ID 1432563

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND COMPARATIVE

AMERICAN STUDIES: Assess the strengths and weaknesses of
Stalins Second Revolution of 1928-32.

STUDENT IDENTITY NUMBER: 1432563

MODULE CODE: HI107

MODULE TITLE: History of Russia since 1881

TITLE OF ESSAY: Assess the strengths and weaknesses of Stalins Second

Revolution of 1928-32.

WORD COUNT: 2011

ID 1432563

The First Five Year Plan can be considered a turning point in the History of the Soviet
Union, but was it really a quantum leap? The aim of this essay will be to assess the
strengths and the weaknesses of the First Five Year Plan and to show how the weaknesses
are definitely more relevant than the strengths. Were the peasants direct participants of the
revolution? Their attitudes towards Stalin policies suggest us that there was, on the
contrary, a resistance of the peasantry. In fact, collectivisation can be seen as a violent
and bloody clash between two cultures at fatal variance with one another 1. The
conclusion of this internal clash was inevitably the defeat of the peasantry, as we will see.
This essay is mainly focused on peasantry, since I believe this is the better way to
understand the advantages and the disadvantages of this crucial historical period.
One of the most important policy adopted by Stalin during 1928-1932 was
collectivisation. The campaign was based on the idea of the elimination of the kulaks as
a class. Peasantry was not a problem in itself, but it was a problem because it obstructed
the spread of Socialism. However, this does not mean that the peasants did not rebel
against collectivisation. There were many episodes of rebellion, which were seen by the
authorities as massovye vystupleniia. Therefore, when peasants responded to negative
terms of trade between industry and agriculture by withholding grain from the market, the
State responded not by raising grain prices, but by employing massive force to seize
grain.2 Even during Stalins halt, the riots increased, reaching the amount of 13,754 in
1930, as opposed to 709 in 1928.3 However, rather than the historical data, what is
interesting is the way peasantry was seen. In fact, peasants were regarded as enemies, and
1 L.. Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the
Culture of Peasant Resistance, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996), p. 3
2 L.. Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the
Culture of Peasant Resistance, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996), p. 133

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their protests were seen as a disobedience, as a refusal of Socialist principles. Refusing a

policy made a peasant immediately an enemy for the State, and this was the main
problem of Stalinism. If a peasant did not agree with the authorities policies, he was
often accused to be a kulak. The kulak was a stereotyped character, created ad hoc by
the State. This amorphous individual can be considered a myth, whose characteristics
were various; he was regarded as an exploiter, a manipulator, and a parasite. 4 Rural
traditions were attacked in all their aspects: even religious holidays were forbidden, since
religion was probably considered in a negative sense, because it has nothing to do with
reason, but with faith. In fact, religious rites reinforced the consideration that the peasants
were mainly illiterate, ignorant, and superstitious. I do not believe that kulaks did not
exist at all; on the contrary, what I mean is that negative attributes had been associated to
a part of the peasantry, with the consequence that all the peasants lived in constant fear to
be regarded as kulaks, and for this reason discriminated, exiled or criminalized.
Collectivisation, however, cannot be analysed in itself, but it has to be connected to a
more general evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Second Revolution. The
most important goal of the First Five Years Plan was the improvement of the heavy
industry, which was achieved, even if the light industry was declining. However, the
working conditions in the lands were often so bad that the peasants decided to resettle in
the cities5. Thanks to this migration, between 1928 and 1832 the total number of
employed increased from 11.5 million to 24 million, and the size of the industrial labor
3 L. Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the
Culture of Peasant Resistance, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996), p. 135
4L. Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture
of Peasant Resistance, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996), p. 35
5 F. Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule, (Boston; London: Unwin
Hyman, 1989), p. 267

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force from three to six million.6 Although there was an increment of the possibilities for
the peasantry to work in cities, people were not prepared at all to work in factories. The
new workforce was not used to industrial discipline and way of life, and there was not
enough effort to train the emergent working class. Moreover, workers were underpaid,
and they worked often in bad conditions. As a whole, however, industrialisation may be
considered as partly beneficial for Russia. The phenomenon of urbanization was a step
towards modernization, because with the empowerment of the heavy industry the nation
could have a major role in the world economy. Furthermore, there was an evident
reduction of unemployment.
Another clear strength of the Five Years Plan was the rise of the grain procurement. With
the NEP the peasants were allowed to keep part of what they produced, whereas with the
new plan of collectivisation grain requisitions were introduced. This is a clear attempt to
fight against private property and to make the incomes of the State stable, but it has also a
strong link with industrialisation. For this reason we may talk about grain requisitioning
as a function of the rise of industry. Even if it was beneficial for the State stability, grain
requisitioning created disappointment among the peasants. Excluding its social
repercussions, the rise of the grain procurement can be certainly regarded as an achieved
result of the Soviet plan in economic terms. How were, on the contrary, the working
conditions of peasants? Despite the promises of the Party, many kolkhozniks believed that
the Five Year Plan was disastrous, because the scarcity of grain was leading the peasants
to die from hunger7. Nonetheless, Stalin introduced tractors and fertilizers, in order to
modernize the Soviet agriculture. Certainly many peasants could use this modern

6 P. Kenez, History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 93
7 F. Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule, (Boston; London: Unwin
Hyman, 1989), p. 266

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machinery, and it was a step forward for agriculture, because its goal was to increase the
production of goods.
One of the direct consequences of forced collectivisation was the increase of the
bureaucracy. There was an over-centralisation of power, and the bureaucrats were not
competent at all. Some kolkhoz chairmen, for instance, were hard driving and hard
drinking, blustering and threatening, frequently abusive and foul of mouth 8. What was
more common, however, is what nowadays is referred to as nepotism. People who were
in leading positions were often members of the same family or group of friends. This is
another bad aspect of collectivisation that is often underestimated. Abuses and corruption
were part of the collectivisation system, and they clearly show the inner contradictions of
the plan and how the population lived during the Second Revolution. Bukharin often
criticized the existence of such a strong bureaucracy. In one of his speeches he addressed
the authorities as bureaucratic idols and he condemned their indifference towards
peasantry9. Stalinist bureaucracy, in fact, created a strong demoralisation among the
peasants, who did not feel totally represented by the political party.
The First Five Years Plan was characterized by an excess of planning, and the
expectations were too high. In fact, despite the serious agricultural and trade crises, the
party decided not to slow the plan, but to rise the achievements 10. This may seem
counterproductive but it should be analysed in terms of Stalins point of view. His intent
was to modernize the Soviet Union, in order to make it more powerful. However,
probably Bukharins approach to planning could have been a more reasonable way to face
8F. Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule, (Boston; London: Unwin
Hyman, 1989), p. 270
9S. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: a Political
Biography, 1888-1938, (London: Wildwood House, 1974), p. 302
10 Holland Hunter, The Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan,
Slavic Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jun., 1973), pp. 244

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the difficulties of that historical period. In fact, for him it should be based on scientific
calculation, equilibrate and tentative11. Planning is necessary in a political agenda, but it
should not be considered unchangeable, since many economic factors influence political
decisions. It may have been more reasonable to look at the Five Years Plan as a draft,
which could be successively modified. Something even more useful could have been the
creation of a balance between heavy industry and agriculture, as Bukharin believed.
Industry should not grow, as it did, at expense of agriculture. On the contrary, agricultural
and industrial improvement should have been both indispensable and dependent one from
another. This is strongly connected with the idea of the exploitation of the peasantry. As
we have seen, peasants culture, religion and traditions were completely annihilated. Was
such a strong aversion towards kulaks necessary? Stalins policies have always been
presented by the party as inevitable. However, even if the plan was declared fulfilled,
more agriculture-oriented policies could have improved the peasants conditions,
avoiding what Bukharin called the military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry. Forced
collectivisation established an atmosphere of terror and distrust, since peasantry was
totally under the control of the State. A more effective policy would not have been based
totally on industrialisation but would have created a balance between agriculture and
industry. In fact, a responsive price policy, advantageous to grain, would stimulate
increase production and, coupled with progressive taxation and a steady abatement of the
industrial goods shortage, market surplus.12 The Second Revolution could have been
more spontaneous if there was a direct participation of the peasants and if the means of
production and of consumption were not totally controlled by the State. Therefore, forced
collectivisation should have been avoided. Furthermore, the process of urbanization
11 S. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: a Political
Biography, 1888-1938, (London: Wildwood House, 1974), p. 319
12 S. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: a Political
Biography, 1888-1938, (London: Wildwood House, 1974), p. 317

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created a disproportion between countryside and cities. This is the reason why it may
have been better to slow down the phenomenon of industrialisation and to set lower
objectives both about the production of industrial products and agricultural ones. The
relationship between rural and urban world should have been conciliatory and peaceful.
The starting point of the Second Revolution could have been agriculture and
collectivisation; there could have been incentives for the peasants that joined collective
farms and whose production of agricultural goods was very high. What is crucial,
however, is that collectivisation should have been the result of a spontaneous decision,
not something imposed from above. As a whole, Stalins Second Revolution can be seen
not as a way to reform the country, but as a war against the peasantry, whose effect were
particularly serious. Even though there were some strengths, the First Five Years Plan was
unpopular and ineffective. Probably Bukharins policies would have been less disastrous
for the peasants, who were the majority of the population of the Soviet Union.
In this essay I have assessed the strengths and the weaknesses of the First Five Year Plan,
giving an explanation of why such policies were introduced. I have questioned the
revolutionary content of the Second Revolution, claiming that it was a clear exploitation
of the peasantry, rather than a way to better the conditions of the citizens.
Even though the First Five Year Plan was regarded as a new method, whose results would
be much better than the ones of the NEP, as a whole it was unsatisfactory. In fact, it
worsened the condition of the peasants, whose traditions were suppressed. In conclusion,
I have argued that Stalins First Five Year Plan tried to lead the Soviet Union to a
modernization of its economic and cultural system. This was necessary in order to
compete with Western superpowers. However, if the starting point was agriculture,
probably the results achieved would have been less unbalanced.

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Bibliography
Cohen, S., Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: a Political
Biography, 1888-1938, (London: Wildwood House, 1974).
Fainsod, F., Smolensk under Soviet Rule, (Boston; London: Unwin
Hyman, 1989), pp. 238-265.
Kenez, P., A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the
End, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 80-102
C. Read, The Making and Breaking of the Soviet System: An
Interpretation, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 67-96.
Viola, L., Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the
Culture of Peasant Resistance, (New York; Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996).
Ward, C., Stalins Russia, (London: Edward Arnold, 1993), pp. 39-106