation is based on the premise that those who depend on
the community for long periods should 'give something back to the community that
supports them' (DEWRSB 2000). Or, as the new Minister for Employment said on
his appointment, 'Serious activity can be expected of a lot more welfare recipients.'
(Tony Abbott cited inAllard & ClenneIl2001). Work forthe Dole is now the default
option for those required to do a Mutual Obligation activity. Given the sometimes
dubious efficacy of the program, this is evidence it is more about giving something
back than training or job creation.
Interestingly, the Work/or the Dole 2000 tender document also refers to the obligations
of the unemployed in terms of what they can give back (DEWRSB 1999). The
document is explicit in describing the program as primarily about providing services
to the local community (cf Abbott 1998). Nowhere does the tender document refer to
the Scheme as having to provide training to the participants. Instead, the participants
are to develop 'work habits' or generic work skills such as working independently. as
part of a team or improving their communication skills (DEWRSB 1999: 4). While
the Mutual Obligation Scheme does allow some accredited training, through TAFE
for instance, the primary aim is not to benefit the unemployed. That the Government
has chosen this and not the accredited training courses as the default position is
suggestive of the underlying ethos.
While it is evident that political theory or moral philosophy has not directly informed
the conceptions of obligation used by government, we may nevertheless turn to
established philosophical arguments to fill out officialdom's de facto moral and
political ideas. For instance, the guiding idea in John Rawls' 'principle of fairness' in
A Theory of Justice is that when citizens engage in a cooperative venture like political

Australian Journal of Social Issues Vo!. 36 No. J February 2001

society and restrict their liberty in ways that 'yield advantages for all', they have a
right to expect that others will do the same (Rawls 1973: Sets 18 & 52). The principle
requires that all will do their fair share. Something like the principle of fairness seems
to be invoked through the Mutual Obligation Scheme's heavy emphasis on reciprocity.
Crucial here is the idea that by receiving benefits the unemployed have exercised a
right which thereby gives them an obligation to do something in return. Others have
sacrificed their labour in order to ensure that there are resources available to provide
welfare. Therefore it is fair that the beneficiaries of that sacrifice give something
back.
In what follows I will analyse the idea that the unemployed in particular should give
something back and see how it holds up in tlie face of various practical and theoretical
problems. I want to question the application of obligations to the unemployed along
two broad lines: that a contract entered into through coercion is not obligationgenerating; and that a lack of mutuality also weakens obligations.

'Accepting' unemployment benefits

The contract between the state and welfare recipient is initiated and maintained by
the welfare recipient's acceptance of their benefit. The reasoning here is that by
accepting the benefit, the unemployed person has consented to the conditions of the
contract. Yet we may ask how this reasoning holds up when the recipient acts not
from free choice but effective coercion (coercion not being a good way of initiating
an obligation or contract).
There is a difference between accepting benefits and merely receiving them. It is one
thing freely to seek and accept a benefit but quite another to have no significant
alternative. In the former case the person knows something is expected in return,
whereas a person who has no choice might be said merely to receive a benefit. Robert
Nozick's counter-examples to Rawls are all instances of this sort of receipt (Nozick
1974: 90-96). For instance, Nozick claims that if I am in a neighbourhood where the
rest of the residents implement a public address system which broadcasts useful
bulletins which I cannot avoid, I have only received this benefit and do not incur any
obligations. While it is true that I might benefit from the information given in the
broadcast, I would also have a great deal of difficulty avoiding the benefit unless I
was prepared to relocate. Many general 'public goods' are of this type. They are
characterised by being hard to avoid but nonetheless beneficial.
Take the situation in which someone is unemployed with no means of supporting
themselves other than by receiving government welfare payments. The 'choice' they
are faced with is either to take the payment or suffer the consequences of having no
income. This is especially true in regions or communities with limited employment
Jerem.y Moss: The Ethics and Politics of Mutual Obligation

opportunities. The point applies a fortiori to particular categories of people who cannot
find work, such as the disabled. We might describe this situation as one where the
person is obligated rather than having obligations. Someone has political obligations
where they, for instance, freely consent to authority or a contract in the manner
discussed above. But when circumstances force them to act in a certain way they are
obligated.

The situation of most welfare recipients is comparable: closer to a case of coercion

than of consent. Therefore, the notion of fairness generated by receiving unemployment
benefits is misplaced if a person really has little choice about whether they can refuse

those benefits. The salient point is that receiving them in this way is not a good basis
on which to base obligations. So, while there are legal obligations that follow from

receiving the benefits, there are few moral or political obligations.

There is also the issue of the sense in which we should think of a Mutual Obligation
agreement as a fair bargain. The contract signed between the welfare recipient and
the state is negotiated through a process where the signatories are not on an equal
footing. The welfare recipient has no real real power to negotiate - only the
opportunity to pick from a relatively narrow range of options to fulfil their mutual
obligations. (Even then, the formal options offer less choice than might at first appear.

Joining the Anny Reserve or the Green Corps, for example, is hardly a serious option
for many older people.) And, as noted, they will also most likely be constrained by

the need to gain financial support. While there are welfare rights organisations which
might offer support in a limited number of circumstances, there is nothing like the
negotiating power that might come, say, through a union, or the threat to withdraw
one's labour. Those who have to sign a Mutual Obligation agreement are some of
society's most economically vulnerable people.

Mutual benefit
A second major difficulty for the obligation-generating nature of the Scheme is that

for such an agreement to generate moral or political obligations it must be mutually

beneficial. It is hard to underestimate this idea in the current Australian welfare debate,
as so much of the appeal of the Scheme comes from the sense of benefit to the

unemployed to be achieved through compulsory work. First, through undertaking

compulsory work or training, an individual might improve their chances of finding
appropriate employment in the general labour market. Leaving aside for the moment
the issue of whether or not it is morally right to tie an individual's benefit to
participation of this kind, it is questionable whether the Mutual Obligation Scheme,
as it now functions, actually performs this role at all well. The largest component of
the Scheme, Work for the Dole, is only partly designed for this purpose. Its emphasis
on generic work skills is unlikely to produce high employment rates, as the study of
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Australian Journal of Social Issues Vol. 36 No. 1 February 2001

the pilot program has shown. It is also hard to see how these generic skills are any
sort of substitute for specific skills and training. I do not want to ignore the fact that
there are training components to Mutual Obligation which do provide ,useful skills
and training. But even these may ultimately be of little use while there is an oversupply
of labour. Nor does it take into account that for people who lack marketable skills,
have little experience in the workforce and are, perhaps, located in communities with
few job openings, there is little justification for using terms of blame or mutuality.
While it is true that at the time of writing Mutual Obligation activities apply only to
those under thirty-four years of age - and Minister Abbott has made it clear this will
change - it should also be pointed out that low skilled jobs are often those relied on
by people seeking to enter the workforce. Lack of previous experience of work in an
industry or a lack of training obviously reduces the chance of finding a job. What this
shift to a new punitive unemployment policy does is recast the issue in terms of the
attitudes and moti vations of those affected by structural unemployment - an approach
that ignores the demand side of the economy by seeing the problem as one that lies
with the attitudes and dispositions of labour itself. It also fails to take into account the
baniers widespread racism may place in the way of indigenous or ethnic jobseekers.
The beneficial effect of compulsory work and training on an unemployed person's
self-esteem is another selling point of the Scheme. But insofar as an individual might
be compelled to engage in a low skill work task to fulfil their obligation, especially
where they object to such a task, it is hard to see how their self-esteem would be
raised. Similarly, the types of work that Work for the Dole might lead to may well
lack the characteristics of satisfying jobs. They may, for instance, be insecure, lowpaid and unfulfilIing - which, it has been argued, is precisely what has happened in
the United States (Peck 1990: 815).

Mutual obligations?
From the beginning the Mutual Obligation Scheme has been interpreted as reflecting
broader social bonds. The trend is continued in the Final Report of the Reference
Group on Welfare Reform, as in its insistence that the obligations for the provision of
welfare and access to participation lie with governments, business and the wider
community as well as welfare recipients. Indeed, the Report goes so far as to say that
the obligations of government and business are no less important than those of the
individual. The Government duly notes that its role is not just to provide income
support but also to 'invest more widely in helping people of workforce age build
their capacities for economic and social participation' (FACS 2000: 35). The role of
business is also said to be part of the overall picture of obligations. Not surprisingly,
however, the obligations each of these sections of society have are treated very
differently. The best example is the nature of the coercive measures associated with
each sector's obligations. While individuals are subject to a rigorously imposed set
Ju~my

Moss: Tlu Ethics and Politics of MutlWl Obligation

of breaches for failing to comply with their obligations, the report sets down no
enforceable obligations for business. Given that the main contribution a business can
make to the problem of unemployment is the provision of jobs (and training) there
seems to be a definite lack of mutuality in not making business fulfil its acknowledged
moral obligations to society. Without such enforced obligations it seems inconsistent
and unfair to penalise individuals who are looking for work and not the organisations
who do not provide enough of it. A similar point might be made against the lack of
job provision by governments. Such an unequal distribution of obligations and coercion
makes it difficuh to see how mutuality, so construed, is fair.
It is appropriate also to note that not only are the penalties unequally distributed, but
that those imposed on welfare recipients are in and of themselves unduly harsh. Since
1997 Activity Test breaches have increased by 102%. (The Activity Test is a test of
whether the unemployed are looking for work or fulfilling their mutual obligations,)
Overall, ACOSS estimates that in the 1999/2000 financial year over 220,000 will
have been breached (ACOSS 2000: 2), Not only is the breach rate excessive, it should
be pointed out that these are merely breaches of social security rules, not instances of
fraud. The imposition of such severe penalties on some of the most vulnerable members
of society must raise serious questions about the motivations of those who stress the
fairness of the contract'.
As a practical point, if the Mutual Obligation Scheme really is concerned with giving
something back, then Work for the Dole is a particularly inefficient way of achieving
this goal. Given the increasing toughness of the Activity Tests, the harsher penalties
for breaches and the savings that accrue to the Government for such breaches, the
Scheme seems geared more towards punishing the unemployed than actually allowing
them to give something back. When we add to this the conspicuous lack of success of
Work for the Dole in finding work for the long-term unemployed in particular, it is
hard not to conclude that the Scheme is essentially punitive. This makes it even more
difficult to justify using the language of social bonds or contract to characterise the
Scheme. There is nothing very fair or mutual about imposing penalties on society's
more vulnerable members.
A final, broader and possibly even more significant point on mutuality. Why, among
all state dependants, are the unemployed singled out to give something back as a
condition of mutuality? Think of the criteria of mutuality that currently apply to other
classes of needy individuals in the community. For example, if someone is involved
in an accident and sustains an injury that requires emergency treatment in a hospital,
then we typically think that they should have such treatment without incurring a debt
to society, which they then have to repay. Funding shortfalls in hospitals not
withstanding, it is a 'no fault' benefit to which anyone can access. Regardless of the

Au.Hralian Journal of Social Issues \..h/. 36 No. } February 2001

blame attached to the injury, we typically think that society ought to provide support
for the injured or sick, even where their condition is largely self-imposed (as with
those who have indulged recklessly in alcohol, tobacco, chocolate or sport'). As a
matter of consistency, why should the principle of mutuality not be extended to those
who have received public hospital treatment? If we agree with the idea that it is fair
to give something back for receiving assistance in times of need, then why shouldn't
hospital patients give something back when they have recovered? One might say that
they have already done so through paying their taxes or the Medicare levy. But many
people probably do not cover these costs in that way. And even if it we accept that
those who benefited from hospital care have given something back through the taxation
system, then surely the same point could be made about the contributions of the
unemployed, many of whom have been, are or will again be taxpayers. While the
contributions of the unemployed have been recognised in the Final Report, that
recognition has not been incorporated into the practice of the Scheme. Government
constantly makes a distinction between taxpayers and social security recipients. This
is particularly apparent with the Work for the Dole program, the rhetoric of which
specifically insinuates that those on the dole owe something to taxpayers. In any
L:ase, the extent of the contributions many of the unemployed may have made does
nol end with taxation or paid work. If they are parents, they may have contributed to
society through their efforts in raising their children. They might also have volunteered
for some charitable organisation or been a member of a community group. All of this
is obscured, unwittingly or not, by the very terms normally used.

Personal responsibility and the unemployed

What would appear to distinguish (in official eyes) the unobligated hospital patient
and the welfare recipient is, in part, an importation of specifically moral premises.
Apart from giving something back, there is also arguably a sense that the unemployed
should assume particular responsibility for their situation. This is a very important
moral motivation for the Scheme and a moral map of the Scheme's commitments
would be incomplete without considering it.
I

If we look at the negative side of the public discussion of unemployment, one of the
recurring themes in the unemployment or welfare debate is the image of the 'dole
bludger'. Take, again, the well known comments ofTony Abbott on the unemployed
being 'lazy' or 'job snobs'. Although this is not yet an official part of Government
policy, ministers other than Abbott have consistently used language suggestive of
'blaming the victim' for not having succeeded in finding work. Even the language of
the Mutual Obligation Scheme has this effect. For instance, the very label 'Work for
the Dole' is disparaging, given the connotations of the term 'dole' (notably, 'dole
bludger'). This portrayal of the unemployed distorts the very real difficulties faced

Jeumy Moss: The Ethics a.nd Politics of Mutual Ohliga.tioll

by many job seekers. It essentially blames the victim for there not being sufficient
jobs. As such, it is both unhelpful and insulting to the unemployed.
This sense of moral responsibility assumed by the Mutual Obligation Scheme is one
of the ways in which the unemployed are both morally and practically separated from
other welfare recipients. What discriminates among the classes of welfare is often
not the neediness of the recipients or the seriousness of the social problem. The
language used to describe the Scheme's goals appeals to morally loaded terms such
as self-reliance, reducing dependency, self-motivation and respecting the individual.
We may consider the example of dependency. The Mutual Obligation Scheme assumes
that it is not only unfortunate that people are dependent on others, but that there is
something morally wrong with this dependency. Dependence is a situation most people,
including the unemployed, do not find desirable. While we might agree that, ideally,
everyone should be responsible for many, if not all, of their own needs and not depend
on others, we should be careful to note that the emphasis on reducing dependency by
forcing people off social security benefits is actually an emphasis on reducing state
dependency (Goodin & Schmidtz 1998: 17ff).
Or we might consider other contexts in which dependency is acceptable. Children
are dependent on their families or relatives, the aged are often dependent on others
for care, as are the sick or disadvantaged. We do not nonnally see these cases as
inherently morally problematic. In the broader welfare sector there are plenty of welfare
recipients dependent on the state for benefits who are not subject to anything like the
level of condemnation as are the unemployed: veterans, pensioners, people on disability
pensions, women with children and so on. In fact. according to a discussion paper
released by Senator Newman, the unemployed account for less than one third of the
welfare budget (Newman 1999: 5). What separates them, it would appear, is the implicit
moral premise that they are responsible for their situation in a way others are not
(including those with self-imposed injury or illness).
This is, at the very least, debatable. Where there is structural unemployment, the
unemployed are no more responsible for their condition than are other dependent
groups for theirs. Goals such as reducing dependency, creating self-reliance and giving
something back are all very well in themselves, but there has to be a non-question
begging account of why these cases of dependency are bad while others are not. It is
the slide between legitimate and non-legitimate dependency that enables the more
punitive welfare policies to gain some of their appeal.

Conclusion: Breaking the link between participation and obligation.

I end by drawing a number of brief conclusions about the Mutual Obligation Scheme
and its obligation-generating nature. What I have argued so far has been a kind of

10

Auslralian Journal oJ Social Issues Vol. 36 No. I February 2001

immanent critique of the Scheme; most simply, that even on its own tenns it is not
obligation-generating. Because of a lack of mutuality, dependence on coercion and
not consent and a narrow definition of work, the Scheme does not generate obligations
of the sort currenlly extracted. Moreover, it seems that the idea that it is somehow fair
to require the unemployed to give something back is not as natural as it might appear.
What this means in policy terms is that benefits should not be tied to participation
because participation, where it is enforced, relies on a sense of the unemployed owing
something. I am not arguing that participation is undesirable, only that the link between
benefit and obligation (of the kind currently sought) needs to be broken. If this is the
case, then it is inappropriate to use contractual language to describe this kind of
welfare arrangement.
In terms of the moral and political considerations involved in welfare policy, Australia
is heading in the wrong direction. If it is doubtful that we should tie the benefits paid
the unemployed to their participation and general fulfilment of a debt to society, then
it is even more dubious to seek to enforce obligations on other disadvantaged groups
who receive benefits. The sense of obligation generated by social security programs
directed at the disabled and single mothers is weaker than that of the unemployed for
a whole range of obvious reasons.
The de facto rationale of the current Scheme is more properly characterised as punitive
(han enabling. The tougher Activity Tests, harsher penalties for breaches, savings to
government as a result of breaches, the inefficient means of giving something back
as well as the lack of benefit to the individual unemployed indicate that the Scheme
is based more on obligation than mutuality. The purpose of the contract between the
state and the unemployed seems to be to make it harder for individuals to gain access
to financial support. It is not mere rhetoric to suggest that the unemployed fulfil their
part of the contract by removing themselves from government benefits.2
What it seems necessary to argue, in terms of the current debate, is to work backwards
(both morally and strategically) from cases or examples where we think assistance
and support should not be tied to obligation or participation: hospital patients, veterans,
parents with young children, the severely disabled, and so on. It is incumbent on
those who make the distinction. to show how and why these groups are relevantly
different, why their dependence is acceptable and the dependence of certain classes
of unemployed is not. We need to ask why a moral language of entitlement is
appropriate in the one case but not in others.
Yet while breaking the link between obligation and benefit is a step forward in the
debate, discussion should not end there. A number of both moral and policy

ltnmy Moss: The Ethics and POlilics of Mutual Obligatioll

11

consequences can be inferred from breaking the link between obligation and benefit.
In closing I will mention some of them.
Working backwards from the kind of examples I have gi ven is a way of focusing
welfare policy on notions of entitlement rather than the assumption they should be
conditional on giving something back. In turn, what this implies is that the idea that

the unemployed have an obligation resulting from some sort of social contract is
misplaced in the areaof welfare provision. It is inappropriate to use the language of
a contract to describe a situation where a person receives a resource on the basis of
entitlement instead of as a result of debt. Removing the language of debt and contract
also goes some way to side lining the element of 'blaming the victim' that runs through
this whole debate.
One way in which the Final Report of the Welfare Reform Group removes the
inappropriate language is through its emphasis on capacity building. In the Final
Report this term is used to describe the process of the accumulation of human, financial
and social capital in disadvantaged communities, which is an important goal. But the
term can be equally employed to describe the sense in which individual capacities are
fostered and developed. In this individual sense, capacity building can be taken to
mean building personal attributes or capabilities which might be of use in personal
development, rather than the generic work skills currently on offer. The benefits of
focusing on this as at least one goal of welfare reform are, first, that it is not centred
on the idea that being in a position of state dependence is one necessarily involving
obligations of the kind to which I have been objecting; rather it might, for example.
involve negotiation, with the skills people might want or be able to acquire being
decided in a process that reflects their wishes and true abilities. Secondly, capacity
building is an 'agent centred' approach which focuses on the needs and conditions of
the agent. It recognises that the role of welfare is to support, assist and develop,
rather than to extract specified contractual obligations from, society's most vulnerable
members.
These suggestions are certainly not exhaustive, but central to a reconsideration of
social security benefits - at least as they apply to the unemployed - that moves
away from the language of contract and obligation. Given the increasingly harsh
nature of the Mutual Obligarion Scheme and attempts to portray the Scheme as about
participation and not punishment, it seems necessary to uncover the ethical
commitments of this trend in welfare policy and to' suggest a more entitlement based
picture of how to view disadvantage.

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Australian Journal f?fSociallssueJ Va!. 36 No. 1 February 2001

Endnotes
I.

Some doctors, notably in the UK, have floated the idea that smokers should
not receive treatment for lung cancer because it is largely, ifnot entirely, selfinflicted. Even the British Medical Association recognised that this would be
the thin edge of a very large wedge indeed.

2.

I owe this point to Bob Goodin.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Len O'Neill for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper and Will Barrett for his comments on the final draft. Versions of this paper
were presented at the Australian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics
Conference, Brisbane 2000 and at 'Mutual Obligation: Assessments and
Developments' a one day workshop at the University of Melbourne, October 2000.
Some of the material was also prepared for the Australia Institute.

References
Abbott, T, Minister for Employment Services (1998) Speech Notes, 'Work for the
Dole Round Two National Launch', December 18th, http://I
www.dewrsb.gov.au/ministers/abbottlspeeches/1998/spI8dec_98.htm.
Allard, T & Clennell, A. (2001) 'Abbott to take big stick to "work wary"', Sydney
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Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (2000), 'What
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wfdlmutual_obligationIMO_index.asp
Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, (2000b) Work
for the Dole 20.00 Request for Tender: Community Work Coordinators,
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Jaem.v Mon: The Ethics and Politics of MU/lUll Obligatioll

13

Department of Family and Community Services [FACS] (2000) Final Report of the
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Equitable Society, Canberra, AGPS.
Goodin, R.E. & Schmidtz, D. (1998) Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility;
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Howard, l., Prime Minister (2000) Federation Address, The Australian Way', http:!
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Klosko, G. (1992) The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, Boston,
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Newrnan, J. Minister for Family and Community Services (1999) Discussion Paper:
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t

Nozick, R (1990 [1974]) Ananchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Peck, l. (1999) 'From welfare to Workfare: Costs, consequences and contradictions',
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Rawls, l. (1973) A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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Australian Journal of Social Issues Vol. 36 No. 1 February 2001