The Supreme Court ruled that Joseph Ang, the director of Polymer Rubber Corporation, could not be held personally liable for the company's debts to former employees. While corporate officers can be solidarily liable with the company for illegal termination if they acted with malice or bad faith, there was no evidence that Ang was responsible for the employees' dismissal or that the company ceased operations solely to evade payment. The prior court judgments against Polymer did not find Ang personally liable. The Court also clarified that back wages should only be computed until the time the company ceased operations.
Original Description:
Case Digest for Polymer v Salamuding - Corporation Law/Labor Law
The Supreme Court ruled that Joseph Ang, the director of Polymer Rubber Corporation, could not be held personally liable for the company's debts to former employees. While corporate officers can be solidarily liable with the company for illegal termination if they acted with malice or bad faith, there was no evidence that Ang was responsible for the employees' dismissal or that the company ceased operations solely to evade payment. The prior court judgments against Polymer did not find Ang personally liable. The Court also clarified that back wages should only be computed until the time the company ceased operations.
The Supreme Court ruled that Joseph Ang, the director of Polymer Rubber Corporation, could not be held personally liable for the company's debts to former employees. While corporate officers can be solidarily liable with the company for illegal termination if they acted with malice or bad faith, there was no evidence that Ang was responsible for the employees' dismissal or that the company ceased operations solely to evade payment. The prior court judgments against Polymer did not find Ang personally liable. The Court also clarified that back wages should only be computed until the time the company ceased operations.
FACTS: Bayolo Salamuding, Mariano Gulanan and Rodolfo Raif were employees of Polymer Rubber Corporation dismissed after allegedly committing certain irregularities against Polymer. Salamuding et al filed a complaint for ULP and ID, nonpayment of overtime and 13 th month against Polymer and its director Joseph Ang, highest ranking officer.
judgment, or in excess of its terms. As to the extent of the
computation of the backwages, the same must only cover the period during which the company was in actual operation. Moreover, the motion to execute was already barred by the statute of limitations. NLRC affirmed the findings but modified the decision stating that the Salamuding et al are not barred by the statute of limitations. Salamuding et al filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
LA: NO ULP but there was ID. Ordered the reinstatement
and back wages, 13 th month, OT pay, moral and exemplary damages and attys fees. A writ of execution was subsequently issued to implement said judgment. Polymer appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the decision with modifications. The NLRC deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages, SIL pay, and modified the computation of 13 th month pay. A writ of execution was subsequently issued based on the NLRC decision. The case was elevated to the SC. On September 29, 1993, the SC affirmed the disposition of the NLRC but modified by deleting the overtime pay.
CA found merit with the petition, stating that there has to be a
responsible person working in the interest of Polymer who may also be considered as the employer. Since Ang as the director of Polymer was considered the highest ranking officer, he was therefore properly impleaded and may be held solidarily liable for the obligations of Polymer to its dismissed employees. CA imputed bad faith when Polymer ceased its operations the day after the promulgation of the SC resolution, allegedly to evade liability. CA found it necessary to pierce the corporate fiction and make Ang liable. CA ordered the reinstatement of the writ of execution and the notice of levy on the shares of stocks owned by Ang. Polymer and Ang filed a petition claiming that: 1.
On September 30, Polymer ceased its operations.
2. In 1994, the LA issued a writ of execution based on the SC resolution. It was returned unsatisfied. Another alias writ of execution was issued in 1997.
3. 4.
In the latter part of 2004, Polymer with all its improvements in
the premises was gutted by fire. On December 2004, Salamuding et al filed a Motion for th Recomputation and Issuance of 5 Alias Writ of Execution. The Research and Computation Unit of NLRC came up with the total amount of P2.9M Due to the failure of Polymer to comment or oppose despite notice, the LA approved said amount. On April 2005, the LA issued the 5 th Alias Writ of Execution, commanding the sheriff to collect the amount. In its implementation, the shares of stock of Joseph Ang at USA Resources Corporation was levied. Polymer and Ang moved to quash the writ and to lift the notice of garnishment. They alleged that: a)
b) c)
Ang should not be held solidarily liable with Polymer
since it was only the latter which was held liable in the decision of the LA, NLRC and the SC. The computation of monetary award in favor of the complainants amounting to P2.9M was erroneous The decision sought to be enforced by mere motion is already barred by the statute of limitations.
LA granted the motion, and ordered the quashal and recall of
the writ of execution, as well as lifting the notice of levy on Angs shares of stock. It ruled that the previous decision did not contain any pronouncement that Ang was also liable. To hold him liable at this stage when the decision had lon g become final and executory will vary the tenor of the
Upon finality of decision, the same can no longer be
altered or modified; Officer cannot be personally held liable and be made to pay the liability of the corporation Polymer cannot be made to pay salaries beyond the existence of the company Separation pay is only half month salary for every year of service.
ISSUE: W/N Ang may be made liable
HELD: NO.GR: Obligations incurred as a result of the directors or officers acts as corpo agents are not their personal liability but that of the corpo. They are only held solidarily liable with the corpo for the illegal termination of services of EEs if they acted with malice or bad faith. 2 Requisites: (1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that the officer acted in BF. In the present case, aside from the assertion that the closure was meant to evade liability, there was no evidence showing that Ang was responsible for the acts complained of. Moreover, it was highly improbable that the corporation would cease its operations if only to evade the payment of the monetary awards in favor of 3 EEs. Ang is merely one of the incorporators and to single him out and require him to personally answer for the liabilities is without basis. In the absence of a finding that he acted with malice or BF, it was error for the CA to hold him responsible. Moreover, the judgment of LA, affirmed by the NLRC and later the SC which had no pronouncement as to the liability of Ang, became final and executory and can no longer be altered even if it was meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. Computation of separation pay is only until the time Polymer ceased operations.
tgavila 2015 Petition granted. Case remanded for proper computation.