Caltex vs.

Philippine Labor Organization

May 27, 1959 No. L-9915
Facts:
Hipdion del Rosario was hired by Caltex as labourer in its Pandacan Terminal
then he was suspended for insubordination. Caltex filed a petition with the Industrial
Court for authority to dismiss him. After hearing, the court found del Rosario guilty
of the acts complained of but believing that a permanent dismissal was to severe a
punishment, the court ordered his reinstatement with payment of backwages.
Caltex claims that the court committed a serious mistake of law and grave
abuse of discretion to retain del Rosario in its employment and in substituting its
judgment in determining the qualification of a temporary employee to become
regular.
Issues:
Whether or not del Rosarios discharge was proper.
Whether or not the court has a right to substitute the judgement of Caltexs
judgment in determining the qualification of employee.
Held:
YES Del Rosarios discharge was proper. The acts of insubordination for which del
Rosario was found guilty and wilful disobedience which to note was committed in a
very short period from the time of his hiring. Wilful disobedience is a ground for an
employees discharge.
No the court has no right considering the period of time that del Rosario had been
working for Caltex before his suspension, it can be said that he was on temporary or
trial basis. Caltex has the right to place him under this condition to determine his
competency.

Mercury Drug Coproration vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 75662)

Facts:
Cesar Ladisla was employed by petitioner, Mercury Drug Corporation as Stock
Analyst. On Aug. 15, 1977, he was apprehended by representatives of Mercury
Drug Corporation while in the act of pilfering company property. He admitted the
guilt to the investigating representatives. Mercury drug filed an application for the
termination of Ladislas employment.
Private respondent opposed that his suspension and proposed dismissal were
unfounded and baseless being premised on the machinations and incriminatory acts
of Ms. Leonora Suarez and Edgardo Imperial, Manager and Retail Supervisor,
respectively, of petitioner's Claro M. Recto Branch;
But cesar ladisla was not given the opportunity to be heard nor allowed to explain
his side before he was suspended.
However, NLRC ruled that Ladisla should be reinstated in his position with back
wages.
Issue:
Whether or not Cesar Ladisla should be dismissed on the grounds of dishonesty
and breach of contract
Held:
Dismissal of a dishonest employee is to the best interest not only of management
but also of labor. As a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest,
a company has the right to dismiss its erring employees. An employer cannot be
compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to its
interest, justifying loss of confidence in him. The law does not impose unjust
situations on either labor or management.
While the constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection

of laborers, it should not be supposed that labor dispute will be automatically

decided in favor of labor. Management has also its own rights which are the
enforcement of interest of simple fair play.

Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation vs Voluntary Arbitrator Allan

Montao
In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which
caused the death of their unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective
bargaining agreement, then filed death benefits claim from his employer, but
denied the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both
parties agreed to have Atty. Allan Montao act as the arbitrator. Montao ruled that
Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of Montao.
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because
under the CBA, death benefits are awarded if an employees legitimate dependent
has died; but that in this case, no death has occurred because the fetus died
inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical personality because it
was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which provides a conceived
child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence it
is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as
contemplated under civil laws.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fetus is considered a legitimate dependent?
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?
HELD:
1. Yes. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the
moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell). In the first place, the

fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in question, hence
they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.
2. No. In this case, Hortillanos fetus had had life inside the womb as evidenced by
the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage. Thus,
death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death
benefit claims as provided for in their CBA. Death is defined as cessation of life.
Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need to discuss whether or not
the unborn child acquired juridical personality that is not the issue here. But
nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality.

STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL

Facts:
The respondents were all regular employees of the company;On October 27,
1993, Simbol was hired by the company. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of
the company. He married her on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco
advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should
resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned on June
20, 1998.On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company. She met Howard
Comia, a co-employee whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise
reminded them pursuant to the aforementioned company policy. Comia resigned on
June 30, 2000. Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily; they
were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. On July 29, 1994,
Estrella was hired by the company. She met Luisito Zuniga, also a co-worker, whom
petitioners claimed to be a married man who got Estrella impregnated. The
company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she
opted to resign on December 21, 1999. Estrella alleged that she had a relationship
with co-worker Zuniga who misrepresented himself as a married but a separated
man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus,
she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy. On
November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and had to recuperate for twenty-one
(21) days as advised by the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital. On December 21,
1999 but she found out that her name was on hold at the gate. She was directed to
the personnel office and handed a memorandum that stated that she was being
dismissed for immoral conduct. Estrella was asked to submit an explanation but
she was dismissed nonetheless. She resigned because she was in dire need of
money and resignation could give her the thirteenth month pay. On May 31, 2001,
Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On January, 11,
2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. On August 8, 2002, NLRC
denied the respondents Motion for Reconsideration through a Resolution. On
August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and declared that: The
petitioners dismissal from employment was illegal. The private respondents are
ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority
rights with full back wages from the time of their dismissal until actual
reinstatement; and the private respondents are to pay petitioners attorneys fees
amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of the suit.

Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is
violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees
and of Article 136 of the Labor Code: and
Held:
No. The CA did not err in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is
violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees
and or Article 136 of the Labor Code:
ARTICLE 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely
by reason of her marriage.

San Miguel Brewery Union vs Ople

FACTS :
In 1979, SMC implemented its Complementary Distribution System (CDS) whereby
wholesalers can directly get beer products from any SMC offices.
The SMB Union assailed this program because it violates the CBA particularly the
established scheme whereby route salesmen have been given specific territories to
sell beer products.
The CDS scheme would then lower the take home pay of the route salesmen. SMB
Union then sued SMC for unfair labor practices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CDS is a violation of the CBA.
HELD:
No. The SC ruled that the CDS is an exercise of management prerogatives whereby
the management can implement schemes to optimize their profit. Further, the CDS
provides for a compensation clause as well for salesmen. San Miguel Corporations
offer to compensate the members of its sales force who will be adversely affected
by the implementation of the CDS by paying them a so-called back adjustment
commission to make up for the commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS
proves the companys good faith and lack of intention to bust their union.

Revidad v. NLRC
Facts:
It appears that sometime in March, 1988, private respondent Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. (hereafter, AG & P ) terminated the services of 178
employees, including herein petitioners, under a redundancy program. Then , a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement was filed by herein
petitioners (except Jose Espaol) with public respondent.
These cases were subsequently decided in favor of petitioners, as a result of which
they were reinstated on July 8, 1991 and assigned to the Batangas plant of private
respondent. The records show, however, that pursuant to Presidential Directive No.
0191 2 issued on July 25, 1991 by the company's president and containing
management's decision to lay off 40% of the employees due to financial losses
incurred from 1989-1990, AG & P implemented and effected, starting August 3,
1991, the temporary lay-off of some 705 employees. By reason thereof, the AG & P
United Rank and File Association (URFA, for facility), which was the employees'
union, staged a strike. In a conciliation conference over the labor dispute held
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on August 13, 1991, the
parties agreed to submit the legality of the lay-offs to voluntary arbitration.
Issue:
Was there a need for retrenchment to prevent losses?
Ruling:
The Court is accordingly convinced, and so hold, that both the retrenchment
program of private respondent and the dismissal of petitioners were valid and legal.
Retrenchment is one of the economic grounds to dismiss employees, which is
resorted to by an employer primarily to avoid or minimize business losses. In its
ordinary connotation, the phrase "to prevent losses" means that retrenchment or
termination of the services of some employees is authorized to be undertaken by
the employer sometime before the anticipated losses are actually sustained or
realized. It is not, in other words, the intention of the lawmaker to compel the
employer to stay his hand and keep all his employees until after losses shall have in
fact materialized. If such an intent were expressly written into the law, that law may
well be vulnerable to constitutional attack as unduly taking property from one man
to be given to another.