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Decentralised Security Constrained DC-OPF of
Decentralised Security Constrained DC-OPF of
List of symbols
X Atie
XA
ij
Ng
N7
Ci(Pi)
P
D
h
yref
B
xij
Fij
A
AA
TA
PA
DA
hA
BA
~A
nA
tA
7A
r IEE, 2004
IEE Proceedings online no. 20041063
doi:10.1049/ip-gtd:20041063
Paper rst received 15th December 2003 and in revised form 19th July 2004
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki 54124, Greece
IEE Proc.-Gener. Transm. Distrib., Vol. 151, No. 6, November 2004
H Atie
HA
ei
k
LODFij,mn
GGDFkij
Introduction
After the restructuring of the electric power industry, forprot generating companies have been developed to deliver
electric energy in a competitive market and independent
regulated transmission system operators (TSOs) manage the
operation of the transmission system. An important goal of
the restructuring of the electric power industry is to move
from command and control decision making for the
planning and operation of generation and transmission to a
decentralised market-driven approach with the goal of
achieving total lowest cost to end-users without sacricing
reliability.
The recent trend is towards large multinational electricity
markets, such as the internal electricity market (IEM)
in Europe. Ideally, the transmission management of a
large, interconnected system is performed centrally by a
747
which the tie-line ows are held xed to the values of the
base-case OPF. Here, it is assumed that each regional
SCOPF can be solved, namely each region has enough units
to correct any overloads on transmission lines, therefore the
infeasible case is not considered. Furthermore, the method
is not fully decentralised, since a global power ow is
required in each iteration of the algorithm to determine
possible overloaded lines and the associated LODFs and
GGDFs.
This paper uses the decentralised DC-OPF algorithm
described in [15] to solve the decentralised SCOPF problem.
The resulting decentralised SCOPF algorithm is an iterative
algorithm in which the TSO of each region iteratively solves
a modied SCOPF subproblem for its own region and
exchanges tie-line information with the TSOs of neighbouring regions. The iterative solution of the regional SCOPF
subproblems converges to a reduced scope central SCOPF
solution, in which the contingency analysis performed by
each region does not take into account the effects of outages
of elements outside the regions borders. Test results from
the application of the method to the 73-bus IEEE 3-area
RTS96 and to the Balkan power system are presented.
2
Central SCOPF
Ci Pi
ByPD
yref 0
1
yi yj F max for all lines ij
ij
x
ij
min
i1
S. t.
Pimin Pi Pimax
4
5
1
yi yj GGDF k Pk
ij
x
ij
Fijmax;c
1 T 1
e B rk
xij ij
where P
rk is a vector having value 1 at the kth row and
6 k. Here, it is assumed
Pimax = Pjmax at all other rows, i
j6k
area AA
ref
ref A
Fig. 1
i
AA
TijA
TjiAA
ijA
jiA
j
j
Ci PiA
i2A
X ^aAA
ji
ij2TA
xij
yAi
S.t.
B A hA H Atie T A PA DA
yAref 0
10
only
11
12
for
reference area
1 A
1
y TijA ^yAA
for all tie-lines ij 2 TA
xij i
xij j
A
A;max
for all tie-lines ij 2 TA
Tij Tij
13
14
15
3.3
i2A
S.t.
X
i2A
PiA
TijA
ij2T A
DAi
i2A
17
18
~ A j F A;max
jZ Aeff T PA D
eff
19
~A
Z Atie T PA T A X Atie 1 ^
hAA Z Atie T D
20
jT A j T A;max
21
AA
~ A DA W A ^
D
tie h
22
23
h i1
Z Atie B~A H Atie X Atie 1
24
where
Z Aeff
h i1
B~A H Aeff X Aeff 1
25
26
Security constraints
1 ~ A 1
B eij
xij
28
ij
ij
ij
ij
ij
32
34
35
36
37
38
( )k
( )k
( )k ( )k
( )k ( )k
neighbouring areas
IF ( TijA + T jiAA for all ij ) EXIT
END WHILE
Fig. 2
39
The values of T^ijA and T^jiAA in (39) are the values assigned
during the current iteration, k.
5
k=1
Test results
Coal/
steam
h/ 6.660
Oil/steam Oil/CT
Hydro
Nuclear
20.874
0.00
6.549
46.046
Table 2: Summary of solution results in all test cases on IEEE 3-area RTS-96
Case
Monitored
element
316317
Fijmax;c , MW
320
Contingent
elements
Optimal
cost, h/h
Security
cost, h/h
Contingent
elements
315321,
223318
237,500.3
1,193.3
16
315321,
318
223
Optimal
cost, h/h
Security
cost, h/h
237,502.1
1,195.1
210212
250
210211
236,555.3
248.3
18
210211
236,554.0
247.0
103124
250
114116
237,859.5
1,552.5
11
114116
237,862.4
1,555.4
121122
200
117122
240,824,8
4,517.8
14
117122
240,826,1
4,519.1
310312
250
310311
236,510.6
203.6
16
310311
236,508.9
201.9
301305
80
310312
237,560.1
1,253.1
24
310312
237,562.3
1,255.3
217218
200
217222
238,847.4
2,540.4
16
217222
238,849.1
2,542.1
223318
100
114116
236,324.0
17.0
15
236,318.5
11.5
752
Djerdap
(JHDJER1)
Portile De Fier
(RPFER41)
WTREBI11
JPODGO2
1,2,3
1,2,3
JBOR1
G
JPODGO1
RCERNA1
TKOSB1
JHPERU2
Isac.
(RISACC1)
RSLATI1
3
RSIBIU1A
Tintareni
(RTINTR1B)
Nis
1
former
Yugoslavia
Romania
1,2,3
case
monitored element
Dobru.
(VDOBRU11)
Sofia
Kozlodui
contingent element
220 150 kV
Bulgaria
400 kV
Fig. 3
Monitored line
Reduced
rating, MW
Continent elements
Line
From
To
VDOBRU11
RISACC1
JHPERU2
JBOR1
To
100
RCERNA1
JPODGO2
JPODGO1
WTREBI11
JHDJER1
350
JTKOSB1
RPFER41
JHDJER1
JHPERU2
JPODGO2
JPODGO1
WTREBI11
RSLATI1
RTINTR1B
400
RSIBIU1A
RTINTR1B
JHPERU2
JPODGO2
JPODGO1
WTREBI11
Optimal
cost, h/h
Security
cost, h/h
28
188.917,6
4,5
26
188.948,6
35,5
19
188.929,3
16,2
Unit
From
Conclusions
Acknowledgement
References
754