RULE 113- ARREST

G.R. No. 186471

People Vs. De Leon
FACTS:
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
On November 9, 2003, at about 5 oclock in the afternoon, a
confidential informant arrived at the office of the Station AntiIllegal Drug Special Operation Task Force at the Novaliches
Police Station in Quezon City and reported the illegal activities
of a person named Rodante De Leon.
Thereafter, Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.)Nilo Wong formed
a team for a buy-bust operation with PO2 Magcalayo as
poseur-buyer. A pre-operation report was prepared. P/SInsp.
Wong then handed to PO2 Magcalayo two (2) pieces of PhP
100 bills as buy-bust money and on which PO2 Magcalayo
wrote his initials NM.
At around 6:30 p.m. in the evening, the team proceeded
Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the
confidential informant introduced PO2 Magcalayo to appellant
as a buyer of shabu. PO2 Magcalayo then asked appellant if
he had shabu and the latter answered in the affirmative and
asked him how much he would buy. PO2 Magcalayo handed
the money and, in return, appellant handed him one (1)
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. He then
scratched his head, which was the pre-arranged signal that
the transaction was consummated, and thereafter arrested
appellant. He recovered the buy-bust money from appellant
as PO2 Collado approached them and handcuffed appellant.
Upon frisking appellant, PO2 Collado discovered another
plastic sachet on the person of appellant.
Afterwards, appellant was brought to the police station for
investigation. PO2 Collado then placed his initials on the
sachet and the evidence was subsequently turned over to the
police investigator, who prepared a request for its laboratory
examination.
PO2 Collado, PO1 Mendoza, PO2 Paculdar, and PO2 Magcalayo
then brought the transparent plastic sachets containing the
white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for
examination. A Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a
qualitative examination on the specimens, which yielded
positive results.
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant testified that, prior to his arrest,
he was a police officer in Cubao, Quezon City for 10 years. On
November 9, 2003, at around 3 oclock in the afternoon, he
went to Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City to
look for a kumpadre from whom he intended to borrow money
when policemen accosted him and poked their guns at him.
The people around him ran, and as he was the only one left on
the scene, the policemen asked him to sit down. He told SPO3
Concepcion, whom he knew, that he was a police officer but
he was told to shut up and to explain his side at the police
station instead.
Upon arrival at the police station in Novaliches, Quezon City,
his wallet, with his I.D. and police badge, were taken from
him. PO2 Magcalayo told him that he had a fake police I.D.
When appellant tried to explain himself, PO2 Magcalayo
allegedly
kicked
him
saying,
Hindi
nausoangpulis,
sundalonaangnakaupongayon.
The following night, he was presented on inquest during which
he was charged with violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165.
He denied all the charges against him claiming that the
alleged shabu marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 came from the
arresting police officers. He did not file a case against them,

because he had no money and because he knew that he was

not guilty.
On cross-examination, appellant further testified that he was
a follow-up operative at the Station Investigation Division of
Police Station 7. He admitted that he was separated from the
service because he was absent without official leave due to a
business problem he had to attend to. He likewise said that he
did not know his arresting officers, whom he saw then for the
first time, and that he was not familiar with RA 9165.
After trial, the RTC convicted appellant.
On April 4, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.
ISSUES:
Is Buy Bust Operation Valid Arrest?
RULING:
Buy-Bust Operation Was Valid
Appellant further argues that the buy-bust operation was full
of irregularities, rendering it illegal. He notes that the PreOperation Report was full of discrepancies.
The arguments are specious. Such irregularities cannot
overturn the finding of the presence in this case of the
elements of violations of Secs. 5 and 11, Art.II of RA 9165.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways
and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan.[22] In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has
been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug
peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken.[23]
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buybust operation conducted by the police officers, who made
use of entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a
dangerous drug, was valid and legal. Moreover, the defense
has failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the
police officers. Even appellant himself declared that it was the
first time he met the police officers during his crossexamination. There was, therefore, no motive for the police
officers to frame up appellant.
Likewise, the identity of appellant as the person who sold the
dangerous drugs to PO2 Magcalayo and the one in possession
of the shabu cannot be doubted anymore. Such positive
identification prevails over appellants defenses of denial and
alibi. These defenses have been invariably viewed by the
Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but
difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense
ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.[24]
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such
a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court
with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over
appellants bare allegation.[25]
We, therefore, uphold the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties and find that the prosecution
has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, appellant Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa guilty of
the crimes charged is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128587
People Vs. Laguio

March 16, 2007

FACTS:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the
DILG arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a

certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. In the

course of the investigation of the three arrested persons,
RedentorTeck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as
the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set
after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and
pretends to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Teck and Junio were
arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of
shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Teck and
Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as
talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of
Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. The two
did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they
were working for Wang. They said they knew of a scheduled
delivery of shabu early the following morning and that their
employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa
Apartment in Malate. The police operatives decided to look for
Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Teck and
Junio. Police Inspector Coronel and his men then proceeded to
Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under
surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Coronel testified that at
about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to
the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked
towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness)
together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers
approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police
officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was
Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to
open the back compartment of the BMW car.7 When frisked,
there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and
confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm
automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the
same time, the other members of the operatives searched the
BMW car and found inside it were the following items:

32 transparent plastic bags of shabu;

cash in the amount ofP650,000.00;
one electronic and one mechanical scales; and
an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine.

Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and

search.
Three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C.
Wang in the court of origin.
Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Violation of Comelec Gun Ban
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea
to all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing
objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the
police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of
"Not Guilty" be entered for him.5 Thereafter, joint trial of the
three (3) consolidated cases followed.
Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file
his intended Demurrer to Evidence.\
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to
Evidence,11 praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the
three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and
search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions
evidence against him.
On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition
alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an incident
to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now
time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto
A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution14
granting Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of
all charges for lack of evidence.

ISSUES:
Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the
police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant
of arrest and/or a search warrant.
HOLDING:
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace
officer may arrest a person without a warrant:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it, and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
None of these circumstances were present when the accused
was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria
Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car
when the police officers arrested and frisked him and
searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible
offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an
indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had
just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm
Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his
possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his
pants. The arresting officers had no information and
knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed
handgun, nor did they see him in possession thereof
immediately prior to his arrest.
The 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Pistol
with magazine that were found and seized from the car were
not in plain view. The shabu were in the trunk compartment,
and the Daewoo handgun was underneath the drivers seat of
the car. The police officers had no information, or knowledge
that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the
accused had placed them there. The police officers searched
the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein.
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and
the search of his person and the car were without probable
cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not
fall under any of the exception to the requirements of
warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is
therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right
of liberty.
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings
that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to
rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental
search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence
acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in
evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of
evidence.
Prosecution posits that "inasmuch as it has been shown in the
present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated
drugs and unlicensed firearms in the accuseds possession
had been validly made upon probable cause and under
exigent circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the
accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been
made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in
flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily
permissible and lawful."28 In effect, the People now contends
that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest.
Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule
requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure,
the police officers were justified in requiring the private
respondent to open his BMW cars trunk to see if he was
carrying illegal drugs.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when
warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a

suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where,

based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime
which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who
has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante
delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.

together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner,

lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed
that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to
be looking for something. They thus approached him but the
latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him,
put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house
of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as
averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag.
Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants,
eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves
wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that
petitioner was taken to the police station for further
investigation.[9]

The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did

not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private
respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria
Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car
when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched
his person and commanded him to open the compartment of
the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend,
David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then.
Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in
flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled
that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within
the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest.

Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most

material points. On cross-examination, however, Aratas
admitted that he himself brought out the contents of
petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
Mercado. Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it
was petitioner himself who brought out the contents of his
bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified
that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open
petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the
purported contents thereof.

Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under

paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from
the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was
arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer
of Teck and Junio who were previously arrested and charged
for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even
categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu
they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos
declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early
morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few
hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa
Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers
conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment,
hoping to find a person which will match the description of
one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These
circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of
probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in
paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under
paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court,
is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the
warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise
unlawful.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against
unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While
we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise
illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record,
Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and
belongings.32 The implied acquiescence to the search, if
there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee.33 Moreover, the continuing
objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of
record during the arraignment bolsters Wangs claim that he
resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007
Valdez Vs. People
FACTS:
Around 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the
routine patrol along San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union

The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Laya, the

forensic chemist who conducted the examination of the
marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya
disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had
knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken from
petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police
officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking was
on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana
leaves.
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole
witness, he testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March
2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Santol, La Union.
After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went
to the house of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to
walk to his brothers house. As he was walking, prosecution
witness Ordoo, a cousin of his brothers wife, allegedly
approached him and asked where he was going. Petitioner
replied that he was going to his brothers house. Ordoo then
purportedly requested to see the contents of his bag and
appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and
Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his
bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by the tanod
and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried
the bag until they reached their destination.[13]
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was
opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an
item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be
marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He
claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his
arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to someone
from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As
petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and
charged with the instant offense. Although petitioner divulged
that it was he who opened and took out the contents of his
bag at his friends house, he averred that it was one of the
tanod who did so at Mercados house and that it was only
there that they saw the marijuana for the first time.
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against
him to be guilty.
ISSUES:
W/N the warrantless arrest effected against him by the
barangay tanod was unlawful.
W/N the warrantless search of his bag that followed was
likewise contrary to law and the marijuana leaves purportedly
seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the
fruit of a poisonous tree.

RULING:
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we
find any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. Considering this and his active
participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates
that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over his person. Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore
cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in
evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the
search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The
search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only
if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.[19] Evaluating the
evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the
reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a
warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was
approached by the tanod and asked to show the contents of
his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken
to the house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it
was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the
contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw
it for the first time at the barangay captains house.
Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the
resolution of this case on the general thrust of the prosecution
evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners arrest stands out
just the same.
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting
barangay tanod, not one of the circumstances in Sec. 5, Rule
113 was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By
their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense
at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be
then committing an offense. The tanod did not have probable
cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this
Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.
Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the
bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the
tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal
knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.
More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away
but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they
approached him.
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in
line with our assumption from the start, the conclusion will not
be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that
petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely
observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons,
would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to
ones consciousness of guilt.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that
they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to
incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his
warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for
the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the
case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have
been harboring based on petitioners behavior.

However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,

[27] must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the
persons outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a
genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his
arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken
during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him
as they were seized during a warrantless search which was
not lawful.
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures
are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of
moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches
(4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations
(Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant
to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant
of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests
effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was
neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was
the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be
reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on
petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized
marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful search is
not the lone cause that militates against the case of the
prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly
establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly
taken from petitioners bag.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails
to overcome the presumption of innocence which petitioner
enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the
elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must
perforce result in petitioners exoneration from criminal
liability.
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs.THE COURT
OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding
Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig,
M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson
St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St.
Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and
started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the
corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and
Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted
from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car.
Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security
guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down
petitioner's car plate number.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the
shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they
were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake
Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a
facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner
from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the
bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively
identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably the
petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San
Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being

hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers.

The police forthwith detained him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected
by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go.
HOLDING:
The general rule on arrest states that the same is valid if
effected with a valid warrant. However, there are instances
specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless
arrest maybe considered lawful. Despite that, The warrantless
arrest of herein petitioner Go does not fall with in the terms of
said rule. The police were not present at the time of the
commission of the offense, neither do they have personal
knowledge on The crime to be committed or has been
committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a
prisoner who escaped from the penal institution. With the
stated facts, The allegation of the prosecution that petitioner
needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of article 125 of the
revised penal code before A preliminary investigation may be
conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all
the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine
whether there is a probable cause that the crime has been
committed and that the petitioner is probably guilty thereof as
well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and
aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of
the accused substantial therefore he should not be deprived
of such.
RULE 114 - BAIL
P/SR SUPT.
Perello

ORLANDO

MABUTAS

Vs.

Judge

Norma

FACTS:
Subject matters of the present administrative cases are two
complaints against respondent Judge Norma C. Perello,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 276) of
Muntinlupa City.
FIRST COMPLAINT
P/Sr. Supt. Mabutas complained of certain irregularities
committed by respondent Judge in the grant of bail to accused
AizaChonaOmadan in Criminal Case No. 03-265. Omadan was
charged in an Information, dated April 21, 2003, with Violation
of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the possession, custody and
control of 57.78 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu), with no bail recommended. Respondent Judges Order
dated May 9, 2003, granting Omadans petition for bail stating
that the evidence of guilt is not very strong.
SECOND COMPLAINT
In Criminal Case No. 03-065, entitled, People of the Philippines
vs. Rosemarie Pascual y Mozo @ Rosema, for Violation of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, accused Pascual was charged with
selling, trading, delivering and giving away to another 0.20
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), with no
bail recommended.[2] Pascual filed, on February 5, 2003, a
motion for bail on the grounds that the quantity of shabu
involved is minimal and the imposable penalty is likewise
minimal in degree; and that she is nine months pregnant and
due to give birth anytime.[3] On the day of arraignment,
February 7, 2003, respondent Judge issued an order granting
Pascuals motion for bail without hearing.
ISSUE:
The issue in these administrative cases is whether respondent
Judge may be administratively held liable for the grant of bail
in the particular criminal cases subject of the complaints. As
earlier stated, the criminal cases subject of the present
administrative complaints all involve violations of R.A. No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

HOLDING:
Under the foregoing provision, possession of 50 grams or
more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is
punishable by life imprisonment to death; hence, a capital
offense. As such, bail becomes a matter of discretion. In this
regard, Rule 114, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court states:
No person charged with the capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The matter of determining whether or not the evidence is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with the
judge. Such discretion must be sound and exercised within
reasonable bounds.
Under the present rules, a hearing on an application for bail is
mandatory. Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
the prosecutor should be given reasonable notice of hearing,
or at least his recommendation on the matter must be
sought. In case an application for bail is filed, the judge is
entrusted to observe the following duties:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail
or require him to submit his recommendation;
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of
the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt
of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the
bail should be denied.[16]
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after
the hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A
summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief
abstract or digest of a text or statement. Based on the
summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own
conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to
indicate the guilt of the accused.[17]
In this case, respondent Judge complied with the foregoing
duties. A hearing was held on the petition; the prosecution
was given the opportunity to present its evidence in support
of its stance. Respondent Judge based her findings on the
prosecutions evidence, namely and since it was her
conclusion that the evidence of accused Omadans guilt is not
strong, the petition for bail was granted.
The Court recognizes that the manner in which the strength of
an accused guilt is proven still primarily rests on the
prosecution. The prosecutor has the right to control the
quantum of evidence and the order of presentation of the
witnesses, in support of the denial of bail. After all, all criminal
actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor.[20] It was the prosecutions judgment to
limit the presentation of evidence to two witnesses, as it felt
that the testimonies of the other witnesses would be merely
corroborative. It is beyond respondent Judges authority to
compel the public prosecutor to exercise its discretion in a
way respondent Judge deems fit, so long as such exercise of
discretion will not defeat the purpose for which the hearing
was held, i.e., to determine whether strong evidence of guilt
exists such that the accused may not be entitled to bail.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, however, portrays an entirely
different picture.

In this case, respondent Judge granted bail in Criminal Cases

Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-288 without the requisite
hearing. In so doing, it was respondent Judges defense that
under R.A. No. 9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but
merely a controlled precursor, in which the selling of less than
5 grams is punishable only with imprisonment of 12 years to
20 years, and as such, bail is a matter of right and a hearing is
not required.
Respondent Judge need not exhaustively study R.A. No. 9165,
as
she
asserted,
to
determine
the
nature
of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. A plain reading of the law
would
immediately
show
that
methamphetamine
hydrochloride is a dangerous drug and not a controlled
precursor.
The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail
has always been ardently and indefatigably stressed by the
Court.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817, DISMISSING the
complaint against respondent Judge; and,
(2) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, finding respondent
Judge Norma C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 276) of Muntinlupa City GUILTY of gross
ignorance of law, and she is hereby SUSPENDED for Six (6)
Months, with warning that a repetition of similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.[12]
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to
bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility
of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.
ISSUE
In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for
more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the
grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court?
RULING:
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court , an application for bail by an
appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of
more than six years imprisonment should automatically be
granted.

scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said

paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual
delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal
confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission
of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional
pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if
released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime
during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
circumstances)
not
present.
The
second
scenario
contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
right when the offense charged is not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand,
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion,
except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall
be denied.[25] (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial
discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or
deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be
denied even if the bail-negating[26] circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words,
the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none
of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully
ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in
fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to
deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of
discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application
for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective
of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where
the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court
will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in
resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants
case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of
sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of
equity and justice;[27] on the basis thereof, it may either
allow or disallow bail.

WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5, RULE 114

CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS INTERPRETATION

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the

second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion
requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the
determination of the proof of the presence of any of the
circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail.
This is so because the existence of any of those
circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.
Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is
present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such
finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
sound discretion approach.

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two

scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant
applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction

between the two different situations that are governed by the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner

Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations

of procedural and substantive rules.

insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import

of the said provision and trivializes the established policy
governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
Laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that
leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd
situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation
that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if
none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists.
Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more
lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not
exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases
where the penalty imposed is more than six years
imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bailnegating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases
where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years
imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, complainant, vs.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN, RTC, Branch
46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, respondent.
FACTS:
On September 14, 2001, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI)
Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued Summary Deportation
Order (SDO) No. ADD-2001-057 against Ernesto M. Peaflorida,
a U.S. citizen, after finding that he is an overstaying and
undocumented alien and that Peaflorida is also a fugitive from
justice since he stands indicted in the United States for health
care fraud which resulted in more than $1,376,000.00 losses
to the U.S. Federal Government.
On the scheduled hearing of November 19, 2001, respondent
denied the P40,000.00 bail recommended by the Provincial
Prosecutor for the provisional release of the accused on the
ground that the crime Peaflorida was charged with involved
large scale estafa, a non-bailable offense. However, later on
that same day, the BOI received information that respondent
had allowed the release from detention of Peaflorida.
In his Comment, dated March 22, 2002, respondent explained:
On November 20, 2001, Peaflorida filed an urgent motion to
fix bail. When the prosecution and the defense jointly
manifested that it would be fair and just if the court would fix
the bail bond for the provisional release of the accused
Peaflorida at P250,000.00, he granted the motion to fix bail on
November 21, 2001; and, at the time he issued the Order
fixing the bail bond of the accused at P250,000.00, he was not
aware that a deportation order had already been issued by
the BOI against the latter.[2]
ISSUE:
WON the grant of bail was correct.
HOLDING:
Under the rules on bail, a hearing is mandatory in granting
bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion.[7] A hearing is
indispensable for the court to ask searching questions from
which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the
lack of it, against the accused, in cases where the offense is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
[8] After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail
must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
and based thereon, the judge should then formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong
enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.[9] Otherwise,
the order granting or denying the application for bail may be
invalidated because the summary of evidence for the
prosecution which contains the judges evaluation of the
evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense.[10]

The herein respondent granted bail to the accused Peaflorida

without
conducting
a
hearing
despite
his
earlier
pronouncement in the Order dated November 19, 2001
denying bail as he considered the crime the accused
Peaflorida was charged with to be a non-bailable offense. The
manifestation of the prosecutor that he is not ready to present
any witness to prove that the prosecutions evidence against
the accused is strong, is never a basis for the outright grant of
bail without a preliminary hearing on the matter.[11] A
hearing is required even when the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the
motion for bail.[12]
The joint manifestation of the prosecution and the defense
that it would be fair and just if the court would fix the bail
bond for the provisional release of the accused at
P250,000.00 does not justify the granting of bail without a
hearing in a case involving a non-bailable offense. A hearing is
necessary for the court to take into consideration the
guidelines in fixing the amount of bail set forth in Section 9,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Needless to stress, judicial discretion is the domain of the
judge and the duty to exercise discretion cannot be reposed
upon the will or whim of the prosecution or the defense.
Respondent should have ascertained personally whether the
evidence of guilt is strong and endeavored to determine the
propriety of the amount of bail recommended. To do away
with the requisite bail hearing is to dispense with this timetested safeguard against arbitrariness.[14] It must always be
remembered that imperative justice requires the proper
observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed
to ensure its proper dispensation.[15]
Respondents explanations that he ordered the cancellation of
the bail bend posted by the accused Peaflorida and issued a
warrant for the latters arrest on April 26, 2002 upon learning
that an order of deportation was issued against the latter;24
that accused Peaflorida voluntarily surrendered himself on
October 24, 2002 and that he is presently detained at the
Provincial Jail of Occidental Mindoro,25 cannot serve to
exonerate him or even mitigate the penalty due him.
WHEREFORE, respondent Executive Judge Ernesto P.
Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro (Branch 46) is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the
Law and is hereby FINED the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00). He is further STERNLY WARNED that the
commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely by this Court. SO ORDERED.
TRINIDAD
TORMIS,

O.

LACHICA

vs.

JUDGE

ROSABELLA

M.

FACTS:
In an Affidavit dated October 2, 2003,[1] Trinidad O. Lachica
charged Judge Rosabella M. Tormis of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities of Cebu City, Branch IV, with Abuse of Authority
relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 57220-R to 57223-R.
Complainant alleged that since the filing of the information,
accused Domugho has remained at large. Thus, the cases
were ordered archived but an alias warrant of arrest was
issued by respondent judge on January 14, 2000.
During the investigation, it was established that the accused
was arrested on July 2, 2003 at 8:45 p.m. and was brought
directly to the Waterfront Police Station where she was booked
at 9:00 p.m. At about 10:00 p.m. the accused was set free
without a release order.[11]
It is also undisputed that respondent judge personally
received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act
alone, respondent is already administratively liable. Section
14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be
deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the

provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not

authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should
such cash be kept in his office.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for
having abused her judicial authority when she personally
accepted the cash bail bond of the accused?
HOLDING:
Yes. The foregoing acts not only seriously undermine and
adversely reflect on the honesty and integrity of respondent
judge as an officer of the court; they also betray a character
flaw which speaks ill of her person. Making false
representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the
judge is the visible representation of the law, and more
importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by
the law and weave an example for the others to follow.
It need not be overemphasized that in receiving the cash bond
respondent judge ran afoul with Rule 114 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Indeed, in the case of Office of the Court
Administrator v. Fernandez, the Court held that:
The rules specify the persons with whom a cash bail bond
may be deposited namely: the collector of internal revenue, or
the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. Section 14 of Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective
December 1, 2000) provides:
SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as bail The accused or any person
acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest
collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal
treasurer the amount of the bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the
case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and of
a written undertaking showing compliance with the
requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be
discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be
considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and
costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused
or to whoever made the deposit.
A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit
of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of
the judge.
WHEREFORE, Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, Branch IV, is found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from office for six (6)
months without salary and other benefits and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
ATTY.
EDWARD
SERAPIO,
petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
FACTS:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by
petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for
bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a
petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No.
26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused
together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy
P. Estrada and several others.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused,
including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27,
2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with
the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set
for hearing on May 4, 2001.For his part, petitioners coaccused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as
a matter of right.

During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent

Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of
the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001
schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of
the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the
petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioners
arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective
petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the
hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners petition
for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioners
petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for
early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and
petitioner and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The following day,
petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the propriety of
including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing
on his (petitioners) petition for bail.
The people insist that arraignment is necessary before bail
hearings may be commenced. However, the bail hearing
again did not proceed because the petitioner filed with the
information a motion to quash the amended information on
the grounds that as against him, the amended information
does not allege a combination of series of over or criminal
acts constitutive of plunder.
According to the prosecution, the motion to quash the
amended information was antithetical to his petition for bail.
Petitioner also prays for the issuance of habeas corpus.
ISSUES:
(a) W/N petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of
his petition for bail may be conducted.
(b) W/N petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended
Information during the pendency of his petition for bail.
(c) W/N a joint hearing of petition for bail for all the accused is
mandatory
(d) W/N petitioner should instead be released through a writ of
habeas corpus.
HOLDING:
(a) Although the petitioner was already arraigned, no plea has
yet been entered thereby rendering the issue of whether an
arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings
in the petitioners case moot. Nonetheless, the court held that
arraignment of an accused is not a pre-requisite to the
conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is
allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his of
his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.
In Lavides vs. CA, the court ruled that in cases where it is
authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion
to quash. However, this pronouncement should not be taken
to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all
times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of
liberty even before a complaint or information is filed against
him. The case of Lavides must be understood in light of the
fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as
well as a motion to quash. Hence, in that case, the court held
that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he had
to choose between filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
petition for bail and forgoing the filing of the motion to quash
so that he can be arraigned at once and therefore be released
on bail. Such would undermine the constitutional right of the
accused. When a bail is matter of right, an accused may apply
for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The Lavides
case also implies that an application for bail in a case
involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned.

Sandiganbayan therefore committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing
of his petition for bail.
(b) Court sees no inconsistency between an application of an
accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail, is the
security given for the release of the person in custody of the
law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by which
an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint filed
against him for insufficiency on its fact in posit of law. These
tow relied have objectives which are not necessarily
antithetical to each other. However, it is true that if a motion
to quash a criminal complaint or information on the ground
that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the
case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the
petition for bail of an accused may become moot and
academic.
(c) Petitioner argues that a joint bail hearing would negate his
right to have his petition for bail resolved in a summary
proceeding since said hearing might be converted into a full
blown trial. Prosecution on the other hand claims that joint
hearings will save the court form having to hear the same
witnesses and the parties from presenting the same
evidences. There is no provision in the Rules of Court
governing the hearings of two or more petitioner for bail filed
by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused
be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the
other accused. The matter should be addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of its discretion,
the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the
convenience of the state, including the prosecution but also
that of the petitioner and the witnesses.
In the case of Ocampo vs. Bernabe, the court ruled that in a
petition or bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a
summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing
which is early to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter
into the inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the
evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the
outcome of the trial or on what further such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters. In the case at bar, the case
against former President Estrada is an entirely different
matter. For, with the participation of the former president in
the hearing of petitioners petition for bail, the proceeding
assumes completely different dimension. The proceeding will
no longer be summary since the proceedings will be full blown
which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. The
joinder of the petitioners bail will be prejudicial to the
petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the
issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and
seek relief from his court. The Sandiganbayn again committed
grave abuse of discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing
of petitioners petition for bail with the trial of the case against
former president.
(d) In the case at bar, bail is not matter of rights since the
accused is charged with a capital offense, but discretionary
upon the court. Under Section 8 of rule 114, there must be a
showing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged
with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him
bail., thus, upon an application for bail, by the person charged
with a capital offense, a hearing must be conducted where the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt against an accused is strong. When the evidence of guilt
is strong, bail becomes a matter of right, which is not so in the
case at bar. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be
granted by the courts even when the person concerned is
detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender.
The writ may be issued where the deprivation of liberty while
initially valid under the lad had not later become invalid.
However, there is no basis for the issuance of the writ in the
case at bar. The general rule is that the writ does not lie

where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in

the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
which had jurisdiction to issued the same applied, because
petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest.
Petitioner in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities.
RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH
LOS BAOS v. PEDRO
FACTS:
Pedro was charged for carrying a loaded firearm without the
required written authorization from the Comelec a day before
the May 2001 elections accusation as per BP 881 (Omnibus
Election Code) in Boac, Marinduque.
A Complaint was filed against him. After Inquest, the
Information was filed in court. When his motion for Preliminary
Investigation was granted, it did not materialize. Hence he
filed Motion to Quash arguing that the Information contains
averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. He attached a Comelec Certification that he was
exempted from the gun ban. The RTC granted the quashal.
Private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos, representing the
checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedros
Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the
prosecution was deprived of due process when the judge
quashed the information without a hearing. The RTC reopened
the case, as Pedro did not object to Los Baos motion. Pedro
filed an MR for the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of
Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent.
The RTC denied Pedros MR.
The CA initially denied Pedros petition. In his MR, Pedro
manifested the exact date and time of the Marinduque
provincial prosecutors receipt of the quashal order to be
2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001, and argued that based on
this date, the provisional dismissal of the case became
permanent on December 10, 2002. Based on this
information, the CA reversed itself ruling that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply
Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision.
ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in applying Sec. 8, Rule 117 in this case?
RULING:
NO. In People v. Lacson, we ruled that there are sine quanon
requirements in the application of the time-bar rule stated in
the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled
that the time-bar under the provision is a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute,
making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar
operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused.
The modifier provisional directly suggests that the
dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that
are temporary in character, and not the dismissals that are
permanent. Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence,
permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle of
double jeopardy, by the previous extinction of criminal
liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and the dismissals after
plea without the express consent of the accused. Section 8, by
its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are
not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds
that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast
with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under
Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a

motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in

itself, with specific and closely- defined characteristics under
the Rules of Court.
Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be
made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the
offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to
a dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7
provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double
jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a dismissal under
Section 8 i.e., one with the express consent of the accused
is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under
Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further
prosecution under the special terms of Section 8.
This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for
the effects of sustaining a motion to quash the dismissal is
not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless
the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability
and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with
Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the consequences of
Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but lead
to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal
under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save
only for what has been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the
governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the
terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under
Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to
further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a
dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional
dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates
in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and
merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals
other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a
dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3,
Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.
The Court notes also the following differences stressing that a
motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class
that should not be confused with other dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to
question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed
against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a
case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either
the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the
conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as
stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not
apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal
complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses
apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal
may be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in
the information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment
(Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional dismissal of
the case even when the trial proper of the case is already
underway provided that the required consents are present.
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms,
impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which time it
becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information
that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a
motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of
impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by
the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the
question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e.,
whether the prescription of action or of the offense has set in.
In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the
time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different
concepts whose respective rules refer to different situations

that should not be confused with one another. If the problem

relates to anintrinsicor extrinsic deficiency ofthe complaint
orinformation, asshown onitsface, the remedy is a motion to
quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other
reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or
information, before arraignment and under the circumstances
outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the
Information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule
117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
[Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the
records that the Information duly charged a specific offense
and provides the details on how the offense was committed.
Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the other
hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the
Information any legal excuse or justification. This COMELEC
Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate
motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash
grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of
the Information. Significantly, no hearing was ever called to
allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the
COMELEC certification.
As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the
basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.
Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded
the original contract for the infrastructure works on the
Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City
to A.C. Cruz Construction. The project, with a contract cost of
P7,666,507.55, was funded by the World Bank under the
Project Loan Agreement forged on 10 June 1983 between the
Philippine Government and the IBRD-World Bank.
A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works
on 1 August 1990. 5 In April 1991, the complainant Candido
M. Fajutag, Jr. (Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project Engineer of
the project.
A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the
excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works. As a
consequence, Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz Construction submitted
the fourth billing and Report of Physical Accomplishments on 6
May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however, discovered certain
deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction No. 1
requiring some supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of
approved concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original
ground and finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of earth fill
actually rendered on site; (4) test results as to the quality of
materials and compaction; and (5) copy of work instructions
attesting to the demolished concrete structures.
The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction.
Upon Fajutag, Jr.'s further verification, it was established that
there was no actual excavation and road filling works
undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction.
On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the
Information raising the following grounds: (1) the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense; (2)
the information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations
against them have been violated by the inadequacy of the
information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the
individual participation of all the accused in the information in
disobedience with the Resolution dated 27 March 2005. 18
On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed
resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash. We quote the
said resolution in part:

Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose

participation in the alleged offense is specifically mentioned in
the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused FelicisimoLazarte,
Jr., the Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance
Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory and final
quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz
Construction. The allegations of Lazarte that the IAC, due to
certain constraints, allegedly had to rely on the reports of the
field engineers and/or the Project Office as to which materials
were actually installed; and that he supposedly affixed his
signature to the IAC Physical Inventory Report and
Memoranda dated August 12, 1991 despite his not being able
to attend the actual inspection because he allegedly saw that
all the members of the Committee had already signed are
matters of defense which he can address in the course of the
trial. Hence, the quashal of the information with respect to
accused Lazarte is denied for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan
insufficiently averred the essential elements of the crime
charged Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure
Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half as it failed to
specify the individual participation of all the accused. NO
2. W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. YES
HOLDING:
The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan. At the outset, it should be stressed
that the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by
certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to
quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a
petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and
often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single court.
This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If
the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash
acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. And in the case at
bar, the Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have
committed grave abuse of discretion.
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion
to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated,
if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined in law. Matters aliunde will not
be considered.
Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to
hear the case. As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan,
it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a position
with Salary Grade 27 as he was a department manager of the
NHA, a government-owned or controlled corporation, at the
time of the commission of the offense, which position falls
within the ambit of its jurisdiction. The instant petition is
DISMISSED.
PEOPLE VS. LACSON
FACTS:
The petitioners filed an MR of the Resolution by the SC
remanding the instant case to the RTC of Quezon City for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the
application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of several criminal cases
filed against the respondent and his co-accused.
In the said criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused
were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing
of eleven male persons bandied as members of the

KuratongBaleleng Gang. The Court ruled in the Resolution

sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of the
said criminal cases were with the express consent of the
respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal
when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and for examination of witnesses.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to the said
criminal cases because the essential requirements,
respondents express consent to the dismissal and due notice
to the private complainants, for its application were not
present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution.
ISSUE:
WON Sec.8, Rule 117 of the RRCP is applicable to the criminal
cases herein disputed
HOLDING:
NO. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure reads:
Sec. 8.Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and
with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of
offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of
prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent
is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first
paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused
or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sinequanon to the
application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the
new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal
case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival
of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the
same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first
and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule
were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the criminal
cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motionfor
the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases.
For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v.
Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a need for the trial
court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and
to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the
court for its examination.
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or
otherwise, of the criminal cases. Neither did he ever agree,

impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the

cases.
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no
notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the
criminal cases or of the hearing thereon was served on the
heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as
mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a
determination of probable cause and examination of
witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a
provisional dismissal of the criminal cases, however, the heirs
of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on
said motion on March 22, 1999. There is no proof on record
that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases.
It should also be noted that when the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, the
State only had one year and three months within which to
revive the cases or refile the Informations. The issue which
arose from such event was whether the time-bar in Section 8
of Rule 117 thereof should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively against the State, to which the Court ruled that
procedural laws may be applied retroactively.
The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to
prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right
or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the timebar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute
the accused.
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.
It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a
criminal case against the accused after the Information had
been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused.
Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is
presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its
right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The
dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. The State may
revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year
periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the
delay. MR granted. The Resolution of the Court is set aside.
RULE 118 PRE TRIAL
People v Sunga
FACTS:
On June 29, 1994 in the afternoon Rey Sunga, RamilLansang,
Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and LitoOctac as principals, and Locil Cui
alias GinalynCuyos as accomplice by means of force, violence
and intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a
minor, fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her against her will and without her consent;
that on the occasion of said rape and to enable them to
conceal the commission of the crime, the herein accused in
furtherance of the conspiracy together with LOCIL CUI, a
minor, acting with discernment and who cooperated in the
execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, taking advantage of their
superior number and strength, with intent to kill,
treacherously attack, assault, and use personal violence upon
JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on
her head, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds and
multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause of
her death shortly thereafter.
On October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge accused Locil Cui
(Locil) to be a state witness, averring therein that the legal

requisites for her discharge had been complied with, and

submitting her sworn statement which detailed how her coaccused carried out the crime.
Her version of the facts is as follows:
"At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle
bearing the marking "Ryan-Ryan" from the Social Security
System (SSS) Office in Puerto Princesa City. Already on board
the tricycle was a lesbian who had a birthmark on the right
side of the face and who invited Locil for a joy ride.13 Upon
instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver, whom she did
not know but whom she later identified and who answered to
the name Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza Park.
At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to
Jocelyn Tan, the victim, who was dressed in a PINS uniform.
The lesbian, together with Jocelyn, then joined Locil aboard
the tricycle which was already driven by Inocencio Pascua
(Pascua) vice Sunga who had in the meantime left. Still
aboard the tricycle, the four of them proceeded to and
reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on
reaching a forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga who held
her and by RamilLansang (Lansang) who wrapped his arm
around her waist as they dragged her to a nearby "buho"
clumps. There, Jocelyn was made to lie down. Her skirt was
raised and her panty was taken off by Lansang. As she lay
face up with both her hands held by Sunga and Pascua,
Lansang stripped naked, placed himself on top of Jocelyn,
inserted his penis into her vagina and "seemed to be
pumping."
After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse
with Jocelyn as Lansang and one who was not known to Locil
and whom the latter described as one who has "chinky" or
"narrow eyes," later identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn
pinned down by her hands.
Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who
all along struggled against her malefactors.
After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed
weapon, stabbed the abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn,
drawing her to rise to a sitting position and clutch her
abdomen. Sunga then passed on the bladed weapon to
Lansang who smashed Jocelyn's head with an irregularly
shaped stone, causing her to fall to the ground lifeless. Locil,
who witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and
led back into the tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga
and Pascua to ride with them. All five thereafter headed back
to Puerto Princesa City proper, leaving Jocelyn's body behind.
When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted,
she heard the voice of someone from inside the tricycle
warning her to keep mum about the incident, otherwise
something would also happen to her. Locil then repaired to her
boarding house. Until she was arrested following the discovery
on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyn's corpse, she did not report the
incident to anyone."
Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi.
Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted
for robbery with homicide, denied having anything to do with
the rape and killing of Jocelyn. He branded as false the
testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp
and was always seen loitering at Mendoza Park. Through a
sworn statement, he averred that: He, Octa and Jun returned
to Irawan, took Jocelyn's corpse and dumped it at a coffee
plantation in Jacana Road; and that he did not take part in the
rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to
Lansang's promise to give him P500.00.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC: By decision of March 7,
1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang as
principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced
each to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal

in the crime of Rape. While the others are acquitted and Locil
is discharged as state witness.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a
state witness is in accordance with law; and
(2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt?
(3) Is Sunga's sworn statement admissible as evidence?
HOLDING:
(1) NO.
Requisites:
1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused
sought to be a state witness; - YES
2. his testimony is absolutely necessary; - YES (Based on
Locil's sworn statement, she was the only person who saw
what happened to Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus
indispensable.)
3. No other direct evidence is available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed except his testimony; YES
4. His testimony can be substantially corroborated in its
material points; - NO
a. As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails
to corroborate Locil's testimony. The declarations of
other witnesses can in no way enhance the veracity
of the essential, material aspects of Locil's account
for they relate --- not to the crime itself but to events
THEREAFTER.
An exhaustive review of the transcript of
stenographic notes of Locil's testimony reveals,
however, that the manner by which she related it
was punctuated with marks of tentativeness,
uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court
unfortunately failed to take note of in its decision on
review.
b. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994
she boarded a tricycle bearing a lesbian who invited
her for a joyride, proceeded to the Mendoza Park and
picked up Jocelyn, whom she was not acquainted
with, then brought by the same tricycle to Irawan
where the latter was raped and brutally murdered. In
other words, she wanted to convey that she was
deliberately brought by appellants with them on June
29, 1994 to the place where they were to carry out,
which they did, their abominable acts against
Jocelyn. This strikes this Court as improbable if not
bizarre.
5. He does not appear to be the most guilty; and. - YES
6. He has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude. - -YES
But -- Who can trust one who, in her early teens, gets
pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding house albeit she
has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an
alias name to evade beingtraced by her mother and aunt?
(2) NO, see items 1 and 2.
In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense
of alibi as well as of denial by appellants is accorded
credence, for it is precisely when the prosecution's case is
weak that the defense of alibi assumes importance and
becomes crucial in negating criminal liability.
In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants' alibi,
the prosecution still has the onus of proving the guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the accused and cannot rely on the
weakness of the defense evidence. The prosecution having
failed to discharge its burden, appellants' presumed
innocence remains and must thus be acquitted.

(3) NO.
From the testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that
Atty. Rocamora (Sunga'scounse during custodial investigation)
did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options
prior to giving his (Sunga's) admission. Evidently, Atty.
Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking
of the admission from Sunga.
Any information or admission given by a person while in
custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time
without the competent assistance of an independent counsel
must be struck down as inadmissible. Even if the confession
contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily
given, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is
inadmissible.
The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a
lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard
questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and
decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation.
RATIO:
(1) The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who
turned state witness may suffice to convict his co-accused if it
is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and is
full of details which by their nature could not have been the
result of deliberate afterthought; otherwise, it needs
corroboration the presence or lack of which may ultimately
decide the cause of the prosecution and the fate of the
accused.
(2) The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a selfconfessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to
or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without
corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that
the latter committed or participated in the commission of the
crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its
material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong
circumstances and must be to such an extent that its
trustworthiness becomes manifest.
a. Was Locil's testimony corroborated in its material points by
the prosecution's other evidence? - NO
b. If in the affirmative, was the corroborative evidence
unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances to such
an extent that Locil's trustworthiness becomes manifest? - NO
In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be
at least two proven circumstances which in complete
sequence lead to no other logical conclusion than that of the
guilt of the accused. [This was not present in this case]
NOTES:
(1) Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken
into custody by the police who carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Dolores L.
Espaol
The OCAs investigation showed that upon her compulsory
retirement on January 9, 2004, Judge Espaol left a total of 69
cases that had not been acted upon. In particular, these
included six criminal and sixteen civil cases already submitted
for decision, five criminal and eighteen civil cases on appeal,
and sixteen cases with pending incidents for resolution.
This Court is aware of the predicament that plagues
respondent, as well as most other trial judges in the country.
The problem of case inputs grossly exceeding case outputs
may be traced to several factors, the most prevalent of which

are the large number of cases filed, indiscriminate grant of

continuances to litigants, inefficient case flow management by
judges, and unrealistic management of the calendar of cases.
To solve these problems, this Court has, in several instances,
advised judges to follow certain guidelines to facilitate speedy
case
disposition.
Among
these
measures
is
the
discouragement of continuances, except for exceptional
reasons. To enforce due diligence in the dispatch of judicial
business without arbitrarily or unreasonably forcing cases to
trial when counsels are unprepared, judges should endeavor
to hold them to a proper appreciation of their duties to the
public, as well as to their own clients and to the adverse party.
[10]
In criminal cases, pretrial is mandatory because, at the outset,
litigation is abbreviated by the identification of contentious
issues. In civil cases, judges are also required to take
advantage of the pretrial conference to arrive at settlements
and compromises between the parties, to ask the latter to
explore the possibility of submitting their cases to any of the
alternative modes of dispute resolution, and at least to reduce
and limit the issues for trial. Judges are further directed to
implement and observe strictly the provisions of
Section 2 of Rule 119, providing for a continuous dayto-day trial as far as practicable until termination.[11]
The work of magistrates is multifarious. They do not only hear
cases and write decisions in the seclusion of their chambers;
equally important, they act also as administrators. Their
administrative efficiency may well define the justice they
dispense.
They should be rational and realistic in calendaring cases.
Only a sufficient number should be calendared in order to
permit them to hear all the cases scheduled. Hence, unless
the docket of the court requires otherwise, not more than four
cases daily should be scheduled for trial. A continuous and
physical inventory of cases on a monthly basis is also
recommended, so that they would be aware of the status of
each case.
With the assistance of the clerk of court, a checklist should be
prepared, indicating the steps to be taken to keep cases
moving. While decision-writing is a matter of personal style,
judges are well-advised to prepare concise but complete as
well as correct and clear decisions, orders or resolutions. With
a table or calendar indicating the cases submitted for
decision, they should note the exact day, month and year
when the 90-day period is to expire.
Prompt disposition of the courts business is attained through
proper and efficient court management. Judges would be
remiss in their duty and responsibility as court managers if
they fail to adopt an efficient system of record management.
At times, circumstances beyond their control result in the
accumulation of ripe cases to a daunting number, making it
humanly impossible for them to comply with the
constitutionally mandated 90-day period. In such instances,
all that they should do is write a request for extension from
the Supreme Court, stating therein their reasons for the delay.
Such administrative requirement finds basis in the 1987
Constitution.
This Court has further directed members of the bench to call
the attention of the OCA when the situation requires remedies
beyond the control or capability of the judges.
10.3 The reduction of case loads would be an
efficacious design to strengthen public confidence in
the Courts. All efforts should be exerted so that case
disposals should exceed case inputs. Whenever
obstacles present themselves which delay case
disposition, the Presiding Judge should immediately
call the attention of the Supreme Court through the
Court Administrator when the situation requires

remedies beyond the control or capability of the

judges
At the very least, Judge Espaol should have requested for an
extension of time once she knew that she could not comply
with the prescribed ninety (90) day period to render
judgment. In doing so, she would have been able to apprise
litigants as to the status of the case and the reason for the
delay, if any. It would have shown that she minded the
deadlines.
While Judge Espaol professes her human limitations coupled
with the disposition of the election cases which allegedly
demand priority, the same cannot exculpate her for noncompliance with the mandates of the law and the rules.
WHEREFORE, the factual findings of the Office of Court
Administrator are ADOPTED. Judge Dolores L. Espaol is found
GUILTY of gross inefficiency and is fined in the amount of
eleven thousand pesos (P11,000), to be deducted from the
retirement benefits due her.
RULE 119 TRIAL
Jeffrey Dayap V Sendiong
FACTS:
Petitioner Jeffrey ResoDayap was charged with the crime of
Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious
Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. He recklessly
drove a 10 wheeler cargo truck hitting an automobile causing
death to one of the passengers and less serious physical
injuries to other passengers.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he
pleaded not guilty to the charge
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified
for the prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case,
petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which
was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated
15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecutions failure to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for
reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment
dated 25 April 2005.
MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the
crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the
evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the
allegations in the Information.
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65,14 alleging that the MTCs dismissal of the case was
done without considering the evidence adduced by the
prosecution.
RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner. The records also
demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in
the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, except that the defense no longer presented its
evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accuseds
demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec.
23, Rule 119.
ISSUE:
Whether the grant of demurrer to evidence was valid
RULING:
Yes. As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners
demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence
in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is
granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction

beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case

on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place
the accused in double jeopardy. But while the dismissal order
consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to
appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the
factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the
reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set
aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a
clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void.
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for
certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of
the prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing
to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of
Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs
conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order
thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the
evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show
that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the
Rules of Court.
The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04
granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner
Jeffrey ResoDayap of the offense charged therein is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Salazar V People
FACTS:
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against
herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused
NenaJaucianTimario.Upon
arraignment,
the
petitioner,
assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a
Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court alleging that she
could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following
reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued
by NenaTimario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa
penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser
thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the
petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check,
NenaJaucianTimario, in order to defraud the private
complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the
petitioner replaced it with a second one.
The prosecution filed
demurrer to evidence.

its

opposition

to

the

petitioners

The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of

the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private
complainant the amount of the check as payment for her
purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the
prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the
issuer of the check, her co-accused NenaJaucianTimario, for
the purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the
private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never
met NenaJaucianTimario who remained at large. As a mere
indorser of the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty
that the check was a good one is not synonymous with the
fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under
Article 315(2)(d).
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil
aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to
present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.

On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the

motion. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was denied due process as she was not
given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she
was not civilly liable to the private respondent.
RULING:
Yes. The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to
prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall
adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the
civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court
should render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the
case but also on the civil aspect thereof:
SEC. 2.Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of
conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended
its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after
the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4)
the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the
guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.[10]
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance
of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the
liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability
of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil
action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding
in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist
or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court
renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the
prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it
would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the
aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both
may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case
within the period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the
option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without
leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he
waives the same. The aforecited rule reads:
Sec. 23.Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its
case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving
the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of
court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When
the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the
accused waives his right to present evidence and submits the

case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the

prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence
shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a
non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution
rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within
a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer
to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to
evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the
nature of a motion to dismiss the case for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a
case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence without
leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence
and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence
of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is
granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the right
to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also
on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the
court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the
court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not
only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and
acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to
the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect
of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the
constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby
violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.:
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the
Constitution provides the fundamentals.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal
proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal
trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that
the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by
now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal
justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The
principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed
in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process
cannot possibly be met without a law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.[12]
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to
evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on

the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence
on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial
court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment
granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the
petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case,
and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of
rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal
evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 11.Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following
order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the
charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense
and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of a provisional
remedy in the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order,
present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case
shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court
directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in
the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense,
the order of trial may be modified.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect
of the case on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution
and the accused.
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to
evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on
its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal
but only civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the
civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for
her purchases from the private complainant even before the
petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore,
the petitioner was denied her right to due process.
The Petition is GRANTED.

CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE

HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, - versus RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and
ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE,
FACTS:
Respondents were charged with EstafaThrough Falsification of
Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City. The case arose
from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage
allegedly committed by respondents where they made it
appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property
known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the
document. Hence, the criminal case.
Earlier, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on
vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati
Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and
was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.
Respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings
in the Criminal Case on the ground of prejudicial question.
They argued that the Civil Case, which was an action for
declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved.
On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion.
Concepcions motion for reconsideration was denied. This
prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the May 11
and June 5 RTC orders. The case remains pending before the
appellate court to date.

The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters

deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions
testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age,
which limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC granted the
motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be taken
before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.
The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the
trial court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated that
procedural technicalities should be brushed aside because of
the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion was already of
advanced age. After several motions for change of venue of
the deposition-taking, Concepcions deposition was finally
taken on March 9, 2001 at her residence.
ISSUE:
WON Concepcion's deposition can be taken in the RTC of
Makati
RULING:
No. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at
the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is
especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may
be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the
chance to propound such questions as they deem material
and necessary to support their position or to test the
credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge
to observe the witnesses demeanor.

that is, through question and answer. At this point, a query

may thus be posed: in granting Concepcions motion and in
actually taking her deposition, were the above rules complied
with? The CA answered in the negative. The appellate court
considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court
of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of
the Rules that the same be made before the court where the
case is pending.
Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave
abuse of discretion. We agree with the CA and quote with
approval its ratiocination in this wise: Unlike an examination
of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of
the previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the
present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken
before any judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar
in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if
the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before
an inferior court to be designated therein, the examination of
a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done
only before the court where the case is pending.
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination
of a prosecution witness shall be made before the court where
the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there
is nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to
mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the
witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he
is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the
court may not introduce exceptions or conditions.

In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a

prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was
too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15
of Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides: Section 15.
Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning,
he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence
of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to
attend the examination has been served on him, shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial.
Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination
after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken
may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES and LUCITA PARANE, Respondents.

Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and

health condition exempt her from the application of Section
15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus,
calls for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The contention does not persuade. The very
reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from
the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places
her squarely within the coverage of the same provision.

On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The

prosecution, on March 4, 1997, moved for the discharge of
accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as
state witnesses. In an Omnibus Order dated September 5,
1997, the trial court granted petitioners application for bail
and denied the prosecutions motion for the discharge of
accused Abutin and Tampelix.

Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be

conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning.
Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken,
had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have
been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside
the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear
before the court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to
the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional
examination be made before the court where the case is
pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so
that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to
waive the same after reasonable notice.
As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be
conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial,

FACTS:
Petitioner RimbertoSalvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin,
Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the
murder of Ruben Parane. The above-named accused have
conspired, confederated and mutually helped each other. As
per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged
mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of
the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the
commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood
money to the latter. All the accused have been arrested and
detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large.
Respondent LucitaParane is the spouse of victim Ruben
Parane.

The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the motion

was denied. The prosecution then appealed to the Court of
Appeals. It contended that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to discharge
accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses. It alleged
that the testimonies of the two accused are absolutely
necessary to establish that petitioner masterminded the
murder of Ruben Parane. The prosecution likewise claimed
that it was premature and baseless for the trial court to grant
petitioners application for bail because the prosecution had
not yet rested its case in the hearing for the discharge of the
two accused.
The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged
accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the
Information to become state witnesses, and cancelled the bail
bond of petitioner Salvanera. In its Resolution dated
September 22, 1999, it denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed his Motion for

Clarification with Leave of Court. The same was also denied in

a Resolution dated May 11, 2000. Hence, this appeal.

must be given their proper weight in determining whether the

petitioner is entitled to bail.

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in discharging the accused to become state
witnesses and in cancelling the bail bond of petitioner
Salvanera.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision

and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
46945, dated April 30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and May
11, 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

RULING:
We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In the discharge
of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the
following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the
commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before
it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the
sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing
in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, versus PABLO L. ESTACIO,

JR. and MARITESS ANG Appellant

We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this

reasoning as specious.
To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to
corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact
same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that
"there must be no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of the state witness." The corroborative evidence
required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very
same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state
witnesses.
We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by
the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is
shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated
by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity.
Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some
particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the
truth in other respects." It is enough that the testimony of a
co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or
evidence.
In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the
records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are
corroborated on important points by each others testimonies
and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of
the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that
their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on
the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is
contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is
essential because only they have knowledge of the crime. The
other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the
crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the
conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies
of the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and
Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission of the
crime.
Lastly, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling
the bail bond of petitioner. The grant of petitioners
application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony
of state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies

FACTS:
MaritessAng (Maritess) was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City with kidnapping for ransom
confederating with to persons. The Information was
subsequently amended to implead the other appellant, Pablo
Estacio, Jr. (Estacio), and to change the charge from
kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with murder. Still later,
the Information was further amended to additionally implead
one HildoSumipo (Sumipo) who was, however, subsequently
discharged as state witness.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in discharging Sumipo as a state witness.
RULING:
Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a
state witness, the same does not lie. The conditions for the
discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
These conditions were established by the prosecution. Sumipo
was the only person other than appellants who had personal
knowledge of the acts for which they were being prosecuted.
Only he could positively identify appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime. He does not appear to be the most
guilty. He did not participate in planning the commission of
the crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was joking
when she said, Diretsongdukotnarinkay Charlie. He tried to
dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan. He did not
participate in the actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate
himself from the attempts to extract ransom from the victims
family. Sumipos testimony was corroborated on material
points. The victims mother testified regarding the demands
for ransom. Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa,
testified to seeing the victim, Estacio, and Maritess at the barrestaurant on the day and at the time in question. Henry
Hong, the victims cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills
ahead of the victims brother during the scheduled delivery of
the ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with companions.
[35] And the victims skeletal remains were found at the scene
of the crime upon Estacios information and direction. And
there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a
state witness was erroneous, such error would not affect the
competency and quality of his testimony. Finally, the Court
brushes aside Maritess disclaimer of participation in killing the
victim. It was she who bound the hands and gagged the
victim. When Estacio, in Maritesscompany, brought the victim
to the scene of the crime and thereafter returned to the car,
her and Estacios hands were bloodied. Parenthetically,
prosecution witness Arlene Francisco, Maritess friend who
visited her in prison, testified that Maritess admitted having
killed Chua. And the prosecution presented letters from
Maritess to Estacio, written from prison, where she admitted
the deed.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 12,

2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Court finds
appellants MaritessAng and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder, with the generic aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle. And in view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006, the
penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.
BERNADETTE ADASA VS. CECILLE ABALOS
FACTS: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaintsaffidavits that petitioner Bernadette Adasa, through deceit,
received and encashed two checks issued in the name of
Abalos without the latters knowledge and consent and that
despite repeated demands by Abalos, Adasa failed and
refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. Adasa filed a
counter-affidavit admitting that she received and encashed
the 2 checks. Then she alleged in a Supplemental affidavit
claiming that it was instead Bebie Correa who received the 2
checks, but that Correa had already left the country.
A resolution was issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Iligan City finding probable cause against
Adasa and ordering the filing of 2 separate Informations for
Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private
Individual. Consequently, 2 separate criminal cases were filed
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No. 8782. This
instant petition concerns only one of these criminal cases
(Criminal Case No. 8782).
On 8 June 2001, upon motion of Adasa, the trial court
issued an order directing the OCP of Iligan City to conduct a
reinvestigation. After conducting the reinvestigation, OCP
issued a resolution affirming the finding of probable cause.
Meanwhile, during her arraignment on 1 October 2001 in
Criminal Case No. 8782, petitioner entered an unconditional
plea of not guilty.
Dissatisfied with the finding of the OCP, Adasa later filed
a Petition for Review before the DOJ. In a Resolution, the DOJ
reversed and set aside the resolution of the OCP and directed
the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa.
Abalos thereafter filed a MR arguing that the DOJ should
have dismissed outright the petition for review since Section 7
of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has
already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a
petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice
cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or
even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright.
On Feb. 2003, the trial court granted Adasas Motion
to Withdraw Information and dismissed Criminal Case No.
8782.
Abalos filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA
regarding the DOJ resolution. CA granted the petition and
reversed the resolution of the DOJ. CA emphasized that
Section 7 of DOJ Circular used the phrase shall not.
Sec 7. If an information has been filed in court pursuant
to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due
course if the accused had already been arraigned
While the permissive word "may" in Section 121 would
seem to imply that the Secretary of Justice has discretion to
entertain an appeal notwithstanding the fact that the accused
has been arraigned. This provision should not be treated
separately, but should be read in relation to Section 7.
ISSUE: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of
Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory such
that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal despite
the fact that the accused had been arraigned? NO.
RATIO: CA is correct. When an accused has already been
arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for

review due course and must dismiss the same. Arraignment of

the accused prior to the filing of the appeal or petition for
review is set forth as one of the grounds for its dismissal.
Therefore, in such instance, the DOJ, noting that the
arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an appeal or
petition for review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12,
must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein.
In other words, the DOJ must not give due course to, and must
necessarily dismiss, the appeal.
To give the second sentence of Section 12 in relation to
its paragraph (e) a directory application would not only
subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the
expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but would
also render its other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6
and 7, nugatory.

PEOPLE
OF
DOCUMENTO

THE

PHILIPPINES

vs.

OSCAR

M.

FACTS: Oscar Documento was charged before the RTC

with 2 counts of Rape, as defined and punished under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. He was accused of raping his
daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age. One information was
for the alleged rape committed on April 22, 1996 at Ochoa
Avenue, Butuan City, and another information was for the
alleged rape committed on October 15, 1995 at Barangay
Antongalon, Butuan City. Upon arraignment, Documento pled
not guilty. Subsequently, however, he changed his earlier plea
to one of guilt. As such, the RTC ordered a re-arraignment and
entered appellants plea of guilt to the charges. Thereafter,
the prosecution presented evidence consisting of the
testimonies of private complainant herself, AAA, her mother,
BBB, and Dr. Johann A. Hugo. Their testimonies established
that Documento started sexually molesting his daughter when
she was 10 years old. Eventually, AAA became pregnant and
gave birth in 1993. Documento raped AAA on a number of
occasions in the houses both located in Butuan City. AAAs
mother, who was working in Manila, searched for Documento
and AAA. Upon learning that Documento and AAA were in
Butuan City, she went to the Butuan Police Station and
requested assistance in securing custody of AAA. As soon as
Documento was arrested, AAA informed the police that
Documento raped her. Dr. Hugo testified that AAA was in fact
raped. Documento testified as the sole witness for the
defense. He asseverated that he pled guilty to the crime of
Rape only because Prosecutor Salise convinced him to do so.
Documento contended that he did not rape AAA, and that, to
the contrary, they had a consensual, sexual relationship. He
further alleged that the incident did not happen in Butuan
City, but in Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Finally, on crossexamination, Documento disowned the handwritten letters he
had supposedly written to his wife and to AAA, asking for their
forgiveness. The RTC convicted Documento of both counts of
Rape. CA affirmed.
ISSUES: 1. WON the prosecution failed to establish that the 2
counts of rape were perpetrated in Butuan City NO!
2. WON the Court gravely erred in failing to conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntainess and full
comprehension by accused of the consequences of his plea
YES!
RATIO: 1. Contrary to the insistence of Documento that the
prosecution failed to establish that 2 counts of Rape were
perpetrated in Butuan City, the CA pointed to specific parts of
the records which show that, although AAA did not specifically
mention "Butuan City" in her testimony, the incidents in the
present cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on
Ochoa Avenue, both in Butuan City. The 2 informations also
clearly state that the crimes were perpetrated in Butuan City.
The inclusion of the two Barangays in the City of Butuan is a
matter of mandatory judicial notice by the trial court.
2. It is true that the appellate court noted the trial
courts failure to conduct the prescribed "searching inquiry"

into the matter of whether or not Documentos plea of guilt

was improvidently made. Nonetheless, it still found the
conviction of appellant proper. Nothing in the records of the
case at bench shows that the trial court complied with the
guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in a number of
cases after appellants re-arraignment and guilty plea. The
questions propounded to appellant during the direct and
cross-examination likewise fall short of these requirements.
The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of
his guilty plea. In fact, as argued by appellant, "the trial court
should have informed him that his plea of guilt would not
affect or reduce the imposable penalty, which is death as he
might have erroneously believed that under Article 63, the
death penalty, being a single indivisible penalty, shall be
applied by the court regardless of any mitigating
circumstances that might have attended the commission of
the deed." Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform
appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the guilty
plea.
With the trial courts failure to comply with the
guidelines, appellants guilty plea is deemed improvidently
made and thus rendered inefficacious. This does not mean,
however, that the case should be remanded to the trial court.
This course of action is appropriate only when the appellants
guilty plea was the sole basis for his conviction.
As held in People v. Mira: Notwithstanding the
incautiousness that attended appellants guilty plea, we are
not inclined to remand the case to the trial court as suggested
by appellant. Convictions based on an improvident plea of
guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible
evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be
sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the
guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.

VIRATA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Cesar Virata is one of the defendants in the case of

Republic vs Romualdez which was filed by the PCGG. The case
involves the recovery of ill-gotten wealth allegedly amassed
by the defendants in that case during the marcos years. The
complaint was amended 3 times. The last amended complaint
filed with the sandiganbayan states the following relevant
allegations against virata:
[summarized version]
Par.14: defendants...engaged in devises, schemes
and strategems to unjustly enrich themselves by... (b) giving
meralco undue advantage (increasing power rates while
reducing electric franchise tax); (g) justify meralcos
anomalous acquisition of electric cooperatives; (m)
manipulated the formation of Erecton Holdings for the
purpose of assuming the obligation of Erecton Inc with
Philguarantee (Virata is an official of philguarantee) so that
Erecton Inc can borrow more capital its obligation with
philguarantee amounting to more than P2B.
Par.17: acting as dummies, nominees...to conceal
and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained.
Par.18: Acts of defendant... constitute gross abuse of
official position... to the grave and irreparable damage of the
Filipino people.
Virata filed a bill of particulars asserting that these
allegations are vague and not averred with sufficient
definiteness to enable him to effectively prepare his
responsive pleadings. Sandiganbayan partially granted the
motion. Only with regard to par.17 and 18 was the republic
required to file a bill of particulars. As to the others,
Sandiganbayan declared them to be clear and specific enough
to allow Virata to file an intelligent responsive pleading.
OSG submitted the bill of particulars relating to par17
and 18. Virata filed a motion to strike out this bill of particular
and to defer the filing of his answer. It is alleged that the bill
of particulars aver for the first time new actionable wrongs
allegedly committed by him in various official capacities and

that the allegations do not indicate that he was a dummy,

nominee or agent (which was the allegation in the complaint)
but rather a government officer acting in his own name.
Meanwhile, Virata filed a petition for certiorari with
the SC with regard to the denial of his bill of particulars with
regard to par.14 and sections b,g and m. SC granted the
petition. OSG filed a manifestation that since PCGG is the
investigating body with the complete records of the case, it is
in a better position to supply the bill of particulars. Thus,
PCGG submitted a bill of particulars (no.2) in relation to par.14
and subparagraphs b,g and m.
Virata filed a comment with a motion to dismiss.
According to him, bill of particulars no.2 is merely a rehash of
the assertions made in the last amended complaint hence, it
is not the bill of particulars required by the court. As to the 1 st
bill of particulars, it allegedly shows that new imputations are
being made which are different from the charge in the
complaint. Sandiganbayan found the bill of particulars to be
sufficient, hence, this recourse to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the bill of particulars should be admitted or
not? NO!
HELD: The rule is that a complaint must contain the ultimate
facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action. A cause of action
has the following elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission
on the part of such defendant violating the plaintiffs right. As
long as the complaint contains these three elements, a cause
of action exists. Even though the allegations are vague,
dismissal is not the proper remedy. Thus, the rules of court
provide that a party may move for more definite statement or
for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly
to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Such
motion shall point out the defects complained of and the
details desired. An order directing the submission of such
statement or bill is proper where it enables the party asking
for it to intelligently prepare a responsive pleading, or
adequately to prepare for trial.
It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform the
opposite party and the court of the precise nature and
character of the cause of action or defense which the pleader
has attempted to set forth and thereby to guide his adversary
in his preparations for trial, and reasonably to protect him
against surprise at the trial. It gives information of the specific
proposition for which the pleader contends, in respect to any
material and issuable fact in the case, and it becomes a part
of the pleading which it supplements. It has been held that a
bill of particulars must inform the opposite party of the nature
of the pleader's cause of action or defense, and it must
furnish the required items of the claim with reasonable
fullness and precision. Generally, it will be held sufficient if it
fairly and substantially gives the opposite party the
information to which he is entitled. It should be definite and
specific and not contain general allegations and conclusions.
It should be reasonably certain and as specific as the
circumstances will allow.
Bill of particular for Par14 (b): Complaint alleges
viratas alleged active collaboration in reducing taxes. Yet,
there is nothing in the bill of particular about this active
collaboration. It is silent as to what acts of Virat that establish
that he collaborated in reducing the taxes.
Par14(g): BOP (bill of particular) on this also failed to
set forth particularly or specifically the charges against virata.
It is full of generalizations and indefinite statements. So many
questions about the alleged acts which were not answered (ie.
What were these electric coops? Why were their acquisition
anomalous? Etc)
Par14(m): BOP is merely a restatement of the charge
in the complaint. Clearly, republic failed to amplify the
charges against Virata. The important question as to what
particular acts of Virata that constituted support and
assistance in the formation of Erectors Holdings is left
unanswered.

With regard to the 1st bill of particular, basically SC

had the same findings. That is, BOP failed to supply Virata
with material matters which he needs in order to file a
responsive pleading. Further, the 1 st BOP contains new
matters which are not covered by the charges in the
complaint. The complaint alleges that he was acting as a
dummy but the BOP state that he acted in his official capacity.
Therefore, under the BOP he acted as agent of the
government whereas in the complaint he allegedly acted as
agent of his co-defendants.
The two bills of particulars filed by the Republic failed
to properly amplify the charges leveled against Virata
because, not only are they mere reiteration or repetition of
the allegations set forth in the expanded Second Amended
Complaint, but, to the large extent, they contain vague,

immaterial and generalized assertions which are inadmissible

under our procedural rules.
As a result, SC orders the dismissal of the complaint
in so far as the charges against Virata are concerned. This is
justified under the rules of court (failure to prosecute
plaintiff... fails to comply with these rules or any order of the
court)
Side issues: Whether PCGG can file the BOP in behalf
of the republic (contention is that only OSG can act in behalf
of republic)? YES. Admin code gives power to the OSG to
deputize legal officers and to call on any dept...etc., as may
be necessary to fulfil its functions. Here, OSG called PCGG for
assistance and authorized it to file the BOP.