April 30, 2013

GUEST POST: Salafi-Jihadists and nonjihadist Salafists in Egypt A case study

about politics and methodology (manhaj)
http://jihadology.net/2013/04/30/guest-post-salafi-jihadists-and-non-jihadist-salafists-inegypt-a-case-study-about-politics-and-methodology-manhaj/#_edn1
By Hazim Fouad
In 2012 the Salafist TV Channel al-Rahma screened a debate between two representatives
of the so called al-Salafiyya al-Jihdiyya and two members of Jamat Anr al-Sunna
al-Muammadiyya, one of the oldest Salafist institutions in Egypt. The debate sheds some
light on the ideological differences, especially with regard to the acceptance of the political
and legal system in post-revolutionary Egypt.
Introduction
The toppling of Hosni Mubaraki in 2011 has led to an increased space for debate about the
role of Islam in society and politics in Egypt. Several persons who had been sentenced over
terrorism charges were released from prison and are now participating in this debate. One of
the most ardent questions is how and to what extent sharia shall be implemented in the
political system. This debate is not new. It was already an issue back in the seventies when
groups like al-Jamh al-Islmiyya revolted against what they perceived as an un-Islamic
regime. What is new is on the one hand, the relatively open space in which such discussions
take place. On the other hand, it becomes obvious that not every group, which can be labeled
Islamist or even Salafist is automatically opposed to the concept of a civil state and laws not
directly derived from the sharia.
This article tries to provide an in depth analysis of a three hour television debate which was
screened in 2012 on the Egyptian Salafist TV Channel al-Rahmaii between two
representatives of the so called al-Salafiyya al-Jihdiyya, a broad current comprising
movements close to the ideology of al-Qidh, and two members of the Jamat Anr alSunna al-Muammadiyya, one of the oldest Salafist institutions in Egypt.iii It will be shown
that the former actually use similar arguments al-Jamh al-Islmiyya has used before to
explain their complete rejection of the current political system,iv while the latter appear to be
much more accommodating, though still at odds with the notion of democracy. The debate
also sheds some light on the legitimacy of violence, as carried out by groups such as alQidh.
The first of its kind
The program begins with the moderator stating that rather than a contentious debate, this talk
is supposed to be a calm discussion about jihadist thought and the first of its kind in Egypt.
He then introduces the participants of the debate. The current of the so-called al-Salafiyya alJihdiyya is represented by Amad Fud Ashsh and Jall al-Sharqw. Ashsh is the
leader of al-ala al-Salafyya al-Mujhidyya Ansr al-Sharh in Egypt, an organization

ideologically close to al-Qidh.v He had openly declared his loyalty to Usma bin Ldin
and Aymn al-awhir and appeared in several videos published by al-Qidh.vi AlSharqw has appeared together with Muammad al-awhir, the brother of Ayman alawhir, in a press conference concerning the viewpoint of al-Salafiyya al-Jihdiyya on
the constitution.vii
The other side is represented by Jaml al-Markib and Al Sad. Al-Markib has been the
former general president of the Jamat Anr al-Sunna al-Muammadiyya, one of the
oldest salafist institutions in Egypt, established in 1926. He is also a member of the Shura
Council of Scholars in Egypt, which was set up by prominent Salafist scholars in 2011.viii
Sad is a preacher from Suez and supporter of the Salafist al-Alh Party.
Acceptance of laws perceived as un-Islamic
The debate starts with Ashsh clarifying his positions with regard to the current constitution
and laws, which govern Egypt. He states that the current reality is a product of the Wests
infiltration of Muslim lands and those Muslims, which have been affected by Western ideas
(al-mustaghribn) and therefore not the result of a pure Islamic development. The Egyptian
jurisdiction is based on the Napoleonic Code, which follows the philosophy of utilitarianism
(al-nafiyya) developed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham. With the application of
this positive or man-made law (al-qnn al-wa), the Sharia had been suspended since 1883.
Ashsh voices harsh criticism towards Muammad Abduh, one of the key leaders of
Muslim reformist thought and Mufti of Egypt at the turn of the 20th century, who had
allegedly used these un-Islamic laws as a basis for his legal judgments. He summarizes his
point by saying: Our position is the complete rejection (al-raf al-tm) of the rule of this
law.
Al-Markib begins his answer by admitting that Ashsh is correct by saying that a Muslim
country has to be governed by the sharia. But he argues for a more nuanced understanding of
the word law (qnn), which for him is an umbrella term, comprising multiple areas such as
the law of inheritance or the law of guardianship, both of which are in his view in accordance
with the sharia.
He also points to the fact that the sharia can be categorized into issues, which are definite
(qa) and those, which can be subject to interpretation (dhann). There are some words for
example, whose meaning is debated and not uniformly defined. The point of contention alMarkib sees is the question of how to change the reality Muslims in Egypt live in. Citing the
founder of his movement Muammad mid al-Fiqq and the Azharite Hadith scholar Amad
Muammad Shkir, he says that this matter has to be solved through preaching (dawah). The
applied method (manhaj) has to be to look first after those parts in the law that violate the
sharia and then to change them via other laws instead of using violence. Jihad for him is the
revival of the sharia and curbing the ignorance towards it, a process which in his eyes started
in Egypt already over a hundred years ago.
This relativizing viewpoint of al-Markib seems to be unacceptable to Ashsh. He replies
that if only a single paragraph violates the sharia, the whole law becomes void (bil). He goes
on to ask about the position of all the other Islamic movements towards this positive law,
which in his view is clear unbelief (kufr), since it allows sexual intercourse between a father
and his daughter. Replying to the question of al-Markib where exactly the law legitimizes
such an act, Ashsh explains that the absence of the death penalty for fornication (zin)
allows for it because the absence of a prohibition means legalization (adam tajrm ibh).

Sad does not want to follow this line of argumentation and asks if everything which is not
prohibited by law is legal and vice versa. For him such a statement has no basis, neither in the
Quran nor in the Sunna. He also stresses the point that the position of all Islamic movements
in Egypt is rejection (inkr) towards un-Islamic laws but the real question is how to solve this
issue and how to deal with people with regard to this matter.
This argument is challenged by al-Sharqw who asks that if all Islamic movements were
supportive of sharia law, then how was it possible that al-Markib describes movements
which are against the rulers who do not rule according to sharia as khawrij?ix How dare he to
describe people like bin Ldin and al-awhir as khawrij if the leader of his own movement,
al-Fiqq, had said that the current laws governing Egypt are the laws of un-Islamic tyrants
(tawght)?
Here, Sad makes some interesting points concerning the legitimacy of declaring someone an
apostate (takfr). A person, even a tyrant (ght), who rules with positive law, is not
necessarily an unbeliever (kfir). There is a difference in Islamic law between deed (fil) and
doer (fil) and the judgment of the former does not necessarily have to be identical with the
latter. So even if there is a consensus about the judgment concerning the deed of ruling with
an un-Islamic law, the judgment concerning the person ruling with this law might be different.
This is because there might be certain reasons for the person to do so, the so-called
mawni, which prevent him from being labeled an infidel.
The issue of takfr continues to be one of the most contentiously debated topics between
Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafistsx and will be dealt with in more detail after the argument
around the legitimacy of violence.
Concerning violence
Al-Markib clarifies his position towards the accusations that had been labeled at him by
saying that the method (manhaj) of facilitating explosions in Muslim societies, as perpetrated
by al-Qidah, is the method of the khawrij. Whosoever raises the sword against the
Muslim Umma belongs to the khawrij.
Now while Ashsh replies to the second, more theoretical, accusation, by claiming that alQidh never raised its sword against the Umma, he ignores the question of bombings and
argues instead that there is nothing in the doctrine (aqdh) of al-Qidh, which resembles
the doctrine of the khawrij. The latter made takfr on the companions of the prophet
(abh) and on people who committed major sins (kabir). No one in the current of alSalafiyya al-Jihdiyya would believe in this doctrine. Also there would be a consensus
among the scholars (ulam) that the one who rebelled against the ruler (kharaja al-lkim) is not automatically from among the khawrij.
It is noticeable that Ashsh elaborates on the doctrine (aqdh) of al-Qidh, although alMarkib had criticized their behavior and method (manhaj). Ashsh seems to be aware of
the fact that the targeting of Muslim populations, like done by al-Zarqw in Iraq, has cost alQidh a great deal of sympathy in the Muslim world. Not for no reason did the newly
established Anr al-Sharah groups not name themselves al-Qidh in Tunisia, Egypt or
Libya.
The question of general and individual takfr by the example of the judiciary

Ashsh declares that concerning individual takfr, al-Salafiyya al-Jihdiyya follows the
interpretation of the majority of Muslims (ahlu sunna wa-l-jamh) and not the
understanding of the khawrij. They consider someone to be an apostate if
a) he committed an act of unbelief by word or deed (al-sabab al-mukaffir min qawlin aw
fil)
b) the conditions for declaring him an apostate are fulfilled (taqq al-shur)
c) there are no reasons which prevent him from being considered an apostate (intif almawni)
As with regards to groups, the matter is slightly different. A group can be labeled as being
apostate if
a) it refrains from fulfilling a part of the sharia (tamtani an sharh min shari-l-islm)
b) it does not follow an admissible interpretation (laysa lah tawl sigh)
c) if it uses force to prevent the search for reasons which could prevent it from being
considered apostate (tamtani bi-l-shawkh bi mn anna-l-shawkh tamna min bath almawn).xi
In the heated debate following Ashshs explanations Sad criticizes the formers approach,
which is in his view is too abstract and general. Although God is the sole legislator and the
sharia has outlined the guidelines according to which Muslims have to organize their life,
there is still some leeway for man to enact laws within these guidelines, as for example traffic
law. The only thing that matters is that these laws must not violate the sharia. Concerning the
matter of takfr he mentions the lack of consensus on the exact meaning and understanding of
the aforementioned conditions (shur) and reasons for preventing someone to be labeled an
apostate (mawn). So he asks Ashsh to define his shur and mawn.
Ashsh reiterates that the current law is a commitment to someone else than God. So he
rhetorically asks whether a judge is allowed to sentence a Muslim according to this law. He
also asks if the legislative councils are legal or not. In addition, al-Sharqwi mentions that he
has studied law but refuses to work because the legal system is not based on sharia law. He
therefore calls for parents not to send their children to law faculties.
In his reply Sad dismisses such calls as being detached from reality. If these demands were
thought through the end, chaos would break out, because nobody would be able to file a
lawsuit anymore. He accuses Ashsh of practicing general takfr on the legal sector by
handing down verdicts before a case-by-case review had been conducted. If he truly adhered
to his conditions for takfr, he would have to go to every single judge he deems to be an
apostate, talk to him and prove his shur and mawn.
Towards the end of the debate Ashsh underlines his point about the illegitimacy of the legal
system by repeatedly quoting the aforementioned scholar Amad Shkir who considered the
Egyptian legal system as the contemporary ysiq (al-ysiq al-muir)xii and as a new
religion (dn jadd). So he keeps asking whether it is permissible to subject oneself to a
sentence or judgment which is islamically void (bil).

In a lengthy reply Sad reminds the audience that the prominent Saudi salafist scholar Ibn
Uthaymn had allowed people to consult judges who are not judging in complete accordance
with sharia, in cases of necessity and if the verdict brings justice. He accuses Ashsh of
relying on the Quranic verse 5:44xiii, without understanding that not everybody who does not
judge according to what God has revealed is automatically an unbeliever (kfir). Ashsh is
for him an exaggerator (ghulh) who misunderstands the concepts of allowing something
which god has forbidden (istill) and replacing the sharia with some other law (tabdl).
Concerning the quote of Amad Shkir, he explains that according to the medieval scholar
Ibn Taymiyyh, al-ysiq was considered unbelief (kufr) because it was claimed that it was the
law of God. This is not the case with the current Egyptian legal law. So Sad considers it
improper to use statements of certain scholars to declare the infidelity of whole institutions. In
addition to all of this Ashsh is blamed for confusing what constitutes minor unbelief (kufr
asghar) and major unbelief (kufr akbar).xiv
Conclusion
The debate sheds some light on the behavior and arguments of jihadist-Salafists in Egypt. One
may interpose the question of whether it is advisable to give people like Ashsh an open
platform to spread their views. Then again, it could be fruitful to have these views challenged
by people who might be perceived as having at least the same authority to speak about Islam.
The comments below the video on YouTube reflect these divergent views by pondering
between praise and fierce criticism of the Jihadists.
It became obvious that those speaking on behalf of al-Salafiyya al-Jihdiyya are keen to
distance themselves from the accusation that they are khawrij, i.e. extremists who randomly
declare other Muslims as apostates. It is for a reason that Ashsh at one point explicitly
clarifies that they (i.e. al-Salafiyya al-Jihdiyya) do neither declare the Muslim Brotherhood
nor non-jihadist Salafists nor the Egyptian society in general as unbelievers. This fits into the
ideology of al-Qidah which tries to restrict its takfr on so called un-Islamic regimes and
their rulers, without necessarily declaring whole Muslim societies as unbelievers, as some
groups have done in the past.xv The discrepancy in this argument becomes vivid by the fact
that Ashsh considers both the constitution and the entire legal system to be illegitimate.
Now that the Muslim Brotherhood is representing the state and its institutions, it remains to be
seen if and when it is declared an apostate regime from among the jihadist-salafist current. So
far, Ashsh has refrained from calling for jihad inside Egypt.xvi
Compared to these beliefs the notions of the non-jihadist Salafists appear relatively moderate
or even progressive. They argue for a context-based reading of religious texts and are
especially vocal against the random use of quotations. Also the possibility of enacting laws
not directly derived from the sharia is affirmed as long as certain principles are not violated.
In general, they seem to be harmonious towards the current political and legal system, since it
already implements parts of the sharia and allows them to operate and spread their views.
Nevertheless this attitude should not be misunderstood as the appreciation of democracy and
secular law. On the contrary, both al-Markib and Sad have argued that in the long-term, all
parts of the legal system, also the penal law, have to be brought into accordance with the
sharia. But with violence being out of the question, it could be asserted that non-jihadist
Salafists are just one segment of a pluralistic Egyptian society, whose views and activities, at
least for the time being, do not represent an imminent danger for the state.
Hazim Fouad has studied Near and Middle Eastern Studies in Bochum/Germany,
Cairo/Egypt and London/UK. He is currently working as an analyst for the Senator of the

Interior and Sport in Bremen/Germany. The views expressed in this article are his own and
do not necessarily reflect those of the aforementioned institution.
i

The names of persons, institutions and terms which are common in non-Arabic literature will
not be transliterated.
For more on salafist TV-Channels see Field, Nathan, and Ahmad Hamam. Salafi Satellite
TV in Egypt. Arab. Media & Society, 2009. http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=712.
Accessed April 6, 2013.
ii

iii

The video was uploaded on August 31, 2012 and has been viewed 14,962 times so far.
Munarh bayna al-Salafiyya al-Jihdiyya wal-l-shaykh Jaml al-Markib wa-l-shaykh Al
Sad (A Debate Between al-Salafiyya al-Jihdiyya and the Shaykh Jaml al-Markib and the
Shaykh Al Sad). http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcyf5okEX60. Accessed March 30,
2013.
For more on this matter see Meijer, Roel. Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a
Principle of Social Action: The Case of the Egyptian al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya. In Global
Salafism, edited by Roel Meijer. 189-220. London: C. Hurst &.Co, 2009.
iv

Zelin, Aaron. Know Your Ansar al-Sharia. Foreign Policy, September 21, 2012.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/21/know_your_ansar_al_sharia. Accessed
April 4, 2013.
v

Joscelyn, Thomas. Ansar al Sharia Egypt Releases Founding Statement. The Long War
Journal, November 20, 2012.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/_defending_al_qaeda.php. Accessed April
06, 2013.
vi

Yaqn: mutamar libayn mawqif al-Salafiyya al-Jihdiyya min al-dustr (yaqn [The name
of the channel]: A Conference to Announce the Position of al-Salafiyya al-Jihdiyya Towards
the Constitution. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eWC05UQADWI. Accessed April 4,
2013.
vii

viii

http://www.shora-alolamaa.com/eg/. Accessed April 4, 2013.

The khawrij where a heterogeneous sect in the early days of Islam, which erupted in the
context of the dispute about the legitimacy of the forth caliph Al ibn Ab lib. They were
known for their extreme views on takfr, i.e. declaring other Muslims as infidels, and the use
of violence. Nowadays the term is often used by state-near Islamic scholars to delegitimize
violent groups for being outside the community of believers (ahlu sunna wa-l-jamh).
ix

For more on this matter see Wagemakers, Joas. The Transformation of a Radical Concept:
al-wala wa-l-bara in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. In Global Salafism,
edited by Roel Meijer. 81-106. London: C. Hurst &.Co, 2009.
x

At a first glance this doesnt seem to make sense. Why should a group prevent the
investigation of reasons which could prove its innocence? Obviously, in such a case the group
is aware that such reasons do not exist and therefore tries to prevent the investigation by force.
xi

Al-ysiq, Yassa in English, was the traditional law of the Mongol empire. Although the
Mongols formerly converted to Islam during their conquest of the Muslim world, they were
still considered infidels by scholars like Ibn Taymiyyh or Ibn Kathr for implementing alysiq instead of sharia law. These historic events and verdicts are sometimes used by
contemporary Islamists to argue for the apostasy of the ruling system. See: Al-Qumayh,
Uthmm bin Abdelrahm. Munqashh ilmiyyh li-shubhat ghult al-takfr qiysan all-lysiq (A scientific discussion of the arguments used by the exaggerators in takfr by analogy
of al-ysiq). Al-sakna li-l-iwr, August 28, 2012.
http://www.assakina.com/shobhat/17703.html. Accessed April 8, 2013.
xii

It was We who revealed the Torah (to Moses); therein was guidance and light. By its
standard have been judged the Jews, by the Prophet who bowed (as in Islam) to Allahs will,
by the Rabbis and the Doctors of Law: for to them was entrusted the protection of Allahs
Book, and they were witnesses thereto: therefore fear not men, but fear Me, and sell not My
Signs for a miserable price. If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what Allah hath revealed,
they are (no better than) Unbelievers (translation by Yusuf Ali).
xiii

xiv

In contrast to minor unbelief, which keeps the believer within the Muslim community,
people who commit acts that constitute major unbelief can no longer be regarded as Muslims.
The question of what exactly constitutes minor and major unbelief continues to be a matter of
contentious debate.
For more on this matter see Cozzens, Jeffrey B. Al-Takfir wal Hijra: Unpacking an
Enigma. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32:6 (2009): 489-510.
xv

Joscelyn, Thomas. Ansar al Sharia Egypt founder honored to be an extension of al

Qaeda. The Long War Journal, November 27, 2012.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/ansar_al_sharia_egyp.php. Accessed April
7, 2013.
xvi